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Restarting The Flow: Restoring Iraqi Oil Production: Ariel Cohen, PH.D

This document discusses restoring Iraqi oil production to benefit both Iraqis and global consumers. It outlines several recommendations to increase security and repair infrastructure to boost oil supply, including: conducting security assessments; increasing guards; hiring international security firms; public relations campaigns; and infrastructure upgrades. Attacks by insurgents aiming to disrupt the economy and population recovery have been a major impediment. Restarting full oil production could reduce US aid spending and support Iraqi reconstruction.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
129 views7 pages

Restarting The Flow: Restoring Iraqi Oil Production: Ariel Cohen, PH.D

This document discusses restoring Iraqi oil production to benefit both Iraqis and global consumers. It outlines several recommendations to increase security and repair infrastructure to boost oil supply, including: conducting security assessments; increasing guards; hiring international security firms; public relations campaigns; and infrastructure upgrades. Attacks by insurgents aiming to disrupt the economy and population recovery have been a major impediment. Restarting full oil production could reduce US aid spending and support Iraqi reconstruction.

Uploaded by

melekgoz
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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You are on page 1/ 7

No.

1693
October 1, 2003

Restarting the Flow: Restoring Iraqi Oil Production


Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.

The Iraqi people desperately need to have their oil


flowing again to the global market. Restarting the
flow of Iraqi oil would be a win-win proposition, as To restore the oil supply to the global
market and the cash flow to the Iraqi peo-
not only the Iraqis, but also consumers around the ple, the Bush Administration and Iraqi offi-
world would benefit from bringing the Iraqi oil sup- cials should:
ply back on line.
• Conduct an assessment of security
The main impediment to increasing Iraqi oil pro- needs to protect the infrastructure.
duction at this point is lack of security—terrorist sab- • Increase the number of infrastructure
otage and looting. The recent attacks on pipelines and security guards, using coalition forces
power stations are disrupting the flow of Iraqi oil and and Iraqi security forces.
are clearly aimed at further impoverishing the Iraqis • Hire an international security company
and even further disrupting their lives. to administer pipeline security and pro-
vide training to Iraqi security forces.
Since the end of major hostilities, saboteurs have
bombed Iraqi pipelines more than eight times, caus- • Develop and conduct a public informa-
ing $7 million per day in lost revenue.1 The culprits, tion campaign explaining the impor-
tance of pipeline security and the
including the remnants of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath resultant oil revenue to the Iraqis.
party and Islamic radicals, are following the old
• Design a technical package to enhance
Leninist adage, “the worse, the better.” They are bet- infrastructure security, using satellite
ting on an upsurge in resistance to the U.S. presence imaging, unmanned aerial vehicles/
in Iraq if they can severely disrupt the country’s gaso- drones, video cameras, and sensors.
line, electricity, and cooking gas supply. Saddam loy- • Provide funding to repair the oil infra-
alists, local Islamist militants, and foreign jihadis who structure.
come to Iraq to fight the “infidels” believe that by • Intensify the purge of former Ba’ath
officials from the oil ministry and the oil
1. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq: Pipeline Fire Cost- industry.
ing $7 Million a Day,” August 18, 2003, at www.rferl.org/
nca/features/2003/08/18082003075830.asp. See also Walter
Rodgers, Nic Robertson, and Jason Bellini, “3 U.S. soldiers
This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
killed in ambush near Tikrit,” CNN.com, September 18, www.heritage.org/research/middleeast/bg1693.cfm
2003, at www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/09/18/
Produced by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
sprj.irq.main. The most recent explosions occurred on Sep- for International Studies
tember 8 and 18. Published by The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., NE
Washington, DC 20002–4999
(202) 546-4400 heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting
the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or
hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
No. 1693 October 1, 2003

