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Translation \ 29 This would give rise to a federation of

nations which, however, would not have to be a State of nations. *
That would involve a contradiction. For the term "state" implies the
relation of one who rules to those who obey — that is to say, of
lawgiver to the subject people : and many nations in one state
would constitute only one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis,
since here we have to consider the right of one nation against
another, in so far as they are so many separate states and are not to
be fused into one. * But see p. 136, where Kant seems to speak of a
State of nations as the ideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point,
more clearly in the Rechtslehre, Part. II. § 61 :— " The natural state
of nations," he says here, "like that of individual men, is a condition
which must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a state
regulated by law. Hence, before this can take place, every right
possessed by these nations and every external "mine" and "thine"
\id est, symbol of possession] which states acquire or preserve
through war are merely provisional^ and can become ftremftorily
valid and constitute a true state of peace only in a universal union of
ttates, by a process analogous to that through which a people
becomes a state. Since, however, the too great extension of such a
State of nations over vast territories must, in the long run, make the
government of that union — and therefore the protection of each of
its members — impossible, a multitude of such corporations will lead
again to a state of war. So that ferpetual peace, the final goal of
international law as a whole, is really an impracticable idea \eine
unaus/uhr~ bare Idee\ The political principles, however, which are
directed towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment
of such unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation
to that ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this
approximation is required by duty and is therefore founded also
upon the rights of men and of states, these principles are, without
doubt, capable of practical realisation." [Tr.] 9
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Perpetual Peace The attachment of savages to their lawless

liberty, the fact that they would rather be at hopeless variance with
one another than submit themselves to a legal authority constituted
by themselves, that they therefore prefer their senseless freedom to
a reason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with profound contempt
as barbarism and uncivilisation and the brutal degradation of
humanity. So one would think that civilised races, each formed into a
state by itself, must come out of such an abandoned condition as
soon as they possibly can. On the contrary, however, every state
thinks rather that its majesty (the "majesty" of a people is an absurd
expression) lies just in the very fact that it is subject to no external
legal authority ; and the glory of the ruler consists in this, that,
without his requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands stand
at his command ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of
no concern to them. * The difference between the savages of
Europe and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while many
tribes of the latter have been entirely devoured by their enemies,
Europeans know a better way of using the vanquished than by
eating * A Greek Emperor who magnanimously volunteered to settle
by a duel his quarrel with a Bulgarian Prince, got the following
answer:— "A smith who has toQgs will not pluck the glowing iron
from the fire with his hands."
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Translation 131 them; and they prefer to increase through

them the number of their subjects, and so the number of
instruments at their command for still more widely spread war. The
depravity of human nature * shows itself without disguise in the
unrestrained relations of nations to each other, while in the law-
governed civil state much of this is hidden by the check of
government. This being so, it is astonishing that the word "right" has
not yet been entirely banished from the politics of war as pedantic,
and that no state has yet ventured to publicly advocate this point of
view/ For Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel and others — Job's
comforters, all of them — are always quoted in good faith to justify
an attack, although their codes, whether couched in philosophical or
diplomatic terms, have not— nor can have — the slightest legal
force, because states, as such, are under no common external
authority; and there is no instance of a state having ever * "Both
sayings are very true: that man to man is a kind of God; and that
man to man u an arrant wolf. The first is true, if we compare citizens
amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare cities. In the
one, there is some analogy of similitude with the Deity; to wit,
justice and charity, the twin sisters of peace. But in the other, good
men must defend themselves by taking to them for a sanctuary the
two daughters of war, deceit and violence: that is, in plain terms, a
mere brutal rapacity." (Hobbes: Epistle Dedicatory*" to the
Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society?) ^Tr.]
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132 Perpetual Peace been moved by argument to desist

from its purpose, even when this was backed up by the testimony of
such great men. This homage which every state renders— in words
at least — to the idea of right, proves that, although it may be
slumbering, there is, notwithstanding, to be found in man a still
higher natural moral capacity by the aid of which he will in time gain
the mastery over the evil principle in his nature, the existence of
which he is unable to deny. And he hopes the same of others; for
otherwise the word "right" would never be uttered by states who
wish to wage war, unless to deride it like the Gallic Prince who
declared: — " The privilege which nature gives the strong is that the
weak must obey them." * The method by which states prosecute
their rights can never be by process of law — as it is where there is
an external tribunal — but only by war. ' Through this means,
however, and its favourable issue, victory, the question of right is
never decided. A treaty of peace makes, it may be, an end to the
war of the moment, but not to the conditions * "The strongest are
still never sufficiently strong to ensure them the continual
mastership, unless they find means of transforming force into right,
and obedience into duty. From the right of the strongest, right takes
an ironical appearance, and is rarely established as a principle."
(Contrat Soda/, I, Ch. III.) [Tr.j
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i j $ of war which at any time may afford a new pretext for

