ISSUE 1

1. Burden of Proof & Legal Standards

Q: You have argued that legal insanity is distinct from medical insanity.
Can you elaborate on the difference and how it applies to this case?
A: Yes, legal insanity is a narrow concept under Section 84 IPC and focuses on
whether the accused was incapable of understanding the nature of the act at the
exact moment of the offense. Medical insanity, on the other hand, refers to a
diagnosed mental illness, which does not automatically mean the person is
legally insane. In this case, Michael was diagnosed with Bipolar Mood
Disorder, but this does not prove that he lacked the ability to distinguish right
from wrong at the time of the crime.
Q: Who bears the burden of proof in an insanity defense under Section 84
IPC?
A: The burden of proof lies on the defense. The accused must prove, through
evidence, that he was legally insane at the time of the offense. As per Murari
Lal v. State of M.P. (1980), the standard of proof is that of the preponderance of
probabilities, meaning the defense must show it was more likely than not that
the accused was legally insane.
Q: Since the accused has been diagnosed with Bipolar Mood Disorder, to
what extent should the court consider medical evidence in determining
legal insanity?
A: The court should consider medical evidence as relevant but not conclusive.
In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat (1964), the Supreme
Court ruled that a medical diagnosis alone do0es not establish legal insanity.
The crucial question is whether Michael’s disorder prevented him from knowing
the nature of his act. Since there is no evidence that Michael was in an acute
manic or psychotic state at the time, his diagnosis alone does not satisfy Section
84 IPC.
Q: You cited the case of Bapu Gajraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan. Could you
clarify whether the burden on the defense is "beyond a reasonable doubt"
or a lesser standard?
A: The burden on the defense is not "beyond a reasonable doubt," as it is for the
prosecution. Instead, the accused must prove legal insanity by the
"preponderance of probabilities," meaning it must be more likely than not that
he was legally insane at the time of the crime. However, the prosecution still has
the overall burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Mental State at the Time of the Crime
Q: You argue that the accused was aware of his actions based on his post-
crime behaviour. However, could a person in a dissociative or manic state
still perform such actions?
A: While it is possible, it is not probable in this case. Legal insanity under
Section 84 IPC requires total cognitive incapacity. The fact that Michael hid the
axe and responded coherently to law enforcement suggests that he was aware of
his actions. Courts have ruled in Mariappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013) that
post-crime conduct indicating rational thinking negates an insanity defense.
Q: Is it possible for a person with Bipolar Mood Disorder to commit a
crime while experiencing an altered state of consciousness?
A: Yes, it is possible. However, the defense has not provided sufficient evidence
that Michael was in such a state at the exact time of the offense. Courts in cases
like Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker have emphasized that past or ongoing
mental illness does not automatically prove legal insanity.
Q: How does the prosecution counter the possibility that Michael was in an
acute manic state during the offense?
A: The prosecution counters this by highlighting his post-crime actions: hiding
the weapon, responding coherently to police, and selectively claiming
unconsciousness. Additionally, no medical evidence confirms that Michael was
experiencing an acute episode at that moment. The defence’s expert witness, Dr.
Alfred, only confirmed a general diagnosis and did not establish legal insanity
at the time of the crime.
Q: Can a momentary lapse of reason or temporary loss of control still
qualify as legal insanity under Section 84 IPC?
A: No. A momentary lapse of reason does not meet the legal standard of
insanity under Section 84 IPC. The Supreme Court in Mani Ram & Ors. v. State
of U.P (1994) held that premeditated actions and attempts to conceal the crime
negate an insanity defense.

3. Eyewitness & Expert Testimony

Q: You place significant reliance on Daniel (PW3), the eyewitness. Is there
any possibility of bias or misinterpretation in his testimony?
A: While bias is always a possibility, Daniel’s testimony aligns with forensic
evidence (Michael’s fingerprints on the axe) and post-crime behavior (hiding
the weapon). His statement is credible as it is corroborated by physical
evidence.
Q: Does Daniel's testimony conclusively prove that Michael was in a
normal mental state at the time of the crime, or could it simply reflect post-
crime actions?
A: Daniel’s testimony primarily establishes post-crime conduct. However, post-
crime actions are relevant under Mariappan v. State of Tamil Nadu to assess
mental state. If Michael was legally insane at the time of the crime, he would
likely exhibit irrational behavior afterward as well.
Q: Would it be prudent for the court to seek an independent psychiatric
evaluation of the accused?
A: While the prosecution does not oppose further evaluation, we argue that
existing evidence sufficiently disproves the insanity defense. However, if the
court deems it necessary, an independent evaluation could provide additional
clarity.

