LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS), petitioner,

vs.
MARCELO ENTERPRISES and MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORP.,
MARCELO RUBBER AND LATEX PRODUCTS, MARCELO STEEL,
CORPORATION, MARCELO CHEMICAL & PIGMENT CORP., POLARIS
MARKETING CORPORATION and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS

G.R. No. L-38258 November 19, 1982

GUERRERO, J.
Facts:

Separate appeals by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of

Industrial Relations (Manila) dated July 20, 1973, as well as the Resolution
of the court en banc dated January 24, 1974 denying the reconsideration
thereof rendered in ULP Case No. 4951 entitled, "Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan, Petitioner, versus Marcelo Enterprises and Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Marcelo Steel
Corporation, Polaris Marketing Corporation, and Marcelo Chemical and
Pigment Corporation, Respondents.

It appears that prior to May 23, 1967, the date which may be stated as
the start of the labor dispute between Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan
(hereinafter referred to as complainant LAKAS) and the management of the
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products,
Inc., Polaris Marketing Corporation, Marcelo Chemical and Pigment
Corporation, and the Marcelo Steel Corporation (Nail Plan) (hereinafter
referred to as respondent Marcelo Companies) the Marcelo Companies had
existing collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the local unions then
existing within the appropriate bargaining units, viz: (1) the respondent
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, with the Marcelo Camelback Tire
and Foam Union (MACATIFU); (2) the respondent Marcelo Rubber and
Latex Products, Inc., with the Marcelo Free Workers Union (MFWU); and
(3) the respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation with the United Nail Workers
Union (UNWU).

Espinas & Associates; and (2) in a letter dated May 25, 1967, it
apprised PSSLU, Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA and complainant LAKAS of the
fact of the existing conflicting demands for recognition as the bargaining
representative in the appropriate units involved, consequently suggesting to
all to settle the question by filing a petition for certification election before
the Court of Industrial Relations, with an assurance that the management
will abide by whatever orders the industrial court may issue thereon.

There being no other union or interested person appearing before the

court except the MUEWA, and finding that MUEWA represented more than
the majority of the workers in respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, the court granted the petition and by Order of July 5, 1967,
certified MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the regular workers in said respondent.

That on November 28, 1967, respondent obtained an injunction from

the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, against the
illegal picketing of the local unions; in the first week of December, 1967, the
striking workers began returning to work; on December 13, 1967, a letter
was received from complainant advising respondents that its striking
workers were calling off, lifting the picket line and returning to work, that
from the first week of December, 1967, respondents invited the striking
workers desiring to return to work to fill out an information sheet stating
therein their readiness to work and the exact dates they were available so
that proper scheduling could be done; a number of workers showed no
interest in reporting to work; management posted in the Checkpoint,
Bulletin Boards, and the gates notices calling all workers to return to work
but a number of workers obviously were not interested in returning
anymore;

That it likewise appears in the above-entitled case that the services of

the herein Petitioner was sought by a certain Augusto Carreon together
with his cohorts who are not members of the Marcelo United Employees
and Workers Association much less connected with the Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation wherein the Marcelo United Employees and
Workers Association has an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement;

That precisely because of the acceptance back to work of these

alleged officers and members of the union-movants, and the refusal of
respondents to accept back to work all the individual complainants in this
case mentioned in Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the instant complaint, inspite
of the offer to return to work by the complainants herein made to the
respondents without any conditions at the time of the strike, as per
complainants' letter of December 13, 1967
 On the merits of the case, while the Decision contained opinions to
the effect that the respondent Marcelo Companies were not remiss in their
obligation to bargain, and that the September 4, 1967 strike as well as the
November 7, 1967 strike, were economic strikes, and were, therefore,
illegal because of lack of the required notices of strike before the strikes
were declared in both instances, the Decision, nevertheless, on the opinion
that the "procedure of scheduling adopted by the respondents was in effect
a screening of those who were to be readmitted," declared respondent
Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in discriminating against
the employees named in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" by refusing to admit
them back to work other strikers were admitted back to work after the
strike of November 7, 1967.

Issue:
Whether or not the Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair
labor practice

Ruling:

Yes. Respondents should be, as they are hereby, declared guilty of

unfair labor practice only for the discrimination on terms or conditions of
employment as hereinbefore discussed in connection with the return of the
strikers complainants back to work after the second strike, and, therefore,
ordered to pay the individual complainants appearing in Annexes "A", "B"
and "C" of the Complaint, except Arlington Glodeviza, Jesus Lim, Wilfredo
Jarquio, Leonardo Sakdalan, Jose Roque, Alfredo Cabel, and those still
working, were dismissed for cause, whose contracts expired or who had
resigned as above indicated, their back wages from December l8, 1967 but
only up to June 29, 1970 when this case was submitted for decision, without
reinstatement, minus their earnings elsewhere for the same period.

The trial court erred in finding that respondent discriminated against

individual complainants who were not readmitted to work after the
November 7, 1967 strike while others were able to return to their former
employment and in holding that the procedure adopted by respondents was
in effect a screening of those who were readmitted and in finding
respondents guilty of unfair labor practice by reason thereof.
 The respondent court erred in finding the strikes of September 4 and
November 7, 1967 to be economic strikes and declaring the said strikes
illegal for non-compliance with the procedural requirement of Section 14(d)
of Republic Act 875, although its illegality was condoned or waived because
of the Return-to-Work agreement on the first strike, and the discriminatory
rehiring of the striking employees after the second strike.

4951-ULP of respondent court who were not readmitted to work after

the November 7, 1967 strike, while others were able to return to their
former employment and in holding that the procedure adopted by
petitioners herein was in effect a screening of those who were readmitted
and in finding petitioners herein guilty of unfair labor practice by reasons
thereof.

From the aforecited assignments of errors respectively made in both

petitions before Us, We find that there are only two basic issues posed for
Our resolution, viz: (1) whether or not the complaint filed by LAKAS against
the Marcelo Companies can be sustained, in view of the alleged fact that its
authority to file and prosecute the same has been squarely raised in issue at
the first instance before the respondent court; and (2) whether or not the
Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice, for which they
should be made liable for backwages and be obliged to reinstate the
employees appearing in Annexes "A", "B", and "C " of the complaint, taking
into consideration the prayer of LAKAS anent the correct payment of said
backwages and the non-exclusion of some employees from the benefits
arising from the appealed Decision.

And proceeding from this basis, it follows that all acts instigated by
complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the Notice of strike on June 13,
1967 (although later withdrawn) and the 'two strikes of September 4, 1967
and November 7, 1967 were calculated , designed and intended to compel
the respondent Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it
notwithstanding that it was an uncertified union, or in the case of
respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, to bargain with it despite
the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro vas already certified as the sole
bargaining agent in said respondent company.

here are also other facts which this Court cannot ignore. the
complaint of LAKAS charge that after their first strike of September 4,
1967, management and the striking employees entered into a Return-to-
Work Agreement but that it was violated by the respondent companies who
"refused to admit the members of the three striking local unions ... and gave
reference to the casual employees."

Respondent court, upholding the contention of petitioner LAKAS that

after the second strike, the respondent Marcelo Companies, despite the
strikers' unconditional offer to return to work, refused to readmit them
without "screening" which LAKAS insists to be "discriminatory hiring of the
striking employees, " declared that although the two strikes were illegal,
being economic strikes held in violation of the strike notice requirement,
nevertheless held the Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in
discriminating against the complaining employees by refusing to readmit
them while other strikers were admitted back to work.

Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS, that when it filed the charge

on December 26, 1967, the officers of the movant unions were not yet then
the officers thereof, nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU separated
from and disaffiliated with 'LAKAS to again exercise its rights as
independent local unions, registered before as such, they are no longer
affiliates of LAKAS, as what transpired here.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP,
respondents.

G.R. No. 96425 February 4, 1992

Facts:

In this case, Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) filed a

petition for certiorari seeking to overturn the resolution and orders issued
by Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz and the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, respectively. The controversy revolves around the
requirements for a local or chapter of a federation to file a petition for a
certification election and be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent
for the employees.

The respondent, Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN), filed a

petition for certification election among PDC's rank-and-file employees,
claiming to be a legitimate labor federation with a local chapter,
Progressive Development Employees Union. PDC moved to dismiss the
petition, arguing that KILUSAN failed to comply with the registration
requirements, specifically the submission of constitution and by-laws, a list
of officers and members, and books of accounts.

KILUSAN countered, asserting that it had submitted the necessary

documents for registration and that the local union was recently organized,
thus lacking books of accounts. PDC, in a supplemental position paper,
argued that the submitted documents were unauthenticated and lacked
proper signatures.

Med-Arbiter dela Cruz ruled in favor of KILUSAN, stating that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements, and the mere issuance of the
charter certificate by the federation was sufficient. Undersecretary
Laguesma, treating PDC's motion for reconsideration as an appeal, upheld
the ruling.

Issue:
Whether the local or chapter of a federation must comply with the
same requirements for registration as an independent labor organization.
PDC contended that a local or chapter must meet the same standards,
including duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, a list of officers, and
books of accounts. The Solicitor General argued for substantial compliance,
invoking Article 257 of the Labor Code.

Ruling:

The court emphasized the importance of a certification election based

on a statutory policy and the workers' freedom to express their choice.
However, it noted that Article 257 requires a petition for certification
election to be filed by a legitimate labor organization, as defined in Article
212(h).

The court analyzed the registration requirements and procedures for

independent unions and those affiliating with a federation. It concluded that
a local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization upon submission
of a charter certificate and duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, a
statement on the set of officers, and books of accounts, all certified under
oath.

In this case, the failure of the local union's secretary to certify the
required documents under oath was deemed fatal to its legitimacy. The
court highlighted the potential abuse of local or chapter formation as a tool
to circumvent registration requirements. It concluded that without strict
compliance with statutory requirements, a local or chapter does not attain
legitimate status.

The court also clarified the relationship between a mother union and a
local union, stating that when a petition for certification election is filed by
the federation, acting as an agent, it is deemed filed by the chapter, the
principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization.

Ultimately, the court granted PDC's petition, setting aside the

resolution and orders and making the temporary restraining order
permanent. The decision underscored the need for strict compliance with
legal requirements to ensure the legitimacy of labor organizations.
DONG SEUNG INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HANS LEO J. CACDAC, Director
and NAMAWU Local 188 – Dong Seung Workers Union, respondents.

G.R. No. 162356 April 14, 2008

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts:
Dong Seung Incorporated (petitioner) filed a Petition for cancellation
of the union registration of NAMAWU Local 188-Dong Seung Workers
Union (respondent union) with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), Region IV. The grounds for cancellation included the lack of an
oath in the union secretary's certification attached to the registration
application and alleged deceit in obtaining signatures. The DOLE Region IV
initially granted the petition, delisting the union. However, the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) reversed this decision on appeal, allowing the union
to remain legitimate but requiring the submission of updated documents.
The petitioner contested this, claiming the appeal was filed out of time and
alleging bias by the BLR. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the BLR's
decision, prompting the petitioner to file a Petition for Review before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the timeliness of the respondent union's appeal, alleged bias
by the BLR, and the validity of the respondent union's registration,
specifically regarding the notarization of the union secretary's certification
and the allegations of fraud in obtaining signatures.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the CA Decision and
Resolution. On the timeliness of the appeal, the Court noted that the issue
involved factual considerations of when the judgment was received and
when the appeal was filed, which cannot be addressed in a Rule 45
proceeding. The Court also rejected the claim of bias by the BLR,
emphasizing that expeditious proceedings, as long as due process is
observed, do not constitute bias. Regarding the validity of the respondent
union's registration, the Court upheld the BLR's interpretation that the
absence of notarization in the union secretary's certification did not
invalidate the registration, citing an advisory allowing flexibility in
notarization. The Court also dismissed the petitioner's claim of fraud, citing
the lack of specific details and the questionable authenticity of the evidence.

In conclusion, the petition was denied, affirming the CA Decision and

Resolution, and upholding the legitimacy of NAMAWU Local 188-Dong
Seung Workers Union.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. CEBU B-MEG FEED PLANT, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of DOLE and
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), respondents.

G.R. No. 116172 October 10, 1996

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

Facts:
On September 24, 1993, Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM), a labor
federation, filed a petition for certification election for the monthly-paid
employees of San Miguel Food, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant. IBM claimed
legitimacy under Registration Certificate No. 5369-IP. SMFI-Cebu B-Meg
Feeds Plant, the employer, filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing a pending
similar petition. The earlier petition was filed on April 28, 1993, involving
the same parties and cause of action. IBM argued that the earlier petition
was already resolved, and the new petition complied with requirements.

Issues:
 The main issue was whether IBM, as a local or chapter of a labor
federation, needed a Certificate of Registration from the Bureau of Labor
Relations to be a legitimate labor organization. Another issue was the
authenticity of the charter certificate and the ongoing leadership dispute
within IBM.

Ruling:
The Med-Arbiter granted the second petition for certification election,
directing its conduct. SMFI appealed, asserting IBM's lack of legitimacy.
The Secretary of Labor denied the appeal, affirming the legitimacy of IBM
at SMFI. The court ruled that, based on Article 212(h) of the Labor Code, a
local or chapter becomes legitimate without a Certificate of Registration
upon submission of a charter certificate and other requirements. The court
rejected SMFI's challenge to the authenticity of the charter certificate,
stating that the legitimacy of IBM at SMFI was not affected by the internal
leadership dispute within IBM. The court emphasized that employers should
maintain a hands-off policy in certification elections and upheld the
democratic decision of SMFI workers who chose IBM at SMFI as their
bargaining agent in the election held on August 20, 1994.

AFFILIATION WITH A FEDERATION

CHRYSLER PHILIPPINES LABOR UNION (CPLU), petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANCISCO ESTRELLA, Acting Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU), and CHRYSLER
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (CPC), respondents.

G.R. No. L-46509 November 16, 1978

SANTOS, J.:

Facts:

This case involves a Special Civil Action for Certiorari filed on July 30,
1977, challenging the resolution of Acting Director Francisco Estrella of the
Bureau of Labor Relations. The resolution affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter
Conrado G. Sagun, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certification
election. The grounds for dismissal were that the petitioner, Chrysler
Philippines Labor Union (CPLU), had no legal personality independent from
its mother union, Associated Labor Union (ALU).

The antecedent facts reveal that CPLU was a duly registered labor
organization affiliated with ALU. A new registration certificate was issued in
the name of Chrysler Philippines Labor Union-ALU (CPLU-ALU) after their
affiliation. CPLU-ALU entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with Chrysler Philippines Corporation (CPC). A petition for certification
election was filed, but it was dismissed on the grounds that it was filed
before the expiration of the CBA.

The Acting Director affirmed the dismissal, citing Article 256 of the
Labor Code, which prohibits the entertainment of certification election
issues if a certified CBA exists between the employer and a legitimate labor
organization, except within 60 days prior to the agreement's expiration. The
Acting Director also stated that CPLU-ALU represented the workers in
collective bargaining, and petitioners could refile their petitions if there
were no legal obstacles.

