Introduction
Introduction
I
INTRODUCTION
1
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1
The Concept of
Strategy
OUTLINE
l Notes
3
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4 PART I INTRODUCTION
By the time you have completed this chapter, you will be able to:
l Understand the basic framework of strategy analysis that underlies this book
and that we shall use both for appraising a firm’s current strategy and making
recommendations for future strategy.
l Understand how strategy is made within organizations and the role played by
strategic planning systems.
Since the purpose of strategy is to help us to win, we start by looking at the role of
strategy in success.
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Nor can their success be attributed either exclusively or primarily to luck. For all
three, lucky breaks provided opportunities at critical junctures. None, however, was
the beneficiary of a consistent run of good fortune. More important than luck was
the ability to recognize opportunities when they appeared and to have the clarity of
direction and the flexibility necessary to exploit these chances.
My contention is that the key common ingredient in all three success stories was
the presence of a soundly formulated and effectively implemented strategy. These
strategies did not exist as a plan; in most the strategy was not even made explicit. Yet,
in all three, we can observe a consistency of direction based on a clear understanding
of the “game” being played and a keen awareness of how to maneuver into a position
of advantage.
6 PART I INTRODUCTION
Madonna
August 2006 saw the 48th birthday of to 30 years, Madonna has worked incessantly
Madonna Louise Veronica Ciccone but no slow- to establish, maintain, and renew her popular
down in her hectic career. Her world concert appeal. She is widely regarded as a workaholic
tour was in its European leg. Confessions on a who survives on little sleep and rarely takes
Dancefloor, upon which the show was based, vacations: “I am a very disciplined person. I
had reached number 1 position in 40 countries. sleep a certain number of hours each night,
Together with her earnings from film, video, then I like to get up and get on with it. All that
books, record production, and managing other means that I am in charge of everything that
artists, it looked as though Madonna would be comes out.”
the world’s highest earning female, entertainer She has drawn heavily on the talents of
for yet another year and still the best-known others: writers, musicians, choreographers, and
woman on earth. designers. Many of her personal relationships
In the summer of 1978, aged 19, Madonna have been stepping stones to career transi-
arrived in New York with $35 to her name. tions. Her transition from dance to music was
After five years of struggle, she landed a assisted by relationships, first, with musician
recording contract. Madonna (1983) ultimately Steve Bray, then with disc jockey John Benitex.
sold 10 million copies worldwide, while Like Her entry into Hollywood was accompanied
a Virgin (1984) topped 12 million copies. by marriage to Sean Penn and an affair with
Between 1985 and 1990, six further albums, Warren Beatty. Most striking has been her
three world tours, and five movie roles had continuous reinvention of her image. From
established Madonna with an image and per- street-kid look of the early 1980s, to hard-core
sona that transcended any single field of sexuality of the 90s, and spiritual image that
entertainment: she was rock singer, actor, accompanied motherhood, Madonna’s fans
author, and pinup. Yet, she was more than this have been treated with multiple reincarnations.
– as her website proclaims, she is “icon, artist, As Jeff Katzenberg of Dreamworks observed:
provocateur, diva, and mogul.” She has also “She has always had a vision of exactly who she
made a great deal of money. is, whether performer or businesswoman, and
What is the basis of Madonna’s incredible she has been strong enough to balance it all.
and lasting success? Certainly not outstanding Every time she comes up with a new look it is
natural talent. As a vocalist, musician, dancer, successful. When it happens once, OK, maybe
songwriter, or actress, Madonna’s talents seem it’s luck, but twice is a coincidence, and three
modest. Few would regard her as an outstand- times it’s got to be a remarkable talent. And
ing beauty. Madonna’s on her fifth or sixth time.”
She possesses relentless drive. Her wide She was quick to learn the ropes both in Tin
range of activities – records, concerts, music Pan Alley and in Hollywood. Like Evita Perón,
videos, movies, books, and charity events – whom Madonna portrayed in Evita, Madonna
belies a remarkable dedication to a single has combined determination, ambition, social
goal: the quest for superstar status. For close astuteness, and mastery of the strategic use of
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sex. As a self-publicist she is without equal. In and management company, Maverick Inc., a
using sex as a marketing tool, she has courted joint venture with Time Warner. Her protégés
controversy through nudity, pornographic im- included Mirwais, William Orbit, Donna De
agery, suggestions of sexual deviance, and the Lory, and the Deftones, and the comedian Ali
juxtaposition of sexual and religious themes. G: “I’ve met these people along the way in my
But she is also astute at walking the fine line career and I want to take them everywhere I
between the shocking and the unacceptable. go. I want to incorporate them into my little
In recent years Madonna has devoted increas- factory of ideas. I also come into contact with
ing time to nurturing the talents of others, a lot of young talent that I feel entrepreneurial
mainly through her recording, film production, about.”
