Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Justifying Violence Author(s): Bernard Gert Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 19, Sixty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 2, 1969), pp. 616-628 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024178 . Accessed: 16/05/2012 14:06
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degree and not in kind from the injuries inflicted by so-called "nonviolent" techniques of political action.
IV

The myth of legitimate authority is the secular reincarnation of that religious superstition which has finally ceased to play a significant role in the affairs of men. Like Christianity, the worship of the state has its fundamentalists, its revisionists, its ecumenicists (or world-Federalists), and its theological rationale. The philosophical anarchist is the atheist of politics. I began my discussion with the observation that the belief in legitimacy, like the penchant for transcendent metaphysics, is an ineradicable irrationality of the human experience. However, the slow extinction of religious faith over the past two centuries may encourage us to hope that in time anarchism, like atheism, will become the accepted conviction of enlightened and rational men.
ROBERT PAUL WOLFF

Columbia University

JUSTIFYING VIOLENCE
T

HERE are ten moral rules. They are:

Do not kill Do not causepain Do not disable Do not depriveof freedomor opportunity Do not depriveof pleasure

Do not deceive Keep your promise Do not cheat Obey the law Do your duty

Some might define an "act of violence" as an unwanted intentional violation of any one of the first three rules. They would then regard an unwanted intentional violation of the fourth or fifth rule as an "act of force." This distinction seems to have been employed by one of the Dartmouth students who occupied an administration building last spring. When the deans were being led out of the
* To be presented in an APA symposium on Violence, December 28, 1969; see Robert Paul Wolff, "On Violence,"this JOURNAL,LXVI, 19 (Oct. 2, 1969):601-616.

Most of this paper is taken from The Moral Rules: Their Nature and Justifi-

cation, copyright Bernard Gert 1966, 1967 and soon to be published by Harper &Row. I am grateful to my colleaguesTim Duggan and LarryStem for trying to help me make this paper understandable.

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building, one asserted that the students were using violence on him, and a student replied that they were not using violence, they were using force. The distinction between an act of violence and an act of force may be valuable in some discussions; e.g., it may allow us to condemn institutional violence while allowing for institutional force. For the purposes of this paper, however, I shall usually not distinguish between unwanted intentional violations of the first three rules and unwanted intentional violations of the next two. I do not deny that violence is more closely related to violations of the first three rules and force to violations of the next two, but there are so many exceptions and borderline cases that I shall, for the purpose of this paper, define an act of violence as an intentional violation of any of the first five rules toward someone who has no rational desire to have the rule violated with regard to himself. I realize that this definition does not correspond exactly to ordinary usage, but it is close enough so that there should be no serious distortion of the philosophically relevant points. Some might prefer to call any unwanted intentional violation of any of the ten moral rules an act of violence. This would be a serious distortion of the concept. It would make it logically impossible for there to be nonviolent civil disobedience. There seems to be a general distinction between violent crimes and nonviolent ones. By and large I think this corresponds to unwanted intentional violations of the first five rules and unwanted intentional violations of the second five. But I do not think the correlation is exact, and nothing very much turns on it. One further point of clarification. Although it may be possible to commit an act of violence against oneself, suicide being common enough to have a name, when I talk of an act of violence in this paper, I shall mean an act of violence committed against another person. Having defined what I mean by an act of violence, I can now proceed to what seems to me to be the philosophically interesting question: How are acts of violence justified? Since violence involves violating the moral rules, we must discuss not only the concept of justification, but also the nature of the moral rules. The concept of justification depends upon the concept of reason, and thus some discussion of reason is necessary. It is irrational to desire death, pain, disability, or loss of freedom, opportunity, or pleasure for oneself, unless one has a reason. I call desires for these things "irrational desires." The objects of irrational desires, I call "personal evils." It is also irrational not to desire to avoid the per-

