PROJECT REPORT ON

Rojer Mathew V. South India Bank

IN THE COURSE

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

SUBMITTED BY

KASHISH RAI

ROLL NO & PROGRAM NAME

49/A Fourth Year B.A.L.L.B

UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF

PROF. ISHRAT PIRANI

ACADEMIC YEAR

2025 - 2026

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 DECLARATION BY LEARNER

I, the undersigned MS. KASHISH RAI, at this moment, declare that the work
embodied in this project work titled “Rojer Mathew v South India Bank” forms my
contribution to the project work carried out under the guidance of PROF. Ishrat
Pirani, it is a result of my research work. It has not been previously submitted to any
other University for any other Degree/Diploma to this or any other University.

KASHISH RAI
Name and signature of the learner

Certified by
PROF. Ishrat Pirani
Name and signature of the Guiding Teacher
Date:

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 Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank

 FACTS OF THE CASE:

After the enactment of the Finance Act, 2017, a total of seventeen petitions, including those
from individuals, Bar Associations, and the tribunals themselves, challenged the
constitutional validity of these sweeping changes. The immediate grievance was that the
amendments, by centralizing key administrative powers in the hands of the executive,
diluted judicial independence and undermined the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioners argued that the executive could now unilaterally influence who sits on the
tribunals and manage their service terms, potentially eroding the independent character of
these quasi-judicial forums.

One of the most contentious issues was whether such amendments could be passed under
the guise of a “money bill.” Petitioners contended that a money bill, as defined in Article
110 of the Constitution, deals only with aspects strictly related to taxation, government
funds, or other financial matters, and not with broad restructuring of tribunals and judicial
administration. Since a money bill requires only the approval of the lower house (Lok
Sabha), this mechanism was seen as a way to avoid thorough parliamentary scrutiny that
would otherwise occur in the upper house (Rajya Sabha).

The challenges invoked core constitutional principles, citing that Part XIV violated Articles
14 (equality before law), 21 (right to life and personal liberty), 50 (separation of judiciary
from executive), and 323B (tribunals). The petitioners also relied on previous Supreme
Court judgments, such as Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, which set out that if
tribunals are to replace courts for adjudicating certain matters, they must have safeguards
in place to guarantee institutional independence1

 ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT:

1. Whether the Finance Act, 2017, can be classified as a ‘Money Bill’ under Article 110
of the Constitution of India? The core question was whether the Finance Act, 2017,
which included provisions regarding tribunals, could be termed a money bill. If it were
indeed a money bill, then it would bypass the scrutiny of the Rajya Sabha, which was
a contentious issue.

2. Whether Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017, which grants rule-making powers to
the Central Government, is unconstitutional due to excessive delegation of power to
the Executive?

3. Whether the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualifications,

Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017, framed under

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SCC ONLINE Rojer Mathew south India Bank 2019.

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 Section 184, align with the parent legislation and previous judgements on tribunal
functioning?

4. Whether a single nodal agency should administer all tribunals, or whether there is a
need for a unified body to oversee tribunal functions?

5. Should there be a Judicial Impact Assessment conducted on all tribunals in India, and
if so, who should carry out the assessment?

6. Can judges of tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution
be equated in ‘rank’ and ‘status’ with Constitutional functionaries?

7. Should direct statutory appeals from tribunals to the Supreme Court be rerouted to
other courts or tribunals to avoid overburdening the Supreme Court?

8. Is there a need for the amalgamation of existing tribunals and the setting up of
additional benches to improve the system’s efficiency?

 LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED:

 Basic Structure Doctrine: Judicial independence is part of the basic structure.

 Separation of Powers: The legislature cannot vest excessive control in the

executive over judicial/quasi-judicial institutions.

 Rule of Law: Tribunals must function fairly, independently, and free of executive
dominance.

 Article 110 (Money Bill): Only those laws strictly related to taxation, expenditure,
and custody of funds can be enacted as a Money Bill.

