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.
 Embabeh Sheykh el Islam 259 own country, as well as
Egypt, by their misrepresentation of facts. "June 17. — Last night I
went to Sherei Pasha's, where Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Abd-el-Aal, Ali
Fehmi, Nadim, Hajrasi and many others were being entertained at
dinner. After they had dined and we were smoking and talking
politics, an officer came in with a letter from an English lady asking
protection, as she had been advised to leave Cairo. I was begged to
write her an answer at once to assure her there was no danger, and
that if there should be trouble Arabi would protect her life as his
own. Arabi has become a hero with many of the European ladies,
whom I have heard praising him for the protection he has given.
When he drives through the town all rush to the windows and
balconies. I make converts to the National Party, all I can, among
the Europeans I meet. "June 18. — Yesterday at noon, on Ragheb
being telegraphed as Prime Minister, I went to see Arabi, who read
me a telegram just received from the Khedive requesting him to co-
operate with Ragheb as Minister of War. After coffee had been
served he wrote a telegram of thanks to the Khedive and handed it
to me. It was very politely worded. A few minutes afterwards he said
: 'Let us go for a drive through the town to inspire confidence in the
minds of the people.' He and Ali Fehmi drove in one carriage, and I
and Nadim in the other. We went through Faggala, preceded by
heralds. We alighted at Embabeh's house (the Sheykh el Islam's),
and Arabi said, 'Come in, I will introduce you to our Pope.' On
entering the reception room Arabi took off his boots, and turning to
me said, 'We consider this place as the holy abode of our Sheykh.'
Accordingly I: did the same. On entering, the Sheykh, who was
sitting on a low divan, rose and advanced a few paces towards
Arabi, who saluted him and kissed his hands. I only shook hands
with him, and he invited us to take seats. There were several of the
Azhar Sheykhs with him, among them the son of Arusi. At first they
talked about the situation and the new Ministry. Then the
conversation turned on Embabeh's dealings with the Khedive during
the late events. From all I saw I conclude that the report of a
coolness having taken place between Embabeh and Arabi was not
true. While Embabeh was concluding his narrative coffee was
served, and Arabi introduced me
 260 Nationalist Dinner formally to him, and explained that I
was a friend of Mr. Blunt. Embabeh then explained to me all about
the telegram. He had written the answer, he said, with his own
hand, thinking the telegram addressed to him; but he had never
apologized to the Khedive about it. He believes Sir E. Malet heard of
it originally through Sultan Pasha, or some of the Khedive's
adherents. "Next Arabi showed Embabeh a proclamation he had
made guaranteeing the lives and properties of all the inhabitants of
Egypt, whatever their creed or nation, and Arabi begged him to write
a similar one, showing, as Sheykh el Islam, that the Mohammedan
religion, far from allowing, forbids Moslems to hurt Christians, Jews,
or others, and commands the faithful to protect them. Embabeh
agreed to this, and, in my presence and that of the other four
Sheykhs, prayed God to help him to succeed in reforming the
country. He also promised to help him in fostering peace between
Mohammedans and others, inasmuch as all were brothers
notwithstanding the diversity of creeds. "We then went on to Artin
Bey's, where also we were entertained with great honour, and
afterwards drove through the Clot Bey^Road, the Mouski, and other
parts of the town, while the people stood on both sides saying, 'May
God exalt you.' "At the end of the drive Arabi told me he was invited
to dine with Seyd Hassan Akkad, and took me with him, with all the
pashas, officers, sheykhs, and Ulemas. Our host's large house was
crowded; Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Ahmed Pasha, Abdu, Nadim, and I
were in the principal sitting-room, where we recited poetry, making
or composing elegies and satires, and amusing ourselves at
Ragheb's expense. Arabi composed a satire, Abdu two, Nadim made
four, and Sami two. At dinner I sat by Arabi. The courses were about
thirty different Arab dishes, besides the European and Eastern cakes,
sweetmeats and fruit. "After dinner we talked freely about politics,
and about different plans and forms of government. The republican
form was preferred; and Mahmud Sami, who displayed great
knowledge and ingenuity, endeavoured to show the advantage of a
republican government for Egypt. He said: 'From the beginning of
our movement we aimed at turning Egypt into a small republic like
Switzerland — and then Syria would have joined —
 Abdul Hamid Denounced 261 and then Hejaz would have
followed us. But we found some of the Ulema were not quite
prepared for it and were behind our time. Nevertheless we shall
endeavour to make Egypt a republic before we die. We all hope to
see the "Saturnia regna" once more.* "June 19. — Abdu, Nadim,
Sami, and I were talking the night before last about the peaceful
means to be taken to tide over the Egyptian difficulty. Abdu said that
he has made up his mind to get together all the documents he has
in his possession, with others concerning Egyptian affairs, and go to
England and depose them himself before Mr. Gladstone and the
English Parlament. He wrould take also with him a worthy person as
representative of the leading merchants of the land; and another
who would represent the liberal fellahin. Mahmud Sami approved the
idea, and said he also wished he could go to Europe on such a
mission, and Abdu is already preparing for the journey. So is Nadim
and Seyyid Hassan Moussa el Akkad, the leading Arab merchant of
Cairo, a man of considerable wealth, influence, and patriotism.
