10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs.

City of Manila

Title
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 122846 Jan 20, 2009

Manila ordice prohibiting short-time hotel stays challenged as unconstitutional;

Supreme Court ruled it violated liberty, privacy, and equal protection rights.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009 ]

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION AND STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. CITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED
BY MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as
subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power
and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance
barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-
Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits
those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
"wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance
against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law.
The same parameters apply to the present petition.

This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the
reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the
validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels,
Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila"

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 1/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

(the Ordinance).

I.

The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to
protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general
and the youth in particular.

SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila.

SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or
other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of
room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more
than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said
establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.

SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this
ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical
person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall
be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the
business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.

SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or
contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.

SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 2/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by
Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC
claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was
authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis
as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The
three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9

On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified
the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a
TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is
a legitimate exercise of police power.14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to
desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the
Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for
decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993,
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 3/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

hereby declared null and void.

Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law
to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate
purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected
through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.

The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994,
the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals.21

Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers
on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III,
Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a
single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right
to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 4/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that
admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power
is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse
effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila,
liberty is regulated by law.

TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their
petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before
the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of
police power.

II.

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners' standing. Petitioners allege that as
owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully
interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection
rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether
or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their
patrons' equal protection rights.

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle
of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by
the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly
from the Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates
concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction,
the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as
the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 5/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines,
the doctrine of transcendental importance.31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court
wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third
parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an
ìnjury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the
issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must
exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33
Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the
Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability
which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence
in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance
for customers to bring suit.34

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed

standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of
other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35
the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a
reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the
constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected
unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United
States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal
protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High
Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third
parties who seek access to their market or function."38

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the
former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 6/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the
rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a
sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of
their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

III.

To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent
City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40 Ermita-Malate concerned the City
ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such
as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to
a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled
ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance
in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.

The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances
were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein
there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.41

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 7/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be
rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

A.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.42 Police power is
based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself
and its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied
actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas
stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the
fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation's legal system, its use has
rarely been denied.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of
its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of
Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.

Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process
or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the
co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we
are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution
emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions
that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception
that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect
and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the
rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous
and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental
and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 8/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

B.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against
the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection
against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected
by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns
itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an
intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level
of formality of a hearing.

If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.50

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has
reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now
confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which
it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should
sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has
acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine
the proper metes and bounds for its application.

C.

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best
tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court
in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 9/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
"discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently,
two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of
review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by

the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court
declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal
protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due
process cases as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence
of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard
for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights
such as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard -
the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons - those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 10/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are
trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of
cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas.
Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
fundamental freedoms - which the people reflexively exercise any day without the
impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence - that accurately reflect the
degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental
right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or
what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel
labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and
nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury
to others.

D.

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we
upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights,
thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65]
In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and
to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[66]

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the
meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 11/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have
gained notoriety as venue of p̀rostitution, adultery and fornications' in Manila since they
p̀rovide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
became the ìdeal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.'"68 Whether or not this depiction
of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected69
will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski,
so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which
his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which
are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience
personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is
set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no
longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion
of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to
the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than
twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the
power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and
rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.
Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of
a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look
to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

E.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 12/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police
power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.73 However, this
is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose
exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74

Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to

candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no
distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons
engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it
makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit
patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its
longtime home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city - the Pearl
of the Orient - as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still
steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that
Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega
cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis
wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate
businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals
that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 13/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

IV.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State
is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However wellA-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court
is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the
State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy
does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on
which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little
shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply
variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality"
is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is
more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are
widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one,
are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted
distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the
right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 14/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not
with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from
our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and
protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral
duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their
expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are
entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to

governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is
possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,

Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., on official leave.
Brion, J., on official leave.
Peralta, J., on leave.

1 G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308.

2 See rollo, pp. 4-41.

3]Id. at 42-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin, concurred in by Associate

Justices Ricardo P. Galvez (later, Solicitor-General) and Antonio P. Solano.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 15/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
4 Id. at 46.

5] Id. at 62-69.

6 Id. at 45-46.

7 Id. at 70-77.

8] Id. at 47.

9] Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 48.

12] Id. at 81.

13] Id. at 82-83.

14 Id. at 84-99.

15 Id. at 104-105.

16] Id. at 49.

17 Id. at 52.

18 Id. at 120.

19 No. L-74457, 20 March 1987, 148 SCRA 659.

20 Rollo, pp. 129-145.

21] Id. at 158.

