• Section 14 of the BNS protects persons who act under a compulsion of law or by

virtue of a matter of fact believed in good faith. It ensures that no one shall be
punished in respect of any act by him done with full honesty and intention under a
legal obligation or in true belief of a matter of fact.

Simplified Explanation
Section 14 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), titled “Act Done by a Person Bound,
or by Mistake of Fact Believing Himself Bound, by Law,” addresses situations where a
person commits an act under the belief that they are legally obligated to do so, or in
situations where they genuinely mistake their actions as lawful because of a
misunderstanding of the facts. This section provides protection from liability in cases
where the person acted in good faith, thinking they were fulfilling a legal duty.

Key Points of Section 14

• Legal Obligation or Duty:

o This section applies to cases where a person performs an act because
they believe they are legally required to do so. For example, a
government official following a direct legal order might carry out
actions they believe are mandatory under their official duties.
• Mistake of Fact Leading to a Belief of Obligation:
o The section also covers situations where a person, due to a mistake of
fact (not law), genuinely believes that they are bound by law to perform
the act. A mistake of fact occurs when someone misunderstands or is
unaware of certain facts that lead them to believe their actions are
legally justified.
• Good Faith Requirement:
o The protection offered by this section applies only if the person acted
in good faith, with no intention to harm others or break the law. This
means they must have had an honest belief in their duty or obligation,
without any malicious intent or negligence in understanding their
duties.
• Examples of Protected Actions:
o If a police officer, while enforcing the law, mistakenly arrests an
individual who appears to meet the criteria for an arrest due to a
factual misunderstanding (such as mistaking someone for a suspect
based on provided information), this section could offer legal
protection, provided the officer acted in good faith.
 • Exclusions – Mistake of Law vs. Mistake of Fact:
o It is important to note that this section protects only mistakes of fact,
not mistakes of law. A person cannot claim this defense if they
misunderstand or misinterpret the law itself. The distinction between
factual error and legal misinterpretation is crucial here.
• Judicial Review and Discretion:
o Courts examine whether the person’s belief in their legal obligation was
reasonable under the circumstances. Judges assess the facts known to
the person at the time and determine whether their belief in their duty
was genuinely justified.
•

Landmark case :-

State of West Bengal v. Shew Mangal Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1917

Fact of the case:-

In State of West Bengal v. Shew Mangal Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1917 case, where the facts were
that a police patrol party opened fire under the orders of a Deputy Commissioner of Police
after it was attacked on a dark night. One Assistant Commissioner of Police was injured in
the attack. As a result of the firing by the patrol party, two persons were killed. After a lapse
of about nine years, the police personnel were prosecuted for murder. The Supreme Court in
the appeal against their acquittal held that the prosecution did not succeed in proving the
case against them. There was no question of proving the defence of mistake of fact by the
accused. It is clear that the order of firing given by the superior officer to his subordinates
was given under commands of the law and, therefore, the patrol party was bound to obey
the orders under the first part of section 76 of IPC (S. 14 BNS). Since the first part of the
section was applicable there was no question of proving of mistake of fact and good faith by
the accused at all. Consequently, they were not held liable for murder.

Issue involved:-

. Whether High Court was justified in setting aside the orders of the subordinate court or
not.

2. Whether orders of open fire was justified or there was malicious intention behind the act.

Arguments of both the Parties:

Petitioners

Counsel on behalf of petitioners:

It was contended by the petitioners that in S.S. Bobde V. State of Maharashtra [1], the same
court held that miscarriage of justice may arise equally with the acquittal of guilty and
conviction of an innocent. He strongly argued that it will be a serious disregard for judiciary
if unmerited acquittal likes this if so happens.

He also contended that respondents are undoubtedly guilty of murder and the judgment of
High Court is totally “lighthearted”. He submitted that police is regarded as protector of laws
and regulations and history will never forgive us if the destroyers of law will be acquitted in
this particular case.

Respondents

Counsel on behalf of respondents:

It was contended by the respondents that the actions of officers are totally justifiable as they
have received orders from the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned area regarding open
fire and they were obeying the instructions of senior officers.

It was also argued by them that the night on which the incident took place it was drizzling
and there are serious deficiencies in the evidences as the witness were deposing the nine
year law incident and which is totally insufficient in establishing the identity of accused for
the murder.

