The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025

"The recent India and Pakistan crisis was the most significant between the two nuclear-armed
adversaries in several decades. It saw military action unfold that crossed previous thresholds in
geographic reach, systems employed, and impacts produced, and concluded with significant diplomatic
engagement, primarily by the United States"

~ Christopher Clary is an associate professor of political science at the University at Albany

The recent tensions between India and Pakistan have internationalized the Kashmir issue – something
that India secured and maintained after the Shimla agreement, downgraded India and tied it with
Pakistan (again); previously, they were insistent that Kashmir is a bilateral affair, and expected the world
to treat India combined with China. Now blinded by arrogance, miscalculations, and inflammatory Hindu
nationalism, Operation Sindoor has pushed India three decades behind in terms of foreign policy retreat.
The USA embarrassed Modi by informing the world that the US played the role in the ceasefire, hence
giving the self-propelled “Wishavguru” a reality check – that may lead to the selling of F-35 fighter jets,
leaving the French out, the way Americans dropped them in AUKUS.

Indo-Pakistan Relations: Key Takeaways from the Recent Escalation/Skirmish

1) India overestimated itself and underestimated Pakistan, therefore, the response to Pehalgam
was knee-jerk and against the norms of engagement between two nuclear-capable states.
2) Pakistan successfully deterred India with conventional weapons under the nuclear umbrella.
3) (lesson) Any aggression by India will face a response quid pro quo plus from Pakistan – the
military edge of India neutralized, full credit to the Pak Air Force.
4) Re-hyphenation of India-Pakistan in foreign capitals.
5) Kashmir internationalized, which was once an international issue, reduced a bilateral issue b/w
India and Pakistan after the Shimla agreement, and internal issue after the revocation of Article
370 by the Modi government in 2019.
6) Kashmir as a nuclear flash point (emphasized)
7) Significant loss of Indian prestige in foreign capitals – dehyphenation of India-China and
rehyphenation of India-Pakistan (a demotion of India – that’s why India has sent delegations to
the foreign capitals for damage control – follow Shashi Tharoor & Co.)
8) Pakistan didn’t provoke the crisis rather responded in defence.
9) Underscores that the nuclear deterrence is at variance with the Cold War model – we still have
the possibility of military confrontation (rationality and irrationality).
10) Possibility of future conflict under nuclear hangover.
11) South Asia witnessed an intense weapon use in 21st century, and the lethality will be even
severe than the recent episode.
12) For Modi, this is a serious strategic setback. He was trapped in a “commitment trap’ and
‘narrative trap’ and would face serious losses in domestic politics.
 13) India got a reality check of its great power ambitions and now feels isolated as friendless. Going
with Israel has a price that Modi’s India paid. As this is against the soft image of Secular and
Democratic India.
14) The water Issue has become a ticking bomb that can trigger a major war in the near future.
15) Indi’s involvement in transnational terrorism - killing in Pakistan and Canada resulted in the loss
of diplomatic support.
16) South Asia as testing ground – Chinese plate forms and systems Vs. Western/Israel systems.
17) Pakistan has to stay vigilant for future ventures from the Indian side.
18) India could not garner international support; Pakistan did. The relative gain of Pakistan vs. India,
which disturbed India.

Future Scenarios

1) India would do it again.

2) India would go for water disruption, destined to flow towards Pakistan.
3) India would support Terror groups to make a case against Pakistan.
4) India would accelerate diplomatic efforts against Pakistan on international fronts – UNSC.
5) Dedicate efforts to drag Pakistan into the FATF Grey List.
6) Appropriate a terror event with alleged involvement of people with Pakistani passports – be
they Afghans or Indians. But to portray them as Pakistanis to deprive Pakistan of European
support.
7) Using Pakistani diaspora against Pakistan – Balochistan or KP-related issues. (Afghans would
help them)
8) Investing in Baloch dissidence – recognizing a Balochistan government in exile.

