THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 246989. December 07, 2020 ]
HEIRS OF JOSE V. LAGON, NAMELY: MARIA JOCELYN LAGON-
RODRIGUEZ, ARMANDO L. LAGON, JONALD JOSE L. LAGON, JOSELITO
L. LAGON, LEILANIE L. LAGON, JOSE L. LAGON, JR., MARY EMILIE
LAGON-SANCHEZ, STEFANIE GRACE L. LAGON, RYAN NEIL L. LAGON,
NENITA L. LAGON, JR., AND NENITA L. LAGON, PETITIONERS, VS.
ULTRAMAX HEALTHCARE SUPPLIES, INC., MARGIE K. HUAN, MELODIE
ANNE KO HUAN, MAEL ALLISON KO HUAN, GIANNE CARLO KO HUAN,
ROSANA M. NAVARRO, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTOBATO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is a well-established rule that no evidence may be introduced during trial if
it was not identified and pre-marked during pre-trial. However, the rule
allows for an exception: If good cause has been shown, the trial court may
allow documentary or object evidence not previously marked to be
introduced. By good cause, it must be shown that there is a "substantial
reason that affords a legal excuse."1
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 filed by the Heirs of
Jose Lagon, assailing the Decision3 and Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court Resolutions5 admitting an evidence
not identified and marked on pre-trial.
Spouses Jose and Nenita Lagon (the Lagon Spouses) are the registered
owners of two parcels of land in Marbel, Koronadal City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-72558 and T-72564.6
In July 2011, the Lagon Spouses discovered that both titles were cancelled by
the Registry of Deeds of South Cotobato and were replaced with TCT Nos. T-
141372 and T-131373, issued in the name of Ultramax Healthcare Supplies,
Inc. (Ultramax).7
This prompted the Lagon Spouses to file on September 29, 2011 a
Complaint8 against Ultramax for annulment of the new titles. They denied
selling the lands, alleging that the cancellation and subsequent transfer of
titles were caused by a falsified deed of absolute sale in favor of Ultramax.9
In their Answer, Ultramax recounted that in 2009, Margie Huan (Huan), one
of its directors, loaned P2.3 million with a 4% monthly interest to the Lagon
Spouses, who allegedly used their two properties as collateral.10 They later
informed Huan that they could not pay their loan and agreed to cede the two
properties to Huan, but with Ultramax as transferee. Consequently, a
representative of the spouses delivered TCT Nos. T-72558 and T-72564 to
Huan; in exchange, Huan gave all the evidence of indebtedness to the
representative.11
Jose Lagon died while the case was pending. His wife, Nenita, then moved to
have Jose's heirs substitute him.12 On June 17, 2013, the trial court granted
the Motion, and trial ensued.13
On August 2, 2013, one Al Barrometro deposed before the branch clerk of
court that he facilitated the registration of TCT Nos. T-141372 and T-131373
by presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale to the Registry of Deeds of Koronadal
City. The deed appeared to be executed by the Lagon Spouses and notarized
by Atty. Damaso Cordero of Sultan Kudarat.14
On September 7, 2013, Jose's heirs moved to have the Deed of Absolute Sale
examined by a forensic handwriting expert from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), which was granted. Upon examination, the signatures on
the deed were found to have indeed been falsified.15
Afterward, Jose's heirs filed their Formal Offer of Evidence and rested their
case. All the pieces of evidence they presented were admitted by the trial
court.16
On November 20, 2015, Ultramax filed a Request for Admission addressed to
Nenita, asking for the admission of two documents, a Real Estate Mortgage
(Deed of Mortgage) and a Deed of Absolute Sale, both dated December
2009.17 Jose's heirs objected, stating that the documents were
immaterial.18
On January 28, 2016, Ultramax again requested that the documents be
admitted, this time addressed to two of the heirs, Jocelyn and Leilani
Lagon.19 Jose's heirs reiterated their objection.20
On May 18, 2016, Ultramax filed a Supplemental Judicial
Affidavit21 executed by Huan, which introduced a Deed of
Mortgage22 signed by the Lagon Spouses-the same document they had
requested to be admitted. Jose's heirs vehemently objected, stating that the
Deed of Mortgage was never alleged in Ultramax's Answer and may not be
introduced so late in the case.23 They also reiterated that it was irrelevant
here.24
On July 1, 2016, the Regional Trial Court issued a Resolution25 admitting the
Supplemental Judicial Affidavit on the ground of substantial justice and
equity. It also permitted the introduction of the Deed of Mortgage, not to
prove its existence, but to prove "previously existing obligations" of Jose's
heirs.26
Ultramax then moved to have the Deed of Mortgage examined by an
NBI27 handwriting expert to determine the genuineness of the Lagon
Spouses' signatures and use it as comparison to determine the authenticity
of their signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale.28 Jose's heirs objected.29
On March 10, 2017, the Regional Trial Court granted Ultramax's Motion and
directed the examination.