Successful
strategy
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
8 PART I INTRODUCTION
As far as logistics and tactics were aimed at weakening the enemy and building
concerned, we succeeded in everything we military strength; finally, general counteroffen-
set out to do. At the height of the war the sive. In 1954, Giap’s brilliant victory over the
army was able to move almost a million French at Dien Bien Phu fully vindicated the
soldiers a year in and out of Vietnam, feed strategy. Against South Vietnam and its US ally,
them, clothe them, house them, supply the approach was similar.
them with arms and ammunition and
Our strategy was . . . to wage a long-
generally sustain them better than any
lasting battle . . . Only a long-term war
army had ever been sustained in
could enable us to utilize to the maximum
the field . . . On the battlefield itself, the
our political trump cards, to overcome our
army was unbeatable. In engagement after
material handicap, and to transform our
engagement the forces of the Vietcong
weakness into strength. To maintain and
and the North Vietnamese Army were
increase our forces was the principle to
thrown back with terrible losses. Yet, in
which we adhered, contenting ourselves
the end, it was North Vietnam, not the
with attacking when success was certain,
United States that emerged victorious.
refusing to give battle likely to incur
How could we have succeeded so well yet
losses.2
failed so miserably?1
The strategy built on the one resource where
Despite having the largest army in Southeast the communists had overwhelming superiority:
Asia, North Vietnam was no match for South their will to fight. As Prime Minister Pham Van
Vietnam so long as the South was backed Dong explained: “The United States is the most
by the world’s most powerful military and in- powerful nation on earth. But Americans do
dustrial nation. South Vietnam and its United not like long, inconclusive wars . . . We can
States ally were defeated not by superior outlast them and we can win in the end.”3
resources but by a superior strategy. North Limited military engagement and the charade
Vietnam achieved what Sun Tzu claimed was of the Paris peace talks helped the North Viet-
the highest form of victory: the enemy gave up. namese prolong the conflict, while diplomatic
The prime mover in the formulation of efforts to isolate the United States from its
North Vietnam’s military strategy was Gen- Western allies and to sustain the US peace
eral Vo Nguyen Giap. In 1944, Giap became movement accelerated the crumbling of Amer-
head of the Vietminh guerrilla forces. He was ican will to win.
commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese The effectiveness of the US military response
Army until 1974 and Minister of Defense until was limited by two key uncertainties: what
1980. Giap’s strategy was based on Mao Tse were the objectives and who was the enemy?
Tung’s three-phase theory of revolutionary war: Was the US role one of supporting the South
first, passive resistance during which political Vietnamese regime, fighting Vietcong terrorism,
support is mobilized; second, guerrilla warfare inflicting a military defeat on North Vietnam,
CSAC01 1/13/07 9:18 Page 9
or combating world communism? Lack of un- recognized that the Watergate scandal had so
animity over goals translated into confusion as weakened the US presidency that an effective
to who was the enemy and whether the war American response to a new communist offen-
was military or political in scope. Diversity of sive was unlikely. On April 29, 1975, Operation
opinion and a shifting balance of political and Frequent Wind began evacuating all remaining
public opinion were fatal for establishing a Americans from South Vietnam, and the next
consistent long-term strategy. morning North Vietnamese troops entered the
The consistency and strength of North Presidential Palace in Saigon.
Vietnam’s strategy allowed it to survive errors
in implementation. Giap was premature in Sources: 1 Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy (Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 1982): 1; 2 Vo Nguyen Giap, Selected
launching his general offensive. Both the 1968
Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977);
Tet Offensive and 1972 Easter Offensive were 3
J. Cameron, Here Is Your Enemy (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
beaten back with heavy losses. By 1974, Giap Winston, 1966).
10 PART I INTRODUCTION
On July 24, 2005, Lance Armstrong became devastating his rivals with a powerful break-
the first person ever to win the Tour de away has been deemed “worthy of a Hollywood
France seven times. Armstrong’s unprecedented Oscar.” However, it was in team planning and
achievement was all the more remarkable for coordination where the major differences
the fact that in 1996 Armstrong was treated between Armstrong and his competitors were
for testicular cancer that had spread to his most evident.
lungs and brain. While the principal prize in the Tour de
Even without cancer, Lance Armstrong was France is for the individual who achieves the
not an obvious candidate for title of the fastest overall time, cyclists compete within
greatest cyclist ever. Despite certain natural teams. The team coordination and the willing-
advantages – notably a heart 30% larger than ness of the other team members (domestiques)
normal with an abnormally slow beat rate (32 to sacrifice themselves for the team leader
times per minute while at rest) – Armstrong’s is critical to individual success. Armstrong’s
aerobic rate was less than that of cycling greats US Postal Service team (which became the
such as Miguel Indurain and Greg LeMond. Discovery Channel team for the 2005 Tour)
For most of his career, Armstrong was not the was remarkable not just for the quality of
world’s preeminent cyclist. He won the world other team members, but the willingness of
championship just once (1993) and his Olympic these world class cyclists to serve their leader.
