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PHOTOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
IN LATIN AMERICA

Content coordination: John Mraz and Ana Maria Mauad

Fernando Aguayo, Magdalena Broquetas, Alberto del Castillo,

Cora Gamarnik, Ana Maria Mauad, John Mraz, Mariana Muaze,
Marcos Felipe de Brum Lopes
PHOTOGRAPHY AND HISTORY IN LATIN AMERICA
PHOTOGRAPHY AND HISTORY IN LATIN AMERICA

Content coordination: John Mraz and Ana Maria Mauad

Authors: Fernando Aguayo, Magdalena Broquetas, Alberto del Castillo, Cora Gamarnik,
Ana Maria Mauad, Mariana Muaze, John Mraz, Marcos Felipe de Brum Lopes
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction
John Mraz & Ana Mauad......................................................................... 9
1. Photohistories of the Mexican Revolution
John Mraz.............................................................................................. 19
2. The Mexican ‘catalogue’ of Gove and North, 1883-1885
Fernando Aguayo .................................................................................... 85
3. Photographic practices in modern Brazil: the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries
Ana Maria Mauad, Mariana Muaze, and Marcos Felipe de Brum Lopes ....109
4. From icons to documents: Photographs of the 1973
general strike in Uruguay
Magdalena Broquetas ........................................................................... 157
5. Between embrace and confrontation. A dialogue between two
iconic images at the end of the twentieth century in Latin America
Alberto del Castillo Troncoso .................................................................. 181
6. Photojournalism and The Malvinas War: A symbolic battle
Cora Gamarnik .................................................................................... 209

About the authors ............................................................................... 239

 6. PHOTOJOURNALISM AND THE MALVINAS WAR: A SYMBOLIC BATTLE
Cora Gamarnik

“The step just taken was decided without any political calculation”.
De facto President L. F. Galtieri’s broadcast to the nation, 3rd April 1982

This paper proposes a historical reconstruction of some of the photographs

taken on 2nd April 1982, the day Argentine troops disembarked on the
Malvinas Islands, at a time when the Argentine dictatorship was still con-
vinced of its victory and proclaimed it to the world. We also intend to ex-
amine how, from that day, history, politics, and photography –in particular
photojournalism– intersected within the context of a war of convenience
initiated by the military dictatorship then ruling in Argentina. Likewise, we
plan to analyse the key role played by some photographers’ actions and the
symbolic dimension of some of their photographs, not only regarding the
way that day’s events were (and still are) described, but also and above all,
regarding the way the events themselves unfolded. To do so, we try to re-
construct the context within which some of these pictures were taken, how,
by whom, and the ongoing situation at the time they were taken, as well as
the way they were circulated by the media.
Photojournalism during the Malvinas conflict –and the way the im-
ages were used later– was part of the symbolic battles fought in the war
between Argentina and Great Britain in 19821. What took place in the
1 In Argentina, the Malvinas do not represent just a territorial claim. They are one of the nation’s
symbols, condensing whole range of varied and conflicting meanings. While before the conflict,
they were the motive of an important international claim linked to a national and popular cause,
during the war they came to be regarded as the symbol of a supposed national unity, to end up

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Malvinas was in many regards a media dispute. The so-called theatre of war Before the War
in the islands was too far away from the neuralgic centres of Buenos Aires
and London, therefore the “war” could only gain visibility for the public In March 1982, the Argentine military dictatorship was going through a
through the media. These became in fact another battlefield, and photo- legitimacy crisis. Both national and international human rights organiza-
journalism was an integral part of that conflict. tions had managed to gain wider recognition for their claims regarding the
In Argentina, newspapers and magazines were the main axis of sup- thousands of detained/disappeared, and the economic crisis had under-
port for the “recovery” of the islands, and the role played by photography mined support for the rulers.4 In this context, a group of the Central Gen-
was functional to that narrative, and not just as mere illustration but as an eral de Trabajadores5 organized a demonstration demanding “Bread, Peace
agent (and main sales pitch, truth be said) of the events. The media had and Work”, which was supported both by most political parties and social
played a pivotal role supporting the military dictatorship during the coup and human rights organizations. On 30th March 1982, the most important
in 1976 and throughout the years that followed.2 popular demonstration ever against the dictatorship, took place. For the
In the early stages of what would eventually culminate in a war, there first time since the 1976 coup, hundreds of demonstrators openly chal-
was a dispute over the photographs that were allowed to circulate and the lenged the police, confronting them in the streets attempting to gain con-
way these were published, reproduced, titled, and analysed. With its enor- trol of the public space. The brutal police repression on that day was explicit
mous capacity to highlight, condense and symbolise events, it was clear and public.6 But the demonstrations were a clear sign that the atmosphere
that photojournalism might easily become the privileged instrument for
4 The third military junta came to power on 22nd December 1981, with L. Galtieri as representative
the construction of meaning and historical analysis. Photographs were also
of the army, J. Anaya of the navy and B. Lami Dozo of the air force. This junta started their admin-
a ‘memory vehicle’3 through which a vision of history could be produced. istration after a dictatorship of six years when the initial support given to the coup by some sectors
Therefore, we believe that the photographs taken and published by the press of the population had started to wear out and was giving way to signs of opposition and rejection.
during the Malvinas war in general, and on 2nd April 1982 in particular, 5 In 1982 the Central General de Trabajadores (CGT) was split up in two factions: one more in-
were an integral part of the symbolic battles that were fought then, and still clined to negotiate with and support the military dictatorship (the CGT-Azopardo) led by J. Triaca,
today, when it comes to reconstructing, recalling, or commemorating the and another that followed a more confrontational agenda (la CGT- Brasil) led by Saúl Ubaldini.
6 In Argentina, the “forced disappearance of persons” was the main repressive strategy imple-
armed conflict. mented by the military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983. The figure of the “disappeared”
implied the person’s forced segregation from social life and the total obliteration of his/her exis-
becoming, at the close of the conflict, the symbol of defeat and shame for some, while others saw tence. The “disappearance” of persons combined a certain degree of visibility (the kidnappings,
in them the painful step that had allowed the nation to recover democracy. (See Rosana Guber, the search raids and, in some cases, the dead bodies) with total secrecy regarding what happened
¿Por qué Malvinas? De la causa nacional a la guerra absurda. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura to the detainees once they were “sucked” into the clandestine extermination centres. This obeyed
Económica 2012; Federico Lorenz, Las guerras por Malvinas. Buenos Aires: EDHASA 2006). a specific policy addressed to spreading terror among the population (see Pilar Calveiro, Poder y
2 For a more comprehensive analysis of the history of photography during the coup in Argentina, desaparición. Los campos de concentración en Argentina. Buenos Aires, Ediciones Colihue 1998).
see: Cora Gamarnik, ‘Imágenes de la dictadura militar. La fotografía de prensa antes, durante y At the same time, to implement this plan, State terror needed to pursue strict disinformation,
después del golpe de Estado de 1976 en Argentina’, in Artículos de Investigación sobre Fotografía, censorship, and media manipulation policies, carried out through the powerful mechanisms of
Centro Municipal de Fotografía de Montevideo, Uruguay, 2011. Available at: http://www.re- the intelligence services under government control which were used to obliterate their crimes.
hime.com.ar/escritos/documentos/idexalfa/g/gamarnikc.php#articulos Until 1982, the press had only shown the photographs that the dictatorship and the collabora-
3 E. Jelin, in Los trabajos de la memoria (Buenos Aires: Siglo xxI Editores 2002), uses this con- tionist press allowed to be published. The Argentine armed forces had studied the experiences
cept of ‘memory vehicle’ to characterize books, archives and commemorative objects, as well as in Algeria and Chile. In Argentina, the open and indiscriminate repression unleashed by the
all kinds of expressions and performances, that, rather than represent the past, incorporate it military at the 11th September 1973 Chilean coup, and what took place soon afterwards, had
performatively. Seen from this point of view, photographs could be interpreted as symbolic tools been photographed by Chilean and foreign journalists. The most conspicuous among these were
used by different memories in conflict. David Burnett (USA), Chas Gerretsen (Netherlands) and Koen Wessing (Netherlands). Their

