AYONIZ MODEL UNITED NATIONS

(AZMUN) 2025
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Turkey v. Israel — Alleged Violations of Maritime and Humanitarian Law in
the 2024 Gaza Blockade

BACKGROUND GUIDE
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR
Distinguished Delegates,

It is with profound honor that I welcome you to the International Court of Justice simulation at
the 2025 Ayoniz Model United Nations Conference. As Director of this prestigious committee, I
am thrilled to present you with a case that sits at the intersection of some of the most critical
questions in contemporary international law.

The dispute between Turkey and Israel concerning alleged violations of maritime and
humanitarian law in the context of the 2024 Gaza blockade represents not merely an isolated
incident between two states, but rather a microcosm of broader tensions in international
relations: the balance between security concerns and humanitarian imperatives, the evolving
nature of maritime law enforcement, and the complex interplay between various legal regimes in
times of conflict.

Each of you arrives at this simulation with your own perspectives and understanding of these
issues. I encourage you to momentarily set these aside and approach this case with the judicial
temperament that characterizes the International Court of Justice. As justices of the Court, you
are called upon to apply the law impartially, to weigh evidence meticulously, and to craft
judgments that contribute meaningfully to the development of international law.

The background guide before you has been prepared with careful attention to detail and
balance. It aims to provide a comprehensive foundation for your preparation, exploring not only
the immediate facts of the case but also its historical context, the applicable legal frameworks,
and the positions of both parties. However, I must emphasize that this document should serve
as merely the beginning of your research journey, not its conclusion. I strongly encourage you to
delve deeper into the sources listed in the research resources section and to explore additional
materials that will enhance your understanding of the complex legal questions at stake.

Successful participation in this committee will demand rigorous preparation, analytical precision,
and the ability to engage thoughtfully with your fellow justices during deliberations. The ability to
articulate clear, legally-sound positions while remaining open to persuasion and compromise will
be particularly valued. Remember that while the ICJ operates through majority voting, its most
influential judgments are often those that reflect broad consensus among the justices.

The issues before you—maritime interdiction, blockade legality, humanitarian access, and state
responsibility for use of force—have implications far beyond this specific case. Your
deliberations will not only address the dispute between Turkey and Israel but will also contribute
to clarifying important questions in international law that have relevance for conflicts and
tensions worldwide.
I look forward to witnessing your thoughtful engagement with these challenging issues and
stand ready to support your preparation in any way possible. Should you have questions or
require clarification on any aspect of the committee or case, please do not hesitate to contact
me.

With anticipation for an intellectually stimulating conference,

Sanchit Dhaunchak, Director, International Court of Justice AZMUN 2025

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

JUSTICE
History and Foundation

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) represents the culmination of over a century of efforts to
establish permanent international judicial institutions. Its immediate predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ), operated under the League of Nations from 1922 to 1946.
When the United Nations was established following World War II, the drafters of the UN Charter
incorporated a new world court—the International Court of Justice—as one of the six principal
organs of the organization.

The Court's founding documents, the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, were signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, and the Court began its work in April
1946 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. The decision to locate the Court in The
Hague continued a tradition established with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1899) and
maintained with the PCIJ, cementing the city's reputation as the international judicial capital.

Unlike its predecessor, the ICJ was fully integrated into the United Nations system. Article 92 of
the UN Charter establishes the Court as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations," and
Article 93 provides that all UN member states are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court.
This arrangement significantly expanded the potential reach of the Court's jurisdiction compared
to the PCIJ, which operated in parallel to but separate from the League of Nations.

The continuity between the PCIJ and ICJ is reflected in Article 92 of the UN Charter, which
states that the ICJ Statute is based on that of the PCIJ. This inheritance includes not only
statutory provisions but also a substantial body of jurisprudence that the ICJ has recognized and
built upon throughout its operation.

Jurisdiction and Powers

The ICJ's jurisdiction encompasses two main types of proceedings:

Contentious Cases: In these proceedings, the Court adjudicates disputes between states.
Critically, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over states that have consented to its authority,
which may be expressed through:

1.​ Special Agreement (compromis): States may jointly agree to submit a specific dispute to
the Court.​

2.​ Jurisdictional Clauses in Treaties: Many bilateral and multilateral treaties contain clauses
providing for ICJ jurisdiction over disputes arising from the interpretation or application of
the treaty.​

3.​ Optional Clause Declarations: Under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, states may make
declarations accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes concerning
treaty interpretation, questions of international law, the existence of facts constituting
treaty breaches, and the nature or extent of reparations.​

4.​ Forum Prorogatum: A state may accept the Court's jurisdiction by explicitly or implicitly
consenting to proceedings initiated by another state, even without prior acceptance of
jurisdiction.​

Advisory Proceedings: The Court provides non-binding legal opinions on questions referred
by authorized UN bodies. Only the General Assembly, Security Council, and other UN organs
and specialized agencies authorized by the General Assembly may request advisory opinions.

The Court's subject matter jurisdiction extends to "all cases which the parties refer to and all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions
in force" (Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute). This encompasses virtually any question of
international law, provided jurisdictional requirements are met.

In exercising its jurisdiction, the Court applies:

1.​ International conventions and treaties

2.​ International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
3.​ General principles of law recognized by civilized nations
4.​ Judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified publicists (as subsidiary means)

The Court may also decide cases ex aequo et bono (according to what is equitable and good) if
the parties agree, though this authority has rarely been invoked.

Court Procedure

Proceedings before the ICJ follow a well-established sequence combining written and oral
phases. The Court's official languages are English and French, and all formal submissions and
judgments are produced in both languages.
Written Proceedings:

1.​ Application or Special Agreement: Proceedings begin with either a unilateral application
instituting proceedings or a joint notification of a special agreement.
2.​ Memorial: The applicant state presents its arguments on facts, law, and requested
remedies.
3.​ Counter-Memorial: The respondent state answers the memorial, presenting its version of
facts, legal arguments, and defenses.
4.​ Reply and Rejoinder: Additional written submissions may be authorized if necessary.

Throughout the written phase, states may attach documentary evidence, expert reports, and
affidavits to support their arguments. The Court may also request additional information or
clarification from the parties.

Preliminary Objections: A respondent state may raise preliminary objections challenging the
Court's jurisdiction or the admissibility of claims. When raised, these objections suspend
proceedings on the merits until the Court decides the preliminary issues.

Provisional Measures: Under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, the Court may indicate provisional
measures to preserve the respective rights of parties pending final judgment. These measures
are binding and typically requested in situations of urgency where irreparable harm may occur
before the final judgment.

Oral Proceedings:

1.​ Public hearings where agents and counsel present arguments and evidence
2.​ Examination of witnesses and experts when relevant
3.​ Questions from judges to clarify points of contention
4.​ Concluding submissions summarizing each party's case

Following oral proceedings, the Court deliberates in private. Deliberations typically involve
general discussion sessions, preparation of individual notes by each judge, and drafting
committee work to produce a judgment that reflects the majority view. Decisions are reached by
majority vote of judges present, with the President casting the deciding vote in case of a tie.

CASE OVERVIEW: TURKEY V. ISRAEL

Summary of Facts

In mid-2024, against the backdrop of escalating tensions and a deteriorating humanitarian

situation in Gaza following the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent Israeli
military operations, Turkey organized a humanitarian aid flotilla bound for Gaza. This initiative
echoed the controversial 2010 Gaza Freedom Flotilla, but occurred in a significantly different
geopolitical and humanitarian context.

The flotilla, consisting of six vessels—MV Marmara II (flagship), MV Freedom, MV Solidarity, MV

Palestine, MV Humanity, and MV Justice—departed from Turkish ports on June 5, 2024. The
vessels carried approximately 10,000 tons of humanitarian supplies including food, medicine,
medical equipment, water purification systems, and construction materials for rebuilding
damaged infrastructure. Approximately 700 participants from 32 countries were aboard,
including doctors, engineers, journalists, human rights activists, and several prominent political
figures from Turkey and other countries.

Prior to the flotilla's departure, Israel issued multiple diplomatic communications warning that it
would not permit direct access to Gaza, citing its naval blockade established in 2007. Israeli
authorities offered to facilitate the transfer of humanitarian supplies through the land crossing at
Kerem Shalom after security inspection, an alternative that flotilla organizers rejected as
insufficient and subject to unacceptable delays.

The Turkish government publicly endorsed the flotilla, with President Erdoğan stating that "no
power can prevent this humanitarian mission from reaching the suffering people of Gaza."
Turkish naval vessels escorted the flotilla through Turkish territorial waters but did not continue
into international waters. Before departure, flotilla organizers emphasized the non-violent nature
of their mission and stated that they would offer no physical resistance to Israeli forces.

On June 12, 2024, approximately 70 nautical miles from the Gaza coast in international waters,
Israeli naval forces initiated contact with the flotilla. After radio warnings were issued, Israeli
warships approached the convoy and Israeli naval commandos boarded five of the six vessels,
which offered no resistance. The flagship MV Marmara II, however, did not comply with orders
to change course to Ashdod port.

Israeli naval commandos then attempted to board the MV Marmara II from speedboats and
helicopters during pre-dawn hours. Accounts of what followed differ substantially between the
parties. According to Israel, commandos were attacked with metal rods, chairs, and other
weapons by passengers upon boarding. According to flotilla participants, Israeli forces used
excessive force from the outset, including stun grenades, tear gas, and live ammunition before
any resistance occurred.

The confrontation resulted in nine Turkish citizens killed and 56 individuals injured, including
seven Israeli personnel. Israel subsequently diverted all vessels to Ashdod port, inspected the
cargo, and detained participants for questioning before deportation. The humanitarian supplies
were later transferred to Gaza through land crossings, though Turkish authorities alleged that
significant portions were damaged or never delivered.

Following the incident, Turkey formally severed diplomatic relations with Israel on June 14,
2024, recalled its ambassador, expelled Israel's ambassador to Turkey, and suspended all
military and economic agreements between the countries. After failed diplomatic efforts to
resolve the dispute, Turkey filed an application instituting proceedings against Israel before the
International Court of Justice on August 3, 2024.

Procedural History

Turkey's application to the International Court of Justice was submitted under Article
36(1) of the ICJ Statute and Article 30 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture
(UNCAT), which provides that disputes between States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention may be submitted to the ICJ if they cannot
be settled through negotiation or arbitration.

Turkey's application also invoked jurisdictional bases in the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), though Israel is not a party to UNCLOS, creating a complex jurisdictional question
for the Court to address.

