Public-Private Partnerships: The Relevance of Budgeting: Paul Posner, Shin Kue Ryu Ann Tkachenko
Public-Private Partnerships: The Relevance of Budgeting: Paul Posner, Shin Kue Ryu Ann Tkachenko
                  Public-Private Partnerships:
                  The Relevance of Budgeting
                                                by
                            Paul Posner, Shin Kue Ryu and Ann Tkachenko*
* Paul Posner is Professor of Public Administration at George Mason University, United States. Shin
  Kue Ryu and Ann Tkachenko are research assistants at the same university.
                                                                                                      1
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE RELEVANCE OF BUDGETING
1. Introduction
             Public-private partnerships have constituted a growing movement worldwide for at
        least the past decade. Countries have been seeking private partners to finance, manage and
        maintain infrastructure serving public purposes in a growing range of areas. Transportation,
        hospitals, prisons and schools are among the leading candidates for private partnerships.
           A previous OECD report provided a comprehensive overview of the numerous public
        management and finance issues raised by this emergent tool of government (OECD, 2008).
        The issues addressed in that report included: definitions; trends; criteria for assessing
        economic viability; budget scoring and accounting treatment; and managerial and regulatory
        issues.
             This article examines the budgetary treatment and issues raised by PPPs in more
        depth. Given the unique budgetary and accounting issues posed by privately financed capital
        services, the budgetary rules, institutions and procedures applying to these transactions
        warrant greater assessment.
            This article examines the budgetary implications of PPPs, in particular the following
        questions:
        ●   What are the issues posed by PPPs for central budget offices?
        ●   How do such proposals affect near and longer-term fiscal targets and priorities?
        ●   What approaches are currently in practice to budget for these partnerships and what are
            their implications for public finance?
        ●   What budgetary strategies and processes should be considered by OECD countries to
            promote greater consideration of the short-term and longer-term affordability of PPPs
            with regard to each country’s fiscal space and priorities?
            The article draws from conversations with budget officials in seven OECD countries
        (Australia, France, Hungary, Korea, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States)
        and one observer country (Chile). In addition, the experiences of other countries both
        within and outside the OECD area are included, to highlight emerging budgetary practices
        and issues. This article also draws on a review of many reports and publications by
        individual countries as well as by multilateral institutions including the IMF, the World
        Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, the European Union and the United Nations.
              Countries have stepped up their use of PPPs in recent years: PPPs have grown to
          comprise a portion, although not the majority, of capital budgets in the countries reviewed
          here. The United Kingdom has had the longest experience, with PPPs currently comprising
          from 10% to 15% of the capital budget in recent years. France and Korea have had similar
          experience, with PPPs comprising 20% and 15% of those countries’ capital budgets
          respectively. Portugal reported the highest payments for PPPs, representing nearly 28% of
          the national budget or 9.4% of GDP; projects could add up to nearly 20% of GDP eventually.
          In the United States, on the other hand, PPPs are quite limited: the cumulative project costs
          of such partnerships that had been funded or completed by October 2006 totalled over
          USD 48 billion (in nominal dollars), a small share of the USD 1.6 trillion in public capital
          spending on infrastructure by all levels of government during a similar period.
               Countries have many reasons for pursuing partnerships with the private sector to
          deliver goods and services. Much of the impetus is political in nature, arising from constraints
          on governmental roles and spending, whether from domestic policies, financial markets or
          regulatory measures such as the deficit and debt limits of the European Union. Some of the
          push is opportunistic: private provision attenuates the negative aspects of higher fees for
          services and gives the illusion of making public budgets look smaller, at least in the near
          term.
               However, the principal analytical rationale is that the private sector can achieve equal
          or greater levels of service with lower costs than pure public sector provision. The private
          sector has incentives to achieve greater efficiencies than public agencies operating alone,
          thanks to the competition provided by healthy markets. In his theory of “creative
          destruction”, Joseph Schumpeter attributes economic growth in free markets to a process
          where entrepreneurs introduce new technologies, new kinds of products, new methods of
          production and new means of distribution that make old ones obsolete, forcing existing
          companies to quickly adapt to a new environment or fail (Schumpeter, 1976). As will be
          discussed below, most countries have rigorous procedures to compare the long-term value-
          for-money prospects of private partnerships with purely public provision prior to authorising
          PPPs, and sometimes prior to determining the winning bids on PPP contracts. Since the
          interest charged to government is inherently lower than private finance, the cost savings
          for equivalent levels of service must be sufficient to overcome this natural public sector
          advantage.
              Table 1 locates the various combinations of public and private roles in the delivery of
          public services. When acquiring and operating capital assets, the government traditionally
          uses a combination of public finance and some form of private delivery for some aspects of
          capital services. Typically, governments will contract for the design and construction of a
          major asset, such as a building or a highway, with highly specific public conditions and
          oversight. Once the asset is completed, the government often performs operation and
          maintenance functions with public employees. For instance, the Australian national
          government only uses private contractors to construct traditional government-owned capital.
        from upfront payment of asset creation to the purchase of a stream of services that the
        private partner generates with the asset.
            In the case of existing assets, the private sector in effect agrees to operate, upgrade
        and maintain the asset. This buy-build-operate model (BBO) is being implemented by
        several states in the United States. For instance, the Indiana Turnpike was purchased from
        the State of Indiana by a private consortium for USD 3.8 billion in exchange for a contract
        to operate, maintain and upgrade the highway for 75 years (United States Government
        Accountability Office, 2008).