"Ragheb is made Prime Minister, but his policy being Turkish nobody
is pleased with him except the Circassians. People suspect some
Ottoman intrigue in the matter and are very uneasy. I am trying to
calm their minds and tell them to keep quiet. "The last events have
increased the hatred in the Arab heart against the Turks, Circassians,
and the Sultan himself. I heard Sami and Abdu and Nadim curse the
Sultans and all the Turkish generation from Genjis Khan to Holagu
and down to Abdul Hamid. They are preparing the nation for a
republican form of government. A large party is already formed and
disposed; crescit eundo. They will seize upon the first occasion
which presents itself. They expect the armed intervention of Turkish
troops with pleasure in this last crisis. It would have been the signal
for a complete independence from the Porte. But the cunning Turk
saw the danger and abstained. Nadim told me yesterday, while we
were coming from Shubra, that he must, before he dies, crush down
the Sultan's throne. said: 'This is my aim too — may God help us to
succeed.' "I must tell you that I have been received here with such
honour, respect, and politeness as I never could dream of. All
 262 Anger Against Malet the pashas, colonels, sheykhs,
merchants receive me with open arms, and lavish upon me their
kindness and hearty thanks. We have arranged with Nadim to give a
dinner party to all the leaders of the National Party in your honour,
and to thank you for the help given them in their struggle." "Cairo,
June 22. "Last night I went to Mahmud Sami's house, where I met
all our friends and the Pashas and many other of the leaders. We
talked politics all night, and I communicated to them the contents of
your letters received to-day by Brindisi. I also gave them a summary
of the English newspapers you and Lady Anne had sent me.
Afterwards I presented to Mahmud Sami, in the presence of Nadim,
a petition on the part of the National Party, in which they ask Mr.
Gladstone to send to Egypt a Consul who understands the affairs of
their country. Sami approved the petition and said they will have it
signed when Arabi Pasha comes back to Cairo and present it to Mr.
Gladstone through you. At the end of the soiree I was informed that
Sir E. Malet has for the fourth time urged Tewfik to arrest Abdu,
Nadim, Mahmud Sami, and myself. "June 23. — Ah soon as Ragheb
Pasha was confirmed by the Khedive as Prime Minister, his first act
and order was to call me to Alexandria with Nadim. On Monday night
the UnderSecretary sent his carriage to my hotel with his man, who
informed me that Hassan Pasha Daramalli wished to see me, and
had sent his carriage. I went with Nadim, not trusting myself to go
alone. When we got there we were received courteously, and
afterwards he informed me that Ragheb Pasha had charged him with
a message that he wished me to go and meet him at Alexandria at
the Divan of the Administration. I replied 'very well,' and Nadim said
he, too, would go with me. And so we left the house with the firm
intention of having nothing to do with Ragheb. "Thus at the very
time I was telegraphing to you, 'for God's sake save Malet or he will
be murdered by fanatics,' he was urging the Khedive to arrest me.
Often, when hot-headed young Egyptians were discussing Malet and
Colvin's death, I endeavoured to convince them of their folly, and
that no possible good result could come of it to the National cause.
