Could God's Purpose Be the Source of Life's Meaning?

Author(s): Thaddeus Metz

Source: Religious Studies , Sep., 2000, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 293-313
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20008297

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Religious Studies 36, 293-313. Printed in the United Kingdom C 2000 Cambridge University Press

Could God's purpose be the source of life's

meaning?
THADDEUS METZ
Philosophy Depar-tment, University of Missouri-St Louis, 8001 Natural Bridge Road
St Louis, MO 63121

Abstract: In this paper, I explore the traditional religious account of what can m
a life meaningful, namely, the view that one's life acquires significance insofar as
one fulfils a purpose God has assigned. Call this view 'purpose theory'. In the
literature, there are objections purporting to show that purpose theory entails the
logical absurdities that God is not moral, omnipotent, or eternal. I show that ther
are versions of purpose theory which are not vulnerable to these reductio
arguments. However, I then contend that there is a problem facing purpose theory
which no version can avoid. I argue that the best reason for holding a God-centred
theory of life's meaning logically precludes the possibility of purpose theory being
the correct version of it. More specifically, I argue that if a relationship with God
necessary for one's life to acquire meaning, this must be because God would have
properties such as atemporality and simplicity, perfections which are incompatible
with purposiveness. I conclude that religious thinkers have good reason to develo
other theories of the way God could confer meaning on our lives.

Introduction: the status of purpose theory

In this paper, I explore the traditional God-centred theory of what can mak
a human life meaningful. I take the question of what can make life meaningf
be the question of what about our lives (besides bare survival) could be worth
great esteem.' A God-centred theory, as construed here, answers that one's lif
worthy of great esteem just insofar as one has a proper relation with a spirit
being who grounds the natural universe. And the traditional God-centred v
maintains that at least one proper relation to have with God is to fulfil His purpos
Call this view 'purpose theory'.2
Purpose theory is a prima facie attractive account of what could make a l
meaningful. It spells out what it would mean to 'exist for a reason' or for 'lif
have a point'. It jibes with the fact that 'purpose' is one synonym of 'mean
It accounts for the intuition that what confers meaning on one's life is an objecti
matter, i.e., that meaning is not merely a function of satisfying whatever de
one happens to have. It provides a plausible candidate for what could con
293

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294 THADDEUS METZ

significance on our lives, namely, a holy being. Finally, it square

judgment that most (if not all) people are capable of living a meaningfu
that not everyone in fact does live a meaningful life.
Despite these advantages, several theorists have contended that realiz
plan could not make our lives meaningful. In fact, many hold that purp
when conjoined with very plausible theses, entails logical contradictio
are important arguments in the literature purporting to show that pur
entails the absurdities that God is not all-good, that God is not all-pow
that God is not eternal.
In this paper, I will argue that there are versions of purpose theory whic
entail these absurdities. The three major reductio arguments again
theory will be shown to fail. However, critical discussion of these argu
point the way to a more telling objection to purpose theory. I will also
reflection on the reason why God might be the key to a meaningful li
that purpose theory must be false. The most promising explanation o
relationship with God could be the sole source of significance implies
thing other than achieving a goal assigned by God must constitute thi
short, the best rationale for God-centred theory in general is incompa
the particular version of God-centred theory which has dominated reli
ing on the meaning of life. I am not sure that this new objection is sou
forward as something that must be addressed in order for belief in pur
to be plausible.
I will begin by spelling out purpose theory in some detail, differenti
is merely compatible with the view from what is essential to it. Along the
also respond to objections which are based on misunderstandings
theory, clearing the way for a discussion of more substantial criticisms. In
three sections I will refute the charges that purpose theory oddly enta
would treat us immorally, lack omnipotence, and fail to be eternal. T
raise a new problem for purpose theory, that it does not square with
explanation of God-centred theory. After rejecting several accounts of
lationship with God might be necessary for life to have meaning, I wi
what I take to be the most promising account, an account which will b
contradict purpose theory. Hence, I will tentatively conclude that real
purpose could not be what it is about relating to God that would mak
meaningful. I will end the paper by pointing both to ways that purpos
might try to respond to this objection and to avenues of research for
thinkers who question purpose theory.

An analysis of purpose theory

In this section, my goal is to explicate purpose theory. I will lay

different basic versions of the view and also clear up common misco

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 295

Purpose theory is the view that a life is meaningful insofar as one fulfils a
purpose that God has assigned. Note that purpose theory implies nothing about
whether God in fact has a purpose or whether God even exists. Of course, many
believers do hold purpose theory, but it would be possible for, say, atheistic
existentialists to hold it as well. We may therefore dismiss one objection to purpose
theory, namely, the charge that the existence of evil shows that there is no God
with a purpose.3 Evil is not a problem for purpose theory, since it does not contend
that there exists a God who has assigned us a purpose. In other words, purpose
theory does not imply anything about whether our lives are in fact meaningful.
Purpose theory is a thesis about what can confer meaning upon our lives. If
atheism were true, then purpose theory would entail nihilism, the view that our
lives are meaningless.
It should be instructive to contrast purpose theory with related religious
theories of what could make a life meaningful. First, purpose theory is logically
distinct from 'justice theory', which says that life is meaningful, say, because God's
rules are the source of justice in this world, or because God gives people their just
deserts in the next one. The defender of purpose theory may, but need not, hold
that God's purposes are the source of morality; she could hold that moral facts
obtain independently of God's will, but that meaning facts do not. The purpose
theorist can also maintain that life would be meaningful even if there were no
ultimate justice; she could hold that doing God's bidding in this imperfect world
is sufficient for a significant life.
Second, purpose theory conceptually differs from standard forms of' perfection
theory', the view that a life is meaningful insofar as it is oriented toward a superior
nature. Typical versions of perfection theory maintain that one's life is meaningful
by virtue of honouring one's higher self as a spiritual, indestructible entity while
on earth, or by virtue of attaining the stage where one will commune with a perfect
being upon leaving the earth. Purpose theory differs from these forms of perfection
theory in that it can hold that life can be meaningful in the absence of a soul which
will survive the death of one's body. Merely realizing God's end, without the
prospect of an afterlife, could be deemed sufficient for meaning.4
Purpose theorists will disagree about whether their account should be con
joined with any of the above perspectives and, if so, which ones. Additional
differences among purpose theorists will turn on their conceptions (a) of God,
(b) of God's purpose, (c) of the way God assigns it to us, and (d) of the way we
are to fulfil it. Let's briefly examine some competing interpretations of these
elements.
For the sake of this paper, I will consider God to be at least a spiritual being who
is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good and who is the ground of the physical
world (a). Although most purpose theorists are theists who hold that God is a
transcendent, personal being, it is worth noting that pantheist and deist versions
of purpose theory are possible, too. And God might also be necessary, infinite,