The Court established the following procedural timeline:

●​ August 3, 2024: Turkey files application instituting proceedings

●​ August 10, 2024: Turkey requests indication of provisional measures
●​ August 20-22, 2024: Public hearings on provisional measures
●​ September 5, 2024: Court issues order on provisional measures
●​ October 15, 2024: Deadline for Turkey's Memorial
●​ February 15, 2025: Deadline for Israel's Counter-Memorial
●​ April 10-20, 2025: Projected dates for public hearings

Israel submitted preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdiction on September 25, 2024,
arguing that:

1.​ The dispute is essentially political rather than legal in nature

2.​ Turkey has not exhausted diplomatic means of resolution
3.​ The jurisdictional clauses invoked by Turkey are inapplicable to the case
4.​ The real parties to the dispute include Hamas, which is not before the Court

Following established procedure, the proceedings on the merits were suspended pending the
Court's decision on preliminary objections. The Court ordered Turkey to submit its observations
on Israel's preliminary objections by November 25, 2024, with hearings on jurisdiction scheduled
for January 2025.

Provisional Measures

On August 10, 2024, Turkey requested that the Court indicate provisional measures under
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. Turkey's request sought orders that Israel:
 1.​ Immediately suspend all military and naval operations preventing humanitarian aid from
reaching Gaza
2.​ Allow unimpeded access for Turkish and other humanitarian vessels to Gaza ports
3.​ Take no action that might aggravate the dispute before the Court
4.​ Report to the Court within 15 days on measures taken to implement the order

After public hearings held from August 20-22, 2024, the Court issued an order on provisional
measures on September 5, 2024. While not granting all of Turkey's requests, the Court ordered
that:

1.​ Both parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute or
make it more difficult to resolve
2.​ Both parties shall facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in Gaza
through appropriate channels
3.​ Israel shall ensure that its enforcement of the naval blockade does not unnecessarily
impede the delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance
4.​ Both parties shall report to the Court on their implementation of these provisional
measures within 30 days

The Court declined to order the suspension of the naval blockade or to mandate direct access
for vessels to Gaza, noting that such measures would effectively prejudge aspects of the merits
of the case. The Court emphasized the provisional nature of these measures, which neither
prejudge questions of jurisdiction nor the merits of Turkey's claims.

In its reasoning, the Court determined that it appeared to have prima facie jurisdiction under at
least one of the instruments invoked by Turkey, that the rights asserted by Turkey were at least
plausible, and that there existed a link between those rights and the provisional measures
requested. The Court also found a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights
claimed by Turkey, particularly concerning humanitarian access and the protection of human
life.

Both parties submitted reports on implementation by the stipulated deadline. Turkey claimed
that Israel had failed to substantially comply with the order, while Israel maintained that it had
enhanced humanitarian corridors through land crossings and expedited inspection procedures.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Brief Overview

The dispute between Israel and Turkey over the Gaza blockade cannot be properly understood
without reference to the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This protracted struggle over
territory, security, self-determination, and competing national narratives has shaped regional
dynamics for over seven decades.

The roots of the conflict lie in competing Jewish and Arab nationalist movements in the early
20th century and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Britain's administration
of Palestine under a League of Nations mandate (1922-1948) was marked by increasing
tensions between Jewish immigrants seeking to establish a national homeland and the
indigenous Arab population.

The United Nations General Assembly's adoption of Resolution 181 in November 1947
recommended partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. While Jewish leaders
accepted the partition plan, Arab leaders rejected it. Following Israel's declaration of
independence in May 1948, neighboring Arab states launched military interventions, resulting in
the first Arab-Israeli war. By the time armistice agreements were signed in 1949, Israel
controlled more territory than allocated in the UN partition plan, Jordan controlled the West
Bank, and Egypt administered the Gaza Strip. Approximately 700,000 Palestinians were
displaced, creating a refugee crisis that remains unresolved.

Subsequent major military confrontations—the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War, the
1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Lebanon War—further altered territorial control and
deepened hostilities. The 1967 war resulted in Israel's occupation of the West Bank, East
Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula (the latter returned to Egypt
following the 1979 peace treaty).

Peace efforts gained momentum in the early 1990s with the Madrid Conference and Oslo
Accords, establishing limited Palestinian self-governance through the Palestinian Authority.
However, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, expansion of Israeli
settlements in occupied territories, continued Palestinian militant attacks, and the failure of the
Camp David Summit in 2000 contributed to the collapse of the peace process and the eruption
of the Second Intifada (2000-2005).

The conflict entered a new phase with Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005,
withdrawing all settlements and military positions while maintaining control over Gaza's
airspace, maritime access, and most border crossings. This period also saw internal Palestinian
divisions deepen, culminating in Hamas's takeover of Gaza in 2007 following violent clashes
with Fatah, which retained control of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Subsequent years have witnessed recurring cycles of violence, including major Israeli military
operations in Gaza in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021, alongside rocket attacks from Gaza
into Israel. Peace initiatives, including the Arab Peace Initiative, the Quartet Roadmap, and
various U.S.-led efforts, have failed to produce lasting solutions.

The international community remains divided on approaches to resolving the conflict. While
there is broad consensus supporting a two-state solution, disagreements persist regarding
borders, Jerusalem's status, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements,
and recognition issues. The conflict continues to generate regional instability and international
diplomatic tensions.

Hamas Control of Gaza and Blockade Implementation

Hamas's rise to power in Gaza represents a critical turning point in the trajectory of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and provides essential context for understanding the blockade at the
center of the current dispute.

Founded during the First Intifada in 1987 as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Resistance Movement) combined
Palestinian nationalism with Islamist ideology. Its 1988 charter called for the destruction of Israel
and the establishment of an Islamic state in historic Palestine, though the organization
published a more moderate political document in 2017 that accepted the possibility of a
Palestinian state based on 1967 borders without explicitly recognizing Israel.

Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, unexpectedly winning
a parliamentary majority. Tensions with Fatah, led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud
Abbas, escalated into armed conflict in Gaza. By June 2007, Hamas had forcibly expelled Fatah
officials from Gaza, establishing de facto control over the territory while Fatah maintained
authority in the West Bank. This split in Palestinian governance persists despite multiple
reconciliation attempts.

Israel responded to Hamas's takeover by implementing a comprehensive blockade of Gaza in

coordination with Egypt. The blockade included:

1.​ Naval Blockade: Israel declared a naval blockade extending 20 nautical miles from
Gaza's coast, preventing vessels from entering or leaving Gaza's waters without Israeli
authorization.​

2.​ Border Crossing Restrictions: Israel tightly controlled its land crossings with Gaza (Erez
for people, Kerem Shalom for goods), significantly restricting the movement of
Palestinians and limiting imports to what Israel defined as humanitarian necessities.​

3.​ Airspace Control: Israel maintained complete control over Gaza's airspace, prohibiting
international flights.​
 4.​ Buffer Zones: Israel established restricted-access areas within Gaza near the border
fence, limiting agricultural use and development.​

Egypt also severely restricted movement through its Rafah crossing, though policies have
fluctuated under different Egyptian governments.

Israel justified these measures as security necessities, citing Hamas's refusal to recognize
Israel, renounce violence, or accept previous agreements. Israeli authorities emphasized the
need to prevent weapons smuggling and materials that could be used for military purposes,
particularly after Hamas and other militant groups launched thousands of rockets into Israel.

Critics, including the United Nations and numerous human rights organizations, characterized
the blockade as collective punishment prohibited under international humanitarian law, citing its
devastating impact on Gaza's civilian population. The UN Conference on Trade and
Development has repeatedly warned that the blockade has "hollowed out" Gaza's productive
capacity and led to de-development.

Over time, Israel modified aspects of the blockade, particularly following international pressure
after the 2010 flotilla incident. These adjustments included expanding the list of permitted
civilian goods, increasing daily truckloads of imports, and periodically extending fishing zones.
However, the core restrictions on movement of people and goods remained largely intact.

The blockade transformed Gaza's economy and society. Unemployment consistently exceeded
40% (reaching 70% among youth), poverty rates surged, and over 80% of the population
became dependent on international aid. Infrastructure deteriorated severely, with electricity
available only for limited hours daily, 95% of water undrinkable without treatment, and sewage
treatment facilities operating well below capacity.

These conditions formed the backdrop for recurring escalations between Hamas and Israel,
including major conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and most recently in 2023-2024. Each
confrontation resulted in further infrastructure damage and humanitarian needs, while the
blockade hampered reconstruction efforts.

Turkish-Israeli Relations: From Alliance to Antagonism

Turkish-Israeli relations have undergone dramatic transformations over the past century,
evolving from strategic partnership to antagonism and limited reconciliation efforts. This history
provides crucial context for understanding Turkey's position in the current dispute.

Turkey was among the first Muslim-majority nations to recognize Israel in 1949, establishing full
diplomatic relations. While relations remained correct but cool during the Cold War era, the
1990s marked a golden age in bilateral ties. Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, Turkey and Israel
signed a groundbreaking defense cooperation agreement in 1996 that included joint military
exercises, intelligence sharing, and Israeli upgrades to Turkish military equipment. Trade
relations flourished, with bilateral commerce growing from $100 million in 1990 to over $3 billion
by 2000.

Several factors facilitated this rapprochement: Turkey's secularist military establishment viewed
Israel as a valuable counterweight to neighboring Arab states and Iran; both countries
maintained strong relationships with the United States; and both faced terrorist threats (PKK for
Turkey, various Palestinian groups for Israel). Tourism, academic exchanges, and cultural ties
complemented strategic cooperation.

This alignment began deteriorating in the early 2000s with the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. The AKP's foreign policy, influenced by
then-foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's "zero problems with neighbors" approach, sought
closer ties with the Arab world and championed Palestinian causes. Erdoğan's Islamic-oriented
politics contrasted with Turkey's earlier secular orientation that had facilitated Israeli ties.

Several incidents marked this deterioration:

1.​ In 2004, Erdoğan characterized Israeli operations in Gaza as "state terrorism."​

2.​ The 2006 Lebanon War prompted Turkish criticism of Israeli tactics and casualties.​

3.​ In January 2009, Erdoğan stormed out of a Davos panel discussion with Israeli President
Shimon Peres, telling him "you know well how to kill people."​

4.​ In January 2010, Turkey publicly humiliated Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny
Ayalon by seating him in a lower chair during a diplomatic meeting, responding to what
Turkey perceive​

5.​ In January 2010, Turkey publicly humiliated Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny
Ayalon by seating him in a lower chair during a diplomatic meeting, responding to what
Turkey perceived as Israeli diplomatic slights.