             Another closely related form of public-private partnership is the concession. A
        concession transfers the operation of an infrastructure service to a private firm which
        operates, maintains and finances the asset. Like a PPP, the private partner takes on certain
        risks specified in the contract, perhaps taking responsibility for a greater share of demand
        risk than traditional DCMF or other forms of PPPs. Unlike a classic PPP where the
        government pays the private partner an annual fee, however, the concessionaire pays a fee
        to the government for the privilege of operating the asset which remains the property of
        the government. Also, unlike a PPP, the concessionaire receives payment not from
        government appropriations but typically from user charges levied on the consumers of the
        asset – for example, highway tolls. However, governments in many cases subsidise and
        underwrite the risks of the concessionaire through such mechanisms as guarantees and
        other forms of contingent subsidies triggered by demand shortfalls.
            While not defined as PPPs by most observers, operating leases and financial leases
        share some of the features of PPPs as well. Unlike PPPs, the government leases an asset
        from a private owner, either for a short time or for a longer period. However, leases have
        similar budget implications. In effect, they enable the financing of asset construction and
        operation with private rather than public resources, thereby circumventing upfront
        funding requirements and other disciplinary constraints in the budget process.
             Financial leases are classified as a form of borrowing, since the government bears the
        risks. International Public Sector Accounting Standards and budget offices in some
        countries have rules that reclassify operating leases as financial leases based on the
        substance rather than the form of the transaction. The State of Victoria in Australia, for
        instance, classifies arrangements as financial leases based on the share of total asset costs
        financed by the government, the extent of the asset’s useful life covered by the lease, and
        the provision for government acquisition at bargain basement prices (IMF, 2006, p. 22). In
        the United States, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has similar rules, and
        financial leases require the agency to record the budget authority for the lease up front
        rather than annually as lease payments are made (United States Office of Management and
        Budget, 2007).
             The United States national audit office, now called the Government Accountability
        Office (GAO), found that federal agencies often sidestep the upfront funding requirements
        of the OMB financial leasing rules, by structuring their leases as short-term operating
        leases. The GAO found that such leases had the function of providing for long-term fiscal
        space needs, but generated a much higher cost to the government than government
        ownership or lease-purchase. To ensure that the underlying costs of competing asset
        financing options were compared on the same terms, the GAO recommended that all tools
        for financing long-term fiscal space needs be budgeted up front in agency budgets. When
        provided with a level budgetary playing field, the GAO concluded that there would be a
          greater chance that the most cost-effective option to the government would be chosen
          (Posner, 1994).
               Each of these forms of PPPs has its own unique attributes and consequences. What
          they have in common is upfront financing of asset construction or enhancement with
          private rather than public resources. However, these are not free resources. In return, the
          public sector must either provide annualised payments over a number of years to the
          private firm, or must provide the firm with concessions which permit it to use public
          resources such as land or to charge fees from the public. These annualised costs have
          budgetary effects for operating budgets rather than capital budgets. In effect, the costs of
          capital are converted from upfront payment to annualised payments.
        be necessary just to maintain current levels of service in the face of expanding populations
        and congestion (United States Congressional Budget Office, 2008).
             In one sense, the presence of backlogs and unmet needs for infrastructure is not
        unusual. While resources are limited in the public sector, needs are relatively unlimited.
        Policy domains beyond infrastructure have their own inventories of backlog and unmet
        needs for government spending and other subsidies, whether they be affordable housing,
        child care for low income mothers, health care for uninsured or underinsured populations, or
        subsidies for university students. Advocates of spending characterised as “public investment”
        have asserted a presumptive place in budgetary priorities over pure “consumption”
        programmes, owing to the potential impact of investment in expanding the economy.
             The rationale for public-private partnerships is in no small part predicated on the
        alleged bias against capital investment in most cash-based budgetary regimes. This central
        issue makes it important to better understand how political incentives and budgetary
        regimes interact and what their implications are for both the overall level of public capital
        investment and the choices of capital projects within the overall budget constraint.
             Some would argue that capital spending can provide highly visible benefits to political
        officials to claim credit with their constituents for delivering specific benefits at the
        expense of the entire country. Some derisively label capital projects as “pork” and suggest
        that public officials, if anything, allocate too much infrastructure spending for specific local
        projects that have little national benefit. In the United States, for instance, earmarking of
        capital projects has grown exponentially in the past 20 years, as congressmen strive to favour
        specific projects in their districts to enhance their election prospects.1 More broadly, public
        officials face a political asymmetry in the interest group system which one political scientist
        calls “clientele politics”. In short, groups that benefit from narrowly defined projects, such as
        certain capital projects, have greater intensity about claiming these specific benefits than
        the broader diffuse public that has to pay for the benefits. Thus, capital projects that
        concentrate benefits on narrow constituencies while spreading costs more broadly often
        constitute a winning political formula (Wilson, 1980).
             Others argue that capital spending is disadvantaged in cash-based systems because
        funds for construction must be provided up front in the years when design and
        construction take place. The uneven, lumpy nature of capital spending makes it difficult to
        plan for such items in hard-pressed budgets (Premchand, 2007, p. 92). As the modern
        entitlement state has grown, mandatory items for pension and health care often crowd out
        discretionary resources such as capital, particularly in recent years when fiscal pressures
        to reduce deficits and achieve surpluses have become ascendant. Some argue for a
        separate capital budget freed of the constraints and trade-offs with operating programmes,
        in recognition of the importance that public investment plays for future growth. Robert
        Eisner, for instance, has long argued for borrowing for capital, given the rates of return that
        such programmes provide the country at large (Eisner, 1992). Countries such as the United
        Kingdom adopted borrowing as part of their fiscal policy, explicitly providing for deficit
        financing of the capital portion of spending. Countries that have switched to accruals point
        to the potential to smooth out spikes in capital funding as a distinct advantage of their
        approach.