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296 THADDEUS METZ

atemporal, immutable, and simple, but I will tend to set such possibilities
(until the penultimate section).
Many defenders of purpose theory hold that any purpose God assigns to
individual would be part of a larger, single plan for the universe (b). It is th
that if God created the natural world, it was done with one highest-order
mind, whereby all other ends would be necessary components of or instrum
for its realization. However, it is not clear that this is the only possible or plaus
account of God's purposes. God could have brought about the univers
several higher-order ends in mind, at least if the ends do not conflict. For exam
God arguably could have made the world for the sake of being generous t
creatures in it, maximizing temporal values, glorifying Himself, and enhanci
meaning of His own existence. Perhaps the purpose God assigns to us woul
necessary for achieving one (or more) of multiple higher-order ends.
Adherents of purpose theory disagree with one another about the precis
tent of God's purpose and the way we might come to know it. These are notorio
difficult questions to answer. However, it is a mistake to think, as some obj
have,5 that purpose theory is unacceptable if it fails to specify our assigne
The idea behind the objection is that a theory of life's meaning should pro
some practical guidance. Now, the purpose theorist can maintain that we do
a reasonable amount of insight into what God's purpose might be. After a
question of why God would create something rather than nothing, or would
us in particular, is amenable of intelligent reply. But even if the defende
purpose theory could provide no indication as to the content of God's purpo
us, I do not think her view would thereby be disqualified. Utilitarianism ha
widely deemed to be a good candidate for a moral theory, despite the enor
difficulty of knowing what course of action would actually produce the best res
Similarly, purpose theory could be an acceptable theory of meaning, even if
not know how to fulfil God's purpose.
There are further differences among versions of purpose theory regardin
way God might assign a purpose to us (c). For instance, would God comma
to realize His end? Might God punish us with eternal damnation if we fai
realize the end assigned to us?
Finally, purpose theorists will disagree about how we ought to fulfil Go
purpose (d). Most will hold that it is possible for us not to realize God's end
that we are not predestined to do what God would like. Typical adhere
purpose theory hold that we must freely fulfil the end God assigns. Hence
incorrect to say that purpose theory implies that everyone's life would be
ingful merely because God assigned us an end6 or because we could not
realizing it.7 Purpose theory maintains that one must fulfil the end, not merely
assigned one, and most adherents hold that one must fulfil it by means of
choice. There arises the further question of how to fulfil God's purpose free

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 297

example, is one's life (more) meaningful if one takes pleasure in attaining the goal
God has assigned, or if one attains it for the basic reason that it is God's goal?
Obviously, many different versions of purpose theory are possible. In the next
three sections, my task will be to find versions which do not entail the logical
absurdities which have been attributed to purpose theory.

God's purpose vs. God's morality

A prominent criticism of purpose theory is that it would be immoral for
God to assign a purpose to other agents. Purpose theory arose in the context of a
teleological conception of human nature, whereby normativity is understood in
terms of a final cause. Modern conceptions of normativity famously reject the idea
that persons ought to realize some predefined end; they instead tend to hold that
we ought to live according to norms which are self-legislated. Now, it appears that
being assigned an end conflicts with the dictum that rational beings ought to live
by their own choice. Hence, Sartre once said of his subjectivist theory that it 'alone
is compatible with the dignity of man; it is the only one which does not make man
into an object'.8
It is difficult to pin down in exactly what respect a God who assigned us a
purpose might degrade our dignity. In order to flesh this out, I will appeal to some
Kantian ideas about morality. In characteristically modern fashion, the Kantian
standpoint presumes that we are essentially autonomous choosers and proposes
that the fundamental moral norm is to respect people's ability to make decisions
for themselves. In the following, I will examine the 'Argument from Disrespect',
the central claims of which are that it is immoral to treat our capacity for self
determination solely as a means to an end and that God's assigning us an end
would do exactly that. These claims together entail that if God assigned us an end,
God would be immoral, a logical contradiction since God is by definition morally
ideal.
Of course, the purpose theorist could always respond by denying that a Kantian
ethics is applicable to us, perhaps favouring utilitarianism instead. Or she could
grant that Kantianism applies to us, but deny that it applies to God.9 Rather than
spend time considering how the Kantian might reply to these two claims, I would
like merely to set them aside. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that both
human and divine wills are morally obliged not to treat rational beings dis
respectfully. It would be interesting if it could be shown that purpose theory is
consistent with this strong Kantian thesis. In the following, I will explore four ways
in which God's assigning us an end might seem to treat our capacity for free choice
disrespectfully. I will show that there is nothing inherently disrespectful about
God's assigning us a purpose and hence that purpose theory need not absurdly
entail that God is immoral.

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298 THADDEUS METZ

Coercion
Why hold that God's ascribing us an end would be disrespectful? First,
restricting a person's choice by making threats is a quintessential form of disre
spect, and it appears that God would threaten us by making eternal damnation the
consequence of not realizing His end.'0
To begin to reply, consider that a threat is not necessarily disrespectful; it
depends on why the threat is made. Specifically, a threat made incidentally in the
course of maintaining a retributive punishment system is not disrespectful. To fix
ideas, suppose that a human society instituted a punishment system for the sake
of giving violators of just laws the punishment they deserve. While not intending
to deter crime with this punishment system, the society would nonetheless be
making incidental threats to those who would break just laws. Regardless of its
purpose, the mere existence of a punishment system threatens citizens in saying,
'If you break a law, you will be intentionally harmed'. It does not appear that such
threats would be disrespectful, on the plausible assumption that retributive pun
ishment is respectful.
Therefore, if it would not be disrespectful for a state to make threats in the
course of maintaining a retributive punishment system, it would not be dis
respectful for God to make threats in doing the same. If it would be God's purpose
for us to be moral, then our failing to fulfil that purpose would warrant punish
ment, and any threats God would make incidental to imposing that punishment
would be respectful.
Unfortunately, we cannot rest content with this response, since it appears that
it is not possible for a human to deserve eternal damnation. No finite action can
earn an infinite reaction. If so, then even monstrosities such as Hitler and Stalin
do not deserve to be in hell forever. Hence, I believe the purpose theorist must
reject the idea that God would impose eternal damnation upon those who do not
fulfil the purpose He assigns. The purpose theorist can accept that we have souls
that live forever. She can also hold that God would impose a finite punishment
upon souls that have rejected His (moral) end. However, to avoid the charge that
God's assigning us a purpose would be disrespectfully coercive, I suspect that the
purpose theorist must reject the postulate that God would send recalcitrants to
hell forever. If I am wrong about this, so much the better for the purpose theorist
who is enthusiastic about the prospect of eternal damnation for the wicked. The
point is that purpose theory can escape the charge that it implies that God would
be wrongfully coercive to assign us a purpose.

