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 Committee on Radiation Source Use and Replacement

Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board

Division on Earth and Life Studies
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.
 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of
the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National
Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The
members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences
and with regard for appropriate balance.

This study was supported by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under grant # NRC-04-06-
069. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies
that provided support for the project.

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-11014-3

International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-11014-9

Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth
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Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.
 The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in
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National Research Council.

www.national-academies.org
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.
 COMMITTEE ON RADIATION SOURCE USE AND REPLACEMENT

THEODORE L. PHILLIPS (Chair), University of California, San Francisco

EVERETT BLOOM, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
DAVID R. CLARKE, University of California, Santa Barbara
LEONARD W. CONNELL, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico
ROBIN GARDNER, North Carolina State University, Raleigh
C. RICHARD LIU, University of Houston, Texas
RUTH MCBURNEY, Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, Austin,
Texas
ERVIN B. PODGORSAK, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada
TOR RAUBENHEIMER, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Palo Alto, California
STEPHEN WAGNER, American Red Cross, Rockville, Maryland
DAVID L. WEIMER, University of Wisconsin at Madison

NUCLEAR AND RADIATION STUDIES BOARD LIAISON

SUSAN LANGHORST, Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri (September 2006 to

December 2006)
ANDREW M. SESSLER, E.O. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley,
California (January 2007 to August 2007)

Staff
MICAH D. LOWENTHAL, Study Director
FEDERICO SAN MARTINI, Program Officer
TRACEY BONNER, Program Assistant (October 2006 to March 2007)
MANDI M. BOYKIN, Senior Program Assistant (April 2007 to April 2008)
MARILI ULLOA, Senior Program Assistant (May 2006 to September 2007)
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

iv
 NUCLEAR AND RADIATION STUDIES BOARD

RICHARD A. MESERVE (Chair), Carnegie Institution, Washington, DC

S. JAMES ADELSTEIN (Vice Chair), Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts
JOEL S. BEDFORD, Colorado State University, Fort Collins
SUE B. CLARK, Washington State University, Pullman
ALLEN G. CROFF, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired), Oak Ridge, Tennessee
SARAH C. DARBY, Clinical Trial Service Unit (CTSU), Oxford, United Kingdom
JAY C. DAVIS, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired), Livermore, California
ROGER L. HAGENGRUBER, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque
PAUL A. LOCKE, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland
BORIS F. MYASOEDOV, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
JOHN C. VILLFORTH, Food and Drug Law Institute (retired), Gaithersburg, Maryland
PAUL L. ZIEMER, Purdue University (retired), West Lafayette, Indiana

Staff
KEVIN D. CROWLEY, Director
NAOKO ISHIBE, Program Officer
MICAH D. LOWENTHAL, Senior Program Officer
JOHN R. WILEY, Senior Program Officer
TONI GREENLEAF, Administrative and Financial Associate
LAURA D. LLANOS, Administrative and Financial Associate
MANDI M. BOYKIN, Senior Program Assistant
COURTNEY GIBBS, Senior Program Assistant
SHAUNTEÉ WHETSTONE, Senior Program Assistant
JAMES YATES, JR., Office Assistant
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

v
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.
 REVIEWERS

This report has been reviewed in draft form by persons chosen for their diverse
perspectives and technical expertise in accordance with procedures approved by the National
Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purposes of this review are to provide
candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making the published report as
sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards of objectivity,
evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript
remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the
following for their participation in the review of this report:

Ahmed Badruzzaman, Chevron Corp. and University of California, Berkeley

Anthony Berejka, Ionicorp+
Joel Bedford, Colorado State University
Barbara Bierer, Brigham and Women’s Hospital
Paul Fischbeck, Carnegie Mellon University
Gregory Van Tuyle, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Karl Hemmerich, Steris Isomedix, Inc.
William Hendee, Wisconsin College of Medicine
Joel Lubenau, private consultant
Richard Meserve, Carnegie Institution of Washington and Nuclear and Radiation Studies
Board of the National Research Council
John Poston, Texas A&M University
Bruce Thompson, Iowa State University
Raymond Wymer, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired)

Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and
suggestions, they were not asked to endorse, nor did they see the final draft of, the report
before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Louis Lanzerotti, New Jersey
Institute of Technology, and Thomas Budinger, University of California at Berkeley. Appointed
by the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent
examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that
all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report
rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Research Council.
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

vii
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.
 PREFACE

On September 11, 2001, terrorists turned passenger airliners in New York, Washington,
and Pennsylvania into weapons, killing not only those onboard, but also thousands of people
working in office buildings and many of those who tried to rescue them. The perverse success
of those attacks has forced the nation to contemplate the possibility that other technologies that
were designed, and are used, solely for the benefit of society—to treat and cure illness, to
prevent infection, illness, and disease, to improve safety in industrial equipment, and to help
obtain resources that we rely on every day—could be used maliciously against us. The U.S.
Congress requested this study as part of a set of actions to improve the nation’s security against
attacks that might use radiation sources. The committee had this in mind throughout the study.
The committee’s charge from the Congress was to evaluate technologies and make
recommendations on options for implementing those technologies. Risk considerations were at
the center of this task: What are the high-risk sources? What makes them hazardous? Would
implementing replacements reduce risks? So, as the committee set out to hear from experts on
the radiation source applications, the committee also examined the hazards associated with the
radiation sources, including both accidents and malevolent acts.
Policy makers will seek to balance among alternative technologies, physical security
measures, tracking and accounting, and intelligence and law enforcement operations to prevent
or mitigate the consequences of a radiological attack. In this report, the committee offers its
recommendations on replacements for high-risk radiation sources, including priorities among
the sources, and options for implementing those replacements.
In carrying out the study, the committee was cognizant of the broad array of people and
institutions that use and benefit from the use of radionuclide radiation sources, and that would
be affected by the committee’s recommendations. The committee met with practitioners and
researchers in the relevant fields, talked with radionuclide source manufacturers and providers
of alternatives or replacements for the sources, and visited facilities that use the radiation
sources. The committee also talked, to some extent, to the customers for the services provided.
The recommendations in this report, and indeed any moves for replacement of radionuclide
radiation sources, will affect those people and institutions to varying degrees and in different
ways. It is the committee’s hope that any actions for implementation of replacements will
consider the input from the people and institutions affected, because those people and
institutions are providing important services to society, have a stake in the outcomes, and are
likely to benefit or suffer the most from the government’s actions.
Readers who examine this report thoroughly will notice that the task statement explicitly
requests an evaluation of worker hazards from technologies meant to replace the current high-
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

risk radiation sources, and the report discusses these hazards only briefly (see, e.g., Chapter 4
and Chapter 6). This is not an oversight. The committee devoted little of the report to this topic
because the most common replacement technologies, electron accelerators, and the high-risk
radiation sources pose similar radiation hazards while the accelerator is operating, and the
accelerators operating at energies below 10 MeV pose fairly insignificant radiation hazards
when they are not operating. Further, these matters are already covered well in other reports
(see especially NCRP, 2005). Readers might desire to see more on the costs and time lines for
readiness of replacement technologies. These are discussed for many, but not all,
replacements. In this case, more extensive discussion and detail were not included because the
data available to the committee do not support saying more.

