This article was downloaded by: [University of Reading] On: 24 May 2012, At: 10:31 Publisher: Routledge Informa

Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Peacekeeping
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/finp20

Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century

To cite this article: D. Donald (2002): Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century, International Peacekeeping, 9:4, 21-38 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714002776

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 21

Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

Assessments of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s have often partly blamed the inappropriate application of traditional principles particularly neutrality and impartiality for its more signal failures. Since 1998, Kofi Annan has led a process of conceptual reappraisal which appears to emphasize impartiality and drop neutrality. But analysis of statements by senior UN officials, interviews with members of the Secretariat, pronouncements in the Security Council and General Assembly, and in-house assessments of UN peacekeeping, reveal that a longstanding confusion about the meaning of the terms endures, so minimizing the real significance of this shift. By failing to break the link between impartiality and neutrality, the UN jeopardizes its ability to conduct grey area operations.

Ever since the UN effectively invented armed peacekeeping in 1956, blue helmets have relied on a trinity of principles as their conceptual body armour. The consent of the parties, the neutrality/impartiality of the peacekeepers, and their minimum or non-use of force, were meant to keep them above the conflicts that they were despatched to ameliorate or end. But this traditional trinity was designed for the passive buffer zone (BZ) operation of peacekeepings heyday, where the belligerents chains of command still functioned, their commitment to resolution was assumed, and the peacekeepers themselves were of minimal military value. It was utterly unsuitable for the complex internal conflicts of the 1990s, where blue helmets had to struggle to assert themselves, and where neutrality in the face of huge human rights abuses jeopardized a forces physical and political survival.1 Most damagingly for the UN and the cause of intervention itself these principles were invoked at political levels to prevent peacekeepers resisting the overrunning of Srebrenica and genocide in Rwanda. The UNs initial reaction to these traumas certainly influenced by conceptual reappraisals such as that in the British Wider Peacekeeping
Dominick Donald, PhD candidate, Kings College, London
International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.4, Winter 2002, pp.2138
PU B L I S H E D BY . RA N K C A S S , LO N D O N

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 22

22
2

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

doctrine was to re-emphasize the old principles. UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghalis Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995) emphasized that peacekeeping and enforcement should not be mixed and that the old principles must stand inviolate,3 so overturning his earlier suggestion in An Agenda for Peace (1992) that peacekeeping operations no longer needed the consent of the belligerents.4 But since 1998, his successor, Kofi Annan, has led a reexamination of UN peacekeeping. Three documents in particular the internal report on the fall of Srebrenica and the external reports, undertaken at Annans behest, of the Independent Inquiry into the Rwandan genocide and the Brahimi panel on peacekeeping issues5 have attempted to draw a line between the passivity of the past and the need for a more active future. There has also been an equivalent shift in the public statements of the Secretary-General and his senior officials. A reassessment of the conceptual basis for peacekeeping, hinging on the neutrality/impartiality element of the traditional trinity, has been a key element of both these processes. This article analyses the shift in UN thinking on neutrality/impartiality. It examines public statements by senior officials, the three key documents mentioned above, peacekeeping-related pronouncements in the Security Council and General Assembly, and the thinking (based on interviews) of key lower-level Secretariat officials. It shows that neutrality is out of favour with all but the most traditionally minded of UN actors; in the words of one official, people seem to prefer impartiality nowadays.6 This shift appears, at first glance, to be significant. Neutrality and impartiality have long been seen as at least inseparable, at most synonymous.7 They have been explicit mainstays of UN peacekeeping since 1957, initially seen as inseparable, later as synonymous.8 Contributor countries neutrality vis--vis a conflict created the freedom for blue helmets to operate impartially (that is, without bias towards the parties) in the field. But the terms are not true synonyms at all.9 Nor can they be applied in tandem in the field. An impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict, based on a judgement of the situation; it is fair and just in its treatment of the parties while not taking sides. A neutral is much more passive; its limited actions are within restrictions imposed by the belligerents, while its abstention from the conflict is based on an absence of decided views. To use an analogy, an impartial entity can resist the wind, while a neutral can only point where it blows. A neutral may claim the ability to act impartially. But it can only do so if there is a balance of power in its vicinity. As soon as that balance is disturbed (a constant in

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 23

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G

23

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

conflict) the belligerents essential interests will clash with the neutrals status; the latter will have to compromise that status and act, only where the strongest power will permit, to preserve it. The neutrals actions in time of conflict are thus neither principled, nor independent of the belligerents, that is, not impartial. If impartial neutrality is only possible in peacetime, and is impossible in the circumstances for which it was designed, then it has the illusory substance of the emperors new clothes. In peacekeeping terms this meant that a neutral UN force could maintain the fiction of independent action (impartiality) if its operational area were calm and it retained the parties absolute consent. But if that consent was withdrawn, as for the UN Emergency .orce (UNE.) in 1967, or the operational environment became more volatile, as for the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the UN Protection .orce (UNPRO.OR) in former Yugoslavia, the force could only act within the limits set by the parties. The neutral force was thus acting neutrally, not impartially.10 Academics and practitioners have suggested changing the understanding of impartiality from the primacy of the belligerents perception that the peacekeepers are impartial, to the impartial execution of the mandate and breaking its traditional links with neutrality.11 This would provide much better conceptual guidance in grey area operations12 than the traditional trinity, and avoid a repetition of what Annan termed the neutrality in the face of evil13 widely practised in the 1990s. Annans shift would suggest that the UN as a whole agrees. This in turn would make the organization far better geared to undertaking grey area operations. But this article reveals that the shift is not nearly as comprehensive as at first appears. It shows that impartialitys links with neutrality remain; that confusion about the meanings of the terms persists; and that this in turn will undermine the UNs attempts to adapt to the new environment. Annan, .rchette and Miyet: Muddy Resolution Annan first indicated a rethink in May 1998, during a visit (appositely enough) to Rwanda with the statement: In the face of genocide, there can be no standing aside, no looking away, no neutrality there are perpetrators and there are victims; there is evil and there is evils harvest.14 He built on this notion of a separation between neutrality and impartiality, with neutrality as the more passive, before a NATO audience a month later. The United Nations had learned that while impartiality is a vital condition for peacekeeping, it must be

