TORTS MIDTERMS - SEPT.

7, 2025 COVERAGE

Topics:

NCC ART. 19, 20, 21, 22, 26 and 2176 to 2194

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his

duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to

another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

ARTICLE 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.

ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of

his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a

criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; dumrrI

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place

of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no

pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by

the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

ARTICLE 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But

the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)

ARTICLE 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)

ARTICLE 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause

of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the

immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff

may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own

acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages

caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under

their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages

caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on

the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers

acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any

business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the

damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case

what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused

by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove

that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

ARTICLE 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may

recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

ARTICLE 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the

minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where

a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

ARTICLE 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is

responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This

responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the

fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)

ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the

former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the

misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two

months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)

ARTICLE 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a

motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic

regulation. (n)

ARTICLE 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a

bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third

persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public official.

(n)

ARTICLE 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar

goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,

although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)

ARTICLE 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if

the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as

firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation

or business. (n)

ARTICLE 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death

of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,

bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)
ARTICLE 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages

resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

(1907)

ARTICLE 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the

inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;

(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed

without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

ARTICLE 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any

defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may

proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article,

within the period therein fixed. (1909a)

ARTICLE 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for

damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)

ARTICLE 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is

solidary. (n)

Definition of –
Negligence The omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. (Article 1173 Civil
Code)

Gross Negligence - Negligence where there is “want of even slight care and diligence.”

PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE GENERAL RULE: If the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving such negligence. (Taylor vs. MERALCO 16Phil8) The quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence. (Rule 133 Revised Rules of Court) ​
​
EXCEPTIONS: Exceptional cases when the rules or the law provides for cases when
negligence is presumed. A. Presumptions of Negligence B. Res Ipsa Loquitur

Public policy - Public policy refers to the set of principles, laws, regulations, actions, and
decisions adopted and implemented by the government (national or local) to address issues
and promote the welfare of society. It is essentially the government’s response to public
problems.

In law, public policy is the legal principle that no person can lawfully do something that
tends to harm the public good, public morals, safety, health, or welfare—even if it is not
expressly prohibited by law. Courts sometimes strike down contracts, agreements, or acts if
they are found to be “against public policy.”​
​
Test for Negligence

1. Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not then he is guilty of
negligence.

2. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against harm.

Diff. cases –

QUASI-DELICT V. BREACH OF CONTRACT

1. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
A Filipino passenger holding a confirmed first-class ticket was forcibly moved to tourist class by
Air France, citing racial bias, leading to a court ruling awarding damages for breach of contract
and bad faith.

Facts:

In Air France vs. Carrascoso (G.R. No. L-21438, decision dated September 28, 1966 under the
1935 Constitution), petitioner Air France, through its agent Philippine Air Lines, issued
respondent Rafael Carrascoso a confirmed first class round-trip ticket from Manila to Rome via
Bangkok and other intermediate points. Carrascoso, a civil engineer, traveled first-class from
Manila to Bangkok, where the airline’s Bangkok manager insisted that he vacate his seat in favor
of a white passenger, despite his confirmed reservation. A commotion ensued, and Carrascoso,
though reluctant, was forcibly moved to tourist class. He completed his trip on another carrier to
avoid further embarrassment. In the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 38810),
the trial court found a breach of contract in bad faith and awarded Carrascoso ₱25,000 moral
damages, ₱10,000 exemplary damages, ₱393.20 as fare difference (later reduced to ₱383.10 by
the Court of Appeals), ₱3,000 attorneys’ fees, interest from complaint filing, and costs. The
Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 26522-R) affirmed the lower court’s judgment “in all other
respects,” only adjusting the fare refund. Petitioner sought certiorari review before the Supreme
Court, alleging incomplete findings of fact and misapplication of law, and challenging the
awards of moral and exemplary damages.

Issues:

●​ Did Carrascoso hold a confirmed first-class reservation entitling him to a first-class seat
on the Bangkok-Rome segment?
●​ Is the Court of Appeals decision void for lack of complete findings of fact on issues
raised?
●​ Were the awards of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys’ fees proper in the
absence of explicit findings of bad faith?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court unanimously held that (1) Carrascoso’s first class ticket, confirmed in
writing and paid for, entitled him to a first-class seat, which petitioner could not disregard merely
by citing seat-availability contingencies; (2) the Court of Appeals decision complied with
constitutional and statutory mandates by stating the essential ultimate facts supporting its
conclusions, and its findings on material issues are conclusive; and (3) the forcible ejection of
Carrascoso without justification constituted a breach of contract in bad faith, justifying the
awards of moral damages (₱25,000), exemplary damages (₱10,000), attorneys’ fees (₱3,000),
interest, and costs. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Ratio:

The Court reasoned that a written, paid and issued first class ticket creates a binding agreement
that cannot be nullified by unsubstantiated oral arrangements. It rejected petitioner’s argument
that ticket issuance was conditional on seat availability, noting that reputable carriers would
honor paid tickets and that oral evidence cannot override written proof of confirmed reservations.
On appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be raised, and findings of fact by the Court of
Appeals are final if they present the “essential ultimate facts.” The trial and appellate courts
found that the manager acted with bad faith in forcing Carrascoso from his seat, as corroborated
by eyewitness testimony and the purser’s res gestae entry, entitling the respondent to moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees under the Civil Code.

Doctrine:

Under the 1935 Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 12) and Rules of Court, a court of record must
clearly state the essential ultimate facts and legal basis of its judgment, but is not obliged to
recite every detail of evidence. A carrier’s issuance of a confirmed ticket constitutes a contractual
obligation to provide the agreed-upon accommodation; breach in bad faith (i.e., with furtive
design or ill will) gives rise to moral damages (Art. 21, Civil Code), exemplary damages (Art.
2232), and attorneys’ fees (Art. 2208). Statements made during the res gestae are admissible
despite best‐evidence objections. An appellate court’s findings of fact are conclusive in certiorari
and not subject to review on factual grounds.

QUASI-DELICT V. DELICTS
2. Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942)

Employer Barredo held primarily liable for employee Fontanilla’s negligence in a fatal collision,
under Civil Code Article 1903, independent of criminal case.

Facts:

At around 1:30 AM on May 3, 1936, along the road between Malabon and Navotas, Rizal
Province, a head-on collision occurred between a taxi owned by petitioner Fausto Barredo and
driven by his employee Pedro Fontanilla, and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis.
Sixteen-year-old Faustino Garcia, a passenger in the carretela, sustained severe injuries and died
two days later. Fontanilla was criminally prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
homicide by simple negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
one year and one day to two years in prisión correccional, reserving the civil action. His
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On March 7, 1939, the victim’s parents,
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, filed a separate civil action in the Court of First Instance
of Manila against Barredo as Fontanilla’s employer. On July 8, 1939, that court awarded ₱2,000
in damages with legal interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed liability but reduced the award to
₱1,000. It found Barredo negligent in hiring Fontanilla, who had prior speeding violations, and
held him directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Barredo then elevated the case to
the Supreme Court.

Issues:

●​ May the parents of Faustino Garcia maintain a separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo under Article 1903 of the Civil Code for damages caused by his servant’s
negligent act?
●​ Is Barredo’s liability for Fontanilla’s criminal negligence primary and direct under the
Civil Code, or merely subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that the action against Barredo is a
valid separate civil remedy for a quasi-delict, governed by Articles 1902–1910 of the Civil Code,
and that his liability is primary and direct under Article 1903. The argument that his
responsibility is only subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code was rejected.