Petitioner then filed a "Petition for Direct Certification with

Preliminary Injunction," alleging that another union, ALU, was claiming to
represent the workers as the proposed bargaining unit, but it represented
the minority. CPLU-ALU opposed this petition, arguing that CPLU had no
legal personality as it had been superseded by CPLU-ALU.
 The Med-Arbiter dismissed CPLU's petition, stating that the issue to
be resolved was the legal personality of CPLU, which was still pending
resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations. The Acting Director affirmed
the dismissal, stating that CPLU had no legal personality independent from
CPLU-ALU and should secure its own registration certificate.

The petition before the court alleged that the Acting Director, in
dismissing their petition, acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction,
and with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:

1. Whether CPLU lost its legal personality after disaffiliation from ALU.
2. Whether the question of representation became moot due to the
ratification of a new CBA.
3. Whether decisions of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
are subject to judicial review.

Ruling:

The court held that CPLU retained its legal personality despite
disaffiliation from ALU. The court cited the Labor Code, which allows
disaffiliation for the purpose of operating as an independent labor
organization. The court rejected the argument that CPLU needed to register
anew after disaffiliation.

The court also rejected the claim that the representation issue
became moot due to the ratification of a new CBA. The ratification was for
the purpose of adopting the CBA and did not address the exclusive
bargaining representative. The court emphasized that the lack of
certification for the new CBA allowed for the holding of a certification
election.

Finally, the court affirmed its jurisdiction for judicial review of

decisions by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. It stated that
certiorari proceedings were appropriate in cases of lack of jurisdiction,
grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud, or collusion.
 As a result, the court reversed the Acting Director's order, remanded
the case to the Bureau of Labor Relations for further proceedings, and
directed the Bureau to call a certification election to resolve the
representation issue. The temporary restraining order was lifted after the
certification election proceeding. The decision was immediately executory,
and no costs were imposed.

DOLORES VILLAR, ROMEO PEQUITO, DIONISIO RAMOS, BENIGNO

MAMARALDO, ORLANDO ACOSTA, RECITACION BERNUS,
ANSELMA ANDAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN and RITA LLAGAS,
petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of the Ministry

of Labor, AMIGO MANUFACTURING INCORPORATED and
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
respondents.
G.R. No. L-50283-84 April 20, 1983

GUERRERO, J.:

Facts:

The Amigo Employees Union (AEU) under the Federation of Unions of

Rizal (FUR) attempted to conduct a certification election. However, due to
opposition from AEU-PAFLU, the petition was denied by the Med-Arbiter.
AEU-PAFLU then held a special meeting and decided to investigate certain
individuals, including Felipe Manlapao, for allegedly maligning and causing
division in the union. A Trial Committee was formed to look into charges of
disloyalty.

While this investigation was ongoing, AEU-PAFLU and the company

reached a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which included a
union security clause stating that members resigning or being expelled
would be dismissed from employment upon the union's request. The
petitioners, facing charges, were summoned to appear before the PAFLU
Trial Committee, but they refused, citing the right to freedom of association.
They also declined to recognize PAFLU's jurisdiction and did not participate
in the rescheduled investigation.

In the absence of the petitioners, the PAFLU Trial Committee found

them guilty based on the charges. The PAFLU President recommended their
termination in accordance with the CBA's security clause. The petitioners
were placed under preventive suspension and denied access to the
workplace during this process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion

when he affirmed the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing the
preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of petitioners by reason of
the exercise of their right to freedom of association.

HELD:

It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal

objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the
Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and
such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. Here, the Company and the
AEU-PAFLU entered into a CBA with a union security clause and the
stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room
for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargaining
agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non-union
membership. Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion
from the general membership of the AEU-PAFLU pursuant to the Decision
of the PAFLU national president.

PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges

filed by their co-employees in the local union and after finding them guilty
as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership under the
constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated. According
to the OIC: stripped of non-essentials, the basic and fundamental issue in
this case tapers down to the determination of WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU
HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE OPPOSITORS AND,
THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE
AMIGOEMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU. Recognized and salutary is the
principle that when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes
bound by the laws and regulations of the parent organization. When a labor
union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or accepts a
charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the superior
body under whose authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-
laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues
pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable
contract between the parent body and the subordinate union, and between
the members of the subordinate union inter se.

'Due process' simply means that the parties were given the
opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and unmistakable
evidence exists to show that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to
present their evidence, but they themselves disdained or spurned the said
opportunity given to them. Inherent in every labor union, or any
organization, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor
union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union;
when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to
which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of
the union which they seek to destroy. We, therefore, hold and rule that
petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from their union and form a new
organization of their own, must, however, suffer the consequences of their
separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA.

FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL LABOR

UNION — TUCP, and EULOGIO LERUM, respondents.

G.R. No. 115180 November 16, 1999

PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:

On February 10, 1986, the National Labor Union-Trade Union

Congress of the Philippines (NLU-TUCP) filed a notice of strike on behalf of
its local chapter, the Filipino Pipe Workers Union-National Labor Union
(FPWU-NLU), against the Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation. The
grounds for the strike were union busting and non-implementation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. The initial conciliation conference
scheduled for February 24, 1986, was reset to March 3, 1986, due to a lack
of notice to the company and failure to provide a copy of the strike notice by
FPWU-NLU. However, on the early morning of March 3, 1986, FPWU-NLU
initiated the strike before the scheduled conciliation conference. The strike
lasted until June 13, 1986, when a return-to-work agreement was reached.

On April 8, 1986, the company petitioned the Arbitration Branch to

declare the strike illegal and sought damages against FPWU-NLU, NLU-
TUCP, and its national president, Atty. Eulogio Lerum. On December 23,
1988, the company moved to partially dismiss the complaint against 43
members of FPWU-NLU but maintained the action against NLU-TUCP and
Atty. Eulogio Lerum. The Labor Arbiter absolved Lerum from liability for
lack of evidence showing personal misconduct.

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC), and on September 29, 1993, the NLRC rendered a decision.
Dissatisfied, the company filed a petition to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS NATIONAL LABOR UNION (NLU)-TUCP AND ATTY.
EULOGIO LERUM ARE NOT PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE AND,
THEREFORE, NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PETITIONER
ON ACCOUNT OF THE ILLEGAL STRIKE THEY HAD DIRECTLY AIDED,
ASSISTED, ABETTED AND PARTICIPATED IN.

Ruling:

Applying the aforecited provision of law in point to the case under

consideration, the Court is of the finding and conclusion that the strike
staged by FPWU-NLU was illegal for want of any legal basis.

A thorough sifting of the pertinent records discloses that the alleged

union busting was not substantiated and the supposed non-implementation
of the collective bargaining agreement was groundless because the
demands of FPWU-NLU, at the time the notice of strike was filed and at...
the time the union actually struck, were the subject of a pending application
for a writ of execution filed by the union in Case No. AB-7933-80 (NCR-CA-
8-674-80), which application was granted on April 4, 1986 by the Labor
Arbiter.[1

Verily, the strike... staged by FPWU-NLU was baseless since it was

still premature then for the union to insist on the implementation of the
advertised provision of the collective bargaining agreement, which was the
subject of a pending writ of execution.

In light of the foregoing, it is beyond cavalry that the subject strike

staged by the union was illegal.

Anent the responsibility for the damages allegedly sustained by

petitioner company on account of the illegal strike, the latter theorized that
the liability therefore should be borne by NLU-TUCP and its national
president, Atty. Eulogio Lerum, for having directly participated in... aiding
and abetting the illegal strike. It is argued that FPWU-NLU is a mere agent
of respondent NLU-TUCP, because FPWU-NLU, which was formed by
respondent NLU-TUCP is not registered as a local unit or chapter but
directly affiliated with the latter and therefore, could not have... acted on its
own. Otherwise stated, petitioner is of the view that FPWU-NLU, a local
union, cannot act as the principal of respondent NLU-TUCP, a mother
federation, because it is not a legitimate labor organization.

In Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary, Department of

Labor and Employment,[15] the Court explained the nature of the
relationship between a mother union/federation and a local union, thus:

"At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between

the mother union and the local union. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills
Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975], the Court
held that the mother union, acting for and... in behalf of its affiliate, had the
status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the
association, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject
only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the
association. x x... x"[16]

The same is true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor
organization. Conformably, in the above cited case the Court ruled that the
mother federation was a mere agent and the local chapter/union was the
principal, notwithstanding the failure of the local union to... comply with the
procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization.

Evidently, in the case under scrutiny, whether or not FPWU, the local
chapter, complied with the procedural requirements that would make it a
legitimate labor organization is immaterial. It would not affect its status as
the principal and basic unit of the association. The... requirement laid down
in the Progressive Development case, that the local union must be a
legitimate labor organization, pertains to the conditions before a union may
file a petition for certification election and to be certified as sole and
exclusive bargaining agent. In the... present case, there is no dispute that
FPWU-NLU is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank
and file employees of the petitioner company. The union's status as a
legitimate labor organization is therefore of no moment in the resolution of
the controversy here. As... the local union, it is considered as the principal;
the entity which staged the illegal strike and the one responsible for the
resulting damages allegedly sustained by the petitioner company.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the

Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No.
003806-92 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES' UNION-CGW, JOSE ENCINAS, JOSE
LUIS TRIBINO, FELIPE DURAN, et, al,. petitioners,

vs.

TROPICAL HUT FOOD MARKET, INC., et, al, respondents.

G.R. No. L-43495-99 January 20, 1990

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Facts:

The workers of the respondent company formed a local union called

THEU and affiliated with the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU).
However, NATU, as a labor federation, was not registered with the
Department of Labor. The main issue is whether the disaffiliation of the
local union from the national federation is valid. The ruling emphasizes that
the right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-
established. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, has
the freedom to disaffiliate when deemed necessary, consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. Local unions are
independent entities designed to secure and maintain equality in bargaining
power, even if they affiliate with a national union. The inclusion of NATU in
the registration with the Department of Labor merely indicates the
affiliation at that time but doesn't restrict the local union's ability to act
independently. The case emphasizes that a local union's existence is based
on the will of its members, not solely on the federation to which it belongs.
The ruling emphasizes the autonomy of local unions in pursuing their
interests and clarifies that registration with a federation doesn't diminish
their independent standing.

(Tablante-Tungol Enterprise vs. Hon. Carmelo Noriel, G.R. No. L-47848,

August 23, 1978)
Issue:

Whether or not illegal strike is a ground for cancellation of

registration.

Ruling:

The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union

registration: ... (e) Acting as a labor contractor or engaging in the "cabo"
system, or otherwise engaging in any activity prohibited by law. Suppletory
to the above provision is Section 6 (c) of Rule II, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended,
which reads as follows: 'Section 6. Denial of Registration of local unions-The
Regional Office may deny the application for registration on any of the
following grounds: ... (c) Engaging in the "cabo " system or other illegal
practices.' It is a fact that Association of Democratic Labor Organization is
not a labor contractor or is it engaged in the 'cabo' system or is it otherwise
engaged in any activity of such nature which is prohibited by law.

The above-quoted article should not be interpreted or construed to

include an illegal strike engaged into by any union. This is so because the
phrase 'or otherwise engaging in any activity prohibited by law' should be
construed to mean such activity engaged into by a union that partakes of
the nature of a labor contractor or 'cabo' system. The law does not intend to
include in the said phrase illegally declared strike simply because strike per
se is legal. Also, if the law intends to include illegally declared strike, the
same could have been expressly placed therein as had been previously done
in Presidential Decree No. 823." 11 Clearly, an awareness of the relevance
of the maxims noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis ought to have
cautioned counsel for petitioner to shy away from this approach
VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION, petitioner,

vs.

BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION FOR

METAL, WORKERS, DMG, INC., PEOPLE'S CAR, INC., KARBAYAN
INC., and RTC TRADING, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-45824 June 19, 1985

CUEVAS, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner was previously affiliated with the Associated Labor Union

for Metal Workers. However, both unions, using the name Volkschel Labor
Union Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers, jointly entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with respondent companies. Later on, a
majority of petitioner's members decided to disaffiliate from the respondent
federation to operate independently, following the Labor Code of the
Philippines. The relevant code states that incumbent affiliates may
disaffiliate for the purpose of joining a proper federation or national union
or operating as an independent labor group.

To formalize the disaffiliation, petitioner's members adopted a

resolution, revoked their check-off authorization for the respondent
federation, and notified the companies involved. The respondent federation,
ALUMETAL, insisted that union dues be continued and sought legal opinion
from the Bureau of Labor Relations. The Med-Arbiter's resolution found the
disaffiliation legal but suggested that petitioner's members should still pay
agency fees to ALUMETAL. Both petitioner and ALUMETAL appealed to the
Director of the Bureau. Petitioner argued that the Med-Arbiter's opinion
contradicted the valid disaffiliation finding, while ALUMETAL claimed that
the disaffiliation should be declared against the law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a local union has the right to disaffiliate from its
mother union.

2 Whether or not companies have the right to effect union dues

collections despite revocation by the employees of the check-off
authorization

Ruling:

1. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to

serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate
when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association (Article IV, Section 7, Philippine
Constitution). Petitioner contends that the disaffiliation was not due to any
opportunist motives on its part. Rather it was prompted by the federation's
deliberate and habitual dereliction of duties as mother federation towards
petitioner union. Employees' grievances were allegedly left unattended to
by the respondent federation to the detriment of the employees' rights and
interests.

2 Under Section 3, Article I, of the CBA, the obligation of the

respondent companies to deduct and remit dues to ALUMETAL is
conditioned on the individual check-off authorization of petitioner's
members, In other words, ALUMETAL is entitled to receive the dues from
respondent companies as long as petitioner union is affiliated with it and
respondent companies are authorized by their employees (members of
petitioner union) to deduct union dues. Without said affiliation, the
employer has no link to the mother union.
 The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with
his affiliation or membership. "The employees' check-off authorization, even
if declared irrevocable, is good only as long as they remain members of the
union concerned." A contract between an employer and the parent
organization as bargaining agent for the employees is terminated by the
disaffiliation of the local of which the employees are members.

RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP

ELISEO FLORA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

VICENTE OXIMANA, ET AL., respondents

G.R. No. L-19745 January 31, 1964

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Facts:

Vicente Oximana has been the president of the Benguet-Balatoc

Workers Union (BBWU) since June 20, 1960, continuously elected in
accordance with the union's constitution and by-laws. In 1926, Oximana was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, leading to a complaint
seeking his removal from the union presidency. The complaint argued
disqualification based on Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875.

Issue:

whether Oximana, given his prior conviction, is eligible to continue

holding the position of president in the BBWU.

