Military Review

April 1975
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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE" FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Cushman
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Brigadier General Benjamin L. Harrison
Editor in Chief
COL lohn H. Chitty, Jr.
Associate Editor
COL Alfred J. Mock
Army War Col/ege
Assistant Editor
MAl loseph E. Burlas
Features Editor
CPT Robert C. MrDonald
Managing Editor
CPT Robert F. Witt
Production Editor
Dixie R. Dominguez
SpanishAmerican Editor
LTC Juan Horta-Merlg
Brazilian Editors
COL 100.0 Olimpio Filhd
LTC Haralda Netto
Publication Officer
111 AJ St .. 'en E. Bartels
Art and Design
Jerome F. Srheele
Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
FIFTY-THREE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE
1
VOL LV APRIL 1975 NO 4
ARTICLES
The Political Problem of the People's Army . CPT William J. Gregor, USA 3
Clausewitz and limited Nuclear War' . lTC William V. Murry, USA 15
East German Army: A New look at Indoctrination Dennis Chaplin 29
The Australian AIIVolunteer Force
Part I-The Political Evolution Kenneth J. Coffey 34
Civil Affairs in Transition l TC Philip D. Coleman, USAR 42
The Infantry Battalion Revisited MAl Alexander M. S. McColl, USAR 52
Bicentennial Feature:
Kings Mountain and Southern loyalism MAl David Curtis Skaggs, USAR 56
Problems of Contemporary War MG A. S. Milovidov, Soviet Army 58
COL V. G. Kozlov, Soviet Army
Future Trends of Communist China's Strategic Policy Niu SienChong 61
The American General Staff (190316) MAl Marc B. Powe, USA 71
Reader Forum
Articles of Interest
Military Notes
Military Books
DEPARTMENTS
COVER
Painting of elements of the 1st Infantry Division (The Big Red One) entitled "Route
Red Clearance" by Specialist 4 David Lavender in Vietnam in 1966. This was made
available from the US Army Historical Collection through the courtesy of the Chief
of Military History. .
2
32
90
98
MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly in English. Spanosh and Portuguese by the US Army Command
and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for printing this publication approved
by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 8 April 1974. Second ciass postage paid at Leavenworth. KS
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are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof.
US ISSN 0026-4148
READER FORUM
Military Professiqn
In his artIcle "The American Military
Profession: An Egalitarian View" in the
November 1974 issue of Military Review,
Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Parham ad-
dresses an important and currently much
discussed topic. Parham's work, however,
is flawed. The article suffers
from oversimplifications, imprecise delin-
eation of concepts, incorrectly implied
causal relationships, history according to
one interpretation and superficial analy-
sis.
The author's egalitarian .definition of
the military professional is so general that
it is useful neither as a practical dermition
nor as an intellectual construct for gain-
ing further understanding. The statement
"The professional in any field either is
practicing' his profession or devoting time
to studying the problems of his profes-
sion and postulating solutions" eliminates
a large portion of those included by the
egalitarian definition of the military pro-
fessional.
While Lieutenant Colonel Parham,'s ar-
guments from analogy and his attempts
to link an obtuse ideology to the Defense
Department while simu!taneously assign.
ing the US military a role that demands it
convert our society to a militaristic, pa-
ternal absolutism are indeed worthy of
. criticism, his most glaring error is his lack
of serious investigation. He notes that
other authors, in their attempts to ana
lyze American military institutions, have
frequently done only superficial research
to back up conclusions alrearly reached.
He apparently has done the same thing.
Lieutenant Colonel Parham's discus-
sion of civilmilitary relationships on the
American frontier illustrates the point. It
is clearly superficial to assert that cities
growing where the Army had been garri
soned demonstrates this relationship. No
causal relationship is shown, and the obvi-
ous question is not answered-that is,
why was the Army garrisoned in the loca-
tions mentioned in the first place? Fur-
ther, the Frederick Jackson Turner thesis
is considered controversial and certainly
has not won the universal acceptance he
implies.
Elsewhere, Lieutenant Colonel Parham
cites General Palmer to show that the
Swiss mobilization in 1914 was faster
than the German. This is no doubt true,
but cannot be used to support his argu-
ment. The fact that, while time passes at
the same rate on either side of the Swiss!
German border, the sheer size of the two
armies was vastly different is not taken
into account.
Later, the author states that the Ger-
man war machine of Bismarck inexorably
drove Germany toward war. To be sure,
the cormections between Gennan mili-
tarism and the coming of World War I
have been examined by many historians.
His statement illustrates his superficial reo
search as it is difficult to reconcile with
the fact that Imperial Germany, with Bis-
marck at the helm, never went to war. A
war finding Prussia and its allies pitted
against France was finished, and Gelmany
remained at peace for 43 years-24 years
past Bismarck's relief from office and 16
years past his death. The inexorable drive
of his war machine was, it would seem,
unsuccessful in his lifetime.
Parham's sources include Bartlett's
Familiar Quotations, Quotes for the Mili-
tary Writer, The Army Almanac and a
general History of the United States
Army. These indicate to me that, in his
words, "superficial research was done
merely to back up conclusions already
reached."
If my criticism seems a bit harsh and
uncompromising, it is perhaps because I
wish to resist the downhill trend I sense
when Lieutenant Colonel Parham com-
pares the military professional, in succes-
sion, to a doctor, a composer and, finally,
to a sheepdog.
CPT Hartmut H. Lau. USA
('ontinued on pnge 111)
Military Review
(contlnl1f'd from POR'I' 2.)
"The American Military Profession:
An Egalitarian View" by Lieutenant
Colonel Paul B. Parham (Military Review,
November 1974)-much ado about noth-
ing_ The ever-continuing pseudosociolog-
ical tlissection of career service people
suggests there is a rather painful search
for a problem instead o ~ a serious effort
to seek new ways to continue the healthy
progress in terms of professional develop-
ment. The more empirical efforts in this
arena such as Morris Janowitz' The New
Military indicate there has been change in
the makeup of the Armed Forces over the
years, reflecting the broader base upon
which military units 'are built. Action
more often is a result of initiative and
persuasion than from domination. Ad-
va'lcement accrues from competent per-
formance. These and other changes have
taken place because professional people
have sought to find the best possible ways
to accomplish the most critical of tasks-
to ensure survival and protect freedom.
Labels for the type and degree of profes-
sionalism are not really that important.
The principal cnticism I have of the
Parham article is the author's treatment
of Emory Upton. Too few Army profes-
sionals know of Upton's truly unique
career, totally dedicated life (there was a
real professional), and of his exemplary
contribution to the modernization of the
United States Army. The "elitist" label-
ing, as applied in this article, is not only
inaccurate but is damaging because it
greatly detracts from the lessons to be
learned in how to effect meaningful
change and reform in institutions such as
the Army. A serious reading of Upton's
effort at military reform will dispel the
narrow perception that he was concerned
only with the Military Academy and its
graduates. Upton's foremost concern-
nurtured to maturity on the bloodiest
battlefields of the Civil War - was to pro-
vide the leadership necessary to save
men's lives. The ultimate goal of his
reform effort was to ensure that profes-
sionally competent officers would be
April 1975
READER FORUM
available to lead men in battle, when
battle was necessary.
The essential ingredient of military
education, for which Parham credits Elihu
Root, was born out of the exhaustive
studies and programs of Emory Upton.
This is not to detract from the dynamic
Secretary of War who was one of the very
fIrst responsible men to recognize the
importance to our profession of Upton's
work. To dismiss this singularly impor-
tant innovator, strategist and teacher as
"elitist" is simply to be in error.
LTC Hubert K. Bartron, USA
Professional Writing
This is in response to a letter on "Pro-
fessional Writing" from Army Major Jo-
se!1h R. Bobbitt III which appeared in
your December edition of Military Re-
view.
Major Bobbitt cites a need for a Troop
Leaders' Journal, dealing with such topics
as leadership problems. race relations,
drug abuse and training. I respectfully ask
the major where he's l)een in the last sev-
eral years that Commanders Call has been
published.
Commanders Call is published quar
terly as a Department of the Army Pam-
phlet in the 360-800 series. It is aimed at
unit commanders, key officers and non-
commissioned officers in leadership POSi-
tions. Its purpose is to provide offIcial
and professional information on Army
plans, policies, directives, operations and
positions on topical subjects.
While Commanders Call has not pre-
viously published articles from junior of-
ficers, the inside back cover of the winter
edition has an editor's note soliciting ar-
ticles for publication.
Commanders ~ l l has long been ac-
cured of being dull and uninformative.
We on the staff have been trying to
change its image and its content, but
change comes slow.
I'm sure the major and many others
will be pleasantly surprised with the next
111
READER FORUM
anl;! subsequent editions. And we hope
Major Bobbitt will be one of our first
contributors.
Emil Nazzaro
Commanders Call Staff
Generalship of George Washington
It was indeed a surprise to learn that
my "The Generalship of George Washing-
ton" (Military Review, July 1974) so dis-
tressed Colonel T. N. Dupuy as to pro-
voke a Reader Forum comment (Novem-
ber 1974). I am thankful for his correc-
tion of my unfortunate gaffe relative to
General Thomas Gage being the com-
marider at Boston m early l776,"when it
should have been William Howe. I apolo-
gize to the readers for this error.
My purpose was to summarize the best
available scholarly commentaries relative
to Washington's military capabilities. Ei-
ther Dupuy has not read the authorities
cited or does not agree with them. Colo-
nel Dupuy may, of course, take exception
to their and my conclusions, as I likewise
disagree with his criticisms. I t is not, how-
ever, worthwhile to engage in nit-picking
over such matters; I made my case and I
will stand by it. In one instance, it does
appear discussion in the Reader Forum is
necessary. D. S. Freeman and Dupuy to
the contrary notwithstanding, the con-
cept of the Chesapeake encirclement was
Rochambeau's, not Washington's. I rec-
ommend to all readers the comments rela-
live thereto to J. T. Flexner's George
Washington in the American Revolution
and Arnold Whitridge's Rochambeau.
Let's give credit where credit is due;
Washington does not need unwarranted
accolades to crown his achievements.
Finally, despite his faults, and for the
reasons shown in my essay, I most cer-
tainly would include Washington, using
Dupuy's words, "in the very limited ranks
of the great captains of history." Colonel
Dupuy would do so only "if he had been
called upon to fight further after York-
town." Who is damning whom with faint
praise?
MAJ David Curtis Skaggs. USAR
NOTICE
112
'The continued lIlld rapid increases in production and dis-
tributioll costs IZd'IN Ilecessitated dll increase ill the M I 1.1-
TARY REVIEW'S subscription rates. I July
1975, the follo'1'ing rates 'lei/I be used:
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$ 8_00 Per Year
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Single copies: US & APO / FPO -$1.00
Foreign-$1.25
Military Review
WITH THANKS AND GRATITUDE ...
April 1945 marked a milestone in the life of Military Review,
for it was then that the Spanish.American and Brazilian editions of
the magazine first appeared.
On the anniversary of that occasion, we pay tribute to the
many dedicated people who, over the years, have used their talents
and experience in translating oftentimes difficult English into
acceptable and understandable Spanish and Portuguese. The
excellence of their efforts-which began with Colonel Andres
Lopez and Major Severino Sombra, first editors of the
Spanish.American and Brazilian editions, respectively-contributed
immeasurably toward a better understanding between the armed
forces of Latin America and the US Army.
We also take this opportunity to pledge our continuing efforts in
bringing to readers of the three editions the latest thinking in
tactics, strategy and changing military affairs.
Colonel John H. Chitty, Jr.
Colonel Joao Olimpio Filho
Lieutenant Colonel Juan HortaMerly
Tne Politicol ProDlem
of tne
People's Army
Captain William J. Gregor, United States Army
T
HE social and political revolu-
tions of the 20th Century have
been characterized by a high level of
political violence. The political vio-
lence which spawned these new re-
gimes also created threat of counter-
revolution and the consequent need to
define and establish a military force
that was both militanly effective and
politically reliable. Although each rev-
olution differed substantially in form,
in each case, the national leadership
initially sought to organize an army
consonant with their ideology. For
this purpose, they drew upon the mili-
tary theories of Jean J au res, a
French Socialist, who, in 1910, wrote
a treatise which he had hoped would
serve as the basis for organizing the
French Army in accordance with So-
cialist principles. His book, L' A r))} ee
Nou1'elle, failed to move the govern-
ment of France, but it did, however,
influence Leon Trotsky, I and, through
Trotsky, the Socialist armies that fol-
lowed. Jaures' principal concern was
bringing democratic-socialistic pre-
cepts to the army. To this end, he con-
ceived of a nation-in-arms, based
upon universal service, selection of
officer candidates by labor organiza-
tions, elective promotion and the
dispersion of units throughout the
populace.
2
In order to prevent the re-
establishment of an officer caste, he
envisioned permanent ties to the
worker. These ties were extragovern-
mental in that the local populace and
labor organizations were to bear the
cost of an officer's education and the
cost of supporting local units. Hence,
the nation-in-arms was designed to be
the protector of a set of social prin-
ciples, not a governmental institution.
Yet, even though Jaures' theory is an
important part of Communist ideology
and has been advocated by prominent
Communist leaders, such as Lenin,
Trotsky and Mao Tse-tung, no perma-
nent military establishment is orga-
nized as a nation-in-arms. Why doesn't
the people's army of the L'Ar))}ee
Nouvelle exist?
The non viability of the people's
army is the subject of this article.
More specifically, the effort here will
Copyrij:!"ht 1975 by Captam Wdliam J. Gregol', UmtE:'d States A.nny
April 1975
POLITICAL PROBLEM
be to explain the changes that oc-
curred in the armies 'of the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of
China; to display, if possible, the po-
litical considerations which forced
Communist leaders to abandon Jaures'
'theory in favor of the military con-
cepts of Niccoli> Machiavelli; and to
identify, where appropriate, the ele-
ments of this metamorphosis which
are universally applicable to the prob-
lem of creating a politically reliable
army. It is necessary, however, to
pause a moment and review some of
the precepts of Machiavelli's military
theory.
Writing in the context of the 15th
Century, Niccoli> Machiavelli was con-
cerned with the problem of building
a politically reliable army. In his book
The Art of War, Machiavelli ad-
dressed this problem for a political,
rather than military, standpoint. Fear-
ing the political intrigues of profes-
sional soldiers and the
. Captain William J. Gregor is a stu-
dent at the Armor Officer Advanced
Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He is
a graduate of the USMA and holds a
Master of Philosophy degree in Polit-
ical Science from Yale University. As-
signments include service in the Re-
public of Vietnam and with the 1st
Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan-
sas.
4
of foreign auxiliaries, he looked to-
ward development of a citizen's mili-
tia. The soldiers were to be chosen by
conscription in order to ensure selec-
tion of those most suited for the rig-
ors of war. Once chosen, intensive
drill and strict discipline were to
mold this force into a loyal and effec-
tive army. Additionally, Machiavelli
hoped that, through the inculcation of
martial spirit and loyalty among the
soldiers, similar sentiments would be
produced in the general populace. Spe-
cifically, the militia was to aid in
creating a civic attitude of loyalty
and discipline, 3 virtues Machiavelli
deemed essential to a healthy state.'
Thus, Machiavelli developed a militia
concept that saw the armed forces as
a defense against external threat, an
obstacle to internal intrigue and a
source of civic cohesion. The army
developed in Machiavelli's theory is
principally a guarantor of the govern-
ment, regardless of the government's
form.
During the discussion that follows,
it will be necessary to keep in mind
some of the salient features of the
aforementioned theories. In particu-
lar, it should be noted that Jaur"s'
theory, the Socialist model, proposes
a voluntary army designed to defend
a set of social principles. Machiavelli's
theory, however, orients upon estab-
lishing an army dedicated to the pres-
ervation of an institution. The ex-
amination of the development of the
armed forces in the Soviet Union and
China reveals that Jaures' theory,
when applied, created several serious
political problems for the national
government. In dealing with these
problems, the organization of the
army was altered and the military or-
ganization finally adopted was the
model proposed by Niccolo Machia-
velli. The formation of the Russian
Military Review
Leon Trotsky
Red Army clearly shows J au res' in-
fluence upon the Communists. The
Red Army is seen passing through
roughly three phases of development.
In the first phase, it was organized
strictly in accordance with the pro-
nouncements of Jaures and Lenin.
Threatened German offensives and the
Russian Civil War, however, forced the
Red Army to assume the mold of tra-
ditional regular armies. The final
phase centered upon Trotsky's efforts
to convert the triumphant Red Army
into a people's militia. The phases of
development are not the subject of
this study, but, rather, the political
considerations which c a use d the
changes.
Prior to the Russian Revolution, V.
1. Lenin and Leon Trotsky were ad-
vocates of Jaures' military theory.
Writing from Switzerland in March
1917, Lenin outlined a military pro-
gram designed to create a universal
militia that would arm, train and
educate the-'masses in order to ensure
freedom and democracy.
5
With Czar
V.I. Lenin
April 1975
POLITICAL PROBLEM
Nicholas' abdication, Lenin recog-
nized the need to establish a para-
military force to promote the Bolshe-
vik rise to power. To that end, the
Bolshevik "military organizations,"
heretofore engaged in propaganda ef-
forts to disrupt the Imperial Russian
Army, were armed with equipment
looted from army arsenals. The Red
Guard's for mat ion was, however,
somewhat late. The Kerensky govern-
ment collapsed long before the Red
Guard could develop any significant
military capabilities. When the revolu-
tion occurred on 7 November 1917, the
Red Guard threat wa. confined to the
cities of Petrograd and Moscow, with
a total force of less than 30,000
guards. 6 The Red Guard's lack of
military skills constituted no obstacle
to Lenin's rise to power. After all, the
\
5
POLITICAL PROBLEM
The storming 01 the Winter Palace. The Reds take charge 01 the revolution.
Red Guard was primarily a political
instrument for fomenting unrest and
spreading propaganda. Despite several
bloody incidents, the Bolshevik sei-
zu re of power actually occu rred in the
absence of governmental authority.
As is characteristic of Western rev-
olutions, the Russian Government col-
lapsed prior to the Bolshevik struggle
for power, not because of it. After
seizing the government, however, Le-
- nin was confronted by the need to de-
fend his government from the invad-
ing German armies. In meeting that
need, the Bolsheviks soon discovered
that the bravado of the Red Guard
was no substitute for the discipline
and training of a regular army.
The October Revolution established
a new government, but it did not free
Russia from the threat of additional
German. conquests anrl' continued war.
This problem was compounded by the
complete collapse of the Imperial Rus-
sian Army. To meet the continued
need for defense, the All-Russian Col-
legiate for the Red Army began in
December 1917 to prepare for the
creation of a Socialist army. The re-
sulting "Workers' and Peasants' Red
Army" provided for voluntary service,
elected commanders and regionally
based units.
7
The Bolshevik party.
however, had split into two factions.
One faction, principally the Left Com-
munists, advocated carrying the Com-
munist revolution to neighboring
countries t h r 0 ugh "revolutionary
war." Lenin and his supporters
wanted, instead, to consolidate the re-
gime and negotiate a quick peace. Rec-
ognizing that a spirited recruitment
campaign to fill the Red Army would
strengthen the Left Communists, Le-
Military Review
nin chose to ignore his commitment
to a Jaures'-type army and blocked
intensive recruitment efforts. As a re-
sult, the fledgling army lacked suffi-
cient volunteers, and, on 22 April
1918, conscription was introduced. B
In this instance, Lenin clearly chose
to consolidate his regime rather than
support his design for a Socialist
army. In doing so, he e;tnphasized the
need to keep differences in the inter-
pretation of ideology within the party
and outside the armed forces.