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sonal evils. "Reasons for acting" are beliefs that can make acting on an irrational desire, rational. The belief that having my right arm cut off will save my life is a reason for wanting my right arm cut off. Any belief that my action will decrease my chances of dying, of suffering pain or disability, or of losing freedom, opportunity, or pleasure are reasons for acting. Other reasons are beliefs that my action will increase my abilities, freedom, opportunity, or pleasure. In the basic sense of 'justify', to justify an action is to show that it is rational. (Moral justification will be discussed later.) Normally, one attempts to justify only those actions which would be irrational if one did not have a reason for doing them. In general, these are actions that one knows significantly increase one's chances of suffering some personal evil, i.e., dying, suffering pain or disability, or losing freedom, opportunity, or pleasure. But not all reasons are adequate to justify all actions that would be irrational without a reason. Clearly, one will need a stronger reason for killing oneself than for depriving oneself of some pleasure. What counts as an adequate reason for a particular action is often a matter of dispute. When all rational men agree that an action needs a reason and that there is no adequate reason for doing it, I call that action "prohibited by reason." When all rational men agree that not performing some action needs a reason and that there is no adequate reason for not doing it, I call that action "required by reason." When neither doing nor omitting an action needs a reason or when rational men differ as to the adequacy of a reason for doing or omitting'some action, I call that action "allowed by reason." Irrational actions are the same as actions prohibited by reason; rational actions include both actions required by reason and those allowed by reason. It is a fair summary of the account given so far to say that it is prohibited by reason to act against one's self-interest; required by reason to act so as to prevent oneself from suffering significant personal evil; and allowed by reason to do anything else. But this account of reason is inadequate because there are other reasons in addition to those related to one's own self-interest. Beliefs that one's action will help others to avoid death, pain, disability, or loss of freedom, opportunity, or pleasure; or to gain further abilities, freedom, opportunity, or pleasure, are also reasons. For these beliefs can also make an action that would otherwise be irrational, rational. Thus it is allowed by reason to act contrary to one's self-interest, if one will thereby benefit another. However, it is also allowed by reason to sacrifice the interests of others in order to benefit oneself.

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Some parents sacrifice their own interests in order to benefit their children, other parents do not; both courses of action are allowed by reason. All that reason prohibits is action or nonaction that both results in suffering evil oneself and fails to benefit anyone else. All that reason requires is the avoidance of irrational action (or nonaction). All other actions are allowed by reason. Reason thus does not offer much in the way of a guide to conduct. Let us now consider the moral rules. Most of their characteristics are purely formal; they simply make clear what is meant by the universality of moral rules, viz., the irrelevance of considerations of person, place, group, or time. Moral rules apply to all and only those who can understand and guide their actions by them, i.e., to all rational men with the relevant voluntary abilities. This makes clear the independence of moral rules from the will or decision of any man or group of men and entails that moral rules are unchanging. It also guarantees that men without certain features are not subject to moral rules. But, though moral rules are universal, they are not absolute. That there are exceptions to the moral rules makes clear that it is impossible to apply the moral rules mechanically in deciding what to do or in making moral judgments. The content of the moral rules is determined by the requirement that protection from evil, rather than the promotion of good, is their primary purpose. This leads to the final characteristic of a moral rule. All rational men must advocate obedience to it. Of course, the concept of a rational man is usually not made very clear. Nor is it clear in what manner or with what qualifications all rational men would advocate obedience to the moral rules. Nonetheless, in spite of the vagueness, there is no doubt that if a rule is to be a moral rule, all rational men must agree in taking a certain attitude toward it, an attitude that involves the view that it should be universally obeyed, though this is not meant to exclude exceptions. If a rational man uses only those beliefs which are shared by all other rational men, e.g., that men are mortal, it turns out that he will share with all other rational men certain attitudes toward the first five moral rules. The beliefs must be specified in this way; for one's attitude is often determined by one's beliefs, and, since beliefs can vary so much, it would be extremely unlikely that without that specification we could reach any agreement in attitude. Limiting beliefs to those required by reason, we find that one attitude that all rational men would make toward the first five moral rules is the following:

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I want all other people to obey the rule with regard to anyone for whom I am concerned (including myself) except when they have a good specific reason for thinking that the person in question or myself (possibly the same) has a rational desire that the rule not be obeyedwith regardto him. Since violence is defined as an unwanted violation of the first five moral rules, it is no accident that all rational men generally condemn violence. But rational men need not condemn all violence; they may agree that some violence is justified. In order to see why violence is sometimes justifiable, let us consider the attitude rational men would have toward the rules if they were required to take an attitude that they could advocate to all other rational men. This eliminates the egocentricity of the previous attitude and gives us an attitude toward the rules that very closely approaches what we now consider to be the appropriate attitude. When something is being advocated in order to reach agreement among all rational men, I shall say that it is being "publicly advocated." When an attitude is adopted in order to be publicly advocated, I shall call it a "public attitude." Public advocacy need not be sincere, though, of course, it can be. A rational man's public attitude toward the first five moral rules does not encourage blind obedience to them. On the contrary, it allows that quite often they need not be obeyed. Less often, all rational men may even publicly advocate that they should not be obeyed. Not only are there justified violations of the moral rules; there is even unjustified obedience to them. For a rational man does not have a fetish for neat, uncluttered obedience to rules; he desires, insofar as possible, to avoid the unwanted evils that result from violations of the moral rules. But sometimes violation of a moral rule may result in preventing significantly more evil than is caused by the violation. In discussing reason we saw that only those actions which would be irrational if one did not have a reason for them need to be justified. Such actions can be justified by providing reasons that show either that the action is allowed by reason or, less frequently, that it is required by it. In a similar manner, only those actions that would be immoral if one did not have a reason, need to be morally justified. Generally, these are violations of the moral rules. And such violations can be justified by providing reasons that would result either in some rational men publicly advocating such a violation or, less frequently, in all rational men publicly advocating violation. Those violations which all rational men would publicly advocate, I call violations "required by public reason." If a viola-

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tion is required by public reason, then public reason prohibits obeying the rule in this situation. Obeying the rule is morally unjustified. Those violations which some rational men would publicly advocate I call violations "allowed by public reason." These kinds of violation cause most of the genuine moral controversy. A violation that no rational man would publicly advocate I call "a violation prohibited by public reason." Such violations are morally unjustified. One kind of violation required by public reason is one in which one inflicts an evil on someone, with his consent, in order to prevent his suffering a significantly greater evil. This kind of violation is not an act of violence. One kind of violation allowed by public reason is one in which significantly greater evil is prevented by breaking the rule than would be caused by the violation, though not for the same person. This is an act of violence. One kind of violation prohibited by public reason is one in which the rule is broken simply in order to promote good for oneself or for someone for whom one is concerned. This is unjustified violence. We want a formulation of a public attitude toward the moral rules that accounts for the different kinds of violations. The following formulation seems to be acceptable: Everyoneis to obey the rule with regard to everyoneexcept when he would publicly advocateviolating it. The "except" clause does not mean that all rational men agree that one is not to obey the moral rule when one would publicly advocate violating it, only that they do not agree that one is to obey the rule when one would publicly advocate breaking it. Though all rational men would publicly advocate the stated attitude toward the moral rules, not all rational men will obey the rules as the public attitude requires. Though reason requires adopting a certain public attitude, it does not require adopting this attitude as one's genuine attitude toward the rules. Reason only allows, it does not require that we act morally. It is a mark of a false theory to "prove" that it is irrational to act immorally. The most one can hope to show is that reason requires a certain public attitude toward at least some of the moral rules. But all rational men are aware that agreement in public attitude does not guarantee that no one will violate a moral rule except when he would publicly advocate violating it. The rational man need not be a hypocrite, but all rational men are aware of the possibility of hypocrisy. Awareness of the pos-

