The Summa on Knowing: Thomass Allegory of the Cave Like Plato in the allegory of the cave1 and Aristotle

in the first chapter of the Metaphysics, Thomas gives an analysis of the order in human knowledge and science, the one following upon the other. At the beginning of the Treatise on Creation in the Summa, Thomas gives a summary of the history of philosophy up until the time that philosophers rose to the level of metaphysical considerations.2Philosophy, he says, progressed slowly (pualatim) and step by step (pedentim) from the earliest times.3It progressed, naturally, from a knowledge of what is more known to a knowledge of what is less known. As he describes it, philosophy proceeded by seeing farther and farther beyond that which is immediately presented to the senses until thinkers raised themselves (erexerunt se) to the consideration of being as being by the power of their intellects (per intellectum). At first (a prinicipio), being coarser of intellect (grossiores), philosophers thought that only the physical bodies which they could sense existed.4As he says elsewhere, since what is closer to the senses comes first in our knowledge, it is understandable (??)5 that the first philosophers could not rise above the senses.6 Here, he says motion, if it existed at all for them,7was only between accidental, sensible qualities, the causes of which were things like friendship.8Bodies themselves, they thought uncreated.9Later, however, some philosophers rose above the directly sensible10 and came to understand that there was a difference between the substantial form of a body and its matter and that bodies undergo substantial change. These thinkers, however, thought the substantial components of things, their matter and form, were uncreated. Since substantial form is not directly sensible, it takes greater force of intellect to grasp than accidental, directly sensible forms.11 So, these thinkers arrived at more universal causes, even of the substance of things, like Platos forms.12Still, matter through form is contracted to a particular species.13Therefore, these thinkers, both those materialist Pre-socratics who thought all change was accidental and the later (ulterius) philosophers who rose to an understanding of substantial change, considered every being under a particular aspect, either as an individual or as a specific kind of being.14Finally, however, some philosophers rose (erexerunt se) to the consideration of being as being. They pondered the

1 2

Et ulterius aliqui [i.e., philosophi] erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed secundum quod sunt entia. I q. 44 a. 2 co. 3 Respondeo dicendum quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pedetentim, intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. Ibid. 4 A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes, non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Ibid. Cf. also ST I.75.1 ad1 the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved, and that the soul is moved per se, and is a body. 5 ??? 6 Meta. 4???? 7 Pamenides???, for example, denied the existence of motion. 8 Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, congregationem et segregationem. Ibid. 9 Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ibid. 10 Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Ibid. Thomas emphasizes through intellect to distinguish these philosophers from the previous ones whom he has specified as being bound to the sensible. The statement is otherwise unnecessary. It applies also to the later philosophers who distinquished the metaphysical principles of being, who take an even farther step from the directly sensible into the intelligibile. 11 Meta. 4??? 12 Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem. Ibid. 13 Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut homo contrahitur per album. Ibid. 14 Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel inquantum est tale ens. Ibid.

causes not only of accidental and substantial change but of everything that pertains to the existence of a thing (ad esse illorum).15From this perspective, they saw that even prime matter is caused. Later in the Prima Pars, treating the mode and order of human understanding (de modo et ordine intelligendi), Thomas explains why human knowledge proceeds from material, sensible things (naturas visibilium rerum) to immaterial, invisible ones in the way reflected by his analysis of the history of philosophy.16All our knowledge begins with the proper object of the human intellect, which is first and best known by us (primo et per se cognitum).17The object of the human intellect is the nature of a sensible thing (natura rei sensibilis), 18for the proper object (proprium obiectum) of a knowing power is proportionate to that power.19And, he says, there are three grades (triplex gradus) of knowing power.20Angels, he says, know without referring to material, sensible things because they are without dependence on material, sensible things.21Sense powers, however, know only individuals because they are inextricably bound to matter, the principle of individuation.22 So, since the human intellect is neither an angel nor a mere sense power but is on the horizon (medio modo) between separate and material substances,23every time it tries to contemplate anything it must turn to the phantasms,24a kind of sense image, and can only directly contemplate the natures of sensible, bodily things (corpora sensibilia).25This follows from mans nature as an intellect joined to matter. Man needs sensation to think at all.26Thus, the proper object of this intellect bound to matter is the nature of a material, sensible being, as the proper object of the
15

omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Ibid.

16

per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. I q. 84 a. 7 co. And: . . . non primo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit. I q. 87 a. 3 ad 1.
17

Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum, considerari potest quo ordine indivisibile intelligatur a nobis, ex eius habitudine ad huiusmodi quidditatem. I q. 85 a. 8 co. Moreover: Illa autem quae sunt primo nota, sunt magis facilia. CM 1.2, n. 11/46 18 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. I q. 84 a. 8 co. 19 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae. I q. 85 a. 1 co.potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. . . . Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens I q. 84 a. 7 co. 20 Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis. I q. 85 a. 1 co. 21 Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia cognoscit. I q. 84 a. 7 co. 22 Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. I q. 85 a. 1 co. 23 Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. I q. 85 a. 1 co.
24

25

. . . incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata. I q. 84 a. 7 ad 3
26

angelic intellect is a nature separate from body (a corpore separata or forma sine materia) and invisible.27 As proof of this, when we are trying to understand something, we, unlike angels, draw images (e.g. in mathematics),28 or think of relevant examples, and when we are trying to get someone else to understand we give examples to help them form an image of it.29However, if the first and proper object of the human intellect were a form separate from matter [Dewan says that immaterial form is known by us almost immediately] then we would not need to turn to images.30We would know immaterial beings from the very start and as such. However, as it is, we only know immaterial things, of which there are no images, by comparison (per comparationem) to corporeal, sensible things31and by negating the properties of bodies (per viam remotionis).32What we first understand are bodies.33In knowing anything about immaterial (i.e., not material) beings we have to deny of them the deficiencies of the nature we know best, by the three ways of causality, remotion and eminence.34Even truth and the other transcendentals are known by first knowing what is the truth of the material being seen in sensible phantasms.35 So, the beginning and end of all our judgments is a sensible, material thing (res sensibiles naturales).36However, since to be intelligible in act a thing must be immaterial, the natures of
27

. . . intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata . . . I q. 84 a. 7 co. Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens, etsi enim materialia cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet vel in seipsis vel in Deo. I q. 85 a. 1 co. The subject of metaphysics is being separate from matter, either because it is actually immaterial or because it can be immaterial.
28 29

. . . quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. I q. 84 a. 7 co.
30

Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus nostri esset forma separata; vel si naturae rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos; non oporteret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata. I q. 84 a. 7 co.
31

Ad tertium dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. I q. 84 a. 7 ad 3. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. I q. 84 a. 8 co.
32

Ad secundum dicendum quod de superioribus rebus in scientiis maxime tractatur per viam remotionis, sic enim corpora caelestia notificat Aristoteles per negationem proprietatum inferiorum corporum. Unde multo magis immateriales substantiae a nobis cognosci non possunt, ut earum quidditates apprehendamus, sed de eis nobis in scientiis documenta traduntur per viam remotionis et alicuius habitudinis ad res materiales . I q. 88 a. 2 ad 2
33 34

35

nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit. I q. 87 a. 3 ad 1
36

Thomas argues that, not only does all understanding come from sensation, all of our judgments, not just ones about material natures, resolve to sensation: Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. Dicit autem philosophus, in III de caelo, quod sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum . . . non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde

material things are intelligible only insofar as they can be separated from mater. Their intelligibility must be drawn out from potency into act.37In other words, the natures of material things must be abstracted from matter (a materia abstractum)38because things are intelligible insofar as they are separable from matter (separabiles a materia).39Only immaterial things are intelligible in act. The object of the angelic intellect, on the other hand, is immaterial being, which is actually intelligible, so there is no need for the angelic mind to abstract from matter. Man is material, therefore he knows the material natures which are proportionate to his knowing power. But, material natures are only intelligible in potency (intelligibilia in potentia)40 because things are intelligible only insofar as they are separate from matter.41Therefore, man must separate the natures of material things from the particular matter in which they are found before they will be intelligible in act. However, if our intellectual knowledge were not taken from our sense knowledge, we would be in our bodies by accident. That is, there would be no reason for our intellect to be joined to physical organs (frustra corpori uniretur).42However, when the sense organs, particularly the imagination, are damaged we cannot think at all.43Therefore, the mind abstracts universal natures from the matter of sense images or phantasms,44and this is the very reason why man has sense organs and is material.

impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus. I q. 84 a. 8 co. 37 [P]rocedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia, et intelligibilia in potentia: unde illa sunt prius nobis nota quam substantiae separatae, quae sunt magis notae secundum naturam, ut patet in II Metaphys. In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7 38 Thomas comments on De Anima III: Est autem aliquod intelligibile in actu, per hoc quod est in actu a materia abstractum: sic enim supra dixit, quod sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic sunt et quae sunt circa intellectum. Et ideo hic dicit, quod in his quae sunt sine materia. Id est si accipiamus intelligibilia actu, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, sicut idem est sentiens in actu et quod sentitur in actu. Ipsa enim scientia speculativa, et sic scibile, idest scibile in actu, est idem. Sentencia De anima, lib. 3 l. 9 n. 5. See lectio 8 for more on abstraction.
39

Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa intellectum sunt.39 Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata. I q. 85 a. 1 s. c Aristotle says: 429b29-430a9
40

Nobis autem e converso accidit, eo quod nos procedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia, et intelligibilia in potentia: unde illa sunt prius nobis nota quam substantiae separatae, quae sunt magis notae secundum naturam, ut patet in II Metaphys. In Physic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7 41 Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa intellectum sunt. Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata. I q. 85 a. 1 s. c. 42 Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio assignari non posset quare anima nostra corpori uniretur. Non enim potest dici quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus, quia nec forma est propter materiam, nec motor propter mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxime autem videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellectivae ad eius propriam operationem, quae est intelligere, quia secundum esse suum a corpore non dependet. Si autem anima species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam apta nata esset recipere per influentiam aliquorum separatorum principiorum tantum, et non acciperet eas ex sensibus, non indigeret corpore ad intelligendum, unde frustra corpori uniretur. I q. 84 a. 4 co.
43

Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. I q. 84 a. 7 co. 44 Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata. I q. 85 a. 1 s. c.

In question 85, article 1, Thomas explains the process of abstraction from matter. The human intellect must abstract the natures (natura or quidditas) of things from matter and from material similitudes45in order to understand them. In the response to the first objection, Thomas divides abstraction according to two of the fundamental processes of the intellect, the first and second acts.46 There is abstraction by simple and absolute apprehension and by composing and dividing.47The latter abstracts things which are separate in reality (secundum rem).48This abstraction states that something is separate from or not in another. It would be false to abstract things from one another by composing and dividing if they were not really separate. 49For example, it is false to make a statement that this color exists separately from the body in which it inheres, but it is not false to consider this color without considering the body in which it inheres.50This is the way that mathematics attains its object. Similarly, by the first act of the mind, man abstracts the nature of a material thing (speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus).51It is when Plato confuses the abstraction of simple apprehension with the abstraction of the second act of combining and dividing that he posits the real existence (secundum rem) of separate forms for natural things instead of their merely being considered separately from matter within the mind because it is the abstraction of combining and dividing which posits real separation from matter.52 In the response to the second objection, Thomas distinguishes the kinds of matter from which one can abstract. Matter can be individual (signata vel individualis) or universal (communis),53 sensible (sensibilis) or intelligible (intelligibilis).54The person considering natural things abstracts them from the individual, sensible matter in which they exist, but not from the universal matter without which they could not be understood. The species of the natural thing (rei naturalis) includes universal sensible matter but not particular matter.55The natures of mathematical
45 46 47

. . . a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata. I q. 85 a. 1 s. c.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando de alio. I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1
48

This seems to be connected to the existential nature of a judgment, [whereas simple apprehension seems to principally consider the nature of a thing ???.]. Being as being is separate from matter secundum rem.
49

Abstrahere igitur per intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed secundo modo abstrahere per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet falsitatem; ut in sensibilibus manifeste apparet. I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1 50 Pomum enim non est de ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet colorem intelligi, nihil intelligendo de pomo. Ibid.
51

Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur. Ibid.
52

Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem. I q. 85 a. 1 ad 2
53

Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis, communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Ibid. 54 Materia enim sensibilis dicitur materia corporalis secundum quod subiacet qualitatibus sensibilibus, scilicet calido et frigido, duro et molli, et huiusmodi. Materia vero intelligibilis dicitur substantia secundum quod subiacet quantitati. Ibid. 55 Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys.; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus. Ibid.

things, however, do not contain either universal sensible matter or particular intelligible matter. They only contain universal, intelligible matter, so they are abstracted from all individual matter and universal sensible matter.56 But, unlike natural and mathematical things, being and the properties of being as being can be without all matter. An abstraction which abstracts from all matter is necessary to grasp them. And, they can be abstracted or separated57from all existence in matter. We can rightly judge that they exist (i.e., secundum rem), or at least can exist, separate from matter.58Plato, however, failed to grasp the two-fold nature of abstraction, by simple apprehension and by judgment, and so thought all abstractions were of what is really separate from matter.59 In this section, I try to show that Thomas takes his analysis of the natural object of the human intellect and shows how this effects the order in our later knowledge. We know what is closer to bodies, material properties, before things which do not partake of material nature. For instance, we know the continuous before the point because bodies are continuous. We only grasp immaterial form through its material effects. eo quod corpora, quae loco circumscribuntur, sunt
maxime nobis nota. ST 1-2.7.1.c.

Act, nature, distance, light,

In the rest of question 85, Thomas brings out several points which follow upon the natural object of the mind, the nature of a material thing. First, in article 2, he clarifies that it is not the images from which it abstracts the species by which it understands that the mind knows primarily, but the material things of which they are the images.60Then, because we are material substances and understand through abstracting from material images, which are only intelligible in potency, our knowledge proceeds from potency to act. Therefore, our first knowledge is imperfect.61As Aristotle had pointed out in the first chapter of the Physics, at first we have only a vague knowledge of things,62through what is more universal. Since the senses also proceed from potency to act, they also know the confused (indistincte sub quadam confusione) before the distinct. We know the approaching object is a body, before we know that it is a man. In time, children know what a man is before they know what a particular kind of man is. So, Aristotle says that children call all men

56

Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali. Ibid. 57 Thomas calls the judgment of separation from matter both an abstraction (ST 1.85.ad1) and separation (CBT???).
58

Quaedam vero sunt quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi, quae etiam esse possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis immaterialibus. Ibid.
59

Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem. Ibid. 60 Thus the intelligibile species is that which is understood secondarily, but that which is primarily understood is the thing, of which the intelligibile species is the likeness. 1.85.2co 61 Secundo oportet considerare quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit. Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum. . . . Actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur res indistincte sub quadam confusione, quod enim sic cognoscitur, secundum quid cognoscitur in actu, et quodammodo in potentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Physic., quod sunt primo nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis; posterius autem cognoscimus distinguendo distincte principia et elementa. I q. 85 a. 3 co. 62 Our first knowledge of things is the least that we ever have. We begin from nothing and proceed slowly.l

father.63They know the generic before the specific. The order of generation and the order of our knowledge are the same in this regard, for in nature the animal is generated before man.64Nature generates the imperfect before the perfect, and the genus which we know first is imperfect with respect to the species.65Therefore, the mind must compose and divide in order to proceed from its first imperfect understanding to a perfect one.66To reason is to proceed from one thing to another, and it occurs through combining and dividing as is clear from the nature of our statements. That we combine and divide, however, follows from the nature of the thing from which we take the natural object of our minds, a material thing (res materialis), which falls under the senses and is composed.67Therefore, because of the two kinds of composition which take place in material things, the mind composes and divides in two ways,68which correspond to two kinds of abstraction: abstraction of the whole and abstraction of the accidental form, because material things are composed both of their essential and accidental forms. For this reason, we can predicate the essence or the accidents of a thing. Thomas, in article 8, concludes question 85 with a discussion of the order in which we know the divisible and the indivisible. He says, because the proper object of our intellect is the quiddity of a material thing abstracted from images, we know what is closer to the nature of a material thing first.69The order in our knowledge follows the order of closeness to bodies (ad rem corporalem).70