After the initial failure to build a
Red Army, Leon Trotsky was ap-
pointed Commissar of War. Tempo-
rarily laying aside his desire for a
people's militia, Trotsky set about
eliminating elected command, re-estab-
lishing discipline and centralizing
military operations. Armed with quan-
titative arguments and pressed by the
need to provide effective combat lead-
ership, the Commissar of War began
the recruitment and employment of ex-
czarist officers. 9 These efforts, par-
ticularly the employment of czarist of-
ficers, brought criticism from all quar-
ters of the party. Trotsky's political
enemies, specifically Stalin and Zino-
viev, used every opportunity to dis-
credit the Commissar of War. 10 De-
spite the criticism, Lenin placed his
unqualified support behind Comrade
Trotsky. Nevertheless, Trotsky be-
came the focus of determined opposi-
tion, and, later, efforts to undermine
his position would be directed at his
proposals for a nation-in-arms.
Although the civil war had pre-
vented implementation of a people's
militia, the 8th and 9th Party Con-
gresses had adopted, at least in prin-
ciple, Leon Trotsky's proposals for
transition to a Jaures'-type army. 11
But, when the 10th Party Congress
met in March 1921, the political cli-
mate had changed. The Russian Civil
April 1975
POLITICAL PROBLEM
I
M. N. Tukhachevski
War and the war with Poland had
been won. Lenin had long since aban-
doned his military theories, and
Trotsky had become the object of per-
sonal political attack. At the 10th
,Congress, the "military opposition,"
prominent party members with strong
ties to the Red Army, arrayed them-
selves against Trotsky and his militia
proposals. Led by M. N. Tukhachevski,
the commander of a Red Army group
and destined to become the com-
mander-in-chief of the Red Army, the
"military opposition" sought to dis-
credit the militia concept through
technical arguments. Trotsky'S reply
pulled him into a technical debate
which dragged on for years and em-
braced such trivial arguments as the
applicability of Marxist doctrine to
the principles of war. 12 The funda-
mental issue appears to have been
avoided by this debate. It was evident
that a nation-state could build a pro-
fessional army if that decision was
made. Therefore, the decision to
create a militia and accept its possible
military weakness was essentially po-
litical. In other words, if the political
desirability of a militia was of great
POLITICAL PROBLEM
merit, then the costs of adopting the
nation-in-arms concept would have
been acceptable. A technical debate
only skirted the fundamental political
iss\le.
'the struggle for a militia did not
wait the outcome of the technical de-
bate. On 3 March 1921, the soldiers
and sailors of the Kronstadt "pro-
claimed that the Whole of Russia
wou Id rise a g a ins t a government
which had wit h d raw n from the
masses. . . ." 13 Trotsky and Tu kha-
chevski were dispatched to Petrograd
where, through eight bloqdy nights
of fighting. they led the Red Army in
suppressing the revolt. I. Although
there were a number of grievances
behind the revolt, the basic cause ap-
pears to have been the growing resent-
ment among local leaders of the cen-
tral government's control. More spe-
cifically, the local soviets and labor
organizations wanted to regain their
former autonomy. Zinoviev, hoping to
improve his own political fortune,
sti rred local unrest through appeals
to the Petrograd soviet. Using the
democratic-socialistic principles of the
Bolshevik movement, he portrayed
himself as a supporter of full democ-
racy and denounced Leon Trotsky as
the source of bureaucratic compul-
sion.
'o
The effect of the revolt was
not, however, decentralization. Lenin
was determined that the position of
the central government would not be
diminished. He certainly was not go-
ing to permit military power to slip
irom central control. Addressing the
10th Party Congress on 9 March 1921,
Lenin said, "We do not need opposi-
tion now comrades, it's not the time,
for it. ... The time has come to put
an end to opposition." 16 In this at-
mosphere; military reforms were not
appropriate. Trotsky's supporters did
prevent the adoption of the "military
opposition's" proposals, but their vic-
tory was limited for the military com-
manders associated with Stalin were
elected to the Central Committee. 17
Although the debate over the militia
continued until Trotsky's replacement
as Commissar of War and the imple-
mentation of Frunze's military pro-
gram, the issue actually died at the
10th Congress. At that time, the as-
cendancy of Stalin and the election of
his supporters to the Central Comit-
tee ensured that no technical debate
would be allowed to produce a militia
and restore Leon Trotsky's political
position. Once Trotsky's opponents
had gained political power and the
support of the Red Army, the nation-
in-arms was doomed to oblivion.
The development of the Red Army
displays the changes that occurred
between the concept outlined by Lenin
in Switzerland and the army actually
fielded. Initially, the paramilitary
Red Guard was an instrument of
propaganda and political violence. The
process of instilling ideological com-
mitment in these forces, however, tied
them strongly to the principles of the
revolution. A iter the revolution. fac-
tions appeared within the party and
with them the possibility that locally
based militia units would support
these factions with their weapons.
This was particularly true because
the units looked to the principles
within the ideology, rather than a
central institution. for direction. As
a result, party leaders such as Zino
viev were able to gain the support of
local units in opposing the dictates of
the central government. Principles.
unlike institutions. are subject to in-
terpretation. and units organized upon
that basis are likely to be coopted into
struggles for power.
The decisive weakness of the peo-
ple's militia, as illustrated by the
Military Review
POLITICAL PROBLEM
Site of the general headquarters of the Chinese Communist
Party during the August 1927 uprising
events in the Soviet Union, seems to
have been its emphasis upon ideologi-
cal principles. Samuel Huntington has
suggested that ideological commit-
ment, which is indispensable for ob-
taining power, is dysfunctional to tbe
maintenance of the new system."
The reconstruction of society after an
upheaval requires that authority be
transferred to an institution and, in a
one-party state, to a party. The para-
military forces which were designed
to destroy the old regime cannot be
expected to become the obedient serv-
ant of the new order.
In contrast to the Soviet revolution,
the examination of the Chinese Com-
munist movement reveals a situation
greatly different in character and one
in which the people's militia played a
relatively minor role. At the outset of
the revolution (the Nanking Uprising
of 1 August 1927), the Communist
party, lacking popular support, faced
the armed opposition of the Kuomin-
April 1975
tang armies. The Nanking Uprising
was in fact a military adventure. Led
and executed by Communist elements
of the Army, the insur-
rection failed to generate civilian sup-
port. In The failure clearly
indicated to the Chinese Communists
the isolation of their movement from
popular sentiments. Relying upon
their own experipnces, tbe Soviet ad-
visors to the Chinese Communist
Party recommended preparations for
an armed insurrection by peasants
and workers. :!iI The Chinese, however,
faced a powerful enemy and not a
weak and vacillating government like
tbe Kerensky regime. Recognizing the
distinctly different situation, Mao Tse-
tung counseled creation of a regular
Red Army. Specifically, Mao Tse-tung
said:
If ICe have only Red Gual'ds of a
local character but no regular Red
Arm1/, then iCe can only deal with the
house-to-house militia (the local force
On 23 April 1949, m m ~ r s of the People's Liberation Army occupied the house of the
president in Nanking marking the downfall of the Kuomintang regime
,,( the landlm'ds I bllt not the "rl/lllar
white tro(}p,'{. n
Although Mao had to overcome the
supporters of Moscow's program, he
obtained suflkient political power to
n ~ u r the outcome of the struggle.
As a result, the advocate, of the peo-
ple's militia never attained political
strength cOJJ1parable to tbat of the
.Left Communi,[s and Leon Trotsky.
The adoption of Mao Tse-tung's
military concepts had a profound ef-
fect upon the course of civil-military
relations in Chilla, In the absence of
popular support, the Red Army had to
be established from the personnel
available which consisted primarily
of deserters from the landlord mili-
tias. mercenaries and brigands. 22
Builrling a disciplined army from
such material not only was a con-
siderable task, but also raised ques-
tions of political reliability. Jus t
as Machiavelli had puzzled over the
poor charadeI' of mercenaries, the
Chinese could ill-afforrl any assump-
tion of innate peasantvirtue. The con-
o
10
summate need was to destroy the sol-
.lier's former pattern of behavior and
instill the party's standard. The actual
method of discipline. indoctrination,
self-criticism and rectification is not
important to this discussion except to
note the neces"ity of producing relia-
bility from within the army structure
itself. This a p pro a c h was clearly
stated by Mao Tse-tung: "Our pl'in-
ciple is that the party mllst control
the gun, and the gun shall never be
allowed to control the party." "" The
foundation was laid for an army loyal
and obedient to an institution, not
ideological principles.
Just as the lack of popular ",pport
had dictated the personnel initially
attracted to the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), so, too, it compeller!
the use of the army as a political in-
strument. In the face of Kuomintang
opposition, political programs cOl,ld
not begin until military forces had
secured a specific area. Thus, the
army constituted the initial element
of the movement's advance, the politi-
Military Review
On 1 October U49, in Peking, Chairman Mao
proclaimed to the world the founding of the
People's Republic of China
cal vanguard, and as such set the
initial example for the people to
emulate.
The achievement of victory in 1949
bl'ought serious efforts to alter tbe
composition and organization of the
army. Although the Korean War de-
layed the process until 1954, it also
displayed some of the serious military
weaknesses which gave the modern-
izers within the armed forces con-
siderable political strength. Korea
clearly exposed the lack of adequate
indirect fire support and the disadvan-
tages of the infleXIble political com-
mand structure." These and other
weakneRSes produced a strong effort
to reform along the lines of the Soviet
Union's army. The Regulation" on the
Sm.,.ire nf Ofjira", promulgated in
February 1955, established a profes-
sional officer corps in accordance with
Russian doctrine. "', The regulation
was an adjunct to the demobilization
of a portion of the PLA and the intro-
duction of conscription. The position
of the modernizers, explicitly stated
by Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, was to
April 1975
POLITICAL PROBLEM
learn from the experiences and exam-
ple of the Soviet Union. 26 The great
failure of this position was Marshal
P'eng's conception of the army as an
instrument of national defense rather
than political action.
Machiavelli had called conscription
delectus, the method by which the
most suitable were selected for mili-
tary service. Similarly, the Chinese
sought to ensure political reliability
through the selection of recruits with
ideologically good recOl'ds and strong
peasant backgrounds."' Yet the pro-
fessionalization which was to assist
in producing military effecth'eness ran
counter to the political purposes of
the party. Emphasis upon martial
capability led to a decline in party
cadre activity, a decline which by July
1960 had caused the party committee
to vanish in 7000 companies. "'
The attack upon professionalization
had begun almost with the inception
of the Regulatinns nn the Service of
Ottice>s. As early as August 1955, Lo
Jung-huan, the director of the army's
General Political Department, had
commented upon the estrangement of
the officers and men and its inherent
contradiction of party principles.""
By 1958, several changes had occurred
to shift the balance of power away
from the modernize!'s. An effort begun
in 1957 was formalized and vigorously
pU;;hed by the General Political De-
partment directive Issued 20 Septem-
ber 1958. The directive ordered all
able-bodied officers to ;;pend a month
annually in the ranh as ordinary sol-
diers. '" This effort undoubtedly was
an attempt to exert political control
over the officer corps. Simultaneously,
Mao Tse-tung exhorted the people to
intensify the commune effort by orga-
nizing along military lines. In con-
junction with this appeal, a people's
militia was established to assist in
11
PDLlTICAL PRDBLEM
national defense, but it was not sub-
ordinate to the PLA. At this point,
the lines were drawn for a political
struggle the modernizers be-
hind Marshal P'eng and the party.
The militia had never constituted a
major force. During the civil war, the
militia had never consisted of more
than eight percent of the population
in Communist hands and had been di-
rectly subordinate to the PLA. 31 After
liberation, the militia served as a local
police force. The expansion generated
by Mao was a distinct break from the
militia's traditional role. Under the
slogan "Everyone-a-Soldier," an at-
tempt was made to enroll every able-
bodied adult into the militia. As con-
ceived, the militia was to be trained
and armed by the PLA, but actual
command was divided between the
party and the army. 32
The popular response to the people's
militia was reportedly tremendous.
Public proclamations, intended for
Russian and :-.rationalist Chinese
sumption, announced that 225 million
armed militiamen were prepared to
repel any aggressor."' Actually, the
PLA resented the requirement to di-
vert equipment and training personnel
to' this amorphous fighting force. The
organization of the militia outside
PLA control equally aggravated the
modernizers. 34 In any event, the fa-
of Everyone-a-Soldier was de-
stroyed When an inspection by the
militia commander in chief revealed
that most units existed only on paper;
that some members had used their
weapons to commit crimes; and that,
in general, the issued weapons had
been rendered unserviceable by inade-
quate care. 3', Critical to the report
was the observation that there had
been a serious lack of cadre supervi-
sion. The implications were all too
clear. The People's Lib.eration Army
12
lin Piao
had defended itself by apathetic ex-
ecution, while the dearth of political
cadre guaranteed that the militia
would be largely unsupervised.
Everyone-a-Soldier revealed to Mao
and Lin Piao the extent to which pro-
fessionalism had diminished political
activity within the army. Lin Piao re-
placed Marshal P'i!llg as Minister of
Defense and began strenuous efforts
to renew the political fervor of the
PLA. Numerous articles appeared in
the armed forces' newspaper stressing
the supremacy of politics over military
skills, and Lin Piao told the PLA that
politics, not military competence,
must command. These concepts were
instituted through regulations govern-
ing political activity and a revised set
of military manuals.
3r
, Finally. on 1
June 1965, the Regulations on the
Service of Officers was rescinded. and,
along with it. all rank and professional
distinctions were abolished. Osten-
sively, the abolition was to eliminate
conditions that promoted bureaucracy
and ambition. 37 Effectively, it accom-
plished two important political pur-
poses. The new regulation declared
that the army would no longer wear
the 8 to 1 device. symbolic of the be-
Military Review
gmmg of the PLA at the Nanking
Uprising on 1 August 1927. Mao Tse-
tung had not participated in the Nan-
king Uprising, and, thus, removal of
the 8 to 1 device indicated Mao's su-
premacy within the party. Secondly.
the abolition of rank enabled Mao to
dismiss old comrades without concern
for their past achievements,38 for,
without secure position based upon
rank, an individual soldier can only
hope to retain his position through
continual party friendship. Loyalty to
the party as an institution was, there-
fore, guaranteed.
The cultural revolution perhaps
demonstrates how firmly the army's
loyalty was wedded to the party as an
institution. The intraparty struggle
which began in 1966 involved the
army in several different roles. Ac-
cording to Juergen Domes, the army
was ostensibly neutral until January
1967, when Lin Piao called upon the
PLA to assist in the movement. 30 Ap-
parently, the request to render all-out
support produced serious rifts within
the military, for most units failed to
l' e s p 0 n d. The fundamental factor
which dictated the PLA's inaction
seems to have been the doctrinal tenet
that the army is an instrument of the
party. The party, as defined by Chi-
'nese doctrine, was an institution, not
a personality, a political theory or a
faction. Quite naturally, the attempt to
use the army in an internal party
power struggle produced diverse reac-
tions among the commanders. The
division not only led some command-
ers to oppose the cultural revolution,
but also created the threat that mili-
tary units would convert the party
quarrel into an armed contlict. Faced
with the possibility that further ef-
forts to involve the army would dan-
gerously divide armed forces' loyalty,
Lin Piao wisely withdrew the PLA
April 1975
..
POLITICAL PROBLEM
from the mission and set the units to
work restoring order. In this crisis,
the army had represented an obstacle
to the ambition of an internal party
faction.
The development of the People's
Liberation Army along lines markedly'
different from the principles of Jean
Jaure" illuminates an important con-
cept. Niccoli> Machiavelli had discov-
ered in the 15th Century that it was
necessary to develop within the army
those virtues deemed valuable. It does
not matter whether the principles are
political or military, unly that they
are actively inculcated. The proper
selection of recruits can ensure a fa-
vorable position from which to begin
the process of molding the soldier's
attitudes, but it cannot replace the
internal military education effort.
Forced to build an army from men of
ill-repute, the Chinese, like Machia-
velli, chose to inculcate within the
army the essential beliefs of. the
party, and then through the army
carry their message to the people. The
political contlicts that arose in Russia
during the attempt to build a people's
militia did not arise in China precisely
because the army was firmly tied to a
political institution, and not a set of
diverse political ideas.
The example of the development of
the Russian Red Army revealed that,
although Bolshevik leaders advocated
a people's militia, such an organiza-
tion represented a constant obstacle
to establishing the authority of the
central government. This was par-
ticularly true when ideological dif-
ferences were accented and local mili-
tia units supported ambitious political
leaders. It was this problem of politi-
cal reliability which forced Lenin to
centralize the armed forces and aban-
don the Jaures 'model. The Chinese
case established that a politically re-
13
POLITICAL PROBLEM
liable army can be instituted if or-
ganized along lines of Machia-
velli's militi'a. It is not possible, on
the basis of these examples, to envi-
sion the passing of the people's mili-
tia concept from the revolutionary
rhetoric of social movements; the need
to maintain the legend of the Red
Guard and its emotional appeal cer-
tainly precludes that. The implication
to be drawn from these historical
cases is that political reliability, po-
Ii tical activism and so:ne degree of
military efficiency can be established
within the armed forces so long as the
armed forces and its guiding princi-
ples emanate from and are strongly
controlled by a central institution. If
the missions of the army are seen. to
be the result of universal social prin-
ciples or the discretion of local politi-
cal leaders, then the army not only
will reflect local differences and ideo-
logical diversity, but also will repre-
sent an armed force that may be em-
ployed against the central government.
;l;OTES
1 IsaaC' Deut ... ,h ..... r. TI" Prophrt Armed
O;o.fnrrl Um\('! ... lty NY. 195.t
I'll 4';7:-<0
:! .Trnn Janre":>. DrD/ornlfll ll"rI Md,tllTII SrTllt'f".
Tran ... lat(',l, Edlt('d Ilnd Abble1Jintf'd from L'Armf'c
,Vo",d/f' by G. G. Coulton, Slmpkm Marshall,
Hamilton, Kent & C,' Ltd. Lontion, 19lf.,
1 NlI'culn MnchlQ\t'lh The Art of H't7T, Tran--
lat('l\ hy EIlts Fal n('worth, Rnbh .... Mf'rrili Cn In.".
N. Y. 1'Hi5, pp 10-11 I
<l Nn'C'olo Ma('hla\dh. The DZSCOlITS(,'1, Random
Hou,>" Inc NY, 1')50, Vulume I. p 4, nnd TIl<
['T"If'"(" (jJld rhf' Random Hnu<,p Inc,
NY. 1950, pp llR-21
-, Samuel n 1.11R1th Ill. Tht.' Chll'f'H(' Peol)/r'lI
[.IIIe-ratlO" Arml/. McGraw-Hill Hnok Co. NY,
}l1I;7, p 2G5
I, John Erlcks,m, Thf' SOllf't Hloh C0771mrll,rl,
f;t, Martin'., Inc. NY., 1'1fi2. p !1
... Lt.'nnani ::khaplTo. T11(" OrlOnlS of ,h" ('nm_
II/lII'I( AlltO('Tllill. HnrvRtll PH''''''', Cam
Mas.. 1 !l55, p 236
.. r.lu'1>..son, 01' ('Jf, p 33
In D('utsrhpr, 0)/ (',f, p 425.
11 Enck'-on, 07) rt', P 115_
12 Lenn Trotsky, Mllit(J.T1j Wrdlllgs. Translated
by ,J"hn n W rllZht pt nl. Pathfindf'r InC'.
NY., l%fl, PP llR-19
1 Rohp) t Payn",. Th(' l.Ifc (J,lld Death of Delllll.
Simon & Schu",ter Inc., N. Y., HI64, p
11 llHd. PP 51435
1-, S('haplro, 01' nt. pp 2'lR_100
Hi Ibid . p 316
1. Erick,>on. 01'. CIt., P 125
18 "Socml and Institutional DynamICs o( One
Party Systems," AllthOTitarl(ol Polltit's In Modern
14
Sondll Thr DYl1amlcf' of OUf'_Partl/
Edlt('d by Samup) Huntlngtun nnd CI('m-
('nt H Moore, Ba!-.ic Books. NY, 1970, PP 2fi_:!7
HI Griffith, op ("It. pp 18-20
';0 [bId, p 21
:!l IbId, fJ 266
.!2 MilO T"e-tunl!, 0" War, M,S Naralnr1l1." anfl
Son .. , Dphra Dun, Jndl3, J966, P "ill.
