🔹

🔴
PART ONE: (First 10 Minutes)

[OPENING STATEMENT & ISSUES 1–2: MURDER UNDER SECTION 101 & INTENT/
KNOWLEDGE]

[Opening]
May it please this Hon’ble Court.

I appear on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, representing not only the rule of law but also the
voice of a grieving family—who lost a husband, a father, and a law-abiding citizen in an utterly
senseless act of violence. We are gathered here not for speculation but to examine the clear,
deliberate, and fatal conduct of the accused, Dipesh Kapadia, whose actions on the night of
December 5th, 2024, meet every legal requirement under Section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita—that is, murder, not a lesser charge.

ISSUE 1: Whether the act amounts to Murder under Section 101, or Culpable Homicide
under Section 100

My Lords, let us begin by asking: what happened?

Dipesh, in a state of aggression, picked up a glass bottle, and forcefully struck it towards the
head of a man—a vital part of the body—with the intention to harm Suraj. But tragically, it was
Dheeraj, an innocent peacemaker, who took the blow. Intent followed the action, and the law
recognizes this through Section 102 (Transferred Intent).

My Lords, the prosecution does not deny that Dipesh Kapadia may have initially
targeted Suraj Rana, but what matters is the manner of assault—not merely the
identity of the intended victim. The act of swinging a bottle at the head with force
and precision reflects a mental state far beyond recklessness. It was a calculated
risk, a conscious engagement with a weapon, and the very selection of the head as
the target reinforces the gravity of the intention.

The moment the bottle was aimed at a vital part of the body, Dipesh crossed the line
from ordinary assault into the realm of murder under Section 101(c). The target
does not have to die for the act to qualify—what matters is that Dipesh used a
dangerous weapon in a manner that any reasonable person would know is likely to
result in death.
 His act is not diluted by the identity of the victim being Dheeraj, nor by any
argument of poor aim. The doctrine of transferred intent under Section 102 holds
Dipesh accountable for the full consequence of his intentional act, regardless of
whether Dheeraj or Suraj was the one killed.”

ISSUE 2: Whether the act showed clear intention or knowledge that it was likely to cause
death

“It is critical to emphasize, My Lords, that Section 101 does not demand pre-
planning or elaborate motive. It requires only that the act be intentional and that
the offender either intends to cause death or knows that death is a likely
consequence.

Dipesh’s conduct—choosing a glass bottle, a hard, shattering object, and striking it

with force on the head—fulfills this requirement completely. Even if we accept the
claim that he did not intend to kill, the law still holds him liable because any person
in Dipesh’s position would have known that such an act could lead to grievous
injury or death.

The defense may attempt to cite Dipesh’s state of intoxication, but the BNS is clear—voluntary
intoxication does not negate knowledge or intent. Dipesh could walk, argue, react, and strike.
His physical and mental faculties were functioning enough to carry out an act that had
predictable lethal consequences. Therefore, the intent or knowledge component under Section
101 stands firmly proven.”

The Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958 AIR SC 465) clearly laid down that if
an injury is intentionally inflicted and is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
murder is made out. In our case, the head injury from the glass bottle caused immediate
unconsciousness, bleeding, and death upon arrival at the hospital.

This isn’t a case of lashing out in the heat of the moment. It is a clear, dangerous, and unlawful
act done with full awareness of its consequences.

Further, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976), it was rightly observed
that when death results from a deliberate act targeted at a vital part, it is not mere culpable
homicide—it is murder. In contrast, in Ghapoo Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2003), no
vital part was struck, and the act lacked intent or lethal knowledge. That is not the case here.
⸻

ISSUE 2: Whether the act demonstrated intent or knowledge to cause death

Dipesh’s act of hurling a glass bottle at someone’s head, in a bar full of people, can never be
dismissed as mere accident or momentary lapse. It reflects both:
• Intention to cause harm, and
• Knowledge that such harm was likely to be fatal.

He did not strike a hand or shoulder—he aimed for the skull—the most delicate and
life-sustaining organ of the human body. Such an act speaks not just of intent, but
of criminal knowledge under Section 101(b) and (c).

Even intoxication, which the defense may attempt to use as a shield, does not
negate criminal intent. In Arjun v. State of Maharashtra (2012), the Court held that
voluntary intoxication does not absolve culpability where the act itself is
inherently dangerous.

Dipesh was able to argue, pick a weapon, swing it with force, and target the head.
That is conscious control—not drunken stupor.

[Transition to Second Half]

My Lords, with your permission, I now move to address the remaining three critical issues: the
applicability of provocation, the question of direct causation, and the fallacy of the self-
defense argument.

⸻
 PART TWO: (Last 10 Minutes)

[ISSUES 3–5: EXCEPTION TO MURDER, CAUSATION, SELF-DEFENSE]

ISSUE 3: Whether the defense of “heat of passion” is sustainable

The defense may seek shelter under Exception 1 to Section 101, BNS, claiming that Dipesh
acted in the heat of passion due to provocation from Suraj.