63

Et quia sensus exit de potentia in actum sicut et intellectus, idem etiam ordo cognitionis apparet in sensu. Nam prius secundum sensum diiudicamus magis commune quam minus commune, et secundum locum et secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, sicut, cum aliquid videtur a remotis, prius deprehenditur esse corpus, quam deprehendatur esse animal; et prius deprehenditur esse animal, quam deprehendatur esse homo; et prius homo, quam Socrates vel Plato. Secundum tempus autem, quia puer a principio prius distinguit hominem a non homine, quam distinguat hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo pueri a principio appellant omnes viros patres, posterius autem determinant unumquemque, ut dicitur in I Physic. I q. 85 a. 3 co. 64 Et sic dicendum est quod duplex est ordo naturae. Unus secundum viam generationis et temporis, secundum quam viam, ea quae sunt imperfecta et in potentia, sunt priora. Et hoc modo magis commune est prius secundum naturam, quod apparet manifeste in generatione hominis et animalis; nam prius generatur animal quam homo, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Alius est ordo perfectionis . . . I q. 85 a. 3 ad 1 65 Sed natura generis comparatur ad naturam speciei magis per modum materialis principii, quia natura generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, ratio vero speciei ab eo quod est formale; sicut ratio animalis a sensitivo, ratio vero hominis ab intellectivo. I q. 85 a. 3 ad 4 66 Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari. I q. 85 a. 5 co. 67 Ad tertium dicendum quod similitudo rei recipitur in intellectu secundum modum intellectus, et non secundum modum rei. Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei; tamen non eodem modo se habet in re, sicut in intellectu. Intellectus enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae sub sensu et imaginatione cadit. I q. 85 a. 5 ad 3 68 Invenitur autem duplex compositio in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte praedicatur; nam genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a materia individuali. Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus. I q. 85 a. 5 ad 3 69 Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum, considerari potest quo ordine indivisibile intelligatur a nobis, ex eius habitudine ad huiusmodi quidditatem. I q. 85 a. 8 co. 70 Et huius ratio est, quia tale indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius quidditatem primo et per se intellectus accipit. Si autem intellectus noster intelligeret per participationem indivisibilium separatorum, ut Platonici posuerunt, sequeretur quod indivisibile huiusmodi esset primo intellectum, quia secundum Platonicos, priora prius participantur a rebus. I q. 85 a. 8 co.

And, indivisible is said in three ways: of the continuum, of species, and of the absolutely indivisible. Whatever is closer to our natural object comes first for us71: i.e., the continuous, the species and the divisible before the absolutely indivisible. This is true because the absolutely indivisible and the others are in some way repugnant (habet quandam oppositionem) to bodies.72We know the divisible before the absolutely indivisible because material things which we know first and best (primo et per se) are divisible. In fact, the indivisible is known by negation of the divisible, and the privative, in our knowledge, naturally comes after that which it negates.73You cannot know the immaterial if you do not know what matter is. We know the universal whole (logically indivisible) before its division into genus and difference because abstracting from matter brings our knowledge from potency to act so that the confused comes before the distinct. However, as we saw above, the genus is taken from the material principle and is therefore known before the more formally complete intelligible whole, the species. And, we know the confused and undivided continuum before it is divided and distinct because the material things which we know first are continuous wholes.74So, although relatively speaking the indivisible might be first in our knowledge, absolutely the material, divisible is prior because bodies are what we know first. However, if Plato were right, and separate forms were the source of all our knowledge, then we would know the nature of immaterial things (indivisibilium separatorum) and their properties before the material.75 In the next question, Thomas continues to track the order in our knowledge based on the fact that what we know first and best is the nature of a material thing. He says that our knowledge of the infinite, like that of the indivisible, must be judged by the infinites relation to material nature, which is the first and best known object of our intellect.76However, in material things (in rebus materialibus) the infinite is only in potency, therefore we know the infinite only in potency.77In fact, an infinite material thing is unknowable in and of itself, since it lacks a formal determination. And, while an infinite form is intelligible in and of itself, man has a natural aptitude (naturalem aptitudinem)78only for knowing material things (ad materialia sola).79So, we can only know a
If what we knew first was the nature of being as being, or metaphysical being, then this would not be true. Indivisibility and immateriality are proper to being as being. What we know first and best is material being (res). 71 Et hoc etiam modo indivisibile est prius intellectum quam divisio eius in partes rationis, ut supra dictum est, et iterum prius quam intellectus componat et dividat, affirmando vel negando. Et huius ratio est, quia huiusmodi duplex indivisibile [the continuous and the intelligibile whole] intellectus secundum se intelligit, sicut proprium obiectum. I q. 85 a. 8 co. 72 Et huius ratio est, quia tale indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius quidditatem primo et per se intellectus accipit. I q. 85 a. 8 co.
73

Tertio modo dicitur indivisibile quod est omnino indivisibile, ut punctus et unitas, quae nec actu nec potentia dividuntur. Et huiusmodi indivisibile per posterius cognoscitur, per privationem divisibilis. Unde punctum privative definitur, punctum est cuius pars non est, et similiter ratio unius est quod sit indivisibile, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. I q. 85 a. 8 co. 74 Dicitur autem indivisibile tripliciter, ut dicitur in III de anima. Uno modo, sicut continuum est indivisibile, quia est indivisum in actu, licet sit divisibile in potentia. Et huiusmodi indivisibile prius est intellectum a nobis quam eius divisio, quae est in partes, quia cognitio confusa est prior quam distincta, ut dictum est. I q. 85 a. 8 co. 75 Si autem intellectus noster intelligeret per participationem indivisibilium separatorum, ut Platonici posuerunt, sequeretur quod indivisibile huiusmodi esset primo intellectum, quia secundum Platonicos, priora prius participantur a rebus. I q. 85 a. 8 co. 76 Respondeo dicendum quod, cum potentia proportionetur suo obiecto, oportet hoc modo se habere intellectum ad infinitum, sicut se habet eius obiectum, quod est quidditas rei materialis. I q. 86 a. 2 co. 77 In rebus autem materialibus non invenitur infinitum in actu, sed solum in potentia, secundum quod unum succedit alteri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et ideo in intellectu nostro invenitur infinitum in potentia, in accipiendo scilicet unum post aliud, quia nunquam intellectus noster tot intelligit, quin possit plura intelligere. I q. 86 a. 2 co. 78 propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui secundum statum praesentis vitae habet naturalem aptitudinem ad materialia cognoscenda. I q. 86 a. 2 ad 1 79 Uterque ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in intellectu possibili. I q. 88 a. 1 co.

formal infinite through its material effects (per materiales effectus).80Therefore, we first know the infinite as it is in matter and know the formal infinite only by reasoning from material things. In In fact, Thomas denies that it is possible for the human intellect to know separate forms in themselves for the reason that the intellect is ordered only to the natures of material things,81the source of all its knowledge being sensible images. The intellect can have no direct knowledge of what does not fall under sensation and imagination.82Immaterial, non-sensible things cannot be known first or through themselves at all83because there can be no sense images of immaterial, non-sensible things, which are the basis of all our natural knowledge.84 Still, Plato argued that we know immaterial things first.85Averroes, moreover, argued that just as now we know material things through union with the potential intellect, when we are united with the agent intellect we will have direct knowledge of immaterial things. Thomas counters that the agent intellect is not a separate substance as Plato and Averroes suggest, and so the agent does not extend to anything beyond that to which the potential intellect extends. Both agent and potential intellects extend first and per se only to material things.86The potential intellect can only be filled with the likenesses of material things found in the phantasms, therefore the intellect only knows material things directly.87Since there cannot be any phantasms of immaterial things,88 immaterial substances cannot be known first and through themselves but only through their material, sensible effects. However, Avempace claimed that we could arrive at the nature of an immaterial thing (ad intelligendum aliquam quidditatem quae sit omnino sine materia) from the nature of a material thing by repeating the process of abstracting from matter over and over again.89Thomas answers that you cannot get something from nothing. An immaterial nature cannot come from a material
80