best was a bronze medal in 2000 Sydney games. Olympic gold medal winner Viatcheslav Ekimov
Armstrong’s seven-year dominance of the – “The Russian Power House” – was critical to
Tour de France resulted from a combination pulling Armstrong through the flatter stages of
of factors, not least of which was his single- the Tour. Roberto Heras and Jose Asevedo were
minded focus, not just on cycling, but on a Armstrong’s main support in the mountains –
single race. Between his 1999 and 2005 Tour shielding him from the wind and supporting
de France victories, Armstrong was overall him during breakaways. George Hinkapie rode
winner in only five other cycle races. in all seven of Armstrong’s Tour victories as a
Armstrong raised planning for the Tour to a versatile all-rounder. Why did the team show a
new level of sophistication. His meticulous unique degree of loyalty to their team leader?
preparations included: “. . . computer calcula- Part was Armstrong’s infectious commitment,
tions that balanced my body weight and my part was his willingness to pay bonuses out of
equipment weight with the potential velocity his own pocket to other riders, but also import-
of my bike,” and “careful computer graphs of ant was reciprocity – while team members
my training rides, calibrating the distances, gave total support to Armstrong on the Tour de
wattages, and thresholds.” Armstrong abilities France, in other competitions the roles were re-
were well-suited to the Tour – as well as versed and Armstrong served as a domestique
all-round strengths as a cyclist, he developed to other team members.
mastery of bluff and psychological warfare. His The team’s strategy genius was director,
feigning exhaustion at critical junctures before Johan Bruyneel, whose unrivaled knowledge of
CSAC01 1/13/07 9:18 Page 11
the Tour spanned sports physiology, game the- attention to team dynamics: he was a careful
ory, psychology, and tactics. As well as selecting listener, encouraged discussion, and welcomed
team members, assigning roles, designing new ideas. Together, Armstrong and Bruyneel
overall strategy and planning tactics for indi- recognized a critical ingredient for success: in a
vidual stages, Bruyneel managed a network of sport of independently minded individualists
secret agreements with other teams. In return where only the team leader is recognized as
for financial support, other teams agreed to the winner, team commitment and loyalty
support Armstrong should he find himself are critical and fragile. A unique feature of
split from his own team members. In addition the USPS/Discovery team was Armstrong
to the conventional roles as team decision and Bruyneel’s fostering of camaraderie,
maker, enforcer of team discipline, prepara- joint ambition, mutual support, and shared
tion and planning, Bruyneel gave continuous emotions.
12 PART I INTRODUCTION
in politics, Marilyn Monroe and Elvis Presley in entertainment, Joe Louis and
O. J. Simpson in sport, and Bobby Fischer in chess. Fulfillment in our personal lives
is likely to require broad-based lifetime strategies.2
These same ingredients of successful strategies – clear goals, understanding the
competitive environment, resource appraisal, and effective implementation – form
the key components of our analysis of business strategy.
FIGURE 1.2 The basic framework: strategy as a link between the firm and its
environment
l Is BMW’s German home base a strength or a weakness for BMW? Its German
origins are fundamental for its reputation for engineering excellence and the
skills of its German-based engineers and technicians are essential to its claim
to be the “world’s ultimate driving machine.” At the same time, Germany is a
high-cost country with an inflexible labor market and is subject to a plethora
of European Union regulations. Hence, BMW’s German home base is both a
strength and a weakness.
l Is global warming a threat or an opportunity to the world’s automobile
producers? Global warming may encourage governments to raise taxes on
motor fuels and support public transport, thereby threatening the demand for
private motoring. At the same time, these circumstances create an opportunity
for developing new, fuel-efficient cars that may encourage consumers to scrap
their gas-guzzlers.
The lesson here is that an arbitrary classification of external factors into opportun-
ities and threats, and internal factors into strengths and weaknesses, is less important
than a careful identification of these external and internal factors followed by an
appraisal of their implications. My approach to strategy analysis favors a simple
two-way classification of internal and external factors. What will characterize our
strategic appraisal will be the rigor and depth of our analysis of these factors, rather
than a superficial categorization into strengths or weaknesses, and opportunities or
threats.
Strategic Fit
Fundamental to this view of strategy as a link between the firm and its external envir-
onment is the notion of strategic fit. For a strategy to be successful, it must be con-
sistent with the firm’s external environment, and with its internal environment – its
goals and values, resources and capabilities, and structure and systems. As we shall see,
the failure of many companies is caused by lack of consistency with either the internal
or external environment. During 2006, Vodafone – the world’s leading supplier of
cellphone services – suffered declining profits and asset write-downs. The problem
was a growth-oriented, acquisition-based strategy that emphasized superior content
that no longer fitted the commoditizing market for cellphone services, where there
were few advantages from global spread. In other cases, many companies have failed
to align their strategies to their internal resources and capabilities. A critical issue for
Nintendo in the coming years will be whether it possesses the financial and techno-
logical resources to continue to compete head-to-head with Sony and Microsoft in the
market for video game consoles.