4. Post-Crime Conduct & Rational Behaviour

Q: You argue that Michael hiding the axe indicates a guilty mind. However,
can a person suffering from a mental disorder still act with instinctive self-
preservation?
A: While instinctive self-preservation can occur, rational and calculated actions
such as hiding a weapon suggest awareness of wrongdoing. In Mariappan v.
State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court held that concealment of evidence
negates insanity claims.
Q: Can legal insanity exist in cases where an accused shows brief moments
of rational behavior before or after an act?
A: It is theoretically possible, but in practical application, courts require clear
evidence that the accused was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at
the time of the crime. In Hari Singh Gond v. State of M.P., the Supreme Court
held that the key moment is the time of the offense itself.

5. Forensic Evidence & Circumstantial Proof

Q: The forensic evidence shows Michael’s fingerprints on the axe. How
does this alone disprove the possibility of him being in a state of insanity at
the time of the crime?
A: It does not disprove insanity alone but, when combined with other evidence
(post-crime conduct, eyewitness testimony), it strengthens the prosecution’s
case.
6. Mental Healthcare Act & Criminal Liability
Q: If convicted, should Michael be sentenced to a mental health institution
rather than prison?
A: If Michael is found guilty but is determined to require treatment, Section 330
CrPC allows for treatment in a mental health institution. However, this does not
absolve him of criminal liability.

7. Dying Declaration & Its Evidentiary Value

Q: You place reliance on Jenny’s dying declaration. Since Michael claims
he was unconscious at the time, could her statement be influenced by
misperception or bias?
A: Jenny’s dying declaration is valid as Dr. Andrew confirmed she was in a
sound mental state. The Supreme Court in Atbir v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi held
that a credible dying declaration is sufficient for conviction.

ISSUE 2

1. Questions on the Standard of Proof for Insanity

Q: You argue that the burden of proving insanity is "on par" with the
prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, isn’t
it well settled that the accused’s burden in such cases is lower—more akin to the
civil standard of "preponderance of probabilities"?
A: Yes, Your Lordship, I acknowledge that the burden of proving insanity is
lower than that of the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the accused must
prove insanity on the preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable
doubt. However, mere medical history is insufficient. The accused must show
that, at the exact moment of the crime, he was incapable of understanding the
nature of his act or distinguishing between right and wrong.
Q: Can you clarify the distinction between the prosecution’s burden to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the defence’s burden to prove insanity
under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act?
A: Certainly, Your Lordship. The prosecution’s burden is to establish every
element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, including mens rea (guilty
mind). However, when an accused claims insanity under Section 84 IPC, the
burden shifts to him under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act. This
means the accused must produce credible evidence to create a reasonable
doubt in the judge’s mind about his mental capacity at the time of the offence.
If he succeeds, the court may grant an acquittal or a lesser sentence, depending
on the circumstances.

2. Questions on Legal Presumptions

Q: You mentioned a rebuttable presumption of sanity. If that is the case, does it
not mean that the accused only needs to produce enough evidence to create a
reasonable doubt rather than prove insanity conclusively?
A: That is correct, Your Lordship. The law presumes that every person is sane
unless proven otherwise. The accused does not have to conclusively establish
insanity but must provide sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about
his mental state at the time of the offence. However, in this case, the accused’s
post-crime behavior—such as attempting to conceal the weapon and responding
coherently to the police—contradicts the claim of insanity, strengthening the
presumption of sanity.
Q: What kind of evidence would the prosecution consider sufficient to rebut
this presumption?
A: The prosecution would consider evidence such as:
 Expert psychiatric evaluations showing the accused was incapable of
understanding his actions at the time of the offence.
 Eyewitness accounts confirming that the accused was acting abnormally
before and during the crime.
 Lack of premeditation or rational behavior post-crime, such as an
inability to recognize the consequences of the act.
In this case, none of these factors are conclusively proven by the defence.
3. Questions on Precedents Cited
Q: In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat (1964), the Supreme
Court held that even if the defence does not conclusively prove insanity, raising
reasonable doubt about mens rea can lead to an acquittal. How does this apply
to the present case?
A: Your Lordship, in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker, the Court held that if
the accused successfully creates a reasonable doubt about his capacity to form
mens rea, he may be entitled to an acquittal. However, in the present case, the
prosecution submits that Michael’s post-offence conduct negates any such
reasonable doubt. His attempt to hide the axe, respond coherently, and
selectively claim unconsciousness shows that he had the cognitive ability to
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime.
Q: How do you distinguish Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand (2011) from
cases where the court has ruled in favor of the defence when some medical
evidence supports the insanity plea?
A: In Surendra Mishra, the Court reaffirmed the evidentiary value of a dying
declaration and held that it could be solely relied upon for conviction if found
credible. In contrast, cases where courts have upheld an insanity plea typically
involve uncontested medical evidence proving that the accused was in a
state of complete mental incapacity. Here, while Michael has a history of
mental illness, the evidence does not demonstrate that he was in an acute
psychotic episode at the time of the crime.