I q. 86 a. 2 ad 1 intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola. I q. 88 a. 1 co. 82 Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam, quam magis experimur, intellectus noster, secundum statum praesentis vitae, naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic manifestum est quod substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu et imaginatione non cadunt, primo et per se, secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum, intelligere non possumus. I q. 88 a. 1 co. Aristotle says clearly: , , . De Anima 431a.15
81 83

Unde secundum statum praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales secundum seipsas. I q. 88 a. 1 co.
84

Non autem eodem modo intelliguntur a nobis substantiae materiales, quae intelliguntur per modum abstractionis; et substantiae immateriales, quae non possunt sic a nobis intelligi, quia non sunt earum aliqua phantasmata. I q. 88 a. 1 ad 5 85 Respondeo dicendum quod secundum opinionem Platonis, substantiae immateriales non solum a nobis intelliguntur, sed etiam sunt prima a nobis intellecta. Posuit enim Plato formas immateriales subsistentes, quas ideas vocabat, esse propria obiecta nostri intellectus, et ita primo et per se intelliguntur a nobis. Applicatur tamen animae cognitio rebus materialibus, secundum quod intellectui permiscetur phantasia et sensus. Unde quanto magis intellectus fuerit depuratus, tanto magis percipit immaterialium intelligibilem veritatem. I q. 88 a. 1 co. 86 Uterque ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in intellectu possibili. I q. 88 a. 1 co. 87 Intellectus autem noster possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natus informari similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis, et ideo cognoscit magis materialia quam substantias immateriales. I q. 88 a. 1 ad 2 88 Non autem eodem modo intelliguntur a nobis substantiae materiales, quae intelliguntur per modum abstractionis; et substantiae immateriales, quae non possunt sic a nobis intelligi, quia non sunt earum aliqua phantasmata. I q. 88 a. 1 ad 5 89 Cum enim intellectus noster natus sit abstrahere quidditatem rei materialis a materia, si iterum in illa quidditate sit aliquid materiae, poterit iterato abstrahere, et cum hoc in infinitum non procedat, tandem pervenire poterit ad intelligendum aliquam quidditatem quae sit omnino sine materia. I q. 88 a. 2 co.

one: sensibilibus intelligibilia, et compositis simplicia, et corporalibus incorporalia apprehendi non possunt. No matter how much we go on abstracting the natures of material things, we will never have immediate knowledge of the nature of an immaterial thing, the reason being that the natures which we abstract from material things are very different (multum dissimiles) from the natures of immaterial things (ad immaterialia).90There are no images of immaterial things as such. Our intellect only knows the natures of material things immediately. Even heavenly bodies, which are joined to matter in a more excellent way than we are, can only be known by us through negation of or relation to the bodily properties which are the proper objects of our intellects, much less can we know immaterial things directly.91And similarly, although we are able to have some knowledge of our own immaterial intellects because they are bound to bodies, it is not sufficient to give us direct knowledge of higher intellects, which are absolutely immaterial.92Immaterial substances are not even in the same natural genus as physical substances, but only share a logical one.93While we have no direct knowledge of immaterial substances, much less is God the first thing that we understand. We only have knowledge of God through reflecting on the material creation. The first thing which is understood by us is the quiddity or nature of a material thing.94

Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod sensibilibus intelligibilia, et compositis simplicia, et corporalibus incorporalia apprehendi non possunt. I q. 88 a. 2

90

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex rebus materialibus ascendere possumus in aliqualem cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non tamen in perfectam, quia non est sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales, sed similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiuntur ad immaterialia intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. Cael. Hier. I q. 88 a. 2 ad 1
91

Ad secundum dicendum quod de superioribus rebus in scientiis maxime tractatur per viam remotionis, sic enim corpora caelestia notificat Aristoteles per negationem proprietatum inferiorum corporum. Unde multo magis immateriales substantiae a nobis cognosci non possunt, ut earum quidditates apprehendamus, sed de eis nobis in scientiis documenta traduntur per viam remotionis et alicuius habitudinis ad res materiales. I q. 88 a. 2 ad 2 92 I q. 88 a. 2 ad 3 93 Ad quartum dicendum quod substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae, conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse. I q. 88 a. 2 ad 4 Neither does material being abide in the same genus as being as being.
94

[32176] I q. 88 a. 3 co. Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum, ut multoties supra dictum est.

substantiae immateriales sint omnino alterius rationis a quidditatibus materialium rerum [is this true of the nature of being as being????]; quantumcumque intellectus noster abstrahat quidditatem rei materialis a materia, nunquam perveniet ad aliquid simile substantiae immateriali.

Mans intellect is less universal than higher intellects. It needs more forms to understand what higher intellects understand with one simple apprehension. Like lines radiating from the center of a circle, intellects become more complex and less universal in their comprehension as they recede from the complete universality and simplicity of the divine mind. Since everything is received into what recieves it according to the mode of the one receiving, if the human intellect receives a universal form like those of the angels, its grasp of it will be imperfect, general and confused. A similar thing happens when a more intelligent man has to explain something: he must do so using particulars. So, in order for man to be created perfect in his kind, it was necessary that he be capable of attaining a perfect, specific, and clear knowledge of the objects which are proper to his intellect. Therefore, he was created so as to abstract natures from material things, the proper objects of his intellect, and the only things which he is capable of knowing with a perfect, specific and clear knowledge. A sign that material things are the proper objects of the human intellect is that uneducated men must be led to the truth through sensible examples. But, first, in the Treatise on Angels, q.50-64, he treats the knowledge of the angels.95He argues that no creatures existence is to understand. Immanent actions are infinite either absolutely or relatively. Sensation is relatively infinite insofar as the senses know everything in their genus, like sight knows all visible things. Knowing and willing are infinite absolutely, insofar as the will wills the good and the mind knows being, which extend to all things. However, all creatures are limited within some genus, God alone is simply infinite, so their knowing powers are also infinite only relative to their capacity as a finite creature. No creature is knowing itself, but rather they are all some finite participation in knowing proportioned to their created genus and species. Since man and angels are not their knowing, their knowing is finite and proportioned to all things only relatively to their mode of created being. Angels understand primarily and principally immaterial things which are intelligible in act, while, on the contrary, man knows first and principally the natures of material things, which are intelligible in potency. Therefore, angels do not need the agent intellect which draws intelligible species from potency to act, which man does. Angels do not know all things perfectly through their natural knowledge, which comes through their own essence. The object of the angelic intellect is being in general and so it extends itself to all things, but only insofar as its natural knowledge of its own essence can provide. There is however a passive potency, which can only be realized through the special intervention of God, much like the beatific vision for man. Both man and angels need the light of grace to bring them to actual knowledge of all things. However, while it is natural for the angels to know immaterial things man must seek his knowledge from and through bodies.

95

Also use the material from later on which compares angelic and separate human intellects. The circle.

There is also a difference in the way angelic and human intellects proceed. The angels, holding the same place as the heavenly bodies do among corporeal things,96 understand immediately all that is implied in the principles of their knowledge, just as the forms of heavenly bodies completely actualize their matter. While man, unlike the angels, holding the same place among intellects that prime matter does among material things, does not immediately understand the full range (or power [virtus]) of its principles or all that can be discovered through syllogizing from them. It proceeds from potency to act. Like prime matter, it is progressively perfected by form.

Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et Angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est transphysicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire. emphasis added Look at CBT 5.3 etc on abstraction, other loci?

What would metaphysics be without a judgment of real separation? Does metaphysics require a judgment of real separation? Can what is really separate from matter be abstracted by the first act of the mind? No, because what is really separate is invisible and hence has no image from which to abstract.

The being of a material thing can only be material being. Being is an analogous term present in no particular object as a common nature extending to all things, rather we can only grasp a particular meaning of being through any particular object. Being as being is only seen when we unite its many different senses(?????), like the many senses of the word health. We have no direct knowledge of immaterial being, otherwise we would not need to abstract it from the sensible phantasms of material things. The subject of metaphysics is being as being which includes in itself all the different senses, in their analogical unity. This unity is created by substance, to which all the meanings of being are ordered. And substance is in turn reducible to form, since all substances are in act by their form. What is the being that we first know? A material being of course. The proper object which is proporionate to our intellect is the nature of a sensible thing. The first and principle objects of the intellect are rooted in matter.

Since the object of a cognitive power must be proportionate to the power of which it is the object, the human intellect can only have as its object a material nature because the human cognitive power is itself joined to matter. The object of sense is a particular thing because the organ of sense is joined to matter, the principle of individuation.

96

???

The responses to objections of 85.1 are an important passage for the understanding of Thoamass treatment of Abstraction, along with CBT V.3, the texts on the distinction of the sciences in Aristotle, De Anima text (??) Things are knowable insofar as they are immaterial or separated from matter. The knowable object is proportioned to the cognitive power, and so there are three levels of knowing power: sensitive, rational, and immaterial intellect. We are material substances so the object of our intellect is a material object, a nature existing in a body. Thomas clarifies in the next article and many times again in later articles that the proper object of our intellect is the nature or quiddity of a material thing. It follows from this that we know material things before we know immaterial things. We first have intellectual knowledge of the natures of material things, and only from this do we attain some knowledge of immaterial natures. Abstraction is divided into that by judgment and that by simple apprehension So the mind must abstract from matter, from the phantams, in order to understand. Thomas divides abstraction into that by composing and dividing and that by simple and absolute apprehension.97 The first abstracts things which are separate in reality (secundum rem).98 This abstraction states that some is separate from or not in another. It would be false to abstract things from one another according to simple apprehension if they were not really separate (secundum rem). It is false to make a statement that this color exists separately from the body in which it inheres, but it is not false to consider this color without considering the body in which it inheres. The Great Reply: The Three Levels of Abstraction Thomas makes a different division of abstraction based on the kinds of matter from which one can abstract. Matter can be individual or universal, sensible or intelligibile. The person considering natural things abstracts them from the individual matter in which they exist, but not from the universal matter without which they could not be understood. The species of the natural thing includes universal matter but not particular matter. The natures of mathematical things, however, do not contain either universal sensible matter or particular intelligible matter. They only contain universal intelligible matter, so they are abstracted from the former and not the latter. But, being and the properties of being as being can be without all matter, even really separate (secundum rem), not just in our considerations. So, a different kind of abstraction is necessary to grasp them, [one which abstracts from all matter, and is a judgment of their separation from matter, that they exist separate from or not in matter.]99
i. Our First Ideas

97

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando de alio. I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1
98

This seems to be connected to the existential nature of a judgment, [whereas simple apprehension seems to principally consider the nature of a thing ???.]. Being as being is separate from matter secundum rem.

99

Aristotle argues, in Physics 1.1, from this natural road (pephuke odos) in our knowledge to the nature of our first understood knowledge. Because our understanding depends on sensation and the sensible species is not intelligible in act, the mind must make, what is only potentially intelligible, actually intelligible. Therefore, the understanding goes from potency to act, while the slightly actual comes before pure act. Thomas explains, to know something indistinctly is a mean between pure potency and perfect act, so it is that while our intellect proceeds from potency to act, it knows the confused before it knows the distinct. But it has complete science in act when it arrives, through resolution [or analysis], at a distinct knowledge of the principles and elements (CP 1.1, n.7/7).100 Confused knowledge is between complete potency and complete act, so both the senses and the mind know the confused whole before they distinguish parts. We start with the confused whole and not the distinct universal causes because our knowledge is only slightly actual before it is fully actual. The vague general notion of being that first falls into the mind must be probed by analysis and augmented with the ideas gleaned from additional experience to get at the principles and causes which bring the minds knowledge to full act. This order in our understood knowledge, from the vague universal to the distinct causes and principles, follows from our dependence on merely potentially intelligible sensible species. It follows upon the natural road, from the senses into the mind, that we start with imperfect knowledge. What is first known to us is not what is more knowable by nature: by singulars he [Aristotle] means not the individuals themselves, but the species. And these are better known by nature, existing more perfectly, as it were, and being known with a distinct knowledge. But the genera are known by us first, being known, as it were, confusedly and in potency (CP 1.1, n.8/8).101 Species are more knowable by nature than genera. Our vague first knowledge is of the only slightly knowable by nature. Seeing the house indistinctly in the distance is a meager vision of the house,102 so Aristotle says that we must proceed from the universal to the particular: what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars . . . (Physics 1.1 184a21). Our knowlege of the world is perfected as we seek the principles, causes and elements. The vague universal is what is more known to us but it is only slightly knowable by nature. In summary, our first vague, understood knowledge is imperfect. We progress in knowledge by making the principles and causes distinct which are not explicit in our first understanding (Physics 1.1 184a21). The reason why our knowledge is imperfect at first is that it goes from potency to act and the imperfect is between pure potency and full act. A vague universal is an imperfect knowledge of things. Thomas refers to Physics 1.1: our intellect when it is reduced from potency to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it has a proper knowledge of them as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from the Physics (ST 1.14.6.c.).103 Starting as blank slates, our first knowledge of the world is imperfect.

100

Et quia cognoscere aliquid indistincte, medium est inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo, dum intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum, primo occurrit sibi confusum quam distinctum; sed tunc est scientia completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem principiorum et elementorum. Et haec est ratio quare confusa sunt primo nobis nota quam distincta. Because our knowledge begins with sensation, the objects of our knowledge are, at first, only potentially intelligible; they are in matter and must be removed from their particular matter if they are to be intelligible in act. But the object and the cognitive power are one in act, so our intellects begin in potency and must be actualized over time. However, between knowledge in full act and in full potency is indistinct knowledge, and so the vague universal comes first in our knowledge. 101 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles Physics. Tr. John Rowan. Dumb Ox: Notre Dame, 1995. 102 Thomas comments on Physics 1.1, just as he who apprehends a genus does not apprehend the species distinctly, but in potency only, so also he who apprehends a house does not yet distinguish its parts. Whence it is that a whole is first known to us as confused (n. 9/9). The first things we know are like the door that nobody misses. 103 Unde intellectus noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut patet in I