The Most Important Issues that would cloud the future between India and Pakistan

1. Indus Water Treaty

2. Terrorism
3. Kashmir

Regional Implications and Policy Options

1) This lack of support from the US to India is temporary; the USA will continue to look towards
India for the China factor in the Indo-Pacific region.
2) Pakistan should not take the Kashmir mediation stance of the USA very seriously. India would
counter it in the next few months.
3) Pakistan should maintain a dignified line with the USA, and it should not offer its mineral wealth
to appease the USA.
4) Pakistan is a key player in the Indo-Chinese and US-China rivalry – it must exploit it.
5) China is a key player in South Asian and Asian politics. Chinese influence has grown in Asian
affairs.
 6) An Axis is emerging based on economic connectivity and counter terrorism: BRI, CPEC, Eurasian
economics. See Pak-China-Afghanistan, Pak-Russia, China-Russia economic dynamics. Also see
Pakistan, Iran, Turkiye and Azebijan etc.
7) Pakistan is an important player, and it should reach Russia (Pakistan has already), but emphasis
added, asking them not to alter the power asymmetry in South Asia by supporting. When
needed, Pakistan should use the China factor to persuade Russia to do so.
8) Pakistan should also reach Africa and the coastline of the Indian Ocean, where we have invested
recently through diplomatic offices.
9) Pakistan should engage Afghanistan and the Middle East as a peace seeker and builder, and a
regional stabilizer, to deprive India of the strategic space. Engaging with the Middle East and
Africa through Pakistan’s ports’ potential will help Pakistan have a say in securing supply lines in
the India Ocean. (CPEC will and has enhanced Pakistan’s profile).

Pakistan continues to increase its tally of diplomatic gains on the international stage one after the other.
Following the US-mediated ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May, India, in a self-boasting display,
pronounced that it would henceforth treat future acts of terror as an act of war, setting the threshold
very low and unreasonable. This posture was grounded in the self-serving, however irrational,
assumption that the international community would unquestionably endorse India’s changes against
Pakistan. However, it proved to be a rhetoric with a serious disconnect from geopolitical reality in the
rapidly changing world. In the last week, India got a reality check when it refused to endorse the SCO
declaration over its silence over Pehalgam. Additionally, the QUAD foreign ministers, while condemning
the Pehalgam incident, refrained from attributing blame to Pakistan, an unprecedented diplomatic
failure of India, reflecting the international community’s growing reluctance to subscribe to India’s anti-
Pakistan diplomatic narratives aimed at Isolating Pakistan.

The Next War Between India and Pakistan

Why New Delhi’s Failure to Deter Islamabad Will Fuel Future Violence ~ AQIL SHAH

The recent fighting represents a significant escalation in the cross-border disputes that have periodically
flared between India and Pakistan. Unlike India’s limited punitive strikes in the past, this offensive
pressed deeper into Pakistani territory. India’s Operation Sindoor ranged far beyond Kashmir into
Punjab, Pakistan’s heartland, eventually hitting not just the facilities of militant groups but also military
targets, including air bases.

With its strikes, the Indian government hoped to demonstrate strength to a public that wanted revenge
for the terrorist attack in Kashmir. But by venturing deeper into Pakistan and hitting a broad array of
targets, India also wanted to reestablish deterrence and discourage Pakistan’s military from backing
militant groups active in Indian territory.

In that effort, India will probably be disappointed. Rather than deterring its rival, India precipitated a
retaliation that ended up burnishing the Pakistani military’s reputation and boosting its domestic
popularity.
Paradoxically, India’s retribution has handed the Pakistani army its biggest symbolic victory in recent
decades. And that will hardly discourage Islamabad from reining in the proxy war against New Delhi or
from risking future flare-ups between these two nuclear-armed state

India took the unprecedented step of unilaterally suspending the Indus Water Treaty, an agreement
brokered by the World Bank in 1960 to manage the flow of water critical for hydropower, irrigation, and
agriculture in Pakistan. The treaty had endured several wars and militarized disputes between the two
countries, but no longer.

The Modi government eventually coupled this diplomatic act with its military attack on a slew of targets
in Pakistani territory. It may have hoped that these efforts would assuage the domestic outrage over
Pahalgam without provoking a wider conflict. But here New Delhi miscalculate. Indian offcials
underestimated how much the Pakistani military needed to demonstrate its own war readiness and
resolve, both to India and to its domestic audience. That amounted to a major symbolic victory for
Islamabad.

It revealed the limitations of India’s presumed air supremacy, renewing the Pakistani military’s
confidence that it can hold its own in a limited conflict despite India’s conventional superiority.

Worse for India, its attempt to reestablish deterrence backfired. New Delhi hoped that a punitive
response, backed by the threat of economic coercion, might discourage Pakistan from engaging in proxy
warfare. Instead, the recent hostilities will likely have the opposite effect.

Although India has adopted a “no first use” policy since it tested nuclear weapons in 1998, senior Indian
officials have indicated in recent years that the country’s nuclear restraint is not cast in stone and that
India may review the policy in the future.