opening hostilities; and this we cannot exactly condemn as unjust,
because under these conditions everyone is his own judge.
Notwithstanding, not quite the same rule applies to states according
to the law of nations as holds good of individuals in a lawless
condition according to the law of nature, namely, "that they ought to
advance out of this condition." This is so, because, as states, they
have already within themselves a legal constitution, and have
therefore advanced beyond the stage at which others, in accordance
with their ideas of right, can force them to come under a wider legal
constitution. Meanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of the
supreme law-giving moral power, absolutely condemns war * as a
morally lawful proceeding, * "The natural state," says Hobbes, (On
Dominion, Ch. VH § 18) "hath the same proportion to the ciril, (I
mean, liberty to subjection), •which passion hath to reason, or a
beast to a man." Locke speaks thus of man, when he puts himself
into the state of war with another: — "haying quitted reason, which
God hath given to be the rule betwixt man aod man, and the
common bond whereby human kind is united ioto one fellowship and
society; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches,
and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon
another, where he has no right: and so revolting from his own kind
to that of beasts, by making force, which is theirs, to be hig rule of
right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured
person, and the rest of mankind that will join with him in the
execution of justice, as any other wild bea«t, or noxious brute, with
whom mankind can have neither society nor stcurity." (Civil
Grvtrnrnmt, Ch. XV. § 172.) [Tr.]
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134 Perpttual Peace and makes a state of peace, on the

other hand, an immediate duty. Without a compact between the
nations, however, this state of peace cannot be established or
assured. Hence there must be an alliance of a particular kind which
we may call a covenant of peace (foedus pacificum\ which would
differ from a treaty of peace (pactum pads] in this respect, that the
latter merely puts an end to one war, while the former would seek to
put an end to war for ever. This alliance does not aim at the gain of
any power whatsoever of the state, but merely at the preservation
and security of the freedom of the state for itself and of other allied
states at the same time. * The latter do not, however, require, for
this reason, to submit themselves like individuals in the state of
nature to public laws and coercion. The practicability or objective
reality of this idea of federation which is to extend gradually over all
states and so lead to perpetual peace can be shewn. For, if Fortune
ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a
republic, — which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace —
this would serve as a centre of federal union for other states wishing
to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom * Cf. Rousseau:
Gouverntment de Polognt, Ch. V. Federate government is "the only
one which unites in itself all the advantage* of great and small
states/' [Tr.]
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Translation 13 J among the states in accordance with the

idea of the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this
kind, the federation would extend further and further. It is quite
comprehensible that a people should say : — " There shall be no war
among us, for we shall form ourselves into a state, that is to say,
constitute for ourselves a supreme legislative, administrative and
judicial power which will settle our disputes peaceably." But if this
state says:— "There shall be no war between me and other states,
although I recognise no supreme law-giving power which will secure
me. my rights and whose rights I will guarantee;" then it is not at all
clear upon what grounds I could base my confidence in my right,
unless it were the substitute for that compact on which civil society
is based— namely, free federation which reason must necessarily
connect with the idea of the law of nations, if indeed any meaning is
to be left in that concept at all. There is no intelligible meaning in
the idea of the law of nations as giving a right to make war; for that
must be a right to decide what is just, not in accordance with
universal, external laws limiting the freedom of each individual, but
by means of one-sided maxims applied by force. We must then
understand by this that men of such ways of thinking are quite justly
served, when they
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136 Perpetual Peace destroy one another, and thui find