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 24

24

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

impartiality in the execution of the mandate not just an unthinking neutrality between warring parties.15 He pursued this theme at the Council on .oreign Relations in the United States in January 1999: Impartiality does not and must not mean neutrality in the face of evil. It means strict and unbiased adherence to the principles of the Charter nothing more, nothing less.16 But this sense of a break with the past was undermined in the following month. On 22 January he appeared to be moving away from this new spin on impartiality when he told the National University of Ireland that the UN had learned the hard way that there are limits to what lightly armed, impartial peacekeepers can achieve when there is no clear consent to their presence from the parties.17 He reinforced this traditional, impartiality-as-its-perception perspective on 23 .ebruary, using a survey of the UN and regional peacekeeping to tell Georgetown University that the experience of decades has shown that peacekeeping is often best done by people from outside the region, who are more easily accepted as truly detached and impartial.18 Although neither of the later speeches directly contradicted his earlier statements, it is clear that there is some tension between them. Of course, it is possible that Annan was tailoring his use of the term to his audience, using it synonymously for neutrality when addressing those still partly wedded to the trinity and synonymously for robust independence before those readier to support forcefulness.19 Yet it also appears that he is genuinely confused about the two principles. .or instance, the conclusion to his report on the fall of Srebrenica is an impassioned mea culpa (personal and institutional) for the flawed responses to Serb aggression which ensured the fall of the safe area and the murder of its menfolk. Part of the blame for that inactivity is ascribed to an institutional ideology of impartiality even when confronted with attempted genocide. 20 This notion that impartiality is its perception and thus an impartial actor must somehow be equidistant between the parties applies to every mention of the concept in the report.21 If wrong, this is at least consistent. Yet impartiality in the face of genocide suggests an absence of the moral judgement, and activity, without which no agent can be impartial; UNPRO.OR was surely neutral in the face of genocide. Confusion is also suggested by two other issues. .irst, Annan argues that errors of judgement were made errors rooted in a philosophy of impartiality and non-violence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia.22 Although non-violence might have been ill-suited to an intervention in Bosnia, impartiality was not; and given that an impartial actor must be ready to use force to ensure its independence, it is doubtful whether it can be

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 25

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G
23

25

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

non-violent. It is hard to avoid the idea that Annan ought to have written neutral for impartial. Second, this is particularly striking given that neutral is not mentioned at all. If Annan were aware of the distinction between the two terms (as evidenced in his robust January speech), why did he not use the passive term to describe what amounts to neutrality in the face of evil? This is particularly pertinent given that in May 2000 he spoke of having to reconsider some of the most basic assumptions about neutrality, the good faith of the parties, and the non-use of force that were the basis of the successful operations of the cold war era24 a suggested reexamination of the traditional trinity that tellingly includes the passive principle. Annans robust January line was also maintained 18 months later by the Deputy Secretary-General, Louise .rchette. Her argument that peacekeeping missions must have the ability to react if parties start to renege on their agreements and to test the resolve of the peacekeepers hinges in part on the statement that: [i]mpartiality is not the same as neutrality. Of course, United Nations forces must apply impartially the mandate given them by the Security Council. But that is not at all the same as being neutral between parties that obey that mandate and those that resist it, or between those who respect international humanitarian and human rights law, and those who grossly violate it.25 Yet despite the association of neutrality with passivity, and the abandonment of equidistance from the belligerents, .rchettes approach still appears to assume that impartiality and neutrality can occupy some common ground. And such progress as it represents was neatly undermined a few months later when Bernard Miyet, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, answered questions on peacekeeper misconduct in the UN Assistance MIssion in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) by stating that it was important that all participants in a mission cooperate in a neutral, impartial and honest manner.26 Miyet was still using the old understanding of the terms when his peers had dropped it. More to the point, he was applying it to a situation (the typical grey area environment of Sierra Leone) where a neutral force could not hope to maintain even the appearance of impartiality. Carlsson and Brahimi: Inconsistency and Confusion This sense of one conceptual step forward, one back, is reinforced in the other two pivotal documents the Carlsson and Brahimi reports driving the UNs reexamination of principles and their practical application. These highlight the neutralityimpartiality distinction or excoriate the inappropriate application of these principles,27 yet also

