143 174
143 174
1. Introduction
As a member of the UN, Bangladesh is under international obligations to promote,
protect, and enforce human rights and human development under a variety of
international Conventions and instruments, including the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 1966 ( ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Paris Declaration, and
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).To fulfill those commitments, the
National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh (Commission or NHRC) could
have played a significant role in safeguarding human rights. Because of some
inherent lacunae in the National Human Rights Commission Act 2009 (NHRC Act),
the Commission has, to a substantial extent, failed to promote, protect, and enforce
human rights and human development in Bangladesh. These lacunae include: (1) an
incomplete definition of "human rights"; (2) a defective appointment procedure and
very minimal qualifications for the appointment of Chairman and commissioners, and
the insufficient number of permanent members of the Commission; (3) a lack of
enforcement mechanism in the hands of the NHRC and inability to provide interim
relief to aggrieved complainants; (4) it has only investigative power and its
recommendations to the government are non-binding; (5) the Commission's lack of
independence from the government; (6) the exclusion of some significant issues from
its jurisdiction. To strengthen the Commission's power of promotion, protection, and
enforcement of human rights, the government must significantly amend the NHRC
Act to address these lacunae and to fulfill its international commitments.
This paper will first provide an overview of Bangladesh's human rights commitments
under international law. Part II will discuss the historical background, composition,
power, and functions of NHRC. Part III will depict human rights conditions in
Bangladesh. Part IV will delve into the judicial approach towards the actions of the
NHRC. Part V will identify the flaws and lacunae in the NHRC Act. Part VI will
scrutinize key provisions of the NHRC Act and compare them to the enabling provisions
of the human rights bodies of India, Nepal, and South Africa. Finally, Part VII will
*
Lecturer, Department of Law, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
144 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
recommend amendments to the NHRC Act based on those flaws and comparisons. This
paper will explore the likely results of amendments to the NHRC Act based on logical
inference (less on empirical observation). The author acknowledges that full
implementation of the NHRC Act, even if amended, will be challenging.
1
National Human Rights Commission Act 2009 (Bangladesh) (hereinafter NHRC Act 2009), s 2(f)
<https://nhrc.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/nhrc.portal.gov.bd/law/de62d323_fe91_45f0_9513
_a0d36ab77fdf/NHRC%20Act%202009_1_.pdf> accessed 12 July 2020.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 145
2
UN Charter 1945, preamble and art 1(3).
3
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), art 2(1).
4
ibid, art 2(3).
5
ibid, art 3.
6
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), art 2(1).
7
Ibid, art 2(2).
8
ibid, art 3.
146 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
economic, social, and cultural rights mentioned in it without any kind of distinction.
It also urges the State Party to make sure equality between men and women in the
realization of these rights.
The CEDAW talks about the equal rights of men and women. It requires the State
to take all measures to eliminate all kinds of discrimination against women and
safeguards to protect the rights of women. However, Bangladesh has reservations to
Article 2 and 16(1)(c), which deal with the State's obligation to take steps to wipe out
all kinds of discrimination against women and to safeguard equal rights of women
concerning the family law issues. By this reservation, Bangladesh has skipped core
obligations under this Convention. It is pertinent to mention here that the Constitution
of Bangladesh has guaranteed the equal rights of both men and women in all spheres
of the State.9 Despite this kind of reservation, Bangladesh has the fundamental
constitutional mandate to eliminate all kinds of discrimination irrespective of gender
in state and public life.
The CRC stipulates that States Parties shall respect and safeguard the rights
outlined in this Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his/her parent's or legal
guardian's race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national,
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.10 It requires that no
child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful intrusion with his or her privacy,
family, home or correspondence, or unlawful attacks on his/her honor and
reputation.11 The child has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.12 It also requires that States Parties shall undertake to protect
the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.13 It provides that
States Parties shall make sure that no child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.14 The combined effect of the
provisions of the CRC requires that every State Party shall care for the rights of the
children within its territory. Thus, every State will take all legal safeguards to protect
the rights of the children. They are also duty-bound to provide the effective and
appropriate remedy to children who become the victim of unlawful torture and
intrusion. Bangladesh has reservations to article 14(1) and 21of this Convention.
Article 14(1) requires that States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion. It takes reservations on the ground that in
9
Constitution of Bangladesh 1972, art 28.
10
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC), art 2 and 4.
11
Ibid, art 16(1).
12
Ibid, art 16(2).
13
Ibid, art 34.
14
Ibid, art 37(a).
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 147
Bangladesh, most people believe in Islam, and renunciation of Islam is a great sin. 15
However, it is contrary to the Constitution of Bangladesh, which recognizes
secularism as one of its four fundamental principles. Hence, Bangladesh cannot
maintain any specific tenet of religion. Despite this reservation, Bangladesh has a
constitutional obligation to abide by the secular principle in administering its
activities.