ix
 Throughout the study the committee benefited from the input of people who
manufacture, use, and regulate the radiation source devices and their potential replacements.
The committee thanks Bob Adolph, Mike Ault, Lester Boeh, Les Braby, Kevin Brooks, Ian
Brown, Greg Budner, Tom Chadwick, Marshall Cleland, David Coppell, Mike Creech, Kirsten
Cutler, Jim Dempsey, Donny Dicharry, Brian Dodd, Patricia Eifel, James Elrod, Hugh Evans,
Tara Federici, Michal Freedhoff, Peter Fundarek, Colette Germain, Allen Gilchrist and Baker
Hughes Incorporated, Michael Gillin, Paul Gray, Dave Hall, Sally Hamlin, Barbara Hamrick,
Patricia K. Holahan, Merri Horn, Bob Irwin, Ramzi Jammal and the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission, Carol Jantzen, Slobodan V. Jovanovic, Randol Kirk, Ken Koziol, Steve Laflin, Ann
Lawyer, Benjamin Lichtiger, Glenn Light, Mick Lord, Grant Malkoske and MDS Nordion, John
Masefield, Joseph E. Maxim, Ray Meyn, Radhe Mohan, Aaron Morrison, Paul Moses, Boris
Myasoedov, Wayne Norwood, Pearce O’Kelley, Mike Pearson, Vladimir Pet’kov, Brendan
Plapp, Jay Poston, Karl Prado and the M. D. Anderson Medical Center, André Régimbald,
Robert Rushton, Ward Schultz, J. L. and Mary Shepherd, Mark Shilton, Almon Shiu, Mark Smith
and Sterigenics, Inc., Mickey Speakmon, Makuteswara Srinivasan, Chris Stoller, Orhan
Suleiman, Peggy Tinkey, David Tiktinsky, Chuck Vecoli, Mark Vist, Bill Ward, Tom Wasiak, Ruth
Watkins, Richard Wiens, Shiao Woo, and Otto Zeck and Memorial Hermann Hospital.
These people were generous with their time, information, and advice. The committee
would specifically like to acknowledge the support provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (U.S. NRC) staff, especially the committee liaison, Tony Huffert, and his office
director, Brian Sheron, who made efforts throughout the study to ensure that the U.S. NRC
provided what it could to assist the committee in fulfilling its task. Finally, the committee thanks
its staff: Mandi Boykin, Tracey Bonner, and Marili Ulloa were responsible for the care and
feeding of the committee; Kevin Crowley and Federico San Martini made important contributions
at key points in the study; and Micah Lowenthal provided the guidance, coordination, and
various kinds of support the committee needed to get the job done well. They were all important
to the successful completion of the study, and we are grateful to them for their help and support.
Prior to public release, and as required under the terms of the grant for this study, the
report was sent to the U.S. NRC in August 2007 for security classification review. The agency
determined that the report contained information that is exempt from public release under 5
U.S.C. § 552(b). In late January 2008, the National Research Council and the U.S. NRC
reached agreement that this abbreviated version could be released to the public without
restriction. The findings and recommendations remain substantively unchanged from the full
version, which has been provided to the government. During the security classification review
the U.S. NRC also provided additional non-security-related comments on the report. The
National Research Council made some factual corrections and revised wording to improve
clarity in the report in response to those comments (but made no other substantive changes)
and consulted with its Report Review Committee about the nature of these changes.
While this abbreviated report was being readied for release, the committee was informed
that the U.S. NRC has begun exploring options to address some of the concerns raised in the
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

report. Although the committee has not received detailed information about the U.S. NRC’s
actions, the committee commends the U.S. NRC for these explorations and encourages the
government to take steps that will facilitate replacement of high-risk radiation sources and
improve radiation source safety and security.