"June 24. — Mahmud Pasha Fellaki, who had deserted the
 Gladstone Hardens his Heart 263 National cause on account
of his not having received a place in Mahmud Sami's Ministry, has
now been reconciled and has received from Arabi the post of
Minister of Public Works." ****** (Sabunji then describes the crisis
preceding Mahmud Sami's resignation, Arabi's appeal to the Sultan,
Dervish's mission and Osman Bey's mission, and how they flattered
Abdul Hamid with professions of zeal for the Caliphate.) "As to their
real convictions, however, they care for Abdul Hamid as much as
they would care for a man in the moon. They would make use of
him as long as he can be useful to them and until they are strong
enough to declare themselves an independent republic. This has
been the basis of their program from the beginning. But they have
prudently chosen to proceed by degrees. Mahmud Pasha Sami
assured me in Nadim and Abdu's presence that before they die they
must declare themselves independent of the Porte, and Egypt a
republic. Nadim's efforts are employed to instill this idea in the minds
of the young generation. Since I came here I and Nadim have been
together night and day. We sit talking and devising plans till one or
two every morning. We mix in every society. Sheykhs, Ulemas,
Notables, merchants, and officers receive us with open arms, and we
talk to them of your endeavours and of the service which you have
rendered to the National cause. They all long to see you and present
you with their hearty thanks. Indeed, people so good and sincerely
kind deserve every attention and help." I am not able to fix an exact
date to the moment when Glad?stone finally hardened his heart
against the Egyptians and resolved on military operations — he
persuaded himself that it would not be war — but it must have been
some time between the 20th June and the end of the month. The
considerations that seem to have decided him were, first, of course,
parliamentary ones. His Whig followers were on the point of a revolt,
and Chamberlain was pressing him with tales of the impatience of
the provinces. The diplomatic defeat of the Foreign Office was
becoming too plain to be concealed. Granville, with his little maxims
of procrastination and using a threat as if it were a blow, had
"dawdled it out" in Egypt till England had become the laughing-stock
of Europe. On the Stock Exchange things were looking badly and
trade was suffering from the long crisis.
 264 Revolt in India Feared What were called the "resources
of civilization," that is to say, lying, treachery and fraud, had been
tried by the Foreign Office to more than their extreme limit, and one
and all had proved; absolutely of no use against the Nationalist
obstinacy. Arabi had been ordered by all the majesty of England to
leave Egypt, and he had not gone. On the contrary he had gained an
immense reputation throughout the Mohammedan East at England's
expense. It seemed to many that there would be a Pan-Islamic
revolt in India. England, as I had said on Waterloo day, had never
looked so foolish. Serious officials were alarmed at this, and all the
jingoism of the Empire, asleep since Disraeli's parliamentary defeat
in 1880, was suddenly awake and crying for blood. Mr. Gladstone
hardened his heart and let his conscience go, not, I think, by any
deliberate decision saying that this or that should be done, but
simply by leaving it to the "departments," and to the "men on the
spot," that is to say, the Admiralty, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and
Colvin (for Malet had been withdrawn) to work out a solution their
own way. We had won our diplomatic game against the Foreign
Office too thoroughly. It was to be the turn now of England's fighting
forces. "June 19. — A Stock Exchange scare of Bright and
Chamberlain having resigned" (a scare which showed the ignorance
of the public as to Chamberlain's position, classing him still with
Bright). "June 20. — A more reasonable article in the 'Daily News.'
Frederic Harrison strongly advises me to write Gladstone a public
letter and have it printed. He is prepared to answer for its effect in
the provinces. I have accordingly begun one. "June 21. — Finished
my letter and took it to the Howards for approval. He (George
Howard) made me modify some sentences, so as not to compromise
Gladstone personally. She warmly approved. Frank Lascelles was
there. I then ar-i ranged with Button to publish it tomorrow, or
Friday at latest, and sent it in to Gladstone. "June 22. — To Button
early. We think they mean mischief after all. Harry Brand writes that
if the French hold out on the Note the Government mean to act in
Egypt, notwithstanding Germany. I doubt, however, if France is
prepared for .this. I shall follow up my letter (to Gladstone) with
other letters, if
 My Public Letter to Gladstone 265 necessary. I am certain
that if England lands troops anywhere in Egypt, the Sultan will
proclaim a Jehad and that the Mussulmans will rise in India. Things
are in a pretty pass." My letter to Gladstone appeared in the "Times"
on the following day, 23rd June, the very day the Conference met at
Constantinople. It created a great sensation. It stands thus: "Sir,
"June 21st, 1882. ' "The gravity of the present situation in Egypt,
and the interests of honour and advantage to the English nation
which are there engaged, impel me to address you publicly on the
subject of the diplomatic steps which have Jed to this imbroglio, and
to put on record certain facts which, in the case of any new