The CAT requires that each State Party shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.16 It states that each State Party shall ensure that any individual
who alleges that he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction
has the right to complain to and to have his case promptly and impartially examined
by its competent authorities.17 It also requires that steps shall be taken to ensure that
the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation
because of his complaint or any evidence given.18 It also stipulates that each State
Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture
as defined in Article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.19 Thus, under the CAT, each State Party must take all appropriate
steps to protect its people from the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment and at the same time, the State shall take proper measures to afford a
quick and effective remedy to the person who is the victim of unlawful torture.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the blueprint to build a better
and more sustainable future for all people around the world. They focus on the global
challenges including poverty, quality health, quality education, gender inequality,
climate change, environmental degradation, sustainable energy, economic
development, peace, and justice. All the contracting parties have pledged to fulfill
these goals by taking robust action within their respective countries by 2030. It
requires that independent, accountable, pro people, and inclusive institutions are
necessary to fulfill these goals. Goal five of the SDGs requires that every State Party
shall take proper steps to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
15
„Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Look at the Reservations of Asian
State Parties‟ (International Commission of Jurists, 1 February 1994) <https://www.icj.org/
wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Asia-Convention-Rights-of-the-Child-non-legal-submission-1994-
eng.pdf> accessed 20 March 2020.
16
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984
(CAT), art 2(1).
17
ibid, art 13.
18
ibid.
19
ibid, art 16.
148 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
Goal ten entails that every State Party shall take appropriate measures to reduce
inequality within and amongst States. Goal 16 requires that every State shall promote
peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice
for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. The
core spirit of the SDGs is to ensure human rights for all. It advocates that without the
realization of human rights, it is implausible to ensure sustainable development. After
all, it urges that without founding an effective, accountable, and inclusive institution,
it may be implausible to enforce, protect, and promote human rights and human
development.
2.2.2 The Paris Principles and the Formation of National Human Rights bodies
The obligations outlined in the instruments described above form the foundation
for establishing national human rights institutions like Bangladesh's NHRC for the
protection, promotion, and enforcement of human rights and human development.
Because of repeated violations of human rights by States worldwide, the
representatives of most States met in Paris to think about how to make up the human
rights Conventions more effective in the lives of citizens. Consequently,
representatives of States developed the Paris Principles, which urge every member
State to set up a national human rights institution to protect, promote, monitor, and
fulfill the human rights of the people. The UN Commission on Human Rights and the
UN General Assembly approved these principles subsequently.20 Thus, it became the
obligation of all member States to establish national human rights institutions for the
protection and promotion of human rights and human development.
The World Conference on Human Rights reiterates the importance and
constructive role played by national human rights institutions for the promotion and
protection of human rights, in particular in their advisory capacity to the competent
authorities, their role in remedying human rights violations, in the dissemination of
human rights information, and education in human rights.21 This Conference
encourages the establishment and strengthening of national institutions, having regard
to the "Principles relating to the status of national institutions" and recognizing that it
is the right of each State to choose the framework which is best suited to its particular
needs at the national level.22 To comply with obligations under the above mentioned
international legal instruments, the Parliament of Bangladesh has enacted the NHRC
Act to found NHRC in order to promote, protect, and monitor the human rights of the
people of Bangladesh.
20
General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993.
21
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action 1993, art I (36).
22
ibid.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 149
29
Ibid, s 7.
30
ibid.
31
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 6.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 151
32
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Bangladesh (US Department of State 2019) <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-
human-rights-practices/bangladesh/> accessed 20 March 2020.
33
Ain O Salish Kendra (n 23) 18.
34
Amnesty International, „Bangladesh 2019‟ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-
pacific/bangladesh/report-bangladesh/> accessed 20 March 2020.
35
Tamanna Hoq Riti in Maimuna Syed Ahmed (ed), National Human Rights Commission,
Bangladesh: Existing Challenges and Expectations of Civil Society (Ain O Salish Kendra 2018) 23-
24 <https://www.askbd.org/ask/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NHRC-Report_English.pdf> accessed
15 February 2020.
36
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (n 32).
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 153
torture. The security forces reportedly use threats, beatings, kneecappings, electric
shocks, and sometimes commits rapes and other sexual abuses in extracting
confessional statement from the accused.37
In August of 2019, the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) expressed deep
concerns over allegations of widespread use of torture, mistreatment and soliciting
the payment of bribes by Bangladeshi law enforcement officials to extract
confessions. The CAT report also condemned the lack of publicly accessible
information on abuse cases and the failure to ensure accountability for law
enforcement agencies, particularly the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB).38 Although
inhuman treatment and unlawful torture violate fundamental rights and human rights,
they are usually employed by law enforcement agencies to gather information as to
the commission of offenses. The cardinal principle of human rights is that nobody
shall be compelled to give evidence against himself. Therefore, inhuman treatment
and torture to extract information is a grave violation of human rights.
4.4 Forced Disappearance
Many people including wealthy businesspeople, political opponents, as well as
critics of the government are frequently disappeared in Bangladesh. In most
instances, the law enforcement agencies are assumed to be involved in such incidents.
According to media reports, some of disappearances occurred in 2018. Mention may
be made to Shajol Chowdhury‟s abduction. Mr. Shajol, an owner of several
businesses, including a shipbreaking venture in Chittagong, has returned home a
week after being abducted.39 According to ASK reports from national dailies, a total
of 34 persons were victims of abduction, disappearance, and went missing in 2018.