14 PART I INTRODUCTION
military strategy. The term strategy derives from the Greek word strategia, meaning
“generalship.” However, the concept of strategy did not originate with the Greeks.
Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War, written about 500 BC, is regarded as the first treatise
on strategy.4
Military strategy and business strategy share a number of common concepts and
principles, the most basic being the distinction between strategy and tactics. Strategy
is the overall plan for deploying resources to establish a favorable position; a tactic is
a scheme for a specific action. Whereas tactics are concerned with the maneuvers neces-
sary to win battles, strategy is concerned with winning the war. Strategic decisions,
whether in military or business spheres, share three common characteristics:
Many of the principles of military strategy have been applied to business situations.
These include the relative strengths of offensive and defensive strategies; the merits
of outflanking over frontal assault; the roles of graduated responses to aggressive
initiatives; the benefits of surprise; and the potential for deception, envelopment,
escalation, and attrition.5 At the same time, the differences between business com-
petition and military conflict must be recognized. The objective of war is (usually) to
defeat the enemy. The purpose of business rivalry is seldom so aggressive: most
business enterprises limit their competitive ambitions, seeking coexistence rather than
the destruction of competitors.
The tendency for the principles of military and business strategy to develop along
separate paths indicates the absence of a general theory of strategy. The publication
of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games in 1944 gave rise to the hope
that a general theory of competitive behavior would emerge. During the subsequent
six decades, game theory has revolutionized the study of competitive interaction, not
just in business but in politics, military conflict, and international relations as well.6 Yet,
as we shall see in Chapter 4, game theory has achieved only limited success as a prac-
tical and broadly applicable general theory of strategy.7
The first step in developing long-range plans various district engineers. Alternative plans for
was to forecast the product demand for future achieving company goals were also developed
years. After calculating the tonnage needed in for some areas, and investment proposals were
each sales district to provide the “target” frac- formulated after considering the amount of
tion of the total forecast demand, the optimal available capital and the company debt policy.
production level for each area was determined. The Vice President who was responsible for
A computer program that incorporated the long-range planning recommended certain
projected demand, existing production capa- plans to the President, and after the top exec-
city, freight costs etc., was used for this purpose. utives and the Board of Directors reviewed
When the optimum production rate in each alternative plans, they made the necessary
area was found, the additional facilities needed decisions about future activities.
to produce the desired tonnage were specified.
Then the capital costs for the necessary equip-
Source: Harold W. Henry, Long Range Planning Processes
ment, buildings, and layout were estimated in 45 Industrial Companies (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
by the Chief Engineer of the corporation and Hall, 1967): 65.
a flood of articles and books addressing this new science.8 By 1963, most large US
companies had set up corporate planning departments. Strategy Capsule 1.4 provides
an example of such formalized corporate planning.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, diversification became the major emphasis of
corporate planning for many large companies. Igor Ansoff, one of the founding figures
of the new discipline of corporate strategy, claimed that: “Strategic decisions are
primarily concerned . . . with the selection of the product-mix that the firm will
produce and the markets to which it will sell.”9
During the 1970s and early 1980s, confidence in corporate planning and infatu-
ation with scientific approaches to management were severely shaken. Not only did
diversification fail to deliver the anticipated synergies, but the oil shocks of 1974 and
1979 ushered in a new era of macroeconomic instability, combined with increased
international competition from resurgent Japanese, European, and Southeast Asian
firms. Faced with a more turbulent business environment, firms could no longer plan
their investments, new product introductions, and personnel requirements three to
five years ahead, simply because they couldn’t forecast that far into the future.
The result was a shift in emphasis from planning to strategy making, where
the focus was less on the detailed management of companies’ growth paths than on
positioning the company in markets and in relation to competitors in order to maxim-
ize the potential for profit. This transition from corporate planning to what became
termed strategic management was associated with increasing focus on competition as
the central characteristic of the business environment and competitive advantage as
the primary goal of strategy.
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16 PART I INTRODUCTION
ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR).20 These trends have been reinforced
by greater awareness of the fragility of Earth’s ecosystem, stimulated by accelerating
global warning. As optimism over the capacity of the “new economy” to generate
new business opportunities waned, companies looked elsewhere for new business
opportunities. Increasingly, Western companies looked to emerging countries – India
and China in particular – as sources of future growth.21
Figure 1.3 summarizes the main developments in strategic management over the
past 60 years.
l Strategy: a plan, method, or series of actions designed to achieve a specific goal or effect.