perpetual peace in the wide grave which covers all the abominations
of acts of violence as well as the authors of such deeds. For states,
in their relation to one another, there can be, according to reason,
no other way of advancing from that lawless condition which
unceasing war implies, than by giving up their savage lawless
freedom, just as individual men have done, and yielding to the
coercion of public laws. Thus they can form a State of nations
(civitas gentium], one, too; which will be ever increasing and would
finally embrace all the peoples of the earth. States, however, in
accordance with their understanding of the law of nations, by no
means desire this, and therefore reject in hypothesi what ii correct in
thesi. Hence, instead of the positive idea of a world-republic, if all is
not to be lost, only the negative substitute for it, a federation
averting war, maintaining its ground and ever extending over the
world may stop the current of this tendency to war and shrinking
from the control of law. But even then there will be a constant
danger that this propensity may break out. * * On the conclusion of
peace at the end of a war, it might not be unseemly for a nation to
appoint a day of humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on
which to invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the
human race are guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit
(in their relation* with other states) to a law-governed constitution,
preferring rather
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Translation 1 3 7 "Furor impiui intui — fremit horddui oro

crucnto." (Virgil.) * THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL
PEACE III. — "The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be
limited to the conditions of universal hospitality." We are speaking
here, as in the previous articles, not of philanthropy, but of right ;
and in this sphere hospitality signifies the claim of a stranger
entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility.
The latter may send him away again, if this can be done without
causing his death; but, so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he
must not be treated as an enemy. It is not a right to be treated as a
guest to which the stranger can lay in the pride of their
independence to use the barbarous method of war, which after all
does not really settle what is wanted, namely, the right of each state
in a quarrel. The feasts of thanksgiving during a war for a victorious
battle, the hymns which are sung — to use the Jewish expression —
" to the Lord of Hosts" are not in less strong contrast to the ethical
idea of a father of mankind; for, apart from the indifference these
customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish their
rights — sad enough as it is — these rejoicings bring in an element
of txultation that a great number of Urea, or at least the happiness
of many, has been destroyed. * Cf. Aeneidos, I. 294 $tq. "Furor
impius iatu*, Saeva sedens super arma, et centum vinetua ai'nis
Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cnieuto." [Tr.]
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138 Perpetual Ptaee claim — a special friendly compact on

his behalf would be required to make him for a given time an actual
inmate — but he has a right of visitation. This right * to present
themselves to society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our
common right of possession on the surface of the earth on which, as
it is a globe, we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end
reconcile ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time,
originally no one individual had more right than another to live in
any one particular spot. Uninhabitable portions of the surface, ocean
and desert, split up the human community, but in such a way that
ships and camels — "the ship of the desert" — make it possible for
men to come into touch with one another across these
unappropriated regions and to take advantage of our common claim
to the face of the earth with a view to a possible
intercommunication. The inhospitality of the inhabitants of certain
sea coasts — as, for example, the coast of Barbary — in plundering
ships in neighbouring seas or making slaves of shipwrecked mariners
; or the behaviour of the Arab Bedouins in the deserts, who think
that * Cf. Vattel (pp. cit., II. ch. IX. § 123):— "The right of passage
is also a remnant of the primitive state of communion, in which the
entire earth was common to all mankind, and the passage was
everywhere free to each individual according to his necessities.
Nobody can be entirely deprived of this right." See also aboTe, P, 65,
note. [Tr.]
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Translation 139 proximity to nomadic tribes constitutes a