departure taken by the Powers at the approaching Conference,
should not be lost sight of. "You are aware, sir, that during the past
winter I was engaged as mediator in a variety of unofficial but
important negotiations carried on between Sir Edward Malet and Sir
Auckland Colvin on the one hand, and the chiefs of the Na* tional
Egyptian party on the other, negotiations in which I engaged my
personal honour to the loyalty of Her Majesty's! agents ; also that I
have been in close communication with those chiefs since my return
to England, and that I am consequently in a position to speak with
certainty and authority as to the character and intentions of the
popular movement in Egypt.' You know, moreover, that I have from
time to time warned Her Majesty's Government of the danger they
were running from a false appreciation of facts, and that I have
repeatedly urged the necessity of their coming to a rapid
understanding with those in whose hands the guidance of the
movement lay. Finally, you know that in the interests of right and
justice, and in accordance with a promise made by me to the
Egyptians, I have counselled them to the best of my ability in the
recent crisis, and spared no pains to urge them to come to that
settlement of their difficulties with the Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik,
at which they have now happily arrived. In this I took upon myself a
great responsibility, but one which, I think, the event has already
justified. "The main points in the past which I would state are these:
"1. In the month of December last I assisted the National
 266 Recapitulation of Events Party to publish a program of
their views, which was just and liberal, and to which they have since
rigidly adhered. At this time, and down to the publication of the Dual
Note of the 8th of January, the Egyptians had no quarrel whatever
with Eng-J land or the English. Neither had they any real quarrel
with the Khedive or the Control, trusting in these to permit the
development of political liberty in their country in the direction of
Parliamentary and constitutional self-government. Their aim was,
and is, the resumption by Egypt of her position as a nation, the
redemption of her debt, and the reform of justice. They trusted
then, as now, to the army, which was and is their servant, to secure
them these rights, and to their Parliament to secure them these
ends; and they were prepared *to advance gradually, and with
moderation, in the path they had traced. "2. The Dual Note, drawn
up by M. Gambetta with the view of making England a partner of his
anti-Mussulman policy and understood by the Egyptians as the first
step in a policy analogous to that recently pursued in Tunis, changed
this confidence into a sentiment of profound distrust. Instead of
awing them, it precipitated their action. It caused them to insist
upon the resignation of Sherif Pasha, whom they suspected of the
design to betray them, and to assist with the Khedive in summoning
a Nationalist Ministry to office. This insistence, though represented
by the English journals as the work of the army, was, hr1 fact, the
work of the nation through their representatives the Notables. Of
this I can furnish ample evidence. "3. The unexpected fall of M.
Gambetta prevented the execution of the threat of armed
intervention implied by the Dual Note. Nevertheless, a plan of
indirect intervention was persisted in. The English and French
Controllers-General protested against the Constitution granted by
the Khedive on the 6th of February, and the English and French
Governments carefully withheld their assent to it, signifying only that
the Article, giving to the Egyptian Parliament the right of voting that
half of the Budget which was not affected to the payment of the
Debt, was an infringement of international engagements. Their
argument for this, based on certain firmans of the Porte, and certain
decrees of the Khedive, has been constantly denied by the
Egyptians. "4. Acting, it must be presumed, in accordance with their
 The Circassian Plot 267 instructions, the English agents at
Cairo have for the past three months set themselves steadily to work
to bring about a revolution counter to the will of the people and the
liberties granted! to them by the Viceroy. The English Controller-
General, though a paid agent of the Egyptian Government, has not
scrupled to take part in this; and the English Resident Minister has
spared no pains to create a quarrel between the Khedive and his
Ministers. The Controller-General, sitting in council with the Ministers
as their official adviser, has withheld his advice, counting, it would
seem, on the mistakes likely to be made by men new to office, and
noting these in silence. The English press correspondents, hitherto
held in check by the Resident, have been permitted full license in the
dissemination of news injurious to the Ministry, and known to be
false. I will venture to recall to you some of the scares reported at
this time and disseminated through Europe — the scare of banditti in
the Delta; the scare of the Bedouin rising; the scare of revolt in the
Soudan;1 the scare of an Abyssinian war; the scare of huge military
expenditure; the scare of a general refusal to pay taxes, of the
resignation of the provincial governors, of the neglect of the,
irrigation works, of danger to the Suez Canal; the scare of Arabi
Pasha having become the bribed agent, in turn, of Ismail, of Halim,
and of the Sultan. uFor some of these a very slight foundation may
have existed in fact; for most there was no foundation whatsoever.