The turning point, however, was the May 2010 Gaza Freedom Flotilla incident involving the MV
Mavi Marmara. Israeli naval commandos boarded the Turkish ship attempting to break the Gaza
blockade, resulting in the deaths of nine Turkish citizens. Turkey immediately recalled its
ambassador, canceled joint military exercises, and demanded an official apology, compensation
for victims' families, and the lifting of the Gaza blockade as conditions for normalizing relations.

For over six years, Turkish-Israeli relations remained in crisis. Turkey downgraded diplomatic
representation, canceled defense contracts, blocked Israeli participation in NATO activities, and
pursued legal action against Israeli officials involved in the raid. Turkey consistently framed itself
as the primary international defender of Palestinian rights, with Erdoğan's rhetoric becoming
increasingly hostile toward Israeli policies.
Geopolitical shifts eventually facilitated a reconciliation agreement in June 2016. Israel's
growing isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean amid deteriorating relations with Egypt and
Jordan, Turkey's tensions with Russia following the downing of a Russian fighter jet, and mutual
concerns about Syria's civil war created incentives for both sides to normalize relations. The
reconciliation deal included Israeli compensation of $20 million to victims' families, Turkish
legislation preventing legal action against Israeli military personnel, and Israeli allowance for
Turkey to implement humanitarian projects in Gaza.

This rapprochement proved short-lived. In December 2017, following U.S. recognition of

Jerusalem as Israel's capital, Turkey convened an extraordinary summit of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation and led international diplomatic efforts opposing the move. In May 2018,
when the U.S. Embassy relocated to Jerusalem amid Palestinian protests in Gaza that resulted
in numerous casualties, Turkey expelled Israel's ambassador and recalled its ambassador from
Israel.

Low-level diplomatic contacts continued, and limited economic relations persisted despite
political tensions. In 2022, amid Turkey's economic challenges and regional realignments
including the Abraham Accords, efforts to rebuild ties culminated in presidential-level exchanges
and the mutual appointment of ambassadors. This tentative reengagement, however, was
severely damaged by the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent Israeli military
operations in Gaza, with Turkey emerging as one of Israel's most vocal critics.

The 2024 flotilla incident thus occurred against a background of deeply antagonistic relations,
with the Turkish government explicitly drawing parallels to the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident
while positioning itself as a defender of Palestinian rights and humanitarian concerns.

The 2010 Mavi Marmara Incident

The 2010 Gaza Freedom Flotilla incident serves as a critical precedent for the current dispute
and merits detailed examination. The similarities and differences between the 2010 and 2024
incidents will likely factor prominently in the Court's deliberations.

In May 2010, a coalition of pro-Palestinian organizations assembled a flotilla of six vessels to

challenge Israel's blockade of Gaza. The largest ship, MV Mavi Marmara, was owned by the
Turkish Islamic charity IHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı), which Israeli
intelligence had linked to Hamas and other Islamist groups—an allegation IHH denied. The
vessels carried approximately 10,000 tons of construction materials, medical supplies, and other
humanitarian goods.

Prior to the flotilla's departure, Israel announced that vessels attempting to breach the blockade
would be intercepted and diverted to Ashdod port for cargo inspection, after which humanitarian
goods would be transferred to Gaza through land crossings. Flotilla organizers rejected this
arrangement, insisting on direct delivery to Gaza to highlight opposition to the blockade itself.
On May 31, 2010, approximately 72 nautical miles from the coast in international waters, Israeli
naval commandos intercepted the flotilla. Five of the six vessels were boarded without
significant incident. The operation against the Mavi Marmara, however, resulted in violence.
Israeli commandos boarding from helicopters and speedboats were confronted by passengers
wielding improvised weapons including metal rods, chairs, and knives. Israeli forces used both
less-lethal weapons (paintball guns, stun grenades) and live ammunition during the
confrontation.

The operation resulted in nine Turkish citizens killed (a tenth died later from injuries) and dozens
wounded, along with several injured Israeli commandos. Israel diverted all vessels to Ashdod,
detained participants, and eventually deported them after questioning. The humanitarian cargo
was later delivered to Gaza through land crossings, though flotilla organizers alleged some
materials were never transferred.

The incident triggered an international crisis and multiple investigations:

1.​ Turkey's National Inquiry: Led by Turkish foreign ministry officials, this investigation
concluded that Israeli forces had used excessive and disproportionate force and violated
international law.​

2.​ Israel's Turkel Commission: This domestic inquiry found that Israel's naval blockade was
legal under international law and that Israeli forces faced organized violent resistance
necessitating the use of lethal force in self-defense.​

3.​ UN Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission: Chaired by Karl T. Hudson-Phillips, this
investigation concluded that Israeli forces demonstrated "an unacceptable level of
brutality" and that the interception was "clearly unlawful" as it occurred in international
waters.​

4.​ UN Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry (Palmer Report): This report reached mixed
conclusions, finding that Israel's naval blockade was legal and a legitimate security
measure, but that Israel used "excessive and unreasonable" force. It criticized flotilla
organizers for acting recklessly but affirmed the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.​

Turkey responded to the incident by withdrawing its ambassador, canceling joint military
exercises, and demanding an apology, compensation, and lifting of the Gaza blockade as
conditions for normalizing relations. Turkey initially pursued legal action against Israeli officials
involved in the operation, though this was later addressed in the 2016 reconciliation agreement.

The political, diplomatic, and legal aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident established important
precedents regarding naval blockades, maritime interdiction, and humanitarian access that will
undoubtedly influence the Court's approach to the current case. Both parties will likely invoke
aspects of previous investigations that support their respective positions, while distinguishing
unfavorable elements.
Reconciliation Attempts and Subsequent Tensions

The period between the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident and the 2024 flotilla confrontation
witnessed multiple reconciliation attempts between Turkey and Israel, interspersed with
recurring tensions and diplomatic crises.

Initial reconciliation efforts began in 2011 through secret talks in Geneva and Rome. These
discussions focused on Turkey's demands for an apology, compensation, and easing of the
Gaza blockade. Progress stalled as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resisted offering
a formal apology, concerned about the political implications and potential legal precedent.

A breakthrough occurred in March 2013 when, during the final hours of U.S. President Barack
Obama's visit to Israel, Netanyahu called Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and offered a carefully
worded apology for "operational errors" that led to loss of life aboard the Mavi Marmara. This
call, facilitated by Obama, temporarily reduced tensions but did not immediately restore full
diplomatic relations.

Negotiations continued throughout 2013-2015, frequently interrupted by Israel's 2014 Gaza

operation and inflammatory rhetoric from both sides. Turkish and Israeli diplomats held multiple
rounds of talks focusing on the compensation package and the precise mechanism for easing
restrictions on Gaza.

The reconciliation agreement was finally concluded in June 2016 after six years of negotiations.
Key provisions included:

1.​ Israel's payment of $20 million in compensation to the families of Turkish citizens killed
or injured
2.​ Turkey's passage of legislation preventing legal action against Israeli military personnel
involved in the raid
3.​ Normalization of diplomatic relations, including the exchange of ambassadors
4.​ Permission for Turkey to implement humanitarian projects in Gaza, including
construction of a hospital, power plant, and desalination facility
5.​ Turkish commitment to prevent Hamas from planning attacks against Israel from Turkish
territory

By December 2016, ambassadors were exchanged and bilateral trade began to rebound
despite continued political differences. Economic relations actually remained relatively robust
throughout the diplomatic crisis, with bilateral trade reaching nearly $6 billion by 2018.

However, the fragile reconciliation collapsed in May 2018 following the U.S. embassy relocation
to Jerusalem and Israeli response to border protests in Gaza that resulted in numerous
Palestinian casualties. Turkey expelled Israel's ambassador and recalled its own, while Erdoğan
accused Israel of "genocide" and "state terrorism." Israel responded by subjecting Turkey's
consul general in Jerusalem to a humiliating security check at Ben Gurion Airport, further
inflaming tensions.
Relations remained severely strained through 2019-2021, with continuing harsh rhetoric
especially from the Turkish side. Turkey positioned itself as Hamas's primary international
supporter, reportedly granting Turkish citizenship to Hamas leaders and allowing the group to
operate from Turkish territory—allegations Turkey denied.

Regional realignments, including the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab states,
Turkey's economic challenges, and energy development in the Eastern Mediterranean created
new incentives for reconciliation by 2022. In March 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited
Ankara, marking the highest-level contact in 14 years. This visit laid groundwork for renewed
diplomatic relations, with ambassadors exchanged in August 2022.

This cautious rapprochement included high-level dialogues on energy cooperation,

counterterrorism, and trade expansion. However, these efforts were severely undermined by the
October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent Israeli military operations in Gaza.
Erdoğan quickly emerged as one of Israel's harshest critics, comparing Netanyahu to Hitler,
canceling planned economic agreements, and positioning Turkey as a primary advocate for
Palestinian rights.

By early 2024, relations had deteriorated to their worst point in decades, with Turkey reportedly
expelling Israel's ambassador and recalling its own for consultations in November 2023. It was
against this backdrop of severely damaged bilateral relations that Turkey announced the
humanitarian flotilla to Gaza in May 2024.

October 7th, 2023 Attack and Aftermath

The events of October 7, 2023, and the resulting military operations in Gaza constitute the
immediate context for the 2024 flotilla incident and the subsequent case before the Court.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas and allied Palestinian militant groups launched a surprise attack on
southern Israel. Militants breached the Gaza-Israel border barrier at multiple points, infiltrating
nearby Israeli communities, military bases, and a music festival. The attack resulted in
approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths, primarily civilians, and the taking of over 200 hostages who
were transported to Gaza.

Israel responded by declaring war on Hamas and launching extensive air strikes across Gaza,
followed by a ground invasion beginning in late October. Israeli operations targeted Hamas
infrastructure, leadership, and militants, but also resulted in widespread civilian casualties and
destruction of housing, hospitals, schools, and essential infrastructure.

The conflict quickly escalated into the deadliest confrontation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
decades. By June 2024, when the flotilla incident occurred, Palestinian authorities reported over
35,000 casualties in Gaza, with UN agencies unable to independently verify these figures but
acknowledging the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe.