Jose's heirs asked for reconsideration,30 to no avail.31
Consequently, they filed a Petition for Certiorari32 before the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it granted Ultramax's Motion since the document was never mentioned
in the previous pleadings. They further alleged that the document had
already been ruled inadmissible by the trial court.33
On January 31, 2019, the Court of Appeals dismissed34 the Petition. It held
that in granting the Motion to have the Deed of Mortgage examined, the trial
court only aimed to determine the authenticity of the Lagon Spouses'
purported signatures, but "did not rule on the admissibility of the [Deed of
Mortgage] per se."35 It also held that the trial court has the authority to
admit or reject evidence deemed determinative of the outcome of the
case.36
Jose's heirs moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied their
Motion in its May 8, 2019 Resolution.37
In their Petition for Review on Certiorari,38 Jose's heirs assert that the Court
of Appeals erred when it dismissed its Petition for Certiorari.39 They state
that since the Deed of Mortgage was not mentioned in respondents' Answer
or other pleadings and had already been deemed inadmissible by the trial
court, the Motion to have it examined should have been disallowed.40 They
likewise claim that the Court of Appeals turned a blind eye to the fact that
the Deed of Mortgage is not the one being questioned in the Complaint, but
the Deed of Absolute Sale.41
In its Comment, respondent Ultramax claims that the Court of Appeals was
correct in finding no fault on the part of the trial court, since presenting the
Deed of Mortgage is a matter of defense evidence that is not prohibited by
the Rules on Evidence.42 It also asserts that the Deed of Mortgage is
relevant to the case as it aims to prove that the signatures found in it are
authentic and executed by the same people that signed the other documents
relevant to the case.43
In their Reply,44 petitioners reiterate that the examination of the Deed of
Mortgage serves no purpose. They add that while respondents are allowed to
prove that petitioners have other existing obligations against it, they cannot
use the Deed of Mortgage to do so.45
The main issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse
its discretion in granting the Motion to have the Deed of Mortgage examined
by a handwriting expert.
In actions for certiorari, such as that filed by petitioners before the Court of
Appeals, courts are asked to determine if the lower court "acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in the exercise
of its judgment, such that the act was done in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary[,] or despotic manner."46 Hence, as long as the courts do not
overstep their authority, any alleged errors committed in their discretion will
not suffice to grant certiorari.
Here, the Court of Appeals was called to ascertain if the trial court was
correct in granting respondents' Motion and directing that the Deed of
Mortgage be examined by a handwriting expert.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. The Regional Trial Court did not gravely
abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
Petitioners rely on technicalities, but these rules are not so rigid as to
frustrate the full adjudication of cases. Procedural rules are designed to aid
the courts in resolving cases. They neither create nor take away vested
rights, but merely facilitate the trial court's reception and evaluation of all
evidence given the facts and circumstances presented by the
parties.47 They give litigants the opportunity to establish the merits of their
complaint or defense rather than lose life, liberty, or property on mere
technicalities.48 This Court should not demand a strict application of these
rules when such would exacerbate the situation rather than promote
substantial justice.
Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule mandates parties to submit their
witnesses' judicial affidavits, together with the documentary and object
evidence, before the pre-trial or preliminary conference.49 Nevertheless, the
same provision allows for an exception. The trial court may, during trial,
allow the introduction of additional evidence despite it not being previously
marked or identified during pre-trial if good cause is shown.50
In Cruz v. People,51 petitioner Anthony Cruz (Cruz) was found guilty of
violating Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484 for using a counterfeit
access device to purchase a pair of designer shoes. Aggrieved, Cruz went
before this Court, asserting that the prosecution was not able to prove his
guilt since the counterfeit credit card he allegedly used was still admitted on
trial despite not being presented and marked during pre-trial. In affirming the
finding of guilt, this Court held that under A.M. No. 03-1-09- SC,52 the
admission of evidence not pre-marked during pre-trial is not absolutely
prohibited. It discussed:
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, sec. I(A)(2) provides that:
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-
trial briefs containing the following:
....
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof.
(No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in
support of a party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier
identified and pre marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court
for good cause shown)[.]
The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not
identified and pre-marked during trial. This provision, however, allows for an
exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is no hard
and fast rule to determine what may constitute "good cause," though this
Court has previously defined it as any substantial reason "that affords a legal
excuse."
The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to be presented at
trial even if not previously marked during pre-trial. Here, the trial court
allowed the presentation of the counterfeit credit card at trial due to the
prosecution's explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card
was still in the Criminal Investigation and Detective Group's
custody.53 (Citations omitted)
Here, the Regional Trial Court found it appropriate to admit the Supplemental
Judicial Affidavit which introduced the Deed of Mortgage to allow
respondents an opportunity to refute petitioners' evidence. To recall,
petitioners moved to have a forensic handwriting expert examine the Deed
of Absolute Sale during the presentation of evidence. When the forensic
examination results were presented in court, only then did respondents
discover that it had to repudiate the findings. Thus, the need to introduce the
separate but related Deed of Mortgage only arose after the pre-trial.1âшphi1
As the main issue pending before the trial court is the alleged falsification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, the trial court admitted the Deed of Mortgage and
allowed its examination. This was not to prove an existing obligation on
petitioners' part, but to compare the signatures found in the document to
those supposedly forged signatures on the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale.