Judgment:

The Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Apex Court on the ground that police
officers were only obeying the orders of the Deputy Commissioner of open fire in that
particular area and hence cannot be convicted for an offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. It
was also laid down that materials on record and evidences were insufficient to establish the
identity of an accused.

So, the Apex Court upheld the judgment of High Court as it will be against the general
principles of law and will lead to grave injustice if the respondents are convicted in the
present case.

Concepts Highlighted in the present Case:

It was highlighted in the present case that an officer cannot be held liable for obeying the
instructions of the senior officers. It must be proved by the applicant that either the order
was unjustifiable and was malicious or the person obeying it has committed the act beyond
the scope of that order and maliciously.

Conclusion:
 It can be concluded from the above mentioned case that firstly, there must be sufficient
evidences to establish the clear identification of the accused and secondly, that a
subordinate officer cannot be held liable for obeying the instructions of the senior officers.

Case :-

Vijay Kumar Sharma vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr. on 2 March, 2005

Facts of the case :-

1. Heard counsel for the parties. The accused petitioner is facing trial for offence
under Section 400 IPC and Ram Niwas, father of Mst. Guddi is a prosecution witness in the
case. He was examined as PW5. His examination-in-chief was complete on 4.3.1999 and
cross examination was closed on 10.2.2003. The accused petitioner filed an application
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. on 24.5.2004 before the Trial Court with the prayer that he may be
allowed to cross examine PW5 Ram Niwas and the learned Trial Court allowed the
petitioner's application on the same day. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court,
the complainant non-petitioner filed a revision petition. The revisional court vide its order
dated 21.9.2004 accepted the revision petition and set aside the order passed by the Trial
Court. Hence the present petition by the accused petitioner.

2. It appears that the case was fixed on 10.2.2003 for cross examination of PW5 Ram Niwas,
but the witness could not be cross examined for the reason that counsel for the accused was
busy in some other court and accordingly the Trial Court closed the cross examination vide
order dated 10.2.2003. In doing so, the Trial Court observed that case is pending since 1991
and therefore, no further opportunity can be given to cross examine the witness. In the
opinion of Trial Court, the senior advocate was busy in some other court was no ground to
adjourn the case. However, the case was fixed for recording the statements of remaining
prosecution witnesses. The revisional court while disposing of the revision petition observed
that since cross examination was already closed vide order dated 10.2.2003, the court
cannot review its earlier order in view of the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C.

8. In Shailendra Kumar v. State of Bihar and Ors., 2002 Crl.L.J. 568 the Sessions Judge closed
the prosecution evidence on 3.9.94. Thereafter the case was transferred to 2nd Additional
Sessions Judge, Gaya, who by his order dated 20.9.95 recalled the order dated 3.9.94 and
directed the appellant to produce the witnesses. This order came to be challenged in
revision petition before the High Court. The High Court vide its order dated 1.2.2000 allowed
the revision petition. On 12.5.2000, the State filed an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
before the Additional Sessions Judge, which was rejected vide order dated 2.6.2000 on the
ground that the application has no meaning in view of the order passed by the High Court in
revision petition. Thereafter the appellant informant filed criminal Misc. Petition, which too
was dismissed by the High Court. The order passed by the High Court in Misc. Petition was
challenged in appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Petitioner arguments :-

Learned counsel for the respondent accused submitted before the Apex Court that in this
case there was no question of referring to Section 311 Cr.P.C. in view of earlier order dated
1.2.2000 passed by the High Court setting aside the order dated 20.9.1995 passed by the
Additional Sessions Judge recalling the order dated 3.9.1994 by which the prosecution
evidence was declared to have been closed. Their Lordships repelled the submission made
by the counsel for accused respondent and held as under:

"Bare reading of the aforesaid section reveals that it is of very wide amplitude and if there is
any negligence, latches or mistakes by not examining material witnesses, the Courts function
to render just decision by examining such witness at any stage is not, in any way, impaired.
This Court in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell (1999) 6 SCC 110 observed: "After all, function
of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed
by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better".

Precedent :-

It may also be noted that revision petition was filed by Ram Niwas who was simply a witness
in the case. Though the revisional court held that Ram Niwas being a private party has no
locus standi to file revision petition, still the revisional court exercised revisional powers.