Ratio:

The Court distinguished between (a) civil obligations arising from crimes, governed by the
Revised Penal Code (Articles 100–103) and (b) obligations for fault or negligence not punishable
by law, i.e., quasi-delicts under the Civil Code (Articles 1089, 1092–1093, 1902–1910). It
emphasized that a single wrongful act may give rise to two independent remedies: a civil liability
arising from a criminal conviction and a separate civil action for a quasi-delict. Article 1903
plainly imposes on employers a direct obligation for their employees’ torts in the course of
employment, subject only to proof that they exercised “all the diligence of a good father of a
family.” Barredo failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in hiring Fontanilla, who had
known traffic violations recorded in public bureau files. Jurisprudence from Spain and previous
Philippine decisions confirmed that the employer’s recourse against the servant does not
diminish his own primary liability in a civil quasi-delict action.

Doctrine:

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902–1910 of the Civil Code is a distinct legal
institution separate from civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code. Article
1903 establishes that owners or directors of a business are primarily and directly liable for
damages caused by their employees while performing their duties, unless they prove they
exercised “all the diligence of a good father of a family.” This doctrine ensures an independent,
expeditious civil remedy that coexists with, but is not subordinated to, criminal proceedings.

QUASI-DELICT Elements and RES IPSA LOQUITUR

3. Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers Inc., G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012

A guest injured in a hotel pool area after hours failed to prove hotel negligence; court ruled her
actions caused the injury, dismissing her claims.

Facts:

In Dr. Genevieve L. Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., Dusit Thani Public Co., Ltd. and First
Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation (G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012), petitioner Dr.
Genevieve L. Huang, a dermatologist, accepted an invitation by her friend Delia Goldberg, a
registered guest at Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (owned by Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. and Dusit
Thani Public Co., Ltd., insured by First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation), to swim in the
hotel’s pool on June 11, 1995. At around 7:00 p.m., the pool attendant announced closing; after
showering, Huang and Goldberg found the pool area plunged into darkness and the exit door
locked. While Huang sought a house phone behind the lifeguard’s counter, she lifted a hinged
wooden countertop that then fell and struck her head, inflicting a serious brain injury. Hotel staff
and the in-house physician offered aid, which she refused except for a topical cream, and she
departed after resting in the coffee shop. Thereafter she suffered dizziness, headaches, memory
loss and visual problems. Diagnostic tests (MRI, EEG, X-rays) and consultations from 1995 to
1999 revealed post-traumatic brain contusions, epilepsy, post-concussion syndrome, cervical
sprain and vitreous detachment. Huang sent a demand letter for ₱100 million in October 1995
but received no response and filed a Complaint for Damages on August 28, 1996, alleging
negligence in shutting off lights, locking the exit and denying proper medical care. The Makati
RTC dismissed her complaint for lack of merit on February 21, 2006. On August 9, 2007, the
Court of Appeals affirmed, and denied reconsideration on November 5, 2007. Huang then filed a
Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

●​ Are the RTC and Court of Appeals’ factual findings conclusive under Rule 45?
●​ Was petitioner’s cause of action properly based on quasi-delict, or may she invoke an
implied contract of hospitality?
●​ Did respondents commit negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, applying res
ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior?
●​ Did petitioner prove that her debilitating and permanent injuries were proximately caused
by the poolside accident?
●​ Is First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation directly liable under its insurance contract?

Ruling:

●​ The Supreme Court held that under Rule 45, only errors of law are reviewable and the
factual findings of both the RTC and Court of Appeals—affirming that Huang’s own
negligence was the proximate cause—are conclusive.
●​ Huang’s Complaint was grounded solely on quasi-delict; she cannot change her theory to
breach of an implied contract on appeal.
●​ Petitioner failed to establish respondents’ negligence: the lights were normally kept on
for security and housekeeping; she admitted overstaying and lifting the countertop
herself; medical aid was promptly offered and declined. The doctrines of res ipsa loquitur
and respondeat superior do not apply absent proof of hotel staff negligence.
●​ The causal link between the June 11, 1995 accident and Huang’s long-term injuries
remains unproven. Expert reports she presented were hearsay or uncorroborated.
●​ In the absence of liability by the hotel, its insurer, First Lepanto, cannot be held liable.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution and denied
the petition.
Ratio:

The Court applied the 1987 Constitution and Rule 45, reaffirming that this Court does not
re-evaluate facts when untainted by grave abuse of discretion or misapprehension of fact. It
emphasized the conclusive presumption accorded to findings of fact when both lower courts
concur. Huang’s attempt to shift from a quasi-delict to a breach of contract theory was barred by
the doctrine against changing causes of action on appeal. Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
she bore the burden to prove fault, damage and proximate cause by a preponderance of evidence;
she failed to do so. The Court rejected res ipsa loquitur because the injury occurred only after her
own act of lifting the countertop, and respondeat superior because no employee negligence was
shown. Hearsay medical certificates lacked probative value absent the certifying physicians’
testimony. Insurance liability is derivative; without primary liability there is none.

Doctrine:

●​ Conclusive Effect of Factual Findings: Under Rule 45, factual determinations of the trial
and appellate courts are binding if supported by evidence and untainted by specified
exceptions (e.g., misapprehension, conjecture, or grave abuse of discretion).
●​ Quasi-Delict vs. Breach of Contract: A cause of action for quasi-delict under Article 2176
requires plaintiff to prove negligence, damage, and proximate cause. Breach of contract
presumes negligence and shifts the burden to defendant, but cannot be invoked if not
pleaded below.
●​ Burden of Proof: Per Section 1, Rule 131, a party alleging negligence must prove it by a
preponderance of evidence; a person is presumed to exercise ordinary care.
●​ Res Ipsa Loquitur: Applies only when an injury would not occur without negligence, the
instrumentality was under exclusive control of defendant, and no contributory act by
plaintiff. Absent direct negligence, the doctrine is inapplicable.
●​ Respondeat Superior: A principal is liable for acts of employees only upon proof of their
negligence within the scope of employment.
●​ Hearsay Rule: Uncorroborated medical certificates and unidentified expert reports are
inadmissible and carry no probative weight.
●​ Derivative Insurance Liability: Under an express contract of insurance, the insurer’s
obligation arises only if the insured is legally liable.

NEGLIGENCE CONCEPT
4. Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918)
Amado Picart sued Frank Smith, Jr. for negligence after a 1912 bridge collision. Smith failed to
avoid the accident despite warning Picart, who was on a pony. The Supreme Court ruled Smith
liable, applying the "last clear chance" doctrine, awarding Picart damages for injuries and loss.

Facts:

In Amado Picart vs. Frank Smith, Jr. (37 Phil. 809), decided March 15, 1918, the plaintiff,
Amado Picart, riding his pony across the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union on
December 12, 1912, was met by an automobile driven by the defendant, Frank Smith, Jr. The
bridge measured approximately 75 meters long and 4.80 meters wide. Approaching at some ten
to twelve miles per hour, the defendant sounded his horn three times as warning. Instead of
moving to the left side of the bridge, Picart, startled by the novelty and speed of the machine,
pressed his pony against the right railing. The defendant, assuming the horseman would yield,
continued toward the center at the same speed until, too late to avoid collision, he swerved
sharply, frightening the pony. The animal reared and turned its hind leg toward the passing car,
which struck and fractured the hock; the horse later died and Picart suffered temporary
unconsciousness and contusions. Picart sued for ₱31,100 in damages. The Court of First Instance
of La Union absolved Smith from liability, finding contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff. Picart appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

●​ Was the defendant negligent in operating his automobile in a manner giving rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage caused?
●​ Does the dismissal of preliminary criminal proceedings against the defendant by a justice
of the peace operate as res judicata on the question of his civil liability?