Ruling:

Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875 disqualifies individuals convicted of

a crime involving moral turpitude from holding office in a legitimate labor
organization. However, the court considered the effect of a full, absolute,
and plenary pardon granted to Oximana on April 1, 1961. The pardon,
restoring Oximana's civil and political rights, effectively removed all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction. The court affirmed
that the pardon made Oximana a "new man" and, consequently, he was
deemed eligible to hold the office of president in the BBWU. The order
dismissing the complaint was upheld.
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGYAKAP (KMP), ISAGANI
GUTIERREZ, FLORENCIA CARREON, JOSE FLORES, DENNIS
ALINEA, ELADIO DE LUNA and CRISANTO DE VILLA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CRESENCIANO TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, CATALINO SILVESTRE, and CESAR
ALFARO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-62306 January 21, 1985

RELOVA, J.:

Facts:

Petitioners seek to annul the resolution and order of public

respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano, which affirmed the order of
Med-Arbiter Antonio D. Cabibihan. The order directed the Kapisanan ng
Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor Union to conduct a general
membership meeting for a referendum on the expulsion or suspension of
union officers. The request for the referendum was based on financial
irregularities and violations of the labor code and union constitution by the
union officers.

Issue:

whether the order for a referendum on the expulsion or suspension of

union officers is proper, considering the alleged financial irregularities and
violations imputed to the said officers.

Ruling:

The court finds merit in the petition for the following reasons:

1. If the union officers were guilty of the alleged acts, the appropriate
penalty, as per Article 242 of the New Labor Code, should have been their
expulsion from the union, not a referendum.
 2. The alleged falsification and misrepresentation charges against the
union officers lacked substantial evidence. The disallowed expenditures,
while not properly documented, appeared to have been made in good faith
for the benefit of the members.

3. The union membership's re-election of the union officers, except for

those who ran for specific positions, is a clear demonstration of faith in their
leadership and a condonation of any alleged wrongdoing.

Given these considerations, the court deems the holding of the

referendum moot and academic. The petition for the expulsion of the union
officers is dismissed in light of the election held on October 4, 1982,
rendering the resolution and order set aside.

The court sets aside the resolution and order, dated August 13 and
October 19, 1982, respectively, of public respondent Director Cresenciano
B. Trajano and dismisses the petition for expulsion of the union officers due
to its moot and academic nature following the October 4, 1982, election.

JULIAN DUYAG, ARMANDO OLIVARES, JOSE ECHEVARIA,

ALEJANDRO SEVILLA and FELIMON GUINGON, petitioners,

vs.

HON. AMANDO G. INCIONG, as Acting Director of Labor Relation

CARMELO C. NORIEL, as Director of Labor Relations, RICA R.
MANALAD, HONORATO K. LEANO, EDUARDO AMPARO and SANTOS
PUERTO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-47775 July 5, 1980

AQUINO, J.:

Facts:

This case involves the removal of private respondents as union

officers due to alleged irregularities and anomalies in the administration of
the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union. The petitioners, arrastre
checkers of E. Razon, Inc., filed a complaint against four private
respondents, who held key positions in the union. The charges included
unauthorized increases in union dues, withholding of union members' share
in profits, disbursements exceeding P500 without board authorization,
maladministration of the welfare fund, membership in another union, and
conflict of interest by one of the respondents.

Issue:

Whether the power to remove union officers rests solely with the union
members or if the Bureau of Labor Relations has the power to expel officers
found guilty of violating the rights and conditions of union membership
under Article 242 of the Labor Code.

Ruling:

The Med-Arbiter decided to remove the union officers, and this

decision was affirmed by the Director of Labor Relations. The private
respondents argued that the Bureau should only remove guilty union
officers when the members could not do so under the union's constitution
and by-laws, subject to review by the Minister of Labor. However, the court
held that the Bureau of Labor Relations unquestionably has the power to
remove erring union officers under the last paragraph of Article 242 of the
Labor Code. The court affirmed the removal of certain union officers,
ordered an examination of the union's books, and declared the petitioners
entitled to a refund of illegally collected union dues.

The court affirmed the removal of certain union officers, asserted the
Bureau's power to remove erring union officers, ordered an examination of
the union's books, and declared the petitioners entitled to a refund of
illegally collected union dues. The decision emphasizes the need for
vigilance and supervision by labor officials to prevent abuses and corruption
within labor unions.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.

RAFAEL HERNANDEZ, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-19791 May 16, 1967

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Facts:
This case involves an appeal by certiorari to review the resolution en
banc of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) in Case No. 2585-ULP, dated
April 26, 1962. The complaint was filed by Rafael S. Hernandez and other
union members against Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad
Company and its officers, alleging violations of Republic Act No. 875. The
charges included unauthorized assessments, inappropriate appropriations,
salary increases without approval, misuse of union funds, and refusal to
allow inspection of union books. The lower court initially rendered a
judgment, and upon a motion for reconsideration, the en banc issued a new
resolution modifying the original decision.

Issue:
whether the CIR has the power to declare a union assessment
excessive and unjustified, if the CIR can interfere with internal union
procedures when the highest governing body has not been availed of,
whether the CIR is limited to evidence presented during the hearing, and
whether the 10% requirement under Section 17 of Republic Act 875 has
been complied with.

Ruling:

The court, citing Section 17 of Republic Act 875, acknowledges the

power of the CIR to intervene in internal union affairs, provided that at least
10% of the union membership reports an alleged violation, and internal
procedures have been exhausted. The court rejects the argument that the
10% requirement was not satisfied, affirming the lower court's finding. It
also recognizes exceptions to the exhaustion of internal remedies,
particularly when it would amount to a denial of justice. The court remands
the case for the reception of evidence concerning resolutions passed during
a union convention, which may have a material bearing on the issues.

The court sets aside the decision appealed from, remanding the case
for the presentation of evidence related to certain resolutions. It
emphasizes the importance of adhering to due process, allowing the
respondents the opportunity to cross-examine and test the veracity of
evidence. The decision reflects the court's commitment to ensuring fair
proceedings and considering all relevant facts before rendering a judgment.

THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGENT

DEMOCRATIC LABOR ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER,

VS.
CEBU STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC. ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E
C IS I O N BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

G. R. No. L-10321, February 28, 1958

Facts:
A petition for a certification election was filed to determine the
collective bargaining unit representing employees and laborers of Cebu
Stevedoring Co., Inc. Three labor unions intervened: Democratic Labor
Association, Cebu Trade Union, and Katubsanan sa Mamumuo. Disputes
arose on the appropriate bargaining unit and the eligibility of each labor
organization.

The court found Cebu Stevedores Association ineligible due to lack of

registration. Katubsanan Sa Mamumuo, seemingly uninterested, was
implied to have waived its claim. The judge ordered an election among
casual laborers, limiting voting to Democratic Labor Association and Cebu
Trade Union, both legally registered.
 Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., Cebu Stevedores Association, and
Katubsanan sa Mamumuo sought reconsideration, challenging the ruling on
bargaining units and union eligibility. A split vote occurred during the en
banc review.

Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. operates in stevedoring and lighterage.

Two worker categories exist: regular employees with benefits and casual
laborers (stevedores) paid daily without benefits. The trial court proposed
two separate bargaining units for certification.

The trial court certified Democratic Labor Association for regular

employees. Cebu Stevedores Association, with more casual laborers but
unregistered, was ineligible. Unclear evidence on Democratic Labor Union's
composition favored holding a certification election, per the en banc
decision.

Issue:
The issue now to be determined is: Considering that there are two
sets of employees or laborers working in respondent company, one regular
and permanent and the other casual or temporary, is it proper and,
convenient that there should be onc collective bargaining unit for... each, aa
held by the trial court, or only one collective bargaining unit for all the
workers and employees of said respondent company regardless of their
terms of employment, as held by the court en banc?

Ruling:

We therefore find that the conclusion reached by the trial court to the
effect that two separate bargaining units should be formed in dealing with
the respondent company, namely, one consisting of regular and permanent
employees, and the other consisting of casual laborers or... stevedores, is
correct, it being supported by precedents on the matter

Wherefore, the decision of the industrial court en banc dated

November 7, 1955 is hereby modified as follows: (1) the Democratic labor
Association is hereby declared as the collective bargaining agent for the
regular and permanent employees and workers of respondent company;...
and (2) let certification election be held for casual or temporary employees
and workers in which the following organizations should participate: Cebu
Stevedores Association, Democratic Labor Association, Katubsanan Sa
Mamumuo and Cebu Trade Union. No pronouncement as to... costs.

Principles:

This issue is novel in this jurisdiction. No other case has arisen before
involving a similar issue and which may serve as a guide for the
determination of the controversy. However, American precedents on the
matter abound and to them we should resort to considering that our...
present Magna Carta has been patterned after the American law on the
subject. Under these precedents, there are various factors which must be
satisfied and considered in determining the proper constituency of the
bargaining unit. No one particular factor is itself decisive of the...
determination. The weight accorded to any particular factor varies in
accordance with the particular question or questions that may arise in a
given case. What are these factors? Rothenberg mentions a good number,
but the most pertinent to our case are: (1) will of employees

(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employees' interest, such as

substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and... probationary
employees (Rothenberg on labor Relations, pp. 488-510). A brief discussion
of the nature of each of these factors becomes necessary.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, Department of Labor and Employment, and THE ALL U.P.
WORKERS' UNION, represented by its President, Rosario del
Rosario, respondent.

G.R. No. 96189 July 14, 1992

NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts:

The University of the Philippines seeks to nullify an Order of the

Bureau of Labor Relations that classified professors, associate professors,
and assistant professors as rank-and-file employees, implying they should be
in the same bargaining unit as non-academic employees. The University
argues for two bargaining units: one for academic and one for non-academic
employees. The case originated from a petition by the Organization of Non-
Academic Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) for a certification election among non-
academic employees.

Issue:
Whether professors should be classified as rank-and-file employees
and included in the same bargaining unit as non-academic personnel, or if
there should be separate bargaining units for academic and non-academic
employees.

Ruling:
The Court affirmed the classification of professors as rank-and-file
employees but modified the order, stating that non-academic rank-and-file
employees should constitute one bargaining unit, excluding academic
employees. The Court emphasized the "community or mutuality of interests"
test, stating that the dissimilarity in the nature of work and duties,
compensation, and working conditions between academic and non-academic
personnel justified separate bargaining units. The ruling also highlighted
the exception in Executive Order No. 180 for circumstances requiring
different organizational units based on substantial differences. The decision
recognized that professors, due to their distinct roles and interests, should
form a separate collective bargaining unit. Only non-academic rank-and-file
personnel were deemed eligible to participate in the certification election.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFTU),

Petitioner,
vs.
MAINIT LUMBER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY WORKERS UNION-
UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
(MALDECOWU-ULGWP), Respondents.

Facts:

Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union

(MALDECOWU), a recognized labor organization, filed a petition for a
certification election to determine the collective bargaining representative
for the rank-and-file workers at MALDECO. The petitioner argued that there
had been no certification election in the past 12 months. The Med-Arbiter
granted the petition, but NAFTU (another labor group) appealed, claiming
that MALDECO had two distinct bargaining units (Sawmill Division and
Logging Division) treated as one in the petition. The Bureau of Labor
Relations upheld the decision. Separate certification elections were held,
with MALDECO-ULGWP winning 146 votes to NAFTU's 2. NAFTU filed an
election protest, alleging vote buying and threats. The Med-Arbiter
dismissed the protest, and NAFTU's appeals and motions for
reconsideration were denied by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Issues:

Whether or not there was massive vote buying and serious threat to
life to justify invalidating the result of the election. Whether or not an
election protest in a certification election can be given due course even if
not entered in the minutes of the election.

Ruling:

Both no. The court ruled, after a careful perusal of the records of this
case and after considering, adducing and weighing all the pleadings,
arguments, etc. and the circumstances attendant to the instant case, this
Office is of the opinion that the grounds relied upon by the protestant
NAFTU in its protest are bereft of any merit, hence, this Office finds no
cogent reason to order the invalidation or annulment of the certification
election under protest or the holding of a run-off election thereat between
no union and the protestee, MALDECOWU-ULGWP. Indeed, the minutes of
said certification elections conducted both at the sawmill and logging
departments on August 15 and 21, 1986 respectively, of the
respondent/employer showed that there was no protest on massive vote
buying accompanied with grave and serious threats, force and intimidation
raised by any of the parties who were ably represented in said elections.
Paragraph 2, Section 9, Rule 6 of the Rules and Regulations implementing
the Labor Code of the Philippines (now Section 3, Rule VI, Book 5 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code) provides that protests not so
raised and contained in the minutes of the proceedings are deemed waived.
Allegations of vote buying, grave and serious threats, force and intimidation
are questions of fact which should be contained in the minutes of said
proceedings. There is no clear and convincing proof presented by the
protestant in support of its contention, hence, we have no other alternative
than to uphold the election results.
PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents

G.R. No. L-14656 November 29, 1960

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Facts:
The case involves a petition for certiorari challenging the Court of
Industrial Relations' order certifying the Allied Workers' Association of the
Philippines, San Carlos Chapter, as the sole collective bargaining
representative of San Carlos Milling Co., Inc. A certification election was
ordered to determine the bargaining agent between two labor unions,
Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) and Allied Workers'
Association (AWA).

Issue:
The main issue revolves around the eligibility of certain voters,
specifically 242 stevedores and piece workers. PLASLU contends that these
votes should be excluded from the total, while AWA argues for their
inclusion, asserting that these employees were eligible.

Ruling:
 The Court found PLASLU's contention to be meritorious. The
Industrial Court's order for the certification election specified the use of the
payroll list from the milling season of 1955 to determine eligible voters. The
challenged votes were cast by casual employees (stevedores and piece
workers) not included in this list. The Court emphasized that the
employment status, nature of work, and mutuality of interest must be
considered in determining the proper constituency of a bargaining unit. As
the challenged workers were on a casual basis and lacked a reasonable
expectation of continued employment, their inclusion in a unit of permanent
employees was deemed inappropriate.

Disregarding the challenged votes, the final results favored PLASLU.

Therefore, the Court reversed the order, certifying PLASLU as the collective
bargaining agent for San Carlos Milling Company's employees.

KNITJOY MANUFACTURING, INC., Petitioner,

V.
PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, and
KNITJOY MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 81883. September 23, 1992

Facts:

KNITJOY and the Federation of Filipino Workers (FFW) had a

collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that covered regular daily or piece-
rate employees, excluding monthly-paid office and production staff. The
CBA ended in June 1987. The Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS) sought a certification election for daily and piece-rate
workers, resulting in CFW winning. While negotiating a new CBA with CFW,
another union, KMEU, petitioned for a certification election for monthly-
paid employees. Med-Arbiter dismissed it, but the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), through Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, reversed the decision
in December 1987, disregarding KNITJOY's arguments about similarities in
working incentives and managerial roles among monthly-paid employees.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner KNITJOY'S monthly-paid regular rank-and-
file employees can constitute an appropriate bargaining unit separate and
distinct from the existing unit composed of daily or piece-rate paid regular
rank-and-file employees, and Whether or not the inclusion in the coverage
of the new CBA between KNITJOY and CFW of the monthly-paid rank-and-
file employees bars the holding of a certification election among the said
monthly paid employees.