:.!,I Dome'-, "The Cultural Rpvolutlon
fOnd thl" Army" AsJt7>1 8m'I'ell, May 1968, p 34!1
..:1 Alexander L, George. The ChlT/cse Commlllllsf
m AC'tl01I TII(' Korea II WIn' and Its .1Iter-
mnth. Co!uTllbl3 University Pre":;>, N. Y., 1967, p 4
:.:-, IbId. p 200
:!H NIU "Th(' Rnnk)ess A'm\ ,"
l1Jlltary Rf'l'/fll'. Fpbrual'Y J%6, p 55
G('orge, Oil, CIt, fJ 212
';" Ib,d, D 201
:!'l [bId., P 202
10 Ellis JoffE'. PaTty llnd Armu PrOlCl!810llttil8m
(/lld PoltltC'o.C Cmltrol 111 thf' Ch'llell(, O(firt.'r Corp8.
194Q-1964. Harvard University Pres .. , ('ambridge,
Mas .. , 1965, P 103
:n Jnhn C1ittml!s, The Rolr 01 tlte Cltll1('8r Arm1/.
O'X(ord Umverslty NY., 1967. pp 201-4.
12 Joffl" oJ'. ('It. pp 88-89
11 Griffith, 01>. ('It. P 271.
34 Joffe. oP. cit., p 89.
Griffith, op. cit, pp 27273.
George, op. (',t., pp 205-6.
.1. Niu Sien-Chong, op. ("It" p '54.
Ibid" p 56.
'm DomE'S, 011. cit.. P 366
Military Review
QIlnu5tfnib and limited ,
Lieutenant Colonel William V. Murry, United States Anny
M
OST Army officers now on ac-
tive duty were schooled in the
nine principles of war now defined in
Field Manual 100-5 and were taught.
as that manual states, that those prin-
ciples are "fundamental truths." Nev-
ertheless, the principles of war have.
been challenged on numerous occa-
,ions. For over 20 years, the Army has
failed to develop a politically accept-
able doctrine for the tactical employ-
ment of nuclear weapons. If the
Clausewitzian concept of war being
an extension of politics by more force-
ful means is accepted, the sanctity of
the "fundamental truths" of the prin-
ciples of war must again be challenged.
Otherwise, they would have led to a
acceptable tactical nuclear
doctrine. Other authors have inter-
April 1975
preted the prInciples of war under
conditions of nuclear combat, but none
have specifically discussed the validity
of the principles in a limited nuclear
war. This article attempts to answer
the question, "Do the principles of war
apply to limited nuclear war?"
Any discussion of nuclear warfare
is limited by a lack of empirical data
derived from actual nuclear combat
experience. Valid nuclear weapon em-
ployment concepts can only be derived
by the logical combi nation of proven
methodology of military operations
and known phenomenology of nuclear
weapon effects. Both the arguments
and counterarguments are affected
equally by this lack of empirical sup-
port.
The concept of limited nuclear war
15
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
is often rejected as unrealistic and im-
possible. This attitude, a carry-over
from the nuclear "firebreak" strategy
of the Sixties, is based on the argu-
ment that the belligerents will esca-
late rather than accept defeat. In real-
ity, this suicidal logic becomes an
argument against the possibility of
limited war, nuclear or not. Escalation
of the nuclear conflict to the level of
massive strategic nuclear strikes deep
both to rehabilitate himself and to
exercise the desirerl control over the
loser. It would be a "Pyrrhic victory."
Thus, the employment of nuclear weap
ons has utility only in a limited war.
Because of the potential of eata
strophic results, the decision to em-
ploy nuclear weapons in war is, and
will likely al ways remam, for all na-
tions, a presidential decision.
For the United States, that decision
would likely be made under one of two
1
conditions. First, the United States
or our vital interests have been at-
tacked by an enemy actually using
nuclear weapons. Second, the
United States or our vital in-
-- terests have been attacked by
an enemy with the capability to
~ employ nuclear weapons tac-
~ to gain a significant margin
~
tically or sufficient manpower
of superiority in the absence
of nuclear weapons. Nu-
clear weapons w{)uld then
be employed tactically so
~
as to preclude the loss
. /'. of the object of the con-
I
, flict by either capture or
destruction. The risk of en-
\ \ S emy escalation of a nuclear
J /J y ~ war to strategic exchanges and
the risk of destruction can be
within the belligerents' homelands is
likely only if the survival or most vital
intel'est of the losing side is threat-
ened. The perception of threat is as
serious as actual threat; therefore,
. the "prerequisite for keeping war lim-
ited is that both sides have correct
intelligence about each other's inten-
tions," t
The destruction resulting from an
all-out mutual strategic nuclear ex-
change will be so great that "victory"
will lose its meaning. The surviving
physical and psychological assets of
the "victor" would not be sufficient
15
reduced by constraining the use
of US nuclear weapons. Weapon
yield, weapon type, target location,
character of target and number of nu-
clear weapons used must all be con-
strained in a limited nuclear war .
The Principles of War
The principles of war are the cul-
mination of efforts to establish a
cause-and-effect relationship between
the actions of al'mies and the outcome
of armed conflicts," For more than
2500 years, philosopher tacticians have
discussed principles which some reo
Military fteview
g.ard more as philosophy of war than
principles for the conduct of war.
3
Napoleon studied the great captains
of antiquity and espoused 115 maxims.
While the maxims he derived were un-
doubtedly valid in Napoleon's time
and had a timeless quality based upon
their historic derivation, the sheer
number would tend to deny them the
status of "principles of wtar."
In 1812, Clausewitz summarized his
milItary instruction to Frederick Wil-
helm IV m a memorandum entitled
"The Most Important Principles For
The Conduct Of War To Complete My
Course Of Instruction Of His Royal
Highness The Crown Prince." After
his death, Clausewitz' wife published
his writings. The English translation
of this memorandum is simply entitled
Principles of War. Although it lacks
the detail and depth of discuRSlOn of
his more famous work, Vom K'nege
IOn War), P"inciples of War was the
foundation for all that Clausewitz dis-
cussed in Fa1/! Kriege. In Principles
or War, Clausewitz cites 3 general
principles for defense. 14 principles
for offense, 8 for the use of troops and
17 for the u,e of tenam. In the third
chapter, "Strategy," he cites 4 rule,;.
the latter !l derived from the first.
Thus, the number of prinCIples varies
depending upon how rlausewitz is in-
terpreted. Although rlausewitz does
not name or title any of his principles,
they are readily identified as combina-
tions or discussions of the modern
Field Manual 100-5. All appear to be
covered except the principle of sim-
plIcity. I
The prmciples of war were recog-
nized by US Army Field Service Regu-
lations as early as 1904 and had been
taught at the Military Academy as
early as the late 1800s. Oddly enough.
they _were not listed until 1921. In sub-
sequent US Army doctrinal documen-
April 1975
tation, the principles of war were dis-
cussed in context but not listed by
name. The first listing and definition
or discussion of principles of war ap-
pears to have been in Field Manual
100-5 in 1949. British Army doctrinal
lIterature was similarly plagued, caUS-
ing General Fuller to, develop first 8,
then 11, and finally 9 principles of war
which the British Army subsequently
adopted in 1923. These 9 were ex-
panded again to 11 following Wol'ld
War II. -,
The lists of the prmciples of war
recognized by different nations are
given in Figure 1. The lists for the
United States and Britain are current.
The lists for the French and Soviets
were current in 1955 and are likely
still current. Although the lists differ.
similarity of content can be recog-
nized without knowing the "official"
definitions of each. The differences in
the principles accepted by various
countries reflect differences in the de-
,ired degree of emphasis which each
country places on the various princi-
ples, The differences in emphasis do
not appear to be due to fundamental
doctrinal or organizational differen-
ces_ Rather, they appear to be due to
17
LIMITED N,UCLEAR WAR
diffeTences in national character 'or
historical experience and language.
Changes in the weaponry of war
have resulted in "hanges in the inter-
pretation and importance of each of
the principles. These changes were
g'enerally slow to impact on military
thought in the Cnited States. Insular
,wlation f"om the wars of Europe and
Asia has allowed the Cnited States to
ignure the need to update military
techniques in the past. This isolation
provided a cushion of time and dis-
tance. behind which the United States
'cou Id leisurely absorb the lessons pain-
fully developed in other countries.
The application of the principles of
wal' in nuclear combat has been ad-
dressed by many authors. One study
concluded that smaller unit offensive
action would be directed toward pro-
ducipg situations in which nuclear
weapons could be used .to destroy the
18
enemy. A ~ l m l l a l F.tudy recognized the
need to limit military objeetivt'!'<o. the
increased role of firepo\\er In f.lehleV-
'ing ma::-.s, the increa:-;ed importance tlf
maneuver and secnrity and the in-
creased difficulty in abiding by the
principle of simplicity. Another study
examined the tactical nuclear doctrine
of the pentomic division era and con-
cluded that the principles of war re-
mamed valid. The interpretation. ap-
plication and emphasis, however.
changed in a manner similar to that
described above except that it elevated
the principle of the offensive to a
higher level of dominance.
Assumptions
Implicit in the question which this
article addresses are the conditions of
limited nuclear warfare as the result
of a US decision to employ nuclear
weapons tactically. The relative merits
Military Review
of nuclear versus nonnuclear conflict
are thus assllmed to have been re-
solved and are not discllssed.
The actions of the enemy are a,,
sumed to be rational and in accordance
with his perceptions of the intent and
capability of the United States. This
assumption may be lhe most difficult
for some reader, to acre pt. Detailed
analysis of the Chi nese fPeople's Re
public intervention In KOl:!,H, Soviet
action...:: during the Cuban miR, .. dIe
crh:.is and the internnl and external
alfairs of any potential enem,' will.
however, prove the rHtionality. The
stated intent of potentIal tn
e:-.calate nuclear W:11' l'upidly IS in It-
self a ratIOnal attempt to ensure that
future WIll he n()nlll1l'h __
ann thus under conditions more favor-
able to theIl" use of armed force. h
Given a choice between natIOnal de-
:-.trudion uy aU-out nlldear war and
a of action le:-.s than uncondi-
tIOnal surrender, it is difficult to imag-
Ine any nation so irrational as to
l'hoose :-.ocial and economic suicide.
The definitions and intent of the
principles of war recognized by the
US Army are assumed to be those in
Field Manual 100-5, Operations of
Army Forces in the Field, 1968, and
are those discussed in this article.
The PrinCiple of the Objective
The principle of the objective is
always listed first because it is the
dominant principle. Without a clearly
defined and attainable objective, all
the others become meaningless.
Through at least 1960, the princi-
ple of the objective proclaimed the
ultimate military objective and the
ultimate objective of war to be de-
struction of the enemy armed forces
and his will to fight. This "destruc-
tion" objective is derived from Clause-
witz' philosoph" of unlimited war of
April 1975
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
annihilation. However, attempts to
destroy an enemy's armeo force, to-
tally are likely to increase, rather than
de,troy. his WIll to fight as long as
he has the means to Although
the current Field Manual 1005 'lOeS
the word "defeat" instead of "de-
thE' emphasl;-; on
is apparent from the Field ;>'Ian-
ual 61-100. The J)ivisI<l11. mi"ion fill'
L'S Army dIvisions. Even the ultl'
mate military oh,ledn"e of defeat of
the enemy's armed forces appears to
be inconsistent with a national pur-
pose of control or termination of the
conflict by limited means. Some au-
thors have interpreted "defeat" in the
case of limited nuclear war to mean
only local defeat. However, any em-
ployment short of theaterwide nuclear
use will not provide US Army forces
with the capability to defeat more than
part of the committed enemy maneu-
ver units.
The ultimate objective of war is to
attain, through the use of military
force, a national objective which' is
19
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
thought unattainable through less vin-
lent means. That national objective
must be foremost in'the determination
of all military objectives.
When US Army forces in the field em-
ploy nuclear weapons, have suf-
ficient combat po\\er to attam mili-
tal'y obJectives greatel' than that re-
quired by a national objective of
control or termination. This excess
capability. if employed, results in
"overkill," with the probnble conse-
quenee of enemy escalation of nuclear
\\ eapon employment. r;ven nonnuclear
action, If it does not contribute to
the natIOnal objecth'e, risks escala-
t ion unneeeHsarily.
When the national obJective of war
IS limited to less than unconditional
surrender of the enemy armed forces.
the ultimate military obJective is more
political than mlhtary. The refusal,
or inability, to recognize this fact
was the cause for much of the frus-
trations, both in the military and P1lb-
lie communitieH, over Korea antI Viet-
nam actionf-;.
The principle of the obJecti ve as
currently defined does not prOVIde fO!'
the attainment of the national objec-
tive through coercive use of military
force short of defeating or destroy-
ing the enemy armed forces. Allow-
ance for a broader interpretation of
the word "defeat" is not sufficient. In
order to minimize the risk of escala-
tion, particularly in a limited nuclear
conflict, it will be necessary that both
the US Armed Forces and the enemy
cunderstand precisely what the limits
of the United States' national objec-
tive are. Because of its emphasis on
"defeat" and "destruction," rather
than "contra]" and "termination," the
principle of the objective does not
enhance success of the US Army in
a limited nuclear war. Instead, it has
a destabilizing and potentially escala-
20
tory effect. Especially in a limited nu-
clear war, this principle would be best
regarded as the principle of national
objective.
The Principle of the Offensive
Tacticians are divided on the rela-
tive value of the offense and the ue-
fense. Fifteen Decisi!'e Battles of fhe
World shows that nine of the victories
were for the defender. Nevertheless,
the prmciple of the offensive is firmly
ingramed in US Army doctrine. Of-
fensive action is regarded as the
only way to ensure ultimate destruc-
tion of the enemy armed forces and
to retain the initiative. The offensive
is also highly regarded for its de-
cisiveness and value as a mOl'ale fac-
tor. This emphasis on "destruction,"
"initiative," "decisiveness" and "mo-
rale" apparently springs from Clause-
Military Review
witz' concept of war of annihilation
and his concern for the psychological
aspects of war.
Some authors believe the principle
of the offensive will become more dom-
inant in a nuclear war. Others be-
lieve that nuclear combat favors de-
fensive action more than offensive
tion. At the strategic le\'el and on a
theaterwide basis. the Ifational objec-
t i ve will be served as well by the
deCisive act of the enemy to cease
as it is by decisive offen-
sive action intended to leave him no
choice. Large-scale offensive actions
may be interpreted as threatening to
the survival of the enemy armed
forces. and thus would tend to result
in escalation. At times, even the op-
portunity for counterattack might be
foregone to preclude further destabi-
lizing complication of the situation,
and to allow the enemy time to exer-
cise his option to end the conflict. Ag-
gressive offensive actions in a limited
nuclear war will likely be confined to
battalion level and lower in, order to
avoid presenting a target for enemy
nuclear weapons and to avoid signal
Ing any intent of escalation. The pur-
poses of the. smaller unit offenshe
actions will be disruption, Interdiction
and punishment, rather than seeking
decisive total destruction of the en-
emy armed forces. The initiative and
freedom of action can be maIntained
in a largely defensive environment by
forcing the enemy to fight when and
where the US commander chooses or
forcing him to become channelized to
avoid a battle. In either case, the en-
emy becomes more vulnerable to US
nuclear weapons. Additionally, free-
dom of action can be improved by pre-
paredness, flexibility, more compre-
hensive intelligence and contingency
planning at all levels of command.
The commander cannot adopt the
April 1975
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
philosophy, "When in doubt, attack!,"
because the corollary is "When in
doubt, ignore all the other princi-
pIes.'" Particularly in nuclear con-
flict, the defensive becomes at leas't as
important as the offensive. Offensive
actions can be escalatory and, there-
fore, counterproductive to the na-
tional objectIve in a limited war. The
bold and daring actions in
US Army history now regarded as
heroic could lead to thermonuclear ca-
tastrophe if executed in a limited n\l-
clear war. Thus. the principle of the
offensive \\ ill not enhance in
a hmited nuclear war.
Stressing rational application of the
principle of the offensive will not suf-
fice. The proper emphasis will be
placed on both the offense and the de-
fense and the original intent of the
principle of the offensive to ensure
freedom of action will be preserved
if it is regarded as the principle of
initiative aetion.
The Principle of Mass
The principle of mass is often Ques-
tioned in a nuclear environment be-
cause. historically. mass has been
identified \\ ith the concentration of
men and materiel. Combat power. how-
ever. is composed of manpower and
firepower. An increase in the potency
of the firepower element increases the
vulnerability of manpower and de-
creases the need for manpower in
establishing a given level of combat
power. A greater dispersion of units
on the nuclear battlefield is a well-
accepted concept.
US commanders have been known
to overemphasize the principle of mass
to the extent of establishing over-
whelming superiority of com bat
power. This tendency has been partic-
ularly true in the employment of fire-
power. Commanders in Korea fre-
21
,LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
.,
quently called for artillery or tactical
air to engage targets even when they
had the organic capability to neutral-
ize. Employing nuclear weapons in
a similar manner would be 'not only
destabilizing but also wasteful of vale
uable combat power.
An element of combat power often
taken for granted within the US
Army is combat service support. Mas-
sive support of the magnitude wit-
nessed in Vietnam will be impossible
in a nudear war. The re-
sponsiveness of smaller
dispersed combat service
support elements will de-
termine to a larger meas.-
ure the total combat power
of US Army forces in the
field.
The principle of mass
will enhance the success of
US Army forces in a lim-
ited nuclear war so long as
all the elements of combat
power-manpower, mate-
del, fil'epower and combat
service support-are con-
22
,
sidered and the real limi-
tations on the availability
of resources are recognized.
Particularly in limited nu-
clear warfare, the applica-
tion of appropriate combat
power must observe the
principle of economy of
force as well as mass.
The Principle 01 Economy 01 Force
Classically, economy of
force has been taken to
mean the reduction of force
in secondary efforts in or-
der to achieve superiority
at the critical time and
place. The need for econ-
omy of force was totally
dependent on the need for
mass at some other location. The pos-
sibility of "overkill" with (JUclear
weapons is not only wasteful of re-
sources, but it also increases the risk
of escalation. Thus, measured appli-
cation, as well as allocation, of avail-
able combat power to both the pri-
mary and secondary tasks becomes
more important when nuclear weapons
are employed. "As a general rule, in
a limited war the smallest amount of
force consistent with achieving the
Military Review
objective should be used." 0 Generally,
this amount of force will be much less
than that required to ensure the de-
struction of the enemy armed force
and his capability to continue combat.
Application of the principle of econ-
omy of force will be essential to the
conduct of a limited nuclear war by
US Army forces and must be applied
in the main as well as fecondary ef-
forts.
The Principle of Maneuver
Maneuver implies more than mere
movement of tactical units and fire-
power. It includes a consideration of
mobility of support and command and
control elements. The British principle
of flexibility is perhaps more descrip-
tive of the intent of maneuver, but it
doeR not emphasize movement to the
extent tlfat the US principle does.
lI.Taneuver is generally regarded as a
key to survival in a nuclear environ-
ment. However, many surveillance ra-
dars depend upon movement for tar-
April 1975
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
get Maneu'ler will be an
important element of survival primar-
ily for units such as headquarters and
active artillery which have other de-
tection enhancing "signatures." To be
effective. maneuver must be more
rapid than the enemy's capability to
affect the situation. The tendency in
a limited nuclear war will be toward
the rapid moves of smaller tactical
u nits. Although the air mobility of
Vietnam experience can assist im-
measurably in rapid maneuver. the
vulnerability of Army aircraft to low
levels of blast overpressures and pilot
vulnerability to flash blindness must
be considered. In the defense. maneu
ver will provide a means for maintain-
ing the initiative by complicating en
emy offensive planning. In addition.
maneuver of small units will be em-
ployed offensively and defensively to
aid in "finding and fixing" enemy
for attack with nuclea r weapons.
Maneuver will be nece,gary to add
depth to battle when lCS forces are
outnumbered. or when more forces
would only increase nuclpar vulnera
bility. Application of the principle of
maneuver WIll enhance the success of
US Army forces in a lImited nuclear
war.