            In most budgets, countries budget for capital on a unified basis. This means that
        capital and operating accounts are allocated under the overall budget constraint in the
        same process. This has important macroeconomic and allocational advantages. Countries
          ensure that their total budgets capture all significant outlays from the government in a
          given year affecting the near and medium-term economy, an important barometer for
          national economic policy. Countries can also assure themselves that all claims compete
          against one another within the ceiling of limited resources. Agencies are encouraged to
          assess trade-offs between capital and labour costs and to explore alternatives for achieving
          public policy goals from a range of capital and non-capital strategies.
               Some countries have provided for a separate capital budget process. In some cases,
          this involves only separate displays or “pullouts” of capital accounts whose funding is
          determined through a unified process. In other cases, it may entail a separate budget cycle
          with its own separate budget constraint and targets. In some countries, such as the United
          Kingdom, capital budgets have a different fiscal decision rule than the rest of the budget.
          In the case of the United Kingdom, the capital portion of the budget is intentionally
          targeted to be in deficit in order to encourage greater building of infrastructure. Under the
          “golden rule”, the budget as a whole must be balanced over the business cycle, with capital
          deficits being offset by balances in other accounts in expansionary phases. In the United
          Kingdom, moreover, departments have separate budgets for resources (operating costs)
          and for capital for new investments.
               The accounting treatment is also relevant to both the macro and allocation objectives
          of budgeting. Countries in cash-based systems generally require capital projects to be
          funded up front for traditional government-provided capital projects, since the cash flows
          for design and construction occur in the first several years of the project. This has the
          advantage of ensuring that public decision makers have to recognise the full construction
          costs of assets up front at the time when the irrevocable commitment to begin the project
          is made. Alternatives such as borrowing and depreciation stretch out the budgetary
          recognition over time to reflect the longer-term benefits and actual consumption of the
          asset. However, these alternatives fail to force decision makers to consider the full costs at
          the time they are in effect taking credit for the full benefits of the projects. This potential
          mismatch of benefits and costs may lower the incentives to carefully deliberate and
          compare specific capital projects as well as alternatives to achieving their goals through
          non-capital means such as congestion pricing.
              In addition to cash, some countries budget for the total commitment that is
          encumbered by programmes in the budget. This may be similar to cash outlays for salaries
          and expense accounts and social services, but it can be very different in timing for capital
          projects. In the United States, budgets are prepared on both a cash and obligations basis.
          Budget authority is appropriated by the Congress to provide agencies with the formal legal
          authority to commit the government to actually expend cash. For capital projects, the OMB
          requires the budget authority to cover the full costs of building the asset, even though the
          cash for design and construction may spend out over several fiscal years. This upfront
          commitment is similar to the capital budget accounts in the United Kingdom and to the
          new French system which requires parliamentary approval for commitments that involve
          future payment.
               The several countries with accrual budgeting use a different accounting system for
          capital projects. In these countries, the costs of capital are not budgeted up front, but
          rather paid over time through a depreciation charge to reflect the consumed cost of that
          asset in each year. While some assets such as national “Crown assets” are excluded from
          this regime, agency-owned capital is largely budgeted on an incremental, annualised basis.
        New Zealand is the only country that awards funding for depreciation, providing agencies
        with a funding source to acquire new capital assets. In the United Kingdom, the budget
        uses cash-based or near cash-based accounts which differ from resource accounts
        prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
              Accrual-based systems can smooth out capital funding and overcome the spikes
        associated with cash-based budgets. In cash-based systems, the requirement to assemble
        sufficient authority or cash becomes challenging and may discourage governments from
        undertaking important capital projects. However, absent other controls, accrual-based
        approaches do not provide the discipline of upfront funding. As a result, the government
        becomes committed to new projects without being forced to budget for the full costs of
        those commitments. While accrual-based countries do have separate approval processes
        for projects exceeding certain thresholds, nonetheless at the agency level these projects do
        not have to compete on a full cost basis against other priorities for limited funds. Those
        countries that enable agencies to use depreciation as the source for new capital funding have
        experienced measurement and allocation problems; depreciation is not easily calculated for
        certain assets, and the government can lose control and flexibility to reallocate to agencies
        with greater relative needs (United States Government Accountability Office, 2007).
             Countries with cash-based budgets have developed various strategies designed to
        overcome or mitigate the spiking problems that are said to discourage public infrastructure
        budgeting. Some of the strategies are internal to the government itself. In some cases,
        funds have been used to accumulate resources over several years from components within
        or across agencies to enable larger projects to be undertaken. In other cases, incremental
        budgeting occurs, where agencies build projects in discrete stages designed to reduce the
        marginal impact on budgets in any one year.
            Notwithstanding the particular budgetary concepts and systems used for capital
        projects, countries that wish to increase the level of public infrastructure have heretofore
        had a limited and politically painful set of options. They can:
        ●   raise taxes;
        ●   levy or increase user fees;
        ●   cut spending elsewhere in the budget;
        ●   borrow;
        ●   reduce or manage demand.
          the budgetary treatment of PPPs may prompt a government to fund more projects than it can
          afford under intertemporal budget constraints (i.e. “absolute affordability”).
        mid-1990s. Given the long-term nature of contracts, it remains to be seen whether these
        projects will ultimately deliver greater benefits at lower costs. A recent comprehensive
        review of international experiences concluded that the efficacy of PPPs is still subject to
        debate; insufficient research has been undertaken to date (Hodge and Greve, 2007, p. 552).
              Some studies suggest that the long-term costs may be higher than traditional government
        provision when transaction costs and higher private financing charges are taken into account.