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 26

26

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

leave the impression of confusion. The Report of the Independent Inquiry on the Rwandan genocide (the Carlsson Commission) encouragingly states that the mandate and rules of engagement (RoE) of a peacekeeping force must make it clear that traditional neutrality cannot be applied amidst massive killings or genocide.28 Yet it also maintains that [i]n effect, there can be no neutrality in the face of genocide, no impartiality in the face of a campaign to exterminate part of a population.29 This presents several difficulties. .irst, it assumes that the two terms are interchangeable; second, that (as with Annans Srebrenica analysis) impartiality is its perception; third, that one cannot be impartial in this situation, when one can at least as regards the execution of ones mandate or other instructions. .inally, it appears to be advocating partiality in the face of genocide a principle fundamentally inappropriate to the kind of limited grey area force likely to be confronted with genocide or ethnic cleansing. Of course, this latter confusion is a function of the misunderstanding of the nature of impartiality; if impartiality is its perception and so a passive principle, what is one to call the principle for the conduct of a forceful intervention short of war? The Brahimi Report is also confusing, in large part for what it does not say. It emphasizes the traditional trinity: consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. It then summarizes how these are tested in the grey area with consent fluid, the belligerents uncontrollable and fragmenting, and the peacekeepers obstructed and emphasizes that in this position UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully, with RoE which allow them to protect themselves, other mission members, civilians whose security they guarantee, and the mandate, as well as allow them to retain the initiative. The Report says that: Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement.30 The distinction drawn between traditional and grey area operations (Impartiality for such operations) and the principles applicable ([s]uch impartiality) appears to suggest two kinds of impartiality: one perceived (for traditional operations) and one objective (for the grey area). If this is so, then the robust potential of genuine impartiality would be best protected by explicitly allocating neutrality (rather than its tacit counterpart, perceived impartiality) as the passive principle. Practising

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 27

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G

27

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

two different kinds of impartiality would surely be both confusing and difficult to explain to the belligerents. Taken as a whole, these three reports show a degree of inconsistency. Whereas the Brahimi Report seems to conceive of two different forms of impartiality, one good and one bad, the Carlsson and Srebrenica studies (and Miyets answer) see impartiality only as neutralitys passive stablemate. These in turn contrast with the (implied) robust Annan/.rchette position, that impartiality is separate from neutrality and that the mandate or Charter principles must be applied impartially in a grey area environment, and the weaker Annan line emphasizing that impartiality is its perception. The end product is the sense that, as in Hammarskjlds day,31 the UN is at worst confused about the two principles, at best applying inconsistent interpretations. There is, however, one conceptual element common to all three reports and to all of the above statements.32 Neutrality is only mentioned in opprobrious or historical terms. Although the concept of neutrality still surfaces not least in the survival of perceived impartiality the contemporary applicability of the term has disappeared. It is a word whose usefulness, at least at the highest levels of the Secretariat, has passed. The Security Council and the General Assembly: Inconsistency vs. Obsolescence The picture drawn from an analysis of the UNs political pronouncements (those emanating from member states diplomats in the Council and Assembly) appears at first glance to show consistency. .or instance, General Assembly and Security Council documents (statements, resolutions and reports) addressing justice matters international tribunals and blue helmet policing almost exclusively use only the derivatives of impartial.33 Documents addressing the role of UN officials specify their neutrality and impartiality,34 while those touching on aid and humanitarian relief issues also use neutral and impartial, often with the adjective humanitarian.35 UN dissemination of information in the field is characterized by the term impartial alone,36 as are matters relating to referendums and elections37 and the implementation of sanctions.38 These references are of course not exclusive many documents touching on these issues make no mention of these principles at all. But the fact that certain permutations of the principles are consistently applied in certain contexts suggests a strong common understanding among delegations in New York. This is not so surprising. Though often erroneous, none of these usages is

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 28

28

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

particularly controversial, given that they reflect either long-standing notions (on the impartiality of justice and law enforcement, humanitarian neutrality and impartiality, and the need for UN officials to be the neutral independent instruments of the organization), or the unobjectionable (elections), or areas of activity where neutrality could play no part (sanctions). It is in those documents reflecting the much murkier world of political and military intervention that confusion and/or wrongheadedness are revealed. Rather than readdress impartiality in the light of peacekeepings grey area difficulties, or even define it, the tendency to mention the term without defining it remains maddeningly widespread.39 The Security Council initially appeared to reinforce the neutral/impartial combination but with a novel, confusing variation. The first joint mention of neutrality and impartiality in a Security Council Resolution was Res. 929 of 22 June 1994, authorizing the .rench Operation Turquoise intervention in Rwanda under Chapter VII. In its preamble, Resolution 929 stress[ed] the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion and shall not constitute an interposition force between the parties. Later it stated that the force was aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons.40 This was also the first resolution to assume that a neutral force could operate under a Chapter VII mandate. Three years later Resolution 1101 of 28 March 1997, followed Resolution 929s precedent by authorizing a neutral and impartial peacekeeping force (the Italian-led multinational operation in Albania, Operation Alba). It, too, suggested that a neutral force could operate under Chapter VII.41 It might be thought that the mention of both principles at last reflected a sense in the Security Council that neutrality and impartiality were separate concepts. But the inclusion of the Chapter VII references shows that this is not the case. In reality, both resolutions were drawn up in haste, in the face of considerable Security Council suspicion, to authorize actions that the .rench and Italian governments had already indicated they would take regardless. .rance had been so closely associated with the Hutu majority regime in Kigali and had in fact directed operations against its Rwandese Patriotic Army opponents42 that several members of the Security Council had severe doubts about the operations avowed humanitarian intent.43 At the same time the international communitys conspicuous failure to find the troops authorized for UNAMIR II meant that the Security Council was in no position to refuse even a tainted offer of assistance to protect the targets of the genocide. The two terms were included to assuage these

