Weekly reading response
By Mohammad Haider Kamruzzaman
Date: 8/18/2025
Theorising in social research is a complex and often elusive process, yet it remains central to the
advancement of knowledge across disciplines. This week we review four articles outlining theory and
theorising. Together, these works provide a multifaceted insights into what theory is, how it is
constructed, and whether it can represent truth.
In his article “What does theorising in social research look like?” (Hammond, 2018), Michael Hammond
explores what it really means to “theorise” and to “theorising”. The article explains that theory is usually
seen as a set of ideas or frameworks that explains social phenomena, while theorising is the process of
building those explanation. In fact, theorising focuses on discovery of patterns from observation of
phenomena rather than only justification (Swedberg, 2012). Hammond shows that theorising typically
involves three steps: (1) identifying a gap in current understanding, (2) Offering an alternative and
explaining that alternative, and (3) justifying this alternative with logic and evidence. However, the actual
process of discovery is often hidden, as academic writing tends to emphasize outcomes over the thinking
behind them. He highlights three key insights from first-person accounts of theorising. First, it often feels
like problem-solving: researchers notice a gap or difficulty in their field. Second, theorising requires
focusing on important or abstracting from data by both looking at the data and looking beyond the data.
Third, though theorising is a personal endeavor, it always draws on resources, such as existing theories
and concepts, though these are usually adapted rather than adopted as they are.
Hammond (2018) argues that theory is difficult to comprehend because it is multidimensional, and that
the process of theory building is even harder to unify, as it draws on multiple perspectives. Fortunately,
there is a consensus, though it is implicit, about what theory is not. In article “What theory is not?”
(Sutton and Staw, 1995) identify five such components that should not be construed as part of the
theoretical argument. The authors argue that theory in organizational research should not be conflated
with mere data, references, variable lists, diagrams, hypotheses or isolated predictions. In fact, a strong
theory rests on explicit causal reasoning, coherent integration of past ideas, and a well-founded
explanation that connects concepts to data though it may contradict common sense. Drawing on
Weick (1995)
, Sutton and Staw (1995) summarize succinctly a good theory explains, predicts, and delights.
Building good theory is no easy fete. Sutton and Staw(1995) identifiy problem as a combination of
education and talent, while (Dimaggio, 1995) modifies Sutton and Staw’s view with three additional
factors, indicating complexity of theory construction. First, he extends purview of theory—theory as
covering laws: generalization or theory should describe the world as we see, theory as enlightment: theory
clarifies conventional notions in order to generate artful and exciting insights, and theory as narrative:
theory accounts social processes, which is often tested empirically. Second, theory should defamiliaze
known world—help people to view their world differently. But this defamiliarization should be qualified
by balancing competing values—such as clarity versus paradox, focus versus multidimensionality, and
novelty versus explanatory power. Third, the author stresses that theory is socially constructed, because
its reception depends on cultural resonance, simplified slogans, and scholarly uptake. Drawing on these
three points, he concludes that producing good theory is difficult not only because it demands intellectual
skill and compromise but also because its success depends on environment and luck.
As we have seen, theory is a set of ideas or standards that explicates phenomena, and builds upon
previous errors. Now, the question is: Does theory represent truth? For decades, philosophers of science
remain skeptical about it. Despite their skepticism, (Massimi, 2019)argues that truth remains central to
scientific practice and society. In her first argument, she agrees that asking for truth is risky, and
‘empirically adequate’ theories, theories that ‘save the observable phenomena’, are good enough for
science. Next, she maintains that the history, practice, and policy of science rejects the universality of
truth in science, which is why philosophers of science frequently append qualifying adjectives to realism
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Weekly reading response
By Mohammad Haider Kamruzzaman
Date: 8/18/2025
(for example, structural, selective, pragmatic, perspectival, or local). In her last argument, she points out
that truth in scientific research is an ‘insupportable and dispensable burden’. Instead, science has a duty to
aim at truth, and a theory counts as true when it is so well supported that we are justified in assenting to it
as knowledge.
Hammond (2018), Sutton and Staw (1995), and DiMaggio (1995) intersect at what theory is, and how it is
built. While Hammond outlines the three steps of theorising, he does not provide strategies how
researchers effectively engage in these steps. Again, he draws heavily on first-person narratives to
illustrate theorising, which brings his perspective into the literature. But he does not contest his view with
others, and justify his theory. Though he acknowledges past knowledge and social involvement in
theorising, he does not explain how new fields of study evolve, and how this knowledge is accepted by
others. He even does not explicate how we differentiate between weak theory and strong theory. In
contrast, Sutton and Staw (1995) take an expulsion approach, showing what do not constitute theory. But
their naïve view about theory does not create knowledge. DiMaggio (1995) modifies Sutton and Staw’s
view and fills the gap of social involvement (Hammond, 1995) by creating tensions between competing
values. While these three authors constructed theory and theorising to represent phenomena, Massimi
(2019) questions about the aim, and veracity of theory. Her philosophy opens our eye that there is no such
things as absolute truth. A theory should aim at truth, and it is true if it reasonably justifies and expounds
phenomena.
Theorising is a nuances and challenging process shaped by intellectual effort, social context, and
philosophical debate. Hammond provides a useful framework but leaves gaps in practical guidance.
Sutton and Staw, and DiMaggio fills that gap, while Massimi reminds us that theory aims to get things
right, and knowledge is its byproduct.
References
DiMaggio, Paul J. 1995. “Comments on ‘What Theory Is Not.’” Administrative Science Quarterly 40, no.
3: 391–397. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393790.
Hammond, Michael. 2018. “‘An Interesting Paper but Not Sufficiently Theoretical’: What Does
Theorising in Social Research Look Like?” Methodological Innovations 11, no. 2: 205979911878775.
https://doi.org/10.1177/2059799118787756.
Massimi, Michela. 2019. “It’s Time for a Robust Philosophical Defence of Truth in Science.” Aeon.
https://aeon.co/essays/its-time-for-a-robust-philosophical-defence-of-truth-in-science.
Sutton, Robert I., and Barry M. Staw. 1995. “What Theory Is Not.” Administrative Science Quarterly 40,
no. 3: 371–384. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393788.
Swedberg, Richard. 2012. Theorizing in Social Science: The Context of Discovery. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Weick, Karl E. 1995. “Definition of ‘Theory.’” In Blackwell Dictionary of Organizational Behavior,
edited by Nigel Nicholson, 416–417. Oxford: Blackwell.AI use declaration: I used ChatGPT(GPT 4.0) to
clarify philosophical terminology