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 Cora Gamarnik P h o t o j o u r n a l i s m a n d T h e M a l v i n a s Wa r : A S y m b o l i c B a t t l e

of social fear brought about by systematic implementation of State Terror demonstration was issued, but a link between both events is certainly unde-
throughout those years was beginning to break down. Despite brutal re- niable. As Rosana Guber points out, ‘The news about the islands’ “recovery”
pression, photographers managed to take pictures giving the demonstration sufficed to reverse the prevailing political antagonism in Argentina’.7 Some
visibility; in fact, many of the best-known photos in Argentina taken during media reflecting the prevailing critical atmosphere against the dictatorship
the military dictatorship and used to illustrate the regime’s brutality were immediately made a volte-face and shifted from showing and condemning
shot on that occasion. There are memorable images of that demonstration repression to elatedly celebrating the landing in the islands. From 2nd April
in which the police are seen in the act of beating and arresting demonstra- on, Argentina became a stage on which, day after day, the ‘unity of the
tors and photojournalists. people and the government’ against ‘English colonialism’ was played. The
This gave rise to a seemingly paradoxical situation: at a time when photographs published by the entire press helped create the homogeneous
Argentine society was opening politically with stronger mass mobilizations, image of monolithic support for the Junta’s decision.
when the darkest hours of state terror had already passed, photojournalists
were being harassed as never before, but with an important difference: the
dictatorship’s repressive policy could no longer go unnoticed. While the The Malvinas: the landing and seizure of the islands
dictatorship had relied till then on media censorship and self-censorship,
this was beginning to prove insufficient. They now had to prevent not so Planning for ‘Operation Virgin del Rosario’ –the name given to the dicta-
much the publication of compromising photographs (for which they still torship’s plan to recover the islands– began in late 19818. The decision was
relied, in part, on self-censorship by the complicit press), but to prevent based on two mistaken (and seemingly contradictory) premises: the first
their production. was that Great Britain would not respond with the use of military force if
The 30th March 1982 demonstration represented a qualitative change Argentina took possession of the islands but would choose diplomatic ac-
in several interconnected aspects: the magnitude of the mass mobilization, tion instead and take the case to international forums. The second was that
the repression methods deployed by the regime’s security forces, and the vis- in the case of conflict, the USA would not support Great Britain.
ibility given to the repression, thanks to the photographers and cameramen At the same time, the decision to recover the islands was built around
who risked their safety to document the event. Three days after the demon- two issues that were not easy to connect: on the one hand, the Junta, now
stration, while thousands of protesters were still under arrest, the armed forces discredited by the economic crisis and reports denouncing human rights
landed in the Malvinas, much to the surprise of most Argentinians – except violations, needed to regain political initiative and social consensus; and,
for some people in the media who were informed of the operation. on the other, a firmly rooted popular feeling about the justice of Argentina’s
The landing was not a response to the 30th March demonstration, as claim to territorial sovereignty of the islands. The real motives of the inva-
is often incorrectly argued – because it could never have been prepared so sion, according to the views of many researchers, were the close relationship
quickly; in fact, the operation was already planned long before the call for a between the economic and institutional crisis the Junta was going through,
pictures quickly circulated abroad, and immediately aroused a wave of strong international con- 7 Guber, ¿Por qué Malvinas? 28.
demnation resulting in the early isolation of the dictatorship headed by A. Pinochet by the 8 For a historical account of the way the Argentine occupation of the islands was conceived and
international community of nations (Raymond Depardon et al., “Chili, September 1973” en prepared, see, among others, Oscar Cardoso et al., Malvinas, la trama secreta. Buenos Aires: Pla-
Chili, Special reporter-Objectif, Special Issue, París 1973; Koen Wessing, Fotografía. El arte de neta, 1992 [1983]; Horacio Verbitsky, Malvinas. La última batalla de la Tercera Guerra Mundial,
visibilizar la pregunta, Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones 2011; Gamarnik, ‘Imágenes de la dicta- Buenos Aires: Sudamericana 2006; Federico Lorenz, Las guerras por Malvinas. Buenos Aires:
dura militar…’.) In contrast, in Argentina, such photos only started to circulate six years into EDHASA 2006.
the dictatorship.