Of them, 19 have been traced subsequently, most of whom are in prison in different
cases.40 The HRSS affirmed that there were 58 enforced disappearances from January
to September, and Odhikar asserted that there were 83 enforced disappearances from
January to November of 2019.41 These reports reveal that enforced disappearance
have become turned out to be a common incident in Bangladesh. The government did
not take any appropriate steps to stop this kind of violation of human rights. The
government did not even respond to a request from the UN Working Group on
Enforced Disappearances to visit the country.42 The report also implies that the
government has failed to prevent this kind of severe violation of human rights.
37
ibid.
38
ibid.
39
Ain O Salish Kendra (n 23) 17.
40
Abu Ahmed Faijul Kabir, Anirban Saha and Hasibur Rahman, Human Rights Situation of
Bangladesh in 2018: An Observation (Ain O Salish Kendra 2019) 6. <https://docs.google.com/
viewerng/viewer?url=http://www.askbd.org/ask/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/ASK-HR-
Booklet-English-2018-Correction-20-06-19.pdf> accessed 30 March 2020.
41
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (n 32).
42
ibid.
154 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
43
Ain O Salish Kendra (n 23) 20.
44
ibid.
45
Amnesty International (n 34).
46
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (n 32).
47
Alexandre Bouchard and others,
Preventing and Eliminating All Forms of Violence against Women and Girls: The Role of National Human
Rights Institutions - A Contribution to the Review and Priority Themes of CSW63 (GANHRI 2018)
<https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Documents/DIMR_GANHRI%20CSW%20Report_final%20BF.pdf>
accessed 20 March 2020.
48
Ain O Salish Kendra (n 40).
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 155
54
Ain O Salish Kendra (n 23).
55
ibid.
56
ibid.
57
ibid.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 157
full compliance with the Paris Principles, including by ensuring its ability to directly
investigate alleged human rights violations perpetrated by the security forces and by
making adequate resources available.58 Thus, the government of Bangladesh has been
instructed to empower the NHRC in full conformity with the Paris Principles. In the
third Cycle UPR of Bangladesh, Germany raised three relevant questions. It
questioned about what is the current status on the withdrawal of reservations on
articles 2 and 16.1(c) of the CEDAW that Bangladesh agreed to; What steps has the
Government of Bangladesh undertaken to fight impunity in recorded cases of
extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture; and what does the
Government of Bangladesh intend to do to guarantee freedom of expression in the
new Digital Security Act.59 These three questions were asked because the
infringements of human rights regarding these three areas are very high in
Bangladesh. Bangladesh has not replied to these questions appropriately. Considering
this report, it is obvious that international communities are not satisfied; rather, they
are concerned about the human rights conditions, violations, and abuses in
Bangladesh.
58
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, National report submitted in accordance with
paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Bangladesh (United Nations
Human Rights Council 2018) <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/050/
26/PDF/G1805026.pdf? Open Element> accessed 20 July 2020.
59
ibid.
60
Habib Zafarullah received a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of Sydney and
currently teaches Political Science and Public Policy at the University of New England, Australia.
61
Mohammad Habibur Rahman is a Professor of Public Administration at the University of Dhaka.
62
Habib Zafarullah & Mohammad Habibur Rahman, Human Rights, „Civil Society and
Nongovernmental Organizations: The Nexus in Bangladesh‟ (2002), vol. 24, no. 4, Hum. Rts. Q.
1011, the Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 1011-1034. Hein Online, accessed 20 April 2020.
63
Numan Mahfuj is a lecturer, Department of Public Administration, Jagannath University, Dhaka.
64
Mizanur Rahman is an Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Bangabandhu
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Science and Technology University, Gopalgonj, Dhaka.
158 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
flouted, leaving people inhumanly unprotected.65 Barrister Md. Abdul Halim66 and Dr
Abdullah A. Dewan67 mentioned in a newspaper article that instances of gross human
rights violations(HRVs) by law enforcing agencies, local political leaders, elected
representatives, private companies, land grabbers, slum evictions and so on are
pouring in expressed on a daily and hourly basis.68 The former US Ambassador to
Bangladesh, Dan Mozena his concern to the NHRC‟s Chairman of that time Dr
Mizanur Rahman that 51 percent of the country‟s 153 million people are not
cognizant of human rights and recommended him to raise people‟s consciousness
(The Daily Sun, 25th July, 2013).69 Maliha Khan, a graduate of the Asian University
for Women and human rights activist, writes in the Daily Star newspaper that the
NHRC Act states that the Commission is an independent statutory body, yet, in many
aspects, it acts as a watchdog. While it has the power to investigate complaints of
human rights violations, it does little beyond basic fact-finding and writing a report. It
does not follow through until official investigations end or are brought to a
satisfactory close. She also says that the year 2018 was tumultuous. The quota reform
and road safety movements saw students, teachers, and journalists attacked while
trying to protest peacefully or covering the protests, pre, and post-election violence,
and extrajudicial killings in anti-narcotics drive-by security forces which claimed the
lives of around 300 people.70 One of the journalists of the Daily New Age newspaper,
published an article on 11th February 2020, that the country witnessed a total of 391
alleged extrajudicial killings and that the human rights situation in the country
remained quite alarming throughout the year. The public opinion as to the condition
of the rule of law is also shocking in Bangladesh. The report demonstrates that in
2020, the position of Bangladesh is 115 out of 128 countries, and the observance of
the rule of law in Bangladesh is decreasing every year.71 This report is prepared based
on public opinion. Thus, the opinion of the public reveals that the contraventions of
fundamental rights and human rights are ever-increasing in Bangladesh.