right to rob, is thus contrary to the law of nature. This right to
hospitality, however — that is to say, the privilege of strangers
arriving on foreign soil — does not amount to more than what is
implied in a permission to make an attempt at intercourse with the
original inhabitants. In this way far distant territories may enter into
peaceful relations with one another. These relations may at last
come under the public control of law, and thus the human race may
be brought nearer the realisation of a cosmopolitan constitution. Let
us look now, for the sake of comparison, at the inhospitable
behaviour of the civilised nations, especially the commercial states of
our continent. The injustice which they exhibit on visiting foreign
lands and races — this being equivalent in their eyes to conquest —
is such as to fill us with horror. America, the negro countries, the
Spice Islands, the Cape etc. were, on being discovered, looked upon
as countries which belonged to nobody; for the native inhabitants
were reckoned as nothing. In Hindustan, under the pretext of
intending to establish merely commercial depots, the Europeans
introduced foreign troops ; and, as a result, the different states of
Hindustan were stirred up to far-spreading wars. Oppression of the
natives followed, famine, insurrection, perfidy and all
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140 Pfrpetual Piace the rest of the litany of evilt which can
afflict mankind. China * and Japan (Nipon) which had made an
attempt at receiving guests of this kind, have now * ID order to call
this great empire by the uame which it girts itself — namely, China,
not Sina or a word of similar sound — we have only to look at
Gcorgii: Alphab. Tibet., pp. 651 — 654, particularly nott b., below.
According to the observation of Professor Fischer of St. Petersburg,
there is really no particular name which it always goes by: tfce most
usual is the word Kin, is. gold, which the inhabitants of Tibet call Scr.
Hence the emperor is called the king of gold, /./. the king of the
most splendid country in the world. This word Kin may probably be
Ckin in the empire itself, but b« pronounced Kin by the Italian
missionaries on account of ihe gutturals. Thus we see that the
country of the Seres, BO often mentioned by the Romans, was
China: the silk, however, was despatched to Europe across Greater
Tibet, probably through Smaller Tibet and Bucharia, through Persia
and then on. Thi« lead* to many reflections as to the antiquity of
this wonderful state, M compared with Hindustan, at the time of it*
union with Tibet and thence with Japan. On the other hand, the
name Sina or Tschina which is said to be given to this land by
neighbouring people* leads to nothing. Perhaps we can explain the
ancient intercourse of Europe with Tibet— » fact at no time widely
kcown — by looking at what Hesychius has preserred on the matter.
I refer to the shout, Kot/zOf4*-a% (Konx Ompax), the cry of the
Hierophants in the Eleusiniaa mysteries (cf. Travels of Anacharsit tke
Younger, Part V., p. 447, setf.). For, according to Georgii Alfk. Tibet.,
the word Coneioa which bears a striking resemblance to Konx means
God. Pak-ci« (fb. p. 520) which might easily be pronounced by the
Greeks like fax means promulgator legis, the divine principle
permeating nature (called also, on p. 177, Cencresi). Om, however,
which La Croie translates by benedictus, i.e. blessed, can when
applied to th« Deity mean nothing but beatified (p. 507). Now P.
Franc. Hormtiua, when be asked th« Lhamas of Tibet, as he often
did, what tfecy mndaratood by God (Cencria) always got tfce aaswer
:—
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Translation 141 taken a prudent step. Only to a single

European people, the Dutch, has China given the right of access to
her shores (but not of entrance into the country), while Japan has
granted both these concessions; but at the same time they exclude
the Dutch who enter, as if they were prisoners, from social
intercourse with the inhabitants. The worst, or from the standpoint
of ethical judgment the best, of all this is that no satisfaction is
derived from all this violence, that all these trading companies stand
on the verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands, that seat of the most
horrible and delib"it is the assembly of all the saints," i.e. the
assembly of those blessed ones who have been born again
according to the faith of the Lama and, after many wanderings in
changing forms, have at last returned to God, to Burchane : that is
to say, they are beings to be worshipped, souls which have
undergone transmigration (p. 223). So the mysterious expression
JKonx Ompax ought probably to mean the holy (Konx\ blessed,
(Om) and wise (Pax) supreme Being pervading the universe, the
personification of nature. Its use in the Greek mysteries probably
signified monotheism for the Epoptes, in distinction from the
polytheism of the people, although elsewhere P. Horalius scented
atheism here. How that mysterious word came by way of Tibet to
the Greeks may be explained as above; and, on the other hand, in
this way is made probable an early intercourse of Europe with China
across Tibet, earlier perhaps than the communication with
Hindustan. (There is some difference of opinion as to the meaning of
the words x^y£ '
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142 Perpetual Peace erate slavery, yield no real profit, but

only have their use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy object —
namely, that of furnishing men to be trained as sailors for the men-
of-war and thereby contributing to the carrying on of war in Europe.
And this has been done by nations who make a great ado about
their piety, and who, while they are quite ready to commit injustice,
would like, in their orthodoxy, to be considered among the elect. The
intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere steadily
increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so
enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all
over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical,
high-flown notion of right, but a complement of the unwritten code
of law — constitutional as well as international law — necessary for
the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realisation of
perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring to fulfil the conditions
laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we flatter ourselves that we
are gradually approaching that ideal.
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FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF

PERPETUAL PEACE THIS guarantee is given by no less a power than
the great artist nature (natura dcsdala rerum) in whose mechanical
course is clearly exhibited a predetermined design to make harmony
spring from human discord, even against the will of man. Now this
design, although called Fate when looked upon as the compelling
force of a cause, the laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is,
when considered as the purpose manifested in the course of nature,
called Providence, * as the deep* In the mechanical system of
nature to which man belongs as a sentient being, there appears, as
the underlying ground of its existence, a certain form which we
cannot make intelligible to ourselves except by thinking into the
physical world the idea of an end preconceived by the Author of the
universe: this predetermination of nature on the part of God we
generally call Divine Providence. In so far as this providence appears
in the origin of the universe, we speak of Providence as founder of
the world (prcvidentia conditrix ; semel jussit, semper parent.
Augustine). As it maintains the course of nature, however, according
to universal laws of adaptation to preconceived ends, [/.*.
teleological laws] we call it a ruling providence (providentia
gubernatrix). Further, we name it the guiding providence
(providentia directrix), as it appears in the world for special ends,
which we coXild not foresee, but suspect only from the result.
Finally, regarding particular events
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144 Perpetual Peace lying wisdom of a Higher Cause,

directing itself towards the ultimate practical end of the human race
and predetermining the course of things with a view to its
realisation. This Providence we do as (Hvine purposes, we speak no
longer of providence, but of dispensation (directio txtraordinaria). As
this term, however, really suggests the idea of miracles, although the
events are not spoken of by this name, the desire to fathom
dispensation, as such, is a foolish presumption in men. Tor, from one
single occurrence, to jump at the conclusion that there u a particular
principle of efficient causes and that this event is an end and not
merely the natural \naturmeehanische\ sequence of a design quite
unknown to us is absurd and presumptuous, in however pious and
humble a spirit we may speak of it. In the same way to distinguish
between a universal and a particular providence when regarding it
materialiier, in its relation to actual objects in the world (to say, for
instance, that there may be, indeed, a providence for the
preservation of the different species of creation, but that individuals
are left to chance) is false and contradictory. For providence is called
universal for the very reason that no single thing may be thought of
as shut out from its care. Probably the distinction of two kinds of
providence, formaliter or subjectively considered, had reference to
the manner in which it* purposes are fulfilled. So that we have
ordinary providence (eg. the yearly decay and awakening to new life
in nature with change of season) and what we may call unusual or
special providence (e.g. the bringing of timber by ocean currents to
Arctic shores where it does not grow, and where without this aid the
inhabitants could not live). Here, although we can quite well explain
the physico-mcchanical cause of these phenomena — in this case,
for example, the banks of the rivers in temperate countries are over-
grown with trees, some of which fall into the water and are carried
along, probably by the Gulf Stream — we must not overlook the
teleological cause which points to the providential care of a ruling
wisdom above nature. But the concept, commonly used in the
schools of philosophy, of a co-operation on the part of the Deity or a
concurrence (concursus) in the operations going on in the world of
sense, must be dropped. For it is, firstly,
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145 not, it i« true, perceive in the cunning contrivances

[Kunstanstaltfn] of nature ; nor can we even conclude from the fact
of their existence that it is there; but, as in every relation between
the form of things and their final cause, we can, and must, supply
the thought of a Higher Wisdom, in order that we may be able to
form an idea of the possible existence of these products after the
analogy of human works of art [Kunsthandwlf-contradictory to
couple the like and the unlike together (ftyphes jungtre equh} and
to let HIM who is Himself the entire cause of tht changes im the
universt make good any shortcomings in His own predetermining
providence (which to require this must be defective) during the
course of the world; for example, to say ttat the physician has
restored the sick with the help of God — that is to say that Ht has
been present as a support. For tausa solitaria nen j*t*>*t. God
created the physician as well as his means ef healing; and we must
ascribe the result wholly to Him, if we will go back to the supreme
First Cause which, theoretically, is beyond our comprehension. Or we
can ascribe the result entirely to the physician, in so far as we follow
up this event, as explicable in the chain of physical causes,
according to the order of nature. Secondly, moreover, such a way of
looking at this question destroys all the fixed principles by which we
judge an effect. But, from the ethico-practical point of view which
looks entirely to the transcendental side of things, the idea of a
divine concurrence is quite proper and even necessary : for example,
in the faith that God will make good the imperfection of our human
justice, if only our feelings and intentions are sincere; and that He
will do this by means beyond our comprehension, and therefore we
should not slacken our efforts after what is good. Whence it follows,
as a matter of course, that no one must attempt to explain a goo 1
action as a mere event in time by this (oncurmt ; for that would be
to pretend a theoretical knowledge of the supersensible aad hence
be absurd, 10
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I4J6 * The representation to ourselves of the relation and