As the weaker South Asian power (in conventional terms), Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy.
Instead, it has maintained the right to strike first if faced with imminent defeat or major territorial losses
to India.

After India enunciated its “cold start” doctrine, a plan to launch a rapid conventional incursion to
capture Pakistani territory as punishment for cross-border terrorism, in 2004, Pakistan further lowered
the nuclear threshold by threatening to deploy tactical nuclear weapons against Indian forces on its
territory.

After India hit key Pakistani air bases, including the strategically located Nur Khan base close to the
army’s general headquarters and the country’s nuclear command center, Pakistan did not just retaliate
conventionally. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif immediately summoned an emergency meeting
of the National Command Authority, which oversees the country’s nuclear arsenal and is tasked with
approving the use of the weapons, to send a calculated message to India—and everybody else.

Trump has claimed that his administration did not just broker a ceasefire but also prevented a “nuclear
conflict.”
An optimistic view of the confrontation would be that both sides responded with appropriate and
measured retaliation without overplaying their hands.

Put differently, the two rivals did not want to risk the catastrophic costs of a nuclear war and managed
to find a timely off-ramp by inviting American mediation. (To be sure, India denies that the United States
played a major role in producing the cease-fire, a rhetorical position that reflects New Delhi’s insistence
that its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir is merely a bilateral issue, not one that needs
“internationalization.”)

Although the crisis did not spiral to the nuclear level, its rapid escalation showed the paradoxical effects
of the countries’ ownership of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence can reduce the probability of a full-
scale conventional war but it can also breed instability by widening the space for lower levels of conflict,
including skirmishes and terrorism. In other words, the possession of nuclear weapons may have
incentivized risky confrontations that pass just below the ambiguous nuclear threshold.

No matter how rational Indian and Pakistani leaders may be, the risk of miscalculation or
misunderstanding in the absence of reliable crisis communication channels makes every future flare-up
more dangerous.

The cease-fire is by no means a lasting peace. Both sides have grounds to claim victory that can, for at
least some time, keep a lid on tensions. Pakistan’s military can boast of balancing India’s conventional
power, reviving international focus on the Kashmir dispute, and re-hyphenating India with Pakistan.

Indian TV news channels took war hysteria to a new peak by concocting or amplifying falsehoods,
including strikes on the port of Karachi and the supposed capture of Pakistani cities. The jostling
jingoistic media narratives further exacerbated tensions amid a lack of direct communication.

The introduction of armed drones has opened a new front in the confict. As the crisis unfolded, fleets of
loitering (self-detonating) drones launched by both sides created widespread public panic and fear.

Drone technology will likely shape both escalation and restraint in future crises. India and Pakistan can
more readily deploy drones and exacerbate tensions without the political and military risks associated
with the use of manned aircraft.

The act of intercepting or destroying drones will probably be less escalatory than the shooting down of
conventional aircraft. But the use of drones in great numbers widens the remit of any future clash, in
turn widening the possibility of escalation.

Despite the cease-fire, New Delhi has asserted that it has merely paused its offensive. It could resume its
attacks at any time to punish future incidents of cross-border terrorism. A single terror attack could
destabilize the region by triggering another cycle of retaliation and counterretaliation.

For now, Indian policymakers still likely believe that the Pakistani military has been at least temporarily
deterred from future adventurism because of its higher expected costs. That is not how Pakistan’s
generals see it. They have emerged out of the crisis stronger and more determined to stand up to India,
with their domestic position bolstered and their battlefield reputation enhanced.

Cooler heads would exercise restraint from a proxy war because Pakistan can ill afford repeated
confrontations with an economically and militarily more powerful rival—nor to court the risk of nuclear
escalation. India, too, should not want perpetual conflict with Pakistan when it seeks to be a great
power. But any respite from violence will likely be temporary as long as one side still believes that it has
something to gain from assailing the other.

Pakistan-India Relations by Ashraf Jehangir Qazi

THE current state of India-Pakistan relations determines the possibilities for dialogue, sustaining such
dialogue, and a positive outcome of dialogue.

The prospect on all three counts today is extremely bleak, since there is no apparent interest among the
ruling elites of either country in dialogue for the resolution of the core issues. As the smaller country,
Pakistan should have more interest in reducing tensions. However, in the aftermath of the four-day
conflict, there is even less interest in dialogue in both countries.