65
Numan Mahfuj and Md. Mizanur Rahman, „Ensuring Human Security in Bangladesh: Role of
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)' <https://www.academia.edu/37437897/Ensuring_
Human_Security_in_Bangladesh_Role_of_National_Human_Rights_Commission_NHRC>
accessed 20 April 2020.
66
Md. Abdul Halim is an Advocate in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.
67
Dr. Abdullah A. Dewan is a Professor of Economics, Eastern Michigan University, USA.
68
Md Abdul Halim and Abdullah A Dewan, „Is National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) A Show
and Tell Institution Part II?‟ The Daily Sun, (Dhaka, 27 July 2013) <https://www.academia.edu/
36846951/Is_National_Human_Rights_Commission_Nhrc_A_Show_And_Tell_Institution_Part-I>
accessed 20 April 2020.
69
ibid.
70
Maliha Khan, How independent and effective is the NHRC, „Your Right To Know‟ The Daily Star,
(Dhaka, 17 July 2019) <https://www.thedailystar.net/star-weekend/cover-story/human-rights-how-
independent-and-effective-the-nhrc-1769992> accessed 25 April 2020.
71
World Justice Project, The World Justice Project Rule of LawIindex2020 (World Justice Project 2020)
<https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/Bangladesh%2%202020%20WJP%
20Rule%20of%20Law%20Index%20Country%20Press%20Release.pdf> accessed 30 April 2020.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 159
72
Writ Petition No 16386 of 2018, Judgment on 11.11.2019(HCD), judgment has not been yet reported.
73
Maliha Khan (n 70).
74
Writ Petition No 16386 of 2018 (n 72), para 4.10.
75
ibid.
76
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 6(2).
160 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
Rights Act 1993 of India stipulates that the Chairman and two members of the
Commission must be appointed from persons who have been or are Chief Justice or
Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts of India and another two members shall
be appointed from persons having knowledge of or practical experience in, the
matters relating to human rights.77 Thus, India has emphasized more on the legal
background in selecting Chairman and members of the NHRC, perhaps considering
the above consequences.
This Act of India, in contrast, provides for the institution of Human Rights
Courts for speedy trial of offenses arising out of contravention of human rights.78As
human rights are the most crucial and specialized area of jurisprudence, it entails
special protection. It is plausible that a special court may protect and enforce
breaches of human rights appropriately and effectively. The NHRC Act does not have
any provision like this. Consequently, the sufferers of abuses of human rights do not
get proper remedies in Bangladesh.
9.2 Comparison between Bangladesh and Nepal
Although as per the NHRC Act 2009, the NHRC is an independent statutory
body79, in reality, it is not as independent as is necessary for its proper and
independent functioning. For several purposes, including those of finances, it has to
depend on the government and other agencies.80 In contrast, the Constitution of Nepal
provides that the Commission is the Constitutional body.81 As the Constitution is the
supreme law of a country, provisions of it are given prime importance, and
everybody, including the government cares about the Constitutional mandate. It is
thought that a Constitutional body is more powerful than the statutory body due to its
Constitutional status. A Constitutional body is only answerable to the Constitution.
Legally, a Constitutional body is given a higher rank than a statutory body. Thus, a
Constitutional body can act more effectively, appropriately, and independently than
the statutory body.
The Constitution of Nepal authorizes that the Commission in accomplishing its
functions and duties may use the authority to order compensation to the victims of
human rights infringements.82 The NHRC of Bangladesh might have the legal power
to award compensation to the victims of human rights violations as interim relief.
However, there is no such provision in the NHRC Act to award compensation to
sufferers for abuses of human rights instead it has the power to recommend to the
government to award aid (not compensation) to the victim as an interim relief during
77
Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 (India), s 3(2).
78
ibid, s 30.
79
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 3(2).
80
ibid, s 24(4)(a).
81
Constitution of Nepal 2015, Part 25, art 248.
82
ibid, art 249(3)(d).
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 161
the period of investigation or inquiry.83 It, in effect, means that aid is possible only
when the government thinks it fit and proper. Thus, the aid measure is dependent on
the mercy of the government. This factually transfers the balance of convenience to
the government and therefore makes the NHRC actions conditional upon the
satisfaction of the former. Thus, the actual power to decide aid belongs to the
government. This hinders the NHRC to ensure justice for the victim.