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 29

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G

29

concerns. Even so, five of the 15 members abstained from the vote.44 As for Resolution 1101, it escaped close scrutiny because, although none of the Permanent 5 was convinced of the need for a force in Albania, neither did they think such a force would come to any harm. Neutral and impartial was included as a last-minute sop to China. Regarding the combination of neutrality and Chapter VII, in both cases the press of time, and in the case of 1101 the feeling that Alba was irrelevant, combined to ensure that their obvious incompatibility was not addressed.45 If these had remained one-off emergency inclusions to smooth over particularly troubled political waters they could be easily dismissed. But a string of 199798 resolutions relating to the comparatively uncontentious operations in the Central African Republic repeated the peculiar combination of neutral and impartial and Chapter VII.46 Neutrality is incompatible with true impartiality; it is doubly incompatible with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. More recently, a resolution authorizing the consensual West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force for Guinea Bissau has repeated the neutral and impartial combination, without the Chapter VII linkage though one paragraph seems to provide justification for a very robust approach to the use of force.47 The fact that the two terms have only been applied to UNauthorized forces rather than blue helmet operations suggests that the Security Council at least believes the latter do not need the respectability bestowed by their use.48 Implicitly, therefore, all UN operations are neutral and impartial. It is possible that this linkage is a form of words chosen to accommodate some member states unease about intervention by regional actors who might be assumed to have some interest in a conflicts outcome. In the draughtsmens eyes, it would therefore be unimportant simply another reflection of the ageold diplomatic practice of pronouncing with no intention of execution. But the disaster of Bosnias Safe Areas highlighted the consequences of the Security Council following this practice. Strenuous efforts have been made ever since to avoid repetition. .urthermore, it is hard to see how the avoidance-of-single-state-dominance argument could apply to the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Agreements in Central African Republic (MISAB) or ECOMOGGuinea Bissau.49 This linkage would therefore represent a regression to the bad old days of the mid-1990s. More recently the Security Council seems to have shown the consistency of omission. It is interesting to note that the last mention of the linkage in a Security Council resolution on the conduct of

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 30

30

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

peacekeeping force was in December 1998 a month before Annans robust reassessment of neutrality and impartiality at the Council of .oreign Relations. The idea of solely impartial peacekeeping has however surfaced occasionally since then.50 .or instance, the speakers in the Councils discussions on the Secretary-Generals Report on the role of UN peacekeeping in 2000 followed his lead by referring to impartiality alone, only one mentioning neutrality at all.51 This followed an earlier intriguing use of the term, in Resolution 998 of 1995, which stated that despite the creation of a rapid reaction force in UNPRO.OR the status of UNPRO.OR and its impartiality will be maintained.52 This might suggest an awareness that impartiality better described the forces increasing military power than the passive neutrality an awareness reflected in the Security Councils discussions five years later. On the other hand, the mentions of the concept are so rare that it may be rash to draw conclusions. Whether the occasional mentions are significant or not, the omission of the neutrality impartiality combination which emerged in the mid-1990s certainly represents progress. At the same time it is striking to note that neutrality has disappeared from the vocabulary of peacekeeping in both the Security Council and the General Assembly. It does surface by implication as impartialitys passive, opprobrious twin, as in Danish Defence Minister Hans Haekkerups pronouncement before the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that impartiality for a peacekeeping force did not mean being passive. It meant to be fair and robust.53 This, coupled with the mentions of impartiality above, would suggest an awareness of the distinctions between terms and that only a more forceful concept impartiality fitted the new environment. But as with the shift identified in the highest echelons of the Secretariat, it appears that it is only the term which has become obsolete. The notion survives. Worryingly, it appears to survive in the use of impartiality alone. Evidently, Haekkerups excellent distinction between the active and the passive is highly unusual. The General Assemblys Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has long used impartiality alone as the neutrality/impartiality element of the traditional trinity. Yet despite or perhaps because of the debates of the last decade, it persists in using impartiality in its unchanged trinitarian sense. Time and again, representatives, the Committee as a whole, and the wider General Assembly of which it is a part, stress that: peacekeeping operations should be implemented in strict compliance with Charter principles, including consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality and minimal use of force, and that they should only be undertaken with

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 31

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G
54

31

proper authorization of the Security Council. This is in part a reflection of the position of the General Assembly and particularly the Special Committee as stalwarts of the traditional worldview. Recent attempts to adapt the UN to peacekeepings changed environment have found considerable opposition in both groupings.55 Yet the result is that a substantial proportion of troop contributing countries still assert the supremacy of the traditional trinity; only they insist on camouflaging their espousal of neutrality with impartiality.56 When taken with the movement within the Security Council and the higher echelons of the Secretariat, this position is at best confusing. At worst, it suggests an appalling lack of grip of peacekeepings conceptual underpinnings a lack made more worrying by the fact that it follows nearly a decade of intellectual revision. The impartiality/neutrality double act survives.
Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