The Principle of Unity of Command
It has been alleged that the prin-
CIples of economy of force. objective.
offensive and maneuver can be sum-
marized under unity of command for
the reason of gaining unity of effort.
The sale purpose of unity of command
is to ensure unity of effort. The Field
Manual 1005 definitIOn recognizes
that unity of effort is attainable
through other techniques- -namely. co-
operation which is the corresponding
British principle of war. Thus. it must
be concluded that unity of command
is a US Army doctrinal technique and
23
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
100-5 definition-namely, the "preser-
vation of combat power." Con-
sidering the greater violence
and lethality which accompa-
nies nuclear combat, the im-
portance of the principle of
security and the attention to
its application will be
greatly increased.
Too often this princi-
ple emphasizes the ele-
ment of secrecy to
avoid sUrprise. As
a result, the intel-
";;ligence, counterintelligence, reconnais-
sance an<l counterreconnaissance func-
tend to <laminate the application
not truly a
principle of
war. How-
ever, complete depend-
ence on unity of com-
mand as a tool to ensure
unity of effort wiII not
suffice in the rapidly
varying conditions of nuclear combat.
The need for responsiveness and con-
trol of both nuclear and nonnuclear
fire support may be solved by a form
of dual subol'dination of dual capable
artillery. Unit operations may well af-
fect an area in excess of the area of
control assigned to a single com-
mander, and lateral cooperation omit-
ting the single superior commander
will be necessary to maintain effec-
tive control. Success wiII be enhanced
more if this principle is regarded as
the principle of unity of effort.
The Principle of Security
The rationale for security as a
principle of war is best stated in the
first 'sentence of the Field Manual
24
of the principle of security. Cover
from blast, <lebris, thermal and pene-
trating nuc lear ra<liation must receive
as much attention as concealment
from <letection. Both cover an<l con-
cealment will require more attention
than they normally receive during less
lethal nonnuclear conflicts. The pos-
sible sudden loss of an entire head-
quarters, or other comman<l an<l con-
trol elements, to a single nuclear
weapon <lemands consideration of con-
tinuity of command as an element of
security.
In applying the principle of secu-
rity, it must be remembered that the
enemy must know our strategic intent
to limit the conflict and not feel his
national survival is at stake. Overly
effective counterintelligence and de-
ception, particularly at higher levels
of command, can increase the rIsk of
escalation due to the enemy's misper-
ception of au r intent.
The need for joint-service cOOl'dina-
tion to preclude self-inflicted losses in
nuclear conflict is greater because of
the vulnerability of air support to low
overpressu res and flash.
More appropriate emphasis wiII be
Military Review
noted If the principle of security is
regarded as the principle of preser-
vation of rombat pOlVer.
The Principle of Surprise
Part of the success of Israel in
battle against numerically superior
Arabic forces in 1967 and 1973 has
been attributed to application of the
principle of surprise. 10 Numerous
other historical examples support the
value of surprise as an element of
war. The real value of surprise lies
not so much in the lack of the enemy's
knowledge as it does in his lack of
ability to respond effectively in orde\'
April 1975
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR'
to control the outcome of the encoUll-
ter. In a Ihnited nuclear war, it be-
comes necessary to sacrifice surprise
to "preclude extending the limits of
the war as a result of inaccurate eval-
uation of such intentions."!l Never-
theless, a!l effort should be made to
achieve surprise in the time, location
and manner of action, while leaving
no doubt as to the intent. The essen-
tial element is maintenance of supe-
riority of responsiveness whether the
action is offensive or defensive. To
25
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
provide the superiority of responsivE>-
ness in the use of micleal' weapons,
the requesting unit or agency must
provide complete, accurate and timely
data to the release authority so that
the employment can be most effective.
Application of the principle of sur-
prise will enhance the success of US
Army forces in a limited nuclear war
if it is confmed to the actions of tac-
tical maneuver and firepower unit".
This constraint appears to relegate
surprise to a technique of battle. The
intent of this principle of war is clear
when regarded as the principle of 1'e-

The PrinCiple of Simplicity
Simplicity of plans and orders can
be regarded in terms of simplicity of
statement or in terms of simplicity of
npClatiol1. r;isenho\ver's 30-word or-
der to enter the European Continent
and undei'lake combined actions to de-
26
stroy German Armed Forces is re-
garded as a model of simplicity of
statement. The almost overwhelming
complexity of that operation need only
be mentioned to be realized. Simplic-
ity is not an end in itself, but a means
to ensu re the most effective action.
Simplicity of operation in a nuclear
conflict is inhibited by the need to co-
ordinate maneuvel' and firepower at
higher staff levels, by the complex
logistical support for nuclear weapons
and by the cumbersome nuclear
weapon release procedures, Modern
military operations which include
night operations, airmobile and am-
phibious operations and nuclear and
chemical warfare are inherently com-
plex, The possibility of failure intro-
duced by complexity is reduced by
tl'aining, task organization and equip-
ment.
In light of inherent complexity, ef-
fective action can be ensured through
Military Review
clarity of plans and orders. Clarity is
necessary to ensure unity of effort
consistent with the objective and to
minimize the risk of escalation. Clar-
ity is more important than sheer sim-
plicity. While the two are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. c I a r i t Y
'should never be sacrificed for sim-
plicity. ,
Application of the principle of sim-
plicity wiII be more difficult but will
enhance the success of US Army
forces in a limited nuclear war. The
more important element should be em
phasized by regarding this principle
as the principle of clarity.
In Conclusion
It has been noted that two princi-
ples of war do not enhance success,
two do not adequately enhance success
without renaming and redefining and
two are not true principles of war.
Only three principles were found to
enhance success in a limited nuclear
war as currently defined. discussed,
named and understood.
The principles of objective and of-
fensive will not enhance Sl1ccess in a
limited nuclear war because of their
emphasis on decisive destruction or
defeat through offensive action which
is deemed to be destabilizing and es-
calatory in a limited war.
The principles of security and sim-
plicity through broad definition wiII
enhance success in a limited nuclear
war, but the breadth of that defini-
tion is so great as to make renaming
of these two principles desirable for
better understanding.
rhe principles of unity of command
and surprise are recognized as tech
niques or tools which are doctrinal to
the US Army, but not truly principles
of war. They will enhance success in
a limited nuclear war, but without the
flexibility of method allowed by true
April 1975
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
principles of war.
The principles of mass, economy of
force and maneuver as currently de-
fined will enhance the success of US
Army forces in a limited nuclear war.
In response to the over-all question
posed at the beginning of this article,
the principles of war, as currently
defined, discussed and named, do 110t
apply to limited nuclear war.
Changes to the names of six of the
principles of war have been suggested
and the "new" definitions implied, at
least in part. While the purpose of
this article was confined to limited
nuclear war, the principles of war, if
they are true "principles," must apply
to all wars, limited or general, nonnu-
clear or nuclear. This constraint was
considered in the recommendation of
"new" names for those six principles
(Figure 2).
27
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
These principles, therefore, will not so much give com- c
plete instruction . as they will stimulate and sel've as a
guide for your own reflections_
, -Kar! von ,
" " ":;;'Y '> \ '.
Lieutenant Colonel William V.
Murry is currently with the Depart-
ment of Tactics, USACGSC. He re-
ceived a B.S. from the USMA, an M.S.
and a Ph.D. tram Rensselaer Polytee/!-
nic Institute, and is a 1974 USACGSC
YIaduate. Assignments include com-
mand of the 1st Light Horse Assault
A rt,/lelV Battery in Vietnam and of
the Headquarters Company, I Corps
(Republic of KOIea/United States)
Group in Korea and sel"vire Field
Command, De/elise Nuclear Agency.
;';OTES
1 Henry A. K1Ssinger. Nuclear Weapon" and
FaretgJt ['alrey. Second Edltlon, W. W. Norton &
Co. Inc., N. Y., 1969, pp 107-61.
Nuclear WarfllrE'," OrblB. Volume XVI!, Number
2. 19,3. p 439
2 Marshall L Fallwel1. "The Principles of War
and the SolutIOn of MlhtaTlI Mll!tanl
Rr.'vu!ut, May 1955. pp 536&.
3 John C Barney, Nur.'lear Wellp0'l18 1'8. Tltro
PTHlC"lple8 oj War, Student ThesiS, US Army War
Gollege. CarlIsle Barracks, Pa . 1960.
-t Karl von C'lausewltz, Prtnnples of War. Edited
by Hans W. Gatzke, The Military S'rvlce
ing Co" Harnst<urg, Pa . 1942, pp 310.
a Fallwell. op. crt., PP 00-52.
6 James H. Polk. "ThE' Reahties of Tactlral
,Alba B Lathrop. "Prlnelpfe"; of Wr r m a
Nudenr Age," Mdrtn.TlI RevtcU', June 1959, p 21i.
H G. C. Reinha.rdt and W. R. Kmtner. AtOhtr("
WeaPons m Land Combat, Second Enmon. ThE'
MIlItary Service Puhlishmg Co. Harrisburg,
Pa, 195'10. P 30.
f) KI.."."inger. 01' CIt .. P 15.8
10 Jar Weller. "Sir Ba..,d Liddell Dis-
npJt's In Israel," Mlhtary ReView. January 1974,
p 13.
11 Barney. ap. Clt .. P 26.
Sketches by Major James B. Channon, United States Army
28
Military Review
East German Army:
A' New Look at Indoctrination
DENNIS CHAPLIN
R
ECENT information imparted
by East German Army (EGA)
defectors Indicates a disturbing
angle on the idea of psychological
conditioning which has often been
ignored in the past. Increasingly,
cross-examinations of defectors have
revealed that the Communist system
of "political indoctrination" has a
limited effect on Europeans without
the objective need to support
something like a national liberation
movement. Political training can have
significant success and produce
attitude changes in Vietcong fighters
filled with the group-susceptibility
of the "guerrilla spirit," or it can, as
in Japan in the last world war, be
effective in people already conditioned
to think in terms of a national
HmisRion,"
With its uninspiring uncharlsmatic
leadership, frontier restrictions and
economic difficulties, East Germany,
or the Gel'man Democl'atic Republic
(G DR), fails to offer the conditions
fol' susceptibility to a stimulatory
political indoctl'ination geal'ed to
producing wildly enthusiastic gl'OUp
feeling. In fact, as indicated by
defector repol'ts, the delicate pl'oblems
evoked by the division of Germany
and the possibility of an inter-German
contlict in the context of interalliance
hostilities raise constant doubts in
EGA soldiers' minds. This is the
April 1975
residue of Germany's past fiercely
guarded national togetherness, and
the Communist regime in the GDR
has spent the past 30 years trying to
break down the links between the two
German states.
I t was not until the early 1960s
that East Gel'mans were actually
physically sealed off, a necessary
response to the prospects of an ever-
diminishing labor force. As recent
Interviews suggest, however, the
Inter-German links have not eroded
enough to facilitate the effective
application of political indoctrination
against \ e ~ t (iermans. This sitliRtion
worsened after 1972 when the
Communist regime in the GDR "as
forced by the USSR to relax frontier
re::;trictions. The result wa.s an
increasing rate of defection and
increasing personal contacts WIth
West Germam-the very people the
political officers were trying to vilify
as warmongers and imperialist
fascists. It Just would not work, and
mid-1972 began to see complaints
from EGA personnel that the
arguments of political education
were anachronisms in the context of
political relaxation and increasing
contacts with West German tourists.
Political indoctrination's function
of shouting "wolf" in connection
29
EAST GERMAN ARMY
with West Germans w.as thus
obstructed. Political officers in EGA
units began .to. encounter more
cynicism and complaints during
schooling sessions. especially from
those conscripts who had Just been
inducted from a civilian environment
filled with ideas of political relaxation
and inter-German contact. It was,
therefore, decided to buttress political
schooling with more positive means
of motivating EGA troops to sense
a deep hatred for the West. Defector
interviews suggest that this modified
approach has worked quite 'well and
that, to quote an ex-EGA captain,
the troops "do in many cases exhibit
a surprisingly deeply ingrained hatred
for the West." Past inclinations to
scoff at the EGA concept of "hate
training" as a fanciful aspect of
political indoctrination can now be
put aside, for it appears that this form
of training i:;; very much a reality in
the EGA.
T his is not to say that political
indoctrination is the main instrument
here. The crux of "hate training" is
l)1ore akin to motivational guidance
based upon the EGA principle of
extremely tough, realistic training
under harsh conditions. EGA
psychologists noted that the pressures
created during training tended to
produce extremely ill-tempered moods
among the troops. In view of the
increasing ineffectiveness of political
schoolmg, it was decided to exploit
the kind of moods generated during
tough training as a basis for
political arguments.
The focal point of political
arguments against the West thus
came to relate to blaming Western
military activities neal' the frontier
for harsh conditions encountered by
30
EGA troops. Training principles
like "constantly doubled combat
readiness,H I'nonstop efforts,"
"permanent alertness" and "ceaseless
competition" are now placed in a
fresh perspective. EGA trainers
argue that constant training efforts
to the point of exhaustion are
occasioned by signs of increasing
military activity by NATO forces.
The object is to help EGA troops to
identify the pressures and discomforts
of training demands with NATO
challenges.
Since Easter 1972, leave has been
cut drastically; currently, only 12
to 15 percent of EGA personnel are
allowed public holiday leave as
opposed to about 50 percent before
1972. The idea is to make EGA
troops nourish a dislike for the
relaxed frontier restrictions and
influx of West German tourists. The
psychology involved is fiendishly
simple but effective. Gradually, the
Dennis Chaplin is a researcher from
the University of East Anglia, special-
izing in military-political analysis. He
received his B.A. and Ph.D. at the
School of European Studies, Norwich,
England. He writes for various inter-
national defense and political journals,
and is currently preparing a book ex-
amining political training and control
in the East Gel'rnan Army. His article
"Multidirectional Harassment" was in
the May 1974 MILITARY REVIEW.
Military Review
soldier comes to feel that his reduced
leave and off-duty times are to be
blamed on political relaxation, that
his discomfort is the ,Price of others'
convenience. Consequently, it is not
long before the EGA man on reduced
leave comes to regard the West
German visitors with deep resentment
and supports the political officer who
argues against the validity of political
relaxation with the West.' He
naturally feels that the return of
the old restrictions will give him
more leave; therefore, he comes to
regard political relaxation with the
West with the exact attitude the
Communist regime wishes to instill
-that of emotionally charged
rejection.
T he psychology of "number one
first" is similarly applied during the
tough and "eemingly ceaseless
training facing the EGA soldier. In
a training system which, according
to one political officer defector,
"knows no rest," there are ideal
possibilities for channelIng
resentments at focal points. Since
a soldier likes to have something
specific to blame for his discomforts,
EGA trainers are now instructed to
supply focal points for anger and
frustration. The argument is based
on the theory that political relaxation
could lay the GDR wide open to
increased saboteurism and covert
N A TO plans to penetrate the
frontier and that, as long as there
IS supposed to be political relaxation,
the EGA must be doubly vigilant.
Again, the suggestion is that the end
of political relaxation will mean less
training pressures.
Alarm training has been stepped
up considerably. Reports suggest that
most.units, especially those near the
April 1975
EAST GERMAN ARMY
frontier, tend to enjoy little more
than 40 days a year free from the
alarm sirens. In 1973, for example,
the !lth Armored Division in Eggesin
experienced as many as 320 days'
alarm training; the 1st Mechanized
Infantry Division (Potsdam), up
to 315 days. lJnits are awakened in
the middle of the night and often
in bad weather. They are expected to
report in full combat kit-plus NBC
(nuclear, biological, chemical)
protective gear-within minutes and
are transported hurriedly to alleged
"crisis areas" where they are kept
under severe conditions for several
hours until the "all clear" is given.
As far as possible, these sudden
alarms are synchronized with
expected exercises or maneu vers by
NATO or Eundesqrenzschutz (EGS)
(West German Frontier Service)
formations near the frontier so that
EGA men are provided with visible
proof that their superiors are only
calling them out at such uncivilized
times in response to alarms occasioned
by NATO activity. Preference is
given to the BGS exercises, for these
help to draw EGA attention to the
continued "aggressive" attitude on
the part of West Germans.
DUring these alarms. political
officers activate their arsenal of
simplistic political arguments and
crude emotional appeals to guide
resentments in the appropriate
direction. Reports suggest that the
political officers find very positive
resonance when schooling is carried
out during alarms. Nearly all
defectors interviewed confirmed that
this approach to indoctrination is
steadily making EGA morale "better
and more reliable than its reputation
in the West." ~ m
31
Part 1The Political Evolution
Kenneth J. Coffey
I
N JANUARY 1973, two of, the
world's major English-speaking
countries began to rely on volunteers
to man their armed forces. In the
United States, the last formal draft
calls were issued for December 1972,
and the arrival of 1973 marked the
beginning of the US transition to an
all-volunteer force. Rased on the
premise that increases in service ben-
efits and reductions in service-life ir-
ritants would attract adequate volun-
teers, the US transition did not
result in fundamental changes in
armed forces' capabilities or strategic
concepts.
In Australia, however, the adoption
of the all-volunteer force, prompted
by the sudden abandonment of the
draft in December 1972 by the newly
elected Labor Party Government, re-
sulted in both major force reductions
and a revised strategic concept with
a more limited role for the Australian
Armed Forces.
The abandonment of the draft in
1972 was the third time in recent his-
tory that Australia switched from a
conscript to an all-volunteer force.
Like all other major participants in
World War II, Australia drafted men
into the armed forces during the
1939-45' period. At the end of the war,
however, the government stopped in-
ductions,' and, for more than three
years, the Australian Armed Forces
were supported with volunteers.
National SelYice Training
In December 1949, the newly estab-
lished Liberal Party, led by Robert G.
Menzies, won the federal election. Be-
lieving that large-scale deployment of
troops could still be a prime factor in
Part II. "The Impact on FOI't'e Lev{'ig." will o.PIH'o.T in the May 1975 Mtlitaru Review.
34
Military Review
many contingencies, the new govern-
ment decided to legislate for the in-
troduction of compulsory military
training. 2 Under the Menzies scheme,
almost all young Australian men
would enter the services for two to
four months' initial training. The
Liberal Government proposal met with
initial Labor Party oPPf'sition, but
not nearly as vehement as in the de-
bates of the _ World War II period
when conscription for service beyond
Australia and the nearby territories
was not authorized until 1944, five
years after Australia entered the
war.
3
Prior to the submission of the mili-
tary training proposal, the Labor
Party was committed by its platform
to "the establishment of an adequate
and properly balanced defence organi-
zation on a voluntary basis" and to
the deletion from the Defence Act "of
all clauses relating to compulsory
Kenneth J. Coffey is Associate Di-
rector, Defense Manpower Commis-
sion, Washington, D. C. He is a Naval
Reserve Officers' Training Corps grad-
uate of Northwestern University and
has spent four and one-half years in
the US Marine Corps. The data for
this two-part article was collected
while Mr. Coffey was preparing a re-
search study and evaluation of mili-
tarl{ manpower procurement systems
in nine countries. .
April 1975
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE
training and service." But, when the
new government announced its inten-
tion to introduce compulsory training,
the 19th Commonwealth Conference
of the Labor Party in 1951 emphati-
cally rejected their previous policy
and approved "the principle of com-
pulsory military training for home de-
fence, subject to a proper regard for
the national economy," It also "in-
structed the Federal Parliamentary
Labor Party not to prevent the pas-
sage of the National Service Bill then
before Parliament."
Following the passage of the N a-
tional Service Act (No.2 and No. 63
of 1951), National Service Training
remained in effect in Australia u'ntil
1960 although the intakes were ma-
terially reduced in 1957. fi
Reinstitutio" of Conscription
From 1960 through 1964, Australia
again relied on volunteers to man its
armed forces. However, in November
1964, the Menzies government an-
nounced its proposal for the reintro-
duction of compulsory military serv-
ice. Unlike National Service Training,
the 1964 plan provided for two years
of conscript service with no restric-
tions against overseas duty.