Exploitation
Even if the purpose theorist rejects the notion of eternal damnation,
charges of disrespect may still arise. In fact, God's offering the reward of heaven
for realizing His end might seem to be disrespectful. Some could deem this to be
a 'coercive offer', or, in terms that I find more applicable, a form of exploitation.

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 299

It seems exploitative, and hence disrespectful, to offer a starving person food in

exchange for doing what you like. What choice would she have but to conform to
your will? By analogy, an objector could maintain that it would be exploitative for
God to offer finite creatures an eternity of bliss in exchange for doing His bidding.
The God-Father would be making an offer we couldn't refuse.
Of course, one option for the purpose theorist would be to reject the reward of
eternal heaven as I have argued she must reject the punishment of eternal hell.
She could hold that God would provide either no reward or a moderate reward for
realizing His end.
However, I think the purpose theorist can plausibly maintain that God could
reward us with eternal bliss for acting according to His will. The charge of
' exploitation' arises most naturally when the purpose of the person making the
offer involves degrading or harming the recipient. Most would not hesitate in
calling 'exploitative' the offer of food to a starving person in exchange for sex or
a kidney. It is not so clear, though, that it would be exploitative to offer such a
person food in exchange for maintaining her rational agency or working part-time
at a soup kitchen. If this would not be exploitative, then it would likewise not be
exploitative for God to offer us heaven forever in exchange for accomplishing His
aim that we act morally.

Condescension
There is a yet a third version of the Argument from Disrespect, namely, one
from Kurt Baier. Baier's rendition interestingly does not turn on God's imposing
any scheme of punishment or reward. Since Baier's remarks are important and
influential, I quote in full the relevant passage:

We do not disparage a dog when we say that it has no purpose, is not a sheep dog
or a watch dog.... Man is in a different category, however. To attribute to a human
being a purpose in that sense is not neutral, let alone complimentary: it is
offensive. It is degrading for a man to be regarded as merely serving a purpose. If,
at a garden party, I ask a man in livery, 'What is your purpose?' I am insulting
him. I might as well have asked, 'What are you for?' Such questions reduce him to
the level of a gadget, a domestic animal, or perhaps a slave. I imply that we allot to
him the tasks, the goals, the aims which he is to pursue; that his wishes and
desires and aspirations and purposes are to count for little or nothing. We are
treating him, in Kant's phrase, merely as a means to our ends, not as an end in
himself.... [Purpose theory] sees man as a creature, a divine artefact, something
halfway between a robot (manufactured) and an animal (alive), a homunculus, or
perhaps Frankenstein, made in God's laboratory, with a purpose or task assigned
him by his Maker.'"

Baier's claim is not that God's purpose would be 'selfish', i.e., in His best
interest but not ours. Therefore, it will not suffice to point out that God's purpose
would be in our objective interests.'2 Baier's concern about God's assigning us a
purpose is that it would degrade us, not that it would harm us. Baier objects that

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300 THADDEUS METZ

being assigned a purpose would treat one's capacity for rational choice a
tool to be used for the realization of a purpose one does not share. It is ir
that realizing the purpose would be good for oneself; that would merely
paternalistic aspect to the degradation.
It is also worth noting that Baier's claim is not that it is disrespectful ever
someone as being useful. Hence, one cannot respond to Baier by noting
which it is not disrespectful to view people as having a use-value. If
stranger what he does for a living, we are in effect asking how he contri
society, and there is nothing disrespectful about this.13 Such a case does
against Baier, since enquiring about someone's job need not involve treat
person merely as a means, which is Baier's concern.
If God were to assign us a purpose, then God would clearly have to regar
a means, i.e., as being useful for the realization of his end. The question is
God must thereby regard us solely as a means, and that is not so clear. If
not coerce, exploit, or deceive humans to get them to fulfil a purpose, th
would engage in no manipulation, the central form of treating a person m
a means. However, Baier's example does not involve the use of force or fraud t
an agent to do something. Baier's case is one in which an agent is insulted
than manipulated. In asking a person what she is for, one offensively expresse
judgment that a person does not exist for her own sake. Must God similar
us insofar as He assigns us a purpose? It might seem so. If God has a pur
wants us to fulfil, it seems that He would have to inform us of it. Hence
assigned a purpose to us, He would in some way have to say to each of us
is something I would like you to do with your life, and this is the reason
exist'. As it stands, this statement does sound a bit patronizing.
However, if we reflect some more on what God's purpose might be an
God might seek to promote it, the statement can be part of a respectful
For example, suppose that the end God assigned us were to exercise our f
in a moral way. Informing us of such an end need not be condescending.
that we filled out God's statement as follows: 'There is something I would
to do with your life, and this is the reason that you exist. Specifically, I woul
you to be a moral person. Your free will is such that I cannot cajole y
exercising it morally, and your moral choice would be valuable only if it were
freely. Therefore, I must ask you to pursue the fundamental end of pursuing
ends.' We could even imagine that a 'please' were thrown in.
In short, being assigned a purpose could be a matter of divine request,
than divine command. If being assigned an end can be a matter of being
adopt the end voluntarily, then there need not be anything insulting abo
assigned an end. We could well imagine a parent telling his adult daughter
brought her up for the sake of there being another good person on the pl
end that he hopes she will freely decide to share with him. There need
condescension here.