escalating Iraq’s suffering they can drive the Ameri- away from the pipelines.4 However, in at least one
cans back across the ocean. case, Sheikh Hatem Al Obeidi, an influential tribal
It is also true that the lack of security, the scarcity leader who was on the government payroll to pre-
of gasoline and other fuels, and the intermittent sup- vent attacks, instead abetted sabotage and was
ply of electricity are impeding the post-war recon- arrested by U.S. troops.5 Without security, neither
struction. Today, Iraq is producing less than half as the U.S. nor the Iraqis can repair the damage caused
much oil as it pumped before the war. to Iraq’s oil industry by the war or rehabilitate Iraq’s
infrastructure, which had fallen into a state of grave
Saving Iraqi Oil Production disrepair under Saddam.6
The attacks on the oil infrastructure are part of a Meanwhile, the continued attacks are hurting
premeditated campaign by the remnants of Sad- both the Iraqi and Western economies. The West is
dam’s regime and radical Islamist mujahideen organi- still suffering from relatively high oil prices, as the
zations to stop the flow of Iraqi oil, harm the people economic recovery remains tenuous, and the Orga-
of Iraq, and disrupt global oil markets. A secret nization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has cut
memo dated January 23, 2003, reportedly issued by production by 900,000 barrels a day.7 As a result of
Saddam’s security services, found in Iraq after the the drop in Iraqi oil production and the Iraqi fiscal
war, and published in the London-based Saudi daily shortfall, U.S. taxpayers will need to subsidize 50
Al-Hayat, directs pro-regime elements to destroy percent of the $6 billion Iraqi budget for fiscal year
power generating stations and the water supply.2 It (FY) 2004.
is likely that Saddam supporters and other terrorists On September 7, President Bush announced that
are applying the same tactics to the oil industry. he would request $87 billion for assistance to Iraq
Iraq is pumping 900,000 barrels per day—con- and Afghanistan for FY 2004, with the lion’s share
siderably less than the pre-war production level of going to Iraq.8 A boost in oil production would rem-
2.2 million–2.4 million barrels per day. The target of edy the Iraqi economic crisis, give the Iraqi people
achieving pre-war production by the end of 2003 is hope, and decrease levels of needed U.S. assistance
in jeopardy, with further increases also in question. funding.
While Halliburton subsidiary Kellog, Brown and Sabotage and Looting. The key impediments to
Root (KBR) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reconstructing the Iraqi oil industry and raising its
are rehabilitating the Iraqi oil infrastructure, their oil revenues are attacks on the 4,350-mile-long
mandate does not include providing pipeline secu- pipeline system and the 11,184-mile-long electric
rity.3 grid.9 The northern pipeline, which runs from
The Iraqi oil ministry has begun paying tribal Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, was attacked
leaders in the south to keep saboteurs and thieves twice in June,10 twice in August, and twice again in

2. This document was translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute in its Special Dispatch Series No. 538, July 17,
2003. Available at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP53803
3. Energy Intelligence Group, “Oil Flows at Kirkuk as KBR Begins Damage Assessment,” Eye on Iraq, May 1, 2003, at www.energy-
intel.com/EyeOnIraq.asp (subscription required).
4. Bassem Mroue, “Oil Ministry and U.S. Troops Take Measures to Protect Iraq’s Main Pipeline from Thieves and Saboteurs,” Asso-
ciated Press, July 4, 2003, at www.enn.com/news/2003-07-04/s_6207.asp.
5. “Iraq Tribal Sheikh Arrested Over Oil Blasts,” Agence France–Presse, August 31, 2003, at www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/cs/Qiraq-oil-
blast-sheikh.RMbd_DaU.html.
6. Energy Intelligence Group, “Oil Flows at Kirkuk as KBR Begins Damage Assessment.” War damage included the bombing of
the K3 pumping station at Haditha and a number of pipelines that crossed the Tigris around Tikrit.
7. John W. Schoen, “OPEC Cuts May Crimp Economy,” MSNBC, September 24, 2003, at www.msnbc.com/news/
971120.asp?0sl=-23.
8. George W. Bush, “President Addresses the Nation,” September 7, 2003, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/
20030907-1.html.