22 Id. at 53.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 16/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
23 Id.

24] Id. at 43-59.

25] Id. at 4-40.

26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).

27 Const., Art. VIII , Sec. 5, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).

28] Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d

66 (1979).

29See Domingo v. Carague, G.R. No. 161065,15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 450. See also
Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236.

30 468 U.S. 737 (1984).

31 Supra note 29.

32 499 U.S. 400 (1991).

33 Id. at p 410-411.

34 See Kelsey McCowan Heilman, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy
Organizations Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 237, for a general discussion
on advocacy groups.

35 381 U.S. 479(1965).

36 Id. at 481.

37 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

38] Id. at 194.

39Chavez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 415; Adiong v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 103956, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA 712.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 17/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

40 127 Phil. 306 (1967).

41City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11
March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No.
102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R.
No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.

42Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127
Phil. 306 (1967).

43JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 94 (1996) citing
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).

44] U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 759.

45 People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938).

46 Javier v. Earnshaw, 64 Phil. 626 (1937).

47] Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 (1931).

48] See U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1908); Insular Government v. Ling Su Fan, 15 Phil. 58

(1910).

49 Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).

50See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 330 citing CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002).

51 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

52] Id, at 152.

53 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

54 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 18/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
55 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

56 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

57] Central Bank Employee's Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531 (2004);

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R.

Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; In Ermita-Malate, supra
note 1 at 324, the Court in fact noted: "if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of government acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider."

58 Central Bank Employee's Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 57.

59 Id.

60Mendoza, J., Concurring Opinion in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19

November 2001, 369 SCRA 394.

61 Id.

62 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

[63] Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

64 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It has been opined by Chemerinsky that the
use of the equal protection clause was to avoid the use of substantive due process since the
latter fell into disfavor in the United States. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law,
Principles and Policies (2nd ed. 2002).

65 Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

66 Id. at 440.

67 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 336-337.

68 Rollo, p. 258.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 19/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
69]"Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to
consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises -- be it
stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state
policy as contained in the Constitution. (See Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu
Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004) Adults have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to
make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do
not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to
be let alone is the beginning of all freedom -- it is the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. supra note 1 at 337-
338.

70 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 338-339.

71Metro Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., G.R. Nos. 170656 and
170657, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 341.

72 U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910).

73 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

74] Carlos
Superdrug v. DSWD, G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007, Alalayan v. National Power
Corporation, 24 Phil. 172 (1968); U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918).

[75] Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 314 Phil. 131 (1995).

76 Supra note 1.

77 City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; De La Cruz, et al. v. Hon. Paras, et al., 208
Phil. 490 (1983); Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor
of Manila, supra note 42.

78 "The end of the state is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of life." Therefore any

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 20/21
10/29/25, 1:17 AM White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

state "which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end
of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere alliance..." The
law "should be a rule of life such as will make the members of a [state] good and just."
Otherwise it "becomes a mere covenant - or (in the phrase of the Sophist Lycophron) à
guarantor of men's rights against one another.'" Politics II.9.6-8.1280 31-1280bii; cited in
Hamburger, M., Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (1951 ed.), p. 178.

79 Greenwalt, K., Conflicts of Law and Morality (1989 ed.), at 38.

80 Steven G., Render Unto Caesar that which is Caesars, and unto God that which is God's,
31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 495. He cites the example of the failed Twentieth (?) Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibited the sale and consumption of liquor, where it was
clear that the State cannot justly and successfully regulate consumption of alcohol, when
huge portions of the population engage in its consumption.

See also Posner, Richard H., The Problematics of Moral And Legal Theory, The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press (2002). He writes:
. . . Holmes warned long ago of the pitfalls of misunderstanding law by taking its moral
vocabulary too seriously. A big part of legal education consists of showing students how to
skirt those pitfalls. The law uses moral terms in part because of its origin, in part to be
impressive, in part to speak a language that the laity, to whom the commands of the law are
addressed, is more likely to understand - and in part, because there is a considerable
overlap between law and morality. The overlap, however, is too limited to justify trying to
align these two systems of social control (the sort of project that Islamic nations such as
Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been engaged in of late). It is not a scandal when the
law to pronounce it out of phase with current moral feeling. If often is, and for good
practical reasons (in particular, the law is a flywheel, limiting the effects of wide swings in
public opinion). When people make that criticism--as many do of the laws, still found on
the statute books of many states, punishing homosexual relations--what they mean is that
the law neither is supported by public opinion nor serves any temporal purpose, even that
of stability, that it is merely a vestige, an empty symbol.
81 See Burton , S., Judging in Good Faith, (1992 ed.), at 218.

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/v/white-light-corp-v-city-of-manila?q=123846 21/21