        Transaction costs for PPPs can be higher than traditional procurement; one study suggests
        that bidding costs represent 3% of total project costs. Moreover, public bodies are often
        required to compensate the costs incurred by reserve bidders in order to promote
        competition. Advisory costs can also be significant, amounting to over 5% of contract costs
        (Marty, 2008a). Shaoul’s work provides evidence of flawed value-for-money appraisals, with
        arbitrary risk transfer allocations that tip the balance in favour of PPPs but that are not
        sustainable in real-world policy making (Shaoul, 2005). Case studies of PPPs in Canada suggest
        that governments have found it difficult to reduce either their total costs or their budgetary
        risks by transferring revenue risks to private partners (Vining and Boardman, 2006). Even
        where cost savings are achieved, the private sector will have an incentive to realise higher
        private sector returns in the first instance rather than lower public sector costs.
             Classic public management problems complicate the implementation of PPPs and
        undercut their ability to deliver on their promises of efficiency. Agencies that deliver
        services directly with their own employees have certain accountability advantages:
        transactions are internalised within hierarchies that are more cohesive and responsive to
        central leadership (Lehman, 1989). Obvious challenges are presented when the government
        must use independent actors it does not fully control to achieve its goals, especially since, as
        Don Kettl has noted, transferring the work to someone else does not relieve the government of
        responsibility for the performance (Kettl, 1989). Private partners have independent bases of
        political power and goals and interests that may conflict with those of government agencies.
        Fundamentally, public-private relationships are consequently best characterised as bargaining
        relationships in which both partners have independent sources of leverage over the other.
        Classic problems include (Posner, 2002):
        ●   Goal conflict: The differing priorities and accountability chains of private and public
            actors can compromise efficiency and distort the goals themselves, becoming manifest
            in excess profit taking and failure to achieve public objectives.
        ●   Principal-agent problems: Principal-agent theory tells us that agents enjoy influence by
            virtue of their inside knowledge about their own behaviours and motivations (Arrow, 1991).
            Thus, when shortfalls are experienced or costs increase above targets, it is difficult for the
            government to challenge the private partner due to the latter’s control of information about
            their costs and programme operations.
        ●   Limited competition: These information asymmetries can be offset by competition
            which provides principals with greater information from multiple agents competing for
            a contract. However, for many PPPs, competition is limited, partly owing to the large
            amounts of private capital that must be assembled to finance infrastructure projects. PPPs in
            the United Kingdom have an average of only three bidders per contract (OECD, 2008, p. 78).
        ●   Rent seeking: Government contracts can draw opportunistic private firms that seek to
            gain excessive profits and incomes, which can undermine the efficiency goals of PPPs.
        ●   Moral hazard: The more a project embodies a public good, the less the government will
            be able to let it fail, regardless of formal allocations of risks in contracts. In particular,
              when demand shortfalls occur, the government has stepped in to bail out projects that
              have become financially unviable for the private partner. This undermines efficiency:
              i) governments lose leverage since private partners know that a government will provide
              a safety net; ii) private partners can shirk their responsibilities and avoid making tough
              decisions in the interests of efficiency, safe in the knowledge that the government will
              not let them or the project fail.
          ●   Interdependency: Both actors become dependent on the other to achieve their goals.
              While this situation can be productive, it can also make the government wary of imposing
              sanctions or other forms of discipline related to a contractor’s performance, in fear of the
              possible impacts on the contractor’s ability to deliver services to clients.
              The traditional advantages enjoyed by contractors become accentuated with long-
          term contracts under PPPs. Contracts that are short term can be reviewed, changed and
          renewed, but long-term contracts increase the stakes and fortify the position of the
          contractor who gains expertise and a monopoly over production and over resources. The
          long time periods make it difficult for governments to write detailed specifications and
          conditions, leaving important issues to be resolved in subsequent negotiations during the
          long implementation phase. It has been observed that long-term contracts erode competition
          as governments become more dependent on the contractors’ expertise and familiarity. It is
          inherently difficult to keep contractors in a state of “healthy insecurity” fostered by a robust
          and competitive marketplace over long periods of time. Contractors often have an incentive
          to underestimate their costs in original contracts, leading to large overruns as the project
          evolves. Chilean officials indicate that contract changes for concessions resulted in
          payments that were 35% higher than original estimates.
                Since the cost effectiveness of PPPs depends in no small part on the transfer of risk, it
          is important to note that, regardless of the formal terms of the contract, governments face
          asymmetrical risks owing to their abiding interest in continuing with the provision of the
          capital service. A government is often left with a disproportionate share of the demand risk,
          but it is difficult to anticipate this at the outset of the contract, leaving the government with
          uncompensated costs. In effect, governments face uncertainty beyond risk – uncertainty that
          is difficult to price in PPP contracts or to record as liabilities or even contingent liabilities in the
          balance sheet. For instance, Portugal’s initial contract for suburban rail service – the Fertagus
          contract – transferred risk to a private provider but stipulated that the government should
          assume risk if traffic was lower. When this materialised, the contract was renegotiated
          with the government in a weaker bargaining position.
               When a project is too big or important for a government to let it fail, a fundamental
          discipline of the market which causes private firms to be more efficient – the prospect of
          market failure – may no longer be influential. If a government is perceived to stand behind the
          venture, then the project is really public rather than private, and a moral hazard could arise if
          the private firm realises that it faces no liability from demand failures. It has been said that
          public-private partnerships have the effect of privatising profits while socialising losses.