page 2
No. 1693 October 1, 2003

September. After an attack on August 16, the pipe- • Radical Sunni groups, such as the predomi-
line burned for more than 48 hours. The pipeline nantly Kurdish Ansar al-Islam; Vanguard of
from the giant Rumeila field in the south has also Muhammad’s Army; and others whom Presi-
been bombed twice. dent Bush has characterized as “Al-Qaeda type
Security analysts divide these attacks into two fighters” and who are part of the international
distinct categories. The first is looting and plunder jihad movement.13 In his September 7 address
of the oil infrastructure, including fields, pumping to the nation, President Bush called Iraq “the
stations, pipelines, and refineries. Organized crime central front of the war against terrorism.”14
is also raising its head, as demonstrated by the Anti-Western fighters are crossing into Iraq
recent interception of a barge with 1,000 tons of from Syria and the adjacent Gulf states, includ-
stolen Iraqi oil.11 Smugglers usually ship oil to Iran, ing Saudi Arabia.15 Funding for their move-
which reflags and re-exports it. ments comes from rich individuals and
foundations in these same Gulf states and from
A much more serious threat, however, comes the global radical Islamic community.
from groups opposing the U.S. and coalition pres-
ence, U.N. involvement, and the elements of Iraqi • Extremist Shi’a groups, affiliated with Mullah
society participating in the Governing Council. Muqtada Sadr, suspected of attacks on leading
Shi’a clerics.16 As the result of the assassina-
Thus far, senior U.S. officials, the Coalition Pro- tions, a militia called the Badr Brigade—the
visional Authority (CPA), and the the U.S. military armed wing of the Supreme Council for the
have not publicly identified the main culprits in the Islamic Revolution in Iraq—was allowed to
pipeline attacks, which suggests that intelligence is operate after attempts to ban it by the coalition.
insufficient.12 The ferocious terrorist bombings Elements of the Lebanon-based Hizballah, an
against personnel and the infrastructure continue. organization on the U.S. terrorism list, and
The main threat comes from three types of other radical pro-Iranian groups and agents are
groups: also present in Iraq.
• Networks of the old regime operating under- Key Iraqi pipelines have been paralyzed repeat-
ground, such as Ba’ath party officials, Iraqi edly by terrorism. On August 13, the day Iraq
intelligence officers, and Fedayeen Saddam started pumping oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan,
militia. terrorists attacked the Northern Kirkuk–Ceyhan

9. Pamela Hess, “CPA Speeding Police Training in Iraq,” The Washington Times, September 2, 2003, at www.washtimes.com/
upi-breaking/20030902-012831-9370r.htm.
10. Lamia Radi, “Fires Blaze on Iraq Oil Pipeline After Twin Bomb Attacks: Residents,” Agence France–Presse, June 13, 2003, at
iafrica.com/news/worldnews/244870.htm.
11. Pacific Disaster Management Information Network, “Iraq Humanitarian Assistance Report,” August 11, 2003, p. 3, at
www.who.int/disasters/repo/10470.pdf.
12. Douglas Jehl and Dexter Filkins, “Rumsfeld Eager for More Iraqis to Keep Peace,” The New York Times, September 5, 2003, at
www.nytimes.com/2003/09/05/international/middleeast/05RUMS.html.
13. See also Genaro C. Armas, “Troops Called Not an Answer,” Associated Press, August 25, 2003.
14. George W. Bush, “President Addresses the Nation.”
15. Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and General John Abizaid, “DoD News Briefing,” August 21, 2003, at www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2003, /tr20030821-secdef0604.html. See also Stephen Schwartz, “Reading Najaf,” The Weekly Standard, September 3,
2003.
16. Aparisim Ghosh, “Terror at a Shrine,” Time, September 8, 2003, p. 30. See also Tarek Al-Issawi, “Previously Banned Militia
Patrols Iraqi Holy City, with Coalition’s Blessing,” Canadian Press, September 6, 2003, at www.canada.com/news/world/
story.asp?id=517B3E75-E27D-42A2-BD33-E47782C941A6. The Badr Brigade was previously disbanded by the coalition, but
after the murder of Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim and an earlier attack on his uncle, it is now being allowed to func-
tion again.

page 3
No. 1693 October 1, 2003

Map 1 B 1693

Major Oil Fields


44 46 48
Zakho (proven/probable reserves )
TURKEY (in billions of barrels)
Dahuk Map Legend - Iraq
Major road
Mosul Oil pipeline
Majnoon 20

To C
eyh
Political boundary
Erbil West Qurna 15

an
Authorized entry point
Sulaymaniyah for humanitarian
SYRIAN ARAB supplies
East Baghdad 11 +
REPUBLIC Kirkuk
Capital City
Bayji Governorates
Kirkuk 10 +
Government Capitals
Mondhariya Rumaila 10 +
Samarra
Al
Hadithah Nahr Umar 6+
Ba'quabah
Ar Ramadi ISLAMIC
Al Walid Baghdad Halfaya 5
Ar Rutbah REPUBLIC
Eu
ph
ra