Mr. S.R. Surana appearing for the complainant non-petitioner has supported the impugned
order and contended that impugned order is barred under Section 362 Cr.P.C. and has
referred to a decision of the Apex Court in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. G.K. Sengupta,
2003 Cr.L.R. (SC) 757.

I have gone through the case law cited at the bar. In the aforesaid case, the High Court
declined to allow the petition under Section 311 Cr.P.C. in 1997, but in the year 2000
reviewed its earlier order and directed to summon P in evidence. In these circumstances it
was held that the impugned order is barred under Section 362 Cr.P.C.

Learned counsel for the complainant has also relied upon Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali
Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 57. This case was also considered by the revisional Court. In this case,
the Apex Court held that Magistrates do not possess inherent powers and hence cannot
review or recall any order passed by them. This case also has no application to the facts of
the present case. Here, the Trial Court did not review or recall its earlier order dated
10.2.2003. At the lime of passing the order dated 10.2.2003 the consideration for closing the
cross examination was different than that which prevailed with the Trial Court while passing
the order on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C.

This Court, in Hazari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 Crl.L.J. 3758 had an occasion to
consider the importance of cross examination. While exercising inherent jurisdiction and
dealing with an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. this court noted the importance of
cross examination at considerable length and I feel it appropriate to quote the same :
"The accused has a right to cross examine the witness to elicit the suppressed facts and to
expose the discripancies. The object of cross examination is to impeach the credibility and
the general value of the evidence given by the witness. The right to cross-examination is one
of the valuable rights of the accused in order to elicit the truth from the witnesses. Though
the accused has no right to seek postpondment of the cross examination and the cross-
examination should follow the Examination-in-chief, but in certain cases, where either the
counsel for the accused is not available on account of some unforseen reason event or the
defence counsel is not prepared with cross-examining the witnesses when the Examination-
in-Chief is over, then in such a case, the Trial Court, in discretion, may permit the cross-
examination of any such witness to be deferred until any witness is examined or re-called for
cross examination. The object of cross examination is to enable the Court to arrive at the
truth, irrespective of the fact whether the prosecution or the defence has examined the
witnesses or failed to produce some evidence or due to unavoidable circumstances the
accused failed to cross- examine the witnesses. The evidence is taken neither to help the
prosecution nor for the defence but the same is taken for a just and proper disposal of the
case. In these circumstances, in order to impart justice and to arrive at a just and proper
disposal of the case, I think it proper to allow the accused-petitioner to cross examine the
witnesses, viz., PW 1 to PW6 as P.W. 7 has been given up by the learned counsel for the
petitioner for being cross examined. If the accused will not be given an opportunity to cross
examine the witnesses then he will not be in a position to impeach the accuracy or
credibility of these witnesses. But the re-calling of these witnesses is subject to the
condition that the accused-petitioner will deposit the expenses for re-calling these witnesses
within 15 days from today since the witness could not be cross-examined on account of non-
appearance of Mr. Jaswant Singh Bhadu, Advocate, if the amount is so deposited for
recalling for cross examination of the witnesses then the petitioner will be free to recover
this amount from his counsel Mr. Jaswant Singh Bhadu, Advocate, on account of whose non-
appearance this litigation has been prolonged and the petitioner had to suffer".

Now I shall deal with the question as to when the powers under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should
be exercised. In Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme
Court dealing with the issue observed as under:

"Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge
in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused
in the Trial of the case, but an oversight In the management of the prosecution cannot be
treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If
proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to
any inadvertance, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be
rectified. After all, function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not
to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties
performed better."
It was then held:

"We cannot therefore accept the contention of the appellant as a legal proposition that the
court cannot exercise power of resummoning any witness If once that power was exercised,
nor can the power be whittled down merely on the ground that the prosecution discovered
laches only when the defence highlighted them during final argument. The power of the
court is plenary to summon or even recall any witness at any stage of the case, if the court
considers it necessary for a just decision. The steps which the Trial Court permitted in this
case for resummoning certain witnesses cannot therefore be spurned down or frowned at".

Court reasoning :-

In the case at hand, the order to close cross examination was passed on 10.2.2003 for the
reasons mentioned in the order. Present is not the case where petitioner earlier also moved
an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and the same was rejected and letter the application
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. was allowed. In these circumstances the authority cited by the
counsel for the complainant has no application to the facts of the present case.