4. Questions on the Evidence Presented in the Present Case

Q: You argue that Michael has failed to prove legal insanity. What specific
evidence or lack thereof leads to this conclusion?
A: The prosecution submits that the following evidence negates Michael’s claim
of insanity:
 Eyewitness testimony (Daniel, PW3) stating that Michael attempted to
hide the murder weapon.
 Medical testimony (Dr. Alfred) confirming Michael had a mental
disorder but not proving that he was incapable of understanding his
actions at the time of the offence.
 Forensic evidence confirming Michael’s fingerprints on the axe,
demonstrating volitional control over the weapon.
Q: If there is medical evidence suggesting a mental disorder, does the
prosecution accept that Michael was suffering from a condition, even if it did
not meet the legal threshold for insanity?
A: Yes, Your Lordship. The prosecution acknowledges that Michael was
diagnosed with Bipolar Mood Disorder, but the mere presence of a mental
condition is not sufficient to invoke Section 84 IPC. The crucial question is
whether he was incapable of understanding the nature of his act at the time
of the crime, which is not established.
Q: Does the prosecution contend that Michael had the capacity to form the
necessary mens rea at the time of the offence?
A: Yes, Your Lordship. His post-offence conduct, coherent responses, and
selective memory all indicate that he had the requisite mens rea at the time of
committing the crime.

5. Questions on the Role of Medical Evidence

Q: You stated that a mere medical diagnosis is insufficient. What additional
evidence should the defence present to establish insanity?
A: The defence must provide:
 Expert psychiatric testimony confirming that the accused was in a state
of complete mental incapacity at the exact time of the offence.
 Evidence of irrational pre- and post-crime behavior, such as
incoherent speech, lack of awareness, or detachment from reality.
 Lack of motive or inability to recall the incident in a structured
manner.
Q: If the defence produces medical records showing a long history of mental
illness, how does the prosecution argue against their relevance to the specific
time of the offence?
A: The prosecution argues that a long history of mental illness does not
automatically translate into legal insanity at the time of the crime. The focus
is on whether the accused was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong
at that moment, which Michael’s rational behavior post-crime contradicts.
6. Questions on the Impact of Insanity on Mens Rea
Q: If the accused raises a reasonable doubt about his mental condition at the
time of the offence, should the benefit of the doubt go to the accused?
A: Yes, Your Lordship. If a reasonable doubt exists regarding mens rea due to
insanity, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. However, in this case,
the prosecution argues that no reasonable doubt exists because of the
accused’s rational actions post-crime, which contradict a claim of legal
insanity.
Q: If a person suffers from intermittent episodes of insanity, but there is no clear
proof whether they were in such a state at the time of the offence, how should
the court approach such uncertainty?
A: Your Lordship, the court should apply the presumption of sanity unless the
accused provides convincing evidence that he was in an insane episode at the
precise time of the offence. If uncertainty remains, the burden of proof under
Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act has not been met, and the accused
should not be acquitted on grounds of insanity.

ISSUE 3
Responses to Critical Questions on the Dying Declaration
1. Can a dying declaration be the sole basis for conviction, or does it
require corroboration in all cases?
Your Lordship, as held in Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) and
reaffirmed in Koli Chunilal Savji vs. State of Gujarat (1999), a dying
declaration can be the sole basis for conviction if it is found to be truthful,
voluntary, and free from suspicion. Corroboration is not required if the
declaration is clear, consistent, and reliable. However, if there are doubts
about its authenticity, the court may seek supporting evidence.