Several features of the conflict are particularly relevant to the legal issues before the Court:
 1.​ Humanitarian Crisis: The combination of intense military operations, pre-existing
infrastructure limitations due to the blockade, and severe restrictions on humanitarian
access created what UN agencies described as an "unprecedented humanitarian
catastrophe." By April 2024, the UN estimated that 85% of Gaza's 2.3 million residents
were internally displaced, often multiple times, while famine conditions emerged in
northern Gaza.​

2.​ Aid Restrictions: During the initial months of the conflict, Israel severely restricted
humanitarian access to Gaza, citing security concerns and allegations that Hamas
diverted aid. Although Israel gradually increased the number of aid trucks permitted
through land crossings, humanitarian organizations consistently reported that the volume
remained far below minimum requirements. International pressure, including from the
United States, led to incremental improvements in aid access by spring 2024, though
significant restrictions remained.​

3.​ Maritime Dimension: In March 2024, the United States announced plans to establish a
temporary pier on Gaza's coast to facilitate humanitarian aid delivery, acknowledging the
limitations of land routes. This floating pier, which became operational in May 2024,
demonstrated the international recognition of maritime access as potentially crucial for
humanitarian response. However, the pier's capacity was limited, and its operation was
frequently interrupted by security concerns and weather conditions.​

4.​ International Legal Proceedings: In January 2024, South Africa initiated proceedings
against Israel before the ICJ alleging violations of the Genocide Convention. The Court
indicated provisional measures ordering Israel to take all measures within its power to
prevent genocidal acts and to ensure humanitarian assistance to Gaza civilians. These
proceedings, though legally distinct from Turkey's case, established an important
backdrop for the broader legal questions surrounding the Gaza conflict.​

5.​ Regional Responses: The conflict triggered divergent reactions across the Middle East.
While some Arab states with normalized relations with Israel maintained diplomatic
engagement while calling for restraint, Turkey emerged as one of Israel's most vocal
critics. The Turkish government suspended all commercial ties with Israel (though not
energy contracts), hosted Hamas political leaders, and positioned itself as the leading
international advocate for Palestinian rights.​

It was in this context that Turkey announced its humanitarian flotilla initiative in May 2024.
Turkish President Erdoğan framed the flotilla as a direct response to what he described as
"Israel's starvation of Gaza" and explicitly invoked the legacy of the 2010 Mavi Marmara
incident, stating that "once again, Turkish ships will challenge an illegal and inhuman blockade."

Israel, meanwhile, characterized the flotilla as a provocative political act rather than a genuine
humanitarian initiative, pointing to the establishment of the U.S.-led maritime corridor and
expanded land access as rendering the flotilla unnecessary. Israeli officials publicly warned that
any attempt to breach the blockade would be prevented, while emphasizing willingness to
facilitate aid delivery through established channels.

Humanitarian Situation in Gaza (2023-2024)

The humanitarian conditions in Gaza between October 2023 and June 2024 form a critical
factual backdrop to the legal questions before the Court, particularly regarding the
proportionality of the blockade and the necessity of direct humanitarian access.

Prior to October 2023, Gaza already faced severe humanitarian challenges resulting from the
long-standing blockade, previous conflicts, and internal governance issues. Approximately 80%
of the population relied on international assistance, unemployment exceeded 45%, and
infrastructure for electricity, water, and sanitation operated well below needed capacity.

The situation deteriorated dramatically following the outbreak of hostilities:

Displacement and Shelter: By June 2024, an estimated 1.9 million Gazans (over 85% of the
population) were internally displaced. Displacement conditions were characterized by extreme
overcrowding, with an average of 12 people sharing small living spaces. Many families endured
multiple displacements as areas initially designated as humanitarian safe zones later became
targets of military operations. The destruction of housing was unprecedented, with satellite
imagery analysis suggesting that over 60% of Gaza's housing stock was damaged or destroyed.

Food Security: The World Food Programme and UN Food and Agriculture Organization
documented severe food insecurity throughout Gaza, with famine conditions emerging in
northern areas by February 2024. Assessments indicated that virtually all households had
adopted crisis-level coping strategies, including reducing meal frequency and size. Food prices
increased by 400-600% compared to pre-conflict levels due to scarcity and transportation
challenges. By April 2024, malnutrition rates among children under five had tripled compared to
pre-conflict measurements.

Healthcare System Collapse: Gaza's healthcare system effectively collapsed under the
combined pressures of conflict casualties, infrastructure damage, and supply shortages. By
June 2024, only 14 of Gaza's 36 hospitals remained partially functional, operating at
approximately 20% capacity. Critical shortages affected essential medicines, surgical supplies,
anesthetics, and fuel for generators. The breakdown of vaccination programs raised concerns
about potential disease outbreaks, particularly given the compromised water and sanitation
infrastructure.

Water and Sanitation Crisis: Access to clean water became increasingly critical as
desalination plants and water infrastructure sustained damage and lacked fuel for operation.
Daily water availability dropped to less than 3 liters per person in many areas, far below the
humanitarian minimum standard of 15 liters. Sewage treatment facilities ceased functioning,
resulting in untreated wastewater discharge and contamination of groundwater resources. By
May 2024, UN agencies reported outbreaks of hepatitis A, dysentery, and other waterborne
diseases.

Humanitarian Access Challenges: The delivery of humanitarian assistance faced multiple

obstacles. Land crossings operated intermittently due to security concerns and bureaucratic
procedures. The Rafah crossing with Egypt, a critical access point, was frequently closed, while
the Kerem Shalom crossing with Israel imposed strict limitations on the type and quantity of
goods permitted entry. UN agencies consistently reported that the volume of aid entering Gaza
met less than 30% of minimum requirements during the height of hostilities.

International Response Efforts: Multiple initiatives attempted to address the humanitarian

catastrophe:

1.​ The temporary maritime corridor established through the U.S.-built floating pier began
operations in May 2024 but faced capacity limitations and weather disruptions.​

2.​ Airdrops of humanitarian supplies by several countries provided limited relief but were
criticized as inefficient and potentially dangerous to civilians on the ground.​

3.​ The UN-coordinated humanitarian response plan requested $1.2 billion to meet critical
needs but remained significantly underfunded as of June 2024.​

4.​ Several countries, including Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, established field hospitals either
inside Gaza or at border areas to treat wounded civilians evacuated from the territory.​

Documentation and Monitoring: Throughout the conflict, the humanitarian situation was
documented by multiple credible sources:

1.​ UN agencies including OCHA, WFP, WHO, and UNICEF issued regular situation reports
detailing deteriorating conditions.​

2.​ International humanitarian organizations including Médecins Sans Frontières, the

International Committee of the Red Cross, and Oxfam maintained field presence despite
security challenges and provided firsthand accounts of conditions.​

3.​ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) conducted formal famine risk
assessments in February and May 2024, confirming catastrophic food insecurity.​

4.​ Human rights organizations documented both the humanitarian impact and potential
violations of international humanitarian law, including restrictions on aid access.​

It was against this backdrop that Turkey organized its humanitarian flotilla, explicitly framing the
initiative as a response to the "catastrophic humanitarian situation" and the "inadequacy of
existing aid channels." The flotilla's cargo reportedly included specialized medical equipment,
nutritional supplements for malnourished children, water purification systems, and hospital
generators—items that humanitarian organizations had identified as critically needed.

Israel contested this characterization, acknowledging humanitarian challenges but arguing that
existing channels were adequate when properly utilized. Israeli authorities pointed to the
maritime corridor established with U.S. support and increased truck movement through land
crossings as evidence of their commitment to facilitating humanitarian access while maintaining
necessary security measures.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Law of Naval Blockades

Naval blockades occupy a unique position in international law as one of the few remaining
lawful methods of economic warfare. The legal framework governing blockades has evolved
from customary international law codified in the 1856 Paris Declaration, the 1909 London
Declaration (never ratified but influential), and most recently articulated in the 1994 San Remo
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. While the San Remo Manual
is not a binding treaty, it is widely recognized as reflecting customary international law on this
subject.

For a naval blockade to be lawful under international law, it must satisfy multiple requirements:

Declaration and Notification: A blockade must be formally declared and notified to all states to
be legally effective. The declaration must specify the commencement date, geographical limits,
and duration if determined in advance. This requirement, codified in Article 94 of the San Remo
Manual, ensures that neutral shipping has adequate notice of restricted areas.

Effectiveness: A blockade must be effective to be lawful, meaning it must be maintained by

forces sufficient to prevent access to the coastline of the enemy. This principle, established in
the 1856 Paris Declaration and preserved in Article 95 of the San Remo Manual, prevents
"paper blockades" that merely assert control without actual enforcement capability.

Impartiality: A blockade must be applied impartially to vessels of all states, including the
blockading power's own merchant vessels. This principle, articulated in Article 100 of the San
Remo Manual, prohibits selective enforcement that might constitute disguised discrimination.

Access for Neutral Vessels: Neutral vessels must be allowed to leave the blockaded area
within a reasonable time period after implementation. The blockading power may designate
specific exit routes for safety purposes.
Proportionality: Perhaps most critically for this case, Article 102(b) of the San Remo Manual
prohibits blockades that have the "sole purpose" of starving the civilian population or denying
objects essential for survival. Additionally, Article 102(a) states that a blockade is prohibited
when "the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade."

Humanitarian Access: The blockading power must allow passage of humanitarian assistance
for the civilian population if the blockaded area has inadequate supplies for humanitarian needs,
subject to technical arrangements including search. This principle, found in Article 103 of the
San Remo Manual, balances military necessity with humanitarian imperatives.

Enforcement Measures: The blockading power may enforce the blockade in international
waters, including by visit, search, and capture of vessels attempting to breach the blockade.
Under Article 67 of the San Remo Manual, merchant vessels believed to be breaching a
blockade and which resist interception may be subject to attack after warning and continued
resistance.

Several additional legal principles are relevant to blockade enforcement:

1.​ Continuous Voyage Doctrine: This principle allows for interdiction of vessels bound for
third-party ports if their ultimate destination is the blockaded area.​

2.​ Intent Standard: Knowledge of the blockade and intent to breach it are typically required
for lawful interdiction, rather than merely approaching the blockaded area.​

3.​ Use of Force in Enforcement: Any use of force in enforcing a blockade must comply with
principles of necessity and proportionality. Warning must be given prior to using force
unless exigent circumstances prevent it.​

Disputes about naval blockades often center on two key questions: (1) whether the blockade is
established in the context of an international armed conflict or analogous situation that legally
permits blockade implementation, and (2) whether the humanitarian impact of the blockade has
become excessive relative to its military necessity.

Israel has consistently maintained that its blockade of Gaza meets all legal requirements: it was
formally declared and notified in January 2009 (following less formal restrictions since 2007), it
is effectively enforced by the Israeli Navy, it applies impartially to all vessels, and it includes
mechanisms for humanitarian assistance delivery. Israel argues that the blockade serves
legitimate security purposes by preventing weapons smuggling to Hamas, which it characterizes
as a terrorist organization engaged in armed conflict with Israel.

Turkey contends that the blockade fails the proportionality test due to its severe humanitarian
impact, effectively constituting collective punishment prohibited under international humanitarian
law. Turkey further challenges whether the blockade occurs in the context of an international
armed conflict that would legally permit such measures, given the contested status of Gaza
under international law.