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 Cora Gamarnik P h o t o j o u r n a l i s m a n d T h e M a l v i n a s Wa r : A S y m b o l i c B a t t l e

and the idea of ‘finding a subject that would galvanize public opinion to distributed among several ships (a fact that would later prove important),
remove internal pressure’.9 though the largest contingent embarked on the tank landing ship ARA
The Junta had established three points for carrying out the invasion Cabo San Antonio. On 2nd April, at ten A.M., Argentine radio and television
plan: it would remain a top military secret (which later created many inter- stations broadcast the first communiqué from the Junta announcing that,
nal problems between the armed forces and the civilians who occupied key through the combined action of the three armed forces, the nation had ‘re-
positions in the ministries of economy and of foreign affairs); the Argentine covered’ the Malvinas islands.
troops had orders to carry out their mission in such a way that ‘Neither
British military nor local civilians should be killed during the entire Ar-
gentine military operation on its territory’10; and that the operation would The ‘fake’ Iwo Jima
be as short as possible. The original idea was to capture the islands, leave
a garrison of five hundred men there and continue negotiations through The photos taken by O. Zurlo during the landing on 2nd April 1982 were
diplomatic channels.11 not even good enough to be published by La Nueva Provincia. As a matter
The armed forces planned the landing then as a great symbolic act that of fact, the only front-page photo of the event published by this newspaper
would be followed by partial withdrawal of the troops and negotiations. In in its 3rd April issue is that of a soldier folding the Union Jack. In the other
order to tell this story to the world, they had basically planned to ‘fake’ a unpublished photos, the reporter can be seen standing next to the comman-
photograph to be accompanied by a report made by three pro-government dos and the Argentine flag flying outside various government offices in the
journalists who would be sailing with the Argentine Marines: two reporters islands. There are also pictures showing him in uniform at the newspaper
(José María Enzo Camarotti, a specialist in military issues for La Razón, and editors’ office, in Bahía Blanca again.
Salvador Fernández, for the Bahía Blanca La Nueva Provincia12) and a pho- The Joint Chiefs of Staff then distributed among local press agencies
tographer, Osvaldo Zurlo, also working for La Nueva Provincia, who usually and the media in general, another photograph of the Malvinas capture in
photographed naval exercises in Bahía Blanca. On 26th March, the troops which five soldiers were portrayed in the act of raising the Argentine flag
selected for the landing were mobilized. The landing forces were composed (figure 1). Several media immediately had serious doubts about the au-
of a total of 914 men, including the three journalists. These forces were thenticity of the photo, and it wasn’t difficult to prove that it was a fake: it
wasn’t a wirephoto, the technical system used at the time to send pictures
9 Cf. Lucrecia Escudero, Malvinas: el gran relato. Fuentes y rumores en la información de guerra. by telephone or wire. The photograph was distributed printed on photo-
Barcelona: Gedisa 1996, 113; Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands,
graphic paper to agencies and the press on that same 2nd April a few hours
New York: W. W. Norton 1983; Cardozo et al., ibid.; Verbitsky, ibid.
10 Argentine Army, Informe Oficial del Ejército Argentino Tomo II – Conflicto Malvinas, quoted after the landing. There was no way that photograph could have come from
in Malvinas: The Argentine perspective of the Falkland’s conflict, A Monograph by Leonardo Ar- the islands, especially since there had been no take-offs that day. Neverthe-
cadio Zarza. less, the following day several morning newspapers published the photo on
11 Cardoso et al., ibid. their front pages. The photograph had been staged on the grounds of the
12 Both newspapers La Razón and La Nueva Provincia were the most important supporters of Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA).13 The picture was a recreation
the Argentine dictatorship among the press. La Razón was under control of the army while La
Nueva Provincia, an ultra-right-wing paper, strictly followed navy directives, but also functioned 13 See ‘La foto trucha’, Clarín, 2 de abril de 1992, p. 3. ESMA (Navy Mechanical School) was
as the mouthpiece of G. Suárez Mason, Commander of the First Army Corps between 1976 and one of the clandestine detention centres during the Argentine military dictatorship, where almost
1980, and of ex Chief of Buenos Aires Police, R. Camps, both convicted for Dirty War crimes 5000 people were imprisoned, with only 150 surviving. On 31st December 2004, the ESMA was
(see, among others, Graciela Mochkofsky, Timerman. El periodista que quiso ser parte del poder transformed into ‘Espacio para la Memoria y la Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos Humanos’,
Latin America’s largest human-rights museum.
(1923-1999). Buenos Aires: Sudamericana 2004, 51-56 y 272).

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2nd April Photographs: The British surrender

The photographs of the Argentine landing in the Malvinas that known

worldwide with the scene of the British surrendering, were not those origi-
nally planned by the Argentine Armed Forces, but those taken at dawn on
2nd April 1982 by photographer Rafael Wollmann, a photojournalist who
in December 1981 had been fired from Gente y la actualidad magazine,
together with other three photographers, Eduardo Bottaro, Tito La Penna y
Silvio Zuccheri, due to budgets cuts. The four photographers then decided
to use the compensation money and their experience to set up an independ-
ent photographic agency, ILA (Imagen Latinoamericana), a completely un-
known undertaking at the time in Argentina. With the idea of working
for a wider market, they offered their services as correspondents in South
America to international agencies, establishing contact with Gamma,15 one
of the most important photography agencies in the world in those years,
with a wide international distribution network.
As Silvio Zuccheri put it:
We proposed a reportage on the Malvinas to Gamma in Decem-
ber 1981 and had made some preparations for it. They asked me
what the Malvinas were, and we had to explain that they were the
Falkland Islands. We offered to make a National Geographic-style
report (….) It was our first international coverage.16
1. Unknown photographer. Photograph taken at the ESMA clandestine detention centre, Buenos Aires, Rafael Wollmann points out that in December 1981, at their newly
Argentina. April 1 or 2, 1982. Author’s archive.
founded ILA agency they read in the papers that a new round of negotia-
tions on the Malvinas had just started in New York. Thus, with an eye on
of the famous picture by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal (a the international context, they offered Gamma a geographical report about
recreation in turn of a previous scene), taken in Iwo Jima, Japan, in 1945.14
15 Gamma agency was founded in Paris in 1966 by photographers Gilles Caron and Raymond
14 Rosenthal’s photograph, usually called ‘Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima’, shows five American Depardon. It was an independent agency playing a key role in the promotion and defense of
marines and a Navy Corpsman raising a U.S. flag on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima Island, during photojournalism. Together with Sigma and Sipa, two later agencies, Gamma helped make Paris
the Second World War. The photograph taken on 23rd February 1945 became a U.S. symbol, and a world capital for photojournalism in the 1970s, attracting some of the best photographers
won the Pulitzer Prize for Photography that same year. The image was actually a recreation: the the field has produced. (See Christian Caujolle, ‘Desventuras del fotoperiodismo’, Le Monde
marines raised a second flag, since the first one was too small for the photo. In 1954, it served as Diplomatique, Edición Cono Sur, 2002, Issue available at: http://www.insumisos.com/diplo/
a model for the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington, Virginia. For a more detailed NODE/3277.HTM#3278)
account see John Mraz, ‘What’s Documentary about Photography? From directed to digital 16 María Esperanza Sánchez, Tras un manto de neblinas. El circuito de las fotos de Malvinas y su
photojournalism’, on line ZoneZero magazine, 2002. lugar en los medios, tesis de licenciatura, Carrera de Ciencias de la Comunicación, Facultad de
Available at: http://www.zonezero.com/magazine/articles/mraz/mraz01en.html Ciencias Sociales, UBA, 2011.

