God and Evil: A Study of Some Relations Between Faith and Morals

Author(s): Henry David Aiken

Source: Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Jan., 1958), pp. 77-97
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379199
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ETHICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

Volume LXVIII JANUARY 1958 Number 2

GOD AND EVIL: A STUDY OF SOME RELATIONS

BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS

HENRY DAVID AIKEN

Teach us to care and not to care.-Ask Wednesday

I theology whose connection with the faith

T O OUTSIDERS, there has always been of the prophets, the apostles, and the fa-
a grim fascination in the fact that thers of the church remains problematic.
Western monotheism, which arro- The problem of evil is of a different or-
gates to its God exclusive power to re- der. What it concerns is the ultimate
deem us from evil, should itself be so consistency of a form of life, and what it
bedeviled by the apparently simple yet threatens is the faith animating that
evident proposition that something is form of life. No solution to it would ex-
evil. But even such comparative insiders tend by a hair's breadth either our grasp
as Augustine and Dostoevski have been of relations of ideas or our knowledge
obsessed by the irony implicit in the fact concerning matters of fact. It would be
that, having hopefully begun by justify- more appropriate, indeed, to speak, not
ing themselves to God, they must end of solutions to the problem of evil, but of
despairingly by having to find excuses modes of absolution from it.
for him. Between man's justice and God's In these gay and gaudy days of exis-
Justice, as Abraham and Job discovered, tentialism and neo-orthodoxy, such re-
there falls a shadow whose darkness be- marks may seem merely to underline the
comes only the more inscrutable as the dangers of consecutive thinking about
light of human reason is trained upon it. religious and ethical problems. Such was
This enigma, or paradox, which marks not their intention. A problem does not
the profoundest crisis of faith and morals transcend logic merely because we can
that the monotheist knows, is usually re- call it practical or existential.-The in-
ferred to as "the problem of evil." It consistency between the faith and the
might, with more propriety, be labeled conscience of the traditional monotheist
"the problem of faith and conscience." cannot be removed, certainly, by the
Compared with it, the metaphysical per- methods available to empirical science,
plexities inherent in the notions of a casamathematics, or linguistic philosophy.
sui or a necessary being are, in Locke's But the very fact that it can be stated
sense, trifling. The latter belong to an with some precision ought to be sufficient
episode in the history of a rationalistic evidence that religious utterances, as well
77

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 78 ETHICS

as moral judgments, occasionally have Before replying to this objection, it is

ponderable implications. And our recog- worth remarking that it is not merely
nition that it is an inconsistency is at the atheists and skeptics who have posed the
same time an implicit acknowledgment problem of evil. It is already present in
of the rational demand that it be re- Job, and it is expressed with great elo-
moved. quence by Augustine and by Dostoev-
There is nothing very devastating in ski. Such an ad hominem is, however, for-
these truisms save for those who are mally question-begging, and, formally, I
tempted to protect their faith by talking stake nothing on it. It is more germane
nonsense about their God. "If you make to inquire whether conversion has any
up a self-contradictory sentence," as Pro- meaning apart from the possibility of
fessor Anthony Flew has observed, "it apostasy or, as I say, "deconversion."
won't miraculously become sense just be- (The proper word. "perversion," has lost
cause you have put the word 'God' as its its usefulness in this connection.) It
subject." It should be added that ob- is also necessary to point out in this
scurity and obfuscation do not suddenly connection that what we call "faith" is,
become edifying when transposed into a in most instances, merely an aspiration
theological key. Opinions may differ as in that direction. If "outsiders" cannot
to the regenerative value of continual meaningfully question the existence or
preoccupation with matters of ultimate the goodness of God, then, since all of us
concern. But there should be no room for are virtual outsiders, who is in a posi-
doubt that ultimate concerns which can- tion to assert this? Limiting questions
not be consistently formulated are of- occur to every man, and every man,
fenses against reason and hence offenses "meaningfully" or not, has doubts about
against the human spirit itself. the goodness of God and, through them,
A more serious question is whether, about His existence. Existentially, de-
within the existential context of faith, conversion, or loss of faith, is a constant
the problem of evil may not be unreal. threat which any person can, at best,
It has been said that the question whetheronly hope to overcome. Even those like
God exists has no meaning for the un- Nietzsche, who announce that "God is
converted, but that for the unconverted dead," may be said to know whereof they
it does not arise. It has likewise been ar- speak. Animals may lack the power to
gued that the question whether God's understand religious concepts but, if so,
will is good has no significance, since forthis is not owing to any lack of faith on
men of faith his will is, as we say, "good their part. On the contrary, lack of faith
by definition," whereas for unbelievers,is, logically, as sound evidence of under-
who deny that there is a God, any ques- standing as faith itself.
tion concerning the merits of his will is We tend, I think, to confuse the issue
meaningless. Within the context of re- by not bearing in mind the distinction
ligious faith, which is the only context between faith and creed. No problem
where such matters could profitably be about God's goodness or existence is ex-
discussed, there is, in brief, no such thing plicitly acknowledged by those entrusted
as the problem of evil. Outside that con-with the formulation of a creed. Why
text it is only a formal dilemma which should it be? It does not follow from this,
has no interest save as an exercise in ele-however, that such problems have no
mentary logic. meaning for those who profess the creed.

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 79

For a Dostoevski, the problem of evil It is to be understood that no claims are

is not so much the problem of Christian- made here for the merits of the theology
ity as it is his problem. The creed is a involved; from this point of view, my
formula which is acceptable or not, de- exposition will be as neutral as I can
pending upon its ability to satisfy the make it. In short, I adopt this formula-
joint demands of faith, conscience, and tion for purposes of analysis and only,
reason. These are not, as it were, the de- therefore, as a working model. Many re-
mands of self-activating and dissociated finements might easily be introduced into
spheres of activity which are impervious it, but I am convinced that they would
to what transpires in the rest of life. They merely complicate our discussion with-
are the interlocking demands of individ- out increasing our understanding of the
ual men or groups of men. There is a concepts and the propositions involved.
sense in which we may perhaps agree As here understood, the problem of
that the heart has reasons which the in- evil tends to arise whenever there is a
tellect knows not of; but they are reasons disposition on the part of anyone to as-
nonetheless, and what does not satisfy sent to both of the following proposi-
the hearts (and minds) of many men is tions: (a) there is an almighty and om-
the possibility that anything can be evil niscient being who is a perfectly good
if there is an almighty God who is also person and who alone is God; and (b)
perfectly good. there is something in the finite universe
created by that being which is evil. For
II
purposes of discussion, they may be re-
It is not my intention in this paper to ferred to respectively as (a) the theolog-
offer any particular form of relief from ical thesis, and (b) the ethical thesis.
the problem of evil. My present interest Their inconsistency may be seen in the
in the problem is philosophical: I desire following way: By hypothesis, an al-
merely to consider what sort of problem mighty and omniscient being can do
it is and to determine the significance of whatever it wills. But any perfectly good
the various theological or ethical moves person, so far as he can, will do good and
that have been made in coping with it. prevent evil. Now, if there is a being that
This investigation belongs less to theol- is at once almighty, omniscient, and per-
fectly good, it will be both able and will-
ogy, which is itself a form of religious dis-
course, than to the philosophy of religioning to prevent evil. On the other hand,
and of morals--to the logical analysis, if something is evil, it must be concluded
that is, of religious and moral utterances that there is no such being, since a per-
and of the forms of life of which they fectly good person would prevent it if he
are at once a manifestation and a part. could, and an almighty and omniscient
There are many ways of stating the being could prevent it if it would. Either,
problem of evil, depending upon the pre- then, there is no such being or nothing
cise nature of the faith in question and is evil. But since, by hypothesis, only
the particular evils, natural or moral, such a being is God, we are forced to con-
whose existence is acknowledged. Because clude either that there is no God or else
of its comparative brevity, it will be con- that there is nothing which is evil.
venient to present here a modified re- This dilemma, however, is a serious
statement of the problem as Philo formu- problem only for the believer who ac-
lates it in Part X of Hume's Dialogues. cepts or aspires to accept both the thee-