Theodore L. Phillips, Chair

Committee on Radiation Source Use and Replacement

x
 CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

SUMMARY 3

1. INTRODUCTION 13

2. RADIATION SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES AND

THEIR USES AND ORIGINS 23

3. RADIATION SOURCE RISKS 43

4. ACCELERATOR AND DETECTOR TECHNOLOGIES 67

5. SELF-CONTAINED IRRADIATORS 85

6. PANORAMIC IRRADIATORS 101

7. RADIOTHERAPY 117

8. INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY 135

9. WELL LOGGING 147

10. IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS FOR ENCOURAGING

REPLACEMENT OF RADIONUCLIDE RADIATION SOURCES
WITH ALTERNATIVES 159

REFERENCES 175

APPENDIXES

A. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 189

B. BACKGROUND ON THE ATOM, RADIOACTIVE DECAY,
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

RADIATION, AND RADIATION DOSE DEPOSITION 193

C. GLOSSARY 209
D. INFORMATION-GATHERING MEETINGS 217

xi
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Congress asked the National Research Council to review the civilian uses of
radionuclide radiation sources and potential replacements for sources that pose a high risk to
public health or safety in the event of an accident or attack. Considering technical and economic
feasibility and risks to workers, the committee was asked to make findings and
recommendations on options for implementing the identified replacements. In carrying out its
charge, the committee met with practitioners and researchers in the relevant fields and, in this
report, has focused foremost on hazards and risks, feasibility of replacements, and options for
implementing the replacements.
Approximately 5,000 devices containing nearly 55,000 high-activity radiation sources are
licensed for use today in the United States. The devices are used for cancer therapy,
sterilization of medical devices, irradiation of blood for transplant patients and of laboratory
animals for research, nondestructive testing of structures and industrial equipment, and
exploration of geologic formations to find oil and gas deposits. These radiation sources and
devices are licensed and regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) or
by state agencies with authority to regulate materials covered by agreements with the U.S. NRC
(Agreement States). Because the array of applications of these radiation sources is so broad
and the applications are essential to securing health, safety, and prosperity, the devices are
licensed for use and found in every state in the nation. Some types of radiation sources should
be replaced with caution, ensuring that the essential functions that they perform are preserved.
For prioritizing its efforts to reduce security risks, the U.S. NRC should consider radiation
sources’ potential to cause contamination of large areas resulting in area denial.
Out of the thousands of manufactured and natural radionuclides, americium-241,
cesium-137, cobalt-60, and iridium-192 account for nearly all (over 99 percent) of the sealed
sources that pose the highest security risks in the United States. Of the radionuclides mentioned
above, cesium-137 in the form of cesium chloride is a greater concern than other radiation
sources based on its dispersibility and its presence in population centers across the country. In
view of the overall liabilities associated with radioactive cesium chloride and the alternatives that
are available now or possible in the future to replace these radiation sources, the committee
finds that high-activity cesium chloride sources should be replaced. The committee suggests
options for implementing the replacement, including discontinuation of licensing of new cesium
chloride irradiator sources and devices and incentives to decommission existing sources and
devices. In addition, the committee finds that nonradionuclide replacements exist for nearly all
applications of the radiation sources examined, but they may not all now be economically viable
or practical. Neither licensees nor manufacturers now bear the full life-cycle cost, including
disposal costs, of some of these radiation sources. The committee recommends that the U.S.
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

government provide incentives (market, regulatory, and certification) to facilitate the introduction
of alternatives for the high-risk radiation sources and reduce the sources’ attractiveness and
availability. These and related findings and recommendations are discussed in detail in the body
of the report.
The study task did not include detailed cost-benefit analyses and did not permit
examination of lower activity radiation sources (Category 3 or lower), even in aggregation.

1
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.
 SUMMARY

Several thousand devices containing nearly 55,000 high-activity1 radiation sources are
licensed for use today in the United States. The devices are used for cancer therapy,
sterilization of medical devices, irradiation of blood for transplant patients and of laboratory
animals for research, nondestructive testing of structures and industrial equipment, and
exploration of geologic formations to find oil and gas deposits. These radiation sources and
devices are licensed and regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) or
by state agencies with authority to regulate materials covered by agreements with the U.S.
NRC, called Agreement States. Because the array of applications of these radiation sources is
so broad and the applications are essential to securing health, safety, and prosperity, the
devices are licensed for use and found in every state in the nation.
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, concerns about
the safety and security of these radiation sources and devices grew, particularly amid fears that
terrorists might use radiation sources to make a radiological dispersal device or “dirty bomb.” As
part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the U.S. Congress directed the U.S. NRC to take several
actions, including requesting a study by the National Research Council to identify the legitimate
uses of high-risk radiation sources and the feasibility of replacing them with lower risk
alternatives. The committee appointed by the National Research Council to carry out the study
was tasked to provide a review of radiation source use, potential replacements for sources that
pose a high risk to public health or safety, and findings and recommendations on options for
implementing the identified replacements. To do that, the committee met with practitioners and
researchers in the relevant fields, examined scientific research and trade literature, and visited
facilities that use the radiation sources.
In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused foremost on hazards and risks,2
feasibility of replacements, and options for implementing the replacements. This study is not the
first effort to examine the uses for radionuclide radiation sources and prioritize among them
based on certain kinds of risk. A number of studies (see, e.g., Ferguson et al., 2003; Van Tuyle
et al., 2003) describe the system of supply of radionuclide radiation sources and their
applications. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. NRC issued a joint report
identifying risk-significant radiation sources and quantities of radioactive material (DOE/U.S.
NRC, 2003). The IAEA, in a similar but broader effort, revised its Code of Conduct on the Safety
and Security of Radioactive Sources (2003), which provides guidelines for countries in the
development and harmonization of policies, laws, and regulations on the safety and security of
radioactive sources. The IAEA Code of Conduct includes a categorization system for
radionuclide radiation sources that provides a risk-based ranking of radioactive sources based
on their potential for harm to human health under specific scenarios and for grouping of source
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

use practices into discrete categories. The radiation sources in Category 1 are those that, if not
managed safely or securely, could lead to the death or permanent injury of individuals in a short
period of time. Similarly, Category 2 sources are those that could lead to the death or

1
Activity is the number of radioactive decays per second. Specific activity is the activity per gram of
material. The high-activity sources cited here are Category 1 and 2 sources, as defined in the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources, and described in this summary.
2
For clarity, and to be consistent with the standard scientific definitions, the committee uses the term
hazard to denote the potential to cause harm and the term risk to describe a hazard linked to a context of
exposure or possibility of an event leading to exposure. Gasoline is hazardous; gasoline stored where an
open flame or spark might ignite it poses a high risk.