The Constitution of Nepal has not excluded any authority from the purview of its
Commission.84 However, the NHRC Act of Bangladesh stipulates that
notwithstanding anything contained in section12 (1), the following matters shall not
be included into the functions or duties of the Commission; issues relating to the
cases being tried before a court; or any issue relating to the service matters of the
public servants of the Republic and any employee engaged in the service of a
statutory public authority which is triable in any tribunal established under the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1980(Act VII OF 1981).85 It may be assumed that the
authorities who are beyond the jurisdiction of the NHRC deal with several crucial
human rights issues. Keeping them out of its jurisdiction in such areas, where a right
can be infringed in any form not only limits the power of the NHRC but also implies
that some breaches, even if they occur, stand outside the jurisdiction of the
Commission forever. This somewhat indemnity is dangerous for a human rights
culture as if it affords a kind of permission for some infringements to continue.
9.3 Comparison between Bangladesh and South Africa
As argued above, the NHRC is, in effect, merely a recommendatory body. It cannot
pass any mandatory decision or direct the government to modify or change the draft bill
of legislations that do not comply with the human rights obligation of Bangladesh. It is
only authorized to make recommendations to the government for taking appropriate
measures, and the government is not legally obligated to comply with recommendations
forwarded by the Commission. In comparison, the Constitution of South Africa stipulates
that the Commission possesses the power to take steps to guarantee appropriate redress
for human rights violations.86 Thus, the South African Commission has extensive
authority to implement human rights by offering a proper remedy to victims. Whereas the
NHRC of Bangladesh does not have any authority over anyone for the enforcement of
human rights or the execution of its decision. It also has no power to take binding
initiatives for the implementation and protection of human rights. The Constitution of
South Africa also provides that the commission is a Constitutional body.87 In contrast, the
same is a statutory body in Bangladesh.
83
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 19(2).
84
Constitution of Nepal 2015, art 249.
85
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 12(2).
86
Constitution of South Africa 1996, s 184(2)(b).
87
ibid, s 184.
162 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
The South African Commission has a mandate to get a report from each
department of government every year to uncover what they have done to promote
human rights in their work.88 This is a vital provision that paves the way for the
Commission to overview the functions of each department of government and
prepare human rights assessment based on that report. Consequently, each
department of government may be more alert in the fulfillment of human rights
obligations and in developing human rights culture. In India, obeying the orders of
the Commissions has become a convention though it is still a pretty borderline case.89
In Bangladesh, the NHRC has no authority to ask for report or even the reason for the
non-compliance of its recommendations.
88
South African Human Rights Commission Act 2013, preamble; Constitution of South Africa 1996, s
184(3).
89
A H Monjurul Kabir, „A National Human Rights Commission for Bangladesh‟ (December 1999) 18
Focus<http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/1999/12/a-national-human-rights-
commission-for-bangladesh.html> accessed 14 January 2020.
90
Ain O Salish Kendra, „Report on Civil Society Dialogue with National Human Rights Commission
Bangladesh’ (n23).
91
ibid.
92
Halim and Dewan (n 68).
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 163
Commission lacks any authority to take action for HRVs by disciplinary forces.93
Thus, because of shortcomings in the NHRC Act, the NHRC is failing to protect
human rights adequately. It is evident that the NHRC Act is by and large a monistic
instrument that very improperly burdens the NHRC with responsibilities for which
there are no guarantees in the Act of mutual or corresponding obligations. This
absence of counterbalancing formulation in the provisions of the Act makes most of
its claims, statements somewhat phony. This is apparent, especially when compared
to a similar yet functionally better model. The generality of such asymmetries
significantly weakens the normative strength of the law and efficacy of the NHRC. A
glimpse of this imbalance is described below:
10.1 Flaws in the Definition of “Human Rights”
The definition of human rights given in the NHRC Act is flawed. As discussed
above, the definition is very thin, and it does not include all facets of human rights. It
also does not cover the universal character of human rights because it includes only
Constitutionally guaranteed human rights and recognized human rights embodied in
international human rights instruments, which have been ratified by Bangladesh as well
as enforceable by the existing laws.94 It disregards the fundamental principles of state
policies, as mentioned in the Constitution of Bangladesh, which are also critical human
rights issues. It expressly focuses more on civil and political rights than social,
economic, and cultural rights. “Human rights those are declared under different
international human rights instruments ratified by Bangladesh and are enforceable by
the laws of Bangladesh".95 This part of the definition has imposed limitations on the
international standard, and the Commission can only exercise its jurisdiction on those
human rights, which are recognized and enforceable by the State, but not all
internationally recognized rights.96 Hence, the cardinal philosophy of human rights, as
discussed earlier, has not been addressed adequately by this definition. It is settled that
human rights do not require recognition or ratification of any country to be enforced
and call for Constitutional recognition of those rights; instead, it covers all rights
recognized by the international human rights instruments. The enforceability of those
rights also does not depend on the domestic court as required by the NHRC Act.
10.2 Multifaceted Institutional Dependencies of the NHRC
Institutional independence is sine qua non to make any institution free and useful.
It implies that an independent institution shall be free from all sorts of dependencies,
pressures, or influences from other institutions of the government. As per the Paris
Principles, for a NHRI to be truly independent, it must be financially solvent and able
93
ibid.
94
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 2(f).
95
ibid.
96
NHRC, Rahmat Ullah and Bayazid Hossain, ‘Study Report on JAMAKON: Critique’ p 13
164 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
97
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human
Rights Institutions (OHCHR 2005) 8. This report is co-published by the International Council on
Human Rights Policy and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/NHRIen.pdf> accessed 20 February 2020.