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 80 ETHICS

logical and the ethical theses. His predic- the worshipful. In theology, as in ethics,
ament may be expressed in the following definitions are commonly misleading.
way: Both propositions seem to him to Where they occur, they serve not as
be certain; the theological thesis is certi- explications of the use of expressions,
fied by faith, the ethical thesis by con- but as devices for the focusing and di-
science. If he abides by the deliverances recting of sentiments or attitudes. They
of conscience his faith is imperiled; but explain nothing, but signify much, and
if he accepts the faith to which he aspires, what they signify is not something about
he must evidently disavow what, in con- the nature of things in themselves but
science, he knows to be evil. How can he rather the drift of our own sense of what
deny what his conscience tells him to be is holy or worshipful. It is in this way, I
evil? Yet how can he deny what by faith take it, that we must understand how
he believes to be God? Does his con- such theologians as Aquinas can argue
science delude him, or is his faith some- that God has no essence, while at the
how a mistaken or even a wicked faith? same time discoursing at length about
What can he do? In principle, he may his inherent power, personality, and
modify his conception of God; he may goodness.
change his attitude toward what he has The first part of the theological thesis
considered to be evil; he may try to find may be called the metaphysical claim.
excuses for God under the auspices of What it asserts is that there is an al-
theodicy; or, finally, he may try to live mighty and omniscient being. Now the
with his contradiction as an honest man metaphysical attributes of omniscience
who despairs of his soul's integrity. What- and omnipotence are not, of course, en-
ever he does, his way of life will never be tirely free from internal difficulties of
quite the same again, for something that their own. It has been argued that no
has hitherto been a cornerstone of that consistent idea of them can be formed at
way of life has now been shaken to its all, and that when we stretch the notions
foundations. of potency or power and knowledge to
infinity and undertake to conceive them
III in absolute or unconditional terms we
Before examining the moves that may always land in paradox and confusion. I
be made in order to relieve the problem myself am inclined to think that any
of evil, it will be necessary to give some terms which have a persistent and com-
attention to the theses themselves. For mon use also have or gradually acquire
our understanding of the problem and a meaning, and that if we bear in mind
the moves themselves will depend entirely the context in which they are character-
upon what we take the propositions that istically employed, we will usually find
give rise to it to mean. an idea which is neither vacuous nor in-
The theological thesis has several parts consistent. I intend this, however, less
which are not always clearly distin- as a "theory" than as a heuristic
guished. It is not to be supposed that, principle of interpretation to which we
taken as a whole, the thesis explicates theare free to admit exceptions in particu-
meaning of "God," even for the mono- lar cases.
theist himself. The fundamental reason As R. B. Perry has remarked:
why God has no essence is that no es- God conceived as perfection reflects man's
sence can exhaust the idea of the holy experience
or of imperfection. Practicing and suf-

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 81

fering injustice, man dreams of perfect of evil. For in regarding his "power" as
justice;
being both hateful and the victim of hate, he merely analogical or metaphorical we
dreams of utter and universal love; being igno-
seem, at least, to relieve ourselves of the
rant, he conceives of omniscience; amidst the
ugliness and drabness of life, he fancies a per- necessity of treating him as an agent,
fection of beauty; from his unhappiness there like ourselves, who does things and who
springs a vision of perfect and uninterrupted is therefore responsible, in the ordinary
bliss. way, for what he does.
The point is that "omniscience" prima- Be this as it may, God is presented,
rily represents the overcoming of our own throughout the biblical literature, as one
deprivation of knowledge or, rather, the who acts and as one who is only in the
ideal overcoming of this deprivation. As manner of an active being. Might is as-
such it signifies an ideal of knowledge- cribed to him as one who performs pro-
ability to which we ourselves conceivably digious acts and who does deeds of ines-
may aspire and which we may endlessly timable importance for mankind. Might
approach. Similarly, "omnipotence" rep- itself is essentially the power to do some-
resents an ideal of power or puissance, of thing, and someone is mighty in so far as
ability to do and to accomplish whatever he has the power to do and to act. Thus,
one may will, without external interfer- in speaking of God as "almighty," one is
ences of any kind. Both characteristics saying that the object of worship, the
are ascribed to God as inverse symbols holy one, possesses unlimited might or
and measures of our own imperfections power, that it has power over all, espe-
and limitations. cially over ourselves, and that nothing
Some hold that the metaphysical at- has power over it. And in asserting that
tributes must be ascribed to God in a there is an almighty or omnipotent being
merely analogical sense, on the ground one is saying that there is something
that God is a being so utterly unlike our- whose nature it is to act and whose power
selves. To me this seems problematic, is unrestricted.
since God, conceived as a "Thou," can- As for the attribute of omniscience, it
not be absolutely unlike ourselves. Such is surely a radical error to restrict its
attributions merely tend to be regarded meaning within the religious context in
as analogical when we re-emphasize the accordance with the preconceptions of
distance between ourselves and God. some special theory of knowledge such
Briefly, whether such attributions are to as empiricism or rationalism. The term
be regarded as analogical or not depends had a use before philosophers undertook
precisely upon how we ourselves con- to solve their epistemological puzzles and
ceive of God, upon how near or far, like before they attempted to establish spe-
or unlike, he appears to us to be. But this cific criteria of knowability. So far as re-
will depend, in every case, upon the par- ligion is concerned, I think it suffices to
ticular stresses to which the religious life say that an omniscient being would know
itself happens to be subject. It is my whatever there is to know, and that just
contention that one primary motive as forOmnipotence is not expected by sen-
insisting upon the "merely" analogical sible men to do the impossible, so Om-
or even metaphorical character of all niscience is not expected to know more
such attributions as "omnipotence'' to about the impossible than that it is such.
God is the felt necessity to overcome the What is logically unknowable could not
inconsistencies involved in the problembe known even by an omniscient being.