—Wordsmyth Dictionary
l Lost Boy: “Injuns! Let’s go get ’em!”
John Darling: “Hold on a minute. First we must have a strategy.”
Lost Boy: “Uhh? What’s a strategy?”
John Darling: “It’s, er . . . it’s a plan of attack.”
—Walt Disney’s Peter Pan
l The determination of the long-run goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption
of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals.
—Alfred Chandler, Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962)
l A strategy is the pattern or plan that integrates an organization’s major goals, policies and
action sequences into a cohesive whole. A well-formulated strategy helps marshal and
allocate an organization’s resources into a unique and viable posture based upon its
relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment,
and contingent moves by intelligent opponents.
—James Brian Quinn, Strategies for Change: Logical Incrementalism
(Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1980)
l Strategy is the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and the major policies and plans
for achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the company is
in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is to be.
—Kenneth Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy
(Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1971)
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Yet, as we have seen in our historical review, the conception of firm strategy has
changed greatly over the past half century. As the business environment has become
more unstable and unpredictable, so strategy has become less concerned with detailed
plans, and more about mission, vision, principles, guidelines, and targets. This is con-
sistent with our starting point to the chapter. If we think back to our three introduc-
tory examples – Madonna, General Giap, and Lance Armstrong – none wrote detailed
strategic plans, but all possessed clear ideas of what they wanted to achieve and how
they would achieve it. This shift in emphasis from strategy as plan to strategy as
direction does not imply any downgrading of the role of strategy. Certainly, in a
turbulent environment, strategy must embrace flexibility and responsiveness. But it is
precisely in these conditions that strategy becomes more rather than less important.
When the firm is buffeted by unforeseen threats and where new opportunities are
constantly appearing, then strategy becomes a vital tool to navigate the firm through
stormy seas.
In an environment of uncertainty and change, a clear sense of direction is essential
to the pursuit of objectives. As Michael Porter has emphasized, strategy is not about
doing things better – this is the concern of operational effectiveness – strategy is about
doing things differently; hence, the essence of strategy is making choices.22
Strategic choices can be distilled to two basic questions:
l Where to compete?
l How to compete?
The answers to these questions also define the major areas of a firm’s strategy:
corporate strategy and business strategy.
20 PART I INTRODUCTION
INDUSTRY
ATTRACTIVENESS
CORPORATE
STRATEGY
Which industries
RATE OF RETURN should we be in?
ABOVE THE COST
OF CAPITAL
How do we
make money?
COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE
BUSINESS
STRATEGY
How should we
compete?
This distinction may be expressed in even simpler terms. The basic question facing
the firm is: “How do we make money?” The answer to this question corresponds to
the two basic strategic choices we identified above: “Where to compete” (i.e. “In
which industries and markets should we be in?”) and “How should we compete?”
The distinction between corporate strategy and business strategy corresponds to the
organization structure of most large companies. Corporate strategy is the respons-
ibility of the top management team and the corporate strategy staff. Business strategy
is primarily the responsibility of divisional management.
As an integrated approach to firm strategy, this book deals with both business
and corporate strategy. However, my primary emphasis will be business strategy. This
is because the critical requirement for a company’s success is its ability to establish
competitive advantage. Hence, issues of business strategy precede those of corporate
strategy. At the same time, these two dimensions of strategy are closely linked: the
scope of a firm’s business has implications for the sources of competitive advantage,
and the nature of a firm’s competitive advantage determines the range of businesses
it can be successful in.
22 PART I INTRODUCTION
Nokia’s Strategy
small-town locations, and unique approach to employee motivation was not the
result of grand design – it was the result of Sam Walton’s hunches and intuition plus
a series of historical accidents.
How organizations make strategy has emerged as an area of intense debate within
the strategy field. Henry Mintzberg distinguishes intended, realized, and emergent
strategies. Intended strategy is strategy as conceived of by the top management team.
Even here, rationality is limited and the intended strategy is the result of a process of
negotiation, bargaining, and compromise, involving many individuals and groups
within the organization. However, realized strategy – the actual strategy that is
implemented – is only partly related to that which was intended (Mintzberg suggests
CSAC01 1/13/07 9:18 Page 23
The Company is committed to bringing the is critical to facilitate innovation of new and
best personal computing and music experi- improved products and technologies. Besides
ence to students, educators, creative profes- updates to its existing line of personal com-
sionals, businesses, government agencies, and puters and related software, services, peri-
consumers through its innovative hardware, pherals, and networking solutions, the Company
software, peripherals, services, and internet continues to capitalize on the convergence of
offerings. The Company’s business strategy digital consumer electronics and the computer
leverages its unique ability, through the design by creating innovations like the iPod and iTunes
and development of its own operating system, Music Store. The Company’s strategy also
hardware, and many software applications and includes expanding its distribution network to
technologies, to bring to its customers new effectively reach more of its targeted customers
products and solutions with superior ease- and provide them a high-quality sales and
of-use, seamless integration, and innovative after-sales support experience.
industrial design. The Company believes con-
tinual investment in research and development Source: Apple Computer Inc., 10K Report, 2005.