3
 4 RADIATION SOURCE USE AND REPLACEMENT

permanent injury of individuals who may be in close proximity to the radioactive source for a
longer period of time than for Category 1 sources. Based on direction and authority in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), the U.S. NRC limited the radiation sources within the
study scope to Category 1 and 2 sources.
Data from the U.S. NRC show that out of the thousands of manufactured and natural
radionuclides, americium-241, cesium-137, cobalt-60, and iridium-192 account for nearly all
(over 99 percent) of the Category 1 and 2 sources. The features of these and some other key
radionuclide radiation sources are summarized in Table S-1.

TABLE S-1 Summary of Radionuclides in Category 1 and 2 Radiation Sources in the United Statesa
Typical Total Activity Physical
Radioactive Specific in U.S. Typical or
Emissions Activity Inventory Major Activity Chemical
Radionuclide Half-life and Energies (TBq/g) [Ci/g] (TBq) [Ci] Applications (TBq) [Ci] Form
Americium-241 432.2 yr α−5.64 MeV, 0.13 [3.5] 240 [6,482] Well logging 0.5–0.8 Pressed
γ-60 keV, [13–22] powder
principal (americium
oxide)
Californium-252 2.645 yr α−6.22 MeV, 20 [540] 0.26 [7] Well logging 0.0004 Metal oxide
fission [0.011]
fragments,
neutrons, and
gamma rays
Cesium-137 30.17 yr β-518 keV 0.75 [20] 104,100 Self-contained 75 [2,000] Pressed
(Ba-137m) max with [2.8 million] irradiators powder
γ-662 keV Teletherapy 50 [1,400] (cesium
(94.4% of decays) Calibrators 15 [400] chloride)
or
β-1.18 MeV
max
Cobalt-60 5.27 yr γ-1.173 and 3.7 [100] 7.32 million Panoramic 150,000 Metal slugs
1.333 MeV [198 million] irradiators [4 million]
Self-contained 900
irradiators [24,000]
11 [300] Teletherapy 500 Metal
[14,000] pellets
Industrial 4 [100]
radiography
Iridium-192 74 d β-1.46 MeV 18.5 [500] 5,436 Industrial 4 [100] Metal
max with 2.3 [146,922] radiography
γ-380 keV
avg, 1.378
MeV max
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

(0.04% of decays)

Plutonium-238 87.7 yr α−5.59 MeV, 2.6 [70] 34.7 [937] RTG 10 [270] Metal oxide
and Pacemakers 0.1 [3]
γ-43 keV (30% (obsolete)
of decays) Fixed gauges 0.75 [20]
Selenium-75 119.8 d γ-280 keV 20–45 9.7 [261] Industrial 3 [75] Elemental
average, 800 [530–1200] radiography or metal
keV max compound

Strontium-90 28.9 yr β-546 keV 5.2 64,000 RTG 750 Metal oxide
(Yttrium-90) [140] [1.73 million] [20,000]
a
Nuclear decay data for this table and throughout the report are from Firestone and Shirley (1996).
 SUMMARY 5

Consideration of technological alternatives to radionuclide radiation sources has been

recommended by the Health Physics Society, the IAEA, and others. The replacement options
may include replacing the radionuclide-based technology with a technology not involving
radiation or with x-rays, an electron beam, or neutrons from a radiation generator (a particle
accelerator device). Finally, the radionuclide or the chemical and physical form of the
radionuclide may be changed to a less hazardous one.
In the body of the report the committee discusses origins, forms, and applications of
radionuclide radiation sources (Chapter 2), risks associated with radionuclide radiation sources
(Chapter 3), accelerator and detector technologies (Chapter 4), each of the major applications
of radionuclide radiation sources (Chapters 5 through 9), and options for implementation of
application-specific replacement technologies, including the various kinds of incentives that
might be applied (Chapter 10).
The major findings and recommendations are described below and are discussed in
detail in the body of the report.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: The radiation sources examined in this study are used in applications that are
important to the nation’s health, safety, and economic strength.