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 82 ETHICS

Such a being would not know how to the way that persons may be good but
square the circle; on the contrary, it also in the way that beautiful things are
would know with blinding clarity that good. There are conceptions of deity, such
the circle cannot be squared. Hence, if as that of Plotinus, which are more aes-
anyone should claim that an omniscient thetic than moral. But traditional the-
being would understand how injustice ism, while it has its aesthetic aspect,
can be just or how evil can be good our is more fundamentally concerned with
best recourse would be simply to stare God's justice and benevolence than with
him out of countenance. Should a ques- his radiance.
tion be raised as to God's ability to know Now, there is no logical connection be-
everything that will happen in the fu- tween the metaphysical attributes and
ture, we have only to consider whether the moral attributes. Logically, there is
anyone can properly be said to know that no reason why an almighty and omnis-
something will happen in the future. An cient being might not be a perfect stinker.
omniscient being will know whatever Nor is it logically impossible that such a
there is to know about the future; and if being might be worshipped as God, even
it should be that the future cannot be if it were denied the attributes of a good
known, then not even an omniscient be- person. The notion of a God of pure pow-
ing could be supposed to know it. How er is not attractive, but it is conceivable.
omniscience might be come by is an in- But from Genesis on, the goodness of the
teresting question, but I think we do not almighty being is constantly reiterated,
have to consider it. It is hardly for us to and even the imponderable "I am that I
ask how the deity may have got into his am" plainly implies by the presence of
line of work. Nor need we consider here the first-person pronoun that whatever
whether there is an omniscient and om- else it is, "the being" is not be to con-
nipotent being. For in dealing with the ceived as a mere thing. It is not difficult
problem of evil, we are concerned with to attenuate God's personality, and those
a situation in which certain propositions who would relieve him of responsibility
have already been premissed and which, for evil are likely to be attracted to this
for those involved in it, are accepted on way out of their perplexities. But they do
faith. so at a price which is greater than tradi-
tional monotheism has usually been will-
IV
ing to pay.
The second part of the theological the- The term "good," as everyone now
sis may be called the moral claim. What knows, is a general term of commenda-
it asserts is that there is an almighty and tion and praise. In using it, we normally
omniscient being which is also a perfectly perform what Professor John Austin calls
good person. More specifically, it asserts an "illocutionary act." That is, in saying
that such a being is both a person and that something is good, we are doing
good-good in the way that a person is something with words, and in this case
so. For present purposes, it will be un- what we are doing is to praise or to com-
necessary to consider the many other mend the thing in question in some way.
ways in which God may be good, since Ordinary commendations, of course, are
they are not directly involved in the prob-always qualified and, in context, they
lem of evil. Many people, no doubt, will presuppose some standard in relation to
wish to say that God is good not only in which the commendation is made. We

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 83

have here to do only with moral goodness, characteristic way that the being of a
and hence with moral praise or commen- mountain as such requires.
dation, for we are considering God only In the sense in question, then, ascrip-
as one who acts and whose merits are tions of personality differ radically from
those of a good person. descriptions of the empirical characteris-
The notion of personality, what it is to tics of things. In speaking of someone as
be a person, is more elusive and more am- a person, we are assigning to him a cer-
biguous than that of goodness, and con- tain function, role, or status and confer-
temporary philosophers have devoted far ring upon him the title of personality
less attention to its analysis. We are not which goes with that function, role, or
here concerned with "personality" in the status. And in addressing someone as a
sense in which that term is used by em- person, we are thereby dealing with him
pirical psychologists, such as Professor in that role and entering into those rela-
Allport, when they talk about the "psy- tions with him that such a role may pre-
chology of personality"-the psychology, scribe. In this sense, a personal relation-
that is, of individual character and tem- ship does not consist in the innumerable
perament. As employed in ethics and in ad hoc dealings which individual persons
theology, personality is not an empirical happen to have with one another but,
characteristic like green or hot; nor is it rather, in the restricted class of dealings
exhaustively definable in terms of empir- that are prescribed by the role and which
ical characteristics. Being a person, like may affect the status of the individuals
being a work of art, is a functional con- involved as persons.
ception which has to do with a character- A personal relationship may be prop-
istic way of treating or dealing with the erly said to fail when the parties to it are
thing in question. This fact is most easily correctly charged with failing in their
seen in the following way: It is always mutual responsibilities as persons. If it
proper to speak of "treating a person as fails absolutely, then, so far at least as
such" or of "treating a work of art as the individuals themselves are concerned,
such," and there is always a point, at once their very existence as persons is placed
understood, in saying that something in jeopardy. As in other spheres, repudi-
should be treated as a work of art or that ation of the role means abandoning the
someone should be treated as a person. responsibilities that go with the role, and
But were it asserted that a mountain, a vice versa. It is thus no idle question
thunderstorm, or a green object should be whether someone is a person or whether
treated as such, or if someone should speakwe ourselves stand in a personal relation-
of "treating amountain as such," the point ship to him. For upon the answer to it
of the remark would not be readily under-depends the validity of the ascription to
stood and we would be obliged to ask the him of a whole system of rights and re-
speaker what in the world he meant by sponsibilities. The denial of a personal
it. It is not that mountains cannot be relationship does not involve the cessa-
treated in various ways; on the contrary, tion of all dealings on the part of the indi-
that is just the trouble: mountains can viduals involved. But it amounts to the
be treated or dealt with in innumerable active repudiation of specific commit-
ways according to our own interest or ments to deal and to be dealt with in cer-
pleasure. But just because of this there tain characteristic ways. In short, there
is no way of treating them as such, no is already built into the notion of person-

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 84 ETHICS

ality a characteristic normative function is so far to cease to regard him as a moral

which prescribes a certain comportment agent and hence as a moral personality.
toward those to whom personality is as- If this is so, it would appear to be im-
cribed and which at the same time im- possible to speak of an almighty and om-
putes to them certain inescapable liabil- niscient as a good person without in some
ities and responsibilities. degree treating it as a moral agent and
There are, of course, many kinds of hence as, in principle, subject to the blame
personality, each carrying with it a dis- to which moral agents are liable. And to
tinctive role and status. Juridical persons the extent that we address such a being
are thus distinguishable from moral per- as a person or as a "thou" we automati-
sons essentially by the different preroga- cally treat it as an agent to whom certain
tives and liabilities that go with their re- obligations are due and from whom the
spective roles. The rights and responsi- fulfilment of corresponding obligations
bilities of juridical persons are defined by may be expected. There may be reason
law, and may be altered as the law re- to deny that such a being can reasonably
quires. The rights and responsibilities be regarded in this way. Thus it might be
associated with moral persons pertain to argued that it would be pointless to ad-
moral agency as such, and they will dress an almighty being as one would
change in accordance with modifications address ordinary mortals who are subject
in our conception of the moral agent. In to our censure as moral agents. How, it
our system they include, above all, the may be asked, can we reasonably think
right to independent judgment and of such a being as beholden to us in any
choice, and the reciprocal responsibility way? It is not my purpose here to assess
to judge disinterestedly and to choose the merits of such arguments and ques-
in accordance with principles of right tions. I contend only that if, for what-
action that are equally binding upon all ever reason, we should seek to place such
persons. a being altogether beyond moral good
Every moral person is liable to moral and evil, the effect would be, so far as we
praise and blame. In fact, anyone for ourselves are concerned, to relieve it of
whom moral personality is claimed is certain attributes of personality and so
ipso
facto subject to moral praise and blame to make it impossible to address the be-
as a "good" or "bad" person, since such ing, with a straight face, as a "thou."
praise or blame is equivalent to the as- Hence, just to the extent that we are im-
sertion that he has fulfilled or failed in pelled to say that the "justice" of such a
his responsibilities as a person. Anyone being has nothing to do with our stand-
who acquits himself of his moral respon- ards of justice or are moved to stress the
sibilities thereby deserves to be praised "mere"~ analogy between its "goodness"
as a good person, and anyone who fails and that which we ascribe to ordinary
to do so thereby deserves to be censured mortals when we consider them as moral
as a bad person. Should it be argued thatagents, we thereby radically attenuate
its status as a person and jeopardize any
a certain person is not, in principle, sub-
moral claims that it might be alleged to
ject to moral criticism, this would amount
to saying that he cannot be charged with impose upon ourselves. On the other
hand, we may speak, if we will or must,
moral responsibilities. By the same token,
to remove an individual altogether from of "the almighty to whom all praise is
the sphere of possible moral reprobation due"; but if we do so in a sense that has