Ruling:

●​ Yes. The Supreme Court held that Smith was negligent, had the last clear chance to avoid
the accident, and is civilly liable for the injuries and death of the horse. Judgment of
absolute discharge was reversed. Picart was awarded ₱200 with costs.
●​ No. The dismissal of the criminal case at the preliminary hearing is not res judicata on the
civil action for negligence.

Ratio:

Applying the reasonable-man standard derived from Article 1170 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code
(the law then in force), the Court found that once Smith observed that Picart would not keep to
the proper side, he had the duty to stop or veer sufficiently away. By maintaining speed and only
swerving when too close, he exposed the horse and rider to a known risk—automobiles frighten
horses—and thereby breached the duty of care. Although Picart was earlier negligent by failing
to yield, Smith’s negligence succeeded Picart’s by an appreciable interval, giving him the “last
clear chance” to avoid harm. Under prevailing tort principles, the party with the final opportunity
to prevent injury bears liability.

Doctrine:

A driver’s negligence is measured by whether an ordinarily prudent person in his position would
have foreseen the probability of harm and taken precautions. Reasonable foresight of danger plus
failure to guard against it constitutes actionable negligence. The “last clear chance” doctrine
imposes liability on the party who, after observing another’s peril, fails to avert the harm when
no reasonable steps could still have saved the situation. Contributory negligence does not bar
recovery if the defendant had the ultimate opportunity to prevent injury. Furthermore, an
acquittal or discharge in preliminary criminal proceedings does not bar a subsequent civil suit for
damages, as the issues and standards of proof differ and no final adjudication on the merits of
negligence was made.

NEGLIGENCE as Proximate Cause and CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

5. Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 (1910)

A 15-year-old boy, David Taylor, suffered severe injuries after experimenting with explosive
caps found on the defendant’s unsecured premises. The court ruled the defendant negligent but
held Taylor’s actions as the proximate cause, barring recovery due to contributory negligence.

Facts:

In David Taylor v. The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, G.R. No. 4977, decided on
March 22, 1910, the 15-year-old plaintiff and appellee, David Taylor, a mechanically apt minor
represented by his father, brought suit against the defendant and appellant, a foreign corporation
operating a street railway and electric light system in Manila. Its power plant was on Isla del
Provisor, accessible only by boat or a footbridge. On September 30, 1905, Taylor and
12-year-old Manuel Claparols crossed the footbridge seeking Murphy, an employee who had
promised to fashion a cylinder for their miniature engine. Finding Murphy absent, the boys
roamed the company’s premises—including its open coal-handling area and ash dump—where
they discovered some twenty to thirty brass fulminating caps, each fitted with wires for electric
detonation. After debating ownership, they loaded the caps onto a stick, carried them across the
footbridge, and met nine-year-old Jessie Adrian. At Manuel’s home the trio experimented: they
first attempted electrical discharge, then tried smashing a cap with stone, failed to find a hammer,
and finally opened a cap with a knife. Upon seeing a yellowish powder, Taylor held the cap
while Manuel applied a match, causing an explosion. Taylor sustained severe facial wounds, lost
his right eye, Manuel suffered hand burns, and Jessie had a minor neck cut. Evidence showed
identical caps had been used months earlier in the company’s blasting operations and were likely
discarded as defective. No fences or warning signs prevented children from entering the
premises, and it was undisputed that local boys often wandered the island. Taylor was unusually
mature, had served as a cabin boy, and worked later as a mechanical draftsman. The trial court
awarded damages under Civil Code articles 1089, 1902, 1903, and 1908, holding the company
liable for negligent storage of explosives.

Issues:

●​ Is the defendant corporation liable for Taylor’s injuries under Civil Code provisions on
negligence and owner’s liability?
●​ Did Taylor’s deliberate handling and ignition of the detonating cap constitute a proximate
cause or contributory negligence that bars recovery?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment. It held that although the company owed
a duty of care to minors entering its premises, the proximate cause of Taylor’s injury was his
own willful act in igniting the cap. Accordingly, the defendant was not civilly liable and the
complaint was dismissed.

Ratio:

The Court accepted that an implied license existed because the company permitted children to
roam its grounds unattended and knew of their presence. Under the “Turntable” and “Torpedo”
line of cases, an owner must guard against hidden dangers attractive to minors. Still, liability
depends on whether the defendant’s negligence was the immediate cause of the injury. Here,
Taylor, a mature 15-year-old familiar with mechanics, knowingly cut open a detonating cap and
applied a match. His deliberate and reckless conduct severed the causal link between the
company’s failure to secure its explosives and his injuries. The Court distinguished his case from
those involving very young children who lacked capacity to appreciate danger. Citing Civil Code
art. 1902 (fault or negligence as a basis for obligation), the Court found that Taylor’s own
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the explosion.

Doctrine:

Where an owner or occupier of premises owes a duty to warn or protect minors against hidden
dangers, an implied license may arise if children are habitually allowed access. However, under
Civil Code art. 1902 and established Spanish and U.S. jurisprudence, recovery is barred when the
injured party’s own negligent act is the immediate and proximate cause of the harm. A mature
minor who voluntarily engages in a dangerous act—fully understanding and appreciating the
risk—cannot attribute resulting injuries to the owner’s prior negligence.

PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
6. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958)

A 14-year-old drowned in a government-operated pool; plaintiffs failed to prove negligence by

the defendant, which had adequate safety measures and prompt response. Contributory
negligence and lack of evidence barred liability.

Facts:

In Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District (G.R. No. L-7664,
decided August 29, 1958 under the 1935 Philippine Constitution),
plaintiffs–appellants Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong seek recovery of ₱50,000 as
damages, ₱5,000 for funeral expenses, and ₱11,000 for attorney’s fees following the
drowning of their 14-year-old son, Dominador Ong, at the Metropolitan Water
District’s (MWD) recreational swimming pools located at Balara filters, Diliman,
Quezon City. The MWD operates three pools with trained lifeguards, a nurse, a
sanitary inspector, and lifesaving equipment. On July 5, 1952, at around 1:45 PM,
Dominador and his brothers entered the shallow pool after paying the ₱0.50
admission fee. At about 4:35 PM, Dominador announced he would fetch a soft drink,
leaving his brothers at the shallow pool. Unaccompanied, he apparently entered the
main pool, where between 4:40 to 4:45 PM, bathers noticed someone submerged too
long. Lifeguard Manuel Abano promptly dived in, retrieved Dominador, and
administered artificial respiration. Nurse Armando Rule and Sanitary Inspector
Iluminado Vicente arrived with a resuscitator and injected camphorated oil. Dr.
Ayuyao came later with another resuscitator but found the boy dead. An autopsy by
Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos confirmed death by asphyxia from submersion. In the
lower court, MWD’s motion to dismiss succeeded on the ground of absence of
 negligence. Plaintiffs appealed to this Court on the basis that the amount in
controversy exceeded ₱50,000.
Issues:

●​ Was Dominador Ong’s death attributable to negligence on the part of the Metropolitan
Water District or its employees?
●​ Can the doctrine of last clear chance be invoked to hold the Metropolitan Water District
liable despite any contributory negligence by the victim?

Ruling:

●​ The Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the Metropolitan
Water District and its employees exercised the required due diligence and that no
negligence was proven.
●​ The Court ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply because there was no
evidence that the District had a final opportunity to avert the accident after discovering
the peril.