"On the 20th of March I addressed Lord Granville, by* Arabi Pasha's
request, on this subject, and pointed out to him the danger caused
to peace in Egypt through the attitudje of the English agents urging
that a Commission should be sent to Cairo to examine into Egyptian
grievances. uIn the month of April advantage was taken by the
English and French ConsulsJGeneral of the discovery of a plot to'
assassinate the National Ministry, and traced by these to anagent of
Ismail Pasha's, to induce the Khedive to put himself in open
opposition to his Ministers. Those implicated in the plot and
condemned to banishment were men of position, Turks and
Circassians, and as such of the same race and society with* the
Khedive and he was unwilling to ratify their sentence, and suffered
himself to be persuaded to refuse his signature. This led to the
rupture which the previous diplomatic action of the
 268 My Public Letter to Gladstone Consuls-General had
prepared. A summons was then sent by Mahmud Sami Pasha to the
Deputies to come to Cairo and decide between the Ministers and the
Khedive, and the Deputies came. Sultan Pasha, however, through
jealousy, refused to preside at any formal sitting; and advantage was
again taken of the circumstance by the Consuls-General to
encourage all who were in opposition to the National Party to rally
round the Khedive. A section of the rich Egyptians, fearing
disturbance, sided with the Circassians, and the Consuls-General,
deceived by appearances, ventured a coup de main. An ultimatum,
dictated by them, was sent in to the Ministers, insisting on the
resignation of the Ministry and Arabi Pasha's departure from the
country. The step for an instant seemed to have succeeded, for the
Ministry resigned. It became, however, immediately apparent that
the feeling of the country had been miscalculated by our diplomacy,
and Arabi, by the manifest will of the nation, returned next day to
power. "I cannot understand that the action of our Consul-General in
this matter was justified by any principle of Liberal policy; it has
certainly not been justified by success. "6. When the Fleet was
ordered to Alexandria, I endeavoured to convey a warning, as my
private opinion, based upon all I had witnessed last winter of the
temper of the Egyptian people, that the presence of English men-of-
war at that moment in the port of Alexandria, especially if their
crews should be allowed on any pretence to land, would be
exceedingly likely to provoke a serious disturbance and it was my
intention to go myself to Egypt to do what I could towards
mitigating what I feared would be the results. "7. About the same
time the English Government consented to the despatch of a Turkish
Commissioner to Cairo. It was supposed that the authority of the
Sultan was so great in Egypt that obedience would be shown to
whatever orders his representative might bring, or that, at any rate,
little opposition would be offered. In any case, the Porte was
authorized to act in its own way. Dervish Pasha was sent; and it is
lamentable to record that the English Foreign Office at that time
seems] to have counted mainly on the fact that he was a man
notoriously unscrupulous in his method of dealing with rebels. I have
reason to know that what was expected of him was, that he
 Egypt Appeals to England 269 should summon Arabi Pasha
to Constantinople; that, failing, this, he should have recourse to
bribery; and that in the extreme resort, he should arrest or shoot the
Minister of War as a mutineer with his own hand. Whether these
were really Dervish Pasha's instructions or intentions I will not argue.
The Porte seems to have been as little prepared as Her Majesty's
Government were for the strength of the National feeling in Egypt;
and only the union and courage shown by the people would seem to
have convinced the Sultan that methods such as those formerly used
by Dervish against the Albanians would here be out of place.
Humaner counsels have in any case prevailed, and peace has been
recommended between the Khedive and his people. 'Such, sir, is
shortly the history of England's diplomatic action in Egypt during the
past six months. It is one of the most deplorable our Foreign Office
has to record. The future, however, in some measure remains to us,
though, when the Conference assembles, England's will be only one
of many voices raised in the settlement. It is not for me to suggest
the words which should there be spoken; but I will venture to
express my conviction that if Her Majesty's representative then
comes forward with an honest confession of the mistakes made, and
a declaration of England's sympathy with Egyptian freedom, England
will regain her lost ground. In spite of the just anger of the
Egyptians at the unworthy tricks which have been played upon them
by our Foreign Office, they believe that a more generous feeling
exists in the body of the English nation, which would not suffer so
vast a public wrong to be committed as the subjugation of their
country for a misunderstood interest! in Egyptian finance and in the
Suez Canal. They have, over and over again, assured me, and I
know that they speak truly, that their only aim is peace,
independence, and economy; and that the Suez Canal cannot be
better protected for England, as for the rest of the world, than by
the admission of the Egyptian people into the comity of nations.
Only let the hand of friendv ship be held out to them freely, and at
once, and we shall still earn their gratitude. "I am, Sir, your obedient
Servant, "Wilfrid Scawen Blunt."