Ruling:
We decide for the respondents. The suggested bias of the Labor Code
in favor of the one company-one union policy, anchored on the greater
mutual benefits which the parties could derive, especially in the case of
employees whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by
their unity and... solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and
dissension, is not without exceptions.

The present Article 245 of the Labor Code expressly allows

supervisory employees who are not performing managerial functions to join,
assist or form their separate union but bars them from membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. "ART. 245. Ineligibility of
managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. -- Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may
join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own." This
provision obviously allows more than one union in a company.

Even Section 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of the Labor Code, which seeks to implement the policy, also
recognizes exceptions. It reads: "SEC. 2. Who may file. -- Any legitimate
labor organization or the employer, when requested to bargain collectively,
may file the petition.

The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization, shall

contain, among others:... x x x (c) description of the bargaining unit which
shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require; x x x."
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends
two (2) broad notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of
restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for himself without
being prevented by... law, and (b) the power, by virtue of which an
employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association.

CERTIFICATION ELECTION

ALLIED FREE WORKERS' UNION (PLUM), petitioner,

vs.
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, Manager JOSE C. TEVES, and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-22951 and L-22952 January 31, 1967

Facts:

This case involves a contract between Compania Maritima

(MARITIMA), a local shipping company, and Allied Free Workers’ Union
(AFWU), a registered labor union, for stevedoring and arrastre services in
Iligan City. The contract allowed MARITIMA to revoke it if AFWU failed to
provide satisfactory service. MARITIMA complained about inefficient
service and terminated the contract in August 1954, hiring another union
for the same services. AFWU filed a complaint of unfair labor practices, but
MARITIMA denied an employer-employee relationship. The court rescinded
the contract, enjoining AFWU from working for MARITIMA. AFWU later
secured an injunction, allowing them to resume work in 1961. In 1963, the
court ordered a certification election for workers in Iligan City's wharf to
determine representation for collective bargaining. AFWU and MARITIMA
appealed, AFWU seeking immediate recognition as the majority union,
while MARITIMA argued against the certification election due to the
absence of an employer-employee relationship.

ISSUE:

WON the order of a certification election by the CIR was proper.

(WON there was an ER-EE relationship between AFWU and MARITIMA)

HELD

NO. Before a certification election can be held, there must exist an

ER-EE relationship between the ER and the petitioner union. Ratio The duty
to bargain collectively exists only between the “employer” and its
“employees.” Where there is no duty to bargain collectively, it is not proper
to hold certification elections in connection therewith. Reasoning In its
findings, the CIR observed that after the rescission, the AFWU laborers
continued working in accordance with the “cabo system,” which was the
prevailing custom in the place. Under this system, the union was an
independent contractor. The CIR also made a finding that prior to the
contract between MARITIMA and AFWU, the former had an oral arrastre
and stevedoring agreement with another union, the Iligan Laborers Union
(ILU), which agreement was also based on the “cabo” system. After
unsatisfactory service, MARITIMA cancelled this oral contract and entered
into a new contract with AFWU, the terms and conditions of which were
similar to the oral contract with ILU. The written contract between AFWU
and MARITIMA was signed under the assurance by AFWU that the same
arrangement previously had with the former union regarding performance
and execution of arrastre and stevedoring contract be followed in
accordance with the custom of such kind of work in Iligan. Thus, petitioner
union operated as a labor contractor under the so-called “cabo” system.

-From these findings, Insofar as the working agreement was

concerned, there was no real difference between the contract and the prior
oral agreement. Both were based on the “cabo” system. Hence, since the
parties observed the “cabo” system after the rescission of the contract, and
since the characteristics of said system show that the contracting union was
an independent contractor, it is reasonable to assume that AFWU continued
being an independent contractor of MARITIMA. And, being an independent
contractor, it could not qualify as an “employee”. With more reason would
this be true with respect to the laborers. Moreover, there is no evidence at
all regarding the characteristics of the working arrangement between
AFWU and MARITIMA after the termination of the CONTRACT. All we have
to go on is the court a quo’s finding that the “cabo” system was observed-a
system that negatives employment relationship.

-Since the only function of a certification election is to determine, with

judicial sanction, which union shall be the official representative or
spokesman of the “employees” will be, there being no ER-EE relationship
between the parties disputants, it follows that there is neither a duty to
bargain collectively. Thus, the order for certification election in question
cannot be sustained

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP,
respondents.

G.R. No. 96425 February 4, 1992

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts:
The case involves Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) and
the petition for certification election filed by Pambansang Kilusan ng
Paggawa (KILUSAN), claiming to be a legitimate labor federation.
KILUSAN's local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union
(PDEU-KILUSAN), sought certification as the exclusive bargaining agent for
PDC's rank-and-file employees. PDC contested the petition, arguing that
PDEU-KILUSAN failed to comply with the registration requirements,
specifically the submission of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, a
list of officers, and books of accounts.

Issue:
The main issue is whether PDEU-KILUSAN, as a local chapter of
KILUSAN, qualifies as a legitimate labor organization entitled to file a
petition for certification election without complying with the registration
requirements.

Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of PDC, holding that PDEU-KILUSAN must
adhere to the statutory requirements for a legitimate labor organization. It
emphasized that the affiliation of a local or chapter with a federation or
national union does not exempt it from compliance. The court stressed the
importance of preventing fraud and ensuring that the local or chapter is a
bona fide organization. The failure of PDEU-KILUSAN to have its documents
certified under oath by the secretary was deemed fatal to its acquisition of
legitimate status. The court affirmed the need for strict compliance with the
law's requisites for the formation of a local or chapter, underscoring that
the intent of the law is to balance the bargaining power of unions while
preventing abuse, fraud, or misrepresentation. The court also clarified that
the filing of the petition for certification election by the federation, acting as
an agent, is deemed filed by the local or chapter, which must be a legitimate
labor organization.
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON.
RODOLFO S. MILADO, Department of Labor and Employment
Mediator-Arbiter for Region VIII, Tacloban, City, and PHILPHOS
MOVEMENT FOR PROGRESS, INC. (PMPI), respondents.

G.R. No. L-98050 March 17, 1994

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI) filed a petition for
certification election among the supervisory employees of Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS). PHILPHOS did not oppose
the petition, but it submitted a position paper specifying its exceptions,
excluding superintendents who were considered managerial, and asserting
that professional/technical employees were not supervisory. Mediator-
Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado ordered the certification election among
supervisory employees, excluding superintendents and
professional/technical employees. PMPI then filed an amended petition
seeking to represent professional/technical and confidential employees. The
Mediator-Arbiter granted the amended petition, and the Secretary of Labor
affirmed it, leading to the filing of a petition by PHILPHOS.

Issues:
1. Whether PHILPHOS was denied due process in the proceedings
before the Mediator-Arbiter.
2. Whether professional/technical and confidential employees of
PHILPHOS may validly join the PMPI union, which is composed of
supervisors.
Ruling:
1. PHILPHOS was not denied due process. Due process requires an
opportunity to be heard, and in this case, PHILPHOS agreed to file its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the position papers. This was considered
sufficient compliance with due process, as it afforded PHILPHOS a
reasonable opportunity to present its side.
2. Professional/technical employees of PHILPHOS cannot validly join
the PMPI union, which is a supervisory union. The employees were
classified into three groups by R.A. 6715: managerial, supervisory, and rank
and file. Professional/technical employees were considered non-supervisory
based on their functions and were more aligned with rank and file. The law
prohibits supervisory employees from joining a union of rank and file
employees. The decision of the Secretary of Labor was set aside, and the
Department of Labor was directed to conduct a certification election among
supervisory employees, excluding professional/technical employees.

The petition was granted, and the decision and order of the Secretary
of Labor were set aside, with directions for the exclusion of
professional/technical employees from the PMPI union

UNITED ALUMINUM FABRICATORS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, and
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN),
respondents.

G.R. No. 93016 July 3, 1992

Facts:
United Aluminum Fabricators Workers' Union (UAFWU) is the
exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file employees of United
Aluminum Fabricators (United Aluminum). They entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for a three-year period from April 1, 1986, to
April 29, 1989. Before the expiration of the CBA, United Aluminum and
UAFWU renegotiated a new CBA for five years, taking effect upon the
expiration of the old CBA on April 29, 1989. This new CBA was registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). After more than
two months from the expiry of the freedom period, KAMPIL filed a petition
for direct certification/certification election with the DOLE, challenging the
majority status of UAFWU.

United Aluminum filed a motion to dismiss the petition, citing the

existing and duly registered CBA with UAFWU as a bar to the certification
election. United Aluminum presented documentary evidence of the new
CBA, a certification from the Chief of the Industrial Relations Division
attesting to its existence, and proofs of ratification by the majority of
employees.

UAFWU filed a motion to intervene, stating its interest in the outcome

of the case, as any decision would affect its members and the
implementation of the existing CBA.

The Med-Arbiter dismissed KAMPIL's petition, ruling that it lacked

merit. However, the Secretary of Labor set aside the Med-Arbiter's decision
and ordered a certification election.

Issues:
1. Whether the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the conduct of a certification election despite the
existence of a valid CBA.
2. Whether KAMPIL's petition was supported by the required written
consent of at least 20% of rank-and-file employees.

Ruling:
1. The Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion. The
Labor Code prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during
the existence of a CBA except within the freedom period of 60 days. In this
case, UAFWU and United Aluminum entered into a new CBA for five years,
starting from April 29, 1989. KAMPIL filed its petition 69 days after the
expiration of the freedom period. The existence of a valid and registered
CBA constituted a bar to the certification election.

2. KAMPIL's petition was not supported by the required written

consent of at least 20% of rank-and-file employees. The records did not
show such consent, and the failure to determine with legal certainty
whether the union enjoyed majority representation could be grounds to
nullify the certification election.
 As a result, both petitions were granted, the decision of the Secretary
of Labor was annulled and set aside, the Med-Arbiter's order was
reinstated, and the temporary restraining order was made permanent.

MONARK INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL (Bureau of Labor Relations),
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and PHILIPPINE TECHNICAL CLERICAL
COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PTCCEA), respondents

G.R. Nos. L-47570-71 May 11, 1978

Facts:
In the case of United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries
Philippines v. Noriel, the Court emphasized the importance of a certification
election in the collective bargaining process, viewing it as crucial to the
institution of collective bargaining and a means to give substance to the
principle of majority rule, a fundamental concept of democratic policy. The
case involved a petition filed by the United Employees Union against
Director Noriel, challenging the latter's decision to order a certification
election.

Issues:
 1. Whether there was a valid objection to the finding that there was
full compliance with the 30% requirement for a certification election.
2. Whether the employer, petitioner in this case, had standing to
challenge the Director's decision.
3. Whether the Director's holding of conferences preparatory to the
certification election was a valid administrative measure or displayed
favoritism.

Ruling:
1. The Court held that there was no valid objection to the finding of
full compliance with the 30% requirement. Even if there were doubts about
meeting the required number of employees, a certification election was the
most effective way to determine the union that truly commanded the
allegiance of the rank-and-file employees.

2. The Court noted that the employer filed the petition, which was
unusual since the institution of collective bargaining is designed to allow
labor to freely choose its representative. The employer's participation may
lend itself to suspicions of partiality, contrary to the spirit of labor laws. The
Court emphasized the need for management to maintain a hands-off policy
in the collective bargaining process unless specific circumstances, such as
invoking the contract-bar rule, justify its involvement. In this case, the
employer lacked standing to raise certain issues.

3. The Court found that there was no plausible objection to the

Director holding conferences preparatory to the certification election. Such
measures were considered wise and prudent to ensure a fair and honest
election. The employer's claim of prejudice was not supported, and it lacked
standing to raise concerns about the Director's actions.

In conclusion, the Court found the petition lacked merit and dismissed
it, emphasizing the need for the judiciary to refrain from interference in
purely administrative matters related to certification elections.

THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-PAFLU, PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and
JUANITO GARCIA, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-24711 April 30, 1968

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

("BENGUET") and two labor organizations, BCI Employees & Workers
Union ("UNION") and the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
("PAFLU"). The factual background reveals that a Collective Bargaining
Contract was entered into on June 23, 1959, between Benguet-Balatoc
Workers Union ("BBWU") and BENGUET. This contract, effective for four
and a half years, included a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. In 1962, a
certification election certified UNION as the exclusive bargaining agent.
Subsequently, UNION filed a notice of strike, leading to a strike in March
1963.

During the strike, incidents of violence and coercion occurred, with

picketers displaying placards bearing BBWU-PAFLU. After two weeks, the
parties agreed to end the dispute, resulting in the execution of an
agreement between BENGUET and UNION-PAFLU. BENGUET incurred
significant expenses due to the strike.

Issues:

1. Whether the Collective Bargaining Contract between BBWU and

BENGUET automatically bound UNION-PAFLU upon certification as the
bargaining representative.

2. Whether the labor unions and their presidents are liable for the
illegal acts during the strike and picketing.

3. Whether the defendants are liable to pay damages claimed by

BENGUET.
Ruling:

1. The Court rejected BENGUET's argument that the "Doctrine of

Substitution" automatically bound UNION-PAFLU to the Collective
Bargaining Contract's terms. The doctrine, formulated by the National
Labor Relations Board, states that during the effectivity of a collective
bargaining agreement, employees can change their bargaining agent, but
the contract continues until its expiration. However, this doctrine does not
extend to automatically impose the terms of the previous contract on the
newly certified bargaining agent. The Court emphasized that UNION did
not formally adopt the existing contract or assume its liabilities before the
strike.

2. The Court held that the rule of vicarious liability had been
legislatively eliminated by Republic Act 875. To establish liability, there
must be clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization or ratification
of, the illegal acts. Although there were instances of violence during the
strike, the court found that the union leaders had warned against violence,
and the evidence did not establish the necessary level of participation or
authorization to hold the unions and their officials liable.

3. The Court ruled that since the defendants were not contractually
bound by the no-strike clause, they could not be held liable for breach of
contract. The lower court's decision to absolve them from liability was
upheld.

The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, stating that BENGUET
failed to prove that UNION-PAFLU was automatically bound by the
Collective Bargaining Contract and that the labor unions and their officials
were liable for the damages claimed.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and
MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA),
respondent.

G.R. No. 127598 February 22, 2000

Facts:
In this case, the Court addressed a petition challenging the orders of
the Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996, and December 28, 1996. The
orders pertained to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) dispute
between the petitioner corporation and the respondent union. The
petitioner sought to set aside certain aspects of the Secretary's orders,
while the union sought modifications and additional benefits. The court
disposed of the case on January 27, 1999, granting the petition, setting
aside the specified orders, and directing the parties to execute a CBA with
certain modifications. The retirement fund issue was remanded to the
Secretary for further proceedings.