Ratio:

Applying Articles 2176 and 2080 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict), the Court
emphasized that plaintiffs bore the burden of proving fault or negligence by MWD or
its agents. The evidence showed that MWD provided adequate lifesaving equipment
(ring buoy, towing line, resuscitator), conspicuous safety rules (including a ban on
swimming alone), and competent, Red Cross-trained lifeguards working in shifts. The
lifeguard on duty promptly responded to alarms as confirmed by contemporaneous
police statements, disproving plaintiffs’ allegations of delayed rescue. Moreover, all
available means—manual respiration, oxygen resuscitators, nurse, sanitary inspector,
and eventual doctor—were employed without success. In light of these facts, MWD
cannot be deemed negligent.
Doctrine:

Under the 1935 Philippine Constitution and Civil Code provisions on quasi-delict, a
proprietor of a public resort must exercise ordinary care but is not an insurer of
 patrons’ safety. Liability arises only upon proof of fault or negligence. The doctrine
of last clear chance requires that the defendant have actual or constructive knowledge
of the victim’s peril and a realistic opportunity to avoid harm, which was absent here.
Without evidence that MWD failed to act instantaneously upon discovering
Dominador’s distress, the doctrine is inapplicable, and liability cannot be imposed.

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

RES IPSA LOQUITOR and RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR and OWNERS and MANAGERS
OF ENTEPRISES/EMPLOYERS
7. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 380 SCRA 467 (2002)

A patient suffered irreversible brain damage due to anesthesiologist's improper intubation and
surgeon's negligence during gallbladder surgery, leading to a coma and death; doctors held liable,
hospital absolved.

Facts:

In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, petitioner Erlinda Ramos was advised in early 1985 to undergo a
cholecystectomy at De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Her husband Rogelio Ramos
engaged surgeon Dr. Orlino Hosaka, who recommended anesthesiologist Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez.
Erlinda was admitted on June 16, 1985, and prepared for surgery the next morning. Dr. Hosaka
arrived three hours late for the 9:00 AM operation; Dr. Gutierrez, who had no prior preoperative
airway evaluation, attempted intubation. Nurse Herminda Cruz observed Dr. Gutierrez struggle,
heard her comment “mahirap ma-intubate, mali yata ang pagkakapasok,” and noted bluish
nailbeds. Erlinda was placed in Trendelenburg position, suffered bronchospasm and cardiac
arrest, was revived but lapsed into coma. She remained comatose for over a decade and died on
August 3, 1999. Petitioners filed a civil case for damages before the RTC of Quezon City, which
found respondents negligent. The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering petitioners to pay unpaid
medical bills. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court, which on December 29, 1999
reversed the CA and held respondents civilly liable, awarding damages.
Issues:
 ●​ Whether Dr. Orlino Hosaka, as surgeon, can be held liable for negligence in the operating
room under the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine?
●​ Whether Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez is liable for negligence in administering anesthesia and
performing intubation?
●​ Whether De Los Santos Medical Center is solidarily liable as employer of the doctors
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code?
●​ Whether the damages awarded—actual, moral, exemplary, attorney’s fees and
costs—were proper and not excessive?

Ruling:

The Court ruled that (1) Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez are solidarily liable for the injury sustained
by Erlinda Ramos; (2) DLSMC is absolved from liability for lack of an employer-employee
relationship; and (3) petitioners are awarded ₱1,352,000.00 actual damages, ₱2,000,000.00
moral damages, ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages, ₱100,000.00 attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit.
Ratio:

The Supreme Court determined that Dr. Gutierrez breached the standard of care by failing to
conduct a pre‐anesthetic airway evaluation, a crucial step involving physical examination of the
upper airway. Her faulty intubation, placing the endotracheal tube in the esophagus, deprived the
patient of oxygen, resulting in hypoxic coma. Application of res ipsa loquitur was warranted
because such an outcome does not ordinarily occur absent negligence and the anesthesia
equipment was exclusively under her control. Nurse Cruz’s testimony regarding difficulty and
misplaced tube was credited over Dr. Gutierrez’s post-operative synopsis, which omitted a
critical ten-minute record gap. As to Dr. Hosaka, the Court held that by recommending Dr.
Gutierrez, supervising the operating room team, observing the patient’s cyanosis, and calling for
additional assistance, he assumed overall responsibility consistent with the Captain-of-the-Ship
doctrine. His three-hour delay exacerbated Erlinda’s anxiety, increasing the risk of
complications. Finally, DLSMC was not considered an employer under Article 2180, as
consultants are accredited through a Credentials Committee, enter into separate contracts with
patients, and are paid directly by them; the hospital merely provides facilities and staff for
ministerial tasks.
Doctrine:

Under the 1987 Constitution, every person is entitled to health and due process. Civil liability for
negligence is founded on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, extending to those for whom one is
responsible under Article 2180. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows a presumption of
negligence when an injury is of a type that ordinarily does not occur without negligence and the
instrumentality is under defendant’s exclusive control. The Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine assigns
overall responsibility to the operating surgeon for the actions of all personnel in the operating
theatre when surgeon and anesthesiologist form a medical team. Awards of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs are governed by the Rules of Court.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR and OWNERS and MANAGERS OF

ENTEPRISES/EMPLOYERS

8. Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, 321 SCRA 393 (1999)

A fatal collision involving a company car led to a civil case against the driver and employer, with
the Supreme Court ruling that the employer was not vicariously liable as the employee was not
acting within the scope of employment.

Facts:

On the early morning of August 28, 1988, Romeo So Vasquez, driving a Honda motorcycle
without helmet or goggles and holding only a student permit, was proceeding counter-clockwise
around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda in Cebu City when he was struck by a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up
owned by Castilex Industrial Corporation and driven by its Production Manager, Jose Benjamin
Abad. Abad had just finished overtime work at Castilex’s plant in Mandaue City, then drove
seven kilometers to Goldie’s Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña for snacks and conversation. Upon
leaving the restaurant around 1:30–2:00 a.m., he cut across the rotunda against traffic and
collided with Vasquez, who later died on September 5, 1988, at Cebu Doctors’ Hospital. Abad
signed an acknowledgment of responsibility for hospital expenses. Criminal charges against
Abad were dismissed for failure to prosecute. Vasquez’s parents filed a civil action for damages
against both Abad and Castilex, and Cebu Doctors’ Hospital intervened to recover unpaid
medical bills. The Regional Trial Court held Abad and Castilex jointly and solidarily liable for
burial expenses, moral damages, loss of earning capacity, attorney’s fees, and hospital bills. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Abad’s liability and imposed vicarious liability on Castilex
“only” (not solidarily), reduced certain damage awards, and lowered interest rates. Castilex then
petitioned the Supreme Court under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Abad
was acting outside the scope of his employment, that the fourth paragraph (not the fifth) of Civil
Code Article 2180 applied, and that the Court of Appeals wrongly shifted the burden of proof to
the employer.
Issues:

●​ May an employer be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code (1987)
for the negligent torts of a managerial employee who uses a company vehicle on a
personal errand outside office hours?
●​ Does the employer bear the burden of proving that its employee was acting outside the
scope of his assigned tasks when the negligent act occurred?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision insofar as it
absolved Castilex of liability, and held that (1) Castilex is not vicariously liable for Abad’s
negligence in operating the company vehicle on a personal errand outside work hours; and (2)
the employer is under no duty to prove a negative averment that the employee was acting outside
the scope of employment.
Ratio:

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the 1987 Civil Code, an employer is liable for torts
committed by an employee acting within the scope of assigned tasks, whether or not engaged in
business. The Court distinguished this from the fourth paragraph, which covers negligent acts
committed in the service or on the occasion of the employee’s functions. The mere fact that Abad
drove a company-issued vehicle does not automatically bring him within the scope of
employment when, as here, he had completed overtime, traveled seven kilometers for personal
refreshments in a known nightlife area, and was returning from a distinct personal purpose.
Drawing on American jurisprudence regarding employer liability for motor vehicle operation,
the Court noted that travel to or from meals or between home and work is generally a personal
errand absent special benefit to the employer. The Court of Appeals’ factual finding that Abad
remained within his duties was reviewed and found to be based on speculation. Furthermore, the
principle ei incumbit probatio qui dicit (he who asserts must prove) means Castilex was not
obliged to demonstrate the absence of scope; it sufficed that the plaintiff failed to prove that
Abad was acting in furtherance of the employer’s interest.
Doctrine:

An employer’s vicarious liability under Civil Code Article 2180 arises only when the employee
is acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the tort. Acts done purely for
personal reasons—even when using a company vehicle provided as a fringe benefit—fall outside
this scope. The employer need only deny the employee’s scope-of-employment status; the
burden remains on the plaintiff to establish that the tortious act was in furtherance of the
employer’s business. This doctrine aligns with the 1987 Constitution’s emphasis on fair process
and the Civil Code’s allocation of burdens of proof.

