Case 5

The Essential Realism: Statism, Survival and Self-help in the Case of East Timor
This case links to Chapter 7 of The Globalization of World Politics.

Realism
Chapter 7 of The Globalization of World Politics introduces the dominant theory of international politics: Realism. Dunne and Schmidt inform us that the central pillars of realism are the three Ss: Statism, where a state will act to preserve and protect its own values and beliefs; Survival of the state being the first priority of state leaders; and Self-help, where states must enhance their own national interests. By exploring these pillars in relation to East Timor, it is possible to develop a theoretical understanding of Indonesias annexation of the territory in 1975, after East Timors Declaration of Independence.

Statism
With the preservation of the state being a key component of realist theory, it can be argued that East Timor has at times been sacrificed as a state, and at other times has sacrificed its own preservation, in relations with other states. During its more than 370 years as a Portuguese colony, East Timor was a sacrificed state as Portugal successfully exploited the territory for economic gain. The Second World War saw the next upheaval of East Timors Statism. Portugal remained neutral during the War; however, East Timor was strategically important to the allied forces when invading Japanese forces were rampaging through South-East Asia towards Australia. Australian and Dutch troops, acting under orders from Allied Command, landed in East Timor around the Christmas of 1941 to establish an offshore line of defence against the advancing Japanese (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee 2000). The Japanese forces were stopped, partly due to the remarkable close friendship that was forged with the Timorese, who supplied and protected the troops (Inbaraj 1995). As a result, Allied troop losses amounted to just forty soldiers, while the Timorese payed a higher price for their help, with as many as 40,000 (14% of the population) estimated to have been killed. A realist would propose that the indigenous East Timorese sought long-term security with the stronger forces of the allies, whatever the cost. After the Second World War, East Timor was devastated. Its faltering economythe outcome of years of Portuguese neglecthad been further crippled by the War. The surviving Timorese population had suffered physically as well as psychologically during the Japanese occupation. When the Australians evacuated, they dropped leaflets promising to never forget the assistance of the East Timorese (Suter 2001). Sadly, this gesture seems to have been somewhat token. In realist terms, this gesture is indicative of another nationAustraliasecuring its protection at the cost of another, weaker state.

Following the War, the security of East Timor was a constant national and international concern. In 1959, a strong nationalist movement swept East Timor, leading to a revolt in June 1959, which was quickly and violently suppressed between 500 and 1000 East Timorese were estimated to have been killed (Inbaraj 1995). There were rumours of Indonesian involvement during the crushing of the revolt, which prompted Portuguese authorities to enhance security and protect its colonial territory against a powerful neighbour with intentions of incursion. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Portugal attracted criticism for its obstructionist stance on East Timorese decolonisation, mainly by refusing to submit accurate reports on the situation in its colonies to the United Nations (UN). However, realists would argue that Portugal behaved accordingly: it sought to preserve and protect its own interests because Timor was part of the greater Portuguese state. In 1974, the dictatorship that had ruled Portugal for fifty years came to an end, and internal political turmoil diverted attention from its overseas colonies. In particular, East Timor was relegated from the Portuguese Governments list of priorities. As word of the Portuguese internal strife spread to Dili, an air of freedom and celebration prevailed for several days (Ramos-Horta 1995 as quoted in Inbaraj 1995). In 1975, when East Timor was finally granted its liberty from Portugal, the nation sought to secure its sovereignty. However, her newfound independence was short-lived. Nine days later, the armed forces of Indonesia invaded and provoked a war of independence that would last close to twenty-five years as indigenous East Timorese sought to preserve their state and Indonesia sought to expand and secure their state.

Survival
The survival of the state is central to realism. Throughout the Cold War, fears of a communist domino effect were rife in South-East Asia, whichin turnspread paranoia throughout the West. With the loss of Portuguese control over East Timor and increasing activism among the indigenous Timorese, neighbouring states became concerned with Timors intended political and ideological direction. In addition, Indonesian concern grew that East Timor was setting an independence precedent that could lead to similar calls by other divergent island communities, thus fracturing the Indonesian state. Certainly Indonesian aggression towards East Timor stemmed from a primary concern for national security and the survival for the larger Indonesian state. One of the concerns was the cost of a non-viable state on its borders. Without external support, a failing East Timor would pose a grave threat to national and regional security. Australia shared Indonesias concerns. Indonesia was informed that Australia would not financially and logistically support East Timor, especially if Indonesia planned another brutal incursion. Consequently, the Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam argued that Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia. The USA had a similar opinion. Recently declassified documents elude to the then Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford as being fully aware of the pending invasion, but having two primary concerns regarding Indonesias actions. First, that Indonesia should not violate the arms trade agreement; meaning US weapons were to be used defensively instead of offensively. Second, that no action should be taken while Kissinger and Ford were visiting Indonesia. Kissinger informed Soeharto that President Ford and he would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens after we return if

you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the president returns home(Burr & Evans 2001). In October 1974, Indonesia launched Operation Komodo, which sought to foster political destabilisation in Timor via infiltration and intelligence activities. While this operation was underway, preparations were being made for a full-scale military invasion. President Soeharto heeded the advice of Henry Kissinger, waiting an entire day after the visit by President Ford before ordering the military to invade East Timor in the early hours of 7 December 1975. In the long term, Indonesias incursion proved catastrophic and the yearning for Timorese independence spawned a protracted guerrilla campaign with the death toll at 200,000, or a quarter of its population.

Self-help
The need for a state to be able to take care of its own interests is validated by the actions of Australia and the USA, who turned their backs on the newly self-declared independent state of East Timor in the face of the Indonesian aggression. Timors inability to help itself facilitated annexation and also mocked the importance of the leading liberalist institution: the UN. Immediately after the invasion, the UN Security Council was convened by Portugal, despite the difficulty of reaching a shared consensus within the UN. At that time, a number of draft resolutions began to circulate and five days after the invasion of East Timor, it was decided that the UN General Assembly strongly deplored Indonesias military intervention and called on it to withdraw its troops as fifty-nine countries voted to condemn the invasion, eleven voted against and fifty-five countries abstained. (Inbaraj 1995) Because the fledgling independent East Timor could not ensure self-help, and because of the lack of strong opposition from the UN, Indonesia refused to withdraw its troops for close to twentyfour years. Today, Timor Leste has a far greater opportunity to help itself, which in turn secures its survival. Although devoid of significant mainland resources, East Timor holds oil and gas fields estimated to be worth up to thirty billion dollars within its maritime border. These resources act as a source of income for the embryonic state and bolster its chances of survival. But this wealth also serves as a catalyst for the broader interests of other international actors seeking oil and gas reserves to meet growing energy demands. The ability of Timor Leste to capitalise upon the three tenants of realism is central to its future success.

Questions
Indonesias actions took place without objection from either the United States of America or Australia, why? In accordance with realist theory, should East Timors colonial power (Portugal) have taken stronger action to prevent Indonesias incursion, as opposed to utilising the UN? Discuss East Timors options in implementing the three Ss of realist theory.

Web resources
http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/

The website of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor.

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/east_timor/history.htm
A description of European relations with Timor Leste.

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/Timorleste.html
UNICEF information on Timor Leste and the children of this history of conflict.

References
Burr W. and Evans M. L. (eds)(2001), East Timor Revisited, National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 62, (Washington DC: National Security Archive, George Washington University), Available: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/index2.html#docs. Inbaraj S. (1995), East Timor: Blood and Tears in ASEAN, (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books). Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (2000), East Timor (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia). Suter, K. (2001) East Timor: On the Road to Independence, Contemporary Review 278 (1622): 1525.