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sibility of unjustified violation of the rules requires us to consider the rational man's attitude toward such violations. All rational men would publicly advocate that all those who unjustifiably violate the moral rules be liable to punishment. Failure to publicly advocate this would lessen the protection from violations that all rational men desire. We can now state the rational man's public attitude toward each of the moral rules as follows: Everyoneis to obey the rule with regard to everyone except when he would publicly advocate violating it. Anyone who violates the rule when he would not publicly advocate such a violation may be punished. I call this attitude the "moral attitude." Only those rules toward which all rational men would publicly take this attitude count as genuine or basic or justifiable moral rules. It is clear that all rational men would publicly take the moral attitude toward the first five moral rules. Since the moral attitude allows one to break the rule when one would publicly advocate breaking it, it is important to examine the circumstances in which a rational man might do this. Publicly advocating anything requires that all rational men be able to understand and to accept what you are advocating. This means that the circumstances in which one can publicly advocate violation of a rule must provide reasons that could be understood and regarded as adequate by all rational men. As noted earlier, sometimes these circumstances will be such that all rational men would publicly advocate violation of the rule. The clearest example of this kind of case is one in which the person toward whom one is violating the rule has a rational desire that the rule be violated with regard to him. But this kind of violation is not an act of violence. For example, a person wants a rabies shot because he knows that, even though it is very painful, failure to have it will result in significantly greater pain and death. In fact, in this example, given the extreme horror of death by rabies, even if the person, because of his fear of present pain, did not want the rabies shot, still public reason would require giving it to him. This is a case of justified violence. However, when the evil that a person would suffer if you did not break the rule with regard to him is not indisputably significantly greater than the evil he would suffer if you did, then public reason only allows breaking the rule with regard to him when he does not desire it. Public reason may also allow violence whenever this results in significantly less evil being suffered even when the evil is shifted from one person

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to another. However, it must be indisputable that the evil being prevented by the violence is significantly greater than the evil caused. But even when this is the case, rational men may still publicly advocate different courses of action. Nonetheless, there are extreme cases in which all rational men would agree that, even if the evil is to be switched from one person to another, there is a point at which the amount of evil to be prevented by breaking the rule is so much greater than the amount of evil caused by breaking it, that one ought to break it. Thus, if an innocent child contracts some highly dangerous and infectious disease, similar to that which causes plagues, it will be justifiable to use violence against him in order to keep the plague from spreading. Thus all rational men would publicly advocate some violence even when it is not for the benefit of the person with regard to whom the rule was violated. However, this would never be done lightly, and some rational men will demand an extremely high proportion of evil prevented to evil caused before they would publicly advocate violence. Further, all rational men will demand good specific reasons for believing that more evil is being prevented by violence than by obeying the moral rules. "Punishment" is also a justifiable violation of the moral rules. Of course, one must be the appropriate person to administer the punishment. There also is a further limitation, namely, that more evil should not be inflicted than one would publicly advocate as punishment for this kind of violation. Violence in order to prevent violence would also be publicly advocated by some rational men. Provided, of course, that one had a good specific reason for thinking that an act of violence was going to be committed. However, one cannot inflict greater evil than would have been inflicted as the punishment for the violence unless significantly greater evil is being prevented. If these provisions are not met, then I do not see the possibility of any rational men still publicly advocating it. Any violence simply in order to obtain some good for someone for whom one is concerned, including oneself, is unjustifiable. No rational man would publicly advocate this kind of violence. Thus all killing and torturing for pleasure or profit is clearly immoral, whereas killing and torturing to prevent greater killing and torturing may sometimes be allowed by public reason. Thus we now see that rational men may disagree about the justification of some violence. The disagreements will occur, however, within a larger framework of agreement. But this does not mean that, in genuine cases of moral disagreement, public reason requires