 Judicial Review: Courts can review whether the Speaker’s certification of a Money
Bill is valid.

The Court navigated the complex interplay between the need for specialized tribunals and the
constitutional safeguards designed to preserve judicial independence. The majority opinion
invoked the "policy and guidelines" test, asserting that as long as the executive adheres to
established policies and guidelines derived from judicial precedents, delegation does not equate to
excessive transfer of legislative power.

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Conversely, dissenting judges contended that certain delegated functions, particularly those related
to the qualifications and appointments of tribunal members, are so inherently legislative that their
transfer to the executive undermines the tribunals' independence. They argued that legislating these
qualifications is fundamental to maintaining the integrity and impartiality of tribunals, and thus,
such functions should remain within the legislative domain.

Additionally, the judgment touched upon the classification of Bills under Article 110, scrutinizing
whether the Finance Act, 2017, could rightly be categorized as a Money Bill. The majority referred
the matter to a larger bench due to ambiguities in the interpretation of the term "only" within
Article 110(1), which is pivotal in determining the Bill's classification and the procedural nuances
it entails.

 PRECEDENTS:2

The judgment extensively references pivotal cases that have shaped the discourse on
tribunal independence and legislative delegation:

 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997): A seven-judge bench that overruled

earlier decisions, emphasizing the supplemental role of tribunals and striking down
certain constitutional provisions that limited the jurisdiction of tribunals.

 Union of India v. Madras Bar Association (2010 & 2014): Affirmed the necessity for
judicial as well as technical members in tribunals to ensure impartiality and expertise,
also highlighting the lapses in achieving full independence post these rulings.

 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2019): Addressed the verifiability of a Bill as a

Money Bill under Article 110, asserting that such certification is subject to judicial
review for constitutional validity.

 R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993): Discussed the extent of permissible legislative
delegation, introducing the "policy and guidelines" test.

 Importance of Administrative Law:

The importance of administrative law in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank lies in its
foundational role in regulating the powers and functioning of tribunals and administrative
bodies. Administrative law acts as the framework that ensures these quasi-judicial institutions

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 operate within constitutional limits, safeguarding principles such as judicial independence,
fairness, and accountability.

In this case, administrative law is critical in addressing the excessive delegation of legislative
powers to the executive government, which framed tribunal rules under Section 184 of the
Finance Act, 2017. Administrative law principles guard against such overreach, ensuring that
delegated powers are exercised according to clearly defined policies and guidelines, preventing
arbitrary or unchecked executive control. This protects tribunals from losing their independent
judicial character, which is essential for fair adjudication.

The doctrine of separation of powers, a core component of administrative law, was central to
the Court’s scrutiny of the amendments. By preventing the executive from having undue
influence over tribunal appointments and the conditions of service, administrative law
maintains the necessary balance between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. It
also enables judicial review as a safeguard against unlawful or unconstitutional administrative
action, ensuring that the rules governing tribunals comply with constitutional mandates.

Furthermore, administrative law promotes procedural fairness, non-arbitrariness, and

transparency in tribunal functioning. The Court’s directive for re-formulated tribunal rules
aligned with prior judicial precedents highlights administrative law’s role in maintaining
uniformity, assured tenure, and equitable service conditions. The mandated judicial impact
assessment underscores the importance of evaluating administrative reforms against legal and
constitutional standards.

Hence, administrative law is indispensable in upholding the rule of law, protecting

fundamental rights, and preserving institutional integrity in tribunal administration, as
demonstrated in this case. It ensures tribunals serve justice efficiently without sacrificing
independence and constitutional values.

CONCLUSION:

(i) The issue and question of Money Bill, as defined under Article 110(1) of the Constitution, and
certification accorded by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in respect of Part-XIV of the Finance Act,
2017, is referred to a larger Bench.

(ii) The Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal, and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other
Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 suffer from various infirmities as observed earlier.
These Rules, formulated by the Central Government under Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017,

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being contrary to the parent enactment and the principles envisaged in the Constitution as
interpreted by this Court, are hereby struck down in entirety.