Desk Officers: Abandoning Neutrality One more group of UN actors pivotal to the conduct of peacekeeping operations has yet to be examined. Desk officers in peacekeeping operations are responsible for making day-to-day decisions referred to UN headquarters, ensuring the continuity between mandate and implementation in the field, briefing senior Secretariat and Permanent mission staff alike, and writing the reports presented to the Security Council. Their recommendations are therefore pivotal at every level, in and out of theatre. A group of desk officers was questioned about neutrality and impartiality, mostly in May 2001.57 They were in post for operations undertaken since Annans January 1999 assertion of the difference between neutrality and impartiality and so likely in some degree either to reflect any shift in the organizations thinking or, in the case of senior staff, to be responsible for driving that shift. All interviewees agreed that the terms were vitally important. All agreed that they used one or both in their everyday work, though the principles tended to inform their decisions as part of their subconscious conceptual framework rather than as an explicit presence. All, either initially or after discussion, saw impartiality as more active and judgemental than neutrality. 58 Thus all appear to some degree to have absorbed the ideas outlined in the introduction to this article. This common understanding suggests that some attempts have been made to have those involved in the day-to-day administration of peacekeeping operations thinking along the same lines. Yet anomalies persist. This may reflect too little airing of principles, so leaving differences dormant. According to G, neutrality and impartiality are so much an expected part of our value system that we dont even

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 32

32
59

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

consciously think of them, while K felt that they are never discussed because there are lots of things no-one wants to say openly.60 It is noteworthy that the interviewees who had the closest answers, and who showed no hesitation and the least confusion when outlining concepts, were those involved in driving the conceptual reassessment and so most likely to discuss terms.61 Certainly, all of the others changed their definitions and assessments to some degree as the interviews progressed. But both the nature and existence of these anomalies may well be a product of the reappreciation process itself. The need for change has been identified, but as will be seen, the change chosen is hampered by association with the past so in part accounting for officials enduring confusion. This is highlighted by the fact that the two interviewees most identified with driving the UNs conceptual reappraisal also showed the closest identification with the cold war past. Senior Political Officer L, with 17 years peacekeeping policy experience, maintained that if we became neutral we wouldnt be doing our job and had never included neutrality in his peacekeeping vocabulary. Yet he also held that impartiality has been a constant guiding principle of peacekeeping and that the old BZ peacekeepers understood better than anyone the difference between impartiality and neutrality, as they had practised the former at considerable political risk.62 But I would argue that neutrality, not impartiality, has been the guiding principle, and that traditional peacekeepers practised neutrality alone. And Senior Political Officer N who again had no place for neutrality in his vocabulary believed that even though in the past the UN used both terms the organization was trying to say the same thing; it dropped neutrality because the meaning [that is, others understanding of it] changed. Yet he also maintained that impartiality is a militarydriven concept which cannot conform with other old tenets such as transparency and absolute consent.63 This hardly conforms with his assertion that the two principles are in effect the same. Interestingly, it is clear that the Secretariat has decided to remove neutrality from the current conceptual menu. As N put it: In the old days neutrality was a good thing: Switzerland, clean air, good cheese, grass. After the Safe Havens, neutrality is a four-letter word I do not recognize the word neutrality, and everyone else will say the same; it is not in our vocabulary.64 Neutrality was Senior Political Officer Bs bad principle.65 Instead, [i]mpartiality is what the UN is supposed to be doing.66 This is partly because the UN now finds itself engaged primarily in civil wars, where one cannot close ones eyes in the face of human

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 33

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G
67

33

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

rights abuses (and thus be neutral); neutrality is only applicable in interstate conflicts.68 As a desk officer for the grey area UNAMSIL operation pointed out, peacekeepers are now under pressure to take the side of the population and act against whoever abuses them, even if the abuse is mutual which is utterly inconsistent with neutrality.69 Impartiality also seems better suited to an environment where political pressure to translate the moral responsibility of the Secretary-General and his mediators into action in the field (incompatible with neutrality) is increasing, in part reflecting the growing influence of NGOs.70 Yet the shift towards impartiality also conceals a contradictory belief that impartiality is the same principle that has always been applied. Most of the interviewees made observations which emphasized the link with the traditional past and minimized the scope of the conceptual shift. People use impartiality as the positive side of neutrality; We impartially apply the mandate of the Security Council and I have never seen a mandate that is neutral; Impartiality is the driving principle as is consent of the parties.71 This is partly explicable by Ls interesting assertion that traditional impartiality and neutrality were much more murky, nuanced entities than the debate of the 1990s suggested: when the world changed [post-cold war] the requirements and fate of peacekeepers changed, and in making adjustments we created an idealized past.72 In effect, the problem lies in the traditional principles elevation to the trinity, not in the principles themselves. This belief in continuity endures even though all of the interviewees acknowledged that there were considerable differences between the two terms, and that the distinctions drawn were useful.73 It may well be that this common understanding is to some degree a modish shield for old thinking: people seem to prefer impartiality nowadays.74 It does at least appear that pivotal officials are unwilling to lose the neutralityimpartiality link. Conclusion Thus the UNs conceptual reappreciation seems to have crystallized two potentially damaging trends of thought. .irst, neutrality has been removed from a menu in which it still has a place, even if only in the increasingly rare traditional buffer zone operation (such as the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea). Impartiality alone will serve as