agreement of these formations of nature to the moral purpose for
which they were made anc which reason directly prescribes to us, is
an Idea it is true, which is in theory superfluous; but in practice it is
dogmatic, and its objective reality K well established, f Thus we see,
for example, with regard to the ideal \Pfiichtb egriff\ of perpetual
peace, that it is our duty to make use of the mechanism of nature
for the realisation of that end. Moreover, in a case like this where we
are interested merely in the theory and not in the religious question,
the use of the word " nature " is more appropriate than that of
"providence", in view of the limitation* of human reason, which, in
considering the relation of effects to their causes, must keep within
the limits of possible experience. And the term "nature" is also less
presumptuous than the other. To speak of a Providence knowable by
us would be boldly to put on the wings of Icarus in order to draw
near to the mystery of its unfathomable purpose. Before we
determine the surety given by nature more exactly, we must first
look at what ultimately makes this guarantee of peace necessary —
the * 14 AT/, which we cannot diuerar troai the id** of a skill
capable of producing th«o». (Tr.j t Sec preface, p. ix. above.
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First Supplement circumstances in which nature has

carefully placed the actors in her great theatre. In the next place, we
shall proceed to consider the manner in which she gives this surety.
The provisions she has made are as follow : (i) she has taken care
that men can live in all parts of the world ; (2) she has scattered
them by means of war in all directions, even into the most
inhospitable regions, so that these too might be populated ; (3) by
this very means she has forced them to enter into relations more or
less controlled by law. It is surely wonderful that, on the cold wastes
round the Arctic Ocean, there is always to be found moss for the
reindeer to scrape out from under the snow, the reindeer itself either
serving as food or to draw the sledge of the Ostiak or Samoyedes.
And salt deserts which would otherwise be left unutilised have the
camel, which seems as if created for travelling in such lands. This
evidence of design in things, however, is still more clear when we
come to know that, besides the fur-clad animals of the shores of the
Arctic Ocean, there are seals, walruses and whales whose flesh
furnishes food and whose oil fire for the dwellers in these regions. -
But the providential care of nature excites our wonder above all,
when we hear of the driftwood which is carried — whence no one
knows — to these treeless shores: for without the
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148 Pfrpttual Ptatt aid of this material the natives could

neither construct their craft, nor weapons, nor huts for shelter. Here
too they have so much to do, making war against wild animals, that
they live at peace with one another. But what drove them originally
into these regions was probably nothing but war. Of animals, used
by us as instruments of war, the horse was the first which man
learned to tame ind domesticate during the period of the peopling of
the earth; the elephant belongs to the later period of the luxury of
states already established. In the same way, the art of cultivating
certain grasses called cereals — no longer known to us in their
original form — and also the multiplication and improvement, by
transplanting and grafting, of the original kinds of fruit — in Europe,
probably only two species, the crab-apple and wild pear — could
only originate under the conditions accompanying established states
where the rights of property are assured. That is to say it would be
after man, hitherto existing in lawless liberty, had advanced beyond
the occupations of a hunter, * a fisherman * Of all modes of
livelihood the life of the hunter is undoubtedly most incompatible
with a civilised condition of society. Because, to live by hunting,
families must isolate themselves from their neighbours, soon
becoming estranged and spread over widely scattered forests, to be
before long on terms of hostility, since each requires a great deal of
space to obtain food and raiment. God's command to Noah not to
shed blood (I. Genesis^ IX. 4—6)
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First Supplement 149 or a shepherd to the life of a tiller of

the soil, when salt and iron were discovered, — to become, perhaps,
the first articles of commerce between different peoples, — and
were sought far and near. In this way the peoples would be at first
brought into peaceful relation with one another, and so come to an
understanding and the enjoyment of friendly intercourse, even with
their most distant neighbours. Now while nature provided that men
could live on all parts of the earth, she also at the same time
despotically willed that they should live everywhere on it, although
against their own inclination and even although this imperative did
not presuppose an idea of duty which would compel obedience to
nature with the force of a moral law. But, to attain this end, she has
chosen war. So we see certain peoples, widely separated, whose
common [4. "But flesh with the life thereof, which U the blood
thereof, shall ye not eat. 5. And surely your blood of your lives will I
require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand
of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of
man. 6. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed : for in the image of God made he man."] is frequently quoted,
and was afterwards — in another connection it is true — made by
the baptised Jews a condition to which Christians, newly converted
from heathendom, had to conform. Cf. Acts XV. 20 ; XXI. 25. This
command seems originally to have been nothing else than a
prohibition of the life of the hunter; for here the possibility of eating
raw flesh must often occur, and, in forbidding the one custom, we
condemn th« other.
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150 Perpetual Peace descent is made evident by affinity in