Issue:
The primary issues involved modifications to the Secretary's
resolutions, including matters related to wages, Christmas bonus, retirees,
loans, benefits, retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, and other
contentious points. Dissatisfied parties filed motions for reconsideration,
alleging that certain matters, particularly those related to wages and the
retroactivity of the CBA, needed further consideration.

Ruling:
The court rejected arguments related to the alleged threat of passing
wage increase costs to consumers and emphasized that approval by the
appropriate regulatory agency is required for any increase in electricity
rates. The court also addressed the reliability of a financial analyst's report,
stating it lacked sufficient support and could not be considered a
commercial list.
 Regarding wages, the court adjusted the awarded amount based on
the petitioner's actual net income for 1996, setting it at P2,000.00 for the
two-year period. The court underscored that the new amounts were
significantly higher than the average salary in the community. On the
retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, the court established a two-year
period from December 1, 1995, to November 30, 1997, rejecting the
petitioner's claim for retroactivity from the date of the Secretary's award.

The court dismissed claims related to the grant of a loan to a

cooperative, distinguishing it from housing loans, which were justified as a
basic necessity. The court clarified a typographical error in the duration of
union leave, confirming it as thirty (30) days. The court also rejected an
added requirement of consultation in contracting out for six months or
more, asserting that the law and jurisprudence already provided sufficient
regulation in this matter.

The court partially granted the motion for reconsideration, modifying

the retroactivity period and adjusting the awarded wage amount. The
decision was affirmed in all other respects, subject to monetary advances
granted by the petitioner during the case's pendency.
GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD,
DENNIS R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and
ISAGANI ALDEA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman of the PAL
Inter-Agency Task Force created under Administrative Order No. 16;
HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor
and Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY
SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J.
BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 135547 January 23, 2002

Facts:
Philippine Airlines (PAL) faced financial difficulties due to strikes by
PAL pilots and the PAL Employees Association (PALEA). PAL downsized its
labor force, and a Task Force, created by an Administrative Order, mediated
between PAL management and the unions. PAL proposed transferring
shares to employees and suspending the Collective Bargaining Agreements
(CBAs) for ten years. PALEA initially accepted but later rejected the offer.
PAL informed the Task Force of its decision to shut down operations,
leading PALEA to seek intervention from the President and Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). A referendum was conducted, and the
PALEA members rejected the offer. PAL ceased operations, and PALEA
proposed new terms, leading to a ratified agreement between PAL and
PALEA.

Issues:
1. Whether an original action for certiorari and prohibition is the
proper remedy to annul the PAL-PALEA agreement.
2. Whether the PAL-PALEA agreement, stipulating the suspension of
the PAL-PALEA CBA for ten years, is unconstitutional and contrary to public
policy.

Ruling:
1. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed because the
public respondents did not perform judicial or quasi-judicial acts, and there
is an available plain, speedy, and adequate remedy through an ordinary civil
action for annulment of contract.
2. The PAL-PALEA agreement is a valid exercise of the freedom to
contract, not violating Article 253-A of the Labor Code. The suspension of
the CBA for ten years is justified given the unique circumstances faced by
PAL, and the agreement upholds the principle of inviolability of contracts
guaranteed by the Constitution. The petition is dismissed.

This ruling affirms the validity of the PAL-PALEA agreement, emphasizing

the voluntary nature of the agreement, its role in preventing PAL's closure,
and its compliance with legal provisions.

STRIKES

BIFLEX PHILS. INC. LABOR UNION (NAFLU), PATRICIA

VILLANUEVA, EMILIA BANDOLA, RAQUEL CRUZ, DELIA RELATO,
REGINA CASTILLO, LOLITA DELOS ANGELES, MARISSA VILLORIA,
MARITA ANTONIO, LOLITA LINDIO, ELIZA CARAULLIA, LIZA SUA,
and FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION
(NAFLU), MYRNA DELA TORRE, AVELINA AÑONUEVO, BERNICE
BORCELO, NARLIE YAGIN, EVELYN SANTILLAN, LEONY
SERDONCILO, TRINIDAD CUYA, ANDREA LUMIBAO, GYNIE ARNEO,
ELIZABETH CAPELLAN, JOSEPHINE DETOSIL, ZENAIDA
FRANCISCO, and FLORENCIA ANAGO, petitioners,
vs.
FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and
BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 155679 December 19, 2006

Facts:
The petition involves a dispute between petitioners, officers of Biflex
(Phils.) Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor
Union, and respondents, sister companies engaged in the garment business.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector organized a welga ng bayan (general
strike), and petitioners, along with other workers, staged a work stoppage.
Respondents claimed that the work stoppage was illegal for failure to
comply with procedural requirements. After the work stoppage,
respondents allegedly refused entry to petitioners as punishment for their
participation in the strike. Respondents filed a petition to declare the work
stoppage illegal.

Issue:
Whether the work stoppage staged by petitioners was legal, and
whether respondents' refusal to allow entry constituted an illegal lockout.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations
Commission's decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's ruling that the
work stoppage was illegal. The court discredited petitioners' claim of being
illegally locked out, emphasizing their failure to file a complaint or protest
with the management. The court also noted that petitioners failed to comply
with the legal requirements of a valid strike. The appellate court reinstated
the termination of petitioners' employment by respondents.

The court emphasized that even if the participation in the welga ng

bayan were considered an exercise of freedom of expression, such exercise
is not absolute and should consider the protection of other significant state
interests. The court ruled that the work stoppage was illegal, considering
petitioners' failure to notify or obtain permission from respondents and
their subsequent blocking of the company premises. The decision affirms
the principle that the legality of a strike is determined not only by
compliance with legal formalities but also by the means by which it is
carried out. The court held that petitioners, as union officers, should bear
the consequences of knowingly participating in an illegal strike, and their
termination was a valid exercise of management prerogative.

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND

ALLIED INDUSTRIES—MANILA PAVILLION HOTEL CHAPTER,
Petitioner,
- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ACESITE

PHILIPPINES HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 179402

Facts:

The hotel had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with HI-

MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (HIMPHLU) that was supposed
to last for five years until June 30, 2005. Before its expiration, the hotel and
HIMPHLU negotiated an extension for two years, from July 1, 2005, to June
30, 2007. NUWHRAIN, a newly recognized labor organization, challenged
the majority status of HIMPHLU by filing a Petition for Certification
Election. The Department of Labor and Employment allowed the extension
of the CBA between HIMPHLU and the hotel for another two years.
HIMPHLU then demanded the dismissal of 36 employees expelled for
disloyalty. Despite reconciliatory conferences, NUWHRAIN filed a Notice of
Strike, alleging unfair labor practices by the hotel. The case was certified
for compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Labor. NUWHRAIN claimed
that the hotel committed unfair labor practices in issuing notices to
employees who switched allegiance from HIMPHLU to NUWHRAIN. During
a reconciliatory conference, the hotel's Vice President expressed a
preference for dealing with HIMPHLU and blamed NUWHRAIN for the
labor problems.

Issue:
Is there an unfair labor practice on the part of the Hotel?
Ruling:
No. Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms

and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other
law shall prevent the parties from requiring membership in a recognized
collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except of those
employees who are already members of another union at the time of the
signing of the collective bargaining agreement x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
 The law allows stipulations for "union shop" and "closed shop" as a
means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice
in the protection of their rights and interests vis-à-vis the employer. By thus
promoting unionism, workers are able to negotiate with management on an
even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to
individually and separately bargain with the employer.

In Villar v. Inciong, this Court held that employees have the right to
disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their own;
however, they must suffer the consequences of their separation from the
union under the
security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In the present case,
the Collective Bargaining Agreement includes a union security provision. To
avoid the clear possibility of liability for breaching the union security clause
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and to protect its own interests, the
only sensible option left to the Hotel, upon its receipt of the demand of
HIMPHLU for the dismissal of the 36 employees, was to conduct its own
inquiry so as to make its own findings on whether there was sufficient
ground to dismiss the said employees who defected from HIMPHLU. The
issuance by the respondent of the Notices requiring the 36 employees to
submit their explanations to the
charges against them was the reasonable and logical first step in a fair
investigation. It is important to note that the Hotel did not take further
steps to terminate the 36 employees.

Instead, it arranged for reconciliatory conferences between the

contending unions in order to avert the possibility of dismissing the 36
employees for violation of the union security clause of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Even the surrounding circumstances would
contradict NUWHRAIN’s allegation that the
respondent interfered with or coerced its employees in their choice of union
membership. In their Reply before the NLRC, NUWHRAIN admitted that
before issuing its Notices, the respondent maintained a neutral stand in the
dispute between HIMPHLU and
NUWHRAIN. 37 Neither did the respondent threaten the 36 employees who
shifted their allegiance to NUWHRAIN with any form of reprisal; they were
not dismissed for their affiliation with NUWHRAIN. The records are bereft
of any instance that would show that respondent rode roughshod over its
employees’ freedom to decide which union to join. In all, respondent had
not committed any act which would constitute unfair labor practice.

Note: "Union security" is a generic term which is applied to and

comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership" or
any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation
to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment.

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA SULPICIO LINES, INC.–NAFLU,

RODOLFO ALINDATO, ROQUE TAN, JESSIE LIM, SUSAN TOPACIO,
LYDDA PASCUAL, BERNARDO ALCANTARA, GELACIO DESQUITADO,
RODRIGO AVELINO, LEONARDO ANDRADE, DANILO CHUA,
AMANDO EUGENIO, CALVIN LOPEZ, ANDRES BASCO, JR., and
CIRILO ALON, petitioners,
vs.
SULPICIO LINES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 140992 March 25, 2004
Facts:
The case involves a petition for review on certiorari, challenging the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in a labor dispute between
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (respondent) and Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio
Lines Inc. – NAFLU (petitioner). The labor dispute arose from the deadlock
in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiations between the
parties. After the negotiation stalemate, the petitioner filed a notice of
strike due to the deadlock, and the respondent sought the Labor Secretary's
assumption of jurisdiction over the matter.

Former Labor Secretary Nieves R. Confesor assumed jurisdiction over

the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout. Despite this, the petitioner
conducted a strike vote and, on May 20, 1994, staged a one-day strike,
alleging unfair labor practices by the respondent. The National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) declared the strike illegal and authorized the
termination of employment for the petitioner's officers. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRC decision.

Issue:
Whether the strike conducted by the petitioner was illegal.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the strike was indeed illegal because the
petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 263
(c) and (f) of the Labor Code. These requirements include observing a 7-day
strike ban and submitting the results of the strike vote to the Department of
Labor and Employment. The court emphasized that the language of the law
leaves no room for doubt that these requirements are mandatory.

The petitioner argued that the strike was done in good faith in
response to alleged unfair labor practices by the respondent. However, the
court found no evidence to support the union-busting claim. The court also
rejected the petitioner's attempt to characterize the one-day absence as a
mere act of absenteeism, emphasizing that the elements of a strike were
present.

The court further held that union officers who knowingly participate
in an illegal strike may lose their employment status, as provided by Article
264 (a) of the Labor Code. Finally, the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the
NLRC over the case, as the Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction
extended to all questions and controversies arising from the labor dispute.
 The court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision
that the strike was illegal and supporting the NLRC's authorization of the
termination of employment for the petitioner's officers who participated in
the illegal strike.

CATALINO N. SARMIENTO and 71 other striking workers of ASIAN

TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO of the Municipal Trial Court
of Calamba, Laguna, ROBERTO PIMENTEL, NELSON C. TEJADA, and
the COMMANDING OFFICER, 224th PC Company at Los Baños
Laguna, respondents

G.R. No. 75271-73 June 27, 1988

Facts:
The case involves two main issues: (1) the validity of a return-to-work
order issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) pending
the determination of the legality of a strike, and (2) the validity of
restraining the criminal prosecution of individuals involved in the strike
during the same period. The first issue arose when the petitioner, Asian
Transmission Corporation (ATC), terminated the services of Catalino
Sarmiento, a union official, leading to a notice of strike by the union. The
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) certified the dispute to the
NLRC, issuing an order enjoining both the management and the union from
taking any action. The NLRC subsequently ordered the ATC to accept
certain workers back, which the ATC challenged through a petition for
certiorari.

The second issue emerged from criminal complaints filed against the
striking workers. The complaints alleged offenses related to the strike,
including violations of the Labor Code and coercion. The petitioners sought
to prevent the enforcement of warrants of arrest and the continuation of the
criminal cases through a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Ruling:
Issue 1: Validity of the Return-to-Work Order
The court held that the NLRC had jurisdiction to issue the return-to-
work order. The authority for such orders is derived from Article 264(g) of
the Labor Code, which empowers the Ministry of Labor and Employment to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and decide it or certify it to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The MOLE's certification order, based on
the potential adverse effects on national interest, automatically enjoined
any intended or ongoing strike. The court emphasized the importance of
maintaining the status quo during the determination of the strike's legality
and highlighted that the return-to-work order is not optional but a duty
imposed on the workers. Failure to comply with the order could lead to the
abandonment of employment.

The court ruled that the return-to-work order should benefit only
those workers who complied with it. Workers who refused to obey the order
and engaged in the restrained strike forfeited their right to be readmitted
and could be validly replaced.

Issue 2: Validity of Restraining Criminal Prosecution

The court recognized the general rule that criminal proceedings are
not subject to injunction. However, it held that, in this case, an exception
applied. The court suspended the criminal cases until the completion of the
compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, citing Circulars from the
Ministry of Justice that required clearance before the prosecution of cases
related to labor disputes. The court considered the criminal cases
premature and intertwined with the ongoing labor arbitration.

In conclusion, the court denied the petition regarding the return-to-

work order, affirmed the NLRC's orders, and continued the suspension of
criminal proceedings related to the labor dispute.

ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-
EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU, respondents.

Facts:
The dispute originated from negotiations for a collective bargaining
agreement between St. Scholastica's College (COLLEGE) and the Samahan
ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU (UNION).
The deadlock led to a strike declared by the UNION on 5 November 1990,
prompting the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction and issue a return-
to-work order.
 Instead of complying, the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration
and continued its strike. The COLLEGE, in response, sent letters to striking
employees, asking them to return to work by a specified date. The UNION
presented demands during a dialogue, including unconditional acceptance
back to work, which were rejected. Subsequently, the Secretary denied
reconsideration of the return-to-work order.

The COLLEGE terminated striking employees, leading to a Complaint

for Illegal Strike. The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-
work order and sought dismissal of the complaint. The Secretary issued an
order directing reinstatement but held UNION officers responsible for
defying return-to-work orders.

The COLLEGE and the UNION sought reconsideration, and both

motions were denied. The present petition challenges the Secretary's
jurisdiction and questions the reinstatement of striking UNION members.

The petitioner contends that the Secretary exceeded jurisdiction,

citing PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, arguing that the
Secretary may only enjoin strikes, not disciplinary actions by the employer.
The petitioner also relies on Sarmiento v. Tuico and Union of Filipro
Employees v. Nestle Philippines, asserting that workers disobeying a
return-to-work order aren't entitled to reinstatement.