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 34

34

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

peacekeepings guiding principle. But this monotheism means that a rugged principle will be applied in Chapter VI operations and thus be tainted by association with the latters passive requirements. It will also prove confusing for peacekeepers and belligerents alike; only separation can provide clarity. Neutralitys vilification will also hamper acknowledgement of the need for a passive principle once the confusions of this reappreciation become evident. Second, the laudable growth in understanding of the two terms and the differences between them has been undermined by the minimization of the operational break with the traditional past and the continued (and contradictory) belief that the two terms are not so different after all. It is difficult to assess whether the abandonment of neutrality has been driven by the Secretary-General, national delegations, influential members of the Secretariat, or the wider debate among academics, doctrine writers and practitioners. It is entirely possible that all have struggled forward together, mutually aware of the unacceptability of the kind of passivity manifested at Srebrenica and in Rwanda. This would certainly account for much of the incoherence highlighted above. But the most significant aspect of this shift is that the past is still with us. Neutrality may have become a four-letter word, but its continued linkage with impartiality means that the spectre of its application in unsuitable environments has yet to be dispelled. And while it is difficult to draw a constant from the UNs institutional and political reappraisal of principles, one thing is clear: neutrality is out of favour. Yet nothing has taken its passive place. Impartiality has become the principle of choice, without its traditional trinitarian link being broken. Consequently despite conceptual progress, confusion endures.
NOTES 1. Dominick Donald, The Doctrine Gap: The Enduring Problem of Contemporary Peace Support Operations Thinking, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.22, No.3, Dec. 2001, pp.10615. 2. Wider Peacekeeping was the most influential of the peacekeeping doctrines drafted in 199295 to reflect the much more complex operational environment of post-cold war peace operations. Broadly, it argued that peacekeepers could jeopardize tactical-level consent with the use of force so long as they retained operational-level consent; loss of operational-level consent would launch the peacekeepers across an escalatory Rubicon from which there could be no return. See Charles Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, Survival, Vol.36, No.3, Autumn 1994. In so far as the UN Secretariat ever expressed a common doctrine for the Bosnian military operation, this [Wider Peacekeeping] was it [T]he UNs civilian and military command more or less came to reflect Britains concept of Wider Peacekeeping. John Ruggie, The UN and the Collective Use of .orce, in Michael Pugh (ed.), The UN, Peace and .orce, London: .rank Cass, 1997, p.10. Though events over the summer of 1995 in Bosnia discredited Wider

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 35

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G

35

Peacekeeping, its influence remained strong. 3. .or instance, the need to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief had led to a new kind of UN operation, where the .orce had Chapter VII authorization yet was without a mandate to stop aggression or hostilities. Confusingly, the .orce remained neutral and impartial between the belligerents. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, UN Dept. of Public Information, New York, 1995, p.10. 4. Peacekeeping was the deployment of a United Nations force in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, UN Dept of Public Information, New York, 1992, p.45 [my italics]. Though the tenor of the whole definition is rather tentative as if it is leaving the door open for change, rather than actively proposing it the inclusion of the word hitherto was widely seen as suggesting that the consent of the parties to the conflict should no longer be assiduously sought. 5. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998) The .all of Srebrenica, UN Doc. A/54/549, 15 Nov. 1999; Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 15 Dec. 1999, attached to UN Doc. S/1999/1257; Report of the Panel on Peace Operations [Brahimi Report] A/55/305 S/2000/809 21 Aug. 2000, accessed at www.un.org/peace/ reports/peaceoperations/docs/part2.htm. 6. Senior Political Officer G, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, interviewed May 2001. 7. .or instance, in the United States 22 April 1793 Declaration of Neutrality and the 1907 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Article 9. 8. The first explicit mention of impartiality in a peacekeeping context is in Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 1123 (XI), 24 January 1957 pt 2A, para.5b, UN Doc. A/3512, on UNE.. However, both terms featured largely in the discussions between Nasser and Hammarskjld which led to the setting up of the force. But the definition Hammarskjld used for impartiality in this report (the force does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues regarded as controversial) was considerably weaker than that advanced three months before (the discretion and impartiality thus imposed on the SecretaryGeneral may not degenerate into a policy of expediency. He must also be a servant of the principles of the Charter, and its aims must ultimately determine what for him is right or wrong. .or this he must stand). In fact he was confused about the differences between the two terms, often swapping their meanings. .or this, and an explanation of how the two terms came later to be seen as interchangeable, see Dominick Donald, Neutral not Impartial: Impartiality in Peace Support Operations Thinking; Traditional Impartialitys Passive Legacy, Armed .orces & Society (forthcoming, 2002) 9. Synonyms are such words as may be defined wholly, or almost wholly, in the same terms. Merriam-Websters Dictionary of Synonyms, Springfield, MA, 1984, p.25a. While disinterested and indifferent are synonymous with neutral and analogous with impartial, impartial and neutral are not themselves synonymous. See ibid., pp.561, 418. 10. See Donald (n.8 above). 11. See, for instance, Adam Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, Survival, Vol.36, No.3, Autumn 1994, p.115, and .rom San .rancisco to Sarajevo, Survival, Vol.37, No.4, Winter 199596, p.23; Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, The .uture of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success, Armed .orces & Society, Vol.23, No.3, Spring 1997; Mark Thompson, Endless Appeasement, Survival, Vol.42, No.1, Spring 2000, p.168; .rench Ministry of Defence, Principles for the Employment of the Armed .orces Under UN Auspices, paper presented at UNIDIR conference on Differing National Perspectives on UN Peace Operations, Geneva, March 1995, sect. 3.2; Letter dated 18 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of .rance to the United