98
ibid.
99
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 24(4)(a).
100
ibid s 24(4).
101
Mizanur Rahman and others (eds), Annual Report (National Human Rights Commission Bangladesh
2010)<http://nhrc.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/nhrc.portal.gov.bd/page/cb8edec9_5aee_4b04
_bf2a_229d9cd226a0/Annual%20report%202010.pdf> accessed 26 October 2019.
102
Ullah and Hossain (n 96).
103
NHRC conducted a baseline survey (2011) having supports form UNDP, Danish International
Development Agency (DANIDA), Swiss for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and Swedish
International Development Agency (SIDA). Cited in NHRC Annual Report (n 26) 55.
104
Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) and Human Rights Forum, Bangladesh, Bangladesh: National Human
Rights Commission is in Critical Juncture of Hype versus Real Action (ANNI Report-2012, Dhaka)
25. cited in NHRC Annual Report’ (n 26) 56.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 165
their appropriate remedial measures.105 This provision implies that the NHRC has to
rely on the government to take remedial measures against infringement of human
rights. In case of violations of human rights by law enforcement agencies, the NHRC
can only ask for a report from the government.106 The government has no
corresponding obligation to send the report in reply to the NHRC under the NHRC
Act. The NHRC has delivered statements, given recommendations and investigated
the violations of human rights for its prevention, despite that unlawful arrest, forced
disappearance, extrajudicial killing, torture in police custody and other cases of
violation of human rights are increasing alarmingly which is evident from the report
made by the NHRC and UNDP.107 Further, the NHRC has no separate secretariat.
The Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs acts as the secretariat of it,
which is likely to hinder the NHRC from functioning independently. Thus, due to the
lack of institutional independence, NHRC is powerless to execute its own decisions
and mandates.
10.3 Inappropriate Appointment Procedure of Office Bearers
As discussed above, even a person who does not have any legal acumen as to
human rights may be appointed as Chairman and member of the Commission under
the NHRC Act.108 Due to the flaws in the selection process, the Chairman and most
members of the NHRC may be appointed from persons who have a direct or indirect
connection with the government. The civil society does not have an opportunity to be
involved in this process. A transparent appointment procedure is necessary to ensure
the independence of the NHRC. Appointment processes are one of the most
important ways to guarantee the freedom, diversity, and accessibility of NHRIs. A
direct appointment by the executive branch of government is undesirable. The
appointment procedure should be open and translucent.109 Because of unfair
appointment provision in the NHRC Act, the appointment procedure is swayed by the
government. Apart from this, of the seven commissioners, only Chairman, and one
commissioner are full-time members, and the rest of the commissioners are appointed
on an honorary basis.110 However, if all members were appointed as full-time
members, they could spend more time participating more efficiently in the affairs of
the NHRC and contribute their potentials to the development of the NHRC.
10.4 Limited Mandates without Power to Enforce
As discussed above, the NHRC can only inquire or investigate any violation of
human rights. It has no power to take any obligatory actions or decisions based on its
105
NHRC Act 2009, s 12(1)(e).
106
ibid. s 18.
107
National Rights Commission Bangladesh (n 26).
108
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 6(2).
109
National Rights Commission Bangladesh (n 26).
110
NHRC Act 2009 (Bangladesh), s 5(2).
166 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
investigation or inquiry report. There is also no provision in the NHRC Act which
makes the government bound to take into account the inquiry or investigation report
submitted by the NHRC. In praxis, acceptance of such a report depends on the will of
the concerned agency of the State. It means that if the State does not accept such
investigation report, it becomes factually pointless and, therefore, the situations it
addressed or, the remedies it offered are more likely to remain dormant forever.
10.5 Lack of Compensatory Measures
The NHRC might have the legal authority to award compensation to the victim of
abuses of human rights as interim relief. Both the commissions of Nepal and South
Africa have such kind of jurisdiction. A right without a remedy is meaningless. The
current human rights jurisprudence advocates that every victim of human rights
violations shall have the enforceable right to have compensation. For example, the
victim of arbitrary arrest is entitled to compensation.111 Thus, lack of this power
hinders the NHRC from ensuring justice for the victim who suffers pecuniary loss
due to the violations of human rights.
10.6 Recommendatory Body
As discussed above the NHRC is, in effect, merely a recommendatory body.
NHRIs should have the power to monitor the extent to which relevant authorities
shall follow their advice and recommendations. Monitoring should become a
consistent practice.112 NHRIs usually have no direct authority to enforce their
recommendations. To have such ability is generally regarded as being contrary to
justice because NHRIs would combine both inquisitorial and quasi-judicial
functions.113 At the same time, relevant authorities should be required to respond
within a specified time to recommendations or contrary findings that national
institutions make.114 Thus, to be an influential institution, the NHRC should have the
authority to get report from the government after sending recommendations to it.
10.7 Segregation of Some Crucial Areas from Sphere of the NHRC
As discussed above, some authorities have been kept outside the jurisdiction of
the NHRC. This kind of indemnity is a threat to the violations of human rights.