               This is not to say that private partners do not also face risks as well; indeed, it appears that
          many PPPs successfully transfer risks for construction and availability. However, private firms
          can anticipate these risks and adjust their price during contract negotiations. Moreover, the
          private firm’s risks, while greater than traditional procurement, need to be compared with
          other forms of investment. Some analysts suggest that the alliance with government provides
          alchemy: costs do not disappear; rather they become less immediately obvious through
          stretching and amortisation.
               Once choices are made to appear less costly than they really are, the prospects
          increase for the distortion of priorities and for higher long-term spending within national
          budgets. Fiscal and allocation risks and distortions occur when there is a mismatch between
          benefits and costs for projects. In the case of PPPs, benefits can be claimed in the near term
          while costs can be spread beyond the immediate political horizon. This creates greater
          potential for several budgetary consequences:
          ●    Higher levels of capital can be funded than can be afforded given current and long-term
               budget constraints.
          ●    Costs can be shifted to future budgets, placing greater burdens on future generations of
               taxpayers and public officials.
          ●    Lower-value projects can be selected due to the lack of upfront budgetary recognition of
               full costs.
               The decision to launch a PPP today serves to encumber future budgets for years to
          come with required annual payments. As a result, a government’s ability to adapt to
          emerging priorities or to fund competing needs is correspondingly constrained. In effect,
          these mandatory payments further reduce the ability of governments to use spending cuts
          or shifts as instruments of countercyclical economic policy.
               The long-term shift of costs is clearly shown in the United Kingdom. Thanks to the
          transparent budgetary information from the United Kingdom, it is possible to illustrate the
          long-term impacts of current PPP commitments (called private finance initiatives – PFIs –
          in the United Kingdom). Figure 1 shows the annual payments due for all PFI projects
          launched in recent years. For each PFI project, a series of annual payments, known as the
          unitary charge, encumbers future budgets for over 20 years into the future. Figure 1 shows
          that payments begin to subside in about 15 years, but this assumes that no further PFI
          projects will be initiated when, in fact, the government is continuing to use this tool.
          United Kingdom Treasury officials indicate that annual PFI charges for larger local
          governments have grown to encumber 25% of future operating budgets.
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            Notably, the growth of these annual PFI payments corresponds with the growing fiscal
        pressures faced by the United Kingdom, along with other advanced countries, as a result of
        the retirement of the “baby boom” generation. Not only will spending on pensions and
        health care be higher, but economic growth will be slower due to slower growth of the
        workforce. Notwithstanding these other fiscal trends, these annual PFI unitary charges
        constitute mandatory payments that must be allocated each year pursuant to the long-term
        contracts supporting each PFI. While the government can attempt to renegotiate the contracts
        as technology or fiscal constraints change, the private partner would have to agree.
            Importantly, budgetary distortions can occur even when the investment is well chosen
        and represents value for money. There are limits in any budget to funding even effective
        projects and programmes. At some point, capital spending crowds out other types of
        spending, and long-term budget constraints can be undermined as well.
             Most OECD countries have focused considerable analytic attention on comparing PPPs
        with traditional government-owned capital prior to authorising new PPP projects. This
        focus on what can be called “relative affordability” is commendable and represents real
        progress. However, countries also need to focus on “absolute affordability”, i.e. the point at
        which even projects surviving value-for-money trade-offs exceed some budget constraint.
        Affordability criteria are not as well institutionalised as value-for-money comparisons. One
        study of the PPP for financing the London Underground found that affordability was not
        formally considered, leaving the project with a more than GBP 500 million gap (Shaoul, 2002).
             PPPs may also carry allocation risks. By sidestepping the upfront allocation of budgetary
        resources, PPPs may enable lower-value projects to gain funding. When the full costs of
        irrevocable decisions committing public resources do not have to be budgeted out of scarce
        resources at the front end of projects, chances increase for the funding of lower-priority
        projects that would not survive in a more constrained and disciplined process. In Portugal,
        while traditional government capital projects must compete against a resource constraint,
        this is not the case for PPPs, opening the door for funding lower-value projects. Officials in
        the United Kingdom also report that low-value projects can be supported when PPPs are off
        the balance sheet and therefore not formally considered in the capital budget on an
        upfront basis.
            Hungary’s experience illustrates how budgeting for PPPs can lead to low funding of
        capital projects that have lower value. In 2003, the Ministry of Education obtained a
        government licence allowing schools throughout the country to obtain funds to build
        university housing. Under the PPP framework, universities were automatically eligible to claim
        approval and funding. A pilot project at the University of Debrecen was followed by 11 similar
        PPP schemes in other universities. As a result, substantially more housing was built than
        needed; some of it is now being used for unrelated purposes.
          there; iii) whether and how PPPs are included in longer-term expenditure frameworks;
          iv) whether specific limits apply to PPP outlays or commitments; v) the degree of legislative
          oversight and review of PPPs; and vi) whether and how guarantees and other subsidies
          provided for PPPs are recorded in budget totals and documents. Wherever possible, a
          comparison will be made between the processes used for PPPs and those applicable to
          traditional government-owned capital assets.
              The implications of PPPs for the budget are pervasive, if not obvious. The specific
          public sector costs that have a bearing on current and future budgets include:
          ●   Annual payments for the life of PPP projects.
          ●   Capital contributions to establish PPPs.
          ●   Revenue losses from forgoing user fees.
          ●   Contingent liabilities such as guarantees.
          ●   Tax expenditures such as accelerated depreciation taken for private investment.
