Reactor Operations and Safety

Andrew C. Kadak Professor of the Practice 22.39

How is Nuclear Plant Safety Managed?

There is a close link between:
Core Design Plant Design Safety Analysis NRC Requirements Operating Requirements Organizational Structure Management Safety Culture

Plant Design to Licensing to Operations

Vendor proposes reactor plant design Vendor performs core and plant design analysis demonstrating power and safety Vendor summarizes all analyses in a Safety Analysis report which demonstrates compliance to NRC regulatory requirements 10 CFR Part 50. Utility submits Safety Analysis and Environmental Report to NRC for review and acceptance. Possible adjudicatory licensing hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Contents of Safety Analysis Report

General Description Site Characteristics Design Criteria SSC Reactor Design Reactor Coolant Sys. Engineered Safety Features. Instrumentation & Controls Electric Power Auxiliary Systems Steam & Power Conversion System Radioactive Waste Management Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations Initial Tests and Operations Accident Analyses Technical Specifications Quality Assurance

Roughly 15 - 3 inch thick Notebooks

Chapter 15 Accident Analyses

Based on Requirements of 10CFR Part 50 and all appendices Appendix K LOCA Includes:
Normal Operation and Operational Transients
Loss of feedwater

Infrequent Faults
Small pipe breaks

Limiting Faults
Loss of Coolant Accidents

Design Basis Accidents

Overcooling increase in secondary side heat removal steam line break Pressurized thermal shock Undercooling decrease in above Overfilling reactor water Loss of flow Loss of cooling LOCA (large and small) STGR Reactivity rod ejection, power anomalies Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) External events tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, etc. Beyond Design Basis Class 9 > leading to meltdown

NRC Requirements
Deterministic and prescriptive as to how to analyze accidents and allowed assumptions. NRC reviews and licenses computer codes used in analysis. The results of the analyses identify operational limits, limiting conditions for operation, test and surveillance requirements - all of which are contained in the Technical Specifications

Key NRC Appendices to 10 CFR 50

A General Design Criteria B Quality Assurance G RV Fracture Toughness Requirements H Reactor Vessel Surveillance Requiremts I Allowed release limits from plant J Containment leak rate testing K ECCS rule R Fire Protection

Other Requirements on Licenses

Generic Letters Bulletins and Orders Information Notices Maintaining Plant Design Basis current Confirmatory Action Letters Commitments made in response to the above

Design Basis Licensing Basis

Design Basis
How the plant is actually designed and works.

Licensing Basis
All the collected commitments of the licensee to the NRC including the safety analysis reports, technical specifications, etc.

NRC Oversight
NRC requires compliance to licensing basis:
Two resident inspectors per site (plant) Special inspections on key regulatory issues Licensee event reports (LERs) Enforcement actions based on performance Reactor Oversight Process risk informed performance based Highly transparent web based

Reactor Oversight Process

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Managing Safety
Technical Specifications are the key operational criteria Procedure Based
Operating Abnormal Operating Procedures Emergency Operating Procedures Maintenance Engineering Security Radiation Protection (As Low As Reasonably Achievable)

Requires Balance
Skills

Rules

Knowledge

Objective
Maintain Compliance to all NRC Regulations Operate within safety envelope Maintain Critical Safety Functions
Reactivity Control Core Heat Removal Secondary Heat Removal Containment Integrity

Make Electricity !

Safety Envelope

Figure removed for copyright reasons. Graph from IAEA Publication NS-G-2.2. "Figure A-1. Interrelationship between a safety limit, a safety system setting and an operational limit."

Control Room
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Automatic Trips Safety Parameter Display System of Critical Safety Functions Risk Monitors Key Process and control parameters

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Organizational Structure
Site Vice President Plant Manager

Operations
Shift Tech Advisors

Maintenance Engineering
Mechanical Electrical I&C Systems Eng Plant Eng.

Radiation Security Protection

Quality

Some companies have a centralized engineering and support organization that provides technical support to a number of plants.