OF IRAN
te
s

Tig
Trebil Karbala
ris Al Kut Bai Hassan 2
Al Hillah
JORDAN
Ad Diwaniyah Buzurgan 2
An Najaf 'Amarah

Khabbaz 2
Judayyidat 'Ar'ar As Swamawah
An
Nasiriyah
'Ar'ar Al Qurnah Nasiriya 2
Basrah
Khormala 2
Rumaila
SAUDI
ARABIA Umm Qasr Abu Ghirab 1.5

Source: Data from U.S. Energy


40 42 44 46 Information Agency as compiled in
Platts Global Energy, “Major Oil Fields,”
in “Country Profile: Iraq,” at
Source: Adapted from map published by United Nations, Office of the Iraq Programme www.platts.com/features/Iraq/oilfields.shtml
Oil-for-Food, September 30, 2003, at www.un.org/depts/oip/map.html. (September 30, 2003).

pipeline. The same pipeline was attacked again on The absence of hard currency reserves to repair and
August 30.17 The pipeline, with a throughput restart the oil industry is slowing production. How-
capacity of 1 million barrels of crude per day, was ever, no investment and expansion are possible
attacked four times between May and September.18 unless the physical security of the vast Iraqi oil infra-
Attacks occurred near the towns of Haditha and structure can be assured.
Hawja, which are close to the largest Iraqi oil refin- Pipeline Security: Planning and Execution. The
ery at Bayji. military component of seizing Iraq’s oil infrastruc-
Iraqi oil production is also suffering from years of ture during the war was brilliantly planned and exe-
centralized, state-run management of the oil sector, cuted. Unlike during the Gulf War, when Saddam
long-term lack of investment, and inadequate tech- succeeded in setting hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells
nical maintenance of the oil fields under Saddam. on fire, fewer than 10 wells were ignited in Iraq.

17. “Iraqi Oil Pipeline Ablaze,” News24, at www.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460_1409548,00.html, and “Iraq Council
Makes Security Demands,” MSNBC News, August 30, 2003, at www.msnbcnews.com/news/959639.asp?cp1=1.
18. “Iraqi Oil Pipeline Sabotaged,” Agence France–Press, August 13, 2003; see also Joseph Logan, “Bomb, Tech Problems Hit Iraq
Pipeline,” Reuters, August 16, 2003, and Celcan Hacaoglu and Bruce Stanley, “Iraq Resumes Pumping Oil from Northern Oil
Fields through Turkish Pipeline,” Canadian Press, August 13, 2003, at www.canada.com.

page 4
No. 1693 October 1, 2003

U.S. and British troops seized and secured the oil Faced with attacks on oil pipelines, the CPA is
fields, refineries, and pipeline infrastructure with working to expand the Iraqi force charged with
minimal casualties and material damage. The final infrastructure protection. During this past summer,
draft of an internal post-war report for the Joint it discussed the provision of training to this security
Chiefs of Staff gave high marks for pre-war gaming force with Kroll Associates and other private U.S.
and combined operations during the time of com- companies.24 With more international troops com-
bat. ing to Iraq, they can also assume responsibility for
However, the post-war planning received the guarding the pipelines and infrastructure and train-
lowest grade, with “capabilities that fell short of ing the Iraqi security forces, which will be tasked
expectations or needs, and need to be readdressed with protecting the pipelines in the future. As long
through new initiatives.”19 CPA Administrator Paul as security is not restored, however, the American
Bremer has admitted that the U.S. forces are taxpayer will pay for this security force.
“stretched thin.”20 Securing the oil infrastructure Criticism on the Hill and Beyond. Senators and
was an important part of post-war objectives, but Representatives, including prominent Republicans,
the plans for post-war occupation of Iraq were not as well as retired senior military officers have criti-
ready when the war started, and the Pentagon was cized the planning, numbers, and troop deploy-
forced to alter its original plan as the post-war vio- ments in Iraq. Senator Richard Lugar (R–IN),
lence escalated.21 Thus, it is not surprising that 80 chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
percent of the damage to Iraq’s oil infrastructure tee, stressed his criticism of the planning done for
occurred after the war ended.22 post-war deployment but called on his colleagues
Five months after the war, the U.S.-led coalition to “rejoice” that the plan has been corrected. Repre-
force in Iraq consists of 140,000 American troops sentative Curt Weldon (R–PA), vice chairman of the
and 20,000 international troops, including one House Armed Services Committee, expressed reser-
British division and one Polish-led division. They vations about the planning for the war last winter.25
are aided by over 54,000 Iraqi security personnel, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R–TX), Senator
including 37,000 police, 12,000 facility guards, John McCain (R–AZ), columnist George Will, and
and 5,000 border police and civil defense corps. Weekly Standard editor William Kristol—all outspo-
On September 4, in Baghdad, Secretary of ken proponents of Saddam’s removal—have criti-
Defense Donald Rumsfeld called for putting up to cized the Administration for post-war mishaps.26 It
75,000–100,000 former Iraqi officers and soldiers is less surprising that Democrats, including Sena-
back in uniform to protect their country and fight tors Joseph Biden (D–DE), ranking Democrat on
its enemies. He also criticized Saudi Arabia and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Jack
Syria for not doing enough to seal Iraq’s borders.23 Reed (D–RI), a West Point graduate who served
with the 82nd Airborne, are also criticizing the