6
The government's case for conscrip
tion was set out fully in the Prime
Minister's statement to Parliament.
Therein, Sir Robert Menzies argued
that:
... the emergence of a greater and
more immediate threat to Aust.ralia
in the north (through the intransi-
gence of Indonesia and the weakness
of South Vietnam), now ouflceighed
the previously accept cd arguments
against conscription. 7
With the exception of the latter
years of World War II, the Austra-
lians had never in their modern his-
tory conscripted men for other than
35
ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
horne defense, and the Labor Party
reacted, strongly to the Menzies pro-
posal. Par.ty Leader Aithur Calwell
declared that "the Labor Party op-
poses utterly absolutely conscrip-
tion lor the youth of this country for
service in peacetime." '" In
Parliament, the official Labor Party
position was that conscription was
completely unnecessary since there
was no immediate threat to Austra-
lia. "
The Menzies proposal was followed
by a nationwide Senate election. Al-
though the Labor Party in the cam-
paign called the Menzies proposal
"unjust, inefficient, costly and im-
moral" 10 and :Ill'. Calwell accuoed the
government of dicing with the lives of
the nation's 20-year-olds," the con-
scription issue did not stir the elec-
torate, and the Menzies government
was returned to power. Shortly there-
after, the enabling legislation for
overseas conscription \ National Serv-
Ice Act, No. 12G of 1964) was passed
into law: I
Although the Labor Party made the
commitment of troops and conscripts
to Vietnam an issue of the election
campaign, the Australian commitment
to Vietnam at that time was limited
t,) ground advisors. It was not until
April 1965-after the Senate elections
-that the Menzies government an-
nounced its decision to send combat
troops to Vietnam. 12 Then, in March
1966, the new Prime Minister, Mr.
Harold Holt, who had replaced Men-
zies as head of the Liberal-Country
Party (LCP), announced that the
troop strength in Vietnam would be
increased and that conscripts would
be included in the reinforcements. ta
Reacting to the announcement, Labor
Party Leader Calwell stated his "em-
phatic opposition to the despatch of
conscripted youth to VIetnam." 14 At
36
the same time, the Labor Party in
Parliament declared that any future
Labor Government would bring back
all conscripts from Vietnam "without
delay" and would insist on the with-
drawal of all Australian forces from
Vietnam as soon as practicable. '"
The Conscription Issue in the
t 966 Federal Elections
Conscription, particularly the as-
signment of conscripts to Vietnam,
was a major issue for the Labor
Party in the 1966 federal elections. '"
By this time, opposition to conscrip-
tion from outside the formal political
structure was growing rapidly. Anti-
conscription organizations such as.
Save our Sons and Youth Campaign
Against Conscription extended their
counteraction to the Vietnam issue
and were joined by new groups such
as the Draft Resistance Movement
and the Vietnam Action Campaign. "
The election cam p a i g n became
heated and violent. Antiwar literature
with pictures of burned and disfigured
Vietnamese women and children was
common, and government spokesmen
were shouted down at rallies as "mur-
derers" and "fascists" selling "dig-
gers for dollars." The Prime Minister
was mobbed and punched, and Ar-
thur Calwell was wounded in a shot-
gUh assassination attempt as he left
an anti-Vietnam rally.IR
Although the Labor Party raised
the conscription issue, it did not ma-
terially sway the electorate, and the
Liberal-Country Party was returned
to power with a record majority
which it maintained in the Senate
elections of 1967.
In 1967, Labor's new leader, Gough
Whit lam, obtained a modified Labor
Party position on conscription. The
new policy would permit conscription
in times of th,'eatened attack on Aus-
Military Review
tralian territory and would allow con-
script service outside of Australian
territory for "declared" war. 19 At the
same time, the demands of the previ-
ous leader, Calwel!, for immediate
withdrawal of A ustralian troops from
Vietnam were replaced by a policy
which supported the Australian com-
bat force commitment, but made the
commitment conditional Jon the US
ending the bombing of North Vietnam
and seeking negotiations to end the
war. 20
Mr. Whitlam's views were expanded
in 1969 by the deputy party leader,
Mr. Lance Barnard, in the Labor
Party's official position paper on de-
fense. This document, which was used
as the party's defense plank in their
key 1972 election victory, listed six
basic defense objectives. Reflecting a
"Fortress Australia" concept, all the
objectives but one were related to the
defense of Australian sea. air and
land space. 21 The exception provided
for the support of UN peacekeeping
operations. Conspicuously absent was
a commitment to provide military sup-
port to neighboring countries faced
,,-ith insurgent or Communist threats.
The 1972 General Elections
In 1972. the Labor Party had been
in opposition to the Liberal and later
the Liberal-Country Party for 22
years. They had not been in office
since losing the 1949 election, and, by
1972. the Labor position on conscrip-
tion had hardened to the point where
the Labor policies were almost totally
opposite to those of the Liberal-Coun-
try Party.
Citing the absence of a real military
threat to the Australian mainland.
Labor Party Leader Whitlam said:
"The Labor Party regards if as a duty
to form an all-volunteer army." 22
Although the LCP Government an-
April 1975
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE
Mr. &ough Whitlam
nounced in August 1971 that all Aus-
tralian troops would be withdrawn
from Vietnam by February 1972. 23
the Vietnam commitment and .the use
of conscripts for overseas duties reo
mained critical issues of the 1972
election campaign.
:'.luch like the protest movement in
the United States, the antiwar and
antidraft activities in Australia be-
came stronger and more vocal during
the 1971-72 period. Teach-ins, sit-ins,
acts of civil disobedience, draft eva
sions and conscientious refusal to en-
ter the service received widespread
attention in the nation's media, and
the protest movement became progres-
si vely stronger. 2.
Mr. Lance Barnard
37
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE
Australian troops depart Vietnam
Although the Labor Party's opposi
tion to conscription certainly con-
tributed to its 2 December 1972 elec-
_tion victory, at least one observer
noted that, although the Labor Party
supported the end of conscription, it
had no hard policy positions concern-
ing a desired level of forces or the
means necessary to obtain them. 25
Indeed, various force levels were dis-
cussed. Early in the campaign, Mr.
Barnard said that a Labor Govern-
ment would not allow the strength of
the army to drop below 36,000 to
40,000 men. (The army at that time
contained 42,000 men, including 12,000
conscripts.) 26
Later, the party stated that "there
is no reason why, once the dust settles
from Vietnam, a peak requirement of
38
36,000 or even 32,000 may not be the
norm for Army manpower require-
ments." 21 Although these force levels
were discussed, there were no policy
proposals from Labor spokesmen on
how to raise the number of
in the army, then about 28,000 men,
to the proposed force levels.
The Policies of the LiberalCountry Party
Although there were objections
from the Labor Party to the Vietnam
policies of the Liberal-Country Party,
most Australian troops had been
withdrawn from Vietnam during late
1971 and early 1972, and the real de-
fense issue which separated the
parties in the election was the ques-
tion of whether conscription and an
"intervention-size" force should be
continued 'in the post-Vietnam era.
The Labor Party opposed continua-
tion of conscription and advocated a
smaller force level. On the other hand,
the Liberal-Country Party supported
the continuation of conscription and
a near-Vietnam-size army, and, as
early as October 1970, an LCP Gov
ernment leader said that National
Service would be needed after the
withdrawal from Vietnam. 2R Shortly
thereafter. another top government
official said that the number of men
volunteering for the services was in-
sufficient to pro v ide the military
strength felt necessary by the govern-
ment for Australian security. 20.
Both these statements based their
conclusions on the necessity to main-
tain a near-Vietnam-size army of ap-
proximately 40,000 men. This strength
level, which was 4000 below the 44,000
high of the Vietnam era, was cited in
December 1971 by the Minister of De-
fence as the "absolute minimum re-
quirement." 30 In fact, the 40,000 fig-
ure was a reduction of almost 15 per-
cent from the 45,000 to 46,000 figure
Military Review
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE---
Official government figures indicated that there were
23,000 men in the Australian Air Force in 1972 and ..
envisaged in 1970 by the then Defence
Minister. 31
A Government White Paper on De-
fence, which was presented to the
Australian Parliament in March-April
1972, reaffirmed the commitment of
the LCP Government to the 40,000
minimum army strength figure and
stated that National Service would
have to be retained in order to keep
the army strength at the desired
level. 3.
The white paper pointed out that
the strength of the regular forces had
been increased some 69 percent in the
1962-72 period, from 48,000 to 81,000.
In addition to the Regular Army
strength of 40,000, the white paper
said that there were 18,000 men in
the navy and 23,000 men in the air
force. 33
The LCP white paper highlighted
the two fundamental differences be-
tween the policies of the two major
politi?al parties: First, it pointed out
April 1975
that the Australian defense policy in-
cluded the capability to provide mili-
tary support to neighboring countries
facing external threats. This policy
was in contrast to the "Fortress Aus-
tralia" policy of the Labor Party. Sec-
ond, the white paper maintained that
a Regu lar Army strength of 40,000
was necessary to maintain Australia's
security. This figure was in contrast
to the lower Regular Army force levels
cited by Labor spokesmen during the
campaign. 34
In August 1972, four months prior
to the election, the LCP Minister of
Defence issued a five-year review of
the Australian defense program. Cit-
ing strategic needs, the 40,000 Regular
Army strength and 80,000 overall
strength for the three services were
once again declared essential. '"
The 1972 Election and Aftermath
On 2 Del'Jmber 1972, Australian
voters went to the polls. For the first
39
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE
... 18,000 men in the Australian Nayy
time in 22 years, the Labor Party won
a majority of seats in the Parliament
and formed its first government since
1949. Party Leader Gough Whitlam
became Prime Minister. Three days
later, the new Labor Government
ended all furtber inductions of men
_into the armed forces. This and other
major manpower procurement policy
changes were authorized by the issu-
ance of a series of administrative di-
rections to the Department of Labor
and National Service.
36
In addition to stopping the process-
ing of inductees, the government
ended the liability of about 8000 con-
scripts serving in the Citizen Military
Forces (reserve/militia) as an alter-
native to National Service. Tbe gov-
ernment also directed that no action
be taken to e x e u t ~ warrants for the
arrest of alleged violators of the Na-
tional Service Act. Further, prein-
dictment investigations of other pos-
40
sible violators were halted. Finally, in
a separate action early in 1973, the
governmen t allowed National Service-
men then on active duty with the
Regular Army to "opt out" of serv-
ice. 37
Summary
The election victory of the Labor
Party in December 1972 prompted a
fundamental cbange in Australian de-
fense policies. The draft was ended
and draftees were allowed to "opt
out" of the Regular Army and the
Citizen Military Force.
In a corollary policy change, tbe
new Labor Government also redefined
strategic policies by adopting the
"Fortress Australia" concept which
had been championed during the 1972
election campaign.
The changes in Australian strategic
concepts and manpower policies were
Military Reyiew
the direct result of a change in the
government's political leadership. Al-
though the adoption of the alI-volun-
teer force in the United States also
was related to ~ change in leadership,
the US transition differed from that
in Australia hecause of the continuing
US commitment to pre-aU-volunteer
force strategic goals and military
capabilities.
ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE
Whether the United States will ever
abruptly change its military man-
power policies and strategic concepts
as a result of a political election, or
whether the Australians will ever
again adopt policies of conscription as
the result of a political election, can-
not be answered or prj!dicted. The les-
son of the recent Australian experi-
ence is that either event is possible.
NOTES
1 AU8tl"a1lan Yearbook 1946-19J,7, Austrahan
Government, p 1147.
2 KeeBlIlg's Contempora't"J/ Archtves, 22 .. 29 July
1960. p 10861.
:1 Glen WIthers, CQl!8I"rtption; Neces81ty and
Jushcc. Angu; and Robertson, Sydney. Australia,
},:172, p 14
'10tricwZ Report tId PrOCeed!1I(J8 oj .the 19th
COflt77l.011U'Ctllth Con/c7('11(,(,. Austrahan Lab 0 r
Party. pp 30-32.
j Defence Rf'POTt 197$!. Australian Department of
Defence, Australian Government Pubhshing Serv-
Jet', Canberra, Australia, 1972, p 61.
G CommonU'f'alth P(f'rliamenta1'1l DcbatcB. Aus-
tralian Senale, 10 November 1964, -pp 1562-63.
.. Commoll1J'efllth Paritamc1/tal1l Debates. Aus-
tralian Hou'>e of Repre'lentatlvli's, 10 Novembpr
1964, p 2716.
R Commonwealth Pwrlfamentarg DebatC8. Aus
tralian Hou"l' elf Reprli'sentatives. 12 Novli'mber
1964, p 2926
V Withers. op, ("It p 16
to Opentng Speech-S en ate ElediontJ-196t.,
Australian Labor Party. p 8
11 The Dally Tr.tegraph. London. Eng . 11 De
cemher 1964
I:! Australia }'earbook 1965. Au"trnlian Govern
ment. p 1197.
13 Withers. op. CIt P 18.
14 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debate". Aus
trahnn House of Representatives. 15 Marrh 1966.
p 238.
t:-, The Canberra TlmeB. 13 May 1966,
16 The Sydnel1 MOrtlHl/1 Herald. 13 May Rnd 6
July 1966.
17 Wither,>. op. cit .. p 1ft
18 IbI'd.
Hl0tJicial Report .and ProceedV108 of the !17th
April 1975
ComT'fto"wealth Conference. Am;tralian La. b 0 r
Party
20 WIthers, op. Cit., P 19.
21 AWitral1an Defence-Policy and Programmes.
Australian Labor Party, 1969.
:!:! The MaftcheBter Guardian. 19 October 1971.
: , ~ Kee8tnf}'" Contemporary ArchlVea. 8 ~ 1 5 Jan-
uary 1972. p 25034.
:.!-l Withers. op. elt., p 20.
:!:i Darcy Me-Gaurr. "The Case for a Smaller
Army," CurTent Affair" Bulletln, 1 August 1972,
pp 72-73
:.!6 The iUant'hcetcr Guardtan. Ibid.
27 Commonu'ealth ParUamenta'TY Debates. Aus-
tralian Housp of Reprpsentatives. 28 S(>ptember
1971, p 1545.
28 Radio AU8lraha Nf:w". News and InfQnnatIon
Bureau. Office of thp Australian High Commis-
sioner. London. Eng .. 9 October 1970.
: ~ Commonwealth ParlIamentary Debate8, Aus-
tralian House of Rep['('sentntives. 19 August 191'1.
p 306
30 RadIO Austraha NcwB. News and Information
Bureau. Offi<'p of the Australian High Comml"-
sionpr. London, Eng., 6 Dee-ember 1971.
31 J. M. f'f'aser, "Address to the Liberal Party
of Australia." West Australia State Conference.
July 1970, mimeograph. as quoted in Withers, op.
r'lt . p 26.
:,\2 Comm.onwealth ParltamentaTl/ Debate". Aus-
tralian Sennte. 11 Aprtl 1972. pp 944-51-
33 Ibid . pp 949-50.
:14 Ibid . pp 948-51.
3n Comm.onwea.lth Parliamentary Debate", Au"'-
tralian SenatA!. 22 August 1972. p 23&.
36 Defence Report 1918, Australian Department
of Defence. Australi.a Government Publishing Sen.-
Ie-e. Canberra, Australia, 1973. p 15.
:\7 Ibid
41
Civil' Affairs in T ransition--
Should We Question Present Doctrine?
Lieutenant Colonel Philip D. Coleman, United States Army Reserve
T
HERE is an almost aphoristic
say i n g which expresses the
thought that a living organism must
grow, change and adapt; otherwi;e, it
will atrophy, decay and die. This say-
ing allows only two choices: adapt or
die. There is no middle ground.
Some present-day prophets espouse
the belief that civil affairs today may
find itself at such a juncture. They
say the old roles and missions of civil
affairs which served so well and so
successfully in the post-World War II
era-particularly' the military govern-
ment function-now need to be re-
evaluated, changed and readapted into
new civil affairs roles and missions
for today's Army. They claim we need
to make such changes because the US
Army will not conduct military gov-
ernment activities within a conquered
country. Consequently, it is no longer
necessary that this function even be
considered as a mission of today's
civii affairs operations. These proph-
42
ets conclude that it is necessary to
redefine present civil affairs doctrine
and to restructure anll reorganize
civil affairs units to conduct new and
different missions. Although our dip-
lomats and military planners indicate
that the chance of conducting military
government operations s i mil a r to
those conducted at the close of World
War II are quite remote, there are
circumstances where this mission could
once again become an important and
viable civil affairs function.
More likely, the prophets are say-
ing that, considering all the other civil
affairs capabilities, there are more
probable requirements for civil affairs
utilization in the US Army today
than just military government. There-
fore, in the civil affairs community,
there should be no more pressing re-
quirement than a positive and com-
plete re-evaluation of present civil
affairs doctrine, organization and
mission.
Military Review
Civil Affairs Defined
Army Regulation (AR) 310-25,
Dictionary of United States Army
Terms (1969), p ~ s n t s this rather
lengthy explanation of civil affairs
and the general conduct of civil-mili-
tary operations:
civil affairs-Those phases of the
activities of a commandqr which em-
brace the rew.tionship 'between the
military forces and civil authorities
and people in a friendly country or
area, or occupied country or area
when military forces are present. Civil
affairb include, interalirv-a. Matters
concerning the rew.tionship between
military forces located in a country
or area and the civil authorities and
people of that country or area usually
involving performance by the military
forces of certain functions 0" the exer-
cise of certain authority normally the
responsibility of the local government.
This relationship may occur prior to,
during. 01' subsequent to military ac-
tion in time of hostilities or other
emergency and is normally covered by
a treaty or other agreement, express
or implied. b. Military government-
The form of administration by ,"'lich
an occupying power exercises execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial authority
over occupied territory.
Note that, in this definition, the
military government function of civil
affairs is considered a secondary mis-
sion. The primary function is one of
civil-military relationships.
Many attempts have been made to
reduce and refine this definition. One
of the latest is found in the discussion
of civil-military operations as pub-
lished by the US Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in
1973 which says civil affairs repre-
sents those:
.. civil-military operations which
devote (themselves) to the efficient
April 1975
CIVIL AFFAIRS
conduct of rew.tions between military
forces, the civilian authorities, and
the civil populace. Civil Affairs span
of operations includes governmental
activities, civic assistance, support to
US military com,nands, domestic sup-
port operations, and military civic ac-
tion.
Or perhaps we might want to use
an even more condensed "definition"
of civil affairs found in AR 350-25,
Civil Affairs and Civil Military Opera-
tions Training (1974), which says:
The term 'civil affairs' includes all
those phases of activities of a com-
mande,' which embrace the relation-
ship between US or friendly military
forces and the civil authorities and
people in a friendly country or area,
01' in an occupied country or area
lI'here US or friendly military forces
are present.
It is interesting to note that, al-
though each of these "definitions" is
different, they all weave the same
thread-the total complex of the art
of civil-military activities to support
US or friendly military operations
through control of the relationship of
the mi litary forces vis-a-vis the civil-
ian authorities and the local populace.
This discussion of the definition of
civil affairs is necessary because the
definition comes from doctrine; know-
ing doctrine, one can begin to under-
stand and identify the missions of
civil affairs. In a single all-inclusive
and almost simplistic statement, the
missions of civil affairs are simply the
art of civil-military operations.
The Continuum of Military Involvement
Consider the missions of civil af-
fairs. Not only must civil affairs op-
erations be conducted in a civil envi-
ronment or at least in an environment
where civil institutions, activities and
populations have the capability of in-
43
CIVIL AffAIRS
fluencing military operations, but also
they must be conducted over a broad
spectrum of employment and over the
total possible continuum of warfare.
Therefore, the actual involvement of
civilmilitary operations may have
many facets, depending upon the spe-
cific mission.
For example, one of the vari-
ables in civil affairs employment is
the spectrum of warfare. An al-
most infinite variety of conflict sit-
uations is possible between any two
nation-states. Such a spectrum of war-
fare will call for a correspondingly
wide range of civil affair's operational
involvement, each of which will re-
quire a different operational emphasis.