. Undisputedly, PW5 Ramniwas Sharma is a star witness as he being a father of the

complaint non-petitioner. The object of cross examination is to impeach the credibility and
the general value of the evidence given by the witnesses. Likewise, the accused has a right
to have the witnesses cross examined so as to elicit the suppressed facts, expose the
discripancies and to bring truth. Therefore, the right to cross examination is one of the
valuable rights of the accused in order to elicit the truth.

Thus, on the basis of what has been staled above, it must be concluded that the learned
revisional court has erred in dismissing the application of the accused petitioner filed
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the order of the Trial Court recalling PW 5 Ram
Niwas for his cross examination is barred by Section 302 Cr.P.C. The order passed by the Trial
Court cannot be held to be an order reviewing Its earlier order dated 10.2.2003 by which
cross examination was closed. The order Impugned in the revision was passed on an
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. filed by the accused petitioner. In my considered view
the Trial Court having considered the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and finding that
recalling of PW5 would be necessary for just decision of the case, passed the order dated
24.5.2004. PW 5 Ramniwas, being father of the complainant non-petitioner on whose
instance the accused petitioner was prosecuted and facing trial, is the main witness in the
case and his cross examination for the purposes of defence cannot be denied and the
accused petitioner, in my firm view, should not be made to suffer for the fault of his
advocate.

Conclusion :-

Thus, on the basis of what has been staled above, it must be concluded that the learned
revisional court has erred in dismissing the application of the accused petitioner filed
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the order of the Trial Court recalling PW 5 Ram
Niwas for his cross examination is barred by Section 302 Cr.P.C. The order passed by the Trial
Court cannot be held to be an order reviewing Its earlier order dated 10.2.2003 by which
cross examination was closed. The order Impugned in the revision was passed on an
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. filed by the accused petitioner. In my considered view
the Trial Court having considered the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and finding that
recalling of PW5 would be necessary for just decision of the case, passed the order dated
24.5.2004. PW 5 Ramniwas, being father of the complainant non-petitioner on whose
instance the accused petitioner was prosecuted and facing trial, is the main witness in the
case and his cross examination for the purposes of defence cannot be denied and the
accused petitioner, in my firm view, should not be made to suffer for the fault of his
advocate.

14. Resultantly, this misc. petition is allowed. The Impugned order passed by the revisional
court is set aside and that of the Trial Court allowing application of the accused petitioner
filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is restored.

Section 15

Section 15 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which is equivalent to Section 77 of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC), protects judges from criminal liability for acts done in their
judicial capacity, provided they are acting under legal authority or with a genuine belief in
such authority.
IPC Section 77
Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any
power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.

Landmark case :-

A.K. Chaudhary And 2 Ors. vs The State Of Gujarat And 2 Ors.

The short facts of the case are as under:

(i) There is no dispute on the following aspects:

a. Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as LIC for short) is a statutory
body governed by the provisions of LIC Act and its employees are governed by the
Regulations framed by LIC in exercise of the statutory power under LIC Act.

b. The deceased Dineshbhai Ganpatbhai Parmar was an employee of LIC holding of the cadre
of Assistant Executive Engineer.

c. The petitioners of Special Criminal Application No. 1176/2004, Shri A.K. Chaudhari and
Shri A.K. Shukla and the petitioners of Special Criminal Application No. 1225/2004, Shri S.
Roy Chaudhary, Shri R.K. Mishra, Shri T.K. Banerjee, and Shri P.P. Upadhyay were and are the
Officers of LIC, In-charge of their concerned Departments, holding different capacities, which
are as under:

1. Shri S. Roy Chowdhury, Executive Director (Personnel) Petitioner No. 1 in Special Criminal
Application No. 1225 of 2004.

2. Shri A.K. Shukla, now Executive Director (Pr & C C) at the relevant time was working Chief
(Personnel) Petitioner No. 2 in Special Criminal Application No. 1176 of 2004.

3. Shri R.K. Mishra, now in Central Office as Superintending Engineer, the then Executive
Engineer, Ahmedabad Divisional Office Petitioner No. 2 in Special Criminal Application No.
1225/2004.

4. Shri T.K. Banerjee, Zonal Manager, Western Zone, Mumbai, now Member, IRDA (Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority), Hyderabad " Petitioner No. 3 in Special Criminal
Application No. 1225 of 2004

5. Shri A.K. Chaudhary, the then Senior Divisional Manager, Rajkot, now on deputation in the
Office of Ombudsman, at Ahmedabad " Petitioner No. 1 in Special Criminal Application No.
1176 of 2004.