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

9. Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918)

Amado Picart sued Frank Smith, Jr. for negligence after a 1912 bridge collision. Smith failed to
avoid the accident despite warning Picart, who was on a pony. The Supreme Court ruled Smith
liable, applying the "last clear chance" doctrine, awarding Picart damages for injuries and loss.

Facts:

In Amado Picart vs. Frank Smith, Jr. (37 Phil. 809), decided March 15, 1918, the plaintiff,
Amado Picart, riding his pony across the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union on
December 12, 1912, was met by an automobile driven by the defendant, Frank Smith, Jr. The
bridge measured approximately 75 meters long and 4.80 meters wide. Approaching at some ten
to twelve miles per hour, the defendant sounded his horn three times as warning. Instead of
moving to the left side of the bridge, Picart, startled by the novelty and speed of the machine,
pressed his pony against the right railing. The defendant, assuming the horseman would yield,
continued toward the center at the same speed until, too late to avoid collision, he swerved
sharply, frightening the pony. The animal reared and turned its hind leg toward the passing car,
which struck and fractured the hock; the horse later died and Picart suffered temporary
unconsciousness and contusions. Picart sued for ₱31,100 in damages. The Court of First Instance
of La Union absolved Smith from liability, finding contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff. Picart appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

●​ Was the defendant negligent in operating his automobile in a manner giving rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage caused?
●​ Does the dismissal of preliminary criminal proceedings against the defendant by a justice
of the peace operate as res judicata on the question of his civil liability?

Ruling:

●​ Yes. The Supreme Court held that Smith was negligent, had the last clear chance to avoid
the accident, and is civilly liable for the injuries and death of the horse. Judgment of
absolute discharge was reversed. Picart was awarded ₱200 with costs.
●​ No. The dismissal of the criminal case at the preliminary hearing is not res judicata on the
civil action for negligence.

Ratio:

Applying the reasonable-man standard derived from Article 1170 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code
(the law then in force), the Court found that once Smith observed that Picart would not keep to
the proper side, he had the duty to stop or veer sufficiently away. By maintaining speed and only
swerving when too close, he exposed the horse and rider to a known risk—automobiles frighten
horses—and thereby breached the duty of care. Although Picart was earlier negligent by failing
to yield, Smith’s negligence succeeded Picart’s by an appreciable interval, giving him the “last
clear chance” to avoid harm. Under prevailing tort principles, the party with the final opportunity
to prevent injury bears liability.

Doctrine:

A driver’s negligence is measured by whether an ordinarily prudent person in his position would
have foreseen the probability of harm and taken precautions. Reasonable foresight of danger plus
failure to guard against it constitutes actionable negligence. The “last clear chance” doctrine
imposes liability on the party who, after observing another’s peril, fails to avert the harm when
no reasonable steps could still have saved the situation. Contributory negligence does not bar
recovery if the defendant had the ultimate opportunity to prevent injury. Furthermore, an
acquittal or discharge in preliminary criminal proceedings does not bar a subsequent civil suit for
damages, as the issues and standards of proof differ and no final adjudication on the merits of
negligence was made.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

PARENTS & GUARDIAN

10. Exconde v. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843 (1957)

A 15-year-old minor caused a fatal jeep accident during a parade. The Supreme Court held both
the minor and his father jointly liable for damages, emphasizing parental responsibility under
Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Facts:

In the case of Sabina Exconde vs. Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno (101 Phil. 843, June 29,
1957), the defendant, Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide
through reckless imprudence resulting from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on March
31, 1949. The victims were Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. Dante, aged fifteen at the time,
took control of a jeep with the driver seated beside him. The vehicle overturned, causing the
deaths of the two passengers. Sabina Exconde, as mother of Isidoro Caperina, reserved the right
to file a civil action for damages. Following Dante’s criminal conviction for reckless imprudence
causing homicide by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and affirmation on appeal, Sabina
Exconde filed a civil case asking for damages amounting to ₱2,959.00, jointly and severally
from Delfin and Dante Capuno. The defendants argued that only Dante should be liable because
at the time of the accident, he was not under Delfin’s control, supervision, or custody. The trial
court agreed, finding Delfin not liable and ordering only Dante to pay damages. Sabina appealed
this decision. Relevant to the case was Article 1903, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Spanish Civil
Code, which holds parents liable for damages caused by their minor children living with them
and teachers responsible for their pupils under their custody. Dante was a Boy Scout and a
student of Balintawak Elementary School in San Pablo City, attending a Rizal Day parade on the
instruction of the school supervisor when the accident occurred.
Issues:

●​ Can Delfin Capuno be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante
Capuno, for the damages resulting from the negligent act of his minor son causing the
death of Isidoro Caperina?
●​ Does the parental liability under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code extend despite
the minor being under school supervision or custody at the time of the incident?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Sabina Exconde, holding Delfin Capuno
civilly liable jointly and severally with his son Dante Capuno for the damages. The Court
modified the trial court’s decision, ordering both defendants to pay the total damages of
₱2,959.00 and costs of action. The Court rejected the defense that Delfin was not responsible
because Dante was allegedly not under his supervision at the time. The Court held that parental
liability applies because Dante was a minor living with his father, and this creates a presumption
of parental responsibility for damages caused by the child.

Ratio:

The Court relied on Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code which imposes upon parents the
obligation to respond for damages caused by minor children living with them. This obligation
stems from the parental authority which includes the duty to support, educate, and supervise their
children, balanced with the parents’ right to discipline them within moderation. The Court
reasoned that the minor’s act of negligence resulting in death was within the ambit of parental
liability, as it was a natural consequence of parental authority and the child’s residence under the
father’s care. The Court distinguished the provision on teachers’ liability for their pupils under
their custody and clarified that it applies only to institutions of arts and trades, not to academic
institutions such as Dante’s elementary school. Since no effective custody or supervision by the
school or scout master at the time was established, the parental liability remains. Therefore,
Delfin could not absolve himself by merely claiming lack of supervision because the law
unequivocally holds parents responsible for damages caused by their minor children living with
them.
Doctrine:

The ruling firmly affirms the legal doctrine that under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code,
parents are civilly liable for damages caused by their minor children who are living with them.
This liability arises from the parental authority as codified in Articles 154 and 155 of the same
code, which command parents to support, educate, supervise, and discipline their children. The
doctrine established in this case delineates the limits of teacher and parent responsibility: while
teachers or heads of arts and trades establishments are liable for pupils under their custody,
academic instructors do not bear such a blanket liability. Parental liability persists even when the
child is attending school-related activities, unless the parent can prove he transferred effective
custody and supervision to someone else competent, thereby relieving himself from
responsibility. This case underscores the legal presumption of parental vigilance and the
accompanying civil responsibility for their minor children’s delicts. The 1987 Philippine
Constitution principles on family and parental authority provide the contemporary constitutional
backdrop reinforcing parental duties and liabilities.