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 301

Poorly motivated creation

Baier's invocation of Frankenstein suggests a fourth way that purpose the
ory might entail that God is disrespectful. We often think that it is possible for
parents to be immoral insofar as they create offspring for the wrong reasons, and
the same might go for God's creation of us.
To illustrate, suppose that a couple decides to have a child fundamentally
because they would like a musician in the family. Now, let us set aside the other
elements of disrespect considered so far; assume that the couple neither manipu
lates the child into becoming a musician nor commands the child to become one.
We instead suppose merely that the basic purpose of getting pregnant is to end up
with a musically-adept relative, a purpose the parents do not promote in any
objectionable way (viz., they observe 'side-constraints' on the pursuit of their
end). Merely acting on the maxim of creating a child in order to have a musician
might be disrespectful, even if the child is in no way manipulated into being a
musician or 'reduced to' her musical aptitude. The same apparently goes for
creating a child with the aim of having a worker on the farm or a playmate for a
sibling. In contrast, it would not seem disrespectful to make a baby for the sake of
promoting a being who will set its own ends. Baier might therefore suggest this
principle to govern the creation of rational beings: it is disrespectful to create a
rational being for any purpose other than that this being pursues its own
purposes.14
Now, God's purpose for us would presumably involve living morally, and it
therefore appears that God would create us for a purpose other than setting our
own ends. By the above principle, then, God would be acting disrespectfully in
creating us for the sake of setting moral ends.
Obviously, the purpose theorist must question the principle I have ascribed to
Baier. In particular, the purpose theorist must contend that the principle is too
broad, i.e., that it can be respectful to create a person for a given purpose in
addition to that of adopting her own purposes. It is clear that someone who created
a person in order to have another moral agent on earth would be treating that
person as a means, but it is not obvious that he would be thereby treating her
merely as a means. If, as we assume, such a creator did not coerce the created into
being moral, did not take advantage of the created's weakness to get her to be
moral, and did not condescendingly tell her to be moral, then his creating her to
be moral would not dishonour her autonomy. Again, if the creator pursued his end
of having the created be moral merely by reasoning and requesting, then the fact
that he made the created in order for her to be moral would not appear to treat her
capacity for free choice merely as a means to his end.
I conclude that while some versions of purpose theory, particularly those in
volving eternal damnation, are vulnerable to the Argument from Disrespect, pur
pose theory as such is not. If we can imagine a God whose end for us includes
moral action, who does not threaten us with an eternity in hell to get His way, who

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302 THADDEUS METZ

does not make offers we cannot refuse, and who does not address u
patronizing way, then we can imagine a purpose theory which does not ent
absurdity that God is immoral.
On behalf of purpose theory I have often supposed that God's end w
require moral action on our part. Note that this does not mean that the pu
theorist must hold divine command theory (or any other religious ethics
purpose theorist may coherently hold that God's purpose for us would be t
according to moral standards which obtain independently of God's will. P
theory might be neater or simpler if it were conjoined with divine comm
theory. However, divine command theory has notorious problems that we
not want purpose theory necessarily to inherit, and it is worth considering
problems might be thought to arise for purpose theory when it is consid
distinct from divine command theory.

God's purpose vs. God's omnipotence

The next objection to purpose theory is that it entails that God is
omnipotent, which is a contradiction. If it were possible for us not to fulfil the
assigned to us, and if the end assigned to us were necessary to realize God's
then God would need our help. But if God needed our help, then God would
be omnipotent. Therefore, purpose theory implies the absurdity that God w
not be omnipotent.15
One might reply that purpose theory as such does not imply that we could
executing God's plan. Specifically, one may hold a soft determinist view of
dom, and maintain that God would structure causal laws so that we would n
arily freely choose to realize the end God has assigned us. However, to say
' necessarily freely choose' to realize a particular end is, to many thinkers, to st
a contradiction. In addition, with this response purpose theory would lose
ability to say that some human lives are more meaningful than others, for ever
would then be determined to do God's bidding. (Of course, God could mak
people choose to attain the ends assigned to them and make others choose n
do so; then it would not be the case that everyone's life is meaningful. How
such a move would introduce an arbitrariness and inequity into God's plan
would presumably undercut its ability to confer meaning at all.)
Therefore, the purpose theorist ought to hold that we have libertarian fre
and hence grant that we could avoid realizing the end God assigns us. She s
also grant that realizing the end God assigns us would be necessary to fulfil
higher-order end(s); assuming that God is the source of the universe, we
presume that our existence is an integral part of the reason(s) for which
created. That means the purpose theorist must admit that there is a sense in
'God would need our help': the realization of God's higher-order end(s) wo
depend on our realizing the end He assigns us, something we could freely c

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 303

to do or not. Therefore, the purpose theorist must respond to the objection by

refuting the claim that God's needing help implies a lack of omnipotence.
Now, it is widely accepted among theologians that we need not conceive of
God's omnipotence as implying that God could do what is logically impossible. It
is also commonly held that it would be logically impossible for God to bring about
by His own power the superior value of a person freely choosing to act morally.
Therefore, if one of God's higher-order ends required us to act morally on the basis
of free choice, we would have a sense of God 'needing our help' that does not
impugn God's omnipotence. God could need our help in that God logically could
not by His own efforts fulfil one of His valuable higher-order purposes.
However, this response might raise a new worry. Even if God's omnipotence is
not called into question by virtue of God's being logically unable to bring about
one of His higher-order ends, we might find such a God to be irrational. It seems
incredible that God would create the universe for the sake of an end that might not
be realized. How could it be rational to go to the trouble of making a world for a
goal, the attainment of which depends on the contingent choice of our un
dependable species?
There are two strong replies to this new concern. First, recall that we can
conceive of God making the universe for several higher-order ends. It would
certainly seem rational to create nature knowing that, say, two higher-order ends
would necessarily be realized but that one would only probably be realized.
Second, it could still be rational to bring about a world for the sake of a single
highest-order goal which God could not ensure would be achieved. At least if the
value of free moral choice were extremely high, then the expected utility of creating
a world for the sake of free moral choice, which may or may not materialize,
could be greater than that of creating a world without free humans but which
necessarily achieves some less valuable goal.
I conclude that God's needing our help to attain His higher-order goal(s)
threatens neither God's omnipotence nor His rationality. Let us turn to the third
reductio against purpose theory.