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 85

any ethical significance, we render it pos- should have sought to treat the holiness
sible also to speak of "the almighty to of almighty God as something which ab-
whom all blame is due." solutely transcends his moral personality.
A "holy person" does not mean the Yet a too emphatic emphasis upon the
same thing as a "moral person." A holy absolute transcendence of God's holy
person is one who is entitled, as such, to self is bound to result in a tendency to-
religious devotion or regard, and for ward the secularization of the moral and
whom the status of holiness is claimed. A hence in a radical circumscription of the
moral person becomes a religious person domain of the religious itself. Such tend-
and the moral "thou" becomes a religious encies are plainly discernible in Kierke-
"Thou" just to the extent that the for- gaard and even, at times, in Martin
mer is regarded as something which is to Buber. On the other hand, identification
be treated reverentially-just to the ex- of God's holiness with his justice and his
tent, that is to say, that his principles, law may result in the defeat of the faith
his conduct, and his volitions are not in him as a divine being, when the valid-
merely praiseworthy, in the moral sense, ity of his justice and his law has been
but also holy or divine. Certain persons, placed in question. If his divinity may
such as Jesus, are thought to be morally provide the guaranty for his wisdom, so,
exemplary by many who would not in turn, the authenticity of his wisdom
dream of regarding them as divine. tends to become a criterion of his divinity.
On the other hand, it is conceivable This hazard is inherent in every ethical
that something might be treated as a religion, and no amount of purely dia-
holy person without at the same time lectical maneuvering will permanently
being regarded as a good person in the remove it.
moral sense. It is also logically possible
V
that ascriptions of moral personality
might be defeated without thereby en- The most crucial part of the theologi-
tailing the defeat of ascriptions of holi- cal thesis is that which asserts that the
ness or divinity. In the case of ethical one almighty, omniscient, and perfectly
religions such as Western monotheism good person is God. I shall call this the
the relations of religious personality to religious claim. The most important thing
moral personality are far from simple. A to be said about it is that the word "God"
certain tension between the holy person- functions at once as a holy name and as
ality and the moral personality of God is a title which serves to deify that upon
bound to occur in so far as one is obliged which it is conferred. The active verb "to
to treat, as holy, principles or actions deify" is illuminating in this connection
which, on their own account, may appearprecisely because it brings out the point
to be reprehensible. No doubt the moral that in calling something "God" we are
personality of God is to be conceived as giving it a holy name and conferring upon
deriving from or as dependent upon his it the states of divinity. Or, to put the
holy personality. But because of this, the matter in another way,, in speaking of
holy personality of God is placed in jeop- something as "God" we are using a name
ardy when his perfection as a moral per- which at the same time invests it with
son is impugned. the prerogatives, responsibilities, and
It is therefore entirely understandable claims upon ourselves to which that
that certain monotheistic theologians name entitles it.

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 86 ETHICS

The apparent circularity in this analy- ligious claim; and one may accept the
sis is removed when it is observed that metaphysical and moral claims without
in deifying something we are treating it necessarily accepting the religious claim.
as an object which is holy, worthy of our In principle, it would also be possible to
worship and reverence. If any being is accept the purely religious claim that
God, then by definition it is worthy to be
God exists or that there is a being that
worshipped and ought to be worshipped. is God without thereby accepting either
Because of this, those who do not the metaphysical or the moral claims. In
worship that being which is God are ipso brief, it is not logically necessary that
facto reprehensible or blameworthy. It is God should be almighty and omniscient
also for this reason that atheism is not gen- or even a perfectly good person, and it is
erally regarded by the pious as one phil- not necessary that an almighty being or
osophical or theological position among even a perfectly good person should be
many, but as a wicked or sinful attitude. God. For the ordinary monotheist, nev-
Atheism is not the same thing as the de- ertheless, such logical possibilities are
nial that there is an almighty being. One not theologically conceivable, or at any
is an atheist, in the strict sense, only if rate they seem not to be so until the prob-
he asserts that there is no God, which is lem of evil is confronted. So regarded,
to say, no being that is holy or worthy the theological thesis may be called "the
of worship. monotheistic syndrome." Given this syn-
In order to reinforce the validity of drome, God "must" be viewed as an al-
this analysis, let me call attention to the mighty, omniscient, and perfectly good
essential difference between the meaning person, and conversely, if there is an al-
of "God" and that of "god." The word mighty, omniscient, and perfectly good
"god" is not at all a holy name, and its person, that person is alone entitled to be
application to any being carries with it called God.
no titular claims whatever. It may be What, logically, is the import of this
used by anyone without the slightest syndrome? It is certainly not an analytic
suggestion of blasphemy or impiety. It truth. Nor is it as such an ordinary state-
is, in fact, impossible to take the name ment of fact. It is more illuminating to
"god" in vain, for it is not a name at all, compare its function with that of moral
but, like "cat" or "tree," a mere common principles. Now, as everyone knows, it is
noun. There is nothing blameworthy in always logically possible to question
denying the existence of a god or in re- whether happiness or pleasure are good.
fusing to worship a god, for there is noth- The ordinary usage of "good" allows for
ing intrinsically worshipful about the be- the possibility of such a question, and
ing of a god. those who speak of "good" and "happi-
ness" or "pleasure" as synonyms are
VI
simply mistaken. For the ethical hedon-
We have now to consider the theolog- ist, however, it is, in effect, not morally
ical thesis as a whole. If I am right, there possible to ask whether pleasure alone is
is no logical contradiction in accepting good. For him, although "pleasure" and
any one of the three main claims embod- "good" do not mean the same thing,
ied in the thesis while denying the rest. pleasure is still held to be the only intrin-
One may accept the metaphysical claim sic good, the only thing, therefore, which
without accepting the moral or the re- ought to be desired for its own sake.

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 87

It is not very helpful to speak of ethi- words. But it is necessary to press the
cal principles as a priori synthetic. Were point, even at the risk of apparent con-
we so to speak of them, it would be only tradiction, for it takes us, as I believe,
in order to emphasize the point that it to the very heart of the spiritual perplex-
is a mistake to treat them either as tau- ities with which we have here to do.
tologies or as contingent ascriptions of It is significant, in this connection,
value. For those who accept it, the great- that we do not so naturally say that a
est-happiness principle is not at all ana- theological thesis is proved or disproved
lytic; nor could its validity be established as that particular individuals have faith
by inspection of the meaning of the or lose it, and are subject to conversion
phrases in question. Taken as a principle, and apostasy. And it is relatively to our
it serves, rather, to prescribe the stand- faith or lack of it, our conversion to or de-
ard of right action which is to be used in conversion from a theological thesis, that
justifying particular maxims of conduct. we may say that it is, in some sense, re-
When it is accepted, the contingency ligiously defeasible. At any rate, in speak-
that a particular pleasure may not be ing here of the defeasibility of a theolog-
intrinsically good is excluded, as we say, ical thesis, I will mean that with respect
on principle, and the moral possibility to it we are subject to conversion or de-
that a right action would not conduce to conversion and that our faith in it, de-
the greatest happiness is precluded a pri- spite the fact that we may hold it beyond
ori from one's moral reckonings. all doubt, may in fact be defeated by con-
Such a conception of moral principles siderations which, as Mill would say, are
provides a useful analogy, I think, for capable of influencing the mind.
interpreting the monotheistic syndrome. It is sometimes thought that faith and
For the monotheist it functions, in effect, conversion, while subject to causes, are
as a religious principle which pre-empts impervious to reasons; and that while
the holy name and title of "God" for the they may have, so to say, a psycho-logic
almighty, omniscient, and perfect being. they have no logic. This is simply not
This, I think, explains the grain of truth true. Pascal, the arch-fideist, claimed
implicit in R. M. Hare's view that theo- that the heart has reasons that the in-
logical theses are not falsifiable. To put tellect knows not of, but he still claimed,
it bluntly, they are not falsifiable just significantly, that the heart has reasons,
because they are so treated; because, not that it is subject to causes. I should
that is to say, the person who accepts prefer to say that faith, although it may
them refuses, on principle, to consider perhaps have no reasons, is nevertheless
seriously any other alternative and be- subject to reasons, and that it may be
cause he refuses to allow for the contin- weakened or else defeated by reasons, as
gency that they might turn out to be well as strengthened or confirmed by
false. them. It is in this light, I think, that the
But now I shall appear to contradict proofs for the existence of God are to be
myself. For I wish to say that while the understood from a religious point of view:
convinced monotheist regards the theo- they are not really proofs at all but, for
logical thesis as a principle which is not those who accept them, confirming evi-
falsifiable, still it is not, in practice, ab- dences of a faith which might still be
solutely beyond question, even for him. sustained without them.
Here, I confess, I find myself in need of Thus although, despite Spinoza, there