 CHAPTER XV THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA We
now come to the bombardment of Alexandria, a quarrel deliberately
picked by Admiral Seymour and Colvin acting in concert, for the
removal of Malet only put the diplomatic power more entirely into
Colvin's hands. Malet was replaced, not as I had hoped by Lascelles,
whose independence of character and knowledge of Egypt might
have enabled him to take a line of his own, but by a simple Foreign
Office clerk named) Cartwright, who, ignorant and helpless, was a
mere passive tool directed by the Controller. I have not much to add
to the public records of those last three weeks at Cairo and
Alexandria, but my diary will give an idea of what was going on in
London. My public letter to Gladstone called down a storm of abuse
upon my head from Malet's and Colvin's friends, and generally from
the Jingo and financial elements in the Press and Parliament. "June
24. — There is an angry letter from Henry Malet (Edward Malet's
elder brother) in to-day's Times.' . . . Lord Lamington, too, has given
notice of a question as to my 'unofficial negotiations' in the House of
Lords for Monday. The more talk the better. ... A party of people (at
Crabbet) for Sunday, Lascelles among them. "June 25. — Wrote an
answer to Henry Malet and sent it to the 'Times.' A soft answer
turneth away wrath." (I was loath to quarrel in this way with old
friends, and I was resolved not to hit back except on compulsion.)
"June 26. — A long letter has come from Sabunji (that already given
in the last chapter). They are giving a public dinner in my honour at
Cairo. . . . Met Lords De la Warr and Lamington (they were brothers-
in-law) at the House of Lords, and got the former to ask for Malet's
despatch of 270
 Granville Acknowledges 271 December 26th (that which
Malet had said he had cancelled). Lord Lamington was going to have
based his speech on Henry Malet's letter, but I showed him what
nonsense this was. All the same he made a very strong speech in an
indignant tonef about me. Lord Granville looked white and
uncomfortable, but admitted the fact of my having acted on one
occasion to» pacify the army, a point gained. (This had been denied
by Henry Malet.) He could not remember about the despatch of the
26th, but would look for it." (The reason of the great embarrassment
of the Government on being questioned about my "unofficial
negotiations" was that they had got into similar difficulties in their
Irish policy by making use of Mr'. Errington the year before as a
means of communicating unoffi-1 daily with the Pope about the
attitude of the Irish clergy. )\ "Dined with Henry Middleton at his
club early, and went with him to a meeting of the Anti-Aggression
League in Farringdon Street. Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in the chair was
excel-i lent. He is the pleasantest speaker I have listened to. Also Sir
Arthur Hobhouse was good. Frederic Harrison read a lecture in which
he stated the Egyptian case fairly." N. B. — 1 Henry Middleton had
been much in Egypt and was intimate there with the Coptic
community. A letter written to him dur-f ing the war by the Coptic
Patriarch has been published. It is' interesting as showing how
entirely the Copts were with Arabi at that time. ! "June 27. — Dinner
at Pembroke's. All the Wilton Club there, some forty people. I sat
next to Harry Brand and had a grand row with him about Egypt.
After dinner healths weredrunk, my own among the number, and I
had to make af speech. I felt myself in rather an unfriendly
atmosphere politically, as most of those present Were Jingoes, but I
was' specially complimented for my public services by Eddy
Hamilton, who proposed my health. I said in reply that some served
thfeir country in one way and some in another, but that as long! as
one served it and did one's duty, it did not much matter* what one
did." (These speeches, of course, were not serious, as the Wilton
Club was only a convivial gathering of Lorti Pembroke's personal
friends who came together at his house two or three times a year to
dine and make merry.)
 272 Talk with Bright "June 28. — Rode to George Howard's,
and showed him Sabunji's letter and my Gladstone correspondence.
Sabunji states that the National leaders are thinking of going to
England to lay their case before Mr. Gladstone, and I have asked
Howard to g
 Colvin Contradicts 273 andria and the necessity of a regular
war, was very angry and resigned his place in the Cabinet, nor did
he ever forgive Gladstone for his share in the deception practised on
him or the abandonment of their common principles.) "Called on
Lady Gregory, who has written a paper on the Control of Egypt,
which is amusing. Dinner at the Howards. She (Mrs. H.) is
enthusiastic about my plans. "June 30. — Colvin contradicts flatly
through the 'Times1' correspondent that either he or Malet have
ever made use of my services as mediator or intermediary on any
occasion. This puts him in my hands after Lord Granville's admission
of the fact on Monday." (N. B. — This denial in plain terms by Colvin
of things it is impossible he should have forgotten need not be
characterized by me. The matter was not made better by a private
letter he wrote me, 6th July, in which hei repudiated in part his
responsibility for the "Times" telegram. I accepted his explanation at
the time as genuine, but when a little later I asked him to repudiate
the telegram publicly, he declined to do so, and in terms which were
merely a repetition and aggravation of the untruth.) "Breakfasted
with De la Warr to meet Broadley, the 'Times' corespondent at
Tunis." (N. B. — This is the same Broadley whom, at Lord De la
Warr's recommendation I afterwards entrusted with the defence of
Arabi. He had been practising as lawyer in the Consular Courts at
Tunis, and latterly as "Times'; correspondent there. He was a man of
great ability and had made himself serviceable to De la Warr in many
ways, giving him the information about Eastern affairs which were
De la Warr's hobby, and preparing, when in England, his speeches
for him on such subjects in the House of Lords. At the time of the
invasion of Tunis by the French he took a strong part' in the "Times"
in favour of the Mohammedan rising and published a useful book
about it afterwards called "The Last Punic War.") 'He says all are
waiting in Tripoli and Tunis for the Sultan to come forward.