A Typical Non-Outage Day

Morning call what happened yesterday, overnight issues operability status days since last human error - LCOs Risk monitor status Plant vulnerabilities Plan for the day shift maintenance, tests surveillances Electric Generation

Plant Oversight Processes

Corrective Action Program
Corrective Action Review Board

Quality Assurance Department Plant Operations Review Committee Nuclear Safety Advisory Review Com. External Review Boards Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Key Success Safety and Performance Factors

Safety Culture Basic Design of Plant Fault tolerant Training Operations, Engineering, Mgt. Quality Assurance Self Assessment Organizational Factors Sustain Safety Regulations Motivate Safety (Risk Informed Regulations)

Culture
The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions and all other products of human work and thought characteristics of a community or population.
Dictionary

Application in a Nuclear Plant Safety Culture

Need to create a community that has socially transmitted behaviors, beliefs and work ethics that focus on safety. Management must create this community by transmitting behavior patterns that support the safety mission with clarity and without confusion. (production vs safety)

Safety Culture
Vital ingredient of successful nuclear operations Essential to protect plant investment If you have it, you know it If you dont have it, everyone knows it !

Attributes of A Good Safety Culture

Trust People to:
Operate conservatively Make the right technical decisions Perform preventive maintenance Make design and operational improvements not because someone ordered you to do it, but because it was the right thing to do.

Basic Attributes
1. A prevailing state of mind...
Always looking for ways to improve safety Constantly aware of what can go wrong Strong feeling of personal accountability Sense of pride and ownership in the plant

T.Murley 1989

30

 2. Disciplined and crisp approach to operations

Confident and highly trained staff that is not complacent Good team work Crisp communications (clear)

31

 3. Insistence on sound technical basis for actions.

Procedures, design basis and technical documentation is up-to-date. Plant design basis well understood by all Plant operated within the design basis

 4. Rigorous Self- Assessment

Organization should be open to problem finding and facing Management should be capable of dealing with bad and good news Problems should be dealt with immediately and not put off

Example: Plant A
Staff rigorously follows procedures Little overtime Unplanned shutdowns rare Plant shutdown to fix safety problems even though tech specs permit operations Professional decorum exist in control room Plant clean Low maintenance backlog

Example Plant B
Procedures are viewed as guidelines Many management and staff vacancies exist Frequent scrams Equipment allowed to run until it breaks High maintenance backlog Plant runs routinely under LCO Equipment out of service for a long time Plant has many high radiation areas.

Recent Examples of Failures of Safety Culture

Davis Besse
Unwillingness to find out what was going on Focus on Production - not safety Management set wrong tone Complacency - thought they were good Oversight groups internal to utility, INPO, NRC failed to question Plant staff didnt push concerns

Davis Besse Pictures

Photos removed for copyright reasons.

April 17, 1998

February 2002

 Millstone Nuclear Power Station

Thought they were good Management focus on reducing costs Significant staff reductions without a plan Many slogans but actions not consistent Employee concerns raised but dismissed No trust in management Employees thought is was just a job

Nuclear Plants are Businesses

Policies and directions established by the Board of Directors and implemented by CEO. Chief Nuclear Officer is the field person Pressures of competition and cost are real Budgets need to be maintained - investments Plants need to operate well If not, they will be shut down Public support is needed

How do you get a good safety culture ?

Developed over time Cannot be regulated, mandated or delegated Awareness of the importance of each and every job Awareness of dependency on other to do the right thing Keen understanding that you are personally responsible for the people who work at the plant and the public

Role of Top Management

Set tone and example Know what is going on Do not delegate safety Attention to detail Staff must believe in and respect top management Hire people who have good work ethic Commitment to safety that goes beyond slogans and posters and meetings.

How to Keep a Safety Culture ?

Avoid complacency - hard to do.. Safety culture is fragile - delegate balance of people, problems and pressures
Requires strong internal communications

Foster identification and resolution of problems - no shooting messenger ! Maintenance of trust in the organization and its value system Motivate people to do the right thing

Maintenance of Safety Culture

People are an important safety system Organizational behavior issues are as important as plant components in assuring safety Managers and supervisors must be trained in dealing with people and open communications. People should understand the importance of their job in the overall success of the plant.

Summary
Nuclear plants are complex man-machines. NRC regulations do not ensure safety they establish requirements which if met will help. The utility determines whether the plant is safe or not. The management of the utility is part of the plants safety system as are all the employees. Safety culture as set by senior management will determine the plants economic and safety success.

Homework Assignment
Review NRC Bulletin 2002-01 to identify the events that lead to the Davis Besse reactor vessel head degradation. Research the studies performed following the discovery of the degradation and provide a summary of the breakdowns by the utility, INPO and the NRC that could have avoided this situation. Prepare a short summary highlighting the failures of each organization. Provide a rough estimate of the cost to FENOC of this lapse in both lost revenue and cost.