But let us ask: what was this provocation?

A few words. Possibly taunts. Maybe insults. But no physical assault. No grave threat. No
weapon drawn.

The law, as settled in Mahmood v. State (1962 AIR SC 1788), holds that mere words, even if
insulting, do not justify lethal retaliation. Dipesh wasn’t ambushed. He picked up a bottle,
charged, and aimed. That, my Lords, is not loss of self-control—that is a choice.

My Lords, the grave and sudden provocation exception under Section 101 is not
triggered by mere arguments, verbal insults, or humiliation. There must be
evidence that the provocation was so overpowering that a reasonable person would
lose self-control and immediately retaliate.

In this case, Dipesh had time to choose a weapon, approach the target, and direct
force to a critical body part. This sequence of conduct contradicts any claim of
temporary loss of control. It shows calculation, not emotional hijacking.

Even if the verbal exchange angered him, it did not deprive him of the ability to
weigh the consequences. The lack of immediacy, the absence of any threat from
Suraj, and the deliberate nature of the act render the Exception wholly inapplicable.
Dipesh was not reacting in a fit of uncontrolled rage—he was attacking, and he
must be held accountable for the consequences of that attack.”

ISSUE 4: Whether Dheeraj’s death was a direct consequence of Dipesh’s act

This issue is straightforward.

“The prosecution stresses that the chain of causation is clear, unbroken, and
medically supported. Dheeraj was alive and uninjured until Dipesh struck him. The
very next moment, he collapsed, bled profusely, and was declared dead upon arrival
at the hospital. The death was not delayed, accidental, or caused by another factor
—it was the immediate result of a single blow.

Causation under Section 101 requires us to ask: Was this death a foreseeable
result of the accused’s act? The answer is yes. A hard strike to the skull using a
glass bottle is foreseeably fatal. The transfer of intent under Section 102 only
strengthens this position—it does not dilute it.

Thus, Dheeraj’s death is the direct and inevitable consequence of the act committed by
Dipesh.”

Dheeraj did not die hours later. He did not die due to lack of medical help or any intervening
event.

He died on the spot—bleeding profusely from the head after being struck by Dipesh.

As held in State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao (2003 AIR SCW 4238), when the act is directly
traceable to the accused, and no third factor breaks the chain of causation, the accused is fully
liable for the consequences—even if the intended victim was someone else.

Dipesh’s action → injury → death is a direct and unbroken chain. Transferred intent, as per
Section 102, BNS, seals this issue in favor of the prosecution.

ISSUE 5: Whether the act was done in lawful self-defense

The defense might further stretch their argument to Sections 34–40 of BNS, invoking self-
defense.

“My Lords, the defense of self-defense does not apply when there is no real,
immediate danger, and the force used is disproportionate. Suraj Rana’s conduct
did not include any physical aggression. He did not possess a weapon, nor did he
attempt to inflict injury. Therefore, the threshold for invoking private defense is
not met.
 Even if Dipesh felt insulted or provoked, his response was not defensive—it was
offensive, disproportionate, and ultimately fatal. He used a lethal object against
an unarmed man in a crowded, public setting. That is not an act of self-
preservation—it is an act of violent escalation.

The prosecution submits that the defense of self-defense collapses at every limb: no imminent
danger, no necessity of response, and excessive force. Thus, Dipesh must be held liable under
Section 101, not protected under Sections 34–40.”

And even if he were provoked—which we firmly deny—he had ample time to cool off and walk
away. But he chose to escalate. That strips him of any protection under Exception 1.

But this defense collapses under the weight of its own contradiction.
• Was Suraj armed? No.
• Was Dipesh under imminent threat of grievous hurt or death? Absolutely
not.
• Was the force used proportionate? Clearly not.

In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab (1963 AIR SC 612), the Supreme Court held that self-
defense fails when force used is excessive or disproportionate. That principle
applies squarely here.

Even if Suraj insulted him—and again, there’s no evidence of real danger—Dipesh’s

response with a lethal blow to the head far exceeds what law considers reasonable
or necessary.

CONCLUDING REMARKS (Final 1–2 Minutes)

My Lords, this is not just a legal argument. It is about accountability. About ensuring that anger
is not licensed, and that recklessness is not rewarded with leniency.

The accused, Dipesh Kapadia, took a life—not just of any man—but of one who stepped up to de-
escalate a fight.

He took away a husband, a father, and a peacekeeper—Dheeraj—who now survives only in

memory.

This Hon’ble Court, in upholding the sacred values of justice, must deliver a verdict that does
not blink in the face of unlawful violence.

Therefore, the Prosecution humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court may:
• Convict the accused under Section 101, BNS, for murder;
• Reject claims of provocation or self-defense as unsupported by law or
facts;
• And impose the maximum punishment permissible, to send a message:
That life is precious. That violence has consequences. That justice, though delayed,
shall not be denied.

May justice prevail