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taking one side and prohibits taking the other. For it is very likely that genuine moral disagreements concerning the justification of violence are those which occur within the larger framework, where it is allowed by reason to publicly advocate either alternative. It is here that each individual has to decide for himself what violence he would publicly advocate. Providing a justification of some violations of the moral rules does not provide a mechanical decision procedure for moral questions. Very few if any genuine moral disputes can be settled by applying this set of justifications to the facts. All I have attempted to do is to provide a limit to genuine moral disputes: to show that there is a point beyond which rational men can no longer disagree about what morally should be done. Before this point is reached, no application of what I have said will settle the issue. Men must decide on their own what weight they will give to the various considerations. I have only shown what the morally relevant considerations are: the amount of evil to be caused, avoided, or prevented; the rational desires of the people toward whom the rule is to be broken; and the effect this kind of violation, if allowed, would have. So I have not provided anything that functions like an ideal observer to whom one can take any moral problem and who will then pronounce what ought to be done. The cases that can be answered clearly by what I have said are those cases in which most people have had no doubt about what is morally right. Though all rational men publicly advocate that a man act morally, they need not publicly advocate that he act this way from certain motives. Some may reply to this, "But sometimes it is the motive that determines the morality of the act." They grant that some actions are immoral no matter what the motives, viz., those in which we know that our violation of the moral rule will cause more evil than it prevents. But they hold that the motive sometimes does determine the morality of the action. Killing an incurable cancer patient who had requested to be killed would be immoral if I did it in order to benefit myself or someone I cared for, but not if I did it in order to prevent his suffering. Persuasive as this reasoning sounds, the conclusion is false. It is not the motive that determines the morality of the action; it is whether one would publicly advocate that sort of violation. If one would publicly advocate the violation, then the violation is not immoral no matter what the motive for it. If one would not, the violation is immoral, regardless of the motive. Two factors serve to obscure this point: (1) We do not distinguish carefully enough be-

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tween our moral judgment on the act and the moral judgment we make on a person who acts from certain kinds of motives. (2) We believe that certain kinds of motives lead people to violate moral rules even when they would not publicly advocate such violations, whereas other kinds of motives naturally lead only to violations that one would publicly advocate. It is primarily this second belief, which is probably true, that accounts for the false view that the motive determines the morality of an act. The morality of a violation of the moral rules is determined by whether one would publicly advocate such a violation. The motive at most determines the moral worth of the action, i.e., how much it indicates about the moral character of the agent. It is extremely important to realize that an action can be both immoral and contrary to one's self-interest. Failure to realize this, together with the view that all rational actions are either required by self-interest or required by morality, leads to the view that whenever a rational person sacrifices himself for others he is acting morally. But violating the moral rules when one would not publicly advocate such a violation is immoral even if one is willing to sacrifice one's life in performing the violation. Unjustified violations of the moral rules that are contrary to one's self-interest are not just a logical possibility. On the contrary, without underestimating the amount of evil caused by immoral actions done from motives of self-interest, I think that considerably more evil has been caused by immoral actions that were contrary to the self-interest of the agent. Religions have provided motives for men to act in ways that were both immoral and contrary to their self-interest. The amount of evil caused by self-sacrificing immoral actions for religious reasons is incredible. So many men have not only slaughtered others but risked their own lives in advancing the interests of their religion that it is impossible to hold that self-interest is the sole cause of immoral action. But religion is only one of many sources of reasons for being immoral. One is often immoral in order to advance the interests of one's social or economic class. And sometimes these immoral actions require some sacrifice of self-interest. Men often act both immorally and contrary to their self-interest in order to advance the interests of their race or ethnic group. But today probably the greatest and most serious source of reasons for being immoral come from one's country. Many men are not only willing, but anxious to sacrifice their lives for their country even when their country is engaged in

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an immoral war. The evil caused by immoral actions due to nationalism probably outweighs the evil caused by the immoral actions due to all other reasons put together. Taking an interest in one's country need not lead to immoral actions. To be willing to do whatever is in the best interests of one's country except act immorally, is the mark of a patriot. A nationalist is one who is willing to advance the interests of his country even when this requires him to act immorally. To keep patriotism from degenerating into nationalism is impossible without a clear understanding of morality. Usually one does not consider whether one would be willing to publicly advocate one's judgment on some moral matter, e.g., a violation of a moral rule. Sometimes a man may even believe that he would be willing to publicly advocate his judgment, but further reflection convinces him that he would not. It is this latter case that is most appropriately called "making a mistaken moral judgment." It is not surprising that people often make mistaken moral judgments. It is no easy matter to see what one would publicly advocate. One must consider what one would advocate if one did not know who the parties involved were, but knew only the morally relevant facts; for no beliefs about individuals can be used when publicly advocating an attitude. Sometimes considering the act with the two parties reversed is helpful. But not always. A judge should not consider what he would advocate if he were the criminal. What he must consider is what he would publicly advocate. The distinction between moral judgments and judgments made on moral matters allows one to make a simple statement about moral progress. Moral progress occurs as judgments on moral matters become moral judgments. Assuming, of course, that these judgments are not hypocritical. It is generally not realized how many judgments on moral matters are not even intended to be moral judgments. Many people realize that their judgments cannot be publicly advocated, but do not care about this. They are not concerned with reaching agreement among all rational men, only with a limited number. In primitive societies this often includes only the other members of the society. In civilized societies, it may not even include this much. Some people make judgments that could be agreed to only by people with a similar social status. Some people make judgments that could be accepted only by people of the same race or religion. Indeed, in modern societies a man is usually considered a highly moral man if his judgments on moral matters could be agreed to by all members of his society. Since most of the moral