The UNION argues for the reinstatement of its officers, asserting that
their actions weren't a "brazen disregard" or a willful refusal to return to
work. They claim the issue arose from questioning the academic
institution's status as an industry indispensable to national interest.

Issue:
Whether striking union members, terminated for abandonment of
work after failing to comply with return-to-work orders from the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, should be legally reinstated.

Ruling:

The court addresses the jurisdictional question, citing International

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, affirming the
Secretary's authority over disputes involving industries indispensable to
national interest. The court reconciles conflicting rulings, emphasizing that
the Secretary's jurisdiction is limited to issues involved in the dispute or
submitted for resolution.

The court then delves into the issue of defying return-to-work orders.
It quotes relevant labor code provisions and rules specifying the effects of
such defiance, emphasizing the Secretary's authority to enforce compliance.

The UNION's argument that they questioned the Secretary's

jurisdiction is dismissed, emphasizing that a return-to-work order is
immediately effective and executory. The court cites previous cases and
rules to justify the strict compliance required during the pendency of any
challenge to the order's validity.

The court acknowledges the potential inconvenience of prolonged

arbitration and litigation and interprets labor laws to provide workers
immediate access to their rights. However, it emphasizes that the issue of
termination was properly submitted to the Secretary for resolution.

Regarding the termination of striking employees, the court cites

Article 264 of the Labor Code, stating that knowingly participating in a
strike defying a return-to-work order may lead to loss of employment status.
The court refers to Sarmiento v. Tuico and Federation of Free Workers v.
Inciong to support the principle that defiance of a return-to-work order
constitutes abandonment of the job.

The court rejects the UNION's argument that the cited cases involved
longer defiance periods, reiterating that abandonment occurs from the
moment of defiance. It criticizes the UNION for its arrogance and pride in
ignoring opportunities to return to work.

In conclusion, the court finds that the Secretary gravely abused

discretion by ordering the reinstatement of striking union members who
refused to comply with return-to-work orders. The order is deemed contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence. The petition for certiorari is granted, and
the Secretary's orders are set aside insofar as they order reinstatement. The
temporary restraining order is made permanent, with no costs imposed.

GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL (formerly known as SILAHIS

INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC.), petitioner,
vs.
GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL,
RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (GLOWHRAIN),
respondent.

G.R. No. 153664 July 18, 2003

Facts:
On June 4, 1987, the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment
issued an order certifying a labor dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for arbitration and directing employees to return to
work within 48 hours. This order required the company to accept returning
employees under the same terms as before the dispute.

Despite these directives, both parties engaged in actions that

worsened their relationship, leading to a strike declaration. The union filed
a notice of strike on September 27, 1990, citing unfair labor practices. The
Secretary of Labor certified the dispute to the NLRC and ordered against
any strike or lockout. In violation of this order, the company issued a
circular on November 5, 1990, announcing a reduction in personnel by 200
employees, and on November 6, 1990, terminated 60 employees, including
two union officers.

The union appealed, asserting compliance with the Labor Code's

requirements for a strike notice. It argued that the November 16, 1990,
notice was a reiteration of the September 27, 1990, notice, which had
fulfilled all necessary conditions.

In summary, despite the ongoing dispute and prior orders, both

parties engaged in actions that escalated tensions. The company's decisions
to reduce personnel and terminate employees, despite protests, prompted
the union to reassert its notice of strike, leading to the strike declaration on
November 16, 1990.

Issue:
a) whether or not the strike staged by the respondent union on
November 16 up to 29, 1990 is legal,

(b) whether or not the dismissals of the private respondents officers of

the respondent union as a consequence of the strike on November 16 to 29,
1990 are valid.

Ruling:
The CA did not commit any error in ruling that the petitioner was
guilty of ULP when it dismissed all the officers of the respondent union
despite the certificate orders of the SOLE and in defiance of the said orders;
and the respondents believed in good faith that indeed the petitioner
committed ULP which belief cured whatever defects there may have been in
the November 16 to 29, 1990 strike staged by the respondents.

In the case at bar, petitioners staged the strike because of alleged

unfair labor practices committed by respondent Silahis, to wit, termination
of two hundred (200) employees in the guise of retrenchment program,
despite the certification order of then Secretary Ruben Torres (Order dated
October 31, 1990) enjoining a strike lockout.

Under the aforequoted provisions, the requisites for a valid strike are
as follows: (a) a notice of strike fled with the DOLE thirty days before the
intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote
approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; (c)
notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike.37 The requisite seven-day period is intended to
give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really
carries the approval of the majority of the union members.

The respondents cannot argue that since the notice of strike on

November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their
notice of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with the
requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike vote and
strike vote report, the strike staged by them on November 16, 1990 was
lawful.

While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the
respondent union from working and had terminated the employment of
Kristoffer So, and sent out circulars of its decision to retrench its employees
effective December 16, 1990, the same were not valid justifications for the
respondents to do away with the statutory procedural requirements for a
lawful strike. It behooved the respondents to avail themselves of the
remedies under the CBA or file an illegal dismissal case in the office of the
Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by agreement of the parties, submit
the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that the matter may be
subjected to voluntary arbitrary proceedings instead of resorting to an
immediate strike.41 There was no immediate and imperative need for the
respondents to stage a strike on the very day that the notice of strike on
November 16, 1990 was filed because the retrenchment envisaged by the
petitioner had yet to take effect on December 14, 1990.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RAFAEL
MALIKSI, respondents.

G.R. No. 147566 December 6, 2006

Facts:
In a case of illegal dismissal, the employer must prove the legality of
the dismissal once admitting prior employment. Here, the employer
admitted employing the complainant and later terminating his employment.
Therefore, the burden is on the employer to provide convincing evidence of
a valid cause for dismissal and proper due process.

The complainant was illegally suspended, starting from April 3, 1995,

and the suspension should have ended thirty days later. Since the
complainant wasn't allowed to return to work or given a new assignment
after May 3, 1995, he is entitled to wages from May 3 to October 3, 1995,
when he was terminated.

Although the Labor Arbiter acknowledged that the petitioner violated

company rules through "paper renewal," it was deemed insufficient for
dismissal. The NLRC supported this decision, explaining that "paper
renewal" amounts to falsification of a private document, as it misrepresents
customer accounts to avoid the customers' credit lines from being cut off,
circumventing the company's rule of collecting credit within one week to its
disadvantage.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DESPITE THE COURT'S FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT INDEED FALSIFIED NUMEROUS COMPANY
RECORDS.

Ruling:
The acts of paper renewal described above, in legal parlance,
constitute falsification of private documents.
Under company rule No. 15, falsification of company records or
documents is punishable with dismissal (discharge, if the offender or
somebody benefits from the falsification.
It is therefore clear that petitioner did in fact violate company Rule
No. 15 by falsifying company records and documents. However, there is a
qualification. Such falsification must benefit the offender (herein petitioner)
or somebody else.
Petitioner did not help matters when he failed to cite the specific
company rule or its number which penalizes the offense of "paper renewal"
which, according to him,... warrants only the suspension for two (2) days, in
contrast to private respondent's submission of the specific company rule
allegedly violated by petitioner, No. 15. This Court therefore also agrees
with the Labor Arbiter when she considered suspension of two (2) years
and... four (4) months as an appropriate penalty, as follows:
In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that
the dismissal of the employee is for a just or an authorized cause.[15]
Failure to dispose of the burden would imply that the dismissal is not lawful,
and that the employee is entitled to... reinstatement, back wages and
accruing benefits.[16] Moreover, dismissed employees are not required to
prove their innocence of the employer's accusations against them.[17]
Petitioner cites Article 282[18] of the Labor Code, specifically loss of
trust and confidence as the ground for validly dismissing respondent.
Under the law, loss of confidence must be based on "fraud or willful breach
by the employee of the trust... reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative." In this regard, the Court has ruled that
ordinary breach does not suffice.[19] A breach of trust is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without any... justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.

BENEDICTO DINGLASAN, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, respondent.

G.R. No. L-14183 November 28, 1959

Facts:
The petitioner seeks a review of the Court of Industrial Relations'
decision, which found the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice under the
Industrial Peace Act. The respondent union filed a complaint, alleging that
the petitioner, on June 27, 1953, locked out 46 drivers who were members
of the union. The petitioner initially argued that there was no employer-
employee relationship, as he operated under a "boundary system." The
court initially agreed but later reversed its decision based on a Supreme
Court ruling. The petitioner denied unfair labor practice, asserting good
faith in believing there was no employment relationship.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner committed the charges of unfair labor practice
as alleged in the complaint, focusing on the circumstances leading to the
suspension of the drivers' operations.

Ruling:
The court found the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practices,
constituting a virtual lockout of his employee drivers. The court
acknowledged the petitioner's good faith but emphasized that the mere
suspicion of a strike is not justification for a lockout. The order directed the
petitioner to cease unfair labor practices, reinstate certain drivers, and pay
back wages from May 29, 1956, with deductions for periods of substantially
equivalent employment. The court exercised discretion in considering the
petitioner's good faith. However, it modified the decision, ruling that
reinstatement would be without back pay, citing the drivers' voluntary and
deliberate refusal to return to work as a factor. The decision was affirmed
with this modification.
HENRY BACUS, MAXIMO DANGGA, SALVADOR FLORES, VICTOR
FUENTES, SANTIAGO LACQUIO, LUZ FUENTES, ELEODORO GAJO,
JUANITO GENILLA, GODOFREDO GAC-ANG, and CALIXTO COYNO,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment and
FINDLAY MILLAR TIMBER COMPANY, respondents,

G.R. No. L-56856 October 23, 1984

Facts:
On February 19, 1979, approximately 1,400 employees of the
company staged a mass walkout to protest non-payment of salaries, non-
compliance with Presidential Decrees, and other grievances. The Minister of
Labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and directed a hearing officer
to resolve it. The company filed clearance applications to terminate the
services of employees, alleging their involvement in an illegal strike.

On March 2, 1979, the Minister of Labor issued an order directing the

company to pay salaries and workers to return to work. The company filed
another clearance application on March 3, 1979. Due to non-compliance
with the March 2 order, a conference was held on March 12, 1979.

On March 13, 1979, the Minister of Labor assumed jurisdiction over all
issues related to the strike. The workers claimed they failed to return to
work due to a requirement to sign a document admitting guilt for the
walkout. On October 18, 1979, the Minister of Labor declared the strike
illegal, ordering the termination of ten workers.

Issue:
The key issue revolves around the denial of due process to the
workers.

Ruling:
The court found that the labor arbiter did not observe procedural due
process, as the workers were not afforded a full opportunity to be heard
before facing drastic consequences like dismissal. The hearing officer
proceeded with an ex-parte hearing when the workers and their counsel left
the proceedings due to scheduling conflicts.

Furthermore, the court criticized the unsympathetic attitude towards

the workers' right to strike. It emphasized that declaring a strike illegal and
terminating employment should not be automatic, especially when inspired
by good faith and valid grievances. The court cited precedents highlighting
that even if a strike is considered premature or violates a no-strike clause, it
does not automatically render it illegal.

Ultimately, the court granted the petition, declaring the decision of

the Minister of Labor null and void. It ordered a new hearing on the charges
against the workers, ensuring they have the opportunity to be heard and
present their evidence. The company was directed to reinstate the workers
pending resolution of the case on its merits, without loss of seniority rights
and privileges.

ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

(AIUP), JOEL DENSING, HENEDINO MIRAFUENTES, CHRISTOPHER
PATENTES, AND ANDRES TEJANA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), CENAPRO
CHEMICAL CORPORATION and/or GO SING CHAN in his capacity as
Managing Director, respondents.

G.R. No. 120505 March 25, 1999

Facts:
Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and
Andres Tejana were casual employees of CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation.
The company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with CENAPRO
Employees Association (CCEA), excluding casual employees from
membership. Casual employees with one to six years of service sought
regularization but were denied. They formed a union and affiliated with the
Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines (AIUP). AIUP filed a
petition for certification election, opposed by the company citing the
contract bar rule.

The union filed a notice of strike citing unfair labor practices. The
strike occurred, involving illegal acts such as barricading and blocking
company premises. The company filed a petition for injunction, leading to a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Labor Arbiter declared the strike
illegal but dismissed charges of illegal lockout and unfair labor practice.
Five union officers lost employment, 15 members weren't reinstated due to
quitclaims, and six workers were ordered reinstated.

The Labor Arbiter's decision was appealed by both parties. Pending

appeals, AIUP filed a motion for execution, granted on October 15, 1993.
The company requested separation pay instead of reinstatement, leading to
a second writ of execution in March 1994. The NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's decision in August 1994 but later modified it, ordering separation
pay instead of reinstatement for some.

Issue:
Whether the strike was conducted within legal bounds and whether
the subsequent actions taken by the company, such as the dismissal of
certain union officers and members, were justified.

Ruling:

The court found that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining separate appeals based on similar grounds. It
upheld the finding that the strike was a union-recognition-strike and that
the company did not engage in illegal lockout. The court emphasized that
the strike was illegal due to prohibited activities and violation of the TRO.

Regarding the loss of employment status, the court found that there
was insufficient evidence to support Joel Densing's dismissal, and he should
be reinstated. However, the other petitioners were found not entirely
faultless, and their reinstatement was warranted. The court affirmed the
immediate executory nature of reinstatement and ordered payment of
salaries and backwages from October 15, 1993, until full payment of
separation pay. The court considered more than eight years had passed,
making separation pay in lieu of reinstatement practical and appropriate.

FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL LABOR
UNION — TUCP, and EULOGIO LERUM, respondents.

G.R. No. 115180 November 16, 1999

Facts:
On February 10, 1986, the National Labor Union-Trade Union Trade
Union Congress of the Philippines (NLU-TUCP) filed a notice of strike on
behalf of its local chapter, the Filipino Pipe Workers Union-National Labor
Union (FPWU-NLU), against the Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation. The
grounds for the strike were alleged union busting and non-implementation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Despite the scheduled conciliation
conference on March 3, 1986, the FPWU-NLU staged the strike on the same
day without waiting for the conference outcome. The strike continued until
June 13, 1986, when a return-to-work agreement was reached.

On April 8, 1986, the company petitioned to declare the strike illegal

and sought damages against FPWU-NLU, NLU-TUCP, and its national
president, Atty. Eulogio Lerum. The Labor Arbiter, on August 31, 1992,
declared the strike illegal and ordered NLU-TUCP to pay damages to the
company.

Issue:
Whether the liability for damages resulted from the illegal strike
Ruling:

The Labor Arbiter held NLU-TUCP liable for damages. However, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision, leading
to the company's petition to the higher court.

The company argued that NLU-TUCP and Atty. Lerum were primarily
responsible for and liable for damages due to their direct participation in
aiding, abetting, and supporting the illegal strike.
 The court, applying Rule XXII, Book V, of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, concluded that the strike was illegal due to various reasons.
The demands of FPWU-NLU were premature as they were still the subject
of a pending application for a writ of execution. Additionally, the union
failed to serve the company a copy of the strike notice, violating due
process and the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period.