NHRIs mandated to receive complaints should have broad powers to deal with them.
As with their monitoring role, no relevant public body should be excluded from their
jurisdiction.115 Thus, no public body, including law enforcement agency and army,
should be kept beyond the purview of the NHRC.
111
ICCPR, art 9(5).
112
International Council on Human Rights Policy (n 97).
113
ibid, at 21-22.
114
ibid.
115
International Council on Human Rights Policy (n 97) 20.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 167
factory which collapsed due to breach of building code resulting in death and injuries
of thousands of laborers therein), the international buyers decided that they would not
buy garment‟s products from Bangladesh if labor rights are not ensured and protected
in Bangladesh.128 At the time of engaging in international relations and cooperations,
many countries investigate the human rights condition and the world rule of law
index. Goal 16 of SDGs requires that every State shall promote peaceful and
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and
build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. It implies that a
developed and strong institution is necessary to prevent violations of human rights.
The reports of violations of human rights implies that lack of effective, accountable,
and inclusive institutions, are responsible for breaches of human rights.
Consequently, Bangladesh is facing obstacles in fulfilling the goals of sustainable
development. The NHRC of Bangladesh could play a crucial role in protecting and
preventing violations of human rights if it would have been an accountable and
influential institution. However, owing to inherent flaws in the NHRC Act, the
NHRC of Bangladesh cannot act as a watchdog for the prevention of violations of
human rights. The SDGs monitoring framework explicitly recognizes the existence
of an independent NHRI that is compliant with the Paris Principles as an indicator for
SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions (indicator 16.a.1).129 Without
instituting an effective, accountable, and inclusive institution to provide access to
justice for all, it is impossible to attain sustainable development goals. NHRIs can
make linkages between human rights and SDGs commitments and standards.130 The
UN Secretary-General urges countries to accelerate the pace of progress to put in
place NHRIs compliant with the Paris Principles.131
The goals of SDGs will not be fully achieved by the State until fundamental
human rights are realized, enforced, and protected. Therefore, to achieve the goals of
SDGs, strengthening the NHRC is a dire necessity.
12. Recommendations
Glancing on the different flaws of the NHRC Act make it urgent to prescribe a
feasible model. Therefore, it may be recommended that the NHRC requires an
intelligent and efficient structure supported by well-drafted, pro-human rights, and
128
Charles Kenny, „Why You should not stop buying from Bangladesh‟ (Bloomberg, May 6, 2013)
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-05/why-you-shouldnt-stop-buying-from-
bangladesh> accessed 2 November 2019.
129
NHRIs and the Sustainable Development Goals, GANHRI (n 120) 10.
130
Ibid, at 11.
131
„Enabling The Implementation of the 2030 Agenda through SDG 16+, Anchoring peace, justice and
inclusion‟(Global Alliance, July 2019) <https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Themes/SustDevGoals/
Documents/Global%20Alliance,%20SDG%2016+%20Global%20Report.pdf> accessed 20 May 2020.
170 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
comprehensive law. The present form of the NHRC Act provides mandates which are
more cosmetic than substantive. It, therefore, is argued that the Act of 2009 requires a
thorough revision to make the NHRC genuinely worthwhile. To that end, the
following recommendations can be considered-
12.1 Amendment of Definition of Human Rights
The term „Human rights‟ has not been appropriately addressed and defined in the
NHRC Act. The Constitution of Nepal 2015 has not imposed any restriction on the
definition of human rights; instead, it has mentioned the term human rights. Thus, the
Commission of Nepal can protect and promote all human rights irrespective of
whether the Constitution recognizes or whether those rights are enforceable by law or
not. Therefore, the definition of human rights should be amended in such a way to
include all human rights recognized by international human rights instruments.
12.2 Recognition of the NHRC as a Constitutional Body
Like Nepal and South Africa, if the NHRC of Bangladesh becomes an independent
Constitutional body, it may perform its duties more efficiently and appropriately. Thus,
the government should take a step to assimilate provisions in the Constitution of
Bangladesh to recognize the NHRC as an independent Constitutional body. It may make
the NHRC a more independent, efficient, and workable institution for the promotion,
protection, and enforcement of human rights and human development.
12.3 Safeguard Institutional Independence
The government may include a provision in the NHRC Act that the NHRC shall
be independent and free from the interference of all governmental institutions,
political bias, and other bodies in discharging its functions. An effective national
institution is one which is authorized to act outside the purview of political parties
and all other entities and situations which may be in a position to affect its work. 132 It
should also have the authority to make its own budget and take direct grants from any
national or international donors without any kind of intervention and approval from
the government. The government may insert provisions in the NHRC Act like the
South African Commission that the Commission shall be subject only to the
Constitution and other organs of the State will be obliged, through legislative and
other measures to assist and protect the commission to ensure its independence,
neutrality, dignity, and effectiveness.133 These agencies shall also be barred from
interfering with its functioning.134 These provisions may be good enough to guarantee
the independence of the NHRC both legally and theoretically.
132
Arun K. Palai, National Human Rights Commission of India: Formation, Functioning and Future
Prospects (Atlantic Publishers 1998) 155.