OWNERS and MANAGERS OF ENTEPRISES/EMPLOYERS

11. St. Francis High School v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82465, February 25,
1991
A 13-year-old drowned during a school picnic; parents sued for negligence. Courts ruled teachers
exercised due diligence, picnic was private, and school/principal not liable. No damages
awarded.

Facts:

The respondents filed a complaint for damages against St. Francis High School, represented by
spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, its principal Benjamin Illumin, and several
teachers for negligence causing the death of their son.

The trial court found the teachers responsible for negligence and awarded actual, moral, and
attorney’s fees damages to the respondents, but initially absolved the school and its principal due
to lack of sufficient evidence proving the picnic as a school activity. Both parties appealed, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling but extended liability to the school and principal under
Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code, reasoning that the school had knowledge and
acquiesced to the picnic despite its informal nature. The Court of Appeals also awarded
exemplary damages to the respondents. This petition for review challenged the Court of Appeals'
decision, contesting the imposition of liability on the school and teachers and the award of
damages.

Issues:

●​ Was there negligence attributable to the defendants, including the teachers and the school
officials, warranting an award of damages to the respondents?
●​ Is Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, applicable to hold the
school and its principal liable for the acts or omissions of the teachers during the picnic?
●​ Are the awards of exemplary and moral damages justified under the circumstances
surrounding the drowning of Ferdinand Castillo?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, finding no negligence attributable to the
petitioners (teachers and the school officials) and reversed the imposition of liability upon them
for Ferdinand’s death. The Court ruled that the picnic was a private affair not sanctioned by the
school and that the acts or omissions of the teachers were not within the scope of their official
duties, hence Article 2180 was not applicable. It further held that the evidence showed the
teachers exercised due diligence during the picnic and in attempting to revive Ferdinand.
Consequently, the Court set aside the damage awards against these petitioners and affirmed the
dismissal of their counterclaims. However, the dissenting opinion maintained that the teachers
and the school were negligent and liable jointly and severally for the damages, supporting the
Court of Appeals’ decision.

Ratio:

The majority rested its decision on a strict interpretation of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
emphasizing that employer liability arises only when the employee’s negligent act occurs within
the scope of their assigned duties. The picnic was neither school-sponsored nor an
extra-curricular activity, and the teachers were not performing official tasks at that time. The lack
of consent or official sanction from the school principal further negated the legal basis to impose
liability under Article 2180. The Court underscored that knowledge of the picnic’s planning did
not translate to acquiescence or approval. It also considered testimonies proving the teachers had
prepared appropriately for the picnic, had lifeguards and first aid capable teachers, and actively
attempted to save Ferdinand using first aid. The Court held that moral and exemplary damages
could not be awarded absent evidence of fault or bad faith.
In contrast, the dissent argued that the teachers' failure to adequately supervise the students and
assess dangers at the beach, coupled with inaction by the school principal despite knowledge of
the event, demonstrated negligence and breach of duty. The dissent relied on the protective
responsibility educational institutions owe students and the doctrine of presumed negligence
under Articles 2176 and 2180, arguing the school and principal had constructive or implied
consent and control over the activity.

Doctrine:

The case clarifies the application of Articles 2176 and 2180 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and the New Civil Code with respect to employer liability for acts of employees. Under Article
2180, employers are liable for damages caused by employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. However, liability does not attach if the employee’s negligent acts occur during
private activities outside official duties or school-sanctioned functions. Knowledge of or mere
acquiescence to unsanctioned activities does not necessarily imply consent sufficient to establish
liability.

Further, the case emphasizes the standard of care owed by teachers as supervisors, requiring
diligence akin to that of a "good father of the family" for the safety of minors. Where it is proven
that the teachers and school officials exercised this diligence and took reasonable precautions,
even when a tragic incident occurs, they may not be held liable. Awards for moral and exemplary
damages require showing fault, bad faith, or gross negligence.

This ruling helps delineate the limits of institutional liability in tort cases involving school
activities, underscoring the need for clear administrative sanction or participation before
imposing employer liability. It balances protection of minors with recognition of private
activities and the extent of supervisory responsibility.

12. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007

A 1996 collision involving a Mercury Drug truck and a Toyota Corolla left Stephen Huang
paralyzed. Courts ruled Mercury Drug and driver Del Rosario jointly liable for negligence and
lack of due diligence, awarding significant damages.

Facts:

This case involves a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30
p.m. in Taguig, Metro Manila. The petitioners are Mercury Drug Corporation, the registered
owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi truck (plate no. PRE 641), and its employee Rolando J.
Del Rosario, the driver of the truck at the time of the accident. The respondents are spouses
Richard and Carmen Huang, owners of a 1991 Toyota Corolla Sedan (plate no. PTT 775), and
their son Stephen Huang, who was driving the car during the accident. The incident took place
on the C-5 Highway with both vehicles travelling northbound from Alabang going to Pasig City.
At the time, the car was on the left innermost lane and the truck on the next lane to its right when
the truck suddenly swerved left and hit the front right side of the car. The collision caused the car
to hit a lamppost, spin, and land on the opposite lane; the truck hit a lamppost and stopped in
front of a church.

Stephen Huang sustained serious injuries — spinal cord injury causing paralysis from the chest
down, head, face, and lung injuries, requiring continuous treatment. At the time of the accident,
Del Rosario was driving without a license because it had been confiscated due to prior reckless
driving, and he only had a Traffic Violation Receipt. The car was a total wreck, valued at
₱300,000. Respondents claimed gross negligence and reckless imprudence against Del Rosario
and faulted Mercury Drug for failure to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its driver.

Petitioners argued that the accident was caused by Stephen Huang’s recklessness, claiming the
car bumped into the truck’s front right tire while the truck was on the left innermost lane. They
also claimed Mercury Drug exercised due diligence in its employment practices.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City ruled on September 29, 2004, finding petitioners
jointly and severally liable for damages including actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses amounting to multi-million pesos. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision on February 16, 2006 but reduced the moral damages award. The
petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

●​ Was petitioner Rolando J. Del Rosario negligent in the operation of the truck and directly
responsible for the accident?
 ●​ Is petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation liable as the employer of Del Rosario for the
damages sustained by Stephen Huang?
●​ Are the amounts awarded for actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees proper and justified under the circumstances?

Ruling:

●​ The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC and CA rulings finding petitioner Del Rosario
negligent and the proximate cause of the accident and injuries sustained by Stephen
Huang.
●​ The Court held petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation liable for the negligence of its
employee because it failed to show it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Del Rosario. Therefore, the employer's liability is joint and solidary with
the employee.
●​ The Court upheld the awards for actual damages, compensatory damages including life
care costs and lost earning capacity, moral damages (except decreasing the amount of
moral damages to ₱1,000,000 as affirmed by the Court of Appeals), exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court based its decision on the clear factual findings and expert testimony that
contradicted petitioners' version of the accident. The physical and scientific evidence established
that the truck was in the left lane and Del Rosario swerved left into the car. The logic of collision
dynamics expert proved that the movement of the vehicles after impact aligned with
respondents’ account, disproving petitioners’ claim that the car caused the collision by hitting the
truck's front right tire.