Otherwise el Senoussi will read the Mohammedan revival. . . . Wrote
a letter to the 'Times' in answer to Colvin which ought to smash him.
Luncheon at the Gregorys. "Eddy writes a friendly letter saying that
Mr. Gladstone will not go back from his expressions of sympathy with
Egyp 
 274 dt Brocket tian independence, if what I have told him
proves true. This* must be owing to Bright." The letter here referred
to is an important one as bearing on thesettlement afterwards made
in Egypt, and the promise of independence and liberal institutions
made at Gladstone's suggestion by Lord Dufferin in his celebrated
despatch. But for the hold I had acquired over Gladstone on this
point, I have no manner of doubt that after Tel-el-Kebir Egypt would
have been annexed to the British Empire. The Whigs in the Cabinet
all intended it. "July 2. — At Brocket. This, after Wilton, is the most
charming country place I have seen. All in it is exactly as it was fifty
and sixty years ago in the days of Caroline Lamb and Lord
Melbourne. Lord Palmerston died here. Henry Cowper, whose it is
now, is to me very sympathetic. Our party consists of Henry Brand
and his wife, the American Minister, Lord Houghton, Lymington, and
Frederick Leveson Gower, Lord Granville's brother and secretary.
Great wrangling about Egypt but all friendly enough, even Leveson.
And the American is on my side. ... I had a little talk with Leveson
after we had played lawn tennis. He spoke very despondingly of the
British Empire, but thought England might last without revolution at
home. At Brocket such talk is melancholy. . . * There is another
fierce attack on me in the 'Observer.' "July 3. — At Brocket. I fancy if
there is to be any intervention at all it is to be Italian — at least, if
intervention is ordered by the Conference. This I should greatly
dislike, for at present the Italians seem sympathetic, but if launched
on conquest they would be brutal in their methods. Besides, the
Italians are not assailable at home, as we and the French are." (TV.
B. — The Italian Government was being asked at this date to join us
in armed intervention in Egypt, but they wisely de-» clined. It would
have been very unpopular with the Liberals in Italy where Menotti
Garibaldi was organizing a force to help Arabi.) "Drove over to
Knebworth to luncheon. Lytton has been building and making a new
drive into the Park, certainly a great improvement; we talked about
the British Empire, on which subject he is as despondent as I am.
He; thinks my policy in Egypt might have succeeded, or any policy
but that of trusting to chance. Now he foresees a Mohanv
 Sir Wilfrid Laws on 275 medan rebellion in India, go things
how they may. ... In the evening to Temple Dinsley where the
Brands are. "July 4. — To London; found a telegram saying that
Arabi certainly would not go to Constantinople, also a letter from
Sabunji, which has made me uneasy. It has evidently been opened
in the post, and the contents may have compromised the National
leaders at Constantinople. There are telegrams, too, in the papers
about a renewed quarrel as to the fortifications at Alexandria; and
Lady Gregory, who came to James Street, has heard from Sir Erskine
May that Beauchamp Seymour has orders to bombard Alexandria to-
morrow." (Sir Erskine May, was I believe, the Chief Permanent
Official of the Admiralty. The earliest correspondence referring to a
bombardment in the Blue Books occurs on 26th June, when the'
Admiralty telegraphs to Sir Beauchamp Seymour: "If Egyptian troops
are making preparations to attack, communicate with French Admiral
and bring ships into position." This telegram shows the wolf and the
lamb argument that was being used to excuse our own intended
attack. We know from Pal* mer's journal, to which reference will be
made later, that Seymour had resolved to bombard at least as early
as 4th July. Among the determining causes with Gladstone and the
Cabinet at this time was, I believe, the bogus report of a massacre
at Benha, a wholly fabulous incident which was largely made* use of
to infuriate English opinion against Arabi.) "She [Lady Gregory] has
also heard that Colvin has resigned and his resignation been
accepted." I don't know whether there was any foundation for this
report, but it is too late already for his recall to have made any
difference in the result. It was probably altogether a false report.