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 88 ETHICS

are no Q.E.D.'s in the domain of religion, should like to put it, we are not so much
there still are reasons, and reasons may asserting something about the nature of
prepare the way to a conversion as well things as expressing certain regulative at-
as a mystic experience, a dose of laugh- titudes toward the nature of things. More
ing gas, or a series of responsive readings briefly, we are testifying to a way of life
from The Brothers Karamazov. The proc- or to the foundational commitment of a
ess of conversion would be irrational way of life. Similarly, to reject the theo-
were the monotheistic syndrome acquired logical thesis is not simply to deny a meta-
solely as an effect of a mystic experience physical hypothesis about the origins of
or a reading of Dostoevski, just as de- things but, more saliently, to disavow the
conversion from the syndrome would be way of life which the monotheistic syn-
irrational if, one fine morning, one simply drome prescribes. The theological thesis
woke up without it. A rational deconver- is thus a practical proposition, and com-
sion occurs in consequence of careful re- mitment to it is a practical commitment
flection upon the practical reasons that whose consequences for the person who
are found inescapably to militate against accepts or rejects it are incalculably
it. great.
There can be no thought, in this con-
VII
nection, of necessary or sufficient reasons,
but only of good reasons which religious We are now in a position to consider
persons find themselves bound to take the significance of solutions to the prob-
into account. What is to count as a good lem of evil. In turning to them, we must
reason is not something which could be re-emphasize that what we have to do
codified for us by theologicians. It is with here is a practical, or existential,
something which, in common practice, problem of faith and morals which is
is recognized by ordinary reflective per- only secondarily concerned with matters
sons, within a common tradition, to be of fact. The inconsistency between the
relevant. Apart from a common, tradi- theological thesis and the ethical thesis
tional form of life which is accepted as represents a conflict of attitudes toward
normative by most persons within a cul-reality and the conduct of life rather
ture, the notion of a good reason would than a contradiction in our beliefs about
have no meaning. But apart from such a the nature of what exists. Hence the
tradition it is doubtful whether the no- question of removing such an inconsist-
tion of reason in any sense would have ency concerns essentially the possibility
any significance. of a consistent system of religious and
Taken as a whole, then, the monothe- moral sentiments rather than the possi-
istic syndrome cannot be understood as bility of a consistent theory about the
a speculative hypothesis; it is not a "the- nature of things.
ory" in the scientific sense or even in the In principle, there are many ways of
metaphysical sense. Such possibilities are seeking relief from the problem of evil.
precluded by the presence within it of Some of them involve primarily some
the moral claim which asserts that the modification of the theological thesis.
almighty and omniscient being is a per- Others involve a modification of the, eth-
fectly good person. But they are. also ical thesis. Whichever way is taken, the"
precluded by the religious claim itself. inevitable result will be a modification
In avowing the theological thesis, as I of the way of life of the person involved.

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 89

Let us first consider those formsations, of relief

however, there are not many
which do not entail a direct rejection of plausible excuses to be made, and it fre-
the ethical thesis. Some of them involve quently happens that there is either one
a radical deconversion from the mono- excuse or none at all.
theistic syndrome and hence the adop- There are, I think, four main ways of
tion of a very different attitude in regard making excuses for a person: (a) by show-
to the object of religious faith; others in- ing that the act in question was unavoid-
volve changes of a more limited sort. able; (b) by showing that, although the
The least radical way of relieving the act was avoidable, it is justified in view
problem of evil is to find, or make, some of its consequences; (c) by shifting re-
excuse for the existence of evil which sponsibility, in whole or in part, to some-
modifies God's responsibility for it. But one else; and (d) by making an exception
if this way is preferable, since it seems to of the person in question.
leave the monotheistic syndrome fairly Now, given the assumptions of the
intact, it is also much more difficult to theological thesis, it is hard to see how
render convincing precisely because of a plausible excuse of the first sort could
the claims regarding the nature of God. be made for God. Apparently he cannot
It should also be borne in mind that it is be excused on grounds of ignorance or
one thing to propose an excuse and an- inability. If such an excuse is made either
other to accept it. No such proposal through some qualification of the con-
functions as an excuse unless someone is cept of omniscience or of the concept of
prepared to accept it. A proposed excuse might, then the conception of the holy or
is no excuse at all, any more than a mere worshipful itself already begins to under-
hypothesis is a statement of fact. More- go a sea-change with consequences that
over, finding an excuse is a very different may well be devastating to the delicately
sort of thing from finding a ten-dollar balanced conception of man's religious
bill or a cure for cancer. It does not in- and moral relationship to God. For ex-
volve looking in a certain place; nor is it ample, it might be argued, in the manner
like making a lucky guess concerning of Leibniz, that any universe created by
causal correlations which may happen to God must be the best of all possible
be confirmed by observation. It is rather worlds and that for whatever evils that
to give a counter practical reason which exist there must be, a priori, a sufficient
defeats or extenuates or removes a charge extenuating reason. Logically and per-
of responsibility. To excuse is to perform haps metaphysically God could have
a distinctive act which is correlated with created some other state of affairs, but
acts of moral praise and blame. Where since he is a perfect being, it is theologi-
there is no question of praise or blame, cally impossible that he should create any
there can be no question of making or other universe than the one which exists.
finding excuses. And where there is a If God exists, in short, his act in creating
question of excuses, there is also the ques- this universe is unavoidable. The effect
tion of praise and blame. A valid or ac- of such an excuse, however, is simply to
ceptable excuse serves to impugn the le- reaffirm the absolute benevolence of God
gitimacy of blame or to sustain the legit- -which is the very point at issue. It
imacy of praise. Invalid excuses formally clarifies the aspiration of the monotheist,
leave open the question whether the but it does not necessarily remove his
praise or blame is justified. In most situ- moral qualms that the world is ethically