2. What are the exceptions where a dying declaration may not be relied
upon?
Your Lordship, a dying declaration may not be relied upon in the following
circumstances:
 If the declarant was not in a fit state of mind to make a rational and
voluntary statement (Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2001).
 If there is doubt about its authenticity, such as in cases of multiple
inconsistent declarations (Amol Singh v. State of MP, 2008).
 If the statement appears tutored or influenced, rendering it unreliable.
 If the declarant had insufficient opportunity to observe the assailant,
leading to possible mistaken identity.
3. How do we ascertain that Jenny was in a fit state of mind to give a
reliable statement?
Your Lordship, as per Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002), the certification
of a medical officer regarding the mental and physical fitness of the declarant is
crucial but not mandatory. In this case:
 Dr. Andrew, the treating physician, has confirmed that Jenny was
conscious and lucid when making the statement.
 The police officer who recorded the statement noted that Jenny was in
a fit state of mind and able to comprehend and narrate the events.
 There are no contradictions or inconsistencies in her statement,
indicating clarity of thought.

4. Was the dying declaration recorded in writing or orally conveyed? If

written, who recorded it?
Your Lordship, Jenny’s dying declaration was recorded in writing by the
SHO, as there was no immediate availability of a magistrate. While a
Magistrate’s recording is preferred, the absence of one does not invalidate a
statement if other reliability factors are met (Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar,
1998).

5. Why was the dying declaration given to the SHO instead of a

Magistrate? Would this impact its evidentiary value?
Your Lordship, while it is ideal for a Magistrate to record a dying declaration, it
is not mandatory if circumstances prevent it. In Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of
Gujarat (1999), the Supreme Court clarified that a statement recorded by a
responsible officer such as a Sub-Inspector or SHO can be admissible,
provided there is no evidence of fabrication.
In this case:
 The declaration was recorded immediately due to Jenny’s critical
condition.
 The absence of a Magistrate does not affect admissibility, as long as
the statement was voluntary and free from influence.
 The SHO followed due procedure, ensuring transparency and reliability.
6. Was there any contradiction between Jenny’s dying declaration and
other evidence presented?
No, Your Lordship. Jenny’s dying declaration aligns with the medical and
forensic evidence:
 Her injuries are consistent with the attack she described.
 Eyewitness testimony (PW3, Daniel) corroborates the sequence of
events.
 The accused’s conduct post-crime, including hiding the weapon,
aligns with Jenny’s account.
As per Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958), a dying declaration should be
consistent with surrounding evidence, which is the case here.

7. How does Dr. Andrew’s testimony support the reliability of the dying
declaration?
Your Lordship, Dr. Andrew’s testimony is crucial in establishing Jenny’s
fitness to make a statement. He has confirmed:
 Jenny was conscious, oriented, and in a position to narrate the
incident.
 Her injuries were consistent with an attack using a sharp-edged
weapon, corroborating the dying declaration.
 There was no sign of mental confusion, strengthening the statement’s
reliability.
Thus, the prosecution submits that Jenny’s dying declaration is credible,
voluntary, and admissible.
8. Did the medical evidence confirm that Jenny was conscious and capable
of making a statement at the time?
Yes, Your Lordship. The medical evidence establishes that:
 Jenny was fully conscious and aware when she provided her statement.
 Dr. Andrew’s certification confirms her mental clarity and ability to
provide an accurate account.
 There are no contradictions in her statement, which suggests it was
given rationally.
This meets the legal standard set in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) for
the admissibility of a dying declaration.

9. Did the testimony of the eyewitness (PW3, Daniel) fully align with
Jenny’s dying declaration?
Yes, Your Lordship. Daniel’s testimony fully supports Jenny’s dying
declaration:
 He witnessed Michael attacking Jenny with an axe.
 He saw Michael attempting to conceal the weapon after the incident.
 His account of Michael’s behavior before and after the attack aligns
with Jenny’s statement.
This strengthens the prosecution’s case, as convictions based on consistent
dying declarations and eyewitness testimony have been upheld (Paniben v. State
of Gujarat, 1992).