216 217
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the islands and its people, to show what they were like. Gamma accepted the Malvinas war, while others see in it a provocation on the part of the
their proposal, and it was agreed that Wollmann, who speaks English well, Argentine Navy addressed to gain prominence over the Army in view of
would draft the report. Thanks to some contacts, they quickly managed to their imminent landing in Malvinas.19 On 25th April 1982, the British ar-
obtain the White Card, a document jointly issued by the British Embassy rived in the Georgias and easily recaptured the island. That same day it was
and the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs required to visit the islands. officially announced in London that the Argentine forces had surrendered
According to Zuccheri: to the British in Grytviken, capital of the island. A. Astiz –who in 1979 had
We knew nothing about the Malvinas and so we thought ‘if we sent M. Thatcher a personal wire to congratulate her for her victory in the
know nothing about them, the world must know even less’. This elections20– signed the unconditional surrender without fighting.
could be an interesting story about the most remote place on earth In the meantime, by 30th March, Wollmann had already finished his
where Britain has a colony.17 job for Gamma, but because of the rumours circulating, his partners in
With that end in sight, Wollmann traveled to the islands on 23rd March ILA asked him to remain a few more days in the Malvinas ‘just in case’.
1982. Once there, he interviewed the British governor, photographed the Wollmann decided to send his rolls of undeveloped film through a LADE
landscape, the inhabitants, the flora, and the fauna, and worked together (Líneas Aéreas del Estado) pilot, of the airline operating in the islands. The
with some British journalists who had traveled to the islands on occasion photographer relates:
of the conflict in the Georgia islands. This incident had been triggered by a I sent the rolls on 30th March 1982, but the material was inter-
commercial operation carried out by Argentine businessman Constantino cepted by the Argentine Air Force. It was then given back to the
Davidoff, who had bought scrap left over from abandoned whale facto- other ILA members, already developed. The Air Force had a colour
ries and facilities on the island. The businessman, together with a group of photographic laboratory equipped with all the latest technology.
scrap metal workers, traveled to the island for the scrapping works. On ar- The rolls of film were very well developed ... perfect. They gave us
rival they raised the Argentine flag, provoking formal diplomatic protest by back everything, the uncut rolls, nothing was missing.21
the British Embassy in Buenos Aires. The Argentine Navy then dispatched Zuccheri adds:
the ship ARA Bahía Paraíso to the area, with a group of naval commandos Wollmann sent the rolls of film he had shot on the LADE plane.
led by Captain Alfredo Astiz, allegedly with the mission of protecting the We are talking about films and slides. The pilot would take the
Argentine workers from any possible British aggression, and guaranteeing rolls with him, he had told us so by radiophone. We went to the
their ‘safety’.18 Many authors interpret this incident as an ‘accelerator’ of airport (...), the pilot didn’t turn up, and neither did the rolls. We
were desperate because that material was what made us Gamma
17 Sánchez, ibid. correspondents in Latin America then. So, we pulled the few strings
18 Astiz was a member of GT 3.3.2 (Task Force 3.3.2) based in the ESMA (Navy Mechanical
we had and finally contacted the Air Force. We were summoned to
School), where political prisoners were interrogated, tortured, and “transferred”, a euphemism
for murdered. Besides other human rights crimes for which he has been convicted, Astiz spe- the Air Force Headquarters and there, in a very informal talk with
cialized as an intelligence officer in infiltrating human rights groups (such as Madre de Plaza the head of intelligence (...), he asked us who we were, why we
de Mayo). Pretending to be a relative of one of the disappeared, he stayed with the group long
enough to identify key members and then organised their abduction by military forces. He was 19 See Marcos Novaro y Vicente Palermo, La dictadura militar, 1976-1983. Del golpe de Estado
responsible for numerous abductions, tortures, and disappearances, including those of a dozen a la restauración democrática, Buenos Aires: Paidós 2003; Andrea Belén Rodríguez, Guerreros sin
people in La Santa Cruz church in Buenos Aires, among whom were two founders of Madres de trincheras. Experiencias y construcciones identitarias de los integrantes del Apostadero Naval Malvinas
Plaza de Mayo. He also kidnapped two French Catholic nuns, Leonie Duquet and Alice Domon, en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2008, 12.
who after being tortured at ESMA were murdered. 20 Verbistky, Malvinas…, 154.
21 Rafael Wollman in interview with the author, 2012.

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were in the Malvinas on 1st April. (...) the rolls were there and were were taken on that day, some by the soldiers themselves, some by the Brit-
being developed. They knew what was happening and were aware ish journalists, and some by Zurlo. But none of them had the quality, the
that we were ‘nobodies’ who had no idea of what we were doing capacity to condense, and the impact of Wollmann’s photos. As Zuccheri
(…). Then he brought us the photographs, and I asked him for a pointed out: ‘Rafael’s ability as a photojournalist, compared with that of a
cassette with interviews and he said, ‘don’t worry’ and pulled out journalist that takes photos, is evident in the quality of his shots’.
some papers with a complete transcription of the interviews. (…) Wollmann comments:
That afternoon we received the rolls of film developed in the best On 1st April, I was having lamb for dinner at the Upland Goose Ho-
laboratory in South America we knew of (...) and that same even- tel, in Port Stanley. At eight P.M., the radio transmission was inter-
ing we took the rolls of film to the airport to be sent to Gamma in rupted, and the British governor Rex Hunt announced the Argen-
France. At the same time, we gave the same material to Siete Días tine invasion slowly and clearly, but sounding nervous. Everybody
magazine, who were very interested in publishing it. We now as- in the restaurant looked at me. The few Argentine residents in the
sume it was because the chief editor of the magazine had been in Malvinas were taken to the town hall but they respected the fact that I
the navy. Later, we realized that that man knew that something was was a photojournalist, and I was allowed to move around freely. Doing
about to happen (...) that’s why he was interested in publishing our my best to go as unnoticed as possible, I managed to photograph
photographic reportage...22 everything that was happening (…). Without meaning it, that night
I went from being a chronicler of events to war correspondent.24
Rex Hunt, the governor of the islands before the Argentine land-
The images of ‘humiliation’ ing, lodged Wollmann, along with the British journalists, at his chauffeur’s
house, next door to his own residence; he indicated that they should not
Rafael Wollmann, a photojournalist who had set up an independent agency walk in the streets, since the British marines had orders to shoot to kill. The
and had made a special deal with one of the most important international British resistance had concentrated around Hunt’s house.25
agencies in the world, happened to be in the Malvinas on 2nd April 1982 Wollmann took his first photograph from the window of the chauf-
thanks to a combination of chance, intuition and professionalism. He was feur’s house, at dawn. After verbal exchange, and weapons fired between
not the only photographer in the islands; several reporters and journalists British and Argentine soldiers, the British surrendered and started to turn
carrying cameras were there on 2nd April. Apart from Osvaldo Zurlo, the in their weapons next to the governor’s house. The Argentine commandos
photographer employed by the Armed Forces, there were some British jour- took the men to an open area as war prisoners. Wollmann went outside and
nalists, such as Simon Winchester of the Sunday Times, who, though he began to photograph the events, taking one or two pictures of each situation:
wasn’t a photographer, had a camera.23 Several soldiers and officers with the I took a picture of Büsser,26 approaching with the amphibian ve-
landing forces also had cameras with them. This meant that a lot of pictures hicles, of the British soldiers who had surrendered and were lying