133
Final Constitution, s 181(3), cited in Susant Kumar Kanungo, National Human Rights Commission
in India and South Africa: A Comparative Analysis (Manak Publication 2015) 289.
134
Ibid, s 181(4).
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 171
135
NHRC, „Annual Report’ (n 101) 14.
136
David A. Johnson and Nizamuddin Al-Hussainy, (JAMAKON) „Final Evaluation of the UNDP Capacity
Development Project‟ (BHRC-CDP) May 2010 December 2014, <https://www.
slideshare.net/drnizamalhussainy/final-evaluation-of-the-bnhrc-11-mar-2015> accessed 20 March 2020.
172 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
12.8 Special Court or Tribunal for Human Rights and Compass of Mediation
Like the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 of India, the NHRC of
Bangladesh may include provision for the establishment of human rights courts to
provide speedy trial of offenses arising out of violation of human rights.137 It may
also include in the Act that the Judges of the said court shall be appointed from the
persons who have legal knowledge, acumen, experience, and strong commitment to
human rights. Human rights law is a special branch of law. Therefore, in addition to
the Human Rights Courts, the Commission may have its tribunal for the trial of the
violations of human rights like other Commission of the country. Under the
Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission Rules 2016, the Bangladesh Bar Council
Order 1972, and the Customs Act 1969, those respective commissions have the
authority to set up tribunals to resolve disputes arising out of their concerned issues.
12.9 Appointment of Special Prosecutor
Like the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 of India, the NHRC Act should
have a provision that special public prosecutors shall be appointed for filing and
representing cases before the Human Rights Court.138 There may also be a provision
in the NHRC Act that pro-people separate bodies of public prosecutors or advocates
who have vast knowledge and an inviolable commitment to human rights, may be
created to fight in other courts on behalf of the NHRC for the proper and adequate
relief for victims of violations of human rights.
12.10 Power to File Case against the Government
As mentioned above that discounting the government's failure, it is theoretically
or factually impossible to frame a case of human rights violation. Thus, to exclude
the government from any charge, especially in case of human rights violations, is a
serious threat to enforce human rights. Therefore, necessary provisions must be
inserted in the NHRC Act to authorize the NHRC to file cases against the
government.
12.11 Restriction to Reappointment of the Chairman of the NHRC in any
Government Post after Retirement
The NHRC Act does not have any provision that the Chairman will be
disqualified to be appointed in any government‟s office after his retirement from the
NHRC. This may encourage him to act in favor of the government to get appointed in
any other lucrative post of the government after his retirement. Thus, the NHRC Act
may insert a provision that after the completion of tenure from NRHC, the Chairman
shall be disqualified to be appointed in any other government‟s post.
137
Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 (India), s 30.
138
ibid, s 31.
Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh 173
139
Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, art 25, <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/about-
precautionary.asp> accessed 12 May 2020.
140
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: <https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf> accessed 10 May 2020.
141
ibid.
142
ibid.
174 Dhaka University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2020
remedy”.143 Thus, the NHRC can play an essential role in protecting the violations of
human rights in the business arena. If the NHRC is empowered to protect and prevent
violations of human rights attached to the business, it can adequately protect those
rights as an independent body. Thus, special provisions may be added in the NHRC
Act that the NHRC will be authorized to take cognizance of the violations of human
rights by the corporate bodies.
12.14 Authority to Award Interim Relief
NHRC should have powers to guarantee effective remedies, including interim
measures to protect the life and safety of an individual and free medical treatment
where necessary. Like the South African‟s Commission, the NHRC may also be
given the power to award prompt compensation and to take the measure of redress
and rehabilitation if it thinks appropriate by considering the circumstances of
violations of human rights.
13. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the NHRC in Bangladesh has the potential to be a significant
institution, but without the power to adjudicate and issue binding commands, they may be
turned to be "glorified ciphers and promise of unreality" as rightly termed by Justice VR
Krishna Iyer.144 From the present structure of the NHRC Act, it is may be said that the
victory of the Commission largely depends on the true political volition of the
government because the NHRC has to rely on it to accomplish most of its mandates.
Therefore, to give the mandate to the NHRC within the current legal framework for the
promotion and protection of human rights and human development in Bangladesh is
nothing but to fight without a weapon. Learning lessons from other countries, it may not
be wise to make the NHRC dependent on the will of the government alone to perform its
functions at this age. To make the Commission more active and effective, it is necessary
to make reasonable and adequate amendments in the existing provisions of the NHRC
Act, which may make the NHRC as independent pro-people Commission and not as an
agent of the government. An independent pro-people Commission is part and parcel to
achieve the goals of SDGs. If the aforesaid recommendations are brought into light by
amending the provisions of the NHRC Act 2009 by the Parliament, the NHRC may be
turned into the long-cherished independent and impartial institution out of the control of
government for the respect, promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights and
human development in Bangladesh and only then the objectives as laid down in the
NHRC Act may come true.
143
ibid.
144
Interview with Justice VR Krishna Iyer, „Law and our Rights‟ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 1 June 1997)
<http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/1999/12/a-national-human-rights-commission-
for-bangladesh.html> accessed 14 March 2020.