We First Understand What Is Sensible

We first know things that are directly sensible: it is those things which are closer to the senses that are more knowable to us. But those things are more knowable by nature which by reason of their own nature are capable of being known. Now these are things which are more actual and are beings to a greater degree. And these lie outside the scope of sensation104 (CM 7.2, n. 33/1302). It follows from the natural road in our knowledge, which begins with sensation, that we know things closer to the senses before things farther away. This is true both with regard to the origin of our knowledge in sensation and the order within our understood knowledge. We know the sensible before the immaterial, and we can only infer the immaterial from the material (ST 1.87.3.ad1). We begin in our understood knowledge with what we can understand directly from the senses. Even among sensible, material things, those which are closer to the senses and more sensible are more easily and readily understood by us. We understand directly sensible accidents before indirectly sensible substantial form (CM 7.2, n. 15/1284 and 35/1304), for example. What we do not experience is difficult or impossible for us to know. It is difficult for our minds to rise above the sensible105: difficile sit mente auferre et separare abinvincem quae actu non separantur. Non enim est hoc nisi illorum qui per intellectum supra sensibilia elevari possunt (CM 7.11, n. 5/1505).106 It is for this reason that we have multiple senses. It is difficult or impossible to separate what is not separate in our experience. One must rise above the senses and understand that of which they do not have direct sense experience. In this way, we are ignorant of the non-sensible in the beginning: For knowledge is acquired in all matters, or by all men, by proceeding from those things which are less knowable by nature to those which are more knowable by nature (CM 7.2, n. 31/1300).107 The mind takes its knowledge from sensation, and the things which transcend sensation are only known, if at all, at the end of the intellectual life. Philosophy progresses from what is more sensible: among the parts of philosophy there must be a first part. Now that part which is concerned with sensible substance is first in the order of instruction, because any branch of learning must start with things which are better known to us (CM 4.2, n. 16/563).108 Sensible things are more evident to us. We proceed from what is closer to the senses and do not easily get beyond them (CM 7.2, n. 33/1302, 35/1304). Only by a process of reasoning do we attain knowledge of what is not sensible. Thus it is in a way fitting, Aristotle and Thomas say, that the first philosophers reasoned about sensible being as if it were all there was. They never got beyond the sensible:

Physic. SANCTI THOMAE AQUINATIS Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 4-5: Pars prima Summae theologiae (Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1888-1889). 104 Nobis enim quorum cognitio a sensu incipit, sunt notiora quae sensui propinquiora. Secundum autem naturam sunt notiora, quae ex sui natura sunt magis cognoscibilia. Et haec sunt quae sunt magis entia, et magis actualia. Quae quidem sunt remota a sensu. 105 See DA 3.1 425b7-10. 106 If all the circles in our experience were bronze, it would be difficult for us to conceive of circles that were not bronze. Si enim poneremus quod non viderentur sensibiliter aliqui circuli nisi ex aere, nihilominus tamen sic esset pars speciei circuli aes. Et licet tunc non separaretur circulus actu ab aere, separaretur tamen mente, quia species circuli posset intelligi sine aere, ex quo aes non esset pars speciei circuli, licet difficile sit mente auferre et separare abinvicem quae actu non separantur. Non enim est hoc nisi illorum qui per intellectum supra sensibilia elevari possunt. S. THOMAE AQUINATIS In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio . Ed. M. R. CATHALA, R. M. SPIAZZI (2 ed.: Marietti, Taurini-Romae, 1971). 107 Ita enim fit disciplina in omnibus rebus, sive omnibus hominibus, per ea quae sunt minus nota secundum naturam, procedendo ad ea quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam. 108 [N]ecesse est inter partes philosophiae esse quamdam primam. Illa tamen, quae est de substantia sensibili, est prima ordine doctrinae, quia a notioribus nobis oportet incipere disciplinam.

for as yet they had not progressed in knowledge to the point where their mind might be elevated to something over and above sensible things. Hence they considered only those forms which are proper or common sensibles; and it is clear that such attributes as white and black, great and small, and the like, are accidents of this kind. But a substantial form is perceptible only indirectly, and therefore they did not acquire a knowledge of it so that they might know how to distinguish it from matter. CM 7.2, n. 15/1284,109 emphasis added The Pre-Socratics erred because, although they understood the existence of accidental, directly sensible being, they had not advanced to the knowledge of substantial or immaterial form, which is only indirectly sensible. We first, at least in part, understand what is directly sensible before we are able to understand what is not. The things farthest away from the senses are the immaterial things, both the things that are never in matter and the things that can be without matter. As Thomas says in his commentary on the De Trinitate, [Some] objects . . . are further removed from sensible things, from which our knowledge takes its origin. This is true both in the case of the separate substances (to which our knowledge of the sense world gives us inadequate access), and also in the case of the principles common to all things (which are most universal and therefore furthest removed from the particular things falling under the senses). But . . . [some] entities do fall under the senses and they are objects of our imagination; for example, figures, lines, numbers and the like. So the human intellect, which takes its knowledge from images, knows these things with greater ease and certainty than it does a separate Intelligence, or even the nature of substance, act, potency, and the like. CBT 6.1.c.12,110 emphasis added

109

Decepit autem antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes, ignorantia formae substantialis. Non enim adhuc tantum profecerant, ut intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia; et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt, quae sunt sensibilia propria vel communia. Huiusmodi autem manifestum est esse accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et huiusmodi. Forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens; et ideo ad eius cognitionem non pervenerunt, ut scirent ipsam a materia distinguere. Sed totum subiectum, quod nos ponimus ex materia et forma componi, ipsi dicebant esse primam materiam, ut aerem, aut aquam, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Formas autem dicebant esse, quae nos dicimus accidentia, ut quantitates et qualitates, quorum subiectum proprium non est materia prima, sed substantia composita quae est substantia in actu: omne enim accidens ex hoc est, quod substantiae inest, ut habitum est. The Pre-socratics never saw beyond accidental form because they never saw entirely beyond the directly sensible: Communis enim philosophorum [e.g., the Pre-scocratics] positio ponentium ex nihilo nihil fieri . . . veritatem habet secundum illud fieri quod ipsi considerabant. Quia enim omnis nostra cognitio a sensu incipit, qui singularium est, a particularibus considerationibus ad universales consideratio humana profecit. Unde principium rerum perquirentes particulares factiones entium tantum consideraverunt, inquirentes qualiter vel hic ignis vel hic lapis fiat (SCG 2.37. n.2). Since our understood knowledge takes its beginning from the senses, it begins with particular consdierations, like how particular things come to be. The most universal considerations come at the end of our knowledge. Therefore, since the proper understanding of creation from nothing comes only with the study of universal being, it comes last in our learning: nec ad naturalem philosophum pertinet huiusmodi rerum originem considerare: sed ad philosophum primum, qui considerat ens commune et ea quae sunt separata a motu (ibidem). At first, our minds consider the way the particular things under the senses and in motion change. The consideration of how being itself or existence comes to be is reserved for metaphysics. The Pre-socratics did not understand creation because we first know the sensible motion from one place into another, but creation takes place without motion: nomen factionis motum vel mutationem importet, in hac autem totius entis origine ab uno ente intelligi non potest transmutatio unius entis in aliud, ut ostensum est (ibidem). The Pre-socratics never saw beyond the kind of change or motion that took place with particular things, subject to our sense experience ( enim omnis nostra cognitio a sensu incipit). The consideration of the coming to be of being, which occurs without motion, is a later consideration. 110 Thomas Aquinas. The Division and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius translated with Introduction and notes. Tr. Armand Maurer. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: Ontario, 1986. Est etiam processus mathematicae certior quam processus scientiae divinae, quia ea, de quibus est scientia divina, sunt magis a sensibilibus remota, a quibus nostra cognitio initium sumit, et quantum ad substantias separatas, in quarum cognitionem insufficienter inducunt ea, quae a sensibilibus accipimus, et

The ideas of substance, act, and potency, understood as being able to be without matter, are far from the senses. Quantities, like lines and numbers, are closer to the senses, from which our knowledge takes its origin. This is why they are easier to know and known with more certainty by us. However, what is first known is easier to know: those things which are known first are easier (CM 1.2, n. 11/46).111 Immaterial things, both what is always immaterial and what is only sometimes immaterial, are far from the senses and hard to know. It follows that the natures of sensible quantities are understood before the immaterial concepts of substance and act.
For example, in book 9 of the Metaphysics, the most universal division of being, act and potency, is first known only in motion: Inter alios autem actus,112 maxime est nobis notus et apparens motus, qui sensibiliter a nobis videtur. Et ideo ei primo impositum fuit nomen actus, et a motu ad alia derivatum est (CM 9.3, n. 11/1805). Because motion is more sensible, we understand it first among all the kinds of act: accidental, substantial, rational, and spiritual. As Shakespeare says, Things in motion sooner catch the eye (Troilus and Cressida, Act 3, Scene 3). We first use the name with regard to sensible motion.113 The immaterial sense of the word is not known until later. The order in our sense knowledge, in part, determines the order in our understood knowledge. We first understand the sensible meanings of the most universal concepts. Thus, Aristotle explains substantial form and matter through the more known and directly sensible motion and accidents. Form is to matter as the shape is to the bronze of a statue. Thomas explains: Exemplificat autem hic membra in artificialibus, in quibus aes est ut materia, figura ut forma speciei, idest dans speciem, statua compositum ex his. Quae quidem exemplificatio non est accipienda secundum veritatem, sed secundum similitudinem proportionis. Figura enim et aliae formae artificiales non sunt substantiae, sed accidentia quaedam. Sed quia hoc modo se habet figura ad aes in artificialibus, sicut forma substantialis ad materiam in naturalibus, pro tanto utitur hoc exemplo, ut demonstret ignotum per manifestum. CM 7.2, n. 8/1277