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 90 ETHICS

out of joint. If, like Pangloss, he does noted, however, that such an excuse does
manage to accept the excuse, he must not touch the question of natural evil,
now view the evils of the world in such a including the involuntary ills that inno-
fundamentally different light that his cent persons are made to suffer in con-
whole conscientious attitude toward them sequence of the evil acts of others. Here,
is virtually transformed. That is to say, one can imagine, those afflicted with a
he is bound, if he is consistent, to accept sense of estrangement or forsakenness
in advance whatever happens to exist as (My God, my God, why hast thou for-
something which is at once unavoidable saken me) or outraged at the "inexcus-
and good. I shall not here remark upon able" sufferings of their loved ones are
the merits of the quietism and optimism not likely to be edified by any attempt to
implicit in such a view. But it is doubtful show the greater good inherent in the
whether anyone deeply involved in the consequences of these evils.
problem of evil will find it easily accept- Doubtless there are some who would
able. hold such a justification of moral evil to
Initially the second sort of excuse may be defective precisely because, although
seem more promising, particularly if we it removes God from blame, it does not
restrict ourselves to the question of mor- entirely remove him from responsibility.
al evil. Thus, it might be argued that, From this point of view, so long as God
although God may have a certain collat- is held to be responsible in any way at
eral responsibility for moral evil, since all for moral evil, our faith in him is im-
he granted freedom to man knowing in perfect and our own sense of freedom and
advance what use man would (perhaps moral responsibility is incomplete and
probably) make of it, moral freedom immature. Thus it may be argued that
is nevertheless a good so great that it we ourselves must share the total bur-
outweighs any possible evils that may den of responsibility and guilt for our
attend it. In short, God's goodness is acts, and that God's act, in making us
saved by claiming that God's act, in free, has nothing to do with our evil
creating man as morally free, has good choices.
consequences that outweigh all admit- What is the spiritual significance of
tedly evil consequences, and that al- such a view? Now, in ordinary circum-
though he shares, in one sense, responsi- stances, when a person is relieved en-
bility for moral evil, his goodness as a tirely of responsibility for a particular
person is not thereby to be impugned. act, his ethical connection with it ceases,
This excuse is of interest because it com- and any question of praise or blame so
mits him who offers it not only to the in- far disappears. Ethically, so to say, he
trinsic worth of moral freedom but also, becomes irrelevant to it. If, then, we
comparatively speaking, to the insignifi- alone are to be held responsible for our
cance of happiness, aesthetic values, and, actions, if our responsibility cannot be
indeed, all the goods that are usually shared, then not only any blame but
classified under the heading of "welfare." also any praise is ours alone. How could
But again, it is a question whether men we consistently praise God for saving us
of ordinary good conscience will be able from moral evil, if we cannot share with
to make this commitment. If they do, him the blame when we do evil things?
another profound shift will doubtless oc- If he has no hand in the evil, how then
cur in their scheme of values. It should be could he be said consistently to have a

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 91

hand in the good? When we commit mur- of the natural evils that abound in the
der, then sin is ours. But then, when we world, and that, at best, it only serves
are loving, kind, or just, must not the to extenuate God's responsibility for
credit and the praise be ours as well? In moral evil. Even so, the consequence of
that case, however, any reciprocal ethi- having to make excuses for God-to
cal relationship between ourselves and "save his face," as it were-is to jeop-
God would tend to disappear. Corre- ardize our own sense of obligation to him
spondingly, it becomes increasingly hard and to render his goodness inoperative as
to see how he could still be addressed as a moral ideal. Religiously, the almighty
a "Thou" to whom we are in any way being might still be conceived as God,
morally beholden. but he would no longer be looked to as
The most radical way of excusing God the source of moral goodness and as the
from responsibility for evil is simply to being to whom, in the moral sense, "all
make an exception of him. This sort of praise is due." Briefly, theodicy nearly
thing is done in ordinary life when some- always increases the sense of the dis-
one is pardoned for a wrong act which tance between man and God, and the
he has committed. A man is also some- remoteness of the moral life from the
times excused, whether properly or not, life of religious worship. It may also, in
for acts involving a moral fault if, for some people, reinforce a sense of com-
example, he is acting in some publicly placency, resignation, inevitability; but
acknowledged capacity which carries they are precisely those who are least
with it non-moral responsibilities that, likely to be affected by the problem of
in the circumstances, are thought to be evil. Conversely, those who are affected
overriding. In the latter case, the excuse by the problem are most likely to be re-
simply places the individual, for the pelled by theodicial excuses. In so far as
nonce, beyond moral good and evil. Were they do accept them, their excuses for
such an excuse made, for whatever rea- God serve to reinforce the sense of per-
son, in the case of God, it would undoubt- sonal guilt which may, in the end, be-
edly involve a modification of the mono- come so overwhelming that nothing is
theistic syndrome and with it a modifi- left of their sense of personal dignity
cation of the sense in which monotheism save the bare freedom-to go on sinning.
could still be considered an ethical re- Several other ways of relieving God
ligion. As for pardoning or forgiving God, of responsibility for evil remain, but they
perhaps it is possible that we might try are all more drastic, since they involve
to do this, but not without impairing a more radical modification in the con-
God's value to us as an ethically exem- ception of God's nature and hence in the
plary being, and not, therefore, without attitudes that are possible toward him.
diminishing our sense of responsibility to All such ways of overcoming the problem
him. Normally, it has been supposed that of evil involve a fundamental breakdown
the relation of forgiveness should go the of the monotheistic syndrome or, which
other way around: we are to forgive one comes to the same thing, a fundamental
another, even as God forgives us. attenuation of the traditional monothe-
In general, any form of theodicy, the istic faith. Nor can they be effected with-
aim of which is to justify God's ways to out in some measure incurring a liability
man, is bound to appear implausible to to deconversion from monotheism.
anyone who has an overwhelming sense The most radical, but in some ways

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 92 ETHICS

easiest, way out is to renounce one or ever, only to men of great emotional ma-
more of the attributes ascribed to God by turity and stability for whom, so to say,
the metaphysical claim. One may cease the trauma of birth has in some meas-
to hold that God is almighty or that he ure been overcome. They are not appeal-
is omniscient, or, which comes to much ing to those for whom religious piety is
the same thing, one may cease to regard possible only to the degree that the needs
omnipotence or omniscience as necessary of emotional dependency are satisfied.
attributes of holiness, of that which is Another way of relieving the problem
worthy of piety or worship. In so doing, of evil is to qualify or else give up alto-
the problem of evil is automatically re- gether the moral claim concerning the
lieved, since a God who is not almighty goodness of God. To some, for whom re-
or who is not omniscient need incur no ligion means ethical religion, such a pos-
responsibility for evils that he may not sibility may appear repugnant; but log-
have anticipated or could do nothing to ically there is nothing to oppose to it.
prevent. Giving up the metaphysical There is no logical connection between
claim, however, does not require renun- the metaphysical and the moral claims
ciation of faith in God's goodness; nor of the theological thesis, and it is entirely
does it preclude us from still worshipping possible to regard an omniscient and al-
him as the holy of holies. But it does af- mighty being as God without investing
fect our attitudes and acts of faith in him with the attributes of a perfectly
other important ways. For while God good person. But if one does accept this
may still be worshipped, claims can no alternative, God automatically loses his
longer be intelligibly addressed to him moral significance, and the autonomy of
and, at least in one sense, praying to him the moral life must now become a reality.
becomes correspondingly pointless. Like- Thus, while God's "commandments"may
wise, it becomes increasingly difficult to still be obeyed, one's obedience to them
view the whole of creation in a religious is no longer a consequence of one's faith
spirit as the providential work of deity. or, to say the same thing in other words,
But, most seriously, the sense of absolute they are obeyed not because God com-
dependence upon God tends to disappear mands them but because they are deemed
and, as one realizes that the amelioration right and good on their own account, re-
of one's lot depends, not upon Grace gardless of the fact that he commands
alone, but upon one's own efforts, God them. From this standpoint, the religious
ceases to appear in the guise of an all- life now detaches itself altogether from
powerful father, and becomes rather a the ethical life, with consequences which
kind of outsized brother who has his are incalculable to both. Now, the ap-
own troubles with evil, even as you andpeal I. to God's will can no longer be used
I, for one, respect those contemporary in justification of a moral principle or
theologians who candidly accept the no- in extenuation of a practice which, on
tion of a finite God. If such finitistic the- other grounds, might seem wicked or ne-
ologies are still involved in grave meta- farious. It must be confessed, moreover,
physical difficulties, they at least enable that the deification of the metaphysical
the believer to preserve his moral integ- attributes as such is likely to appear re-
rity and his religious devotion to a God pugnant to an ordinary moral conscious-
who can be regarded with a straight face ness, and that once God's goodness as a
as a good person. They are possible, how- person has been effectively challenged,