In each operational emphasis, civil af-
fairs will continue to work in the
interface between the military and
civilian interests so as to support the
overall Army operational and/or tac-
tical mission.
In considering this spectrum of
warfare, it is usually only
to distinguish warfare as being:
Lowintensity-in which the re-
strictions on the areas, weapons, troop
strength, tactical and strategic objec-
tives, or other aspects may be volun-
tarily observed by both sides.
Mid-intensity-in which the con-
straints andior characteristics of a
low-intensity conflict are not present
and where, in addition, the principal
parties to the conflict may be joined
by other nation-states and carry out
the conflict over wide, often global,
areas.
High-intensity-in which all the
characteristics of general war are
present, and in which nuclear weap-
ons are also used, thereby increasing
the levels of civilian problems.
In this spectrum of warfare, civil
affairs functions in a combat service
support role. When US troops are en-
44
gaged in combat operations, civil af-
fairs units have the primary mission
of assisting the combat commander
by assuming the civil-military respon-
sibility toward the civilian sector.
Civil affairs works to promote the
civilian support of, and to prevent
civilian interference with, the tactical
and logistical operations of the com-
bat mission.
Present Attacks an Civil Affairs
In a recently published article, "Up-
dating Civil Affairs Doctrine and Or-
ganization," by Raymond J, Barrett
(Military Review, July 1974), the au-
thor identifies five missions for civil
affairs and then uses these five mis-
sions as discussion points in address-
ing five different situations that could
involve civil affairs. Much of his ar-
ticle analyzes the military government
role. He identifies this mission as an
"obsolete World' War II concept" and
generally concludes that overemphasis
of this concept has beset ci vil affai rs
with internal contradictions and in-
adequacies.
Similarly, Barrett goes through the
other four situations that could in-
volve civil affairs-from the host-
guest relationship to the civil-military
relations of a peacetime Army-and
attacks these areas of involvement to
such an extent that there appears to,
be virtually no raison d'etre for the'
present-day Army Reserve organiza-
tion known as civil affairs.
Barrett does, however, recognize
the need for civil-military involve-
ment in low-intensity warfare and
makes the point that civil affairs
should be confined to advice and as-
sistance to local military forces. He
further notes that, since military ac-
tivities will have to be in keeping with
both host government desires and US
policy, it will be necessary for guid-
Military Review
ance on all matters to come from the
American Embassy. So, for civil-mili-
tary operations, close liaison with the
Embassy will be essential.
Barrett further suggests th"t the
role of civil affairs in this instance
would be mainly to provide selected
specific expertise as required by ei-
ther the host government's plans or
identified US programs.: He then ad-
vocates that civil affairs units be
broken into small mobile training
teams coming under the general guid-
ance and supervision of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, but un-
der the specific assignment authority
of the Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG) and the American
Ambassador.
Such a proposal would, in essence,
reduce the civil affairs organization
to no more than a collection of small
mobile training teams and give it no
ability to perform its primary mili-
tary mission, that of combat service
support for a tactical military force.
Certainly, this is not the only at-
tack on civil affairs today. Martin
Binkin (Lieutenant Colonel, CS Air
Furce, Retired), writing for The
Brookings Institution, authored a
staff paper entitled "US Reserve
Forces: The Problem of the Weekend
Warrior." Tn his publication, Mr.
Binkin titles a chapter "Pruning Non-
essentials" and immediately ask s
these rhetorical questions:
Should 7.000 reservists continue to
be tmined to gopern occupied nations?
Is the"e a need for those trained in
the administration of art. archives.
and monuments to preserve the cul-
tm'e of occupied territories?
He then proceeds to answer these
and other questions by assigning some
undefined subjective criteria of nones-
sentialism to about 150,000 selected
reservists in 3353 Army and Air Force
April 1975
CIVIL AFFAIRS
Reserve units. Binkin fails to say
just what his subjective measurement
criteria was, but he does establish a
list of Reserve unit: that, in his judg-
ment, should be ref uced. Binkin states
that these cuts. te.gether with
which he advocates, would reduce the
total Reserve posture of the United
States by approximately one-third and
"save" about $400 million a year if
implemented.
Listed among those Reserve forces
for reduction are the 53 civil affairs
Reserve units-representing approxi-
mately 99 percent of the total civil af
fairs capability of the US Army and,
to quote Mr. Binkin:
... ?Chose missions might appear
appropriate. but for ,"',;ch personnel
,cith the necessary skills ,could be
readily obtainable from the civilian
labor force after mobilization began.
(Emphasis added.!
Just where the country could look to
find the replacements for 7000 civil
affairs specialists who understand the
relationships between the military
structure and the total gamut of civil-
ian government in many areas of the
world if; an unanswered question.
Civil Affairs Experience Cited
The experience resident in these
civil affairs reservists is a scarce
modity. The Army has kept these men
and women together in selected Re-
serve units and trained them to under
stand the complexities of modern mili-
tary tactics through attendance at the
senior s e I' vic e schools. They are
knowledgeable in the complexities of
their particular areas of technical
specialization.
Certainly, in time of national mo-
bilization, the courttry could draft
from the civilian labor market qual-
ified experts in the 21 functiomll spe-
cialties of civil affairs. Undoubtedly.
45
CIVil AFFAIRS
these personnel could be found rap-
idly, for these trained'men and women
practice their specialties in the higher
levels of industry and government.
But, once identified and located, could
the Army then rapidly train these
newly found 7000 I'eplacements--{)r
even' 3500 of them-in the complexi-
ties of modern military tactics to such
an extent that they could immediately
step into positions of hig,h military
responsibility on a division, corps or
theater commander's general staff? In
case of mobilization, civil affairs must
be able to perform immediately in a
combat service support mission and be
able to offer counsel and advice on the
total complexity of civil-military rela-
tionships.
Since almost all of the civil affairs
capability for the US Army is in the
Reserves, a better scenario is to retain
most or all of the 53 Reserve units in
an advanced state of readiness so that,
in time of crisis 01' national mobiliza-
tion, the unit is available as "strength
in reserve" to the Active Army.
Civil affairs is being fired upon
from all sides, and almost all the fusil-
lade is based on the accusation that
civil affairs is "being trained to gov-
ern occupied nations." But military
government is not the primary mis-
sion of civil affairs. The primary mis-
s;on is the combat service support
mission of dealing ,<,ith civil authori-
ties in sup:port of the military mission.
Learn From the Past
-Anticipate the Future
Let us look forward now and show
some of the uses of civil affairs in the
control of relationships between the
military and civil authorities to fur-
ther the military mission.
With the introduction of mass de-
struction weapons onto the battlefield
-whether employed ~ not-and with
46
the probable requirement fol' a fluid
battlefield caused by demands fol' high
military mobility will come the possi-
bility of the massive disruption of the
lives of noncombatant civilians. Herein
lies the very crux of a massive prob-
lem. Large masses of civilian refugees
are foreseen as hampering the move-
ment of military supplies and equip-
ment and, more importantly, military
'combat maneuver units.
Even as this happens, the require-
ment arises for the humanitarian con-
trol of these large masses of refugees
-the requirement for food, medical
supplies and, possibly, even housing-
if the military organization is in any
way to attempt to convert or use these
people in the support of the military
effort. On future battlefields, there
will always be a requirement for large
masses of laborers to "clean up" after
the battle. A prime source of civilian
labor is represented by refugee camps.
The control of civilians displaced
by warfare in fact becomes a very real
military problem. Consider the experi-
, ences of the French Army in the open-
ing days of the German invasion of
France at the beginning of World
War II. As the German juggernaut
surged across France, it became evi-
dent that the military requirement for
road space and the military necessity
for freedom of movement were being
acutely hampered by the millions of
French, Du tch and Belgian refugees
who had taken to the road before the
advancing German panzer units. It
has been estimated that, at one time,
there were some two million Belgian
and Dutch refugees plus some eight
million French refugees on the roads,
hampering the military movement of
critical supplies and maneuver units.
In some larger cities in Northern
France, such as Lille, as much as 90
percent of the city's population had
Military Review
CIVIL AFFAIRS
Refutees wait at a crossroad for the go-ahead signal from an MP in France during World War II.
People evacuating their homes can easily block traffic if not controlled.
departed the town before the Nazi in-
vading force.
It was fear that drove them on-
ward; it was panic that kept them in
motion; and it was rumor of German
depredations against the refugees
that caused the fear and the uncon-
trollable panic.
Is There a Present-Day Solution?
From a tactical standpoint, the
commander of a military unit, whose
mission is impeded by masses of evac-
uees congesting'all roads at a moment
when tactical mobility is the key ele-
ment, must take some action. How
would you as a tactical unit com-
mander handle one million of your
fellow or allied countrymen wander--
ing as refugees throughout your zone
of operations--let alone 10 million
refugees-while maneuvering your
tactical elements in such a way as to
protect those very people hampering
your military maneuver?
April 1975
The oft-stated answer-"Let the
Military Police handle the prolillem"-
is not a viable solution. There are not
enough MPs in an entire theater to
handle a problem of this magnitude,
particularly when one considers other
humanitarian services required by
these refugees 'such as food, medical
supplies and housing.
Rather, a problem of this magni-.
tude could be reduced to more man-'
ageable proportions by measures e ~
signed in the first instance to prevent
such a mass movement-for example,
the articulation and enforcement of a
stay-at-home policy, followed by local
indigenous governmental control meas-
ures designed to effect compliance
with such a policy. These measures,
properly enforced, could keep the
roads clear for military movement
and would be the best insurance to
control such a mass exodus.
Control measures could take the
form of actions such as curfew,. a
47
CIVIL AFFAIRS
positive movement control policy for
civilians" special civilian vehicle reg-
istration, oil and gasoline rationing,
vehicle repair parts control, food sup-
ply control and medical support con-
trol. Such measures 'do not require
the' imposition of martial law, but,
rather, they do suggest the require-
ment for active, close and continuous
civil-military cooperation through the
duly acclaimed indigenous govern-
ment.
In such instances, the local civilian
population must be made aware of the
stay-at-home policy and the measures
used to enforce the policy iong before
the need for its use arises. For effec-
tiveness, the promulgation of this pol-
icy must be through the local indige-
nous government. This is a most
critical civil-military program that
must be planned, articulated and com-
menced before any actual fighting
begins. A fter fighting has started,
such a stay-at-home policy will be po-
litically unacceptable and hence im-
possible to enforce other than through
martial law.
Is There a Need for Civil Affairs?
The discussion so far leads us to the
following three questions: Is there a
requirement or need for some kind of
civil-military organization within the
US Army to work with and through
local levels of indigenous government
to help the Army perform its tactical
mission? I f so, then is the US Army's
Reserve civil affairs organization the
proper and optimum organization to
fu1ftll this mission? Finally, if civil
affairs is the proper organization, is
its present doctrine current and is it
optimally structured or is there a
present requirement to update civil
affairs doctrine and organization?
Let's take these three questions one
at a'time.
48
Is there a need for an organization
to handle the civil-military relations'
in the US Army today? One of the
lessons of history is that as wars
have become more and more complex,
with weapons of mass destruction and
with the generally accepted possibility
that future wars will be fought over
larger land areas, more noncombatant
civilians will be reduced to refugee
status. If we can learn from history
and if We will accept the fact that
future wars will have the same basic
refugee problems. then we Can see
how the threat of nuclear warfare
could cause such utter panic as to
multiply the World War 11 refugee
prohlem manyfold. Further, if we ac-
cept the fact that these refugees could
be either allies or fellow countrymen,
we should expect the military to
handle them in as humanitarian a
manner as possible. Properly handled,
refugees can be considered as a source
of labor. Therefore, we can say there
will be a requirement for some type
of a US Army civil-military control
organization in a future large-scale
land warfare.
Let us now address the second ques-
tion: Is the US Army's Reserve or-
ganization-civil affairs-the best or-
ganization to handle the problems
of civil-military interrelationships?
Here, the anSWeJ' may not be so easy.
It is possible to conjure up many
types of units and organizations that
could perform this civil-military mis-
sion. The military police certainly
have the capability of handling limited
numbers of refugees and displaced
persons. Local civilian police forces
have capabilities in the limited control
of refugees even though they may not
have the proper understanding of tac-
tical military necessity. Military med-
ical units have capabilities to relieve
pain and suffering among civilians as
'Military Review
do civilian medical units. Military
quartermaster, transportation and en-
gineer units have capabilities to pro-
vide food, movement and shelter for
civilians, so also do certain civilian
food distribution companies, transpor-
tation units and construction organi-
zations. It is even possible that the
refugees themselves may have certain
personal and capabilities,
or possess equipment and supplies
wherein they may be able to help
themselves in times of emergency.
It is important that the civilians
first aid themselves in every way pos-
sible. Control of civilians must be ex-
ercised through indigenous leadership,
and the control of civilians must be
handled in such a way as not to inter-
fere with the tactical military opera-
tions. Only after all civilian self-help
capability has been exhausted should
military resources be earmarked for
civilian use.
Can civil affairs handle this job?
,h'il alfairs is not a completely war-
tested combat support organi-
zation. Athough it fulfilled its second-
ary mission of military government
the close of World War II. it has
yet to perform its primary mission
during actual hostilities.
For political reasons, no Reserve
units were called to active duty dur-
ing the Vietnam fighting. Since ap-
proximately 90 percent of the total
capability of the Army's civil alfairs
is in the Reserves, there was little
civil alfairs involvement in Vietnam.
Hence, the Reserve civil alfairs units
are yet to be tried in battle.
During the" ietnam conflict, a lim-
ited number of active duty civil alfairs
units were employed. These units filled
the vacuum for civil-military involve-
ment as requirements were uncovered.
One of those roles was that of mili-
tary civic action where US assistance
April 1975
CIVIL AFFAIRS
to a friendly or allied nation was
given to help the latter maintain in-
ternal security against insurgent vio-
lence that threatened important US
interests.
The military civic action missions
were performed by both the civil af-
fairs units and by other tactical mili-
tary forces. In most instances, the
CIVIC actions were performed under
the supervision and direction of either
the MAAG, the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (A lD) or the
American Embassy.
Possibly, it was because there were
only a few active civil affairs units in
Vietnam that the primary mission of
civil affairs was not performed during
this conflict. Consequently, military
civic action became almost the total
civil affairs involvement in Vietnam.
Because of this, it should not be con-
cluded that military civic is
now synonymous with civil affairs.
Military civic action is only a subor-
dinate mission of civil alfairs.
The fad that Reserve civil affairs
units which had trained to do combat
fiervice misRions but \vere not
called to active duty does not allow
one to conclUde that civil alfnirs could
not have done the job. NOl' does it
mean, as many critics of ch'i! affairs
would suggest today, that we should
throw the baby out with the bath
",RIel'. Rather, it means that there is
a greater responsibility within the
Reserve civil alfairs branch today to
continue to train to perform all of its
missions and to continue to test and
e,'aluate itself to determine if its
training is correct and meaningful.
Civil affairs has the branch respon-
sibility to continue to educate the bal-
ance of the Active Army in civil af-
fairs missions and capabilities so that,
when and if there is ever another
requirement for civil affairs involve-
49
CIVIL AFFAIRS
50
An AID, technician demonstrates
use of a canvas dam
to an Indian farmer
in the state of Mysore
~ An AID advisor supervises
'0 repair work at the
Northeast Technical Institute,
! K o r ~ t Thailand
"
Q
Civil affairs member assists in paving a village street
in Bien Hoa Province, Vietnam
Military Review
ment in an active war. both will be
ready. The Active Army will under-
stand what civil affairs can do for the
tactical military force as a combat
service support organization. and civil
affairs units will be ready to perform
this vital mission.
Finally, if we conclude there is a
combat service support mission for
civil affairs. we need t9 address the
third question: Is there presently a
requirement to update the doctrine
and organization under which civil af-
fairs units are organized for combat?
This is the most critical of the three.
The true and definitive answer to
this question will only be found dur-
ing actual civil affairs operation in
combat. and one can hope that such a
question need never be answered in a
definitive manner. However. prudence
would indicate that we must always
be prepared for the eventuality of
combat and the ensuing holocaust of
mass destruction.
This means. then. that civil affairs
must continue to exercise its capabili-
ties. just as infantry rifle companies
must' continue to exercise their capa-
bilities. and that civil affairs must
continue to inject realistic problems
into all military training exercises.
Above all. we must continue to edu-
cate the active military establishment
to the fact that civil affairs can aid
the tactical military mission by con-
trolling civil-military relationships. In
short. we must plan for the eventual
-but. hopefully. not the inevitable--
utilization of civil affairs as a combat
service support organization during
actual combat operations of US mili-
tary forces.
Plall-Train-Evaluate
Through this continuous planning
and preparation in military exercises.
and'through a constant training and
April 1975
CIVIL AFFAIRS
evaluation of civil affairs units in-
volved in these exercises. we will be
able to identify possible changes and
modifications to present civil affairs
doctrine. From the changes in doc-
trine. if any are appropriate. can then
come changes in the civil affairs mis-
sion and organization.
We can only hope that the nations
of the world today are so intelligent
that the US Army and its total mili-
tary capability will never have to be
used as an instrument of national pol-
icy in support of a global armed con-
flict. Prudence would tell us. however.
that all the branches of the US Army
-not only civil affairs-must con-
tinue to plan, train and evaluate them-
selves in as reali:.itic a manner as pos-
sible so as to be ready for that day
which all the world hopes "'i11 never
come.
Lieutenant Colonel Philip D. Cole-
man. US A,.my Resave. is I'ith the
Cost of U,illg Council. Washington.
D. C. He is a gmduate of the USMA
and holds an M.S. in lndust,.ial Engi-
nee,.ing from Stanford University. He
has held a variety of staff positions
in civil affairs units over the past 12
years and is currently assigned to the
352d Civil Affairs Area "A" Head-
quarters. Rivadale. Malyland.
51
COMMANDO

THE INFANTRY
BATTALION
REVISITED
Major Alexander M. S. McColl, United States Army Reserve
F
OR many years, and in all its
variations, the infantry
of the US Army has been based on
the ll-man rifle squad and a strictly
triangular organization-t hat is,
three rifle squads per platoon, three
,:itle platoons per nfle company and
three rifle companies to the battalion.
This structure did very well in World
War II and Korea and well enough in
Vietnam although, in this most recent
conflict, the structure of many bat-
talions was reshuffled to meet the
special requirements of that situation.
No invention of the human mind,
however, is perfect for all times and
places, and the purpose of thi.s article
is to look at a rather different ap-
proach to the org-anization of the in-
fantry battalion, based chiefly and
perhaps selectively on our experience
in Vietnam.
Meet the Special Forces reconnais-
sance team (RT) in one of its more
or less standard variations, otherwise
gometimes known as a "commando
squad." In Vietnam, the six-man RT
proved to be a very versatile, efficient
organization, as a practical matter
the smallest infantry element that can
operate effectively by itself. It was
easier to control and hence more re-
sponsive and flexible than the stand
ard II-man rifle squad. Four RTs plus
a couple of machineguns and a com-
mand element were found to make a
very workable sort of rifle platoon.
This is the germ of the first half of
the commando square concept.
The other half comes out of the
during the Vietnam War
of the virtues of a "square" infantry
battalion, one with four rifle com-
panies. Among other things, this
Cnpyril!"ht (fj 1975 by MaJor Ale'llnnder M. S, MC'Coli. United States Army R('<;erv('.
52
Military Review
structure permits leaving one rifle
company to secure the base camp or
fire base while the other three go out
and try the old two-up-and-one-back
on the enemy. This structure also can
be used to establish a mixed Active
Army/Reserve component battalion
with sundry advantages by way of
cost-saving and improved training for
the Reserve components.
Another premise whigh is not spe-
cific to commando square is that, in a
nonmechanized infantry unit, real
foot mobility is a mllst, especially in
the hilly, jllngleclad country where
we may expect to use this type of
unit. This requirement places rigor-
Olls limitations on the number and
size of crew-served weapons that can
be carried. especially at the rifle com-
pany level. The battalion must be able
to park all its vehicles, walk away up
the trail and fight the enemy for an
indefinite period without them, sup-
ported by air assets external to the
battalion, porters and, if available,
mules and other pack animals.