God's purpose vs. God's eternality

The last charge of incoherence in purpose theory claims that there is a
tension between claiming that God is beyond space and time, on one hand, and
claiming that God sets an end for us, on the other. In the only book-length treat
ment of life's meaning published in the l990s, Irving Singer clearly voices the worry
about speaking of 'God's purpose':

... to talk in this way is to assume that one can refer to an intentionality outside of
time and space comparable to what occurs within. That is the basic flaw in the
analogy.... It is not a question of determining whether we can fathom the cosmic
plan, or prove that a cosmic planner exists, or manage to fulfill his purposive

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304 THADDEUS METZ

program. It is a question of knowing whether our mind is able to formulate th

notions with any degree of clarity.'6

Singer finds the traditional concern about the compatibility of eternalit

personality sufficient to disqualify purpose theory.
The most straightforward response, of course, is to deny that eternality mu
interpreted in atemporal terms. It appears open to the purpose theorist t
tain that God would exist always in time rather than exist never in time.
To reply on behalf of Singer, one may note that conceiving of God as everlas
has well-known prima facie difficulties for other aspects of theism, e.g., it is
that an everlasting God could be the source of space and time. Now, I want to
this debate. I would prefer to downplay questions about the coherence o
concept of God, in order to focus on the much more neglected topic of th
bility of purpose theory.
Therefore, I suggest that a more attractive reply is to say that a merely
lasting God would not be special enough to be a unique source of significa
a temporal being could not have the right sort of status to be the only so
life's meaning, and if an atemporal being could not be conceived to have
pose, then the purpose theorist would be caught in a trap. In brief, the
theorist potentially faces this dilemma: either (1) God would be atempor
could be the sole source of meaning, but God could not have a purpose, or
would be temporal and could have a purpose, but God could not be the sole
of meaning.
I believe this is the most important objection facing purpose theory, one that I
will develop in the following section. In order to flesh out this dilemma, we must
enquire into the underpinnings of God-centred theory.

God's purpose vs. God-centred theory

The objections in the previous three sections contended that purpose the
ory entails logical absurdities. I have argued that there are versions of purpose
theory which can avoid these implications. However, I will now argue that there
is a problem facing purpose theory which no version can avoid. Specifically, I will
contend that purpose theory as such is incompatible with claims central to a God
centred perspective.
The objection I will develop can be understood in terms of the responses which
one might offer to two questions. First, why think that the significance of our lives
essentially depends on a relationship with God? Second, why think that a relevant
relationship with God is a matter of realizing His purpose? I will argue that the
most promising answer to the first question implies that no satisfactory answer to
the second question is available. Specifically, I will argue that the best reason for
holding a God-centred theory is that God has qualities such as atemporality,

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 305

immutability, simplicity, and infinitude, qualities that seem to be incompatible

with God's being purposive.
Before presenting the objection, I want to respond to a worry about its form.
Someone might be inclined to say the following: 'So what if purpose theory cannot
be the correct version of God-centred theory? Whoever supposed that God
centred theory is the proper way to articulate a religious thinker's perspective on
the meaning of life?'A God-centred theory, as I construe it, maintains not just that
the better one's relationship with God, the more meaningful one's life; it also holds
that the existence of God is necessary for one's life to be at all meaningful. A God
centred theory of meaning implies that, if the physical world did not spring from
God, then there would be no way to acquire meaning in it. The question is, why
think that such a theory should be attractive to theologians? Why not hold instead
that, while some meaning would be possible if God did not exist, God's existence
would potentially make people's lives more meaningful? If Western religious
scholars denied the view that God's existence is necessary for a meaningful life, or
if such a view were prima facie implausible, then it would not substantially dis
credit purpose theory to show that it is incompatible with this view.
I have three reasons for thinking that God-centred theory is a relevant standard
for appraising purpose theory, at least given a Western context. First, the most
influential statements on the meaning of life in the Western religious tradition are
clear instances of God-centred theory. Consider Tolstoy's 'Confession ','7 by far the
most widely-read religious discussion of the meaning of life. In this work, Tolstoy
acutely expresses the worry that life would be meaningless without God. For
another instance, think about Kierkegaard's writings on God. In them, he also
expresses the judgment that life would be without significance if God did not
exist."8
In addition to historical prominence, there are strong theoretical reasons for
using God-centred theory as a base from which to evaluate purpose theory.
Meaningfulness is a value concept, and one would expect a religious theory of
meaning to accord with other religious theories of value. Consider, then, that in
moral theory a religious view is standardly understood to maintain that moral rules
are identical to God's commands and hence that 'if God does not exist, everything
is permitted' (Dostoyevsky). For another example, consider the theory of human
excellence. Here, many religious thinkers follow Aquinas, holding that God is the
unique source of perfection and that other things obtain excellence by virtue of
participating in God's. By analogy, then, a religious theory of meaning ought to
hold that God is the sole source of meaning and that, without God, there would be
no meaning (just as there would be no morality or excellence).
Finally, God-centred theory cuts out philosophically interesting territory. In
order for the dispute between naturalists and supernaturalists about life's mean
ing to be substantive, the latter must hold that a relationship with God is necessary
to make our lives meaningful. To see this, suppose that a religious thinker instead

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306 THADDEUS METZ

maintained the weaker view that while a relationship with God would make
lives more meaningful, it is not necessary for meaning. The problem is th
virtually no naturalist would dispute this claim. Very few naturalists would
tend that, if God existed, relating to him would fail to enhance the meaning of o
life (and the arguments for this contention are simply unpersuasive).19 Afte
typical naturalists would hardly be displeased if they suddenly discovered
exists; they simply maintain that for a life to be meaningful there need not exis
spiritual being who grounds the universe. Therefore, for religious thinking to ca
out a distinct and interesting position, it must maintain that God's existenc
a certain relationship with Him are necessary for life to acquire significance
I conclude, then, that for reasons of tradition, coherence, and relevance
makes sense to appraise purpose theory in light of God-centred theory. If, as
contend, purpose theory is not consistent with the underpinnings of God-cen
theory, then there is strong reason to reject purpose theory.
My thesis is that if a relationship with God is essential for a meaningful life, t
the meaning cannot come by accomplishing a purpose He sets. To defend t
thesis, I will now argue in two stages. Step 1 contends that the best explanati
God-centred theory includes the claim that God has certain properties such
immutability and atemporality. Step 2 maintains that these properties are i
patible with a purposive God. These two steps entail (probably) that pu
theory cannot be the correct version of God-centred theory.