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 36

36

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/50/869 & S/1996/71, 26 .eb. 1996, p.3; UK Doctrine for Peace Support Operations Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, 1999, pp.45, para.414. Grey Area operations are those between traditional UNE.-style buffer zone peacekeeping, and Desert Storm war against Iraq. Most peace operations (including those with electoral/nation-building responsibilities, support to a government, implementation of a peace process, creating secure environments for the delivery of humanitarian relief) now fall into this category. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Reflects on Promise, Realities of his Role in World Affairs, address to the Council on .oreign Relations, 19 Jan. 1999, UN press release SG/SM/6865, p.4, accessed at www0.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990119.sgsm6865.html. UN press release, SG/SM/6552 A.R 56, 6 May 1998. UN press release, SG/SM/6598, 15 June 1998. Annan (n.13 above). Annan, Speech at the National University of Ireland, 22 Jan. 1999, UN press release, SG/SM/6870. Annan echoed this in an address to ministers from countries providing the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in March 2000: We have come to recognize, as never before, the reality of evil; the limits to impartiality; and the impossible demands made upon a peacekeeping force when there is no peace to keep. UN Doc. SG/SM/7339 PKO/87, 27 March 2000. Annan, Speech at Georgetown University, 23 .eb. 1999, UN press release, SG/SM/6901. The audience at the NUI would have been drawn heavily from the political and academic class of a country long a mainstay of traditional peacekeeping, yet willingly adjusting to the new environment. Georgetown is a fairly liberal institution strongly wedded to the principles and practices of traditional diplomacy. One might speculate that neither the Council on .oreign Relations (a pragmatic group of American practitioners and commentators), nor NATO, nor Rwandans would hold much truck with the reassertion of passivity. UN Doc. A/54/549, para.505. Thompson (n.11 above), p.168. UN Doc. A/54/549, para.499. Annans confusion over impartiality and the use of force was also evident in August 2000, when he told the Chiefs of Staff of countries contributing troops to UNAMSIL that the force was intended to be impartial in terms of its political position vis--vis the parties, but strong in its ability to deter attacks and to defend itself and its mandate should this become necessary. UN press release, SG/SM/7514 PKO/95, 23 Aug. 2000. Of course, this implies (unlike the Srebrenica report) that impartiality is consistent with the use of force. UN press release, SG/SM/7421, 25 May 2000. Louise .rchette, United Nations Peacekeeping A Changing Landscape, address to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the United Nations Association of Canada, Ottawa, 8 June 2000, UN press release, DSG/SM/96, 8 June 2000. Press Briefing by Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, 22 Sept. 2000. This is also true of the Organization of African Unitys (OAU) report on Rwanda which although conducted entirely outside the UN has had a considerable effect on the reexamination process. See Organization of African Unity, The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 7 July 2000, ch.15, para.19. Report of the Independent Inquiry (n.5 above), p.48. Ibid., p.45. Report of the Panel on Peace Operations (n.5 above), paras 4850 [my emphasis]. See further, Donald (n.8 above). This is also true of the OAUs Rwanda report (n.27 above). See, for example, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001120.greyarea9828.doc.html, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001019.greyarea13151.doc.html, press releases SC/6879 20 June 2000; G/L/3132, 11 Nov. 1999; SC/6916, 14 Aug. 2000 (on the Sierra

12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 37

N E U T RA L I T Y, I M PA RT I A L I T Y A N D U N P E AC E K E E P I N G

37

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51.