The present ll-man rifle squad
dates from the period when most of
the troops had semiautomatic rifles
and only two men per squad had fully
automatic, weapons; it was designed
around the requirements of a conven-
tional, mid-intensity conflict. But now,
at least in units armed with M16s, we
have wall-to-wall automatic weapons
and a need to do many things in addi-
tion to "take and hold the high
ground." For most types of opera-
tions, any size squad from six to 13
men can be made to work effectively,
but the smaller squad is easier to con-
trol. An "all-square" battalion based
on II-man squads would have rifle
companies with about 250 men and an
overall strength of about 1300, which
is a bit large. An all-square battalion
based on six-man squads, however,
April 1975
COMMANDO SQUARE
comes out to a total size of a little un-
der 900 people, about what we have
now.
Specifically, the proposed "com-
mando square" battalion has the fol-
lowing structure:
The basic element is a six-man
RT or commando squad, armed with
five M16s and one M203 (or M79 plus
pistol). .
Square organization throughout
-that is, four rifle squads per pla-
toon, four rifle platoons per company
and four rifle companies in the bat-
talion.
Limitation of the size and num-
ber of crew-served weapons and other
equipment to assure a high degree of
foot mobility.
Multicapable organization. In ad-
dition to the usual duties, the unit can
be structured to provide long-range
reconnaissance pat l' 0 I s (LRRPs),
mounted commandos and a variety of
other specialized functions.
Within the battalion, the rifle pla-
toon has fOllr rifle squads plus a weap-
ons squad with two M60 machineguns
and one 90mm recoilless ri fie. The rifle
company has the usual company head-
quarters. a mortar section with two
60mm mortars and four rifle platoons.
FOllr such companies plus. a 'head-
quarters and headquarters company
I HIIC) constitute the battalion. HHC
heavy weapons would include four
81mm mortars, six 75n:!m or 106mm
recoilless rifles on 1.
1
-ton and eight
scout vehicles with M60 machineguns.
In off-road situations, the scout pla-
toon dismounts, breaks out the tripods
and becomes a heavy machinegun pla-
toon. Conversely, all '4-tons in the
battalion, except those carrying recoil-
less rifles, would be fitted with pedes-
tal mounts for M60 machineguns or
90mm recoilless rifles for road secu-
rity, urban counterinsurgency and
53
COMMANDO SQUARE
mounted commando operations.
This concept envisages a battalion
with the following, assets (radios and
individual weapons not listed) :
Personnel: 44 officers (1 lieuten-
ant colonel; 2 majors; 10 captains; 1
captain, Medical Corps; 30 lieuten-
ants) ; 2 warrant officers, 173 noncom-
missioned officers, 667 enlisted men
equaling 886 aggregate.
Heavy Weapons: four 81mm
mortars, eight 60mm mortars, six
75mm or 106mm recoilless rifles on
'4 -ton, sixteen 90mm recoilless rifles,
forty M60 machineguns including
eight on ," -ton or tripod ..
Vehicles: forty-three '4 -ton in-
cluding 14 with machinegun or recoil-
less rifle, twenty-three 1
'
,:\ -ton or
Gama Goat, fourteen 2
'
/
2
-ton, ten 5-
ton, five field ambulances, one 5-ton
wrecker for a total of 96 wheeled ve-
hicles plus eight 1 %-ton and five water
trailers.
Compared to the present battalion,
commando square is about the same
size, but strong in officers, strong in
riflemen (64 X 6 = 384 versus 27 X
11 = 297), machineguns and other di-
rect-fire platoon weapons and wheeled
vehicles. It is weak in mortars and
heavy antitank weapons. This is the
price of foot mobility. Within limits,
the mortar firepower is less a function
of the number of tubes carried than
of the amount of ammunition carried.
A column of men on foot can carry
only a certain overall weight and still
move out. Structurally, in addition to
. its primary missions, the battalion is
able to provide LRRPs and other six-
man teams for saturation patrols, sup-
port of civil authority, house searches,
and so forth. It also has a number of
machinegun vehicles for duty as street
and road patrols, convoy escorts, and
so on.
Other possible variations include:
54
. In a conventional, mid-intensity
operation with limited off-road re-
quirements such as Korea or Alaska,
substitute 81mm for 60mm mortars,
4.2-inch for 81mm mortars, and add
one or two additional soldiers to each
mortar squad.
The battalion-level ant ita n k
weapon is the 75mm or 106mm recoil-
less rifle. The choice is a function of
the terrain and the tank threat and,
possibly, of the availability of 75mm
weapons and ammunition in the inven-
tory. In a situation with an imminent
tank threat, such as in Europe, Korea
or the Middle East, the battalion
WQuld have to be reinforced with a
TOW platoon and/or a platoon or
more of tanks or M551 Sheridans in a
tank-destroyer role.
Conversely, for extended back-
country off-road operations where
therp. was a minimum tank threat and
not much requirement for destroying
fortifications, the 90mm recoilless
rifles could be left behind and their
crews used to provide additional eyes,
ears and rifles, and to carry more am-
munition for the machineguns.
There is a mechanized version of
commando square, but elaboration of
this is outside the scope of this arti
c1e. Otherwise, the concept applies to
airborne, airmobile and armor bat-
talions.
Finally, the commando square or-
ganization lends itself to formation of
mixed Active Army, Reserve compo-
nent battalions. In such a unit, the
Active Army element would be able to
operate alone as a thin triangular bat-
talion of 457 men, a light but viable
combat organization. The Reserve
augmentation, con sis tin g of the
fourth rifle company, fourth platoons
and squads, and other elements, would
add 429 men with appropriate equip-
ment.
Military Review
The Reserve augmentation Can be
organized into a headquarters and
headquarters detachment and three
rifle companies. This structure would
apply when the Reserve augmentation
was acting independent of the parent
battalion, as at home-station training
or when called to aid civil authority.
The provisional battalion would be
marginally viable as a combat organi-
zation by American standards but
quite adequate to conduct training or
to assist the civil authority. Ordinar-
ily, the active duty for training phase
would be conducted as an integral
part of the parent battalion; this
would also give the parent battalion
some exposure to operating with a
full-sized organization. Presumably,
the parent battalion commander would
Major Alexander M. S: McColl, US
Army Reserve, is a graduate of Har-
vard College, Harvard Law School,
and the USACGSC. While on active
duty, he served as an advisor in Viet-
nam and in assorted staff and intel-
ligence jobs in the Continental United
States, France, Germany and Viet-
nam. He is currently a mobilization
designee to Headquarte,'s, US Army
John F. Kennedy Center for Military
Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Caro-
lina. His article "Artillery Slwck" ap-
peared in the February 1975 MILI-
TARY REVIEW.
April 1975
COMMANDO SQUARE
have some degree of responsibility
and supervision over the home-station
training and other activities of the
Reserve augmentation of his battalion.
The chief advantage of this struc-
ture is that it is a battalion that can
be brought together in a deployable
state nearly as fast as a pure Active
Army unit, but at substantially lower
personnel costs in peacetime. The main
drawbacks relate to matters of defin-
ing the respective powers and respon-
sibilities of the parent battalion com-
mander and the Reserve component
chain of command over the Reserve
augmentation. The organization capa-
bility is one of the big advantages of
the commando square battalion.
Other advantages for the commando
square battalion, as compared to the
existing battalions, are:
The smaller squad is inherently
easier to control and, therefore, more
efficient, flexible and responsive, and
easier to train.
The square organizption provides
greater flexibility of employment; we
are no longer locked into two-up-and-
one-back as the only way of doing
business.
Real, built-in off-road foot mo-
bility, admittedly at the cost of some
loss of heavy weapons firepower but
about twice the number of machine-
guns.
Preplanned, built-in capability to
"beef up" or "slim down" the cre\\'-
served weapons and other heavy items
depending on the terrain and expected
enemy threat.
Capability to provide LRRPs,
mounted commandos, road patrols and
other specialized functions,
These are substantial merits, mak-
ing the commando square concept
worthy of consideration and evalua-
tion by the Army's force structure
planners. ~ t
55
Kings Mountain
and,the
Denouement of Southern Loyalism
Major David Curtis Skaggs, United States Army Reserve
W
HE:-r the War for American
Independence turned from a
rebellion into an international conflict
"'i th the entry of France (1778),
Spain ( 1779) and the Netherland"
( 1780), the British had to re-evaluate
their :-rorth American strategy, The
necesSity to redeploy troops to the
fanbbean and the requirement to
defend England from invasion de-
manded that the' admInlgtratlOn de-
pend upon the American Loyalists as
a basis for new troops on the conti-
nent. :l-!oreover, the failure to destroy
~ o r t h r n reHlstance as represented
In the surrender at Saratoga in 1777,
the inability to bring Washington into
conclu"ive battle after BrandY"'ine,
and the evacuation of Philadelphia and
- Newport forced the British to shift
the center of the American theater to
the South, To accomplish the objective
of reintegration of the supposedly less
rebellious Southern colonies, Loyalist
units would have to augment Ilis Maj-
esty's few Regulars and protect loyal
noncombatants in the region.
Tbe danger of this dependence upon
Loyalists is well-illustrated in a series
of defeatg they gutfered tbrougbout
the Southern campaign.
N one wag more critical, however,
than that at Kings Mountain, South
Carolina, on 7 October 1780. I
British victories over American
co'nventional units at Charleston and
56
Camden, South Carolina, in tbe spring
and summer of 1780 caused the rebelg
to revert to irregular warfare. Coun-
tering the isolated attacks were Loy-
alist militia units. One such force \Va"
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Patrick Ferguson, son of a wealthy
Scottish judge. HIS Provincial Corps
of American Loyaligts operated out of
:-;'inety-Six, Soutb Carolina, as a flank-
Ing force to Charleg Lord Cornwalhs'
main army at Charlotte, North faro-
lina. The 37-year-old Ferguson hoped
to cru"h the remaining patriotg and
rouse the backcountry Loyalists to
hIS banner when he marched into
western North Carolina in early Sep-
tember 1780. Incensed by his threats
to hang those who opposed him, the
"overmountain men" of modern east
Tennessee and southwestern Virginia
rallied at Sycamore Shoals on the
Watauga River. They marched act'osg
the mountains to Quaker Meadows,
near present Morganton, North Caro-
lina, where they were joined by North
and South Cal'olina militiamen on 30
September.
Learning of the pending juncture
of a major opposing force, Ferguson
withdrew south from Rutherfordton,
North Carolina, toward Ninety-Six
on 27 September. On the 30th, he
turned toward Charlotte and, on 6
October, encamped on the summit of
a hogback ridge known as Kings
Military Review
Mountain, just south of the boundary
between the Carolinas and 35 miles
from Charlotte. Here, he informed
Cornwallis that he intended to fight.
The pursuing Americans, irregular
contingents unaer the nominal com-
mand of Colonel William Campbell,
continued to increase in number as
additional detachments met them en
route. They eventually tOt,\lled between
1400 and 1800 when they surrounded
Ferguson's 1100 on the afternoon of
7 October.
The ensuing battle reminds one
more of a Vietcong attack on a base
camp than a typical 18th-Century en-
gagement. Most of Ferguson's troops,
armed with the Brown Bess musket
and bayonet, depended more upon the
shock action of the latter rather than
firepower to destroy their foe. Since
the tree line extended nearly to the
summit, the narrow foot-shaped ridge
allowed neither fields of fire nor room
to maneuver. On the other hand, the
Americans effectively used their
longel' range rifles to great advantage.
and n<' bayonet charge could repel
them from the trees. The battle began
at approximately 1500 with the initial
assault of Colonel Campbell's Virgin-
ians and Colonel Isaac Shelby's Ten
nesseans. Their deadly fire drove the
Loyalists back into the other units.
Ferguson then tried unsuccessfully to
extricate his force by counterattacking
through Colonel Benjamin Cleveland's
:-< orth Carohnians. Ferguson received
a mortal wound in this effort and com-
mand devolved upon Captain Abraham
de Peystel', a New York Loyalist. He
Mojo>' Dal'id Curtis Skaggs, US
Army Reser"e. is Assoriate Profes."JI
of History at Bowling Green State
University. !lis article '"The General-
ship of George Washington" appeared
in the July 1974 MILITARY REVIEW.
April 1975
SOUTHERN LOYALISM
surrendered, but not before the Amer-
icans exacted vengance for alleged
Loyalist atrocities upon surrendering
patriots in previous engagements.
The entire action lasted approxi-
mately one hOllr. The Loyalists lost
157 dead, 163 wounded and 700 pris-
oners. American losses were 28 ki11ed
and 62 wounded. Subsequently, a
court-martial tried 30 Loyalists for
war crimes, sentenced 12 to be hanged
and carried out the sentence upon
nine prisoners. Many of the remain-
ing prisoners escaped from their care-
less guards and spread word of the
encounter throughout the backcoun-
try.
2
The battle caused Cornwallis to
withdraw temporarily from North
Carolina and to delay his attempted
conquest of the state. The escapee,,'
tales of horror and suffering probablY
caused many potential Loyalists to
refrain from joining His Majesty'"
troops, Taken in conjunction with the
other Loyalist losses, Kings Moun-
tain represents a significant epi,ode
in the defeat of loyalism in the Caro-
lina,. Without these "good Ameri-
cans," all of Cornwallis' \'Ictories rOlll,1
not be sllstailled and secured.
NOTES
I For g"t'neral background, sl;'e Paul H. Smith
LoyalIsts and i?edconts A Strldy p! BrItish Reva-
lllr1ou<lTIj Pol/I'll. Um ... ersity of North Cat'oilnn
Chap(>! HIli, N. C. Rus'lell F Weil!-
l(>y, The PflTt 1I111" War TiI(' Sa"th Carollua ram-
palgll of 1:',01(".: . Trtcentt'nnmi Booklet Num-
ber 2," Unnpr;'lt:\.' of South Carolina Prpss, Co-
lumbIa. S C. 1970, RohE'rt McClu(>T Calhoon, Tlrl
l.oY<lll'Jfi1 '" Rfl ol'ltlOI1(lry A 771(,Tlru, 11(;0-1 i, t.
Harcourt. Brace, .Jo\uno\lrh. N. Y., lIli3.
.! DetaJi(>d of the battlp may be
found In Lyman C Drapl'r. KW!1's /Hollntalll alld
Herof's, P. r. Thom"on, Cincinnati, OhIO, 1881,
(leOTll'e C. MackenZie, Klllqs MOIlI/taw NatlOlIrd
.1fII,tflTY PaTI.. "NatlOnal Park Sen Ice Historical
Hanrlhook Spril><;," Number 22, Supermtendent of
Documpnb, Uf' Government PnntmR' OffiCf" Wash-
mgton, D. C, 1955. Christopher Ward. The War
of titr' Rl't'ofutZOll, Edited by John R Alden, The
MacmIllan Co ,N Y. 1952. Volume n. pp 737-45
Frankl," and Mary Wlckwirt', COT1f1l'rtll!s alld th(
H'/lr of /llrif'l't'lHi."rf'. Farber and Farbl'r, London.
Eng, HI'1. pp 19.-:!16. Some> crroneoush'
ll"{' the pn<; ... e>"-.,ve <'a"'e m th(> name
r-alhE'r than thl' cnrrpct plural furm
57
The Ph,iloscphical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and
PROBLEMS OF
CONTEMPORARY WAR
(A Soviet View)
Maior General A. S. Milovidov, Editor in Chief
Colonel V. G. Kozlov, Editor, o s c o ~ 1972
Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force.
US Government' Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $235.
Reviewed by Colonel Jess B. Hendricks Jr.,
Department, nf Command, USACGSC
Both the critics of the Soviet Union
and the Communist party are in com-
plete agreement on one fundamental
'point: the current Soviet state and
system are the direct lineal descend-
ants of one man, Vladimir Ilyich Le-
nin (born Ulyanov), This book reflects
the modern-day pervasiveness of Le-
nin's thought and the hortatory use
of Lenin's name in all realms of So-
viet life.
As with the other works in the cur-
rent US Air Force series of transla-
tions of significant Soviet military
thought, this book is concerned with
updating the thinking of the Soviet
military professional. The goal is to
introduce new levels of technical com-
petence, commensurate with the pro-
gress of modern technology, and to
increase emphasis on flexible military
thought. The method 'is to refer to
58
the diverse writings of Lenin, the
founding father, for relevant thoughts
and then to discourse around Leninist
theory and practice until a basis for
the desired conclusion has been estab-
lished. One assumes this constant ap-
peal to Lenin's authority is necessary
and meaningful to Communist read-
ers. To a Western mind, it is unfamil-
iar ground and wearily redundant.
Though the constant effort to estab-
lish an ideological or party-line con-
text for each statement of military
policy in such writing seems tortured
to us, we must not ignore the signifi-
cance in the effort. Part of the sig-
nificance lies in the reiteration of the
divergence wbich exists between the
Soviet Union and ourselves: "The fun-
damental contlict of the present era
is the antagonistic conflict between
socialism and capitalis":,." This is part
Mi1ltary Review
of the inheritance from Lenin, and,
as the authors state, "It conditions
the entire historical process of world
development." The stated continuing
goal of the Soviet Union and its "So-
cialist" clients and adherents remains
"the destruction of capitalism and all
its traces .... " This is not to say
that this book leads one to the conclu-
sion that the Soviet Union espouses
aggressive war on its pah. On the
contrary I all the improvements in
readiness and strengthening of the
Soviet Armed Forces are couched in
defensive terms:
For the imperialist reactionaries
and Iheir paid ideologues. contra,'y to
the root aspirations of peoples. are
pushing the ",orld toward u'ar It'ith
increasing vigor. are appealing for
the destrllction of Communism at all
cost.
The significance lies in the fact that
the Soviet Union is a doctrinaire so-
ciety. and doctrine asserts in black
and white terms the inevitability of
conflict between our society and theirs.
A second level of significance lies
in the constant effort to surround
military policy with political and ideo-
logical meaning. This serves to remind
the Soviet officer that the party is the
vanguard of each element of Soviet
society. including the military. but it
has other. more important, purposes.
It stresses and emphasizes that "the
principal. determining as;:>ect of the
essence of war is politics. and the
subordinated aspect is armed vio-
lence." Lenin stressed this point. elab-
orated upon it and put the theory into
practice from the Bolshevik assump-
tion of power in 1917 to his death in
1924. We make fun of the frequent
extreme shifts in the Communist
party ,line. and it would be natural for
April 1915
an American to be defensive about
standing for one thing today and its
opposite tomorrow. This is not the So-
viet way, however, and the tlexibility
of Soviet policy is admiringly attrib-
uted to Lenin and fuBy discussed.
with examples offered.
One advantage to reading works
such as this is to gain insight into the
differing thought processes between
Soviet military leaders and ourselves.
One of these major differences lies in
the process of dialectics which is at
the heart of Communist thought. Here
is an example of the process at work:
Originating as a reslIlt of acute im-
perialisl conflicts. it I World War II)
initially lras an unJust /Va,' of plunder
on the pa1'f of all the principal capi-
talist nations taking part in it, The
nat1l1'e of the lI'a,'. hOIl'eveT, did not
"emain unequirocal at all stages of its
development. E,'enls del'eloped unde>'
conditions ll'he1reby capitalism was no
longa thg e.rclusively dominant sys-
tem. Peoples ,chich had been the vic-
tims of fascist aggression rose up in
struggle and thlls altered tlze very
nature of tlze lI'a", Entry by the So-
,'iet Union into tlze ,ml' constituted a
decisil'e factor in tJ'ansforfning it into
a illst. antifascist lI'a/',
The price of such policy flexibility
is constant indoctl'ination of the faith-
ful.
The leadership of the Soviet Union
is interested not only in political flexi-
bility but also in flexibility of military
leadershi p:
The ability to Ihink. 11I adaptable
and f l e ~ i b l e concepts, is a mandatory
att"ibute of military cad,es. Flexi-
bility. the ability to assess a mtuation
quickly and soberly. to catch tlze es-
sential and. in conformity ,,,itl, this.