24 PART I INTRODUCTION
Coca-Cola’s mission statement – “To refresh the With regard to how: Coca-Cola pursues a
world . . . To inspire moments of optimism . . . differentiation strategy in which it relies on
To create value in everything we do . . .” – is brand image developed through heavy adver-
ethereal, but doesn’t say much about how tising and promotion. It seeks market share
these lofty goals are translated into strategy. leadership through its mass marketing and
However, on the basis of some basic facts through close relationships with the leading
about the company’s operation and intentions, bottlers in every country where it does business.
we can provide a more explicit statement of These facts outline Coca-Cola’s strategy only
its strategy. Our starting point is to answer in the static sense of describing its current com-
the two basic questions of where and how it petitive stance. Strategy is also dynamic – it’s
competes. about the direction in which a company is
The where question can be answered as developing. Coca-Cola’s company reports tell
follows: us a good deal about what the company is cur-
rently doing to change its competitive position.
l Coca-Cola competes in the soft drinks
In particular, it is committed to continuous
industry where it supplies concentrate for
growth of both volume and earnings, and to
its branded carbonated drinks (e.g. Coca-
the reinforcement of its world leadership. Its
Cola, Sprite, Fanta, Tab, and Fresca) and
major growth opportunities will be in fast-
supplies other drinks (e.g. Minute Maid,
growing countries outside the US, such as
Hi-C, and Fiver Alive fruit juices and Dasani
China, Russia, and Turkey. (During 2001–5, the
bottled water).
international portion of its capital expenditure
l Geographically, Coca-Cola competes in budget increased from 56% to 71%.) Coca-
200 countries, with 27% of sales in the US Cola also sought to capitalize on increasing
and a further 27% in its next four biggest demand for low carbohydrate and natural in-
markets (Mexico, Brazil, Japan, and China). gredient drinks. However, its primary emphasis
l In terms of vertical scope, Coca-Cola is will be on marketing its core brands – particu-
primarily engaged in product larly targeting younger consumers through
development, brand management, linking Coca-Cola products with sport and
and the manufacture of concentrate. music. Acquisition will play an important role
It relies on franchised local bottlers for in building and reinforcing Coca-Cola’s inter-
bottling and distribution. Coca-Cola holds national market position.
equity interest in over half of its larger
bottlers. Source: www2.coca-cola.com/investors/index.html
While the debate between these schools rumbles on,31 it is apparent that the cen-
tral issue is not “who is right?” but “how can the two views complement one another
to give us a richer understanding of how strategy is made?” In most organizations,
strategy is made through a combination of design and emergence. At the formal,
deliberate level, strategy is made in board meetings, meetings of the top management
CSAC01 1/13/07 9:18 Page 25
team, and within the strategic planning process. At the same time, strategy is
being continually enacted through decisions that are made by every member of the
organization – by middle management especially. The decentralized, bottom–up pro-
cess of strategy emergence may lead formal, top–down strategy formulation. Intel’s
historic decision to abandon memory chips and concentrate on microprocessors was
initiated through a host of decentralized decisions taken by divisional and plant man-
agers that were subsequently acknowledged by top management and promulgated
into strategy.32 Maximizing responsiveness and adaptability requires that strategic
management processes combine design and emergence. Thus, the strategic planning
process typically combines both top–down and bottom–up strategy making. Corpor-
ate headquarters sets guidelines in the form of mission statements, business prin-
ciples, and performance targets while the individual business units take the lead in
formulating strategic plans. Within the strategic plans that are decided, divisional and
business unit managers have considerable freedom to adjust, adapt, and experiment.
This predominant pattern of strategic planning may be described as one of “planned
emergence.”33
This idea of strategy providing overall direction for an emergent, adaptive, re-
sponsive process of strategic decision making is central to Bain & Company’s advo-
cacy of strategic principles to guide the organization. A strategic principle is a “pithy,
memorable distillation of strategy that guides employees as it empowers them.” Thus,
America’s most successful airline, Southwest, encapsulates its strategy in a simple
statement: “Meet customers’ short-haul travel needs at fares competitive with the cost
of automobile travel.” This principle provides a clear strategy focus of the company
while allowing employees to enact the strategy in adaptive, innovative ways.34
The notion of fostering strategic adaptation through establishing a few broad
principles and directives to guide decentralized decision making is consistent with the
tenets of complexity theory. Jack Welch’s management of General Electric combined
simple directives (“Be number 1 or number 2 in your sector,” “Simplicity . . .