Law of the Sea and Freedom of Navigation

The law of the sea provides the legal framework governing maritime spaces and activities,
including navigation rights that are central to Turkey's claims. The primary source of this law is
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which, although not
ratified by all states including Israel, is largely considered to reflect customary international law
binding on all states.

The law of the sea divides maritime spaces into different zones with corresponding rights and
obligations:

Territorial Sea: Extending up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline (typically the low-water
mark), the territorial sea is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state. Foreign vessels enjoy
the right of innocent passage through territorial seas, defined as navigation that is "not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State" (UNCLOS Article 19). A
vessel's passage is not innocent if it engages in activities including threats or use of force,
exercises with weapons, intelligence gathering, propaganda, launching or taking on board
aircraft or military devices, loading or unloading commodities in violation of customs or fiscal
regulations, willful pollution, fishing, research, or interference with communications systems.

Contiguous Zone: Extending up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline, the contiguous zone
allows coastal states to exercise control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of
customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws within their territory or territorial sea.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline, the
EEZ grants coastal states sovereign rights for economic exploitation and exploration, including
fisheries and energy resources, while preserving freedom of navigation for other states.

High Seas: Areas beyond national jurisdiction where all states enjoy freedoms including
navigation, overflight, laying submarine cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands,
fishing, and scientific research. These freedoms must be exercised with due regard for other
states' interests and rights under the Convention.

Freedom of navigation on the high seas is a fundamental principle of the law of the sea, subject
to limited exceptions:

1.​ Piracy: All states may seize pirate ships and aircraft on the high seas and arrest persons
responsible for piracy.​

2.​ Slave Trade: Warships may board foreign vessels suspected of engaging in the slave
trade.​
 3.​ Unauthorized Broadcasting: States may arrest persons or seize vessels engaged in
unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas.​

4.​ Hot Pursuit: A coastal state may pursue vessels that have violated its laws from its
internal waters, territorial sea, or contiguous zone onto the high seas if pursuit is
uninterrupted.​

5.​ Constructive Presence: A vessel on the high seas may be pursued if its boats or other
craft working as a team have committed violations within a coastal state's maritime
zones.​

6.​ Right of Visit: Warships may board foreign vessels if there are reasonable grounds to
suspect they are engaged in piracy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, are without
nationality, or are of the same nationality as the warship but flying another flag.​

7.​ UN Security Council Resolutions: The Security Council may authorize maritime
interdiction operations that permit boarding, search, and seizure of vessels in derogation
of normal navigational freedoms.​

Notably absent from these exceptions is a general right to intercept vessels on the high seas to
enforce a blockade. This creates a potential tension between the law of naval warfare (which
permits blockade enforcement in international waters) and the law of the sea (which generally
prohibits interference with navigation on the high seas outside the specific exceptions).

This tension is addressed differently depending on whether the situation is characterized as an

armed conflict. During armed conflict, the specialized rules of naval warfare, including blockade
law, may provide lex specialis (specialized law) that modifies general rules on freedom of
navigation. However, if the situation is not properly characterized as an armed conflict, or if the
blockade itself is unlawful, then the general prohibition on interfering with navigation on the high
seas would apply.

In the present case, Turkey argues that Israel's interception of the flotilla violated freedom of
navigation guaranteed under customary international law and reflected in UNCLOS. Israel
contends that its actions were lawful under the specialized regime governing naval blockades
during armed conflict. Resolution of this issue requires determining whether Israel's blockade
enforcement actions fell within the naval warfare exception to general freedom of navigation
principles.

International Humanitarian Law

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict or jus in bello,
governs the conduct of hostilities and the protection of persons affected by armed conflict. The
legal framework applicable to the Gaza blockade and the flotilla incident includes:
The Hague Regulations of 1907: Establishing fundamental principles for the conduct of land
warfare, including rules on occupation that may be relevant to characterizing Israel's relationship
with Gaza.

Geneva Conventions of 1949: Particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which provides protections for civilians in
occupied territories and during armed conflicts.

Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions: While Israel is not a party to the 1977
Additional Protocols, many provisions are considered customary international law, including
those regarding distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.

Customary International Humanitarian Law: As identified by the International Committee of

the Red Cross study and various judicial decisions, these norms bind all states regardless of
treaty ratification.

Several core principles of IHL are particularly relevant to this case:

Distinction: Parties to a conflict must distinguish between civilian and military objectives, and
direct operations only against military objectives. This principle prohibits indiscriminate attacks
and measures that fail to differentiate between civilian and military targets.

Proportionality: Attacks and military measures that may be expected to cause incidental
civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military
advantage. This principle requires balancing military necessity against humanitarian
considerations.

Precaution: Parties must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian harm when
planning and conducting military operations.

Prohibition on Collective Punishment: Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly

prohibits collective penalties and "all measures of intimidation or of terrorism" against protected
persons. This prohibition is particularly relevant to evaluating the legality of blockades that
significantly impact civilian populations.

Obligation to Allow Humanitarian Relief: Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires
parties to allow free passage of medical supplies, objects necessary for religious worship, and
essential foodstuffs for children, expectant mothers, and maternity cases. Article 59 requires
occupying powers to agree to relief schemes if the territory is inadequately supplied.

Protection of Medical Units and Transports: The Geneva Conventions provide special
protection for medical units and transports, which may have implications for vessels carrying
medical supplies.

The application of IHL to the Gaza blockade raises several complex legal questions:
 1.​ Classification of the Conflict: Different IHL regimes apply depending on whether the
situation is classified as an international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict,
or occupation. Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 complicates the legal classification,
with different perspectives on whether Gaza remains occupied territory.​

2.​ Status of Blockade under IHL: As discussed in the naval blockade section, blockades
must comply with humanitarian requirements including proportionality and allowing
humanitarian access. A blockade that causes starvation or denies essential
humanitarian supplies would violate IHL.​

3.​ Protection of Humanitarian Missions: While IHL provides special protection for
humanitarian relief, such missions must respect security measures imposed by parties to
the conflict. The extent to which humanitarian vessels can insist on direct access versus
accepting alternative delivery routes remains contested.​

4.​ Use of Force Against Civilians: The boarding of the MV Marmara II raises questions
about the appropriate use of force against civilians who may have become directly
involved in hostilities through resistance to boarding operations.​

Israel maintains that its blockade is consistent with IHL requirements, arguing that:

●​ The blockade serves legitimate security purposes against Hamas, which it classifies as a
terrorist organization engaged in armed conflict with Israel
●​ Humanitarian goods are permitted entry through land crossings after security inspection
●​ The naval blockade is narrowly targeted at preventing weapons smuggling rather than
imposing collective punishment

Turkey contends that the blockade violates IHL principles, arguing that:

●​ The blockade's humanitarian impact constitutes collective punishment prohibited under

Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
●​ Restrictions on essential goods and humanitarian access are disproportionate to any
legitimate security concerns
●​ Israel, as the occupying power, has heightened obligations to ensure humanitarian
welfare in Gaza

The Court's analysis will need to determine which IHL framework applies to the situation in
Gaza, assess the blockade's compliance with relevant provisions, and evaluate whether the
enforcement action against the flotilla satisfied IHL requirements regarding use of force and
protection of humanitarian missions.

Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict

The relationship between international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian
law during armed conflict represents one of the most complex and evolving areas of
international law. This relationship is particularly relevant to the flotilla incident, which raises
questions about the application of human rights norms to maritime enforcement actions
conducted under the law of naval warfare.

The traditional view that IHL operates as lex specialis (specialized law) that displaces human
rights law during armed conflict has increasingly given way to recognition that both legal
frameworks apply simultaneously, though IHL may inform the interpretation of human rights
obligations in conflict settings. This contemporary understanding is reflected in numerous
pronouncements by international courts and UN bodies:

●​ The International Court of Justice affirmed in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) that "the protection of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except through the
operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from
in a time of national emergency."​

●​ The ICJ further developed this position in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004),
stating that "the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case
of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation."​

●​ The European Court of Human Rights has consistently applied human rights standards
to situations of armed conflict, including in cases like Varnava v. Turkey and Al-Skeini v.
United Kingdom.​

Key human rights potentially implicated in the flotilla incident include:

Right to Life: Protected under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to
life prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. While this right may be qualified during armed conflict
through the application of IHL standards, the use of lethal force must still be necessary and
proportionate under the circumstances.

Prohibition of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment: Absolute prohibitions

under the ICCPR, ECHR, and the Convention Against Torture that continue to apply during
armed conflict.

Right to Liberty and Security: Protected under Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the
ECHR, these rights establish procedural and substantive protections regarding detention. The
detention of flotilla participants raises questions about the legal basis for detention, treatment
during detention, and procedural guarantees provided.
Freedom of Movement: While subject to limitations, this right protected under Article 12 of the
ICCPR has implications for maritime interdiction operations that restrict movement in
international waters.

Right to Health and Adequate Standard of Living: Economic and social rights protected
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may be relevant
when evaluating the humanitarian impact of blockades affecting civilian access to essential
goods and services.

Several jurisdictional questions arise when applying human rights law to maritime enforcement
actions:

1.​ Extraterritorial Application: To what extent do states' human rights obligations extend to
actions taken outside their territory? Modern jurisprudence increasingly recognizes that
human rights obligations follow state agents exercising effective control over persons or
areas, even beyond national borders. The boarding of the MV Marmara II in international
waters would likely qualify as an exercise of effective control triggering human rights
obligations.​

2.​ Jurisdictional Threshold: When does a state exercise sufficient control to trigger the
application of human rights obligations? The European Court of Human Rights has
developed the "effective control" test, which would likely apply to naval enforcement
operations involving boarding and physical control of vessels and persons.​

3.​ Derogations and Limitations: To what extent can security considerations justify limitations
on human rights during armed conflict? While some rights may be subject to
proportionate limitations for security purposes, others (such as the prohibition on torture)
remain absolute under all circumstances. Israel may argue that security imperatives
justified temporary restrictions on certain rights, while Turkey might contend that the
lethal force used exceeded permissible limitations.

The human rights dimensions of the blockade itself present additional questions:

1.​ Collective Impact: Do maritime blockades that significantly impact civilian access to
essential goods violate economic and social rights?
2.​ Humanitarian Access: Does denying humanitarian vessels direct access to deliver aid
constitute a violation of human rights obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights
to health, food, and adequate standard of living?
3.​ Proportionality in Human Rights Law: Even if certain limitations on rights are permissible
for security purposes, do they meet the proportionality requirements under human rights
jurisprudence?