their languages. Thus, for instance, we find the Samoyedes on the
Arctic Ocean, and again a people speaking a similar language on the
Altai Mts., 200 miles [Mfileri\ * off, between whom has pressed in a
mounted tribe, war-like in character and of Mongolian origin, which
has driven one branch of the race far from the other, into the most
inhospitable regions where their own inclination would certainly not
have carried them, f In the same way, through the intrusion of the
Gothic and Sarmatian tribes, the Finns in the most northerly regions
of Europe, whom we call Laplanders, have been separated by as
great a distance from the Hungarians, with whose language their
own is allied. And what but war can have brought the Esquimos to
the north of America, a race quite distinct from those of that country
and probably European adventurers of * About 1000 English miles. f
The question might be put:—" If it is nature's will that thes« Arctic
shores should not remain unpopulated, what will become of their
inhabitants, if, as is to be expected, at some time or other no more
driftwood should be brought to them? For we may believe that, with
the advance of civilisation, the inhabitants of temperate zones will
utilise berter the wood which grows on the banks of their rivers, aiid
not let it fall into the stream and so be swept away." I answer: the
inhabitants of the shores of the River Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena will
supply them with it through trade, and take in exchange the animal
produce in which the seat of Arctic shore* are so rich— that is, if
nature KM first of all brought about peace among them.
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First Supplement 151 prehistoric times? And war too,

nature's method of populating the earth, must have driven the
Pescherais * in South America as far as Patagonia. War itself,
however, is in need of no special ) stimulating cause, but seems
engrafted in human7 nature, and is even regarded as something
noble \ in itself to which man is inspired by the love of glory apart
from motives of self-interest. Hence, among the savages of America
as well as those of Europe in the age of chivalry, martial courage is
looked upon as of great value in itself, not merely when a war is
going on, as is reasonable enough, but in order that there should be
war: and thus war is often entered upon merely to exhibit this
quality. So that an intrinsic dignity is held to attach to war in itself,
and even philosophers eulogise it as an ennobling, refining influence
on humanity, unmindful of the Greek proverb, " War is evil, in so far
as it makes more bad people than it takes away." So much, then, of
what nature does for her own ends with regard to the human race
as members of the animal world. - Now comes the question which
touches the essential points in this design of a perpetual peace: —
"What does nature do in this respect with reference to the end
which man's own * Cf. EMC. Brit, (gth «••!.), art. '; Indians", in
which there is an t» " Futgiww, At Ptsckti-mis" tf some \rrihws. [Tr.]
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151 Perpetual Peace reason sets before him as a duty ? and

consequently what does she do to further the realisation of hit moral
purpose ? How does she guarantee that what man, by the laws of
freedom, ought to do and yet fails to do, he will do, without any
infringement of his freedom by the compulsion of nature and that,
moreover, this shall be done in accordance with the three forms of
public right — constitutional or political law, international law and
cosmopolitan law?" When I say of nature that she wills that this or
that should take place, I do not mean that she imposes upon us the
duty to do it — for only the free, unrestrained, practical reason can
do that — but that she does it herself, whether we will or not. "Fata
voltntem ducunt," nolentem trahunt" i . Even if a people were not
compelled through internal discord to submit to the restraint of
public laws, war would bring this about, working from without. For,
according to the contrivance of nature which we have mentioned,
every people finds another tribe in its neighbourhood, pressing upon
it in such a manner that it is compelled to form itself internally into a
state to be able to defend itself as a power should. Now the
republican constitution is the only one which is perfectly adapted to
the rights of man, but it is also the most difficult to establish and still
more to maintain. So generally is this retognised that people
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First Supplement 153 often say the members of a