               The first question is whether the PPP costs are recognised in the budget at all. Unified
          budget principles call for all significant government financial commitments to be included
          in a comprehensive budget. Such documents are not only useful for fiscal policy, but
          ensure that transactions involving government resources all benefit from common
          guidance and controls. If the PPP is off budget, then none of the budgetary controls that can
          promote fiscal discipline and accountability for PPP decisions are applicable. Moreover,
          government officials will be tempted to disproportionately rely on those techniques even if
          they are more costly. The treatment of PPPs in financial accounting statements often plays
          a major role in determining whether the transactions will be recorded in the budget. If PPPs
          are defined as private rather than public assets, they are not accounted for on the
          government’s balance sheet or counted as part of the public debt.
               Accounting standards vary across countries, and there are no internationally recognised
          standards for accounting and reporting in place for PPPs. Countries in the European Union are
          guided by a decision of Eurostat which governs the statistical data on government
          expenditures that member states must report for purposes of compliance with EU fiscal rules.
          This guidance recommends that PPP projects be classified as nongovernmental if the private
          partner bears the construction risk and either the availability or the demand risk – a
          characteristic that most projects can easily meet. This 2004 ruling has given rise to concerns
          that PPPs would be disproportionately classified as nongovernmental, enabling governments
          to more easily comply with the EU deficit and debt limits. However, countries can and do go
          beyond this guidance in adopting their own accounting definitions and guidelines to govern
          the treatment of PPPs for internal budgetary and policy-making deliberations (see Box 2 for
          an example).
               Budgets need not reflect or mirror accounting standards and definitions. After all,
          many budgets are cash based even though their financial accounting statements are
          prepared pursuant to accrual-based standards. However, for PPPs, accounting standards
          play a formative role in determining budgetary treatment. In the United Kingdom, PPPs
          that are off the balance sheet are not included in the capital budget and are thus not part
          of the budgetary totals recording capital investment. However, annual unitary payments to
          PPPs are on budget, regardless of the project’s status as on or off the balance sheet. If the
          London Underground is excluded, most United Kingdom projects are off the balance sheet;
          only 13% of PPPs, representing 46% of the total value, are recorded on the balance sheet
        (Marty, 2008b). Experience varies by department: 100% of health care PPPs are off the
        balance sheet, as are 36 of the 47 defence projects. In Hungary, most PPPs are also recorded
        as off budget, leaving only the annual payments in the budget.
             The budgetary inclusion of concessions varies among countries. In France, concessions
        are not defined as PPPs and are considered private assets since all risks are formally
        transferred to the private partner. Portugal includes its concession PPPs as part of the balance
        sheet, in view of the government subsidies for these projects. However, the commercial-
        status government agencies are exempted from budgetary controls and information
        presented on PPPs in the budget. These include projects sponsored by the highway
        department, which is no longer a government agency but a privatised governmental body
        funded by user payments.
             Budgeting for all financial commitments up front is often viewed as essential to
        ensure that decision makers can fully consider all known costs at the time that irrevocable
        commitments of government resources are made. Most of the countries in this study,
        however, do not require agencies to budget for the full costs of PPPs up front at the time
        that the commitment of the government is made. Hungary, Korea and Portugal, for instance,
        only budget for PPPs once the annual charge is payable. This gives rise to a perception that PPPs
        are zero-cost projects. The annual charges are only recognised and paid over time rather than
        up front. Moreover, the annual charges are reflected in budgets only several years after the
        project is authorised and construction has been completed. Thus, the budget reflects the
        costs of PPPs on a much-delayed basis, far after the fundamental decision has been made.
              The budgetary recognition of private engagements differs from traditional government
        capital projects. Since most countries budget on a cash basis, agency budgets must reflect the
        estimated cash needed up front to finance design and construction costs, concentrated in the
        first or second year of funded projects. Accordingly, there is greater upfront recognition for
          traditional government capital than for PPPs. However, unlike PPPs, there is no comprehensive
          accounting for the lifecycle costs including design, construction, operation and maintenance
          over the lifecycle of the asset. Rather, budgets for operation and maintenance are developed on
          an annual basis during the entire life of the project.
                Another important long-term difference between PPPs and traditional capital involves
          the nature of the annual payments supporting capital projects. For traditional capital
          projects, the existence of the asset implies some government obligation to budget for
          operation and maintenance, but the actual levels of support are decided on a discretionary
          basis each year. However, for PPPs, the annual payment comprises a mandatory cost in the
          budget for every year of the project’s life, reflecting a combined charge amortising capital
          financing and operating and maintenance costs. As noted above, the long-term contracts
          dictate the length of time that annual budgets will be encumbered with this annual
          payment mandate. In Hungary, for instance, PPPs for motorways are contracted for
          20-35 years and airports for 75 years.
                Two countries in this study – France and the United Kingdom – do recognise the
          upfront costs of PPPs in capital and investment budgeting at the time that decisions are
          made. In the United Kingdom, for projects on the balance sheet, agencies must budget the
          full costs of the capital portion up front as part of separate capital budget accounts. Similar
          to traditional capital, this PPP cost must be traded off with other capital budget proposals
          and budgeted under the agency’s fixed budgetary allotment for capital under the separate
          departmental expenditure limits for capital spending. The PPP proposals are examined at
          the time of the three-year spending review done for each agency as part of the budget
          process.
               France budgets for PPPs in two ways – for the gross investment costs covering the
          duration of the contract, and for gross upkeep payments. Thus there is some recognition of
          the costs of commitment up front when projects are launched. However, this presented a
          problem because French law prohibited deferred payments from commitments, necessitating
          a change in statute to accommodate the delayed annual payments for PPPs.
               The budgetary treatment for PPPs in some countries is still evolving. In the United
          States, budgetary recognition of private engagements varies and is done on a piecemeal
          basis, according to the Congressional Budget Office (2003). There is disagreement between
          the two budget agencies – the OMB and the CBO – over the proper scoring of public-private
          partnerships for military housing. OMB guidelines enabled the Defense Department to use
          housing provided by private partners without recording large budgetary obligations up front.