Step 1
In looking for an acceptable explanation of why God alone could make
lives meaningful, we must appeal to features that cannot be found anywher
in God. Again, if our lives acquire significance just to the extent that we ha
proper relationship with God, then to explain why God is central to life's me
we must appeal to features which only God can manifest. Keeping this in min
us quickly canvass some common explanations of why life might be meaning
without God.
First, many maintain that God would prevent our lives from being acciden
The idea is that without God as our source and destiny, our lives would be
tingent and random matters, which would make them meaningless. Now, it i
entirely clear what it means to speak of a 'contingent' or 'accidental'life. It s
well understood, however, as a life the existence or course of which is not
grounded in the fabric of reality. A life that could not have arisen, or which
perish in a handful of years, seems accidental in this respect. In contrast,
springing from and returning to a spiritual source of the physical world w
seem not to be accidental.
There are two problems with this account. First, if, as many theists beli
God's nature did not require Him to create us, then God would arguably

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 307

ground necessity in our lives; it would be His contingent choice to create us.
Second, even if God's nature did require Him to create us (or even if His contingent
choice to create us prevented our lives from being 'contingent' in the relevant
sense), it is not clear that only God could prevent contingency. To see this, suppose
that the universe were everlasting. In addition, assume that fundamental physical
laws dictated only one path for the universe, a path that necessarily resulted in our
coming into existence. Finally, imagine that we were somewhat like vampires, able
to live indefinitely. Since under these naturalist conditions our lives would be
firmly rooted in the structure of reality, it appears that God is not necessary to
avoid contingency. Hence, that God could prevent our lives from being contingent
cannot explain why a relationship with Him is necessary for meaning.
The same goes for the suggestion that God could make our lives part of a grand
scheme, one that encompasses the universe. Some suggest that, from an extremely
objective point of view, our lives would be meaningless insofar as they failed to
have some large impact on the universe or to play a role crucial to its develop
ment.2' If God did not exist, so the argument goes, we would merely be short-lived
beings who exist on the third rock from a star in an enormous sea of stars.
However, God's existence is not necessary to avoid this condition, which a brief
reflection on the television series Star Trek might indicate. If we could travel near
or at the speed of light, then we could enact a plan with an enormous range.
Therefore, it cannot be mere scope which explains how God could be the sole
source of life's significance.
Now consider justice theory, the relevant version of which maintains that there
could be no justice, or more generally no morality, if God did not exist. The most
famous version of justice theory is divine command theory, the view that God's
willing is the source of moral reasons for action, but we may also include here the
Thomistic view that God's being is the archetype of goodness. Perhaps a world
without God would lack meaning because it would lack moral value.
Philosophers have had a difficult time providing a compelling explanation of
why morality is to be identified with God's willing or being. It has seemed to many
that morality could be a natural property. It is not my concern to address the
responses which religious thinkers have made to their rivals. The point I want to
make here is that there is a much more auspicious way to explain why God's
existence and a relationship with Him might be necessary for life to acquire
significance.
I have explored the possibilities that a relationship with God might be necessary
for our lives to be meaningful by virtue of His preventing our lives from being
contingent, making our lives part of a grand scheme, and grounding morality.
Against all three possibilities, I have suggested that nature, independently of God,
could perform these functions. In light of this, I suggest that we look to something
utterly supernatural in order to explain why God's existence would be necessary
for meaning. In particular, perfection theory provides the best explanation of this

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308 THADDEUS METZ

condition. Perfection theory is the view that a life is meaningful just insofar as
is oriented toward a superior nature. On this view, God alone could be the sour
of meaning since He has an absolutely unique, supernatural essence, one whic
alone has the kind of intrinsic value toward which it would be worthwhile co
touring one's life.
What is it about God that might make His nature qualitatively different fr
and more valuable than anything in the natural world? I do not think that Go
being all-good, all-powerful, or all-knowing are very plausible candidates. We fi
goodness, power, and knowledge in our world to some degree. To be sure, Go
would have these to a superior degree, but this appears to be more of a quantitat
difference from human beings, not a qualitative one. It would make most sense
look for features of God that other beings such as humans and angels cannot
exhibit; such features would most clearly indicate in what respect God's natu
and value would be unique. Four properties readily come to mind: atemporalit
immutability, simplicity, and infinitude. Call these the 'qualitative properties'
God alone had some combination of the qualitative properties, if a being with
some combination of these properties had an exceptional excellence, and if w
gained significance by contouring our lives toward such a being, then we wo
have a satisfying explanation of how God alone could be the source of significan
Now, it is clear that human beings cannot have the qualitative properties. W
essentially are spatiotemporal, changeable, decomposable, and limited. Angels
too, are typically understood to be limited and decomposable (at least in though
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that important sorts of intrinsic value
supervene on the qualitative properties. Classical theists provided many argu
ments purporting to show that the two values of unity and independence are
(partially) constituted by the qualitative properties.22
First consider the value of independence, which is a matter of not being co
fined by or dependent on anything else. All four of the qualitative properties m
be deemed instances of independence par excellence. A being beyond space an
time would be free from the limits of these forms. Such a being would be free not
only from decay and death, but also from a point of view restricted to now an
here. An immutable being would similarly be something that utterly determin
its own nature; if a being which exists in a certain mode can neither have beg
to exist nor cease to exist in this mode, then it is free from any influences sa
itself. A simple being, viz., one without parts, would be free from dependence
these parts for its existence. Such a being would be completely unto itself or a
Finally, an unlimited being would by definition be free of any limits.
Now think about the value of unity. Integrity and oneness are better th
disintegration and fragmentation, and the qualitative properties are plausibly
manifestations of the former. A being beyond space and time would lack extens
or the 'feebleness of division' (Anselm). A simple being, having no parts, forms
ultimate unity in that it cannot even be conceived to dissolve. An immutable be

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 309

cannot help but remain what it is. Lastly, an unlimited being would be utterly
whole.
These have been more argument sketches than full-blown arguments; one
could spend an entire paper developing just one of them. My goal is not really to
convince the reader that unity and independence are values which supervene on
the qualitative properties. My aim is more modestly to show that the most
promising explanation of why relating to God is essential for a significant life is
that God has certain features not found in the physical world and that these
features have a superior value which confers significance on us when we orient
our lives toward it. Even without a complete analysis of the qualitative properties
and of the values of unity and independence, my hope is that the reader will agree
that, particularly given the problems facing a supernaturalist ethics, it is fair to say
that this perfection theory is the best rationale for God-centred theory. Again,
explaining why a relationship with God is necessary for one's life to be meaningful
is most naturally done by holding that God has some combination of the quali
tative properties and that our lives can acquire meaning by being contoured
toward an entity with these exceptionally valuable features. Such contouring
might take the form of glorifying God in this life or by communing with Him in an
afterlife, but, as I will now argue, it cannot be a matter of realizing God's purpose.