22 Sánchez, Tras un manto de neblinas… 24 Graciela Speranza and Fernando Cittadini, Partes de guerra. Malvinas 1982. Buenos Aires:
23 The British journalists who were in the islands to cover the conflict in the Georgias were Edhasa 2005, 30. My emphasis.
Simon Winchester, The Sunday Times; Ken Clark, The Daily Telegraph; David Graver, The Sun, 25 At that moment there were eighty British marines in the islands. Normally, there were only
and a The Daily Mail reporter. Wollmann had established a good relationship with S. Winchester forty, but the garrison was in the process of changing over and the replacements had arrived a
(who was then arrested by Argentine militaries and was imprisoned for three months in Ushuaia few days earlier. The Argentine landing troops were composed of 914 men, including soldiers,
with no charges). On Winchester’s recommendation, The Sunday Times had even authorized non-commissioned officers, and officers.
Wollmann to take some photos for the paper, since the British journalist, although he had a 26 Rear Admiral Carlos Büsser, Commander of the Marines First Battalion, led the Argentine
camera with him, was not a photojournalist. forces in the landing operation.

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face-down on the road, I took the picture of the British soldiers The photographs that would soon become the symbol of British hu-
who had just surrendered being escorted by commando Jacinto Ba- miliation in the international press were two: in one of these, some British
tista with their hands up, when the Union Jack was being taken soldiers are seen walking with their hands up as they are escorted by Argen-
down; I photographed the soldier with the folded Union Jack, and tine commando Jacinto Batista. In the other, the British soldiers are pictured
the raising of the Argentine flag. Argentine vehicles wouldn’t take ‘face-down in the dust’, as The Sun commented, and surrounded by a group
me anywhere, so I had to walk kilometers all that day.27 of armed Argentine commandos. The careful composition of both photos
Wollmann was able work without interference the day of the invasion, can be seen in the way the photographer succeeds in freezing the precise mo-
thanks to the British governor’s permission, as well as that of the Argentine ment of action. In both, too, transcendent historical fact and excellent visual
military; he had won Hunt’s confidence, and the Argentine soldiers thought composition condensing the event, are perfectly fused (2 and 3).
that Wollman had come on one of the landing ships. The combination of These photographs are, following the famous theoretical construc-
those factors allowed Wollman to be at the precise place where events were tion invented by Cartier- Bresson in 195229, decisive moments. According
unfolding, and with total freedom to photograph whatever he chose, with- to Cartier-Bresson, in this kind of photos, the photographer has a certain
out being censured either by the British or the Argentines. technical control of the situation (where to place the camera in relationship
Abel Zadrayec, a journalist working for La Nueva Provincia, wrote: to the action, what lens to use, what framing, etc.), but not of the event
Inside Hunt’s house, five civilians remained: four British journalists itself. This is a dominant concept in photojournalism, according to which
and Argentine photographer Rafael Wollmann. Büsser told them photojournalists must capture the events as faithfully as possible and with
they could work freely and was asking them to avoid all kind of sen- the minimum possible degree of interference on their part. In these cases,
sationalism when he was interrupted by Captain Monnereau. “Sir, the role of photographers is as a ‘witness’ who mustn’t get involved directly
the prisoners have been made to lie face-down on the ground to be in the events they are trying to capture, nor alter them in any way. Their job
searched”. Büsser rushed out immediately: “I found the measure to- is to register what they see. Accepting this concept, Wollmann points out:
tally unnecessary, because they had already surrendered”. But before My safe passage was principally the fact that I spoke Spanish and al-
the British soldiers were made to stand up, Wollmann captured the lowing them to believe that there had to be a reason for my being there.
scene with his camera. And that was one of the most published pho- Whether I’d been on their ship, come on a next one, or flown out on a
tos in the world, one of the photos that caused British fury. “And a Hercules… and I did my best to go unnoticed. I didn’t let myself get greedy.
photograph that did a lot of harm, because it gave a wrong image of I have two shots of the British lying face-down, not twenty. Since they were
what had really happened”, Büsser commented. However, he didn’t all busy, they all had a task… Imagine, the British were surrendering with
realize this at the time, saying to Wollmann, “By being here, you’ve their hands up! They weren’t going to ask me, Who are you? And if someone
won the lottery”. The photographer smiled, as did Büsser, who said, looked at me twice, I moved away.30
“Please be very careful how you use the material”.28 In their testimonies, the photographers told us about the way photo-
Wollmann doesn’t remember the verbal exchanges which Zadrayec journalism was practiced in those days: the subject selection, the photog-
novelizes, but they are very revealing, if not of what actually happened, at rapher’s relationship with the media, agencies and political power, the pos-
least of Büsser’s version of the facts today. sibilities that analogical photography then offered, and the part that chance
27 Rafael Wollman in interview with the author, 2012. 29 Henri Cartier Bresson, ‘El instante decisivo’, 1952, in Joan Fontcuberta (comp.), Estética
28 Abel Escudero Zadrayec, Malvinas: el desembarco de una primicia, Suplemento especial, La fotográfica, Barcelona, Gustavo Gilli 2003.
Nueva Provincia, Bahía Blanca 2007, 17. 30 Rafael Wollmann in interview with the author, 2012.