          The CBO urged the OMB to score the partnerships as government-owned investments since
          the government will eventually be responsible for the housing.
               The form of budgetary recognition makes a difference for the quality of deliberation
          on proposed projects. Officials from several countries said that there is more scrutiny of
          appropriations for traditional government-owned capital for two reasons. First, capital
          costs are budgeted up front and, second, they must compete with other projects for a
          limited pool of funding. Since PPPs are not funded up front and are not recorded for several
          years, the budget itself does not prompt a similar level of debate. However, recognising the
          longer-term financial issues, a number of countries have initiated scrutiny outside the
          formal budget process through analytical reviews of value for money for PPP projects. In
          fact, in some countries such as Portugal and the United Kingdom, officials indicate that
          PPPs get greater scrutiny through these analytical processes than traditional government-
        owned capital. Portugal has decided to extend the same review process and criteria for
        PPPs to all government-owned capital.
             In addition to budgetary payments, some countries provide more indirect forms of
        subsidies for PPPs and concessions. Guarantees and other forms of payment are often
        triggered when projects fall below certain financial thresholds, constituting a contingent
        liability. In most countries, budget and accounting rules do not require appropriations for
        these contingent claims. France and Korea, for instance, have guarantees, but they are not
        recorded or recognised until they are triggered. Australia does not reflect contingent
        liabilities in budget totals but rather in a statement of risk accompanying the budget. The
        United States, which has very few PPPs, is among the few countries that do budget the
        costs of guarantees up front in the budget. The credit subsidy records the net present value
        of costs to the government over the life of the guarantee based on interest subsidies and
        projected defaults. Chile has an intemporal budget constraint that limits the guarantees
        and subsidies for concessions, as discussed in Box 3.
             Some countries have imposed budgetary limits on annual PPP spending, partly to
        compensate for the lack of upfront budget recognition and controls. Hungary has a limit of
        3% for PPPs as a share of government revenues, while Korea has a limit of 2% of spending.
        While not having specific PPP ceilings, countries like the United Kingdom that budget for
        the upfront costs of PPPs have inherent limits since the PPP projects must be allocated from
        a limited pool of funds provided to agencies for capital projects.
             Effective scrutiny and review of PPP proposals calls for a perspective that goes beyond
        the annual budget to encompass the lifecycle of proposed projects. However, most
        countries traditionally devote weaker scrutiny to non-cash items and long-term obligations
        compared to immediate outlays (Budina et al., 2007, p. 14). Having said this, countries are
        moving in the right direction by providing more information and perspectives on longer-term
        PPP trajectories as well as longer-term budgetary outlooks.
               Most countries include annualised PPP costs in their medium-term frameworks which
          typically extend from three to five years. In countries like Hungary and Korea, this provides
          some longer-term assessment of cash payments for PPPs, but falls far short of capturing
          the full costs. Some countries go further and undertake longer-term analyses of full PPP
          costs over the life of the project, which appear as supplements to the regular budget. The
          United Kingdom, for instance, provides data on the year-by-year costs of annual payments
          for all PPPs in a chapter in the budget. These long-term schedules are included as part of
          the initial assessment of value for money for each project. Since 2003, Portugal has prepared a
          memo to the budget director providing the long-term costs for all PPPs, a memo that is
          appended to the budget document.
               The growing movement in OECD countries to examine the longer-term projections for
          current budgetary policy is also helpful. The United Kingdom, the United States and other
          countries have developed models to simulate budget outcomes over as much as 50 to
          75 years (Ulla, 2006). While these long-term projections do not incorporate or highlight the
          long-term trajectories of PPPs, they do provide an overall perspective of the fiscal space
          that will be available over the many years that PPP payments appear in budgets. For most
          OECD countries, the long-term outlook is worrisome and shows that budgets will increasingly
          be devoted to paying for the elderly and their doctors, with less fiscal space available for
          financing capital – either investing in the future or paying debts from the past.
              The degree of legislative and public oversight over PPPs appears to be less extensive
          than for traditional government-owned capital. In most countries, the annual appropriations
          process will not disclose the presence of new PPPs since there is no upfront budget authority
          required to start these projects. For traditional capital, the legislature must appropriate the
          upfront funding necessary to begin design and construction. Among the eight countries,
          Hungary requires that any major capital project above a certain threshold, whether it be
          traditional capital or PPPs, gain legislative approval. However, many countries with
          extensive PPP activity do not obtain legislative approval prior to approving projects. Korea,
          the United Kingdom and Chile have all decided not to require legislative review and
          approval. Some officials indicated a concern that legislative review might bring “pork
          barrelling” into the decisions.
              While the budget process is critical, other components of policy making and management
          also play a vital role in ensuring that PPP projects deliver public value within budget
          constraints (Akitoby et al., 2007):
          ●   Investment planning: Determination of which projects are suitable for PPPs and whether
              such projects satisfy both value-for-money and affordability criteria through the use of
              public sector comparators. For instance, the IMF suggests that PPPs are better suited to
              economic infrastructure than social infrastructure due to the greater return of sound
              economic projects for business and the higher potential to charge users for services.
          ●   Legal and institutional framework: Such issues as clear definitions for PPPs, competition
              and contract management, specific metrics linking contracts with outputs and outcomes,
              oversight and review units to provide consistency and expert assistance to agencies, and
              clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of central budget and line agencies for
              project review, approval and monitoring. “Gateway processes” are being instituted by
              countries to provide a strong role for the ministry of finance in project selection and
              approval (see Box 4).