Regarding liability, the court emphasized that even if FPWU-NLU was

not a legitimate labor organization, it remained the principal and basic unit
of the association responsible for the illegal strike. The court rejected the
argument that NLU-TUCP was primarily responsible, considering it as a
mere agent of FPWU-NLU. The court ruled that NLU-TUCP's involvement,
as indicated by Atty. Lerum's letter, did not make it the principal, and the
responsibility for damages fell on FPWU-NLU as the recognized bargaining
representative.

The court dismissed the company's claim for damages against NLU-
TUCP and Atty. Lerum, affirming the NLRC's decision. The recognition
extended by the company to FPWU-NLU as the bargaining representative
barred it from challenging the union's legitimacy belatedly. Consequently,
the court held that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the Labor Arbiter's decision.

The petition was dismissed, and the NLRC decision was affirmed, with
no pronouncement as to costs.

LOCKOUT

RIZAL CEMENT WORKERS UNION (FFW), petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC.,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-18442 November 30, 1962

Facts:
On September 2, 1954, the petitioner union sent a set of proposals to
the respondent company for the purpose of entering into a collective
bargaining contract. The respondent company, in its reply on September 11,
1954, stated that it could not entertain the proposals until after the
resolution of Case No. 676-V, then pending with the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR), as the demands in the proposals were similar to those
involved in the pending case. The petitioner union claimed that the
proposals were distinct and separate from those litigated in Case No. 676-V.
Subsequently, the petitioner union filed a Notice of Strike on October 5,
1954. Despite a series of conferences with the Conciliation Service of the
Labor Department, the union's proposals were not discussed. Another
union, the Binangonan Labor Union (NWB), presented proposals to the
respondent company, and a collective bargaining contract was entered into.
On May 27, 1956, the petitioner union declared a strike against the
respondent company, leading to a dispute certified to the CIR.

Issue:
Whether or not the members of the petitioner union are entitled to
back wages. The petitioner contends that since the CIR found the strike
justified, it was an error not to award back wages. The primary argument is
based on the theory that there was a lockout or a "virtual lockout"
preventing the employees from working, justifying the claim for back
wages.

Ruling:
The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) denied the claim for back
wages, emphasizing that there was no lockout as the refusal to accept the
unconditional offer to return to work did not constitute a lockout. The court
found that the strike was justified despite isolated acts of violence. The CIR,
in exercising its powers of arbitration under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, concluded that it could order the
reinstatement of the strikers with or without back wages as a term or
condition of employment. The court held that the decision and resolution
placed the parties in a situation where both the employer and employees
suffered losses due to the strike, and thus, the denial of back wages was
justified. The petitioner's argument that the denial of back wages violated
labor laws was rejected, and the decision of the CIR was affirmed, with
costs against the petitioner.

TEOFILO ARICA, DANILO BERNABE, MELQUIADES DOHINO,

ABONDIO OMERTA, GIL TANGIHAN, SAMUEL LABAJO, NESTOR
NORBE, RODOLFO CONCEPCION, RICARDO RICHA, RODOLFO
NENO, ALBERTO BALATRO, BENJAMIN JUMAMOY, FERMIN
DAAROL, JOVENAL ENRIQUEZ, OSCAR BASAL, RAMON ACENA,
JAIME BUGTAY, and 561 OTHERS, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
KORONADO B. APUZEN, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE
FRANKLIN DRILON, HONORABLE CONRADO B. MAGLAYA,
HONORABLE ROSARIO B. ENCARNACION, and STANDARD
(PHILIPPINES) FRUIT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 78210 February 28, 1989

PARAS, J.:
Facts:
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari challenging the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated
December 12, 1986, which affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos dismissing the claim of the petitioners. The complaint against
private respondent Standard (Phil.) Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) was
filed on April 9, 1984, seeking compensation for assembly time, moral
damages, and attorney's fees. After the submission of position papers, Labor
Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a decision on October 9, 1985, dismissing
the complaint based on the principle of res judicata, as a similar claim had
been previously filed and dismissed. The NLRC, in its resolution on
December 12, 1986, upheld the dismissal, and subsequent motions for
reconsideration were denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the
scheduled working time is compensable under the Labor Code.

Ruling:
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of
STANFILCO, citing res judicata based on a prior case (NLRC Case No. 26-
LS-XI-76) where the claim for compensable assembly time was already
considered and dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the dismissal of the present
complaint, stating that the claim was already barred by res judicata, and the
Minister of Labor's decision in the earlier case had become the law of the
case. The petitioners argued that there were substantial changes in the
facts, but the NLRC rejected this argument, maintaining that the issue had
already been conclusively settled.

The court, in its ruling, emphasized the principle of res judicata,

barring the relitigation of issues that were already raised and adjudicated in
a prior suit. The court held that the NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion, affirmed its decision, and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The court also highlighted the expertise of quasi-judicial agencies and the
deference given to their findings when supported by substantial evidence.
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU),
petitioner,
vs.
NESTLÉ PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, respondent
G.R. Nos. 158930-31 March 3, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
On June 30, 1987, the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) for
four units were expiring. Nestle was open to negotiations with the Makati
and Alabang/Cabuyao units but not with the Cagayan de Oro and
Cebu/Davao units due to representation issues. In June and July 1987, the
Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) was certified as the exclusive bargaining
representative for the Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units. The
negotiating panel was dissolved in September.

Following advice from the BLR Director, Nestle refused to negotiate

with factions of UFE claiming bargaining authority, except for the
terminated negotiating panel members. UFE filed a Notice of Strike, citing
CBA deadlock and unfair labor practices, questioning the validity of the CBA
for all four units.

The Secretary of Labor decided to address only the bargaining

deadlock with the Makati and Alabang/Cabuyao units. On June 5, 1989, the
Second Division of the NLRC issued a resolution granting wage increases
and other benefits to Nestlé's employees while addressing non-economic
issues.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent NLRC seriously erred in holding that
the CBA to be signed by the parties shall cover solely the bargaining unit
consisting of all regular rank-and-file employees of the respondent company
at Makati, Alabang and Cabuyao

Ruling:
NO. Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides: Any agreement on such
other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within
six (6) months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions
as fixed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into
beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity
thereof.
The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the
parties was promulgated June 5, 1989, and hence, outside the 6 month
period from June 30, 1987, the expiry date of the past CBA. But since no
agreement to that effect was made, public respondent did not abuse its
discretion in giving the said CBA a prospective effect.

Articles 253 and 253-A mandate the parties to keep the status quo and
to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Consequently, there
being no new agreement reached, the automatic renewal clause provided
for by the law which is deemed incorporated in all CBAs, provides the
reason why the new CBA can only be given a prospective effect.

PICKET

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),

petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA; WELLINGTON INVESTMENT and
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION; and METROPOLITAN BANK and
TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-25878 March 28, 1969

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:
PAFLU picketed METBANK at Wellington Building, but Wellington
complained about the picketers blocking the common passageway.
Wellington took the matter to court, alleging that PAFLU's picketing
interfered with its property, business, and neutral tenants' businesses. In
response, Judge Cloribel granted Wellington's request and issued a
preliminary injunction against the picketers.

ISSUE:
Does the writ of injunction violate the worker’s right to picket as a
means of communicating labor dispute guaranteed by the constitution?

RULING:
No. The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a
labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
constitution is not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as an exercise of free speech, the courts are not without power to
confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the
parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to
insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if it
appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression
that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists
between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their
rights.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) and
MAJESTIC AND REPUBLIC THEATERS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(PAFLU), Petitioners,

v.
Hon. EDILBERTO BAROT, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and REMA, INCORPORATED, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-9281. September 28, 1956.

Facts:

The petition involves a certiorari against an order of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, presided over by Hon. Edilberto Barot, which enjoined
the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) and Majestic and
Republic Theaters Employees Association, along with their members, from
picketing the premises of Republic Theater Enterprises, Inc. and Majestic
Theater, Inc. The picketing allegedly interfered with the lawful possession
and use of the theaters and hindered entry for customers.

Before March 31, 1955, L. C. Eugenio & Co., Inc., owner of the
theaters, leased them to Republic Theater Enterprises, Inc., and Majestic
Theater, Inc. A collective bargaining agreement was reached on February
16, 1955, between these corporations and PAFLU. However, on March 31,
1955, L. C. Eugenio sold the theaters to Goodwill Trading Co., Inc., and on
April 26, 1955, Goodwill Trading leased the theaters to Rema, Inc., the
respondent.

The unions, claiming rights under the collective bargaining

agreement, initiated picketing. Rema filed a case against the unions for
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance
granted a preliminary injunction against the picketers. The unions
contested the court's jurisdiction, citing a labor dispute. However, the court
held that no employer-employee relationship existed between the unions
and Rema.
Issue:
Whether the court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary
injunction.

Ruling:

It is evident, therefore, that while the Court of First Instance had

jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition, it had transcended its powers
(called jurisdiction in the Act) because it enjoined the petitioners from
picketing, a legitimate labor right, and because the procedure expressly
outlined in the law for the issuance of an injunction was not strictly
followed.

The court, however, ruled that there was no employer-employee

relationship between the unions and Rema. The unions contested this, but a
previous case involving the same parties and dispute had settled the matter.
The court maintained that it had jurisdiction over the case.

The unions further argue that the court's grant of a preliminary

injunction was an abuse of discretion. The order, they claim, did not follow
the procedural requirements outlined in the law for issuing an injunction,
such as a hearing with testimonies in open court and findings of fact.
Additionally, the order improperly prohibited lawful picketing, infringing on
the unions' fundamental rights.

The court granted the writ of certiorari, annulling the order and
emphasizing that while the court had jurisdiction, it had exceeded its
powers by enjoining lawful picketing and not following proper procedures.
HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG WORKERS' UNION
(CLO), petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CANLUBANG SUGAR
ESTATE and BISIG NG CANLUBANG (NLU), respondents.

G.R. No. L-1340 October 13, 1947

PERFECTO, J.:

Facts:
The petition seeks the annulment of the Court of Industrial Relations'
order dated February 21, 1947, in case No. 44-V(1), titled "Bisig ng
Canlubang (NLU) vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate." The order required laborers
to return to work immediately and prohibited picketing starting February
23, 1947. Petitioners argue that the order is contrary to law, issued without
jurisdiction, and unfairly applies to members of the Canlubang Workers'
Union (CLO), who were not part of the case.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioners, who formed the Canlubang Workers' Union
(CLO) after the order of December 11, 1946, were parties in case No. 44-V
and subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.
2. Whether the blanket prohibition against picketing in the February
21, 1947, order is valid.

Ruling:
1. The court rejects the argument that the formation of a new union
should divest the Court of Industrial Relations of jurisdiction. The
petitioners, having appeared initially as members of the Bisig Ng Canlubang
(NLU), remain subject to the court's jurisdiction. Splitting the union does
not affect the court's authority.

2. The blanket prohibition against picketing is clarified to refer only to

illegal picketing that employs unlawful means. Peaceful picketing is
protected as part of freedom of speech under the Constitution.

The petition seeking the annulment of the order is dismissed. The

court emphasizes the legislative intent behind Commonwealth Act No. 103,
which aims to provide an orderly and just resolution of labor disputes, and
underscores the importance of avoiding prolonged strikes for the economic
well-being of the Philippines.

NATIONAL INTEREST DISPUTES

PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU), MAURICIO BARTOLO,

CESAR DAVID, EMMANUEL AGUSTIN, PECSON BARANDA, NELSON
BAGUIO, ROLANDO MATALOG, PEPITO DAMICOG, EDUARDO
SANTOS, ISABELO GALOPE, REYNALDO MALEON, AL PEDRIQUE,
BAYANI HERNANDEZ, ROBERT LORESCA, LEONARDO LACSINA,
petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY NIEVES R. CONFESOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, GEN. RECAREDO SARMIENTO, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, PHILTREAD TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION,
GERARD BRIMO, HARRY McMILLAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 117169 March 12, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.:

Facts:
The petition challenges an order issued by the Secretary of Labor on
September 8, 1994, which certified the entire labor dispute at Philtread Tire
and Rubber Corporation for compulsory arbitration. The order enjoined any
strike or lockout and directed striking workers, except those dismissed or
retrenched with separation pay, to return to work within 24 hours. The
dispute arose from a notice of strike filed by Philtread Tire Workers Union
(PTWU) on grounds of unfair labor practice, and a notice of lockout filed by
Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation. The Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute due to its impact on an industry indispensable
to national interest.

Issues:
1. Whether Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order.

Ruling:
1. The court rejects the argument that Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code is unconstitutional. It clarifies that Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor
Code have not been expressly repealed, and there is no showing of
inconsistency with the 1987 Constitution. The court emphasizes that these
articles were recognized by Congress when it enacted R.A. 6715.

2. The court finds that the Secretary of Labor did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the certification for compulsory arbitration.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the constitutional right to
strike but regulates it when national interests are affected. The court
upholds the Secretary's authority to determine industries indispensable to
national interest and to intervene in labor disputes for the common good.
The Secretary's intervention was deemed necessary to settle the prolonged
labor dispute that had adverse effects on both the company and the union.
The court emphasizes that grave abuse of discretion requires a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is not evident in this case. The
petition is dismissed, and the Secretary of Labor's order is affirmed.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA),
respondents.

G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts:
The case involves a dispute between Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the
Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) over the terms of the
1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The CBA included
provisions for pay increases and the formation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale
Panel to study and update the payscale and position classification.
Disagreements arose during the payscale study, leading to a notice of strike
filed by PALEA on December 29, 1988, citing bargaining deadlock and
unfair labor practice.

Despite the conciliation meetings, the parties failed to reach an

agreement, and PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith. PAL argued
that the strike was premature since the CBA had nine more months to run.
PALEA proceeded with a strike on January 20, 1989, paralyzing PAL's
operations.

PAL petitioned the Secretary of Labor, Franklin Drilon, to assume

jurisdiction over the dispute to avert the strike's impact on the national
interest, citing PAL's role as the flag carrier of the Philippines. Seven days
after PAL's petition, and after the strike had commenced, Secretary Drilon
issued an order assuming jurisdiction and directing the strikers to lift their
pickets.

Issues:
1. Whether the Secretary of Labor exceeded his jurisdiction in ruling
on the legality of the strike.
2. Whether the Secretary erred in directing PAL not to take
retaliatory action against the strikers.
3. Whether the Secretary failed to promptly exercise his authority to
avert the illegal strike.
Ruling:
1. The court ruled that the Secretary of Labor exceeded his
jurisdiction in ruling on the legality of the strike. Under Article 263 of the
Labor Code, the Secretary's authority is limited to resolving the issues in
the dispute, not determining the legality or illegality of a strike.

2. The court held that PAL has the right to take disciplinary action
against the union officers who participated in the illegal strike, as provided
by Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Secretary's prohibition against PAL
taking retaliatory action was deemed an unlawful deprivation of property
and denial of due process.