6. Shri P.B. Upadhyay, now Faulty Member, Divisional Training Centre, Rajkot, the then
Manager (I.T.) - Petitioner No. 4 in Special Criminal Application No. 1225/2004.

(f)In the year 2000 contracts were granted by the deceased for repair of the official quarters
of L.I.C., at Rajkot as an Officer of LIC in capacity as Assistant Executive Engineer to the
petitioner of Special Criminal Application No. 1292/2004 and one another contractor M/s.
Vijay Construction (hereinafter referred to as another contractor).

(g)There was complaint by petitioners of Special Criminal Application No. 1292 of 2004
against deceased, lodged with Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB) for demanding bribe and a trap
was organized by ACB, which was not successful and had failed, in the month of August,
2002. There were complaints lodged by the petitioners of Special Criminal Application No.
1292 of 2004 and other contractor to the Authority of LIC, by making allegations against the
deceased for demand of bribe and on the basis of such complaint the Specified Authority of
LIC had passed the order on 24.9.2002 for suspending the deceased.

(l) On 19.10.2004, the deceased made a demand for supply of certain documents.

3. In light of the aforesaid undisputed factual scenario, the matter deserves to be examined.

Isuues :-

Life is dear to everybody and death is painful to one and all. Should sentiments prevail or
discipline for the administration of any institution ? Can sentiments be allowed to be
enforced over rule of law ? Can the action or inaction or propriety of action or inaction to
discharge legal obligation be said as an aid or instigation or abetment to commit suicide ?
The aforesaid are the aspects which directly or indirectly arise for the consideration of this
Court in the present group of petitions.

(d)The petitioner of Special Criminal Application No. 1292 of 2004 was the contractor who
was granted contract by LIC for construction of certain works of LIC with one M/s. Vijay
Construction.

(e)One of the contractors, who is the petitioner of Special Criminal Application No. 1292 of
2004 is also Dalit. The deceased D.G. Parmar (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) was
also Dalit.

(h)There were no actions for about two years by the specified officers, though the deceased
continued to make representations against the action of suspension.

(i)In April-June, 2004 explanation was called by LIC from the deceased in connection with
the allegations made by the contractor against the deceased.

(j)On 14.7.2004, deceased replied to the Authority by submitting his explanation.

(m)In the meantime, the National Commission for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
recommended for taking appropriate action for ventilating the grievance of the deceased.

(n)As per the specified officers LIC as there were serious allegations of demanding bribe, the
action is taken by the Specified Authority in discharge of official duty provided under LIC
Act read with Staff Regulations framed thereunder. Whereas as per the deceased, the action
is taken by arranging conspiracy of the Bengali Officers in collusion with the aforesaid two
contractors.

Petitioner arguments :-

Mr. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Nanavati, learned Counsel for the
petitioners submitted that even if the complaint is accepted on its face value, it does not
make out a case for commission of the alleged offences namely; abetment for suicide and
the alleged offence under the Atrocities Act and the submission of the learned Counsel
appearing for the petitioners is that the action was taken of suspending the deceased, of
issuing charge-sheet etc., etc., in discharge of the official duty or, in any case, in purported
exercise of the official duty. It was also submitted that had the petitioners in capacity as the
Specified Officers of LIC not taken action in such a serious matter, where the allegations
were for demand of bribe in a complaint made by the contractor, there would have been ex-
facie dereliction of the duty and if the actions were not taken, the petitioners themselves
could have been subjected to the departmental proceedings for dereliction of the duty. He
also submitted that in none of the correspondences made by the deceased with LIC there is
any allegation of so-called Bengali conspiracy and he alternatively submitted that even if
there is such allegation, the same is the self-creation of the deceased himself on imagination
and, in any case, even if such allegations stand, the same would not result into commission
of offence as such allegations, at the most, can be said as harassment or mental torture or at
best, cruelty which even otherwise cannot be said as abetment or incitement to commit
suicide. He also submitted that as the deceased was suspended in the year 2002, he had
enough time to think and not only that but even after issuance of the charge-sheet on
6.10.2004, the deceased had demanded documents on 19.10.2004 and thereafter also there
was sufficient time to think consciously and the alleged incident had happened on
23.10.2004 and, therefore, it cannot be said as abetment to suicide. The learned Counsel
also submitted that even if the person is a Dalit, he is also not immune to law and, therefore,
in any case, when the action is taken in discharge of the official duties or, in any case, in
purported exercise of the official duty, it cannot be said that any alleged offence is
committed under the Atrocities Act. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has
relied upon various decision to support his contention, which shall be referred to hereinafter
to the extent they are found relevant, for the present case.