Turkey's case invokes several human rights instruments, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture. Israel may challenge the
jurisdictional basis for applying these instruments to actions in international waters, arguing that
IHL provides the exclusive legal framework for evaluating blockade enforcement during armed
conflict.

The Court's analysis will need to determine which human rights obligations applied to Israel's
actions, whether those obligations were modified by the concurrent application of IHL, and
whether the boarding operation and treatment of flotilla participants satisfied applicable human
rights standards.

State Responsibility and Reparations

The law of state responsibility provides the framework for determining when a state bears legal
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and what consequences follow from such
responsibility. This body of law is largely reflected in the International Law Commission's Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which, while not a
binding treaty, are widely considered to reflect customary international law.

Under Article 2 of ARSIWA, an internationally wrongful act occurs when conduct consisting of
an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the state under international law; and (b) constitutes
a breach of an international obligation of the state. Several elements of this framework are
particularly relevant to the present case:

Attribution: Actions of a state's military forces, such as the Israeli Navy, are clearly attributable
to the state under Article 4 of ARSIWA, which covers conduct of state organs. The boarding
operation against the flotilla was conducted by official Israeli forces acting in their official
capacity, making attribution straightforward.

Breach of International Obligations: Turkey alleges that Israel breached multiple international
obligations relating to:

●​ Freedom of navigation in international waters

●​ Limits on the lawful use of force
●​ Prohibition on collective punishment
●​ Obligation to permit humanitarian access
●​ Human rights protections including the right to life and prohibition of torture

Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Israel may invoke certain defenses under

ARSIWA, particularly:

●​ Self-defense (Article 21)

●​ Necessity (Article 25)
●​ Compliance with peremptory norms (Article 26)

Israel would likely argue that its blockade enforcement actions were justified by the necessity of
preventing weapons smuggling to Hamas and protecting its citizens from terrorist attacks, thus
precluding the wrongfulness of any technical violations of maritime navigation rights.
Reparations: If an internationally wrongful act is established, Article 31 of ARSIWA requires the
responsible state to make full reparation for injury caused. Forms of reparation may include:

1.​ Restitution: Restoring the situation that existed before the wrongful act
2.​ Compensation: Financial payment covering financially assessable damage
3.​ Satisfaction: Acknowledgment of the breach, formal apology, or other appropriate
modalities

Turkey's application requests multiple forms of reparation:

●​ Compensation for loss of life and injuries sustained by Turkish nationals

●​ Compensation for material damage to vessels and cargo
●​ Public apology and acknowledgment of wrongdoing
●​ Guarantees of non-repetition, including lifting or modifying the naval blockade
●​ Punitive or exemplary damages reflecting the gravity of violations

Israel challenges both the legal basis for finding an internationally wrongful act and,
consequently, the justification for any reparations. Israel maintains that its actions conformed to
applicable international law on naval blockades and interdiction operations, and that any use of
force was necessary and proportionate under the circumstances.

The Court's analysis will need to determine whether Israel's actions constituted internationally
wrongful acts, whether any circumstances precluded wrongfulness, and if responsibility is
established, what forms of reparation would be appropriate to remedy the injury caused.

Use of Force in International Law

The international legal framework governing the use of force encompasses both the law
governing recourse to force (jus ad bellum) and the law governing how force may be used
during armed conflict (jus in bello). While the former primarily concerns the initiation of hostilities
under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and its exceptions, the latter—addressed substantially in
the IHL section—regulates conduct during conflict. For the flotilla incident, both dimensions are
relevant.

Under the UN Charter framework, Article 2(4) prohibits "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." Recognized exceptions include:

1.​ Self-defense under Article 51, permitting states to use force in response to an armed
attack
2.​ Authorization by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII
3.​ Consent of the territorial state

Maritime enforcement operations present unique challenges in this framework, as they often
involve the use of force in international waters rather than against another state's territory. The
legal status of forcible actions to enforce blockades depends partly on whether the underlying
blockade is lawful and whether the enforcement action satisfies requirements of necessity and
proportionality.

Several principles govern the use of force in maritime interdiction operations:

Necessity: Force may only be used when non-forcible means are insufficient to achieve the
legitimate objective.

Proportionality: Any force used must be proportionate to the objective and situation,
considering the threat posed by the vessel.

Graduated Response: Enforcement typically requires a graduated approach:

1.​ Verbal warnings and instructions

2.​ Presence and deterrence maneuvers
3.​ Non-lethal measures (water cannons, blocking)
4.​ Warning shots
5.​ Disabling fire (targeting non-essential parts of the vessel)
6.​ Direct force against the vessel or personnel as a last resort

Prior Warning: Before using force, clear warning must be given that force will be employed if
compliance is not achieved, unless exigent circumstances prevent such warning.

Turkey contends that Israel's use of force against the flotilla violated these constraints, arguing
that:

●​ The operation occurred in international waters where freedom of navigation should

prevail
●​ The force used was excessive relative to any threat posed by humanitarian vessels
●​ Israel failed to exhaust non-forcible alternatives before resorting to lethal force
●​ The pre-dawn timing and method of boarding unnecessarily escalated the risk of
violence

Israel asserts that its use of force was lawful, contending that:

●​ The enforcement of a validly established blockade permits necessary and proportionate

force
●​ Initial attempts at peaceful boarding were met with violent resistance
●​ Force escalation occurred only in response to attacks on Israeli personnel
●​ The operation employed restraint, as evidenced by the peaceful boarding of five of six
vessels

The Court's assessment will likely focus on whether the initial decision to intercept the flotilla in
international waters was justified, whether the operation's planning and execution minimized the
risk of violence, and whether the force used during the confrontation aboard the MV Marmara II
satisfied the requirements of necessity and proportionality under the circumstances.

TURKEY'S CLAIMS
Turkey's application to the International Court of Justice presents multiple claims alleging
violations of international law by Israel in connection with the interception of the humanitarian
flotilla and the broader Gaza blockade. These claims span maritime law, international
humanitarian law, human rights law, and the law on use of force.

Unlawful Use of Force in International Waters

Turkey contends that Israel's interception and boarding of the flotilla vessels in international
waters constituted an unlawful use of force contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and
customary international law. This claim centers on several key arguments:

1.​ The naval operation occurred approximately 70 nautical miles from the Gaza coast, well
beyond Israel's territorial sea or contiguous zone.
2.​ The pre-dawn raid employed excessive force disproportionate to any legitimate security
objective.
3.​ The operation caused nine deaths and numerous injuries to Turkish nationals engaged
in a humanitarian mission.
4.​ Israel failed to exhaust peaceful alternatives before resorting to armed intervention.

Turkey rejects Israel's contention that the blockade enforcement powers provide legal
justification for the operation, arguing that the underlying blockade lacks legal validity given the
humanitarian situation in Gaza.

Freedom of Navigation Violations

Turkey claims that Israel's interception of the flotilla violated the freedom of navigation
guaranteed under customary international law and reflected in the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea. While acknowledging that Israel is not a party to UNCLOS, Turkey
maintains that the freedom of navigation in international waters represents a fundamental
principle of customary international law binding on all states.

Turkey argues that:

1.​ The flotilla vessels were exercising lawful navigational rights in international waters.
2.​ The vessels posed no imminent security threat that would justify intervention.
3.​ None of the recognized exceptions to freedom of navigation (piracy, slave trading,
unauthorized broadcasting, etc.) applied to the humanitarian vessels.
4.​ Israel's blockade enforcement powers, even if the blockade were legal, must be
exercised consistently with basic maritime rights.
 Challenge to the Legality of the Gaza Blockade

Turkey claims that Israel's naval blockade of Gaza violates international law on several grounds:

1.​ Proportionality: The blockade causes suffering to the civilian population

disproportionate to any concrete military advantage, violating Article 102(a) of the San
Remo Manual.
2.​ Starvation: The blockade, particularly when combined with restrictions on land access,
effectively denies the civilian population objects essential for survival, contrary to Article
102(b) of the San Remo Manual.
3.​ Collective Punishment: The comprehensive nature of the blockade constitutes
collective punishment prohibited under Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
4.​ Humanitarian Access: The blockade impermissibly restricts humanitarian access
required under Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 70 of Additional
Protocol I (reflecting customary international law).

Turkey argues that these violations render the entire blockade unlawful, invalidating any
enforcement measures taken pursuant to it.

Alleged Violations of Human Rights Law

Turkey alleges that Israel's actions violated numerous human rights protected under
international conventions, including:

1.​ Right to Life: The killing of nine Turkish nationals aboard the MV Marmara II violated
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as the use of lethal
force was neither necessary nor proportionate.
2.​ Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment: The treatment of detained flotilla participants
allegedly involved physical abuse, sensory deprivation, denial of basic necessities, and
humiliating treatment constituting violations of the Convention Against Torture and Article
7 of the ICCPR.
3.​ Right to Liberty and Security: The detention of flotilla participants lacked proper legal
basis and procedural safeguards required under Article 9 of the ICCPR.
4.​ Right to Health: Both the blockade itself and the interdiction of vessels carrying medical
supplies violate the right to health under Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Turkey contends that Israel's human rights obligations applied extraterritorially to its actions in
international waters, as its forces exercised effective control over the vessels and their
passengers during the interdiction operation.

Humanitarian Law Breaches

Turkey claims that Israel violated several provisions of international humanitarian law:
 1.​ The principle of distinction, by failing to distinguish properly between civilians and
combatants during the boarding operation.
2.​ The principle of proportionality, by using force resulting in casualties disproportionate to
the military objective.
3.​ The obligation to allow humanitarian relief, by preventing direct delivery of humanitarian
assistance to Gaza.
4.​ Special protections for medical personnel and supplies, by intercepting vessels carrying
medical equipment and personnel.

Turkey argues that these violations occurred regardless of whether the Gaza situation is
classified as occupation, international armed conflict, or non-international armed conflict, as the
relevant provisions reflect customary international law applicable in all contexts.

State Responsibility for Deaths and Injuries

Turkey claims that Israel bears state responsibility for the deaths of nine Turkish nationals and
injuries to dozens of others during the flotilla interdiction. This responsibility arises from:

1.​ The actions of Israeli naval forces clearly attributable to the state.
2.​ The allegedly wrongful nature of the interdiction operation itself.
3.​ The excessive use of force during the boarding operation.
4.​ The failure to plan and execute the operation in a manner that minimized the risk to
civilian lives.

Turkey argues that no circumstances preclude the wrongfulness of these actions, as neither
necessity nor self-defense justifications are sustainable given the humanitarian nature of the
mission and the operation's execution.