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matters one makes judgments upon are matters concerning only those people in one's society, it is easy to overestimate the extent of moral progress. A man whose judgments on domestic matters make him seem a most moral man often is seen not to be so when he makes judgments on foreign policy. One of the lesser, but nonetheless significant evils of war is the reversing of moral progress. People, whose judgments on moral matters had been genuine moral judgments, no longer make the same judgments. Especially when the moral rules are violated by their country, they make judgments they could not possibly publicly advocate. They no longer care about reaching agreement among all rational men; they care only about reaching agreement among their fellow countrymen. They even condemn as unpatriotic those who continue to make genuine moral judgments on such matters. Thus nationalism overwhelms morality, not only as the basis for action, but also as the basis for judgment. Confusion about morality often allows nationalistic judgments to pass for moral ones, a confusion often not only supported by the leaders of the country but often shared by them. Sometimes, however, nationalism is explicitly put forward as superior to morality. "My country, right or wrong" is a slogan war makes respectable even in the most civilized societies. Thus war often causes people to lose that decent respect for the opinion of mankind that morality demands. To summarize and make relevant. Violence, i.e., an unwanted intentional violation of any of the first five moral rules, is justifiable only when one would publicly advocate such a violation. In most situations, a necessary condition for being able to publicly advocate such a violation is that there be good reason to believe that the violation will prevent more death, pain, etc., than it causes. Violence is not justified as a purely symbolic protest against injustice; one must believe this protest will have some beneficial effect. It is not better when it is all in vain, as some members of the Cyrano Left believe. Neither purity of heart nor willingness to sacrifice oneself justifies violence, and it is even clearer that attempts to ease one's conscience do not do so. However, these mistaken attempts to justify individual acts of violence do not result in as much death, pain, disability, etc., as the mistaken attempts to justify collective violence. National selfinterest, except for self-defense, does not justify violence, nor does national honor. To use violence to defend honor is to do such violence to the concept of honor, that it will never survive the defense.

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I do not deny that violence is sometimes even required by public reason and that considerably more violence is allowed by public reason, but I think there can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of acts of violence are prohibited by public reason and thus completely unjustified.
BERNARD GERT

Dartmouth College

THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY

HE idea that God is One, as expressed,for example, in the

Shema Yisrael: "Hear 0 Israel, the Lord thy God, the Lord is One," comes in part to this: there is but one God (if there's any at all). But it also comes to this: God is a unity, not a "heap." Insofar, God's oneness doesn't differ from the oneness of, say, legs attached to my right side; there's just one, and it's a unity, not a "heap." However, God's uniqueness is, presumably, not accidental, whereas the uniqueness of legs on my right side is. The sense of the term 'God', supposedly, requires that there be at most one (as it would require that there be at least one, if the ontological argument in one of its forms is sound), whereas the sense of 'leg attached to my right side' does not require that there be at most one. In that way God's uniqueness might be unique. Is there anything unique about God's unity? According to some theologians, God's unity is unique in that God is absolutely simple. The unity of my right leg involves its being an organization of proper parts. According to the theologians in question, God has no proper parts. "There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by admitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or plurality of elements; one from whatever side you view it, and by whatever test you examine it; not divisible into two parts in any way and by any cause" (Maimonides). In this paper I want to try to clarify somewhat the idea that God is thus absolutely simple and to try to show that certain difficulties
* To be presented in an APA symposium on Philosophical Theology, December 28, 1969. Commentators will be Norris Clarke and a second commentator, to be announced.