Thus, petitioners' claim that the Deed of Mortgage is irrelevant does not hold
water. Rule 128 of the Rules of Court describes what is relevant evidence:
SECTION 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. - Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when
it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability
of the fact in issue. (4a)
The main question of the Complaint before the trial court is the falsification
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the signatures on the Deed of Mortgage
may establish the probability of such falsification.
Moreover, a reading of the trial court's Resolutions will show that it did not
unequivocally state that the Deed of Mortgage was inadmissible and
prohibited from being presented. The July 1, 2016 Resolution reads:
In the case at bar, the Court is convinced that the SJA of said witness
defendant, despite the aforementioned procedural and evidentiary obstacles,
is relevant evidence which may tend to reinforce her claims affecting the
plaintiffs' liability leading to the execution of the questioned deed of
conveyance. While the SJA is not part of the answer, it may still be
considered as part of her answer and the same is justified by
jurisprudence, viz:
Equity requires that an amended answer which alters (the) theory of the
defense be admitted when, if proved, it would negate the defendant's
liability.
In furtherance of the above discussions, while the Court may not permit the
defendants to prove the existence of an ancillary (mortgage) contract, they
may be permitted to prove the plaintiffs' previously existing valid obligations
as the same is logical and in consonance with their defenses in this
case.54 (Citation omitted)
Meanwhile, the March 2017 Resolution reads:
In the first place, what is being sought in the motion is to prove the plaintiffs'
signature in the questioned Deed of Sale by presenting other evidence
similar to those presented by the plaintiffs to impeach the same. While it is
true that the plaintiffs would neither confirm nor deny the existence of the
Deeds of Mortgage now bannered by the defendants, nay, opposes the
presentation of the same as defendants' evidence, the signatures therein are
relevant and material evidence to prove what the plaintiffs have already
attempted to disprove.
Elsewise stated, the defendants are only asking for an opportunity to
compare the signatures of the plaintiffs in the questioned Deed of Sale as
well as in the ignored "Deed of Mortgage".55
Lastly, it can be gleaned from the Pre-Trial Order56 that both petitioners and
respondents reserved their rights to present additional evidence without
objection against the other party. This reservation amounts to waiving the
application of Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule.57 Petitioners cannot
now disown their previous declaration for their convenience and to the
prejudice of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2019
Decision and May 8, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 08653-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, Delos Santos, and Rosario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Cruz v. People, 810 Phil. 801 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
2 Rollo, pp. 9-26.
3 Id. at 28-33. The January 31, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 08653-MIN
was penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Evalyn M. Arellano-Morales and Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr.
of the Special Twenty-Third Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
4 Id. at 28-33. The May 8, 2019 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 08653-MIN was
penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Evalyn M. Arellano-Morales and Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr. of the
Former Special Twenty-Third Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
5 Id. at 227-228 and 260-261.
6 Id. at 11.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 40-45.
9 Id. at 42.
10 Id. at 29.
11 Id. at 29-30.
12 Namely, his spouse, Nenita Lagon, and their children, Maria Jocelyn,
Armando, Jonald Jose, Joselito, Leilanie (at times referred to as Lailani), Jose
Jr., Mary Emilie Lagon, Stefanie Grace, Ryan Niel, and Nenita Jr.
13 Id. at 30.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 30-31 and 139.
17 Id. at 140-141.
18 Id. at 146-148.
19 Id. at 155-156. The request was erroneously addressed to "Lailani"
instead of Leilani.
20 Id. at 159-161.
21 Id. at 211-215. To supplement Huan's Judicial Affidavit dated May 3, 2014
(rollo, pp. 173-183).
22 Id. at 216.
23 Id. at 218.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 227-228.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 278-280.
28 Id. at 229-230.
29 Id. at 234-236.
30 Id. at 262-266.
31 Id. at 281.
32 Id. at 282-298.
33 Id. at 282.
34 Id. at 28-33.
35 Id. at 32.
36 Id. at 33.
37 Id. at 35-37.
38 Id. at 9-26.
39 Id. at 19.
40 Id. at 17 and 20.
41 Id. at 17.
42 Id. at 381.
43 Id. at 380.
44 Id. at 386-392.
45 Id. at 389.
46 Lara's Gift and Decors. Inc. v. PNB General Insurers Co., Inc., 824 Phil.
652, 663 (2018) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
47 Republic v. Spouses Gimenez, 776 Phil. 233,237-238 (2016) [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division].
48 Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda, 729 Phil. 639, 651 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, Third
Division].
49 JUD. AFFIDAVIT RULE, sec. 2.
50 Cruz v. People, 810 Phil. 801, 815 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
51 810 Phil. 801 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
52 Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and
Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery
Measures.
53 Id. at 814-815.
54 Id. at 227-228.
55 Id. at 260.
56 Id. at 89-94.
57 Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc. v. PNB General Insurers Co., Inc., 824 Phil.
652, 670 (2018) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