19. Rowan Scarborough, “Joint Chiefs Report: U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning,” The Washington Times, September 3, 2003,
p. 1.
20. Armas, “Troops Called Not an Answer.”
21. Ibid.
22. Bruce Stanley, “Security the Top Priority for Iraqi Oil Industry As Looting Continues,” Oil and Gas Reporter, May 27, 2003, at
www.oilandgasreporter.com/stories/052703/ind_20030527006.shtml.
23. Douglas Jehl and Dexter Filkins, “Rumsfeld Eager for More Iraqis to Keep Peace,” The New York Times, September 5, 2003.
24. Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Considers Private Iraqi Force to Guard Sites,” The New York Times, July 18, 2003, at query.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.html?res=F30C17FC3B580C7B8DDDAE0894DB404482.
25. Amy Fagan and Rowan Scarborough, “Post-Saddam Planning Failures ‘Unforgivable,’ Democrats Say,” The Washington Times,
September 4, 2003, at washingtontimes.com/national/20030903-115853-1572r.htm.
26. Sig Chrstenson, “Some Republicans Doubt Progress on Iraq,” San Antonio Express–News, August 31, 2003, at
news.mysanantonio.com/story.cfm?xla=saen&xlb=180&xlc=1048090.

page 5
No. 1693 October 1, 2003

Administration for mistakes in post-war planning Providing Security for the


and deployment. Iraqi Oil Infrastructure
Among senior generals critical of the post-war Iraq’s oil reserves are the third largest in the world
performance in Iraq is General Anthony Zinni, the after Russia and Saudi Arabia. However, only 15 of
former head of the U.S. Central Command who has its 73 discovered giant and large fields have been
extensive experience in the Middle East and serves developed.32 Vast parts of the country remain unex-
as a consultant to the U.S. State Department.27 The plored.
most prominent proponent of a bigger Army and a According to current estimates, the investment
greater deployment in Iraq is General Eric Shinseki, needed to bring Iraqi production to about 3 million
the recently retired Army Chief of Staff, who called barrels a day will exceed $3 billion over the next two
for “several hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the to three years. Over the next 10 years, $35 billion–
ground” and warned against a “twelve division strat- $40 billion will be needed to boost production from
egy for the ten division army.”28 the current 1.2 million–1.4 million barrels per day
Even if the actual size of the U.S. Iraqi deploy- (MBD) to the pre-1979 production level of 5–6
ment is not increased, it has to be refocused on MBD.
intelligence and training of the Iraqi forces, while Before serious reconstruction work can begin,
the number of coalition troops from other countries however, the physical security of the infrastructure
must go up, according to General John Abizaid, the needs to be achieved. To this end, the Bush Admin-
current head of Central Command.29 This is also the
istration, including the CPA, and the Iraqi Cabinet
opinion of the pre-eminent British military histo- should:
rian, John Keegan.30 Increased intelligence collec-
tion, anti-terrorist operations, and training should • Conduct an assessment of security needs to pro-
become the focus of the U.S.-led force in Iraq. vide for infrastructure protection in conjunction
with the Iraqi oil ministry. Before serious recon-
Protecting Iraqi Oil Revenue. The Bush Admin-
struction of the oil industry can begin, the coali-
istration has issued an executive order barring tion and the Iraqi cabinet must be able to assure
claims in U.S. courts against Iraqi oil or proceeds
physical security of Iraqi energy infrastructure.
from it.31 It has also coordinated with other perma-
nent U.S. Security Council members—the United • Increase the number of Iraqi guards as needed
Kingdom, France, China, and Russia—on the impo- to provide security. However, the rank-and-file
sition of a moratorium on Iraq’s national debt. and all officers must be adequately screened to
root out Saddam’s hard-core supporters and
The U.S. should further coordinate its actions Islamic radicals.
with companies and sovereign claimants (states) to
delay reparations for Gulf War damages and other • Utilize coalition forces, especially the British, to
claims. Iraq needs breathing space in order to restart train Iraqi security forces, including pipeline
its cash flow and get its oil industry up and running security units. British instructors have earned
again. high marks the world over providing security
and military training.