The question of immediate interest in both countries is whether a second round of hostilities is likely,
and, if so, what outcomes may be anticipated. This is a horrendous state of affairs considering both
countries are nuclear weapons powers that may or may not have the necessary control over the so-
called escalation ladder, especially in a conflict that in a second round would expand beyond the border
regions.

This alone should justify exploring all possibilities for productive dialogue. However, even among
seasoned diplomats, the effort to rise above zero-sum exchanges is largely absent. This is because we
have so completely internalised mutually exclusive and hostile narratives that the costs of continuing
with the present unavailing situation seem far less than the political risks of seeking diplomatic
breakthroughs.

This is a losing situation for both countries and for South Asia.

This is a losing situation for both countries and for South Asia. The region faces enormous challenges,
including avoiding the spectre of nuclear conflict; mitigating and overcoming the fatal consequences of
irreversible climate change; the whole range of good governance, development, and human rights
issues; transforming South Asia into a hub of global economic activity, etc. Accordingly, the whole region
has a critical stake in the transformation of India-Pakistan relations and the revival of Saarc from its
moribund state.

India sees Pakistan as a ‘structurally’ failing state with which any longer-term engagement is more or
less irrelevant. Pakistan sees India acting as a regional hegemon instead of a first among equals, and
being frustrated by the strategic entry of China into South Asia as an effective counterforce to India,
which China sees as a US proxy. Within this unpromising scenario, India and Pakistan, not without
justification, see each other engaged in a range of mutually destabilising activities.
For such a process of normalization to be sustainable, it will be essential for both countries to take
measures aimed at building a minimum of mutual trust to fuel the process of accommodation,
compromise, and eventually, significant normalisation.

The Indians with justification see Pakistan’s military as institutionally unwilling to allow a lasting
breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations, as the prevailing hostility facilitates its control of Pakistan’s
politics. With equal justification, Pakistanis see the BJP and Modi’s electoral winning strategy of
Hindutva, hostility to Pakistan, repression and refusal to negotiate on Kashmir, and threats to divert the
Indus waters as equally insuperable obstacles to normalisation.

an India-Pakistan normalisation process should in no way hinder the further deepening of Pakistan’s
relations with China, which does not see itself as an enemy or rival of India as long as the latter does not
ally itself with the US against China. Involving the US or the Gulf countries in India-Pakistan relations
would be thoroughly counterproductive.

South Asian Quad

States are avoiding hardcore military alliances and embracing like-minded countries for issue-based
cooperation like the Quad and I2U2.

Pakistan, with China’s help, established stronger cooperation with two important regional countries —
Afghanistan and Bangladesh. While the Strategic Dialogue Forum of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan was
established a decade ago, it has gained prominence recently due to regional geopolitical dynamics.

In May, the trilateral dialogue culminated in improved diplomatic ties between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Similarly, in June, Bangladesh, China and Pakistan held trilateral talks, during which they
pledged to enhance cooperation in various spheres. It seems Pakistan is eager to establish a ‘South
Asian Quad’ — a forum fundamentally immune to Indian interventions.

Why is Pakistan eager to establish minilateral forums?

First, Islamabad is concerned about Saarc’s ineffectiveness. This South Asian forum for regional
cooperation has not held a summit-level meeting for over a decade. New Delhi’s decision to boycott the
summit in Islamabad, and later, its consistent refusal to revive Saarc, dashed Islamabad’s hopes for
regionalism. Furthermore, New Delhi’s eagerness to strengthen Bimstec (Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) as a parallel to Saarc pushed Pakistan to seek
options beyond the South Asian forum.

Second minilateral forums deliver quick results, because they are generally established for specific
issues. The trilateral forum of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan has achieved several milestones in the
recent past. China has agreed to build the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan railway project. This
strategic forum has also helped mitigate irritants between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These successes
have encouraged Pakistan to push for a similar forum with Bangladesh.

Minilateral forums deliver quick results

Third, Islamabad considers China a stabilising factor in South Asia. Beijing’s ability to challenge Indian
influence in South Asia has been viewed positively by Islamabad. Beijing’s role in South Asia has been
significantly enhanced during the past decade. Except for Bhutan and India, all South Asian countries are
signatories to the Belt and Road Initiative. China has pledged over $100 billion in these countries in
various capacities. Therefore, Beijing has greater stakes in South Asia. In Saarc’s absence, Pakistan is free
to bring Beijing into the South Asian equation.