Del Rosario’s admission that he lost control and failed to apply brakes after impact demonstrated
recklessness. He was driving without a valid license, further underscoring negligence and bad
faith. Regarding Mercury Drug's liability, the Court stressed the strict standards employers must
meet to be exempt from liability for their employees’ torts – specifically, the exercise of due
diligence in worker selection and adequate supervision. Mercury Drug’s hiring practices were
deficient, lacking proper testing and failure to supervise or discipline Del Rosario, notably
ignoring his reckless driving citation.
The quantum of damages was supported by actual receipts for medical expenses and expert
actuarial evidence for future life care costs and loss of earning capacity. Moral and exemplary
damages were justified by the serious injuries and Del Rosario’s gross negligence. Attorney’s
fees were warranted as respondents had to litigate to enforce their rights due to petitioners’
unjustified acts.

Doctrine:

The Court applied the principles under the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the Civil Code
related to quasi-delict (tort) liability. Article 2176 defines fault or negligence and grounds for
liability when damage is caused by an act or omission. Article 2180 establishes direct and
solidary liability of employers for damages caused by employees in the service of the employer,
regardless of prior recourse against the employee.

Employers are bound to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising employees; failure to do so results in employer liability. The burden of proof to show
due diligence rests with the employer, requiring concrete evidence. Negligence includes the
failure to discipline employees who commit wrongful acts.

On damages, the Court refers to Articles 2199 and 2205 of the Civil Code, requiring proof of
actual pecuniary loss, and declaring recovery for loss or impairment of earning capacity. Moral
damages serve to restore the injured party’s spiritual status as much as possible and compensate
for non-pecuniary injuries, while exemplary damages punish gross negligence or willful
misconduct (Art. 2231).

Lastly, attorney’s fees can be awarded under Article 2208 when undue litigation expenses are
incurred due to the wrongful conduct of the opposing party.

The STATE
13. Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, March 21,
1916
Motorcyclist Merritt collided with a negligently driven government ambulance, sustaining severe
injuries. Court ruled government not liable for driver’s negligence despite waived immunity.

Facts:

In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, E. Merritt (plaintiff and appellant) was riding
his motorcycle westward along Padre Faura Street, Manila, on March 25, 1913, when, upon
crossing Taft Avenue, a General Hospital ambulance driven by a government chauffeur turned
suddenly into the right side of the avenue without signaling and collided with Merritt’s
motorcycle. The collision inflicted a depressed skull fracture, head and leg wounds, and total
unconsciousness, requiring two months and twenty-one days of hospitalization and leaving the
plaintiff permanently weakened in mind and body. Witnesses testified that Merritt, previously a
vigorous contractor earning ₱1,000 monthly, suffered a 50 percent loss in efficiency, forced
dissolution of a partnership, and abandonment of a building contract. In the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the trial judge attributed the accident to the chauffeur’s negligence, awarded
₱5,000 for permanent injuries, ₱2,666 for lost earnings during hospitalization, and general
damages of ₱5,000, totaling ₱14,741 plus costs. Both parties appealed.
Issues:

●​ Was the accident caused by the negligence of the General Hospital ambulance chauffeur?
●​ Is the Government of the Philippine Islands liable for damages resulting from its
chauffeur’s tort?
●​ Should the award for lost earnings be limited to the period of hospitalization or extended
to the full incapacity period?

Ruling:

●​ Yes; the sudden, unannounced turn of the ambulance constituted negligence.

●​ No; the Government’s enactment of Act No. 2457 waived immunity from suit but did not
admit liability, and under Civil Code art. 1903(5) it is only liable for acts of special
agents, which the chauffeur was not.
●​ The Court agreed that Merritt was incapacitated for six months and that compensation for
lost earnings should cover the entire period, but this finding became moot upon reversal
of liability. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed.
Ratio:

The Court recognized that while the Act of February 3, 1915 (No. 2457) authorized Merritt to
sue to determine responsibility and quantum of damages, it did not expressly concede the
Government’s liability for torts committed by its employees. Citing United States and Spanish
precedents, it held that consent to be sued waives only sovereign immunity, not substantive
liability. Under Civil Code art. 1903(5), the State is responsible only for acts of “special agents”
acting on a definite commission extraneous to their official functions. The chauffeur, performing
routine duty without special delegation, did not fall within this category.
Doctrine:

By consenting to suit under a specific statute, a government waives its immunity from
adjudication but does not create or enlarge its substantive liability; liability for torts by public
servants exists only when those servants act as special agents under a definite commission, as
prescribed by Civil Code art. 1903(5). Absent express legislative language extending liability,
the Government remains immune from damages for negligence of ordinary employees.

Teachers and Heads of Establishments

14. Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 414 (1960)

A schoolyard quarrel over a "pitogo" led to injury; father not liable for minor son's actions, moral
damages deemed excessive, P50 medical expenses upheld.

Facts:

The case involves petitioner Ciriaco L. Mercado and respondents Manuel Quisumbing Jr. and his
parents. Both Manuel Quisumbing Jr. and Augusto Mercado, son of Ciriaco, were classmates at
Lourdes Catholic School in Kanlaon, Quezon City. On February 22, 1966, during recess, a
quarrel broke out between Augusto and Manuel over a "pitogo," an empty nutshell used as a
piggy bank by children. Augusto Mercado wounded Manuel Quisumbing Jr. on the right cheek
with a piece of razor during this altercation. Manuel and others were unaware that the pitogo
belonged to Augusto as it had been lent out. The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the
complaint filed by the Quisumbings against Ciriaco Mercado, the father, holding him not liable
for his son's act. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and ordered the
petitioner to pay ₱2,000 as moral damages and ₱50 for medical expenses. The lower court found
that Augusto initiated the aggression and that the wound caused moral damages to Manuel.
However, the moral damages claimed by Manuel’s parents and attorney’s fees were denied. The
case was elevated to the Supreme Court through a petition for review by Ciriaco Mercado.

Issues:

●​ Whether the father, Ciriaco L. Mercado, should be held liable for the damages caused by
his minor son’s physical injury to Manuel Quisumbing Jr.
●​ Whether the school should be held liable instead of the father.
●​ Whether the moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals amounting to ₱2,000 were
excessive and justified.
●​ Whether moral damages can be awarded to the parents for their mental anguish arising
from injury to their child.

Ruling:

●​ The Supreme Court ruled that the father, Ciriaco L. Mercado, is liable for the damages
caused by his minor son.
●​ The Court held that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the school is not liable because
it does not qualify as an establishment of arts and trades where pupils remain in custody;
the pupils only attend during school hours and return home after, so custody and
responsibility remain with the parents.
●​ The Supreme Court found the moral damages of ₱2,000 awarded by the Court of Appeals
excessive and unjustified and reversed this part of the decision, declaring the petitioner
exempt from paying moral damages.
●​ The claim for moral damages by the parents for mental anguish was denied citing legal
doctrine that parents cannot recover for mental suffering due to sympathy for injuries
caused to their children.

Ratio:

The Court emphasized that Article 2180 of the Civil Code imposes liability on parents for
damages caused by their minor children except where the pupils are under the custody of their
teachers in arts and trades establishments. Since Lourdes Catholic School was an academic
institution without boarding or custody of pupils beyond school hours, the responsibility for
Augusto’s tort rests with his parents. The Court reviewed the incident’s facts and noted that
Augusto was nine years old, and there was no finding of criminal offense or deliberate
misconduct causing permanent injury — only a minor wound that did not require hospitalization.
The Court applied Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which considers contributory negligence,
pointing out that Manuel Quisumbing Jr. had interfered with Augusto’s attempt to retrieve the
pitogo, which was the proximate cause of the injury. Regarding moral damages, the Court
referred to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the conditions for awarding moral
damages, none of which were met in this case since no criminal act was proven and the injury
was minor. The Court also cited that mental anguish recoverable by law must arise from injury to
the person himself and not sympathy or anxiety experienced by relatives.