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 93

the whole interest in his metaphysical called "atheistic" religions of the East.
attributes is likely to collapse. From a logical point of view, there is
The most drastic way out of the prob- nothing whatever to preclude the possi-
lem of evil is to give up altogether the bility of a person sincerely affirming his
belief in God-the belief, that is, that belief in God while at the same time
there is anything worthy of worship. But denying that God is a person, a sub-
this way of putting the matter is ambig- stance, or a thing.
uous. For one may renounce the belief This possibility suggests a way of mod-
that any actual thing is worthy of wor- ifying the monotheistic syndrome itself
ship, without ceasing to have attitudes in such a way as to solve, once for all,
which may be deemed religious. Thus, the problem of evil. Thus, one might
for example, philosophers like Comte or adopt the view that God, as such, is com-
Dewey appear to have thought that pletely unknowable, and that as such no
while no actual thing is worthy of wor- positive attributes may validly be im-
ship the moral ideal is itself worshipful. puted to him. From this standpoint,
This is not the place to enter into de- God's nature becomes a complete mys-
tailed discussion of the concepts of ex- tery, and the worship of "him" as an
istence, actuality, and being. There is, "other," not ourselves, ceases altogether
however, a quite proper sense in which to be the worship of an almighty or good
one might be able to say that there is person who creates the universe out of
something worthy of worship, or even His infinite goodness and who gives to
that something is God, without at the man the commandments by which he is
same time implying by this that there isto live. This is the move which has been
a thing or a person that is God. The term taken, now and then, by "pure" mystics
''something" does not mean" some thing," and by men of "pure" faith. But it is a
and the contention that something is form of adoration or worship which is
worthy of worship or that something is virtually devoid of content and which, at
God does not entail that there is a thing, last, merely battens upon its own sub-
a substance, an actual entity which is jective intensity. Saying nothing, it com-
worshipful or God. It is owing entirely to mits us to nothing; affirming nothing
the exigencies of our own Western reli- about God, it divests God of any signifi-
gious tradition, and to the monotheistic cance for the conduct of life. It solves the
syndrome which goes with it, that we problem of evil, but only by removing
would consider it -misleading to claim the religious life altogether from contact
that there is a God, an object worthy of with, and hence possible contamination
worship, while at the same time denying by, the moral life. Precisely because it
that- there is any thing or any person views God as utterly transcendent or, as
that is worshipful and toward which our some theologians put it, as sheer "tran-
piety is due. And it is merely because of scendence" itself, it loses all relevance to
this that it has not been customary for the ordinary problems of human action.
naturalists, materialists, or positivists to Such, I take it, is at bottom the theolog-
say that they believe in God or that God ical position of Kierkegaard. But the
exists. This is perhaps nothing more than spiritual remedies which it proposes are
a sign of the parochial limitations of desperate remedies which ordinary per-
Western theology which, all too fre- sons are not likely to be able to accept.
quently, mistakes the meaning of the so- What remains of monotheism, when it is

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 94 ETHICS

accepted, is anybody's guess. It is not all's really well with the world. But it is
for nothing, indeed, that Kierkegaard not something which can seriously be as-
himself has been sometimes called an serted by anyone who takes a dim view
"atheist." No doubt some precedent for of pain, loneliness, and cruelty. No ordi-
it can be found in the biblical literature. nary Jew or Christian, so far as I can
But surely the drift of what most people see, could entertain it for more than a
think of as biblical monotheism is incom- moment, for it makes nonsense of the
patible with it, and surely it is not the moral life. If nothing is evil, choice is
view of God which is normally enter- pointless, and responsibility has no
tained in our churches and our syna- meaning.
gogues. A subtler view involves a persuasive
redefinition of evil which conceives it as
VIII
merely a privation of being. According to
All of the foregoing ways of relieving this view, whatever is created by God is
the problem of evil involve some tam- good and hence worthy of praise. Evil,
pering with the theological thesis and no doubt, is a necessary consequence of
hence some degree of deconversion from finite or created being, but only of its
the monotheistic syndrome. Traditionally, finitude, not of its being. Thus, so far as
however, relief has frequently been sought they are, pain, suffering, and guilt are
through a modification of the attitudes good. The evil in them is only that of a
expressed by the ethical thesis that some- limitation or privation.
thing in the created universe is evil. It At this point, it is easy to become en-
is this way out which most obviously tangled in a web of words. We are inter-
shows how morals and religion may come ested here only in the moral significance
into conflict and how, in turn, moral of such a view, that is to say, in its bear-
sentiments may be modified to meet the ing upon our spiritual attitudes toward
exigencies of religious faith. the world and toward the conduct of life.
The most drastic, if also the most im- Formally, everything seems to remain
plausible, way of dealing with the prob- just as it was before, since, in one sense,
lem of evil from this standpoint is simply it is still possible to say that something
to deny the ethical thesis altogether. On is evil. But materially, a complete sea-
this view, which most men would regard change comes over the moral life. Thus,
as highly immoral, there simply is no for example, so far as pain or suffering
evil, and when someone says that some- are positive facts of experience, they are
thing is evil he speaks falsely: evil, that to be approved of as good, as something,
is to say, is merely apparent, and the that is to say, which ought to exist and
common view that such things as earth- which should be affectionately endured
quakes, insanity, and cancer are evils is or, more strictly, rejoiced in. To that ex-
illusory. This, we have been told, is the tent, the will to remove suffering and to
position taken by Christian Scientists, root out pain, as well as the conviction
but I do not vouch for it. In any case, it that, simply per se, pain ought not to
is hard for an outsider to see how such exist, must be regarded as forms of im-
a point of view could be consistently piety. The man who worships God as
maintained in practice. No doubt a suf- good and accepts His creation as part of
ficiently resolute optimist might say, for His divine providence, must so far ac-
the nonce, that God's in his heaven and claim pain and suffering as intrinsically