High-activity radiation sources are used in the United States and other modern societies
in a variety of ways: They are used in devices that improve the success of medical
procedures—ensuring that medical devices and implants are sterile, preventing fatal
complications from bone marrow transplants, and providing noninvasive techniques for treating
brain lesions; they are used in devices for inspecting the integrity of buildings, bridges, and
industrial equipment; and they are used to seek out oil and gas resources deep in the ground.
These applications are immensely valuable to the United States. The question is not whether
these activities should continue, but whether lower risk replacements for the radiation sources
are feasible and practical, and what steps should be taken to implement replacements for the
sources that pose a high risk to public health and safety.

Recommendation 1: Replacement of some radionuclide radiation sources with

alternatives should be implemented with caution, ensuring that the essential functions
that the radionuclide radiation sources perform are preserved.

As the nation seeks to improve safety and security, the value and benefits of current
practices should be recognized and, where possible, the services the devices provide should
not be compromised. Some replacements do entail trade-offs with respect to safety, security,
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

costs, convenience, and performance, as discussed in Chapters 3 through 9. These trade-offs

should be considered carefully. A reduction in the performance of a device may be acceptable if
it provides sufficient benefits in safety, for example. Replacement should preserve acceptable
performance of these applications to preserve the benefits that these applications provide, on
many of which the United States has come to rely.
 6 RADIATION SOURCE USE AND REPLACEMENT

Finding 2a: The U.S. NRC ranks the hazards of radiation sources primarily based on the
potential for deterministic health effects (especially death and severe bodily harm) from
direct exposure to the radiation emitted by the bare (unshielded) sources. The U.S.
NRC’s analyses that support the commission’s security requirements for nuclear
materials licensees are based only on these potential consequences.

The U.S. NRC has ranked radiation sources in terms of hazard using the IAEA system of
five source categories, determining that the Category 1 and 2 sources are “high-risk sources.”
The IAEA analyses supporting its source categorization system consider only deterministic
health effects (such as early fatalities) from direct exposure to ionizing radiation from the
unshielded source under different exposure scenarios. The initial DOE/U.S. NRC analysis used
the same consequences and added a contamination threshold criterion that does not account
well for the differing potential for area denial or economic consequences of dispersal attacks
with different radiation sources. The U.S. NRC also carried out security analyses of each type of
facility licensed to use Category 1 and 2 sources, but these analyses were confined to
examining the potential for deterministic health effects caused by attacks involving the Category
1 and 2 sources. The U.S. NRC staff told the committee that this was seen as a first step, and
that the commission was considering whether to include other factors.

Finding 2b: Factors other than the potential to cause deterministic health effects are
important when evaluating hazards from radiation sources, especially the potential to
cause contamination of large areas resulting in economic and social disruption (area
denial).

A radiological incident (an accident or especially an attack) could have its most long-
lasting and far-reaching effects as a result of contamination of land, buildings, and infrastructure
in densely populated regions, partially or completely disabling those assets for human use for
long periods of time. This is illustrated by the radiotherapy source incident in 1987 in Goiania,
Brazil, and the Chornobyl nuclear reactor accident in the Ukraine. Although an event like the
Chornobyl reactor fire is not possible with radiation sources and the scale of the contamination
from an incident with radiation sources would inherently be smaller, that 1986 accident showed
that radioactive contamination can create sizeable areas that are deemed uninhabitable for
extended periods of time. The economic and social disruptions caused by such incidents can be
difficult to quantify, but they are critical to understanding the scope of the impact beyond the
fatalities and severe bodily injuries caused by these events.

Recommendation 2: For prioritizing efforts to reduce risks from malicious use of

radiation sources, the U.S. NRC should consider radiation sources’ potential to cause
Copyright © 2008. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

contamination of large areas resulting in economic and social disruption (area denial) to
determine what, if any, additional security measures are needed.

Having taken an essential first step in considering deterministic health effects from
possible radiation exposure from an incident involving radiation sources, the U.S. NRC should
now include economic and social disruption in its risk analyses of radiation sources. These
impacts can vary significantly depending on the scenarios considered, but that variability does
not make them less important. Further, even with such variability, certain factors emerge as
important in other analyses of these issues (e.g., Van Tuyle et al., 2003). In carrying out its
analyses, the U.S. NRC should not confine itself to the numeric source-activity cutoffs defining
the lower limits for Category 1 and 2 sources because the source categorization system itself is
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