Remedies Sought

Turkey requests that the Court adjudge and declare that Israel:

1.​ Violated international law through the unlawful use of force in international waters.
2.​ Violated freedom of navigation under customary international law.
3.​ Implemented and enforced an unlawful naval blockade.
4.​ Violated international humanitarian law obligations regarding humanitarian access and
protection of civilians.
5.​ Violated human rights obligations under relevant treaties.
6.​ Bears international responsibility for the deaths and injuries resulting from the interdiction
operation.

As remedies, Turkey seeks:

1.​ An order that Israel cease all unlawful conduct, including modification of the naval
blockade to ensure humanitarian access.
 2.​ Compensation for the families of those killed and injured during the operation.
3.​ Compensation for material damage to vessels and cargo.
4.​ A formal apology and acknowledgment of wrongdoing.
5.​ Guarantees of non-repetition.
6.​ Punitive damages reflecting the gravity of the violations.

ISRAEL'S DEFENSE
Israel's response to Turkey's claims presents both jurisdictional objections and substantive
defenses addressing the legality of the blockade, the enforcement operation, and the broader
context of Israel's security situation.

Jurisdiction and Admissibility Challenges

Israel raises several preliminary objections challenging the Court's jurisdiction and the
admissibility of Turkey's claims:

1.​ Treaty Basis: Israel contends that none of the treaties invoked by Turkey provide a valid
jurisdictional basis for the case. Israel is not a party to UNCLOS, denies that the dispute
properly concerns the interpretation or application of the Convention Against Torture,
and argues that the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR does not apply to the situation.​

2.​ Political Question: Israel characterizes the dispute as essentially political rather than
legal in nature, portraying Turkey's application as seeking to use the Court for political
purposes amid deteriorating bilateral relations.​

3.​ Non-Exhaustion of Diplomatic Remedies: Israel argues that Turkey did not genuinely
attempt to resolve the dispute through negotiation before filing its application, noting that
Turkey rejected Israel's offer to establish a joint investigation into the incident.​

4.​ Indispensable Third Party: Israel contends that adjudicating the dispute would
necessarily require determining rights and obligations of Hamas, which controls Gaza
but is not before the Court, rendering the case inadmissible under the Monetary Gold
principle.​

5.​ Abuse of Process: Israel characterizes Turkey's application as an abuse of the Court's
process, citing President Erdoğan's public statements suggesting the flotilla was
intended to provoke confrontation rather than deliver humanitarian aid.​

Legality of the Naval Blockade

On the merits, Israel defends the legality of its naval blockade of Gaza on multiple grounds:
 1.​ Armed Conflict Context: Israel maintains that it is engaged in an armed conflict with
Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2007 and has launched thousands of rockets
into Israeli territory. This armed conflict provides the legal basis for imposing a blockade
under the law of naval warfare.​

2.​ Compliance with Technical Requirements: Israel argues that its blockade satisfies all
technical requirements under customary international law as reflected in the San Remo
Manual:​

○​ It was formally declared and notified in January 2009

○​ It is effectively enforced by Israeli naval forces
○​ It is applied impartially to vessels of all states
○​ It includes provisions for humanitarian access through designated channels
3.​ Proportionality: Israel contends that the blockade is proportionate to the military
advantage of preventing weapons smuggling to Hamas and other militant groups. Israel
argues that any humanitarian impacts result primarily from Hamas's governance and
prioritization of military infrastructure over civilian needs.​

4.​ Humanitarian Access: Israel emphasizes that the blockade permits humanitarian
assistance through land crossings after security inspection, and that these alternative
delivery mechanisms satisfy obligations under IHL. Israel cites the significant volume of
aid entering Gaza through these channels and notes international recognition of these
routes, including the U.S.-built temporary pier.​

5.​ No Starvation Purpose: Israel categorically denies that the blockade aims to starve the
civilian population, pointing to the continued flow of food, medicine, and other essential
supplies through land crossings.​

Authority to Enforce in International Waters

Israel defends its legal authority to intercept the flotilla in international waters based on several
arguments:

1.​ Blockade Enforcement Powers: Under customary international law of naval warfare, a
blockading power may enforce its blockade in international waters against vessels
demonstrating clear intention to breach the blockade. Israel cites Article 67 of the San
Remo Manual and state practice supporting this position.​

2.​ Continuous Voyage Doctrine: Israel invokes the doctrine of continuous voyage, which
permits interdiction of vessels bound for third-party ports if their ultimate destination is
the blockaded area. Israel argues that the flotilla's publicly declared intention to sail
directly to Gaza justified interception.​
 3.​ Prior Warning: Israel notes that it issued multiple diplomatic communications and radio
warnings before resorting to physical interdiction, satisfying notice requirements under
maritime law.​

4.​ Security Necessity: Israel contends that security considerations necessitated

interdiction in international waters rather than closer to the Gaza coast, citing previous
weapon smuggling attempts and the risk of confrontation in crowded coastal waters.​

Self-Defense Justification

Israel characterizes its boarding operation as an exercise of self-defense at multiple levels:

1.​ Strategic Self-Defense: The blockade itself represents a defensive measure against the
security threat posed by Hamas acquisition of weapons and materials for attacks against
Israel.​

2.​ Operational Self-Defense: The interdiction operation aimed to prevent vessels from
breaching a security measure (the blockade) established for defensive purposes.​

3.​ Tactical Self-Defense: Israeli personnel used force during the boarding operation only
in response to violent resistance from passengers, particularly aboard the MV Marmara
II. Israel claims its commandos initially carried paintball guns and sidearms, resorting to
lethal force only when attacked with knives, metal rods, and other weapons.​

Israel emphasizes that five of six vessels were boarded without casualties, demonstrating that
violence occurred only where resistance was encountered.

Proportionality of Force Used

Israel defends the proportionality of force employed during the operation:

1.​ Graduated Approach: Israel maintains that its forces followed a graduated approach to
the interdiction, beginning with verbal warnings, followed by non-lethal methods, and
escalating to lethal force only when facing life-threatening resistance.​

2.​ Hostile Reception: Israel presents evidence that passengers aboard the MV Marmara II
prepared improvised weapons before the boarding and organized resistance groups,
suggesting premeditated violence rather than spontaneous defense.​

3.​ Defensive Response: Israel characterizes all lethal force used as defensive responses
to protect Israeli personnel who were attacked, beaten, stabbed, and in some cases
thrown overboard during the boarding attempt.​
 4.​ Restraint Demonstrated: Israel points to the limited casualties despite the chaotic
close-quarters confrontation as evidence of restraint by its forces, noting that specialized
counter-terrorism units trained to operate with precision conducted the operation.​

Humanitarian Access Arguments

Israel counters Turkey's humanitarian access claims with several arguments:

1.​ Alternative Routes Available: Israel emphasizes that established channels existed for
delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza through land crossings, rendering the flotilla's
insistence on direct maritime access unnecessary from a humanitarian perspective.​

2.​ Security Inspection Necessity: Israel defends its inspection requirements as essential
security measures given documented attempts to smuggle weapons and dual-use items
into Gaza disguised as humanitarian goods.​

3.​ Maritime Corridor: Israel notes that by mid-2024, a U.S.-established maritime corridor
already provided an alternative route for humanitarian deliveries, supervised by
international actors that could verify cargo contents.​

4.​ Political Motivation: Israel characterizes the flotilla as primarily a political demonstration
rather than a genuine humanitarian mission, citing statements by organizers and
Turkey's government explicitly framing it as a challenge to the blockade itself.​

Security Concerns and Evidence

Israel presents evidence supporting its security concerns:

1.​ Previous Weapons Smuggling: Israel documents multiple previous attempts to

smuggle weapons to Gaza by sea, including the Karine A incident (2002), Santorini
(2001), and several attempts discovered between 2015-2023.​

2.​ Hamas Military Capabilities: Israel provides intelligence assessments of Hamas's

military buildup, including rocket manufacturing facilities dependent on dual-use
materials that could be smuggled by sea.​

3.​ October 7 Attack Context: Israel emphasizes that the flotilla incident occurred less than
a year after the October 7, 2023 attack, during ongoing hostilities that heightened
security imperatives.​

4.​ Turkey-Hamas Relationship: Israel presents evidence of Turkey's political support for
Hamas, arguing that this relationship undermines the purported neutrality of the
 Turkish-organized flotilla.​

Israel concludes that its actions were lawful measures taken to protect its security in the context
of an ongoing armed conflict, implemented in a manner consistent with applicable international
law governing blockades, maritime interdiction, and use of force.

FACTUAL DISPUTES
Events Aboard the MV Marmara II

The parties present starkly different accounts of what transpired during the boarding of the MV
Marmara II, creating several key factual disputes for the Court to resolve:

Initiation of Violence: Turkey claims Israeli forces began using stun grenades, tear gas, and
live ammunition immediately upon approaching the vessel, before any resistance occurred.
Israel contends its forces faced violent resistance from the moment they attempted to board,
with passengers attacking using metal rods, knives, chairs, and other improvised weapons.

Preparedness for Resistance: Israel presents evidence that some passengers prepared
improvised weapons before the boarding attempt, suggesting organized resistance. Turkey
argues any items that could be construed as weapons were ordinary shipboard equipment and
that passengers were instructed to remain peaceful.

Use of Firearms: Turkey alleges Israeli commandos fired indiscriminately, including shots from
helicopters before boarding. Israel maintains that sidearms were drawn only after commandos
were attacked, with lethal force used solely in life-threatening situations.

Medical Assistance: Turkey claims Israel denied prompt medical assistance to wounded
passengers. Israel counters that it provided immediate treatment to all injured persons,
prioritized medical evacuations, and transferred the wounded to Israeli hospitals.

Treatment During Detention: Turkey alleges passengers were subjected to mistreatment

during detention, including physical abuse and humiliation. Israel maintains that all detainees
received proper treatment consistent with international standards, including medical care, food,
water, and consular access.

These factual disputes will require the Court to assess conflicting testimonies, video evidence,
forensic reports, and expert opinions to establish what actually occurred during the
confrontation.

Humanitarian Situation Assessment

The parties present divergent assessments of the humanitarian situation in Gaza at the time of
the flotilla incident:
Severity of Crisis: Turkey characterizes the situation as a "catastrophic humanitarian
emergency" with famine conditions in parts of Gaza and critical shortages of medicine, clean
water, and shelter. Israel acknowledges serious humanitarian challenges but disputes the most
extreme characterizations, arguing that basic necessities continued to enter Gaza through land
crossings.

Aid Delivery Volume: Israel presents data showing thousands of aid trucks entered Gaza
through land crossings in the months preceding the flotilla incident. Turkey counters that this
volume represented less than 30% of minimum requirements identified by UN agencies and that
bureaucratic obstacles and security restrictions severely hampered distribution.