(iii) The Central Government is accordingly directed to re-formulate the Rules strictly in
conformity and in accordance with the principles delineated by this Court in R.K. Jain (supra), L.
Chandra Kumar (supra), Madras Bar Association (supra), and Gujarat Urja Vikas Ltd. (supra),
conjointly read with the observations made in the earlier part of this decision.

(iv)The new set of Rules to be formulated by the Central Government shall ensure non-
discriminatory and uniform conditions of service, including assured tenure, keeping in mind the
fact that the Chairperson and Members appointed after retirement and those who are appointed
from the Bar or from other specialized professions/services, constitute two separate and distinct
homogeneous classes.

(v) It would be open to the Central Government to provide in the new set of Rules that the Presiding
Officers or Members of the Statutory Tribunals shall not hold 'rank' and 'status' equivalent to that
of the Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts, as the case may be, only based on drawing
equal salary or other perquisites.

(vi)There is a need-based requirement to conduct a 'Judicial Impact Assessment' of all the

Tribunals referable to the Finance Act, 2017, to analyse the ramifications of the changes in the
framework of Tribunals as provided under the Finance Act, 2017. Thus, we find it appropriate to
issue a writ of mandamus to the Ministry of Law and Justice to carry out such 'Judicial Impact
Assessment' and submit the result of the findings before the competent legislative authority.

(vii) The Central Government, in consultation with the Law Commission of India or any other
expert body shall re-visit the provisions of the statutes referable to the Finance Act, 2017 or other
Acts as listed in para 174 of this order and place appropriate proposals before the Parliament for
consideration of the need to remove direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders of Tribunals.
A decision in this regard by the Union of India shall be taken within six months.

(viii) The Union Government shall carry out an appropriate exercise for amalgamation of existing
Tribunals adopting the test of homogeneity of the subject matters to be dealt with and thereafter
constitute an adequate number of Benches commensurate with the existing and anticipated volume
of work.

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My Opinion on this Case Law:
The case of Rojer Mathew v. South India Bank, the judgment represents a significant discourse on
the constitutional balance between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, particularly under
administrative law and the doctrine of separation of powers. This case profoundly highlights the
constitutional safeguards essential to preserving the independence of tribunals functioning as
quasi-judicial bodies.
The core legal dilemmas about the Finance Act, 2017, being a Money Bill and the executive’s
delegated power under Section 184 demonstrate how critical judicial scrutiny is in preventing the
erosion of judicial independence by executive overreach. The Supreme Court's referral of the
Money Bill classification to a larger bench underscores the gravity and complexity of ensuring
procedural legitimacy in legislative processes, especially when fundamental rights and
institutional frameworks are at stake.
The striking down of the Tribunal Rules for not aligning with the principles of non-arbitrariness,
assured tenure, and institutional independence reinforces the principle that administrative law must
restrict excessive delegation and guard against dilution of tribunal autonomy. Moreover, the
judgment’s emphasis on judicial impact assessments and recommendations for tribunal
amalgamation and reformed appeal routes reflect a progressive approach toward streamlining
administrative justice, improving efficiency without compromising constitutional values.
In conclusion, this case is a landmark example of how administrative law acts as a vital tool in
balancing governance needs with constitutional mandates. It reiterates the judiciary’s role as a
sentinel protecting the basic structure particularly judicial independence from arbitrary executive
interference while also calling for reforms to optimize tribunal functionality. This case enriches
understanding of the interplay between legislative delegation, constitutional checks, and the
necessity of procedural fairness in the administrative justice system. It is a critical study for anyone
exploring the nuances of constitutional and administrative law in India.

References:

1. https://www.manupatracademy.com/legalpost/manu-sc-1563-2019

2. https://www.khaitanco.com/thought-leaderships/Roger-Mathew-v-South-Indian-
Bank-Limited-Ors

3. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/36423291/