            Many countries with weak budgetary controls nonetheless sustain separate analytic
        reviews focused on PPP projects. Some of these elements can compensate for weak
        budgetary controls. For instance, most of the eight countries in this study have a dedicated
        PPP unit in the central budget office, in a line agency, or in both, to review PPP assessments,
        provide technical assistance and guidance, and oversee implementation of PPP projects.
        Units in Portugal are constituted as an independent board, while France has established a
        special task force to review PPPs. The United Kingdom Treasury has a 12-person PPP unit.
        These units can help ensure that PPPs are selected and designed to be consistent with the
        government’s overall budget constraints. For instance, the units oversee the crucial value-
        for-money assessments, where PPPs are compared with public sector comparators prior to
        project approval.
             As a result, these review processes do provide transparency about PPP proposals, at
        least inside the government. Some officials suggested that there is actually a greater
        degree of review of PPPs than for traditional government capital projects. Portugal
        extended its analytic reviews of PPPs adopted in 2003 to all proposed capital projects, partly
        out of concern that special PPP analytic procedures might bias decisions against PPPs.
7. Conclusion
             The use of private financing and delivery for public services has advantages. Private
        efficiencies can deliver real benefits that might overcome higher financing and transaction
        charges. The risk sharing and bundling of all phases of capital services may very well promote
        incentives to achieve improved outputs with lower costs.
               However, these promises rest on heroic assumptions and ideal conditions that are too
          often missing in many cases. Deep markets are often not available to provide the level of
          competition necessary to motivate private innovation and efficiency. Clear demarcation
          and sharing of risks is often overturned in practice, as public officials face asymmetrical
          risks that are often impossible to measure and delineate for the long timeframes involved
          with PPP contracts. Fundamentally, public and private partners have differing interests
          and, while these differences can lead to a healthy marriage between the partners, they
          must also be acknowledged as a source of uncertainty and entropy that can complicate and
          perhaps erode the attainment of public goals and values.
               Some policy domains and countries may be better candidates than others: economic
          infrastructure that can deliver greater productivity for private firms offers better prospects
          for aligning public and private interests in constructive partnerships. However, the more a
          service takes on the character of a pure public good, the less private incentives will be
          congruent with public interest, leading to greater public disappointment with the results.
          The long-term financial impacts of PPPs may be better absorbed in countries with good
          long-term growth prospects, while countries with slowing economies and large long-term
          commitments are advised to be far more cautious.
               Public-private partnerships, while promising performance breakthroughs, create
          significant uncertainties and risks for governments. The lack of upfront budget scoring
          lowers the level of deliberation for these projects and invites decisions to be taken on the
          basis of opportunistic exploitation of budget rules rather than evaluations of longer-term
          risks and rewards. The risks and uncertainties intensify over the long term, as projects face
          new challenges and as budgets become more encumbered with financial commitments.
          Accordingly, countries should be wary of using private capital to finance infrastructure and
          capital assets.
              Countries have sought to compensate for the weakness of budgetary controls with
          impressive analytic initiatives and information that go beyond anything done for conventional
          public capital projects – and with good reason, given the higher stakes, greater uncertainty
          and longer-term commitments that public-private partnerships entail.
              However, stronger budgetary processes and controls are necessary to provide greater
          assurance that PPPs are being funded for the right reasons. Given limited fiscal resources
          both now and over the longer term, countries need to ensure that the projects selected
          represent the most cost-effective and affordable approach to financing infrastructure and
          that this particular strategy is compared with other competing needs across the entire
          budget using similar budgetary concepts and scoring.
               The following elements constitute a strategy for strengthening budgetary review and
          deliberation for PPPs:
          ●   The establishment of upfront funding in the budget for the total commitment entailed
              for PPP projects should be institutionalised in the budget formulation process. This
              would help ensure that decision makers face the full cost consequences of their
              decisions.
          ●   The funding for PPPs should compete with other claims in agency budgets for inherently
              limited resources. The full funding of commitments up front from scarce resources provides
              the best assurance that decision makers will deliberate about the relative value of PPP
              projects compared with other programmes and priorities.
        ●   There should be a presumption that all PPPs will be fully recorded in the budget, even if
            projects are deemed to be off the financial balance sheet based on relative risks.
        ●   Countries should strengthen the process for analysing PPP proposals by providing for
            explicit criteria assessing affordability to accompany existing value-for-money reviews.
        ●   Affordability can be operationalised by establishing limits on the total level of PPP
            commitments undertaken in a given year. Limits can be measured on the basis of total
            net present value of long-term costs and/or total annual payments for approved projects.
        ●   Guarantees and other subsidies for PPPs, and for other purposes, should be estimated at
            the time that commitments are authorised. Consideration should be given to using
            accrual-based approaches to measure guarantees, such as the credit subsidy concept
            used in New Zealand and the United States. Limits on total guarantees should also be
            explored.
        ●   Countries should consider establishing or strengthening longer-term budget frameworks
            for many reasons, including providing a more informed basis for considering the long-term
            affordability of PPP projects. Modelling long-term fiscal outlooks is the first step. Following
            this, countries should consider developing their near-term and medium-term fiscal targets
            with the longer-term outlook in mind.
        ●   Countries should also work to provide greater disclosures on future payment obligations
            for PPPs in budget documents. The extensive information published in the budget
            documents of the United Kingdom and the new budget memos prepared by Portugal
            provide two excellent examples of transparency in support of PPP decision making.
        Notes
         1. One estimate from the United States Congressional Research Service (2006) shows a growth of
            earmarked transportation projects in congressional appropriations from 140 in 1994 to 2 094 in 2005,
            or 5% of total transportation appropriations in that year.
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