The visible shape of a statue is more known to us than its substantial form. Sensible, accidental forms are more known to us than substantial ones. Because accidental form, like shape, is more manifest, we understand substantial form through it. It also follows from our knowledge beginning with motion and sensible accidents that we are more likely to proceed from effect to cause in our knowledge. Thomas explains in the Commentary on the Book of Causes, Since an effect is known through its cause, it is clear that a cause is more intelligible in its nature than an effect; although sometimes, as far as we are concerned, effects are better known than causes, because we take our knowledge of universal and intelligible causes from the particular things that fall

quantum ad ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae sunt maxime universalia et sic maxime remota a particularibus cadentibus sub sensu. Mathematica autem ipsa in sensu cadunt et imaginationi subiacent, ut figura, linea et numerus et huiusmodi. Et ideo intellectus humanus a phantasmatibus accipiens facilius capit horum cognitionem et certius quam intelligentiae alicuius vel etiam quam quiditatem substantiae et actum et potentiam et alia huiusmodi. Et sic patet quod mathematica consideratio est facilior et certior quam naturalis et theologica . . .
111 112 113

Illa autem quae sunt primo nota, sunt magis facilia. Potency is only known through its act. Energeia (act, in Greek) first meant something like our work. Our word work comes from the same root (w-

erg).

under the senses (proem.).114 Our dependence on sensation forces us to start from the more sensible effects. This is clearly true in the case of substances. We know sensible substance before immaterial substance, its cause. But it is also true that sensible effects, like motion, are more known to us than what is more knowable in itself. Act, the principle metaphysical concept, is known first in motion. This is precisely because our knowledge begins in sensation and effects are more sensible than their more spiritual and knowable causes. Because of our dependence on sensation, effect to cause reasoning is more characteristic of reason (see CBT 6.1.c.3).115 So, although there are differences between the nature of sensation and understanding, the order in our sensing determines the order in our understanding. What is closer to the senses is understood first: Ea quae sunt priora secundum naturam et magis nota, sunt posteriora et minus nota quo ad nos, eo quod rerum notitiam per sensum accipimus. Composita autem et confusa prius cadunt in sensu, ut dicitur in primo Physicorum. Et inde est, quod composita prius cadunt in nostrum cognitionem. Simpliciora autem quae sunt priora et notiora secundum naturam, cadunt in cognitionem nostrum per posterius. CM 10.4, n. 7/1990, emphasis added

Composed, sensible things first fall into the senses and, for this reason, we understand them first. We know things that are prior according to nature, simpler and more knowable, later. As a rule, what is more known to us is what is least knowable in itself. It is for this reason that we know bodies before spirits, moving things before the immutable, and the finite before the infinite: Inde est quod prima rerum principia non definimus nisi per negationes posteriorum; sicut dicimus quod punctum est, cuius pars non est; et Deum cognoscimus per negationes, inquantum dicimus Deum incorporeum esse, immobilem, infinitum (ibidem). Affirmation is prior to negation, so the things that we know by affirmation, bodies, are prior in our knowledge to the things that we know by negation. Immaterial things are known through negation of bodily properties, so we know bodies and motion better than immaterial things.

114

Quia vero effectus per causam cognoscitur, manifestum est quod causa secundum sui naturam est magis intelligibilis quam effectus, etsi aliquando quoad nos effectus sint notiores causis propter hoc quod ex particularibus sub sensu cadentibus universalium et intelligibilium causarum cognitionem accipimus. Cf. CBT 6.1.c.3 [A] method is called rational from the rational power, that is inasmuch as in our procedure we follow the manner proper to the rational soul in knowing. . . . just as the rational soul receives from sensible things (which are more knowable relatively to us) knowledge of intelligible things (which are more knowable in their nature), so [it] proceeds from what is better known to us and less knowable in its own nature. . . . it is characteristic of reason to move from one thing to another . . . for example from the knowledge of an effect to the knowledge of its cause. See also Super Sententiis 1.17.1.4.c. 115 The exception is mathematics. Mathematics follows more the order of synthesis, from the simple natures of figures and numbers to their manifold properties. For example, mathematics proves from its formal cause, the essence of a triangle, that the angles of triangles are equal to two rights. Natural philosophy, proceeding in the mode proper to reason, on the other hand, is usually analytical, or effect to cause. Thomas says, intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima naturae, sicut oculus verspertilionis ad lucem solis. . . . Unde cum naturale sit nobis procedure ex sensibus ad intelligibilia, ex effectibus in causas, ex posterioribus in priora, secundum statum viae, quia in patria alius modus erit intelligendi (Super Sententiis 1.17.1.4.c.). S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis , t. 1. Ed. P. MANDONNET (P. Lethielleux, Parisiis, 1929). It is natural for us in this life to reason from effects to causes.

ii. The Order in Naming Reveals the Order in Our Understanding

The order in the imposition of names confirms this order in our knowledge. Although the things that are most sensible are posterior according to the order of nature, they come first in the order of our knowledge. As already noted, Thomas recognizes this in his analysis of act. [H]oc nomen actus, quod ponitur ad significandum endelechiam et perfectionem, scilicet formam, et alia huiusmodi, sicut sunt quaecumque operationes, veniunt maxime ex motibus quantum ad originem vocabuli. Cum enim nomina sint signa intelligibilium conceptionum, illis primo imponimus nomina, quae primo intelligimus, licet sint posteriora secundum ordinem naturae. CM 9.3, n. 11/1805

We name things as we know them, but we first name things, like motion, which are last in the order of nature (ordinem naturae). We name first what we know first. Our understanding of the most abstract and immaterial senses of act are rooted in and presuppose our understanding of motion. We must proceed from the only slightly knowable motion and accidents to the more intelligible substantial and immaterial form. Transporting the name in this way, according to the order in our knowledge, from one sense to another different, but related, sense gives rise to analogous names, words with many related meanings. 116 The order in analogous naming confirms the order in our knowledge from the most sensible to the nonsensible. Act and nature are both analogous. Act first means motion and nature first means birth. Quia enim formae et virtutes rerum ex actibus cognoscuntur, per prius ipsa generatio vel nativitas, naturae nomen accepit, et ultimo forma (CM 5.5, n. 17/824).117 We know forms from what they do. If we knew substantial form before motion, nature would not first mean birth and act would not first mean motion, but, because form
116

It seems that, as a rule, the sensible meaning of analogous words come first for us. By dropping the sensible notes, the meaning is extended to the immaterial. Thomas says, quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est .(ST 1.13.1.ad2). The natural object of the mind is material being, and our words first take on this material sense of things. Abstract words, like whiteness, signify in the manner of something simple but imperfect. Concrete words signify in the manner of something perfect but composite. But immaterial things are both simple and perfect. The manner in which our words signify must be denied before we can say them of immaterial beings. This is true even of being. Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua alia creatura; nam ipse est suum esse, quod nulli alii creaturae competit. Unde nullo modo univoce de Deo [et] creautura dicitur; et per consequens nec aliquid aliorum praedicabilium inter quae est ipsum primum ens. . . . (De Potentia 7.7.c.). S. THOMAE AQUINATIS Quaestiones disputatae, t. 2: Quaestiones disputatae de potentia . Ed. P. M. PESSION (10 ed.: Marietti, Taurini-Romae, 1965) p. 1-276. Because we first know being as it exists in a material composite, our first concept of being cannot be predicated of God. The sensible, material notes must be denied when they are said of God and immaterial beings.