27. Thomas E. Ricks, “Ex-Envoy Criticizes Bush’s Postwar Policy,” The Washington Post, September 4, 2003, at
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27846-2003Sep4.html.
28. Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy, “Is the Army Stretched Too Thin?” Time, August 24, 2003, at www.time.com/time/magazine/
printout/0,8816,477891,00.html.
29. Rumsfeld and Abizaid, “DoD News Briefing.”
30. Jack Kelley, “Troop Strength Debate Ranging,” Pittsburgh Post–Gazette, August 23, 2003, at www.post-gazette.com/pg/03235/
214252.stm.
31. George W. Bush, “Executive Order Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq Has an
Interest,” May 22, 2003, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030522-15.html.
32. Emma Clark, “Iraq ‘Needs Foreign Oil Companies,’” BBC News, July 24, 2003, at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3075521.stm.

page 6
No. 1693 October 1, 2003

• Hire an international security company to credit to the Iraqi Governing Council or the oil
administer pipeline security and train the Iraqi ministry, to be repaid from future oil revenues.
security forces tasked with protecting the pipe- • Work with the Iraqi oil ministry leadership
lines to complement military training. appointed by the Coalition Provisional Author-
• Train the guards for the task at hand; deploy- ity and the Council to intensify the purge of
ment without training is self-defeating. The former Ba’ath officials from the oil ministry and
CPA has cut the training time for Iraqi police the oil industry.
from 12 weeks to eight, and the quality of this
force leaves much to be desired.33 Similar Conclusion
shortcuts in training for pipeline protection Without adequate security, Iraqi oil will not
forces could lead to undesirable results. reach global markets. Rebuilding the Iraqi oil sector
through Western investment will not work as long
• Develop and conduct a public information
as terrorists and looters are able to target technical
campaign explaining to the Iraqis the impor-
personnel, pipelines, power lines, and other assets
tance of pipeline security and the resultant oil
necessary for restarting oil production.
revenue. Such a campaign should emphasize
the direct link between oil revenue and the pro- By liberating Iraq, the U.S. undertook an
vision of basic services and the growth in living immense responsibility. Without Iraqi oil, the U.S.
standards. taxpayer will have to foot the bill for the occupation
and reconstruction of Iraq. U.S. consumers will pay
• Design a technological package to enhance
higher prices at the pump, and the U.S. and global
infrastructure security, using satellite imaging,
economies will endure an indirect tax by paying
unmanned aerial vehicles/drones, video cam-
higher energy prices. The alternative to restoring
eras, and sensors. This package would be inte-
Iraqi oil production—misery for the Iraqi people
grated with the security provider (state or
and victory for the terrorists—is not an option.
private).
—Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian
• Provide additional funding to repair the oil
and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby
infrastructure. The rundown state of the oil
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
infrastructure will require significant invest-
Heritage Foundation.34
ment: up to $3 billion per year to get it up and
running again. These funds can be provided on

33. Pamela Hess, “CPA Speeding Police Training in Iraq,” The Washington Times, September 3, 2003, at www.washtimes.com/
upi-breaking/20030902-012831-9370r.htm.
34. The author would like to thank William Schirano, Research Assistant in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, and Anita Greco and Irene Gorelik, interns at The Heritage Foundation, for their assistance with
researching this paper. The author also wishes to thank Heritage Foundation colleagues Peter Brookes, James Phillips, and
Jack Spencer, as well as Ed Badolato, Executive Vice President of the Shaw Group, and Dr. Gal Luft, Director of the Institute
for Analysis of Global Security, for discussing concepts contained herein and commenting on the paper.

page 7

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