Fourth, the regional geopolitical environment is also conducive for such a forum. In 2016, India’s boycott
of the Saarc summit in Islamabad was supported by Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Today, the
altered domestic political environment of these countries has changed their attitude towards Pakistan.
Bangladesh’s leadership has repeatedly echoed its desire for Saarc’s revival. Pakistan’s proactive
approach, growing calls for Saarc’s revival by member states, and India’s refusal to revive Saarc have
created fertile ground for alternative forums.

Naturally, New Delhi is concerned about these developments in its neighbourhood. For New Delhi,
creating such forums would be tantamount to its ‘strategic encirclement’. New Delhi has always viewed
South Asia as its primary sphere of influence, and China’s growing influence in the region is a major
concern for it. Although New Delhi could repair its ties with smaller South Asian states if it wanted to,
the temptation of economic and strategic cooperation with the China-Pakistan duo might be too much
to ignore.

Whether China and Pakistan continue to engage South Asian states by establishing strategic dialogue
forums or create a ‘South Asian Quad’, the major concern will remain the sustainability of such a
platform. In Bangladesh’s case, the interim government seems eager to be part of such forums, but will
the next elected government there continue to cooperate with similar enthusiasm? Secondly, New
Delhi’s strategic reaction to such arrangements will also determine the future prospects of such forums.

Saarc’s future
FOR nearly a decade, Saarc has lain dormant, a victim of India’s stubborn refusal to engage with
Pakistan. The platform became dysfunctional after New Delhi chose to boycott the Islamabad summit in
2016, and a few other countries followed suit.

But South Asia’s vast potential cannot be held hostage forever by India. This is perhaps why recent
reports of Pakistan, China and Bangladesh possibly exploring a new regional bloc generated
considerable excitement, including across our eastern border.

Islamabad has for now publicly reiterated its commitment to Saarc, signalling that it still believes in
inclusive regionalism. Diplomatically, this puts the ball in India’s court: it is now up to New Delhi to
recognise that reviving the forum, and not fragmenting the region with its rivalries, is the path to
unlocking South Asia’s untapped potential. Saarc was a promising platform for economic and cultural
integration, but it has decidedly failed to emulate Asean’s success, even though that is what it had
originally aspired to do.
The platform’s charter makes it compulsory for all states to attend summits at the level of heads of
government or state. India chose to exploit this when it led a boycott of the Islamabad summit in 2016.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has consistently championed Saarc’s potential, even in strained times.

Perhaps New Delhi needs a reminder that there was a time in the 1990s when Pakistan was tempted to
do what it did in 2016 but chose prudence instead. In 1995, with tensions between India and Pakistan at
a high, then prime minister Benazir Bhutto did not wish to attend the Eighth Saarc Summit in New Delhi.
The then president Farooq Leghari was nonetheless dispatched in her stead, reflecting Islamabad’s
commitment to the platform and the process.

Today, Pakistan is reaffirming its dedication to Saarc. It is a vital mechanism to address shared
challenges such as poverty, climate change and trade barriers. But if India continues to choose
disengagement and obstruct progress, it should reconsider its stance without hesitation. With the global
economy experiencing upheaval, and conflict over dwindling resources growing intense, there is
strength to be found in numbers. With or without India, South Asia must forge ahead.

The four-day war has established numerous new normals:

Masood khan is a former ambassador of Pakistan to the US, UN and China

1) If India commits aggression, Pakistan will retaliate massively and punitively. If Pakistan’s very
existence and sovereignty are put at risk, Pakistan’s response will be disproportionate.
2) India has declared that any terrorist attack within minutes will be attributed to Pakistan and
without waiting for any investigation and corroboration, it will attack Pakistan.
3) India would target civilians in Pakistan and call them terrorists to justify its aggression.
4) The myth of Indian military supremacy has been shattered. Pakistan has established its parity or
preeminence in the conventional realm. Strategically, India and Pakistan are on par.
5) The Pakistan-China dyad has proved its upper edge on the India-West combine in military
technologies and platforms – fighter jets, missiles, drones, loitering munitions and tools of cyber
warfare.
6) Hybrid warfare will dominate future conflicts, blending conventional and non-conventional
tactics. For India and Pakistan, this means war could persist even in peacetime, with India
launching attacks unpredictably.
7) The risk of nuclear war in South Asia is real. A conflict between India and Pakistan could trigger a
global catastrophe. Major powers now recognise this threat as a potential apocalypse with
worldwide consequences.
8) If an India-Pakistan war spirals into the nuclear realm, major powers would intercede to defuse
the crisis and bring the two nations back from the precipice.
9) It has become clear that there will be no peace in South Asia without resolving the Jammu and
Kashmir dispute. India’s policies to brutalise the state’s population and merge it into its
federation have failed.
10) In diplomacy, mediation is widely practised. US President Donald Trump, foreseeing the
consequences of the escalating war, intervened to broker a ceasefire. India agreed to, as US
 Secretary Marco Rubio put it, “start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site”. Now, after
facing a backlash from his own party and opposition, Modi is trying to wriggle out of that
commitment.
11) Narrativisation during war would have salience not just between combatants, as always, but in
the international information domain. The recent India-Pakistan war demonstrated that the
authenticity of narratives by traditional and new media will be fact-checked, and the side
pedalling fake news and footage will lose.
12) India’s doctrines of Cold Start and surgical strikes have all been debunked. Its much-touted new
normal is aspirational at best and a damp squib at worst.