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played in their work. Wollman also told us how he captured the images, the
technical aspects that influenced his decisions, and reversals of fortune. He
mentioned details on how he moved on the ground, the route followed by
the rolls once the photos had been taken, the risks he ran and how he profited
from the circumstances.31 All this proves that the photographers’ privileged
outlook turns them into invaluable voices due to the spaces they occupy. At
the same time, even if the photographers’ testimonies are crucial, the author’s
intention, viewpoint and later analysis aren’t the only explanation for the im-
ages. In fact, one of the greatest appeals of photography for social history is
its capacity to retain –maybe more than any other form of representation– a
certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the photographer’s subjectivity. There
are even cases in which a photograph is used in a way contrary to the pho-
tographer’s own interest. In this case, both ILA photographers interviewed
analyzed the impact of the images and their consequences.32
The indexical character of photography gave these images their pro-
batory value. What these images showed had unquestionably happened.
2. Photographer: Rafael Wollmann. British soldiers escorted by Argentine commando Jacinto Batista. These photos were proof of the British surrender, but they had some ad-
Malvinas Islands, April 2, 1982. ditional meanings attached to them. The British appeared at the feet of the
Argentines. A colonial remnant at ‘end of the world’ had freed itself. Now, a
photograph is by definition just a fragment of a time continuum, a fraction
detached from a complete sequence of events. These photographs, origi-
nating from an essentially ephemeral function were to eventually acquire
long-lasting effect. As Joly argues: ‘Most press photographs are completely
paradoxical: anchored in reality, “pulled out of the present”, they reach the
31 The fact that we basically rely on the testimony of the photographers themselves, an irre-
placeable testimony no doubt, when defining and analyzing these photographs, also reflects the
scarcity of other theoretical works on the subject.
32 Wollmann pointed out in interview with the author: ‘There is a lot of myth about my photos.
What weighed on Galtieri’s decision was the crowd that filled the Plaza de Mayo, not my photos.
I know because I talked to some British people who had seen my photos and they cried. Ordi-
nary, common, people. They saw the photos and cried. Those who had surrendered were marines.
And they had surrendered in our Malvinas. But to think that Thatcher sent the fleet because of
the photos, no way. She sent the fleet because Galtieri sent over nine or ten thousand soldiers
after the crowd filled the Plaza de Mayo’. Silvio Zuccheri on the other hand points out: “I believe
that the story about Margaret Thatcher getting furious at the sight of the photos must be true.
The picture of your subjects lying face-down on the ground because of a drunken dictator must
3. Photographer: Rafael Wollmann. British soldiers surrounded by a group of armed Argentine com- be really shocking, don’t you think?” (Sánchez, Tras un manto de neblinas…).
mandos. Malvinas Islands, April 2, 1982.

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The photographer captured two frames of the British soldiers lying

face-down. In the first one, most of them can be seen still lying on the road,
whereas in the second, several of the soldiers appear already in the act of
standing up (figure 4). This second frame, which shows that the British
were made to lie down for only a very brief space of time, never circulated.
Through the photo, the ten minutes during which the British remained
‘face-down in the dust’ in the Malvinas were frozen for history. But this
photo contradicts the war’s outcome. It was a single instant detached from a
long sequence of events that would culminate in Argentina’s defeat.

The route of the photographs

On 3rd April, the Argentine dictatorship sent a plane to the Malvinas carry-
ing 40 journalists and photographers from all the media to cover the ‘recov-
ery’ of the islands. They were allowed to stay for four hours on the islands
and photograph whatever they liked with no restrictions. When the time
to go back came, Wollmann boarded that same plain and returned to the
4. Photographer: Rafael Wollmann. The British were made to lie face-down for only a few minu-
tes. This photo never circulated in the press. Malvinas Islands, April 2, 1982. continent. Many of his colleagues were flying with him, among these his
ex-boss at Atlántida, Eduardo Forte, and his ILA partner, Silvio Zuccheri.
Wollmann comments: ‘I gave the original rolls to Forte, who was there on
public with such force and last so long in the collective memory that they the plane. I cut some new rolls to look as if they had been used in case they
generate interpretations that exceed the event itself ’.33 confiscated them, but when we finally arrived at Comodoro Rivadavia,35
At the same time, photographs in general, and those taken by the nobody searched us’.36
press in particular, have an advantage as compared to other languages: they Then ILA started dealings with Gamma and Editorial Atlántida for
are both ‘traces of the real’ and offer the possibility of a metaphorical di- the sale of the photographs. The Argentine publisher not only offered to
mension. Herein lies the typical duplicity of photography. In photography buy the material, but to make available a plane that would take them from
there is always an implicit possibility for fiction, simulation, and realistic Comodoro Rivadavia to Buenos Aires, as well as to open the color and black
illusion.34 The fact that these images show only a thin slice of reality partially and white labs to immediately process of the photos. Given the distance
explains why the photographs of the surrender are part of this last possibil- from the capital, and the technology then available for sending images,
ity. While what these photographs show did really happen, the historical these were indispensable requirements. This would also allow ILA members
events didn’t develop as these images suggested. to have the photographs developed in a short lapse of time. Atlántida of-
fered to give Gamma agency the originals, make copies and duplicates of
33 Martine Joly, La fotografía fija, Buenos Aires: La Marca editora, Biblioteca de la Mirada
2009, 169. 35 Comodoro Rivadavia is a city in Chubut, a province 1750 kilometers away from Buenos Aires.
34 Lorenzo Vilches, Teoría de la imagen periodística, Barcelona: Paidós Comunicación 1997, 20. 36 Rafael Wollmann, in interview with the author, 2012.

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5. (left) Daily Mail front page. 5 April 1982. Rafael Wollmann collection. 7. (left) L’ Espresso front page.Year XXVIII. 8 April 1982. Rafael Wollmann collection.

6. (right) The Sun front page. 5 April 1982. Rafael Wollmann collection. 8. (right) VSD front page. No. 240. 8 April 1982. Rafael Wollmann collection.

the photos and keep the copies. ILA accepted the offer and Atlántida paid During the first half of April, the photos appeared on the front page of
$18.500 (US dollars), the equivalent of two apartments in Buenos Aires many international newspapers. The images showed the strongest colonial
at the time, plus the expenses for the plane and lab. Gamma, on the other power of the 19th century in the act of surrender in a distant and unknown
hand, had sent François Lochon, a renowned French photojournalist, to ne- group of islands in the South Atlantic. The British marines, portrayed face-
gotiate the purchase of the photographs. Gamma had financed a geographic down on the ground or with their hands up, had been defeated by a cluster
reportage and would now be getting unpublished images of British marines of soldiers from a remote Latin American country. Those photos were, no
in the act of surrendering to a Latin American country in one of their colo- doubt, irresistible.
nies where an imminent war could break out any minute.37 Lochon man- The headline chosen by The Daily Mail for its 5th April issue read
aged to leave Argentina on 4th April at 3 P.M., taking the photographs of ‘Surrender’, accompanied by the photograph of the British soldiers lying
the British surrender. face-down. The same photo appeared in The Sun under the subheading ‘A
moment of humiliating defeat for our marines’ and The Daily Telegraph had
37 Wollmann comments: “When I came back from the Malvinas, there were journalists from a headline that read, ‘Humiliation’. L’Illustré (France) published the same
all the international agencies in Comodoro Rivadavia, and they offered me more money than photo under the headline ‘God save the Falklands’ riffing on ‘God save the
Gamma. There were people from Sigma who offered us more money than Gamma, they of-
fered me $ 50.000 (US dollars). But we decided to give the material to Gamma all the same”.
Queen’. The photos also appeared in Stern (Germany) under the headline:
(R. Wollmann in interview with the author, 2012). ‘Krieg am Ende der Welt’ (War at the End of the World), and L’Espresso (Italy):

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In Argentina, exclusive rights for publishing the photos had been ac-
quired by Gente magazine. Its issue of 8th April 1982 came out with the
headline: ‘We saw the English surrender’; below it stated: ‘The Landing.
The Resistance. The Fire Exchange. The Victory’. ‘2nd April, day of the re-
covery of the Malvinas, we were the only medium there. You will only see
these exclusive photos in Gente’.39 The photographer who had been fired
from the magazine only three months before was now presented as its star
correspondent (figure 9).

