0% found this document useful (0 votes)
53 views2 pages

Western Policy and Pakistan's Crisis

1) Pakistan has long been a concern for the West due to its nuclear weapons program and links to militant groups, leading the US to support General Musharraf as a partner after 9/11 despite his military coup. 2) Musharraf has cracked down on militants at times but refused to fully restore civilian rule, straining ties with the US. 3) With Benazir Bhutto's assassination destroying plans for power sharing, the West's policy of supporting Musharraf over democracy has failed, and he should now encourage to step down to allow a unity government and restore stability to Pakistan.
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
53 views2 pages

Western Policy and Pakistan's Crisis

1) Pakistan has long been a concern for the West due to its nuclear weapons program and links to militant groups, leading the US to support General Musharraf as a partner after 9/11 despite his military coup. 2) Musharraf has cracked down on militants at times but refused to fully restore civilian rule, straining ties with the US. 3) With Benazir Bhutto's assassination destroying plans for power sharing, the West's policy of supporting Musharraf over democracy has failed, and he should now encourage to step down to allow a unity government and restore stability to Pakistan.
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 2

Leader

As long as Musharraf is in power,Pakistan will not be stable

ver the past decade one country has caused more alarm in the west than any other over its weapons of mass destruction. It is neither North Korea, nor Iraq, nor even Iran. Pakistan is the concern. That is why the decision was taken to tolerate General Pervez Musharraf when he seized power in a military coup in 1999. After 9/11, Pakistan became the front line in the so-called war on terror, and its leader became George W Bushs main partner. Musharraf promised to do what he could to root out al-Qaeda camps on the border with Afghanistan, to turn in senior figures from that organisation, and to keep Islamists at bay within his own country. In return, billions of dollars were poured into Pakistan. Most of the cash went to the military. Throughout this time, the army, and particularly the intelligence service, the ISI, maintained strong links with Islamist groups, while the father of the countrys

The west has often regarded the civilian dimension of Pakistani politics as a hindrance to its security priorities
bomb, A Q Khan, confessed to selling nuclear technology to Pyongyang. Khan was pardoned by Musharraf, and with a nod from London and Washington little more was said. Musharraf was indulged, but not trusted. In the words of Franklin D Roosevelt, he might have been a son of a bitch, but at least he was Americas son of a bitch. He was encouraged to crack down on militants in the increasingly lawless northern region of Waziristan and to smash an Islamist protest at the Red Mosque in Islamabad. Amid the crackdowns, Musharrafs refusal to countenance the reinstatement of civilian rule put the relationship with the US under strain. He was finally prevailed upon to reach an accommodation with his erstwhile enemies, notably Benazir Bhutto. A disreputable deal was done, in which the scion of Pakistans best-known family would return from exile; all corruption investigations against her and her husband would be dropped. The constitution would be changed to allow Bhutto to return as

www.newstatesman.com/leaders
4 | NEW STATESMAN | 7 JANUARY 2008

prime minister for a third time, while Musharraf would remain president. The assassination of Bhutto on 27 December destroyed these best-laid plans. As Ziauddin Sardar reports on page 18, the ISI was probably responsible for her death. Less clear is Musharrafs connivance in it. Paradoxically, the less he may have had to do with it, the more that shows him to be a prisoner of the security services. With Pakistan in chaos, the US, the UK, India and the other states that stand to lose most are close to despair. Their options are limited. They continue to support the elections, but may now feel obliged to back Nawaz Sharif, the only remaining opposition leader with national stature. Sharif, who was ousted by Musharraf in the 1999 coup, is much less of a friend of Washington than Bhutto was. In any case, it is Musharraf who will pull the strings. That is why, as Andrew Stephen notes on page 22, western policy has failed so spectacularly. The US and UK are still quite happy to throw in their lot with autocrats, as long as they pursue similar interests. That could be Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the Saudi royal family (feted only weeks ago in London), or, fleetingly, the torturers and murderers of states such as Uzbekistan (as long as they provided military bases for the Afghan war). Most Pakistanis believe that Washington is content to work with a pliant military puppet. Rather than support the democratic revival of civil society, as seen in the lawyers movement and a reasonably critical press, the US wanted to use Bhutto as a democratic fig leaf. It has often regarded the civilian dimension of Pakistani politics as a hindrance to its security priorities. Now the west must change tack. Musharraf should be encouraged to step down. The various political parties should be coaxed into forming a government of national unity, while the full independence of the judiciary should be restored (and the lawyers and judges released from jail). Even where military means may be required, such as to prevent the Talibanisation of Waziristan, Musharraf is the person least likely to succeed. In ethical terms, he has been a disaster. In pragmatic terms, he has disappointed. Pakistan will never enjoy democracy or stability under his rule.

You might also like