Doctrine:

Liability of parents for damages caused by minor children is grounded in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, which holds parents responsible except where the children are under the custody of
teachers or heads of arts and trades establishments. The Court clarified that academic schools do
not impose such liability on the institution since pupils attend during school hours only. The
principle of contributory negligence under Article 2179 may reduce or relieve liability if the
injured party's fault contributed to the injury. Moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code require the presence of particular aggravating circumstances or presence of a criminal
offense and cannot be awarded solely for minor injuries sustained in a schoolchild quarrel.
Mental anguish damages are limited to the person injured, and sympathy or anxiety of relatives
do not justify recovery of moral damages. This interpretation aligns with protections guaranteed
by the 1987 Philippine Constitution, emphasizing the rights and obligations within family and
civil responsibility.

15. Palisoc v. Brillantes, 41, SCRA 557 (1971)

A student fatally injured by a classmate during a school fight; school officials held jointly liable
under Article 2180 for inadequate supervision, with indemnity increased to P12,000.

Facts:

In Spouses Moises P. Palisoc and Brigida P. Palisoc v. Antonio C. Brillantes et al. (G.R. No.
L-29025, decided October 4, 1971 under the 1935 Constitution), the parents of sixteen-year-old
Dominador Palisoc, a student of automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute (M.I.T.),
sued for damages after their son’s death on March 10, 1966. According to an eyewitness, fellow
student Virgilio L. Daffon taunted Dominador, who lightly slapped him; Daffon then struck
Dominador with powerful fist blows in the face and stomach. Dominador stumbled over an
engine block, fell unconscious, and died without regaining consciousness. A postmortem
examination revealed fractured ribs, internal hemorrhages, and brain injury consistent with
strong fist blows. The Court of First Instance of Manila found Daffon liable for a quasidelict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, awarded P6,000 for death indemnity plus additional
expenses, and absolved three school officials—Antonio C. Brillantes (board member and former
proprietor), Teodosio V. Valenton (president), and Santiago M. Quibulue (instructor)—based on
its interpretation of Article 2180, which it held confined custodial liability to pupils who lived
and boarded with their teachers. Plaintiffs appealed solely on legal questions.
Issues:

●​ Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, does the phrase “so long as they remain in their
custody” require that a student live and board with a teacher or school head for liability to
attach?
●​ Are the president and instructor of a technical-vocational school jointly and severally
liable for damages caused by a student while on the school premises?
●​ Should the death indemnity award be adjusted in light of the decline in the peso’s
purchasing power?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that “custody” in Article 2180 refers to the protective and supervisory
custody exercised over students during school hours, not to residence or boarding. Hence,
Teodosio V. Valenton (president) and Santiago M. Quibulue (instructor) are jointly and severally
liable with Virgilio L. Daffon for the damages awarded. Antonio C. Brillantes remains absolved.
The award for death indemnity was increased from P6,000 to P12,000 pursuant to *People v.
Pantoja*. All other awards (actual expenses, moral damages, loss of earning capacity, attorney’s
fees, and costs) were affirmed. Counterclaims were dismissed.
Ratio:

The Court interpreted Article 2180—imposing liability on “teachers or heads of establishments

of arts and trades … for damages caused by their pupils and students … so long as they remain
in their custody”—to mean any period during which students attend school, including recess.
Teachers and school heads stand in loco parentis and are bound by Articles 349, 350, and 352 of
the Civil Code to exercise substitute parental authority and reasonable supervision. The lower
court’s narrowing dictum in *Mercado v. Court of Appeals* and *Exconde v. Capuno*, which
confined custodial liability to students living and boarding with teachers, was expressly set aside.
The Court further relied on Article 2176 (quasidelict) and Article 2206 (death indemnity),
applying the adjustment endorsed in *People v. Pantoja* to address currency depreciation.
Doctrine:

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the longstanding principle of in loco parentis, teachers
and heads of vocational and trade schools are civilly responsible for torts committed by students
while under their protective supervision on school premises. “Custody” extends to all hours of
school attendance and recess, not solely to boarding arrangements. The teacher’s and school
head’s duty to prevent harm arises from their substitute parental authority (Arts. 349, 350, 352),
and liability for quasi-delicts (Art. 2176) is automatic unless the defendant proves the diligence
of a good father of a family. Death indemnity must reflect current economic realities, hence the
P12,000 minimum under Art. 2206 as recalibrated in *People v. Pantoja*.

16. Amadora v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 315 (1988)

A student fatally shot by a classmate at school; parents sued for damages under Article 2180.
Court ruled no liability, citing lack of negligence and due diligence by school officials.

Facts:
In Jose S. Amadora et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos et al. (G.R.
No. L-47745, April 15, 1988), petitioners are the parents and heirs of seventeen‐year‐old
Alfredo Amadora who was fatally shot on April 13, 1972, inside the auditorium of Colegio de
San Jose–Recoletos by his classmate, Pablito Daffon. Daffon was later criminally convicted for
homicide by reckless imprudence. Concurrently, the petitioners filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the school, its rector, high school principal, dean of
boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon’s parents. The Court of First Instance of
Cebu held the school officials solidarily liable for P294,984.00 covering death compensation,
loss of earning capacity, funeral and litigation expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and absolved all defendants, ruling that
Article 2180 did not apply to academic institutions, that custody ceased when semestral classes
ended, there was no proof the gun had been previously confiscated by school authorities, and that
defendants exercised the necessary diligence to prevent injury. The petitioners then sought
review by certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues:

●​ Does Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as amended, extend liability to teachers of academic
institutions for tortious acts of their students?
●​ Was Alfredo Amadora still “in the custody” of the school authorities when he was shot,
thus triggering the custody requirement under Article 2180?
●​ Did the respondents exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
injury, thereby extinguishing their liability under Article 2180?
●​ Can the school itself be held directly liable for the acts of its teachers or heads under the
doctrine of respondeat superior?

Ruling:

●​ Article 2180 applies to all schools; in academic institutions, teachers (not the school
head) are liable for torts committed by their students while in custody.
●​ Alfredo remained under school custody when he entered campus for a legitimate student
purpose after formal classes ended.
●​ None of the individuals sued was shown to be the teacher-in-charge of Daffon or to have
failed to exercise due diligence in discipline; accordingly, no liability attached.
●​ The school itself cannot be directly liable under Article 2180; it may only face vicarious
liability under respondeat superior if it fails to prove due diligence.

Ratio:

The Court traced the history of Article 2180 and reconciled prior decisions (Exconde v. Capuno,
Mercado v. Court of Appeals, Palisoc v. Brillantes) to hold that “teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable” means teachers in general for all schools, while
the special mention of heads of arts-and-trades schools remains an exception. Applying the
canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” attaches to “pupils and students,” and “heads of
establishments of arts and trades” to “apprentices.” The concept of custody is read broadly to
cover any period when a student is lawfully on school premises and under its disciplinary
authority, not strictly the semester dates. Finally, the Court reaffirmed that liability under Article
2180 is a presumption juris et de jure, defeasible only by proof of the diligence of a good father
of a family. None of the respondents breached this standard; accordingly, their liability could not
be sustained.
Doctrine:

Under the 1987 Constitution, all educational institutions must ensure the safety and discipline of
students within their premises. Article 2180 of the Civil Code imposes strict liability on teachers
of both academic and technical schools for torts committed by students in their custody, with the
remedy of showing due diligence as a defense. The school itself is not directly liable under this
provision but may be held under respondeat superior if it cannot prove reasonable care in
selecting and supervising its personnel. Custody, for purposes of Article 2180, extends beyond
class hours to any time a student is legitimately on school premises, including periods for
registration, report submission, and even social activities, provided the authority and influence of
the school remain in effect.