India’s Great-Power Delusions by Ashley Tellis

Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to help India rise as a great power. During
George W. Bush’s presidency, Washington agreed to a major deal with New Delhi that ordered support
for India’s civilian nuclear program despite the country’s controversial development of nuclear weapons.

Under the Obama administration, the United States and India began defense industrial cooperation that
aimed to boost the latter’s military capabilities and help it project power.

During President Donald Trump’s first term, the United States started sharing sensitive intelligence with
India and made it eligible to receive advanced technologies previously reserved only for American allies.

Under President Joe Biden, Washington gave New Delhi sophisticated fighter jet engine technology.
Each of these recent administrations deepened diplomatic, technological, and military cooperation with
India, making good on Bush’s promise “to help India become a major world power in the twenty first
century.”

The rationale for this pledge was simple. Washington wanted to transcend the rancor of the Cold War
era that had divided the two great democracies. With the demise of the Soviet Union, India and the
United States no longer had reason to be on opposite sides.
Furthermore, they were increasingly tied by deep people-to-people connections, as Indian immigrants
played a larger role in shaping the American economy and New Delhi’s own post–Cold War economic
reforms invited American firms and capital to Indian markets.

Beneath these shifts lay a deeper geopolitical opportunity: Indian and U.S. offcials recognized that they
had many shared interests, including combating Islamist terrorism and, more important, addressing the
dangers of a rising China while protecting the liberal international order.

Washington correctly concluded that a stronger India would make for a stronger United States.
But India and the United States are not aligned on all issues. New Delhi does not want a world in which
Washington is perpetually the sole superpower. Instead, it seeks a multipolar international system, in
which India would rank as a genuine great power. It aims to restrain not just China—the near-term
challenge—but also any country that would aspire to singular, hegemonic dominance, including the
United States.
India believes that multipolarity is the key to both global peace and its own rise. It obsessively guards its
strategic autonomy, eschewing formal alliances and maintaining ties with Western adversaries such as
Iran and Russia, even as it has grown closer to the United States.

This behavior is intended to help advance a multipolar international order. But it may not be effective or
even realistic. Although India has grown in economic strength over the last two decades, it is not
growing fast enough to balance China, let alone the United States, even in the long term.

In military terms, it is the most signigcant conventional power in South Asia, but here, too, its
advantages over its local rival are not enormous: in fighting in May, Pakistan used Chinese supplied
defense systems to shoot down Indian aircraft. With China on one side and an adversarial Pakistan on
the other, India must always fear the prospect of an unpalatable two-front war.

Meanwhile, at home, the country is shedding one of its main sources of strength—its liberal democracy
—by embracing Hindu nationalism. This evolution could undermine India’s rise by intensifying
communal tensions and exacerbating problems with its neighbors, forcing it to redirect security
resources inward to the detriment of outward power projection.

The country’s illiberal pivot further undermines the rules-based international order that has served it so
well.
India’s relative weakness, its yearning for multipolarity, and its illiberal trajectory mean that it will have
less global influence than it desires even when it can justifiably consider itself a great power.

Becoming the fourth largest economy in the world should herald a dramatic expansion of a country’s
clout, but that will not be the case for India. Even by 2047—the centenary of its independence—it may
still have to rely on foreign partners to ward off Chinese power.
And because of its perennial discomfort with alliances, or even with close partnerships, securing
external support could be challenging, especially as the United States grows more transactional in its
foreign policy—and also if Washington comes to fear New Delhi as a competitor. In the coming decades,
India will grow undeniably stronger but less able to wield that strength in meaningful ways, with less
global sway.