"July 5. — I am very uneasy in my mind now about these threats of
bombardment. At twelve I went to the House of Commons and
heard Dilke announce that the fleet had orders 'under certain
circumstances to act in a certain way.' Had luncheon with Sir Wilfrid
Lawson, who is a really charming man, and read him Sabunji's letter
describing his dinners and conversations with the National Chiefs. He
and others with him will do what they can. But there is nothing now
to do. My letters to Gladstone are printed, but I dare not publish
 276 "Avoid Meddling with the Fleet" them until I see what
line the Porte takes. . . . Dined at Lady Rosamund Christie's. Knowles
was there and says that the bombardment is to begin to-morrow
morning. Fawcett takes my side. My fear is lest the Nationalists
should stake all on an artillery duel with the fleet, in which they
cannot help being beaten, and so be discouraged. They ought, I
think, to abandon Alexandria, and make an entrenched camp out of
reach of the guns of the fleet. But I dare not advise."' (About this
time Button informed me that the Admiralty plan was to effect a
landing during the bombardment with the idea of cutting off Arabi's
retreat. This news, if I remember rightly, influenced my telegram
next day and my letter of the seventh. ) "July 6. — Admiral Seymour
has sent in an ultimatum, and I have telegraphed to Sabunji as
follows: 'Avoid meddling with the fleet. Send Abdu with a message
to Gladstone. Patience.' I am not sure whether I am doing right, but
prudence is certainly on the right side. Besides, Arabi will judge
independently of my opinion, and he has never yet been wrong. I
have sent copies of my correspondence with Downing Street to
Cardinal Manning and Knowles (and also to Lord Dufferin). After
luncheon went to see Hill, the editor of the 'Daily News.' He is now
all on our side, it being too late to do. any good. He promises,
however, to write what he can. ... In the evening a telegram from
Sabunji saying that all is quiety so I suppose the difficulty is staved
off. ... I wrote to-day to Eddy proposing to show him Sabunji's
letters (those already given). It is a desperate remedy, but the
circumstances are desperate. "July 7. — Went to see Stanley of
Alderley and urged him to see Musurus, so as to prevent any split
between Arabi and the Sultan. I told him pretty nearly the facts of
the case, but made him understand this was not a moment for
Mohammedans to dispute, and that the Turks and Egyptians could
settle their domestic differences later. He seems quite to agree with
me. . . . Then wrote a letter to Sabunji recommending them not to
quarrel with the fleet, but to make an entrenched camp out of reach
of the guns. I still think that no English expedition will be landed in
Egypt, but that they will have to fight the Turks or possibly the
Italians, , , . The papers announce
 Lascelles on the Situation 277 a pacific settlement of the
difference between Arabi and the fleet, which is satisfactory so far.
"July 8. — At Crabbet. The second post has brought a letter from
Eddy Hamilton which seems to imply that Gladstone is still open to
conviction. This is more than I expected" — (and| more, too, than
the letter implied. What Hamilton wrote was, "I hope it goes without
saying that it has been the desire of the Government all along to get
at the truth, but that, apparently, has not been so easy.") "I have
accordingly been preparing a precis of Sabunji's letters. In the
Evening Lascelles and others arrived. j "July 9. — Sunday. I have
consulted Lascelles about sending Sabunji's letters to Gladstone, but
he thinks it is too late. Hartington has told him that they intend
occupying Egypt and probably annexing it, on the principle j'y suis,
j'y teste. Chamberlain has said: 'We have got the Grand Old Man
into a corner now, and he must fight.' I shall, therefore, wait events.
The 'Observer' announces a new threat or Ultimatum. This time I
shall leave Providence to decide." (What I record here as having
been told me by Lascelles is of historical importance. He was in a
position to know what was going on more than any of my friends. As
a former Charge a" Affaires in Egypt he was consulted at the Foreign
Office, and as Lord Hartington's first cousin he had his confidences
about what was going on in the Whig section of the Cabinet.) "July
10. — A new Ultimatum is announced, this time in terms which Arabi
cannot accept. They want him to surrender the forts. The French,
however, refuse to take any part in this act of piracy. M. P., who
knows naval people, assures me that Beauchamp Seymour is in a
terrible fright; that the 'Invincible' is the only ship with really sound
armour plates, and that the fleet is in a most critical position."
(There was some truth, I believe, in this. The ships, as they were
moored in the harbour, lay directly under the fire of the forts at short
range. If the Nationalists had been as unscrupulous as our people
were, they might have taken the ships at a disadvantage and
perhaps sunk them. But Arabi was not the man for a coup of this
kind, and he was, besides, a stickler for the common Mohammedan
rule of not firing the first shot in war. The quarrel, too, was none of
his seeking, and all he was bent on was to avoid all