Self-confidence,” “Achieve six-sigma quality”), strong performance incentives, and
considerable autonomy for divisional managers. The result was that one of the world’s
biggest and most complex companies achieved outstanding financial performance,
rapid response to change, and a high level of internal cohesiveness.35 We shall
explore the implications of complexity theory more fully in Chapter 17.
The optimal balance between design and emergence depends on the stability of
the external environment. The Roman Catholic Church and the US Postal Service
inhabit relatively stable environments. They can use top–down, formalized approaches
to planning strategy. Organizations whose environments are fast changing and
unpredictable – Google Inc. or the Baghdad Home Security Services Ltd. – must limit
their strategic planning to a few principles and guidelines; the rest must emerge as
circumstances unfold.
26 PART I INTRODUCTION
while Coca-Cola’s drive for growth is driven by the quest to “have a Coca-Cola within
arm’s reach of everyone in the world.”
28 PART I INTRODUCTION
Summary
This chapter has covered a great deal of ground – and structure and systems – comprise the basic
I hope that you are not suffering from indigestion. components of strategy analysis. Part II of the
If you are feeling a little overwhelmed, not to book will devote a separate chapter to each. (In
worry: we shall be returning to most of the the case of industry analysis – two chapters.) We
themes and issues raised in this chapter in the then deploy these tools in the analysis of compet-
subsequent chapters of the book. itive advantage (Part III), in the formulation and
The next stage is to delve further into the basic implementation of business strategies in different
strategy framework shown in Figure 1.2. Each ele- industry contexts (Part IV), and then in the devel-
ment of this framework – goals and values, the opment of corporate strategy (Part V). Figure 1.5
industry environment, resources and capabilities, shows the framework for the book.
I INTRODUCTION
Ch. 1 The Concept of Strategy
V CORPORATE STRATEGY
Ch. 13 Vertical Integration Ch. 14 Global Strategies and Ch. 15 Diversification
and the Scope of the Firm the Multinational Corporation Strategy
Ch. 16 Managing the Multibusiness Ch. 17 Current Trends in
Corporation Strategic Management
CSAC01 1/13/07 9:18 Page 29
Self-Study Questions
1 In relation to the four characteristics of successful strategies (clear, consistent, long-term
objectives; profound understanding of the environment; objective appraisal of resources; and
effective implementation), assess the US strategy towards Iraq during 2003–7.
2 To what extent does McDonald’s Corporation achieve a close strategic fit between its
strategy, the characteristics of its external environment, and its internal resources and
capabilities? Are changes occurring in its external environment weakening this strategic fit?
If so, how should McDonald’s adjust its strategy?
4 I have noted that a firm’s strategy can be described in terms of the answers to two questions:
where are we competing? and how are we competing? (“Describing a Firm’s Strategy”).
Applying these two questions, provide a concise description of the Madonna’s career strategy
(see Strategy Capsule 1.1).
5 What is your career strategy for the next five years? To what extent does your strategy fit
with your long-term goals, the characteristics of the external environment, and your own
strengths and weaknesses?
Notes
1 P. F. Drucker, “Managing Oneself,” Harvard Business 6 On the contribution of game theory to business strategy
Review (March–April 1999): 65–74. analysis, see F. M. Fisher, “Games Economists Play: A
2 Stephen Covey (The Seven Habits of Highly Effective Non-cooperative View,” RAND Journal of Economics 20
People, Simon & Schuster, 1989) advises us to start at (Spring 1989): 113–24; and C. F. Camerer, “Does
the end – to visualize our own funerals and imagine Strategy Research Need Game Theory?,” Strategic
what we would like the funeral speakers to say about us Management Journal 12, Special Issue (Winter 1991):
and our lives. On this basis, he recommends that we 137–52.
develop lifetime mission statements based on the 7 For practical and accessible introductions to the
multiple roles that we occupy in life. application of game theory, see T. C. Schelling, The
3 On SWOT analysis see entries in Wikipedia Strategy of Conflict, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
(http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT) or Mindtools University Press, 1980); A. K. Dixit and B. J. Nalebuff,
(www.mindtools.com/pages/articles/newTMC_05.htm). Thinking Strategically (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991);
4 Sun Tzu, The Art of Strategy: A New Translation of and A. Brandenburger and B. J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition
Sun Tzu’s Classic “The Art of War,” trans. R. L. Wing (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
(New York: Doubleday, 1988). 8 During the late 1950s, Harvard Business Review featured
5 On the links between military and business strategy, see a number of articles on corporate planning, e.g. D. W.
R. Evered, “So What Is Strategy?” Long Range Planning Ewing, “Looking Around: Long-range Business
16, no. 3 ( June 1983): 57–72; E. Clemons and J. Planning,” Harvard Business Review ( July–August 1956):
Santamaria, “Maneuver Warfare,” Harvard Business 135– 46; B. Payne, “Steps in Long-range Planning,”
Review (April 2002): 46–53. Harvard Business Review (March–April 1957): 95–101.