5. Mr. Tulsi, learned Sr. Counsel has also alternatively submitted that there is no jurisdiction
with the police to investigate into the complaint as no offence is made out and he, therefore,
submitted that merely because FIR is registered of a cognizable case is no ground for the
police to proceed with the investigation by effecting arrest etc., unless prima facie
satisfaction is arrived at that cognizable offence is committed and, therefore, he submitted
that as no offence is made out or, in any case, as there is no authority with the police to
investigate into the present complaint, this Court may exercise the power for quashing of the
complaint. He also submitted that the death, in any case, is un-natural death and the police
could have inquired into the case of un-natural death. If there is sufficient material for
abetment of suicide, then only the FIR can be registered under Section 306, but merely
because there is a suicidal note in the present case, it is not sufficient to make out a case for
commission of offence under Section 306 of the IPC for abetment of suicide or for the
alleged offence under the Atrocities act.

7. Mr. Amin, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contractor submitted that as the
demand of bribe was made by the deceased, his client had approached the ACB, but
somehow, as the information was leaked, the trap failed. He submitted that the petitioner
had no option but to complain to the higher Officer of the LIC for the demand of illegal
gratification made by the deceased. He submitted that merely because the complaint is filed
by the petitioner against the alleged misconduct of the deceased, it cannot be said that
there is any abetment to suicide. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioner is also a Dalit
and, therefore, the charge under the Atrocities Act cannot be maintained against the
petitioner. Mr. Amin for supporting his contention has also relied upon certain decisions to
which the reference shall be made to the extent they are found relevant for the present
case.

8. On behalf of the State and the Original Complainant, Mr. Kogje, learned APP, Mr. P.K. Jani,
learned Counsel and Mr. Bairavia, learned Counsel appearing for the complainant in the
respective petitions, inter alia, submitted that there is prima facie material for showing
commission of offence for abetment to suicide and also for the alleged offence under
Atrocities Act. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that in normal
circumstances, as a responsible Officer of LIC, the suspension order could have been revoked
and the representation made by the deceased could have been responded to by taking
appropriate action. However, all omission were with the deliberate purpose of harassing the
deceased who was Dalit and it has been submitted that the action of suspending and other
departmental proceedings were coupled with the malice and, therefore, can be said as
abetment to suicide. It was also submitted that the Atrocities act is enacted with a view to
provide additional safe-guard to Dalit and if the purposive interpretation is made of the
relevant provisions of Atrocities Act or of the allegations made in the complaint, it does
make out a case prima facie for commission of offence under the Atrocities Act.

7. ... The prosecution initiated against the appellant would only result in sheer harassment to
the appellant without any fruitful result. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge seriously
erred in holding that the first information report against the appellant disclosed the
elements of a cognizable offence. There was absolutely no ground to proceed against the
appellant herein.

Respondent arguments :-

It was also submitted on behalf of the State and original complainant that the matter is still
at the investigation stage and the police has yet to investigate into the complaint. It was
submitted on behalf of the respondents that when the FIR is registered in connection with
the cognizable offence, it is obligatory on the part of the police to investigate and such
investigation may also result into dereliction of the statutory duties by the accused
petitioners. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the investigation by the
police in connection with the present complaint cannot be said as without jurisdiction. It
was submitted that the present complaint may not be quashed and all petitions deserve to
be dismissed.

10. The learned APP, Mr. Kogje had additionally submitted that in the investigation made up
till now by the police there are statements of the witnesses showing that there was
harassment or bias by some of the Officers of LIC, who are petitioners against the deceased
since he was Dalit. He submitted that as the investigation is yet to be made further, the
matter cannot be concluded at this stage on the basis that there is no offence committed by
the accused for abetment of suicide or alleged offence under the Atrocities act. The learned
APP submitted that considering the allegations made in the complaint it cannot be said that
there is no prima facie case for investigation by police and, therefore, it was submitted that
the complaint may not be quashed by this Court at this stage.