Step 2
In Step 1 of the argument, I argued that if God alone could confer meaning
on life, this would have to be because He has utterly unique features with a
superior worth, viz., the qualitative properties. In Step 2, I need to show that God's
having the qualitative properties is incompatible with central tenets of purpose
theory.
It is hard to see how a being with the qualitative properties could play the role
that purpose theory requires. In fact, this is a common concern among theists; my
aim is not to add anything new to this particular issue, but rather to articulate it.
So, first off, how could there be an unchangeable being beyond time which is
purposive? The worry here is not that it is difficult to conceptualize an immutable,
timeless being. While it is difficult, it is not impossible, for, as several philosophers
have recently noted, states and dispositions do not seem essentially to be temporal
or to involve change. The concern is rather that, to the extent that we can conceive
of an immutable being beyond time, such a being appears unable to engage in
goal-directed activity. Specifically, the problem is that activities are events, and
events seem fundamentally to involve change and time. For God to adopt an end
for humans might presuppose some deliberation, and deliberation would appear
to be a temporal event involving alteration in God. And even if God adopted an
end without prior deliberation, the adoption alone would seem to be something
that takes time and that forms something new in God. Furthermore, creating a
world according to a plan seems hard to understand as something that does not

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310 THADDEUS METZ

cover a span of time. Finally, purpose theorists usually hold that God info
of the end He has set and that He responds to our free decisions of whether to
it or not. Again, these are activities which seem irreducibly to take time to per
and to involve change on God's part.
For another instance of the problem, how could there be an absolutely s
being which has multiple ends, one for humans and one for animals? God
sumably would have created bees for a purpose which they do not fail to f
order to avoid the counterintuitive implication that animal lives can be a
ingful as human lives, the purpose theorist must maintain that we w
assigned a purpose different from and better than those assigned to anim
Now, even if human and animal purposes are components of a single plan f
universe, the fact of there being components would seem to imply a
simplicity. The same goes for the different acts mentioned above; more th
act would appear to compromise God's absolute simplicity, and it is difficul
how a single, grand act could ground purpose theory's conception of wha
does.
Finally, how could a being which is unlimited be the sort of entity which has a
purpose? As Nozick puts it, 'To be one way and not another is to have limits. It
seems, then, that no terms can describe something unlimited, no human terms
can truly apply to it.'24 Analogical reasoning will not get the purpose theorist very
far. While I have argued above that purpose theory need not provide much prac
tical guidance to be viable, it must at least be theoretically comprehensible.
There are, of course, responses to these worries in the literature. I do not have
the space to explore them here. Instead, my goal at this stage has been to note the
prima facie difficulty of reconciling a view of God as timeless, immutable, simple,
and unlimited with a view of God as purposive. Summing up: if indeed a God with
the qualitative properties cannot be purposive (Step 2), and if God must have the
qualitative properties to be the sole source of meaning (Step 1), then it follows that
we cannot acquire meaning in our lives by virtue of realizing a purpose God assigns
us. I submit that this is the most significant problem facing purpose theory.
Before considering strategies for responding to this objection, I want to clarify
it. There is of course a substantial tradition of wondering whether and how God's
otherness might be consistent with God's personality. I am not just reiterating
points from this tradition, for I am not making a claim about inconsistency within
the concept of God. Moreover, my point is not even that purpose theory is in
consistent with the concept of God (this may or may not follow from the account
of perfection suggested here) .25 Instead, my thesis is that the most plausible reason
for holding a God-centred theory of life's meaning is not consistent with the
traditional version of God-centred theory. God alone could be the source of
significance just insofar as He has some combination of the qualitative properties,
and it is difficult to conceive of a purposive agent which has no limits, is absolutely
simple, cannot change, and does not act in time. This argument does not threaten

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 311

God-centred theory as such. It instead suggests that, if one is sympathetic to God

centred theory, one should reject the version of it which has been central to
Western religious thinking about the meaning of life. Rather than hold purpose
theory, theologians should adopt the view that a meaningful life consists of, say,
worshipping God in this life, or merging with Him in an afterlife.

Conclusion: the end of purpose theory

I do not claim that the objection as it has been stated here requires disbelief
in purpose theory. However, it would seem that an adequate defence of purpose
theory must address it. I will conclude by noting the two aims which purpose
theorists might pursue in future work.
First, the purpose theorist could try to show that it is conceivable that a being
with some or all of the qualitative properties could be purposive. Aquinas is a
promising source of ideas needed to flesh out this strategy. For example, one could
contend that atemporal, simple, and immutable knowing is possible, that willing
and knowing are not distinct in God, and that having a purpose is part of the
concept of willing.26
Second, the purpose theorist could grant that purposiveness is indeed incom
patible with the qualitative properties, but seek to refute the idea that the latter are
the key to meaningfulness. For example, the purpose theorist might join forces
with the divine command theorist. If it were plausible to think that God alone
could ground morality and that morality is necessary for meaning, then we would
have an explanation of how God alone could ground meaning without appeal to
qualities such as atemporality and simplicity.
I am at this stage doubtful that either of these two goals is attainable. However,
that is something to establish elsewhere, if one is interested in doing so. I suggest
that it would also be reasonable, given the objection made here, to develop a God
centred alternative to purpose theory. Suppose God's having some combination
of the qualitative properties is part of the best explanation of what would enable
Him alone to confer significance on our lives. Exactly which qualitative properties
ground God-centred theory? Precisely how would we have to relate to a being with
the relevant qualitative properties in order for our lives to acquire significance?
These questions, too, are worth considering at this point.27

Notes
1. No arguments in this paper depend on this somewhat controversial characterization of the question of
life's meaning. I defend this characterization in 'The concept of a meaningful life', forthcoming as an
article and constituting the first chapter of a book manuscript in progress, Meaningful Lives and
Politics. The present essay forms the core of this monograph's second chapter.
2. Explicit adherents of purpose theory include Paul Althaus 'The meaning and purpose of history in the
Christian view', Universitas: A German Review of the Arts and Sciences, 7 (1965), 197-204; the
monotheistic essays in R. C. Chalmers and John Irving (eds) The Meaning of Life in Five Great Religions