Alternative Access Routes: Israel points to the functioning U.S.-established maritime corridor
and expanded land crossing capacity as evidence that alternative humanitarian access routes
existed. Turkey argues these alternatives were inadequate, subject to arbitrary restrictions, and
involved unacceptable delays for urgent humanitarian supplies.

Medical System Capacity: Turkey presents evidence of collapsed healthcare infrastructure,

critical shortages of medical supplies, and inability to treat wounded civilians. Israel
acknowledges healthcare challenges but argues they resulted primarily from Hamas's
misallocation of resources and damage from combat operations rather than from blockade
effects.

Nutritional Status: The parties dispute the extent of malnutrition in Gaza, with Turkey citing UN
assessments warning of famine conditions in northern areas and Israel questioning the
methodology of these assessments while emphasizing food supplies that continued to enter
through official channels.

Resolving these factual disputes will require the Court to evaluate reports from UN agencies,
humanitarian organizations, and other neutral observers regarding conditions on the ground at
the time of the incident.

Security Threat Evaluation

The parties present conflicting assessments of security threats that allegedly justified the
blockade and interdiction:

Weapons Smuggling Risk: Israel presents intelligence assessments and historical examples
of maritime weapons smuggling attempts to Gaza. Turkey questions the evidence of recent
smuggling by sea and argues that the flotilla's international visibility and inspection by Turkish
authorities before departure eliminated any reasonable suspicion of weapons transport.

Flotilla Participants' Intentions: Israel alleges that significant numbers of flotilla participants
had connections to extremist organizations and intended to provoke confrontation. Turkey
maintains that participants were primarily humanitarian workers, medical professionals,
journalists, and peace activists with no violent intentions.
Cargo Security Concerns: Israel cites "dual-use" concerns about certain cargo items that
could be repurposed for military use. Turkey argues that all cargo was transparently
documented, inspected prior to departure, and consisted solely of humanitarian necessities.

Hamas Involvement: Israel alleges Hamas involvement in organizing or supporting the flotilla.
Turkey denies any connection between the flotilla organization and Hamas, characterizing it as
an independent humanitarian initiative.

These differing security assessments will require the Court to evaluate intelligence reports,
historical patterns, and the specific flotilla preparations to determine whether Israel's security
concerns constituted reasonable grounds for interdiction.

Alternative Aid Routes Availability

The availability and adequacy of alternative routes for humanitarian aid delivery represents
another area of factual contention:

Land Crossing Efficiency: Israel maintains that land crossings were functioning adequately for
humanitarian delivery after security inspection. Turkey argues these crossings operated at
minimal capacity with excessive delays, arbitrary rejections, and impossible security
requirements.

U.S. Maritime Corridor: Israel points to the temporary pier established with U.S. support as
evidence of alternative maritime access. Turkey contends this facility had minimal capacity,
frequent operational interruptions, and was controlled by the same authorities imposing the
broader blockade.

Inspection and Transfer Protocols: The parties dispute the efficiency and necessity of Israel's
inspection procedures, with Israel describing them as streamlined security measures and
Turkey characterizing them as deliberately obstructive processes causing critical delays for
time-sensitive supplies.

Distribution Constraints: Even when aid entered Gaza, the parties dispute whether internal
distribution was possible, with Turkey citing destroyed roads, fuel shortages, and security
restrictions that prevented aid from reaching northern Gaza, and Israel arguing that Hamas
interference with distribution represented the primary obstacle.

Resolving these disputes will require the Court to examine the actual functioning of alternative
aid routes at the time of the flotilla incident, including processing times, volume capacities, and
practical accessibility.

PRECEDENTS AND SIMILAR CASES

The 2010 Mavi Marmara Incident: Legal Aftermath
The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident generated significant legal proceedings and investigations that
provide important precedents for the current case:

UN Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission (September 2010): Chaired by Judge Karl T.
Hudson-Phillips, this investigation concluded that Israel's interception was "clearly unlawful"
because it occurred in international waters. The report characterized the use of force as
"unnecessary, disproportionate, excessive and inappropriate," and found that the treatment of
passengers during detention violated international human rights law. Israel rejected the report
as biased and declined to cooperate with the investigation.

The Palmer Report (UN Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry, September 2011): This more
balanced assessment reached mixed conclusions. It found that Israel's naval blockade was
legal and a legitimate security measure but that the decision to intercept the flotilla at a great
distance from the blockade zone was "excessive and unreasonable." The report criticized both
Israel's use of force and the flotilla organizers' actions, noting that "more could have been done
to warn the flotilla of the risks it faced and to dissuade it from its course."

Turkish Criminal Proceedings: In 2012, a Turkish court indicted four senior Israeli officers in
absentia for their role in the raid. After the 2016 reconciliation agreement, Turkey passed
legislation terminating these proceedings.

International Criminal Court Preliminary Examination: The ICC Prosecutor conducted a

preliminary examination but ultimately decided in 2014 not to proceed with an investigation,
concluding that the incident was not of "sufficient gravity" to justify further action. This decision
was controversial and subject to criticism from human rights organizations.

Israeli Turkel Commission: Israel's domestic investigation concluded that the naval blockade
was legal under international law, that the interception was consistent with customary
international law, and that the use of force was justified by the violent resistance encountered.
The report was criticized by human rights organizations for lack of independence but praised by
some international observers for its detailed legal analysis.

These previous legal assessments established several key principles that may influence the
current case:

1.​ The legality of naval blockades depends on balancing military necessity against
humanitarian impact
2.​ Enforcement actions in international waters require particular justification
3.​ Proportionality must be assessed at both the policy level (blockade) and operational
level (enforcement)
4.​ Competing factual narratives require careful weighing of evidence from multiple sources

ICJ Jurisprudence on Use of Force

The Court has addressed questions regarding the use of force in several cases with potential
relevance to the current dispute:

Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania, 1949): Established that even states
exercising rights of intervention must respect principles of necessity and proportionality. The
Court found that the forcible minesweeping operation conducted by the UK in Albanian territorial
waters exceeded what was necessary, potentially applicable to analyzing Israel's boarding
operation in international waters.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States,
1986): Elaborated on principles regarding use of force, self-defense, and proportionality. The
Court emphasized that measures taken in self-defense must be proportional to the armed attack
and necessary to respond to it—standards that may apply to Israel's boarding operation if
characterized as a defensive measure.

Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States, 2003): Required a stringent necessity analysis for
measures taken in self-defense, potentially relevant to assessing whether Israel's interdiction in
international waters was necessary given available alternatives.

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda, 2005): Addressed questions of military necessity and proportionality in the context of
security concerns, possibly applicable to evaluating Israel's security justifications for the
blockade and its enforcement.

These precedents suggest the Court will likely apply a rigorous analysis of necessity and
proportionality to both the blockade itself and the specific enforcement action against the flotilla.

Blockades in Modern International Law

Modern jurisprudence and state practice regarding naval blockades provide relevant context:

The Gaza Blockade Opinion (Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May
2010, Part One, 2011): The Israeli Turkel Commission's detailed analysis of blockade law
concluded that Israel's blockade complied with international law requirements. While not an
international tribunal, this report has been cited in academic literature for its comprehensive
review of blockade law.

Humanitarian Impact Assessment: The San Remo Manual's requirements that blockades not
have the "sole purpose" of starving civilians or cause disproportionate humanitarian suffering
have been increasingly emphasized in legal scholarship. The International Committee of the
Red Cross and UN human rights bodies have stressed the need to assess blockades'
humanitarian impact when determining legality.

Contemporary State Practice: Recent blockades imposed by Saudi Arabia in Yemen

(2015-present) and the naval blockade aspects of the Qatar diplomatic crisis (2017-2021) have
reinforced the principle that while blockades remain permissible under certain circumstances,
their humanitarian impacts face increasing scrutiny under international law.

These developments suggest a trend toward more stringent humanitarian requirements for
lawful blockades, particularly regarding provisions for civilian access to essential goods and
services.

State Practice in Maritime Interdiction

Recent state practice in maritime interdiction operations provides comparative context:

Multinational Interdiction Operations: UN-authorized maritime interdiction operations in Libya

(2011) and against piracy off Somalia (2008-present) established procedures emphasizing
graduated use of force and prioritizing safety of civilian vessels. These operations typically
involve clear warnings, non-lethal measures, and use of force only as a last resort.

EU Operation Sophia: The European Union's Mediterranean operation to disrupt human

trafficking networks developed strict rules of engagement for intercepting vessels, including
detailed protocols for boarding operations that minimize risks to civilians.

Coalition Maritime Forces Operations: Multinational maritime security operations in the

Persian Gulf and Red Sea have developed best practices for maritime interdiction, including
standardized communication protocols, boarding procedures designed to prevent escalation,
and training focused on de-escalation techniques.

Comparison with these contemporary maritime interdiction practices may inform the Court's
assessment of whether Israel's boarding operation followed appropriate procedures to minimize
the risk of casualties.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER
As justices of the International Court of Justice preparing to adjudicate this case, several critical
questions warrant careful consideration:

Jurisdictional Issues

1.​ Does the Court possess jurisdiction under any of the treaty provisions invoked by
Turkey?
2.​ Can the Court adjudicate issues related to the blockade's legality without the
participation of Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza?
3.​ Have procedural prerequisites for bringing the case before the Court been satisfied?

Blockade Legality
 4. Does the Gaza situation constitute an international armed conflict or analogous
situation permitting the imposition of a naval blockade under international law?

5. Does Israel's blockade satisfy the technical requirements for lawful blockades under
customary international law?

6. Does the blockade's humanitarian impact render it disproportionate relative to

legitimate security objectives?

7. Has Israel fulfilled obligations to allow humanitarian access through alternative

routes?

Maritime Interdiction

8. Does the customary law of naval warfare permit interdiction of vessels in international
waters when enforcing a blockade?

9. Was the decision to intercept the flotilla 70 nautical miles from Gaza necessary and
proportionate?

10. What role should the vessels' declared intention to breach the blockade play in
assessing the legality of preemptive interdiction?

Use of Force

11. Was the force used during the boarding operation necessary and proportionate
under the circumstances?

12. How should the Court evaluate conflicting factual claims regarding who initiated
violence during the boarding? ​
​
​
Resources to use:
https://treaties.un.org — United Nations Treaty Collection

https://www.icj-cij.org — International Court of Justice

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en — International Committee of the Red Cross

https://www.aljazeera.com — Al Jazeera

https://www.haaretz.com — Haaretz

https://www.jpost.com — The Jerusalem Post

https://www.trtworld.com — TRT World

​