Precedent :-

The Supreme Court in Netai Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2005) 2 SCC 659 clarified that
mere mention of a person’s name in a suicide note, without any specific allegations of
instigation, aiding, or participation in a conspiracy, does not satisfy the ingredients of
abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. The Court stressed that abetment requires a
clear act of instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid as per Section 107 IPC, and the
existence of mens rea is indispensable.

Key Principles from Netai Dutta

A suicide note must disclose a proximate and live link between the accused’s conduct and
the act of suicide.

Dissatisfaction, workplace tensions, transfers, or personal grievances do not automatically

amount to abetment.

Quarrels, harsh words said in anger, or routine disciplinary actions cannot, without more,
establish "instigation." The person’s abnormal or subjective reactions to such situations
cannot lead to criminal liability.

Supporting Precedents Considered

Sanju v. State of MP (2002) 5 SCC 371: Telling someone “go and die” in quarrel does not
amount to instigation; abusive words spoken in anger lack the required mens rea.

Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1995 Supp (3) SCC 731): Mere harassment without
evidence of incitement is insufficient for Section 306 IPC.

Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618: Presumption under Section 113A
of the Evidence Act arises only when cruelty is shown to have a direct nexus with the
suicide.

Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 618: Cruelty must be such that it is likely to drive
a person to commit suicide.

Broader Legal Position

Normal disciplinary action such as transfer, suspension, charge-sheet, or initiation of inquiry
cannot be equated with instigation to suicide.

Courts distinguish between the lawful exercise of authority and unlawful

prosecution/harassment. If an employee, out of sentiment, overreacts by committing suicide
due to official measures, liability does not fall on superior officers unless mala fides, excess,
or illegal action is proved.

The law is framed on the assumption of a reasonable and prudent person’s reaction; if the
reaction is abnormal or due to personal weaknesses (such as alcoholism or pre-existing
mental stress), the abetment charge will fail.

Conclusion :-

The aforesaid takes me to examine the aspects as to whether in such circumstances law
provides for remedy or remedial measure or not ? As per the complainant the deceased has
put an end to life due to the departmental action of suspension and of inaction in revocation
of suspension order and of issuing the charge-sheet and contemplating to hold
departmental inquiry, whereas as per the accused officers the action is taken in discharge of
the official duty and had the action not taken, the officers could have been charged with the
derelictions of duty. Though in view of the observations made hereinabove, it may not
amount to offence but the fact remains that there is a loss of life of the deceased, who was
an employee of Life Insurance Corporation of India. The remedial measures under the Civil
Law and Criminal Law are different. The different yardstick and the criteria prevails for
commission of offence, prosecution and for imposing punishment upon a person when
offence is committed but when even no offence is committed and in a case where the family
members of the deceased are visited with the consequences to loss of life, it cannot be said
that there is no remedy provided under the law. Under such circumstances, there is a
remedy provided as per the Civil Law for compensating to the death of the deceased. The
principles of vicarious liability may also apply if ultimately it is proved that the loss of life is
due to inaction by the specified officers of LIC and not due to abnormal sentimental reaction
of the deceased to the departmental proceedings. As such, even for finding the aforesaid
aspects, full fledged opportunity is required to be given to both the sides namely; the
relatives of the deceased may prove that the loss of life is due to inaction or so-called
purported exercise of the power and the officers and also LIC itself may prove their defence
that the so-called action for suicide and the loss of life is due to abnormal psychological
reaction by the deceased to the departmental proceedings. All such aspects, if ultimately
proved to the extent that the loss of life of the deceased is on account of any negligence in
discharge of duty by the officers concerned of LIC, the dependent members of the deceased
may get appropriate compensation. Therefore, there is a remedial measure provided under
Civil Law for compensating to the loss of life to the deceased to the dependent members of
the deceased. Since there is neither prayer, nor all parties to the proceedings, more
particularly LIC is before the Court, I find it proper to leave the matter at that stage, leaving
the parties to resort to appropriate remedy under Civil Law for compensation etc., due to
loss of life to the deceased, as may be permissible in law.

51. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, I find it proper to pass final order
to quash the impugned complaint vide C.R. No. I-498 of 2004 of Sabarmati Police Station
hence ordered accordingly. All the petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made
absolute accordingly.

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