Leone Special Court); S/PRST/1998/20, 13 July 1998, on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The only exception I have found is one of the reports of the SecretaryGeneral on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which speaks of impartial and neutral justice. UN press release S/1998/862, 16 Sept. 1998. See www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/greyareaag3448.doc.htm. See, SC Res.1296, or UN press releases, SC/6371, 21 May 1997; SC/6803 9 .eb. 2000. These documents rarely include a reference to impartiality without an accompanying reference to neutrality or universality. See, e.g., the Secretary-Generals Report on Abkhazia, UN press release S/1999/60, 20 Jan. 1999, para.46; SC Res.1045, 8 .eb. 1996; UN press release S/1998/608, on Kosovo, para.14; press release SC/6689, 11 Jan. 1999. See, e.g., SC resolutions on MINURSO, such as Res.1204, 30 Oct. 1998. See, e.g., UN press releases SC/6846, 18 Apr. 2000, on sanctions in Angola, and S/PRST/2000/20, 2 June 2000, on the DRC. .or instance, at no point in the Srebrenica report does Annan define the term. SC Res. 929, preamble and para.2. The solo mention of impartiality here might be thought to indicate an awareness that it was included to differentiate an operational principle (impartiality) from a political one (neutrality), but this is contradicted by the mention of impartial and neutral in an operational context. It is not clear why it was included. The Security Council Authorizes the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to conduct the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2 above and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, further authorizes these Member States to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the said multinational protection force, UN Doc. S/RES/1101 (1997), 28 Mar. 1997, para.4. Though the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace had mentioned the neutral/impartialChapter VII combination, SC Res.1101 was the first document to apply it to a mission. See L.R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwandas Genocide, London: Zed Books, 2000. A new interim administration had been in place since mid-April, but despite the withdrawal of .rench military assistance the .rench government was very closely identified with it. Conversation with retired senior .rench Army officer, 30 May 2001; Interview with .irst Secretary, UK Mission to the UN, 28 June 1997; Melvern (n.42 above), pp.21011; Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, March 1999. Interview with .irst Secretary, UK Mission (n.44 above). The two terms were also included in the Security Councils renewing resolutions, in the Multinational Peacekeeping .orces (MNP.s) reports to the Council, and in the debate over the withdrawal of the force. See, e.g., UN press release, SC/6410 14 Aug. 1997. These are: SC Res.1125 (6 Aug. 1997); 1136 (6 Nov. 1997); 1155 (16 March 1998); 1159 (27 March 1998). The terms were also repeated in Council discussions about the force, e.g., UN press release SC/6407, 6 Aug. 1997. See SC Res. 1216 (21 Dec. 1998). Para.6 [a]ffirms that the ECOMOG interposition force may be required to take action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel in the discharge of its mandate. Both MNP. and MISAB were authorized under Chapter VIII of the Charter. SC Res.1159 set up the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), yet it only mentioned neutral and impartial in the context of MISAB, whose functions MINURCA assumed. No one country predominated in either force. .urthermore, MISAB had already been functioning effectively and impartially for several months before the first of its authorizing UN resolutions (1125, 6 Aug. 1997), Eric Berman and Katie Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa, UNIDIR: Geneva, 2000, pp.12838, 2227. The Security Council has of course used impartial in its discussions or resolutions on issues such as policing, sanctions and humanitarian relief detailed above. See UN press releases S/2000/101 for the Secretary-Generals Report and SC/6830 for the discussions.

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012

94ip02.qxd

05/12/02

08:40

Page 38

38

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E K E E P I N G

52. SC Res. 998 16 June 1995. 53. UN press release GA/SPD/143, 29 Oct. 1998. 54. UN press release GA/PK/160, 15 Mar. 1999. .or instance, the use of impartiality alone as an element of the traditional trinity can be seen in numerous UN press releases, such as GA/PK/141, 3 April 1996; GA/PK/155, 2 April 1998; GA/PK/164, 11 .eb. 2000; GA/PK/170, 18 June 2001 (all describing either statements by representatives or the Committee as a whole); and UN press releases, GA/SPD/167, 21 Oct. 1999; GA/SPD/179, 22 May 2000; G/SPD/208, 3 Aug. 2001 (for the .ourth Committee of the GA). 55. The Brahimi Report in particular received a frosty reception in the Special Committee. One senior DPKO official characterized the wider contribution of the Special Committee as a pothole in the road. You want anything done, you go around it; conversation with senior political officer, DPKO, 30 April 2001. 56. See, e.g., the statement of the Permanent Representative of Jordan, UN press release GA/PK/170, 18 June 2001. 57. The missions launched since January 1999 are UNMIK, UNTAET, UNAMSIL, MONUC and UNMEE. Officials interviewed included senior and junior desk officers in the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations and senior doctrine and concepts staff in DPKO and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. 58. .or instance, according to Political Officer D neutrality is disengagement while impartiality involves applying the same standards equally and acting or speaking out against violations of agreements. Senior Political Officer K used an operational analogy to draw the distinction: when UNPREDEP personnel saw two men crossing into Macedonia from Albania with mules and two green boxes [cases of weapons or munitions] but made no comment, they were being neutral; whereas British K.OR peacekeepers, who would do everything to complete their mission and shoot anyone who did anything stupid, were impartial. 59. Senior Political Officer G [my emphasis]. 60. Senior Political Officer K, who also observed that when planning an operation, everyone understands that youre supposed to be impartial, but no-one will engage in theoretical discussion. Often its a matter of whos running the mission whether its neutral, impartial or partial. 61. Namely, Senior Political Officers L and N. 62. Senior Political Officer L. 63. Senior Political Officer N. 64. Senior Political Officer N. 65. See n.58 above. 66. Political Officer D. 67. Impartiality means you dont close your eyes when any or all parties commit atrocities; you cannot remain neutral in the sense of not reacting its not our mandate, close our eyes, Senior Political Officers N and E. 68. Political Officer J. 69. Ibid. Although J also appeared to believe that peacekeepers must be partial on behalf of the mandate: You can be impartial in regard to political objectives, but you cant be impartial in terms of the mandate. 70. Senior Political Officer G. 71. Senior Political Officers G, L and N. 72. Senior Political Officer L. 73. Typical of this was Senior Political Officer G, who felt that the distinctions drawn were very useful and timely, particularly in translating the moral responsibility of the SG and his mediators into action in the field, yet also believed that the two principles are all bunched into one in practice. We have a code of conduct which can be described by either word. This may reflect the fact that as a DPA official, G had little operational influence, given that DPA only provides political analysis before an operation is launched and after it withdraws. 74. Senior Political Officer G.

Downloaded by [University of Reading] at 10:31 24 May 2012