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 95

good. It is only in so far as pain indicates he calls "the courage to be." It is essen-
some privation of being, some privation tial to bear in mind, however, that the
of a higher perfection which is potentially courage to be is not something which can
ours, that it can be regarded, albeit mis- be required by theological pronounce-
leadingly, as evil. Strictly, it is merely ments. For those who lack this sort of
an indication or sign of evil; what is evil courage, the problem of evil is not re-
is simply the accompanying privation. motely relieved by pointing out that evil
To many moralists the quietism im- is a necessary consequence of finitude,
plicit in this view has seemed obvious. and hence of all created being. For it is
It is not my purpose here to evaluate it the very evil of creation itself which is
either from a moral or from a religious now in question. Why should anything
viewpoint. It is undoubtedly the view of exist? Such a limiting question is not
many so-called saints, and those who are meaningless, but it cannot be answered
taken with saintliness will undoubtedly by the ploys of theodicy. It can be an-
be attracted to it. My point is that it is swered, if at all, only by a change of
not an ethically neutral position, and heart. But who shall say to another that
that it does not leave our ordinary moral such a change of heart is good? Even so,
attitudes just where it found them. recovery of the courage to be does not
Strictly speaking, moreover, it cannot necessarily involve a reconciliation of
be regarded as a final solution of the faith and morals, since it is entirely pos-
problem of evil. For it still countenances sible that, in recovering, a man might
the assertion that something, namely, still, in his heart, condemn as evil many
privation of being, is evil. Indeed, from positive features of created being, with
the point of view of those who are faced the consequence that his faith in the
with the problem of evil, the privation goodness of God continues to conflict
theory merely forces the issue onto an- with his conviction that some, at least,
other plane. The problem, now, is to of God's works ought not to be at all.
justify creation itself, which reopens the
Ix
question of theodicy in its most radical
form. It may be argued that it was al- Up to this point, I have proceeded on
ways possible for God to choose not to the tacit assumption that the problem of
create anything at all, and that if he evil is itself an unmitigated evil, that it
could create something only by bringing is something which, at least from a logi-
evil-or privation-into the world he cal point of view, is intolerable. I have
should not have created anything. Here assumed, that is to say, that the accept-
we find the problem of evil in perhaps ance of an inconsistency, and especially
its most poignant and intractable form. a practical inconsistency, is wrong and
For even if the individual can make his that it ought to be overcome. This means,
peace with pain and the sense of moral in effect, that, like most moral philoso-
guilt, he may still find existence itself phers, I have taken it for granted that
stale, flat, and unprofitable, and he may self-consistency and integrity in the spir-
still be torn between his desire to love itual domain is the consummation most
God and his unqualified loathing of the devoutly to be wished. But is it? Why
world which God has created. should the demand for consistency be re-
Here we face the very issues implicit garded as categorical or as taking prece-
in Professor Tillich's discussion of what dence over every other requirement of

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 96 ETHICS

the moral or religious life? Within the illustrate certain approaches to the prob-
moral sphere itself, we are frequently lem of evil in order to see what their ex-
faced with conflicts of principle which istential or practical import really is-
can be removed only by subordinating not, on my own, to advocate one solution
one principle to another and which, there- above another. Study of the problem of
fore, can be removed only by disavowing evil is instructive in many ways. It helps
some hitherto fundamental moral com- us to see, in the first place, how questions
mitment. In such a case, is it reasonable of logic may arise within the moral and
to insist that an individual ought to mod- religious life as well as within science or
ify his principles? Without begging the mathematics. The very possibility of a
question, what sort of reason could be problem of evil makes plain the fact that
given that would at the same time satisfyquestions of consistency are not impos-
the requirements of logic and those of sible in the domains of religion and mor-
conscience? als. Such questions, I have argued, are, at
Suppose, then, that someone found bottom, practical, and the reasons that
himself faced with the problem of evil may be offered in attempting to answer
and that even after the most deliberate them must provide motives to influence
and painstaking reflection he still foundthe will, or heart, or they are nothing. Any
no answer to it. Suppose also that he arguments in this sphere have a point
found that he could bring himself to re- only in so far as they effectually dispose
ject or qualify neither the theological us to modify our active religious or moral
thesis nor the ethical thesis. No doubt, commitments. Any religious or moral dia-
such a person would find that his religiouslectic must be, in Hegel's phrase, a "logic
aspirations and his moral intuitions can- of passion."
not be reconciled and hence that at the In the second place, the problem of
very heart of what is deepest and most evil makes us forcibly aware that philo-
sincere in him as a person, there remains sophical theories which insist upon the
an insuperable and unremitting tragedy necessary "autonomy" of moral and re-
of spiritual self-division. Shall he be asked ligious principles cannot be sustained.
to fish or cut bait? But from what stand- This is not to say that it is logically im-
point could such a request significantly possible to divorce morals from religion
be made? If we appeal to the principle of and to separate questions concerning
consistency or integrity, we are evidently what is right or good from questions con-
appealing to something which, even if he cerning what is worshipful or holy. It
is sensible of its proper claims, requires seems evident to the humanist that ques-
him to renounce his profoundest loyal- tions of right and wrong are answerable
ties, to cease, that is, to be the very per- without recourse to the will of God. What
son he is. To reply to him, as Professor is good is good, and the fact that God
C. I. Lewis might, that if he continues wills it cannot make it more so. What he
self-divided he will be sorry is not to tellforgets is that, for the theist, God's will
him something he does not already know. alone certifies that anything is good at
Of course he will be sorry; he is alreadyall. Here, however, is no mere problem
sorry. But what, in the name of goodness of analysis which closer inquiry into the
and of God, is he to do? meanings of moral and religious expres-
In saying this, I do not wish to be mis- sions might be thought to solve.
understood. I have been trying only to Too often such a problem is presented

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 GOD AND EVIL: RELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH AND MORALS 97

as an external conflict between two dis- cept but insist upon the thesis that reli-
tinct ways of life. But for anyone involved gious speech and literature provide the
with the problem of evil it is an internal paradigmatic uses of the term which it
problem, since in affirming the ethical is the business of the philosopher to ex-
thesis in the teeth of the theological the- plain. But religious discourse is not the
sis he is so far acting as a moral autono- discourse of angels who do not know the
mist who accepts as final the deliverances meaning of doubt, but of men for whom
of his conscience, whereas in affirming doubt is a condition of life. To ask wheth-
the theological thesis (which itself in- er there is a God constitutes the funda-
volves a moral claim) he is accepting the mental trauma of the religious life itself,
will of God, whatever it is, as that which just as the question whether anything is
alone makes good things good. Such a good is the great nightmare of the moral
person is caught within himself in a prac- life. In the case of our own traditional
tical conflict of religion and morals. But forms of monotheism, this trauma is
it would be more accurate to say that he brought on directly by the problem of
is caught in a conflict between ethical in- evil. Pending its resolution, or our abso-
dependence and ethical dependence, be- lution from it, the possibility of answer-
tween a conscience which presumes to ing "No" hangs immediately in the bal-
judge for itself what is good or evil and ance. Religious faith is not necessarily
an ethical faith which depends upon the dependent upon the confirming evidences
will of God to authorize what is to be of reason. But it may be impugned by
believed in the moral sphere. contrary evidences which reason recog-
The study of the problem of evil is in- nizes to be incompatible with it. Although
structive, finally, in that it enables us to it is perhaps possible that men of faith
see with great clarity what it can be to believe or wish to believe that the theo-
question the existence of God and how, logical thesis is true, it is as certain as
within the religious context itself, such the proposition that two plus two equals
a question is bound to arise. I have never four that the thesis is falsifiable. What
doubted that the word "God" gets its makes it certain is Augustine's ancient
primary meaning from the part it plays question: "Whence, then, is evil?"
in religious discourse. And I not only ac- HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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