Questions, uses and appropriations

The global impact of the events which took place in the islands was ampli-
fied and accompanied by the photographs taken at the precise moment the
actions were occurring. Hence, it may be asked if the photos in any way
influenced the course of events and, if so, to what extent and how. Our
contention is that the photographs were not innocuous, that both Britain’s
symbolical and material response to the Argentine landing considered the
meaning of those images and the need to quickly neutralize them. Certain-
ly, the war was the consequence of deep political and historical causes that
affected both contending nations, but the exceptional character of these
photos, taken early in the conflict, acted as a catalyst for different uses, ap-
propriations, and interpretations.
9. Gente y la actualidad front page. Year 17 No. 872. 8 April 1982. Author’s collection. As Eric Hobsbawn pointed out in an article written in January 1983,
soon after the Argentine landing in the islands, a general sense of disbelief
under the headline ‘Mani in alto, Inghilterra!’ chose the image that showed and humiliation prevailed among the English population:
the soldiers as they walked with their hands up, as did VSD (France) under ... So the gut reaction that a lot of people felt at the news that Ar-
the headline: ‘L’Anglaterre humiliée’, adding in the lead: ‘Dans les Malvines, gentina had simply invaded and occupied a bit of British territory
îles du bout du monde’ and in the subheading: ‘Les photos qui ont echappé a could have been put into the following words: ‘(…) But now it’s got
la censure des Argentins’ (figures 5, 6, 7, 8).38 to the point where some bunch of foreigners think they can simply

38 The importance of these photos can also be seen in their inclusion in two important world 39 The magazine announced on its cover that it was the only media present in the islands. The is-
photography compilations. Marie-Monique Robin included the photo of the British marines sue also included a six-page article titled ‘The only journalist who was there speaks of the landing’,
with their hands up under the title ‘L’ Humillation’, to represent the year 1982, in her book which is an account of Wollman’s in the first person, the same photographer who three months
Les 100 photos de siècle. Anne Tucker selected the same photograph for the exhibition and book before had been fired from the magazine. With total disregard for the flagrant contradiction,
‘WAR/PHOTOGRAPHY: Images of Armed Conflict and Its Aftermath’, held at the Museum on pages 86 and 87, there is another article titled: ‘This is how two journalists experienced the
of Fine Arts Houston, in 2012. landing’, in reference to Nueva Provincia journalists O. Zurlo and S. Fernández. My emphasis.

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march some troops onto British territory, occupy it and take it over, univocal meanings and had different and even contradictory impacts, uses,
and they think the British are so far gone that nobody’s going to appropriations, and interpretations, according to the different actors and
do anything about it, nothing’s going to be done. Well, this is the interests at stake.
straw that breaks the camel’s back, something’s got to be done. By For the British (both the people and the government) they were no
God, we’ll have to show them that we’re not really just there to be doubt embarrassing photos given their symbolic dimension. In this sense,
walked over.40 the emphasis given by magazine covers and newspapers on the humiliation
Hobsbawm added that that popular feeling was caught and turned in inflicted on the British by showing images that ‘proved’ and ‘demonstrated’
a nationalist right wing “semi-fascist” direction by Thatcher’s government.41 what had happened in the islands and the treatment given to their soldiers,
In the context of ‘Britain’s loss of Empire and general decline’ (a process that contributed to providing those who advocated for a direct action with more
had started with the end of Second World War), the British popular reac- convincing arguments, and prevented any possible peaceful negotiation
tion to a feeling of national humiliation prompted the actions of the most with Argentina. It wouldn’t be wrong then to say that the photos were used
conservative groups of Thatcher’s government.42 According to Hobsbawm: ‘to fuel the fire’. They somehow incited among the British the feeling that
‘…there’s no question that this was a reaction to the decline of the British these images had to be undone. Most of the tabloid press and the hard-liner
Empire’.43 This coincided with a military junta in Argentina led by a sector conservative members of Thatcher’s government used them as proof that
of the armed forces regarded as the “hard-liners” within the regime itself war was inevitable. The outrage the British had suffered at the hands of the
who also gave clear proofs of political and military ineptitude. Argentine armed forces, which the photos had contributed to spread all over
In this context, the appearance of these photographs in the media rep- the world made the settlement of the conflict via negotiations impracticable;
resents what Didí Huberman calls a ‘visual event’.44 The widespread reper- the British needed an overwhelming victory. As pointed out by Hobsbawn
cussion of these photos demonstrates the force and impact that press photos himself: ‘That is why the war was provoked by the British side whatever the
can have under certain circumstances. But they can only be understood in Argentine attitude’.45 The British had to prove that Britain was still great,
all their complexity if they are analyzed as part and product of the histori- if only symbolically. A victorious war would serve this purpose, and Great
cal, political (and even fortuitous) processes that made them possible. As Britain would have a chance to show the power of her arms industry, her
both powerful and ambiguous objects, the photographs resisted all kind of political determination, and her military supremacy. The Falkland Islands
played a crucial role in Britain’s domestic politics because of the govern-
40 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Falklands Fallout’ in Marxism Today, pp. 13-19. January 1983. Available at: ment’s decision to recreate an old empire.
http://www.amielandmelburn.org.uk/collections/mt/pdf/83_01_13.pdf
41 Thatcher stated: “When we started out there were the waverers and the faint-hearts, the people
We now know that, in terms of global politics, the war was absurd,
who thought we could no longer do the great things we once did, those who believed our decline unnecessary, and could have been avoided. The number of Argentine sol-
was irreversible, that we could never again be what we were, that Britain was no longer the nation diers killed in the war that ended with Britain’s victory was 746 and over a
that had built an empire and ruled a quarter of the world. Well, they were wrong” (Ibid., 15). thousand were wounded. According to official British estimates, 255 British
42 Hobsbawm pointed out: ‘Now this upsurge of feeling had nothing to do with the Falklands as soldiers were killed and 777 wounded. Besides, and although there are no of-
such. We have seen that the Falklands were simple a far-away territory swathed in mists off Cape
ficial figures, it is estimated that the toll of suicides among former Argentine
Horn, about which we knew nothing and cared less. It has everything to do with the history of
this country since 1945 and the visible acceleration of the crisis of British capitalism since the late combatants is even higher than the number of those killed in the conflict.
1960s and in particular the slump of the late 70s and early 80s’ (Ibid., 14). In Argentina it is possible to observe different and even opposed uses
43 Ibid. and readings of these images. For the armed forces commanding the land-
44 Georges Didí-Huberman, Imágenes pese a todo. Memoria visual del Holocausto. Barcelona:
Paidós, 2004, 65. 45 Hobsbawm, ‘Falklands Fallout’, 15.