3. The court acknowledged that the Secretary's delay in acting on

PAL's petition may have contributed to PAL's damages. However, it
emphasized that the union's declaration of an illegal strike was reckless and
irresponsible. The court held PAL liable for the damages incurred during
the strike and affirmed the monetary benefits awarded to the union but set
aside the Secretary's orders regarding the strike's validity and the restraint
against PAL taking appropriate legal action.

In summary, the court granted the petition, setting aside the

Secretary's orders related to the strike's validity and the prohibition on PAL
taking retaliatory action, while affirming the monetary benefits awarded to
the union. Costs were imposed against respondent PALEA.
INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION
(ALU), respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92981-83 January 9, 1992

REGALADO, J.:

Facts:
The case involves a labor dispute between International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Company) and the Associated Labor Union (Union).
Before the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement, the Union
submitted economic and political demands, leading to a deadlock. The
Union filed a notice of strike, and when conciliation efforts failed, the Union
went on strike. Three other labor cases were subsequently filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Due to the industry's
national interest, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute, ordering the parties to return to the status quo.

Issue:
whether the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
has the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its
incidental controversies, including unfair labor practice cases, causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest.

Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the Secretary's authority to assume
jurisdiction. The Secretary, under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, has the
power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and decide or certify it to
the Commission for compulsory arbitration. This authority extends to all
questions and controversies arising from the labor dispute, including cases
under the exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters.

The court upheld the consolidation of the NLRC cases with the labor
dispute, emphasizing the need for the Secretary to efficiently dispose of the
entire dispute. The rule allowing the Secretary to direct the labor arbiter to
cease proceedings during the assumption of jurisdiction was deemed valid
and in line with the objectives of the Labor Code. The court emphasized the
need to resolve doubts in the interpretation of labor laws in favor of labor
and affirmed the Secretary's orders.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES,
NATIONAL MINES & ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU),
MARCOPPER EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (MELU), respondents.

G.R. No. 119381 March 11, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:
Marcopper Mining Corporation, in which 49% of the equity is owned
by the Philippine government, is engaged in the exploration, development,
and extraction of copper and other mineral ores.

In December 1994, Marcopper granted its employees a year-end profit

bonus based on employment category.

The National Mines and Allied Workers Union filed a preventive

mediation case, alleging unfair labor practices related to job evaluation and
the profit bonus.

The conciliation proceedings failed, leading to a Notice of Strike filed

by the union.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment issued an order certifying

the dispute for compulsory arbitration under Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code, enjoining any strike or lockout.
 Despite the certification order, the union went on strike on February
27, 1995.

Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion for an order directing the

union and striking workers to return to work.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment issued orders directing

workers to return to work and for management to accept them under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.

The union did not comply with the return-to-work orders, and on
March 4, 1995, petitioner issued notices of termination to workers who
failed to return.

The union filed a motion for reconsideration of the Secretary's orders.

On March 20, 1995, the Secretary issued an order directing petitioner

to accept the workers pending resolution of the issues in compulsory
arbitration.

Issue:
Whether the Secretary of Labor and Employment's order directing the
acceptance of striking workers pending compulsory arbitration is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the Secretary's
order insofar as it directed petitioner to accept, pending resolution of the
issues, all returning workers under the same terms and conditions prior to
the work stoppage. The Court emphasized that the NLRC must resolve the
issues involved in the labor dispute and that the order did not determine the
legality or illegality of the termination of employment. The NLRC was
directed to expedite the conciliation proceedings and resolve the dispute
promptly.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR

AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-
EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts:

On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the

striking employees enjoining them to return to work not later than 8:00
o'clock A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same time, giving notice to
some twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them.

Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties

held conciliation meetings before the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board where the UNION pruned down its demands to three (3), viz.: that
striking employees be reinstated under the same terms and conditions
before the strike; that no retaliatory or disciplinary action be taken against
them; and, that CBA negotiations be continued.

On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order

which, inter alia, directed the reinstatement of striking UNION members,
premised on his finding that no violent or otherwise illegal act accompanied
the conduct of the strike and that a fledgling UNION like private respondent
was "naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced enthusiasm, in
asserting its existence".

Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as

otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar
days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural: . . .

The labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL

from taking disciplinary measures against its guilty employees, for, under
Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding
of the strike but not the company's right to take action against union
officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts.

Issue:

Whether striking union members, terminated for abandonment of

work after failing to comply strictly with a return-to-work order, should be
reinstated.

Ruling:
We quote hereunder the pertinent provisions of law which govern the
effects of defying a return-to-work order:

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code —

Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. — . . . (g) When, in his opinion, there
exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining
the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption
or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such
orders as he may issue to enforce the same
Article 264, same Labor Code —Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor
organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or
without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or
without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction

by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as consequence

of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back
wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a
lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during
such lawful strike . . . (emphasis supplied).

Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which
took effect on 31 August 1990)
Effects of Defiance. — Non-compliance with the certification order of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment or a return to work order of the
Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course of
the strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the same
under pain or loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment
benefits from the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other
positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the
liable parties . . . (emphasis supplied).

Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to

immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was
because they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent
SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an academic
institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to
national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue, they were under
no obligation to immediately return to work.

This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of
assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall immediately return to work."
This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately
effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration (University of Sto. ... 9 It must be strictly complied with
even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of
Filipro Employees v. ... After all, the assumption and/or certification order
is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY's compulsive power of
arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied
with.

The rationale for this rule is explained in University of Sto. ... NLRC,
supra, citing Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v.

To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance

in a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to
defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work
would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer
be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned.

Moreover, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor

and Employment over labor disputes involving academic institutions was
already upheld in Philippine School of Business Administration v.

There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school

adversely affects the national interest. The school is a duly registered
educational institution of higher learning with more or less 9,000 students.
The on-going work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students
and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all
concerned. More important, it is not amiss to mention that the school is
engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual and emotional well-
being of the country's youth.
 Respondent UNION's failure to immediately comply with the return-
to-work order of 5 November 1990, therefore, cannot be condoned.

The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who

failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in
Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike
or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal. act. Any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-
work order may, consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment
status."

Section 6 Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which
provides the penalties for defying a certification order of the Secretary of
Labor or a return-to-work order of the Commission, also reiterates the same
penalty. It specifically states that non-compliance with the aforesaid
orders, which is considered an illegal act, "shall authorize the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission . . . to enforce the same under
pain of loss of employment status." Under the Labor Code, assumption
and/or certification orders are similarly treated.

Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by insisting on

staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises
to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited their
right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be
validly replaced.

We recently reiterated this stance in Federation of Free Workers v.

Inciong, 12 wherein we cited Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle
Philippines, Inc., supra, thus —

A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of

an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus
illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as
amended . . . The union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to
have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an
illegal act.
 Despite knowledge of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra,
records of the case reveal that private respondent UNION opted to defy not
only the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 but also that of 9
November 1990.

While they claim that after receiving copy of the Order of 9 November
1990 initiatives were immediately undertaken to fashion out a return-to-
work agreement with management, still, the unrebutted evidence remains
that the striking union officers and members tried to return to work only
eleven (11) days after the conciliation meetings ended in failure, or twenty
(20) days after they received copy of the first return-to-work order on 5
November 1990.

The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the

laboring classes (Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC), 13
cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the
instant petition. There was willful disobedience not only to one but two
return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of
teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court
cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the UNION in
this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against
some union officers and members who actively participated in the strike,
the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE enjoining the union
officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990 presented
the workers an opportunity to return to work under the same terms and
conditions or prior to the strike. ... The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had
every right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the
return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to protect
the interests of its students who form part of the youth of the land.

Lastly, the UNION officers and members also argue that the doctrine
laid down in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, and Union of Filipro Employees v.
Nestle, Philippines, Inc., supra, cannot be made applicable to them because
in the latter two cases, workers defied the return-to-work orders for more
than five (5) months. Their defiance of the return-to-work order, it is said,
did not last more than a month.

It is clear from the provisions above quoted that from the moment a
worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his
job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act.
Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to return to his work and
cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions
they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v. ...
Suffice it to say, in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra, the
workers were terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order
for only nine (9) days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee, despite
a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to stand akimbo and
wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before they
report back to work.

In fine, respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when

he ordered the reinstatement of striking union members who refused to
report back to work after he issued two (2) return-to-work orders, which in
itself is knowingly participating in an illegal act. The Order in question is,
certainly, contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.

The Order of 12 April 1991 and the Resolution 31 May 1991 both
issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are SET ASIDE
insofar as they order the reinstatement of striking union members
terminated by petitioner, and the temporary restraining order We issued on
June 26, 1991, is made permanent
THE RIGHT OF SECURITY OF TENURE

JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON
DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and JONATHAN CAGABCAB,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005

GARCIA, J.:

Facts:

In this case, the petitioner, JAKA Foods Processing Corporation

(JAKA), appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 59847. The CA decision reversed and set aside the National Labor
Relations Commission's (NLRC) decision, which had affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's ruling declaring the termination of the respondents (Darwin Pacot,
Robert Parohinog, David Bisnar, Marlon Domingo, Rhoel Lescano, and
Jonathan Cagabcab) as illegal.

The material facts of the case reveal that JAKA terminated the
employment of the respondents on August 29, 1997, citing dire financial
straits as the reason. However, the termination was done without complying
with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code, which
mandates the service of a written notice to employees and the Department
of Labor and Employment at least one month before the intended date of
termination.

The Labor Arbiter initially ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering

JAKA to reinstate them with full backwages and additional payments for
service incentive leave and 13th-month pay. JAKA appealed to the NLRC,
which modified the decision, granting separation pay but reversing the
awards of backwages and service incentive leave pay. The NLRC found that
JAKA was in dire financial straits, justifying the retrenchment.
 The CA, applying the doctrine in Agabon vs. NLRC, held that the lack
of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal but required JAKA
to pay nominal damages for non-compliance with due process. The CA
ordered JAKA to pay full backwages, separation pay, and proportionate
13th-month pay.

Issues:

(1) whether the CA correctly awarded full backwages to respondents

and

(2) whether the CA correctly awarded separation pay to respondents.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court, in resolving the issues, referred to the Agabon

case and distinguished between dismissals based on just causes under
Article 282 and authorized causes under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The
Court emphasized that in cases of authorized cause, like retrenchment,
initiated by the employer's exercise of management prerogative, stiffer
sanctions should be imposed for non-compliance with the notice
requirement.

In this specific case, the Supreme Court found that JAKA had valid
grounds for retrenchment due to serious business losses. However, the
failure to comply with the notice requirement warranted an indemnity, and
the Court fixed the indemnity at P50,000. The Court disagreed with the CA's
order for separation pay, citing the rule that separation pay is not required
in cases of authorized causes, unless there is a closure or cessation of
operations due to serious business losses.

Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the CA
decision, and entered a new one upholding the legality of the dismissal but
ordering JAKA to pay nominal damages of P50,000 to each respondent for
non-compliance with statutory due process.
ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and DANILO

RUPISAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 106771 November 18, 1994

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts:

On 27 June 1987, petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc. (ALHAMBRA

for brevity), a Filipino cigar and cigarette manufacturing and distribution
company, employed private respondent Danilo C. Rupisan as salesman on a
six-month probationary basis. From 9-12 December 1989, ALHAMBRA
conducted a surprise audit of the records of Rupisan. He was then called to
the Head Office on 3 January 1990 where alleged violations of company
rules purportedly committed by him were brought to his attention. On 8
January 1990, Rupisan was placed under a one-month preventive
suspension for serious violations of company policies, rules and regulations,
as reflected in the results of the surprise audit.

On 22 January 1990, Rupisan protested his suspension, reiterating

vehement denial of the charges against him and exposing the threat of
termination at their meeting of 3 January 1990. He alleges that as of 30
December 1989 the charges against him had become academic when he
was given a clearance of all his accountabilities.

On 6 February 1990, a day before the end of his suspension,

ALHAMBRA wrote Rupisan terminating his services effective 8 February
1990. On 23 March 1990, Rupisan sued ALHAMBRA for illegal dismissal
and unpaid wages or commissions. The suit was later amended on 24 April
1990 to include charges of illegal suspension and damages.

Ruling of Labor Arbiter:

After trial, Labor Arbiter, found that the termination of Rupisan was for a
just cause.2 However, he also ruled that there was a violation of Rupisan's
right to due process, particularly the failure of ALHAMBRA to furnish him
copy of the audit report on which his dismissal was based. Consequently,
judgment was rendered directing ALHAMBRA to pay Rupisan P23,040.00 in
backwages covering the period 8 February to 19 November 1990, P600.00
in unpaid salary from 1-7 January 1990, P2,650.00 for separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement, and commissions for the sales generated in the months of
November and December 1989.

NLRC Ruling:

Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations

Commission which on 29 May 1992 affirmed the Labor Arbiter's findings of
lack of due process but added that since Rupisan could have explained fully
the charges against him had he been given the chance to do so, his
reinstatement was instead ordered in lieu of separation pay.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of

discretion in sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter that Rupisan was
illegally dismissed but directing at the same time his reinstatement for the
reason that he could have explained the charges had he been given the
opportunity to be heard.

Ruling:

Yes, the error is consequential. A termination without just cause

entitles a worker to reinstatement regardless of whether he was accorded
due process. On the other hand, termination of a worker for cause, even
without procedural due process, does not warrant reinstatement, but the
employer incurs liability for damages.

Since the Labor Arbiter found a valid ground for dismissal, taking into
consideration the controverting evidence of the parties, which finding was
not set aside by NLRC, the latter was in grave error when it directed
reinstatement. Where, on the basis of the evidence of the opposing parties
the validity of the dismissal is determinable at the level of the Labor Arbiter,
the latter should resolve that issue. And if the Labor Arbiter finds just cause
in the termination, reinstatement would no longer serve any purpose. After
all, a finding by the Labor Arbiter as to the validity of the ground for
dismissal is much more impartial and trustworthy than a determination by
the employer who assumes the role of accuser and judge at the same time.

In the case at bench, the decision to dismiss Rupisan did not state the
reason for his termination, in disregard of Sec. 6, Rule XIV, Book V, of the
Omnibus Rules. But, having been found guilty of serious misconduct, private
respondent cannot demand reinstatement nor separation pay. However, he
is entitled to damages for petitioner's non-observance of procedural due
process which is not only required by statute but enshrined in the
Constitution. For this purpose, the amount of P10,000.00 is considered fair,
reasonable and realistic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of

NLRC dated 29 May 1992 is SET ASIDE. The decision of Labor Arbiter
Donato G. Quinto, Jr., dated 19 November 1990 is REINSTATED except as
to the award of separation pay which is deleted. In addition, petitioner is
ordered to pay private respondent Danilo Rupisan P10,000.00 for having
been denied procedural due process.