Asal Arefi

PHL200: Ancient Philosophy

Prof. Mark Gatten
Term 2 Essay: Prompt 3
August 12, 2025
Word Count: 1344

Between Man and God: Aristotle’s Dual Ideal of Human Flourishing in Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics reveals that human happiness (eudaimonia) is not a

fleeting feeling or mere pleasure, but the realization of our unique function through rational
virtue. Grounding ethics firmly in human nature, Aristotle offers a comprehensive account of
flourishing that culminates in contemplation as the highest good. By systematically connecting
human capacities with flourishing, he argues that happiness fundamentally involves virtuous
rational activity, with the contemplative life as the highest form of excellence and complete
happiness. This essay will examine Aristotle’s approach to human happiness, clarifying the key
premises underpinning his function argument, and evaluating both the reasoning behind his
claims and his conclusion about the supreme human good.
Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia begins with a foundational claim: just as every
craftsperson, tool, or organ has a distinctive function (ergon), so too must human beings. He
writes, “If there is some function of man, and the good and the well is thought to reside in the
function, this will be something distinctive of man” (EN I.7, 1097b25–1098a17). This ergon
argument relies on the premise that the proper function of something is what it alone can do or
do best. For example, the function of a knife is to cut; it performs well if it cuts excellently.
Similarly, Aristotle infers that the human function cannot be mere nutrition or growth, which
humans share with plants, nor mere perception and movement, shared with animals, but must be
an activity of the soul guided by reason: “an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without,
rational principle” (EN I.7, 1098a7–8). This premise—that human function is uniquely realized
through rational activity—is critical, as it elevates ethics beyond mere survival or pleasure to the
distinct expression of human nature. Therefore, happiness is the “activity of soul in accordance
with excellence,” and if there are multiple excellences, it is that activity performed “in
accordance with the best and most complete” (EN I.7, 1098a15–17). In other words, the good
life for humans is virtuous rational activity.
Aristotle further develops his account by dividing the soul into rational and non-rational
parts. The rational soul itself comprises two distinct components: the calculative reason, which is
responsible for intellectual virtues such as wisdom and understanding, and the part of reason that
governs desire, aligning with moral virtues. Moral virtue arises through habituation, shaping
desires to accord with reason and thereby creating harmony between emotion and rational choice
(EN I.13, 1102a10–25; VI.1, 1138b19–21). Intellectual virtues perfect the rational faculties
directly, specifically the theoretical or speculative reason, while moral virtues perfect the
practical reason, which guides desire and voluntary action (EN VI.3, 1140a10–20). This division
highlights the complexity of the rational soul and clarifies how intellectual and moral virtues
relate to different aspects of reason.
Book VI emphasizes the central role of practical wisdom (phronesis), which is the virtue
of the calculative part of the rational soul concerned with deliberation about action. Aristotle
defines phronesis as “a true and reasoned state of capacity to act regarding the things that are
good or bad for man” (EN VI.5, 1140a24). Phronesis unites rational deliberation with rightly
ordered desire, guiding moral virtue in changing circumstances (EN VI.2, 1138b19 ff). Moral
excellence sets the aim rightly, and practical wisdom determines the means (EN VI.12, 1144a7–
9). Thus, flourishing requires both intellectual virtues (like wisdom) and moral virtues (like
courage), each perfecting distinct aspects of the rational soul in relation to the non-rational parts.
The link between moral virtue and phronesis is essential, as phronesis ensures that moral virtue
is rightly applied in practical life.
Aristotle thus identifies the highest form of happiness as the life of contemplation, the
exercise of intellect, which he calls “the best thing in us” and “the most divine element” (EN
X.7, 1177a15–16). This activity is uniquely continuous, self-sufficient, and pleasurable: “It is
always loved for its own sake… it is the most leisurely of activities… and aims at no end beyond
itself” (EN X.7, 1177a24–25). These qualities satisfy the classical criteria for the ultimate good:
self-sufficiency, completeness, and finality.
However, Aristotle qualifies that this life “would be too high for man,” more suited to a
divine being, since intellect is divine compared to our composite human nature (EN X.7,
1178a8–12). Consequently, the moral life remains a “secondary degree” of happiness, grounded
in our social and composite nature (EN X.8, 1178b7–10). This forms the core of Aristotle’s dual
ideal of happiness: the divine intellectual life of contemplation and the eminently human moral
life of virtuous social engagement. Both reflect genuine flourishing, but the contemplative life is
the supreme ideal, while the moral life is the highest practical good for most humans.
By rooting ethics in human nature and empirical observation, Aristotle offers a
compelling account of human happiness. Unlike purely abstract or hedonistic theories, his
approach begins with the function argument, connecting flourishing to the realization of uniquely
human rational capacities. This naturalistic foundation provides robust empirical and
psychological footing, avoiding reductive accounts that equate happiness with transient pleasure
or external goods, which often fail to capture the complexity of human experience and the active
role of virtue.
His integration of moral and intellectual virtues, practical wisdom, and appropriate
pleasure creates a holistic and psychologically sophisticated account of flourishing, portraying
happiness as a full-bodied activity rather than a mere state. The clear hierarchy culminating in
contemplation provides a coherent ideal that synthesizes reason and virtue, expressed through his
dual ideal framework that honors both the highest divine-like excellence and the practical human
moral life.
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s method faces a significant challenge in the teleological nature of
the function argument. This argument extends the concept of ergon—a clear, fixed function
applied to tools and organs—to human beings, asserting that humans have a distinctive function
that determines their good. Critics may contend this leap risks oversimplification because human
beings are complex, multifaceted, and capable of many activities that cannot be reduced to a
single function.
More fundamentally, critics may question the validity of moving from describing what
humans uniquely do to prescribing what they ought to do for happiness. This shift from a
descriptive claim about human capacities to a normative claim about the good life may be
circular or insufficiently justified. In particular, it risks assuming what it tries to prove: that
rational activity is the good, because it is the function, and the function is defined by what is
good.
Aristotle anticipates this objection by grounding the function in reason, which he
identifies as the unique human capacity. He argues that since reason is what distinguishes
humans from other beings, the human function must involve activity in accordance with rational
principle (EN I.7, 1098a7–8). This appeal to reason is meant to provide a non-arbitrary basis for
linking function and good.
However, modern skepticism about teleology challenges whether the presence of a
natural capacity necessarily entails a normative purpose. Even if reason is distinctively human, it
does not automatically follow that its exercise constitutes the ultimate good. Human life is
marked by diversity, contingency, and cultural variability, complicating the idea of a single,
natural end. Moreover, naturalistic explanations do not inherently prescribe normative aims, so
Aristotle’s argument may not fully bridge the descriptive-prescriptive gap.
This teleological objection thus strikes at the foundation of Aristotle’s ethics. Without a
secure move from function to good, the entire framework risks losing its normative force.
Addressing this challenge requires more than identifying unique human capacities; it demands a
robust justification of why these capacities ought to determine what counts as the good life.
Despite critiques, Aristotle’s approach remains influential by challenging simplistic views
of happiness and emphasizing virtue, reason, and human nature. His Nicomachean Ethics
grounds eudaimonia in virtuous rational activity, culminating in contemplation as the highest
good. While the teleological function argument faces challenges—particularly regarding the
move from natural function to normative good—Aristotle’s naturalistic and holistic vision
continues to shape how we understand the good life, viewing happiness as an active fulfillment
of our nature that bridges the human and the divine.
Works Cited
Ackrill, J. L. (Ed.). (1987). A new Aristotle reader. Princeton University Press.