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ing, they were unplanned photographs that somehow escaped their control. popular support for the war and created a false notion of military superior-
That was not what they had originally planned. Their intention (at least as ity for Argentina.
confessed explicitly by the ruling military junta) was not to humiliate the For the Gamma agency, the agreement with ILA turned out to be a
British, but to carry out a bloodless occupation so as to generate a symbolic real surprise leading to its tremendous success. Scarcely a few hours after
act with the purpose of creating a dramatic effect, and then to sit at a table the beginning of the conflict, the agency’s photos were being published on
for negotiations. But the action itself, the images and their circulation es- the front pages of the most important international papers, thus gaining
caped their control.46 Wollman’s photos, consequently, didn’t contribute to considerable advantage over its competitors Sipa and Sigma for the dura-
this goal as subsequent events clearly proved. tion of the war.
For the most nationalist elements in the Argentine armed forces,47 Lastly, for the photographer and ILA agency, the photos marked a
those who had made the British soldiers lie ‘face-down in the dust’ –and turning point in their careers. By pure chance, but also thanks to Wollmann’s
for the sector of the Argentine population easily stirred by the nationalist and his partners’ professionalism, the photojournalist had the unique op-
speeches– to see the British thus subdued by the Argentine forces was un- portunity to witness a historical event which he photographed with impec-
doubtedly a dream come true and a cause of national pride. Even today it’s cable technical quality and of a high symbolic value that would circulate
easy to hear the testimony of military figures who declare being filled with around the globe and generate a great impact on all the actors involved.
pride by those photos. One of the determining virtues of photography is its capacity for per-
For Gente magazine those photos meant an uncontestable ‘journalistic sisting in time by somehow managing to capture the fleeting impermanence
success’. They lifted the magazine to first place in sales, a position it kept for of the event. Some images can also be invested with special qualities that
the duration of the conflict.48 This also meant that the magazine became one transform them into a synthesis of the events condensing the main elements
of the main media supporters for the ‘recovery’ of the islands. That first is- that composed them. The photos analyzed surpassed the events, and the
sue in particular served also as a kick-off for a media campaign addressed to events in turn surpassed the photos. Even today, as we look at those photos,
persuade a population ready and willing to be persuaded, in any case, of the the British are surrendering. The war was lost, the photos remain.
likelihood of an Argentine victory. This, in turn, contributed to promoting To exaggerate the importance they had in the course taken by the
events would simply mean to underrate the value of politics and history as
46 In fact, what escaped the planned scenario was the circumstance that the Argentine comman-
dos made the British soldiers lie face-down. The photo –with all the contingencies that made it
parameters of analysis. To ignore them amounts to overlooking the particu-
possible– was consequence of this circumstance. lar role these photos played in the Malvinas War. Peter Burke points out
47 This was an army sector that responded to lieutenant-colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín, one of that images are to a certain extent historical agents, since they not only are
the commanders of the landing operation. Years later, Seineldín participated in two failed upris- not only keepers of the memory of events, but ‘affect the way in which those
ings against the democratically elected governments of both President Raúl Alfonsin in 1988 events were seen at the time’.49 Accordingly, we believe that the photographs
and President Carlos Menem in 1990. He was sentenced to life in prison for his role in the 1990 that we have analyzed were not only a testimony, or a source of information,
mutiny but was pardoned in 2003 by President E. Duhalde. He died in 2009.
48 Gente magazine sales figures rose from 183.808 issues in March to 301.808 in April and
but also were an active part in the symbolic dispute about how to narrate
411.569 in May, its highest ever. In June, the magazine sold 408.672 issues. Number two in sales the events. They were in themselves agents of history.
was La Semana that rose from 78.343 sold issues in March to 97.068 in April, 90.815 in May
and 88.702 in June. The newspaper with the highest sales record was Clarín: in March the paper
sold 504.786 issues, in April 582.115, in May 611.885, and in June 558.573. The sales numbers
of all the print media experienced a considerable fall in July and August. Source: Instituto Veri- 49 Peter Burke, Lo visto y no visto. El uso de la imagen como documento histórico. Barcelona:
ficador de Circulación (IVC). Crítica 2000.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Alberto Del Castillo Troncoso is a Professor at the Dr. José María Luis
Mora Research Institute, CONACYT. A specialist in the social and cultural
history of Mexico in the 20th century, over the past 20 years his work has
generated critical reflection on the use of photographic documentation in
historical research. In 2022 he received the National Award from the Na-
tional Institute for Historical Studies of Revolutions in Mexico in recogni-
tion of his career as a historian. His book Las mujeres de X’oyep, which won
the Conaculta National Award for the best essay on photography in 2013,
has been published in 2023 in the following languages: Tzotzil (Instituto
Mora / Centro de Estudios Sobre México y Centroamérica); Italian (Uni-
versity of Milan); Portuguese (FGV), and French (Universidad Toulouse Le
Mirail). Recent works include: La matanza del jueves de Corpus. Fotografía y
memoria, INEHRM, Mexico, 2021; Marco Antonio Cruz: la construcción de
una mirada, Instituto Mora/Conaculta, Mexico, 2020; Fotografía y Memo-
ria. Conversaciones con Eduardo Longoni, FCE, Buenos Aires, 2017; Ensayo
sobre el movimiento estudiantil de 1968. La construcción de un imaginario,
Instituto Mora / IISUE, UNAM, Mexico, 2012; Rodrigo Moya. Una mirada
documental, La Jornada / El Milagro / Instituto de Investigaciones Históri-
cas. UNAM, Mexico, 2011.

Ana Maria Mauad holds a PhD in History and is a Full Professor in the
History Department at Universidade Federal Fluminense. Since 1996 she
has been a researcher with the Brazilian Council of Research, and in 2013
she became a researcher with the Council of Research of the State of Rio de

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