117

Nature first means birth, and only later comes to mean substantial form. In the order of things, substantial form is the prior sense of the word, but in the order of our knowledge, birth, a kind of sensible change, is. The meanings of names can be ordered according to the order of things or the order in our knowledge of things. Deinde dum dicit ex dictis reducit omnes modos praedictos ad unum. Sciendum est autem, quod reductio aliorum modorum ad unum primum, fieri potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ordinem rerum. Alio modo secundum ordinem, qui attenditur quantum ad nominis impositionem. Nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod nos intelligimus, quia nomina sunt intellectuum signa. Intelligimus autem quandoque priora ex posterioribus. Unde aliquid per prius apud nos sortitur nomen, cui res nominis per posterius convenit: et sic est in proposito. Quia enim formae et virtutes rerum ex actibus cognoscuntur, per prius ipsa generatio vel nativitas, naturae nomen accepit, et ultimo forma. CM 5.5, n. 16/824

comes later in our knowledge, the words act and nature do not take that meaning until later. When Aristotle distinguishes and orders the different senses of nature, he says, finally, that nature is said of every substance, and is said even of spiritual substances, secundum quandam metaphoram (CM 5.5, n. 15/823). Aristotle underlines the great distance between the first, sensible imposition of nature and its final extension to spiritual substances, by calling it a metaphor. The examples of act and nature reveal that, according to Aristotle and the commentary of Thomas, we do in fact proceed in our understanding from what is most sensible to what is farther away from the senses. The immaterial senses of words are last in our knowledge. There are many other examples of this in Aristotles examinations of the analogical uses of words.118 Words which first refer to sensible bodies are extended to more abstract things.119 The way in which we first use the abstract words of philosophy attests to the priority of the sensible in our knowledge. Our naming shows that in our knowledge we proceed from sensible motion and accidents, like shape, to what is farther away from the senses, like substantial form.120 If a name were first applied to something abstract or immaterial and then extended to something sensible, it would go against the natural order in our knowledge. This defeats the purpose of the extension of a name: to shed light on what is less known to us by reference to what is more known.121 With a single word, we can contemplate an ordered series of universals, ascending from what is more known to us to what is more knowable in itself.122 This is the perfection of philosophical language. Contemplating an abstraction is made possible, in part, by resolving to the more known, sensible meanings of words.

iii. The Natural Object of the Mind

Thomas explains why the names for abstract things are first applied to bodies. We name sensible things first because the proper object of our intellects is the quiddity of a material, sensible being. Since according to the Philosopher, words are the signs of what we understand, it must be that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge
118

See his treatment of beginning, end or limit, whole and part, and one in Metaphysics 5, for example. Thomas uses the examples of sight and light to show how words are extended from sensible meanings to ones farther from the senses in ST 1.67.1.c: Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum (dicimus enim, vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum); et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus, secundum illud Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et similiter dicendum est de nomine lucis. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visus , postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem. Si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur, ut Ambrosius dicit. Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur (emphasis added). Words are first imposed on sensibe things and then extended to more abstract senses. 120 Analogous names facilitate the comprehension of abstract concepts by linking them to the sensible and more known. The abstracts senses can be resolved to the concrete, sensible ones. At a given moment, a word will be found to imply at once something notius quoad nos and something notius quoad se. Words lead us from what is more known to what is more knowable.
119
121

The sensible senses of words lead us back to the images from which we abstract the universal in the first place and use every time we think. The mind seems to choose to use the same word in many senses, instead of picking another, because it assists it in comprehension. A different word could be chosen, but the mind uses the same word in different senses.

122

proceeds from the better known to the less known. Accordingly with us, names of more known things are transferred so as to signify things less known; and hence it is that, as stated in the Metaphysics, the notion of distance has been transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition, and in like manner words that signify local movement are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. ST 1-2.7.1.c.,123 emphasis added

Distance is extended, from a length of physical place, to apply to the oppositions of logical and spiritual beings because bodies and their properties are what we know best. The natures of bodies are the proper objects of our minds, and hence the first things we know. [N]ec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit (ST 1.87.3.ad1). Because the natures of bodies are the first objects of our minds, we first give names to bodies and their properties. Therefore, our most profound, philosophical words are ultimately led back to sensible impositions. Act and nature first refer to motion and change. Form first means the shape of a body. We name and know the most sensible things first.124 The fact that our first imposition of names is on sensible, accidental qualities gives rise to Thomas's etymology for lapis since the essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes use accidents or effects in their stead . . . and name the things accordingly. And thus it is that, what ever is used to take the place of the essential difference is also that whence the name is imposed, considered on the part of the one who imposes the meaning: as when lapis is imposed from an effect, laedere pedem. De Veritate 4.1. ad8125

Since we often know what is accidental before what is essential, names are taken from accidents, instead of substantial form.126 We arrive at substantial form through an understanding of the more sensible. The

123

Respondeo dicendum quod, quia nomina, secundum philosophum, sunt signa intellectuum, necesse est quod secundum processum intellectivae cognitionis, sit etiam nominationis processus. Procedit autem nostra cognitio intellectualis a notioribus ad minus nota. Et ideo apud nos a notioribus nomina transferuntur ad significandum res minus notas. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur in X Metaphys., ab his quae sunt secundum locum, processit nomen distantiae ad omnia contraria, et similiter nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem, utimur ad significandum alios motus, eo quod corpora, quae loco circumscribuntur, sunt maxime nobis nota. Cf. ST 1.13.1.ad3: Just as we can understand what is both simple and subsistent only as though it were composite, so we can understand and speak of the simplicity of eternity only after the manner of temporal things: it is composite and temporal things that we ordinarily and naturally understand. emphasis added. Again, Thomas says the Pre-Socratics reduced everything to accidental causes because they had not yet risen above their senses enough to reason about substantial form.

124

125

Sed quia differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel effectibus loco earum, ut VIII Metaph. dicitur; et secundum hoc nominamus rem; et sic illud quod loco differentiae essentialis sumitur, est a quo imponitur nomen ex parte imponentis, sicut lapis imponitur ab effectu, qui est laedere pedem. SANCTI THOMAE DE AQUINO Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 22: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Editori di San Tommaso, Roma, 1975-1970-1972-1976) 3 vol. 4 fascicula. 126 In the Summa theologiae, Thomas argues that the essence of the soul, which is the substantial form best known to us, may be defined by an accident: because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are

name for stone is taken from the sensible effect that it has on the foot and not its essential nature. The etymology may be wrong but the reasoning is valid. The reasoning reveals Thomas's understanding of our naming things as we do and the order of learning that is implied by it. We often understand the sensible effects and accidents of things before their substantial forms. The natural road from the senses determines, in large part, the order of knowledge within reason. Every time we think we must return to the images from which our knowledge arises. Because we start from and depend upon sensation every time we think, we cannot intuit the natures of immaterial things, and abstract senses of words cannot be understood without reference to what is more known to us. By resolving the abstract senses of words to their more known meanings, what we could not otherwise understand becomes intelligible. Thomas says, it is those things which are closer to the senses that are more knowable to us (CM 7.2, n. 33/1302). We reason from what we know first, the things that fall under the senses, to the existence of things that we cannot sense (ST 1.87.3.ad1). The things we know best are bodies, like our own, and their sensible properties. We have sense knowledge before we have the universal knowledge of the reason, and, within our universal knowledge, we understand what is closer to the senses before what is farther away.

known by their accidents, nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for subs tantial differences 1.77.1.ad1