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312 THADDEUS METZ

(Philadelphia PA: Westminster Press, 1965), chs 4-6; Delwin Brown 'Process philosophy and the
question of life's meaning', Religious Studies, 7 (1971), 13-29; Michael Levine 'What does death hav
do with the meaning of life?', Religious Studies, 23 (1987), 457-465; Lois Hope Walker 'Religion and
meaning of life and death', in Louis Pojman (ed.) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth (Belmont CA:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), ch. 16; Philip Quinn 'How Christianity secures life's meani
in Joseph Runzo and Nancy Martin (eds) The Meaning of Life in the World Religions (Oxford:
Oneworld Publications, 2000), ch. 3.
3. For this objection, see Kurt Baier 'The meaning of life', in E. D. Klemke (ed.) The Meaning of Life
York NY: Oxford University Press, 1981), 106-108; Norman Dahl 'Morality and the meaning of life:
first thoughts', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17 (1987), 11-12 n.; and Oswald Hanfling The Quest f
Meaning (New York NY: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1987), 50.
4. For explicitly this-worldly versions of purpose theory, see Brown, 'Process philosophy and the qu
of life's meaning', esp. 24-25; and Levine, 'What does death have to do with the meaning of life?'.
5. Baier 'The meaning of life', 106; and Joseph Ellin Morality and the Meaning of Life (Fort Worth TX:
Harcourt Brace, 1995), 322.
6. Baier incorrectly states that purpose theory implies the following: 'No human life, however pointless
may seem, is meaningless because in being part of God's plan, every life is assured of significance',
(Baier 'The meaning of life', 105; see also 106, 115).
7. A. J. Ayer tends to assume that we could not avoid realizing God's plan. See his 'The claims of
philosophy', in Maurice Natanson (ed.) Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York NY: Random
House, 1963), 475-477.
8. Jean-Paul Sartre Existentialism and Humanism Philip Mairet (tr.) (London: Methuen & Co, 1948), 4
9. For an instance of this argument, see Hanfling The Quest for Meaning, 45-46.
lo. Baier 'The meaning of life', 107; and Paul Kurtz 'The meaning of life' in The Fullness of Life (New
NY: Horizon Press, 1974), 86.
11. Baier 'The meaning of life', 104. For echoes of Baier, see W. D. Joske 'Philosophy and the meaning
life', in Klemke The Meaning of Life, 259; and Irving Singer Meaning in Life, vol. 1: The Creation of
Value (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 29.
12. For this response to Baier, see Levine 'What does death have to do with the meaning of life?', 461 n.
13. Brown makes this reply to Baier in 'Process philosophy and the question of life's meaning', 20.
14. Compare Singer's comment: 'If humanity, or life in general, was created to serve a purpose beyo
itself, our being would be analogous to that of a manufactured artifact', (Singer Meaning in Life, 29).
15. For discussions that prompted me to consider this objection, see Karl Britton Philosophy and the
Meaning of Life (New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 31, 34-35; and Hanfling The Que
for Meaning, 48.
16. Singer Meaning in Life, 31, 32. For the same point, see R. W. Hepburn 'Questions about the meani
life', in Klemke The Meaning of Life, 223.
17. See the selection in Klemke The Meaning of Life, 9-19.
i8. See, e.g., 'Training in Christianity', in Robert Bretall (ed.) A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1946), 414.
19. The main arguments are these: a life relating to God would be degrading and hence meaningless;
achieving our own subjective ends is alone what confers meaning. For suggestions of both claims,
Baier 'The meaning of life'.
20. For this view, see Tolstoy 'My confession'; Albert Camus The Myth of Sisyphus Justin O'Brien (tr.)
(New York NY: Knopf, 1955); and William Davis 'The meaning of life', Metaphilosophy, 18 (1987),
288-305.
21. Thomas Nagel, while not a supernaturalist, has expressed this in a compelling way. See his 'The
absurd', in Mortal Questions (New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 1979), ch. 2, and 'Birth, death,
and the meaning of life', in The View from Nowhere (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 1986),
ch. 1l.
22. Many of the following arguments can be found in Plotinus The Enneads; Anselm Monologion and
Proslogion; and Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles, and Summa Theologica.
23. For more discussion of human and animal meaning in the context of purpose theory, see Robert
Nozick 'Philosophy and the meaning of life', in Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981), 586-587; and Hanfling The Quest for Meaning, 48-49.

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 Purpose and the meaning of life 313

24. Making a very different argument, Nozick also answers the question of why realizing God's purpose
might be a source of meaning by appealing to God's being unlimited ('Philosophy and the meaning of
life', 593-609). At one point Nozick does not recognize the tension in claiming that God is unlimited
and that God has a purpose (606), though at another point Nozick notes that it would be difficult to
predicate anything of an unlimited being (608). For other recent statements of the tension between
God's personality and some of the qualitative properties, see Richard Gale On the Nature and Existence
of God (New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 2; and Richard Swinburne The Coherence
of Theism rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 12.
25. The argument I make in the text is that if God alone could be the source of meaning, this must be
because God would have the qualitative properties, perfections which are incompatible with
purposiveness. Darrel Moellendorf and Graeme McLean have wondered whether my argument could
be collapsed into the more common contention that God, qua perfect, by definition has the qualitative
properties and hence cannot be purposive. I do not think that my argument can be easily reduced to
this rationale, since God does not, merely qua perfect being, have all the perfections. To see this,
imagine a quite valuable being who created the universe but who is short of being Anselm's 'thing of
which none greater can be conceived'. Such an entity would sensibly be called 'God'. Hence, insofar
as the concept of God (or a common one) does not include having all the perfections, God does not
(or does not obviously) by definition have the qualitative properties.
26. For interesting work along these general lines, see Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump 'Eternity',
The Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1981), 429-458, and 'Absolute simplicity', Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985),
353-382; Katherin Rogers 'The traditional doctrine of divine simplicity', Religious Studies, 32 (1996),
165-186; and Don Lodzinski 'The eternal act', Religious Studies, 34 (1998), 325-352.
27. I wrote this essay while I was a Visiting Researcher at the University of the Witwatersrand in
Johannesburg, South Africa. I thank members of the Wits Philosophy Department for generously
providing a supportive environment and for actively participating in a colloquium based on this paper.
I would also like to acknowledge the written comments of an anonymous referee for Religious Studies.
Finally, I must express gratitude to the University of Missouri Research Board for the summer salary
and research award which gave me the freedom to write this paper.

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