republican state would require to be angels, * because men, with
their selfseeking propensities, are not fit for a constitution of so
sublime a form But now nature comes to the aid of the universal,
reason-derived will which, much as we honour it, is in practice
powerless. And this she does, by means of these very selfseeking
propensities, so that it only depends — and so much lies within the
power of man — on a good organisation of the state for their forces
to be so pitted against one another, that the one may check the
destructive activity of the other or neutralise its effect. And hence,
from the standpoint of reason, the result will be the same as if both
forces did not exist, and each individual is compelled to be, if not a
morally good man, yet at least a good citizen. The problem of the
formation of the state, hard as it may sound, is not insoluble, even
for a * Rousseau uses these terms in speaking of democracy. (Cont.
Sea., III. Ch. 4.) " If there were a nation of Gods, they might be
governed by a democracy: but so perfect a government will not
agree with men." But he writes elsewhere of republican
governments (op. ft/., II. Ch. 6.): — "AH lawful governments are
republican." And in a footnote to this passage: — "I do not by the
word 'republic' mean an aristocracy or democracy only, but in
general all governments directed by the public will which is the law.
If a government is to b« lawful, it must not be coufused with the
sovereign power, but be considered as the administrator of that
power: and then Monarchy itself is a republic," This language ha* a
eiosd affinity \vitfc &*t wed by Kam*. (Cf. above, p. i»$.) [Tr.]
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154 Perpetual Peace race of devils, granted that they have

intelligence. It may be put thus : — " Given a multitude of rational
beings who, in a body, require general laws for their own
preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly inclined
to exempt himself from this restraint : how are we to order their
affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that, although
their private dispositions may be really antagonistic, they may yet so
act as a check upon one another, that, in their public relations, the
effect is the same as if they had no such evil sentiments." Such a
problem must be capable of solution. For it deals, not with the moral
reformation of mankind, but only with the mechanism of nature ;
and the problem is to learn how this mechanism of nature can be
applied to men, in order so to regulate the antagonism of conflicting
interests in a people that they may even compel one another to
submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily bring about the
state of peace in which laws have force. We can see, in states
actually existing, although very imperfectly organised, that, in
externals, they already approximate very nearly to what the Idea of
right prescribes, although the principle of morality is certainly not the
cause. A good political constitution, however, is not to be expected
as a result of progress in morality; but rather, conversely, the good
moral • condition of a nation is to be looked for, M one of
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First Supplement 155 the first fruits of such a constitution.

Hence the mechanism of nature, working through the selfseeking
propensities of man (which of course counteract one another in their
external effects), may be used by reason as a means of making way
for the realisation of her own purpose, the empire of right, and, as
far as is in the power of the state, to promote and secure in this way
internal as well as external peace. We may say, then, that it is the
irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the supremacy.
What one here fails to do will be accomplished in the long run,
although perhaps with much inconvenience to us. As Bouterwek
says, 11 If you bend the reed too much it breaks : he who would do
too much does nothing." 2. The idea of international law
presupposes the separate existence of a number of neighbouring
and independent states ; and, although such a condition of things is
in itself already a state of war, (if a federative union of these nations
does not prevent the outbreak of hostilities) yet, according to the
Idea of reason, this is better than that all the states should be
merged into one under a power which has gained the ascendency
over its neighbours and gradually become a universal monarchy. *
For the wider the sphere of their jurisdic* $«« above, p. 69, n»tet
««p. reference to Thetry 0f Etkus.
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156 Perpetual Peace tion, the more laws lose in force; and
soulless despotism, when it has choked the seeds of good, at last
sinks into anarchy. Nevertheless it is the desire of every state, or of
its ruler, to attain to a permanent condition of peace in this very
way; that is to say, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible
to its sway. But nature wills it otherwise. She employs two means to
separate nations, and prevent them from intermixing : namely, the
differences of language and of religion. * These differences bring
with them a tendency to mutual hatred, and furnish pretexts for
waging war. But, none the less, with the growth of culture and the
gradual advance of men to greater unanimity of principle, they lead
to concord in a state of peace which, unlike the despotism we have
spoken of, (the churchyard of freedom) does not arise from the
weakening of all forces, but is brought into being and secured
through the equilibrium of these forces in their most active rivalry. *
Difference of religion! A strange expression, M if one were to speak
of different kinds of morality. There may indeed be different
historical forms of belief, — that is to say, the various means which
have been used in the course of time to promote religion, — but
they are mere subjects of learned investigation, and do not really lie
within the sphere of religion. In the same way there are many
religious works — the Zendavesta, Vida) Koran etc. — but there is
only one religion, binding for all men and for all times. These books
are each no more than the accidental mouthpiece of rtligion, and
may be different according to diff«renc« in tim« and place.