CSAC01 1/13/07 9:18 Page 30
30 PART I INTRODUCTION
9 I. Ansoff, Corporate Strategy (London: Penguin, 1985): Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations
18. (New York: Free Press, 1988).
10 M. E. Porter, Competitive Strategy (New York: Free 26 The two views of Honda are captured in two Harvard
Press, 1980). cases: Honda [A] (Boston: Harvard Business School,
11 Boston Consulting Group, Perspectives on Experience Case No. 384049, 1989) and Honda [B] (Boston:
(Boston: Boston Consulting Group, 1978). Harvard Business School, Case No. 384050, 1989).
12 R. D. Buzzell and B. T. Gale, The PIMS Principles 27 Boston Consulting Group, Strategy Alternatives for the
(New York: Free Press, 1987). British Motorcycle Industry (London: Her Majesty’s
13 R. M. Grant, “The Resource-based Theory of Stationery Office, 1975).
Competitive Advantage: Implications for Strategy 28 R. T. Pascale, “Perspective on Strategy: The Real Story
Formulation,” California Management Review 33 Behind Honda’s Success,” California Management
(Spring 1991): 114–35; D. J. Collis and Review 26, no. 3 (Spring 1984): 47–72.
C. Montgomery, “Competing on Resources: Strategy in 29 H. Mintzberg, “Crafting Strategy,” Harvard Business
the 1990s,” Harvard Business Review ( July–August Review 65 ( July–August 1987): 70.
1995): 119–28. 30 H. Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,”
14 M. E. Porter, “What is Strategy?,” Harvard Business Harvard Business Review ( January–February 1994):
Review (November–December 1996): 64. 107–14.
15 C. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (Boston: 31 H. Mintzberg, R. T. Pascale, M. Goold, and
Harvard Business School Press, 1997). R. P. Rumelt, “The Honda Effect Revisited,” California
16 T. Peters, The Pursuit of Wow (New York: Vintage Management Review 38 (Summer 1996): 78–117.
Books, 1994); G. Hamel, Leading the Revolution 32 R. A. Burgelman and A. Grove, “Strategic Dissonance,”
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000). California Management Review 38 (Winter 1996): 8–28.
17 C. Shapiro and H. R. Varian, Information Rules (Boston: 33 R. M. Grant “Strategic Planning in a Turbulent
Harvard Business School Press, 1998). Environment: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Majors,”
18 R. H. Frank and P. J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society Strategic Management Journal 14 ( June 2003): 491–517.
(New York: Penguin, 1997). 34 O. Gadiesh and J. Gilbert, “Transforming Corner-office
19 On option theory and strategy see: T. Copeland and Strategy into Frontline Action,” Harvard Business
V. Antikarov, Real Options: A Practitioner’s Guide Review (May 2001): 73– 80.
(Texere, 2001); A. van Putten and I. C. Macmillan, 35 B. McKelvey, “Energising Order-Creating Networks of
“Making Real Options Really Work,” Harvard Business Distributed Intelligence: Improving the Corporate
Review (December 2004): 134– 41. Brain,” International Journal of Innovation Management
20 C. Smith, “Corporate Social Responsibility: Whether or 5(2) ( June 2001): 181–212.
How?” California Management Review 45, no. 4 36 “Strategic Intensity: A Conversation with Garry
(Summer 2003): 52–76. Kasparov,” Harvard Business Review (April 2005):
21 “Survey: India and China,” Economist (March 3, 2005). 105–13.
22 M. E. Porter, “What is Strategy?” op. cit. 37 The concept of bounded rationality was developed by
23 L. J. Bourgeois, “Strategy and the Environment: A Herbert Simon (“A Behavioral Model of Rational
Conceptual Integration,” Academy of Management Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 (1955):
Review 5 (1980): 25–39. 99–118).
24 J. Magretta, “Why Business Models Motter,” Harvard 38 G. Hamel and C. K. Prahalad, “Strategic Intent,”
Business Review (May 2002): 86–92; George Yip, “Using Harvard Business Review (May–June 1989): 63–77.
Strategy to Change Your Business Model,” Business 39 G. Hamel and C. K. Prahalad, “Strategy as Stretch and
Strategy Review 15, issue 2 (Summer 2004): 17–24. Leverage,” Harvard Business Review (March–April
25 See H. Mintzberg, “Patterns of Strategy Formulation,” 1993): 75– 84.
Management Science 24 (1978): 934– 48; “Of Strategies: 40 J. C. Collins and J. I. Porras, Built to Last: Successful
Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic Management Habits of Visionary Companies (New York:
Journal 6 (1985): 257–72; and Mintzberg on HarperCollins, 1995).