59
to make cm'rect decisions and follon'
thrQugh !l'ith these qecisions are es-
sential f01' accomplishing all practical
tusks on a I st1'ate'gfr, nperatiunal 01'
tactical scale.
There are several other good treat-
ments of the subject of mental flexi-
bility on the battlefield. Whether we
here witness an effort to achieve such
flexibility or ,vhether it already exists
is an open question. The following
quotations could a>i easily be describ-
ing current US Army Command and
General Staff College thinking:
TVaI' i8 an art, an e.l'traordinarily
emlll'le,!' and ",ultiraeeted a,.t, War is
an area of ,'a,.iable 'Iuantities. Just as
politics qs a 1I'hole, it ;8 more like
algebra than arithmetic and "'en more
like highe,. than 10ll'e>' mathematics.
, .. Unity of flexibility and definite-
nes.' i8 inherent 'n the intellectual
acti"ities of eu,.y commande,.. On the
nne hand. it is necessary to fake into
account the enti"e complexity of the
changing situation and if) cnrnprehend
a s01neh"me . ., cont1"adicf{)ry (i{)U' {)f in-
fOl'mation; on the othel' hand, it is
essential 7"'eeisely to spot the turning
_,point and to make a decisinn imme-
diatcly--a rlea,', precise, and definite
deci"ion . ... Flel'ibility and definite-
ness in a rmnmander's activities pre-
,'-wrnes the c{)uragr to innovate . ...
Field manual" a,.e not a ,.igid scheme
/l'hich must be preci.'fly followed, but
rathe,. a guide to the pe,.formance of
independent art" of thinking and per-
({)rmanre.
Earlier commenls related to the
lack of embarrassment of the Soviet
leadership over the zigzag course of
Soviet policy. Neither do they apolo-
gize for many of the techniques they
use to confuse international audi-
60
ences; such as encouragement of paci-
fists. Here, again, Lenin is the oracle
and the model. Lenin "fought against
pacifism as a program for a revolu-
tionary proletarian party," but is
quoted asking the rhetorical question:
"but where, when and who denied
utilization of pacifists by this party
in order to demoralize the enemy, the
bourgeoisie?" That this quote is still
alive in the hearts of Lenin's succes-
sors is evident in the succeeding state-
ment:
This cmnment is of ennrmnU8 sig-
nificance in defining the tactics of
Communist palties in the .,truggle for
peace and socialism, in the cause of
b/li/ding a bmad /mnt of democmtic
forces around the Communists fm' the
struggle agamst imperialist reaction-
ar!! f{)1"ces.
One is tempted to comment that
this book attempts to create sponta-
neity by the numbers. Another inter-
nal contradiction is seen in the urging
of the disciplined Communists of to-
day to emulate the mercurial genius,
Lenin, Yet these same contradictions
did not prevent the Bolsheviks from
coming to power and the Soviet state
from vastly increasing in power and
influence. We can at least be thankful
that no modern-day Lenin sits atop
the Soviet pinnacle.
(Colonel Hendricks /I'a" ymduatrd
f"olll the Mi/ital'y Academy in 1948
alld received a.Maste, of Arts deg,.ee
ill lnte,.national Relations fmlll Tulane
Uni"p)'sity ill 1956. He commanded the
3/32 A,.",or. 3d AmlOred Division, in
1967-68 and was Division Suppo,t
lmll1>land Commander in the 2d A,'-
nlm'rd Dil,isirJn for two ypars prior tn
inining the CGSC faculty in 1973.1
Military Review
from
NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS
future trends of
COM;MUNIST CHINA's
strategic policy
NIU Slen-Chong
T
HE predlclJon, or even the dIscussIon, of future trends of CommunIst
Chma's strategIc polIcy IS a very complicated affaIr because they are
mfluenced by so many factors. Those factors are not only mterrelated but
also sometImes contradIctory to one another. However, the followmg factors
are especially Important and may be consIdered as the foundatIOn of the
present analysIs.
Ideological Influence
The People's Republic of China (PRC) prodaims Itself a SOCIalIst state
which is also an upholder of MarxIsm-leninIsm-Maoism. IdeologIcal concept
IS certamly an important factor behmd most features of Communist Chma's
strategIc Ime because Mao Tse-tung and hIs discIples senously regard world
revolutIOn as theu responsIbIlIty. The gUldmg ideology in the Communist
party consIsts essentIally of a predlclIon, unfettered by any precIse lime span,
that sooner or later the world WIll progress along such a path toward a
historIcally determmed goal.
It IS now customary to downgrade the sjgnificance of ideology in the
strategIc poliCIes of CommunIst countries To some extent, this IS justifIed.
Many of Communist China's pohcies appear to stem from what we loosely
call natIOnal Interests, and are advanced lflespectlve of the contradlcllon they
may pose to Ideological tenets.
Nevertheless, Marxism can mean a vanety of thmgs to different adaptors.
Reprinted from NATO's Fifteen Nations (The Netherlands), JuneJuW 1974 Copyright (i) 1974
by NATO's Fifteen Nations.
April 1975 61
COMMUNIST CHINA
It can have intense ethical appeal, and It can be reconciled with the most
intense nationalIsm. The Sinification of Marxism has now reached the point
where Communist Chwa's spokesmen insist that only the thought of
ChaIrman Mao truly expresses the great doctrine. Those who acknowledge his
genius are true Marxist-Leninist, all others are revisionists or worse.
At least in the patterns of reasoning and terminology, ideology has always
exerted its strong influence althOUgh this influence on policy decisionrnakwg
is not so simple as a matter of straIghtforward cause and effect. The relatIOns
are much more complex and indirect than this. In short, ideology remaws an
important factor in Chinese strategic consideration, but it IS far from being
the only one.
Dialectical Logic
More Important, and more sophistical, the dialectical logic is another
foundatIon of CommunIst Chwa's strategic thought. We should not mistake
CommunIst Ideology for the CommunIst dIalectical mode of thought.
AlthOUgh a funclIonal slmilanty and correlatIon eXIst between them, they are
two dIfferent thwgs. In order to grasp more fully the meanIng of CommUnIst
thought and actIon, one must comprehend the logIcal framework of
dIalectICS. Modern CommUnIsts have had great respect for the dialectical
mode of thOUght. To Lenm, "dIalectics IS hving, many-sided knowledge,"
whIle, to Stahn, "dIalectics IS the soul of Marxism." Mao Tse-tung once saId:
"CommUnIsts over the world are wIser than the bOUrgeOIsie, because they
understand dIalectICS and can see further."
Dialectics IS a complex and puzzling method of reasonIng. It IS a
philosophy of becommg, of perpetual motIon, and of constant change
through endless syntheses of contradIctions. The most important concept is
motion. Since motIOn is change, and change is becoffiing, It follows that
everythmg IS m a state of becoming.
_ AccordIng to thIS point of view, Chmese CommunIsts do not divide the
world Into the strong and the weak because that represents a static vIew of
power. They consider power as somethIng dynamic, ever changing; therefore,
they see a world diVIded ~ o the "stronger-become-weaker" and the
"weaker-beconung-stronger." The PRC's leaders believe themselves to be In
the latter category, and their task IS to hasten the process.
Since everythmg IS In motion, and consequently is in a state of becoming,
everythIng contams contradIctIOn. According to the dIalectics, therefore, the
conflict is unconditIonal and absolute while the unity is only conditional and
relatIve. ThIS makes struggle at all levels not only unaVOIdable but desirable.
To the dI3lectical mmd, pohlICS, either domestIc or mternatlOnal, is
ImpOSSIble without an enemy, for It IS a dIalectical process in which the friend
IS becoming the enemy and vIce versa.
Furthermore, the emphasis on contradiction permits the dialectics to offer
two mutual antagonIstIc mterpretations to every issue. In this respect, George
Orwell's memorable representation of the CommunIst's "doublethink"
process in his famous novel 1984 IS fnghteningly accurate_ As a philosophy of
62
Military Review
April 1975
COMMUNIST CHINA
contradlclIon, the applIcatIOn of dlalec1lcs is elusive and deceptive. Applied
to mternational relatIOns, this means that Maoist doctrine can be made to
seem consistent practically With any set of polIcies. The foreign relations of
Communist China, hence, have always been more complex and variable than
some Western observers have supposed. No policy is Immutable and no
development IS impossible.
Domestic Situation
The prevaIlmg domestic situation bears heavily upon Chinese strategic
policy m a variety of ways It contnbutes to the sense of insecurity and the
attitude of defenSiveness, particularly vlS-d-vis the two great powers. It also
makes logical Communist Chilla's IdentificatIOn with the rest of the
developmg world. Furthermore, the fragile polItical and economic conditIons
cause the PRC to select mimmal fISk policy at least temporanly.
For more than a decade, foreign policy has been a weapon, occaSIOnally a
key ISsue, in the bitter, deadly struggle within China's ruling circles. Because
Mao's successIOn problem remams unsolved, there is no certainty that, upon
his death, the country can move easily to a new generation of leaders.
Because uncertamty contmues 10 hover over the Chinese domestic scene,
some important questions about the PRe's future polIcy will remain
unanswered, or even unanswerable.
Psychological Attitude
The psychological attitude of the Chinese Communist leaders IS an
unportant factor too. It is necessary to recall that the perception of Mao
Tse-tung and his comrades IS colored by experiences gamed dunng a lifetime
of revolutionary aCl!vity. The isolation of these leaders from the Western
World, and from much of the Communist bloc as well, has led them
unrealistically to see the world as an album of stereotypes. They view It
through the haze of their own prejudices and misconceptions, and tend to
deCide then actions on the basis of myth rather than reality. However, no
matter how unrealisl!c the attitude may appear to most Western observers,
the Chinese leaders have faith in the Validity of their long-range goals. They
may shift pnontles among strategic objectives as the international situation
demands, but theu ultimate goals are fixed and their determmation has been
proved in the crucible of war.
Maoist doctnne in fact is a curious mixture of revolutionary realIsm and
revolutionary romanticism. It believes m the pnnciple of "where there is a
will, there IS a way." The oft-repeated concept of "men over weapons" stems
from this belief. The Chinese talk and act as if the limitation of their
resources were completely melevant. They sincerely believe that all the
reactionaries are just paper tigers. The suggestion that Communist China's
policy is characterized by pragmatism and conservatism seems to be more
apparent than real.
63
COMMUNIST CHINA
The general attitude of Chinese people is also worthy of serious
consideration. As a nafion, they have almost unlimited patience. They always
can wait u n ~ i l some favorable opportunity appears. The Chinese have been
obsessively concerned wIth their humiliations in the 19th Century. To the
Russians, the reaction is both hate and fear; to the Japanese, it is hate but no
fear. Nevertheless, Chinese feeling toward the Western World in general, and
the United States in particular, is not so bad as Communist propaganda has
expressed.
Geopolitical Position
Geopohttcal posItion IS definitely a factor playmg a very important role m
the future evolutIOn of CommunIst Chma's strategic pohcy. The posltton of a
country in the world is more or less a constant in the international political
equatIon. ,
At least at thIs juncture, CommunIst China IS still a regional power. The
farther from theIr borders the Chmese Communists attempt to project their
power, the less adequate are their resources for the purpose. It may be said
that the effect of thell power decreases in mverse geometric progression as
the dIstance from Pekmg lengthens. On the other hand, the most Immediate
threat to Communist China comes from one of Its neighbors.
Although, compared WIth the UnIted States and the SovIet UnIon,
Communist Chma may be relatIvely weak, It IS a gIant among mIdgets when
contrasted WIth most of its nmland neighbors. The Chmese may make theIr
most Important strategIc mOves m those countnes dunng the foreseeable
future.
Moreover, CommunIst Chma has ItS partIcular geopolitical view. In
Pekmg's eyes, the contemporary world IS divIded mto three distinct parts' the
two superpowers, the Second IntermedIate Zone and the Third World.
Accordmg to the pronouncements of the PRC, the danger and thleat come
from the forces of imperialism and socialimperialism, labels today for the
. Untted States and the SovIet Unton. Singly or jointly, these two superpowers
are stnvmg for global hegemony. They represent the chIef evil of this era and
tlueaten the independence of other countnes and the success of revolutionary
movements.
The second group IS mamly composed of Japan and Western Europe. They
are "advanced, capitalist nations," but possess more hmited power and
mfluence than the superpowers In the InternatIOnal arena.
The thud group IS more or less synon)'mous with the AfroAsian and
LatmAmencan states It comprises 90 percent of the world's population,
with which one must ahgn oneself to acrueve success.
Strategic Tradition
China is a very old nallon. Its martial tradition was born in remote
antIqUIty and has been enIlched during almost 5,000 years of history. It has a
military history, literature and traditton worthy of critical study. The most
famous Chinese military classic IS "Sun Tzu" (known in the Western World as
64
Military Review
April 1975
COMMUNIST CHINA
"The Art of War"). The late Sir Basil Liddell Hart, a great strategist of our
time, once said:
Sun Tzu s essays on 'The Art of War' form the earliest of known treatises
on the subject, but have never been surpassed in comprehensiveness and
depth of understanding.
Although, for centuries, the Chmese have regarded Sun Tzu as theu
"StrategIc Sage," he is by no means the only strategist whose work they
esteem. The mm'j of Chmese literature on the art Df war-including strategy,
tactics and techh,ques-Is almost inexhaustible. Many of the tactics and
technIques are, of course, dated, but the theones of strategy developed by
ancient masters are generally tImeless and, on the whole, as relevant to war in
thIS age as when they were first conceived.
It seems that at least three princIples denved frorv ancient literature have
greatly influenced Pekmg's strategy. The flISt ISYUan'chiao-ching-kung whIch
means "to cooperate with the far country and to strIke at the near country."
The second IS i-i-chih-i which means "USIng a barbarian to check another
barbanan." The third is pi-shih-chi-shu which means "to avoid strength and to
attack weakness."
These strategic princIples and their stories are well-known to Chinese
intellectuals, mcluding Mao Tse-tung. The first emperor of the Ch'in dynasty
(Ch'in-Shih-Huang-Ti) used thl! first principle to annex six powerful states
and establish the first UnIfied empire in Chinese hIstory. During the 19th
Century, the second principle was proposed by Li Hung-chang, a famous
statesman In the Manchu Government, In order to use RusS]3 to check Japan.
The thud pnnclple really IS the foundation of Mao's four slogans coined at
Ching Kang Shan whIch read as follows:
When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts, we harass;
when the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack, when the enemy retreats,
we pursue.
WIthout any explanation, the slgmficance of these prinCIples m Commu-
nist Chma's strategic policy can easIly be understood. As to the first pnnclple,
the United States means the far and the Soviet UnIon n.eans the near.
Accordmg to the second pnnclple, Communist Chma IS using one superpower
to check another superpower, and also attempting to use the Second
IntermedIate Zone and the Thud World to check both superpowers. Peking is
now aVOIdIng any conflict WIth powerful countrIes but prepanng to move
into the power vacuum left by the UnIted States. This clearly is the
applIcation of the third principle.
The Soviet Union
So much for the theoretical analyses. A single issue which has dominated
Communist China's foreign policy during recent years IS its relatIons with the
65
COMMUNIST CHINA
Soviet Union. This is the most important question which has pf{)duced a
senous cleavage within the PRC's top hierarchy for nearly 20 years and been
instrumental in shapililg Peking's varied responses to the outside world since
the mid-1950s.'
In the context of Smo-Sovlet conflict. the importance of an ideological
difference is sometimes exaggerated. As far as their relations with the
non-Communist world are concerned, they really have some common
interests. After all, the Commumsts' dialectical reasoning allows them to
argue that, when they are flghtmg each other, they are really cooperating in
furthering the world revolutIOn.
However, the geopolitIcal aspect of the Sino-Soviet conflict IS of a
fundamental nature. They are neighbors with the longest border in the world
and cannot get away flOm each other. Furthermore, the conflict doubtlessly
has deep historical root. These factors have caused the two Red giants to
consIder each other as a mam source of danger.
But the surface sIgn can be' deceptive. In fact, the threat of an imminent
war between them IS more theoretical than rea\. In the recent past, the Pekmg
regime has taken great pams to emphasize the grave danger of a Soviet attack.
However, It seems that the pnmary concern of the Chinese leaders today is
not the threat of immment war but the possIbility of the penetration of
SovIet power m the Chinese political organization. Essentially, therefore, the
Issue IS more polItical than Ill1htary m nature.
No doubt, Soviet advocates of a preemptive nuclear strike continue to
exist. In its mainstream, however, it is quite clear that Soviet strategy is not
aimed at war but at the domestic political sItuation in the post-Mao era. At
the present, the Soviets wish only to main tam a posture of containment with
a great arc of alliances and forward military positions, not dissimilar to earlier
American policy.
To counter the total SovIet threat, Communist China will drive relentlessly
toward three pnncipal objectIves.
A relative sufficiency of nuclear deterrent.
A conventional defense m depth.
A major counteroffensIve actIOn on the polItical front to nullify Soviet
containment efforts.
. As to the military aspect, the quest of a credible nuclear deterrent will
continue, together WIth the selective modernizatIon of the conventional
forces. One key element, the intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of
reaching Moscow and most parts of Asia, may already have been deployed. It
is unthinkable, however, that the Chinese would launch a suicidal attack
against the Soviet Union. No matter what the sacrifices made, the PRC
cannot hope to match the mIlItary might of either superpower. Parity simply
is not a feasible goal In the foreseeable future. Consequently, whatever the
Chinese may regard as a credible deterrent br..an effective defense, the
66
Military Review
April 1975
COMMUNIST CHINA
political aspect of their countermeasure is of a vital and long-range value.
Pekmg's policies toward both the Second Intermediate Zone and the Third
World have been shaped by the necessIty of the effor! to break up Soviet
encirclement and deflect Soviet pressure away from China. Chinese actions
are dlIected toward undermining Soviet credrbtlity with both fnend and
enemy. This involves not only the effort to break the Soviet system of
alliances, but also to penetrate "the Soviet Empire ," and even to appeal to
the Soviet people themselves to turn against their current government.
At least for the short range, the Cold War between Communist China and
the Soviet Union ;wIIl most probably contmue. However, nobody can predict
the future trend exactly. Either a future war or a future rapprochement is
pOSSible, but the contmuatlon of a limited or controlled connlct remains a far
more plaUSible prospect. .
Sino-American Relations
The most sigmficant change of Communist Chma's strategic policy hne is
in the field of Smo-American relatIOns. After 22 years of unYleldmg enmity,
the improvements in Smo-Amencan relatJons have produced m the Western
World at large a sense of rehef and optImism about the future. Yet,
overoptImism could be tragiC. Nothmg could be more detrimental at this
stage than believing that the 22-year legacy of mutual bitterness and distrust
could disappear sWIftly and completely overnight.
When defending his new pohcy toward the United States, Chou En-lal
quoted Lenin for the benefit of hIS audIence at the 10th National Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party. When he saId "one must learn to distinguish
between a man who gives the bandits money and firearms in order to lessen
the damage they can do and faciirtate thell capture and execution, and a man
who gIves bandIts money and firearms in order to share m the loot," he was
obviously thinkmg of the United States as the "bandits" and the PRC as the
man who compromIses with the bandIts for a good but transitory reason.
Little imagination is needed to visuahze the role Chou must have carved out
for the United States in hIS particular perceptIOn of the future. There is a
distrnction, he asserted, between the "necessary compromises" between
revolutionary countries and Impenalist countnes and the sinister compromise
between "Soviet reviSIOnism" and "US imperialism."
Today, Peking's strategIc pohcy regarding the United States is full of
contradictions. First, Peking IS concentratmg its attention on the threat of the
Soviet Umon. It obviously hopes to use the United States to check the Soviet
Uni<ln. The rapprochement between the two superpowers is definitely not
beneficial to Communist Chma. Secondly, the ideological positIOn and
long-range interest of Communist China would support the effort to isolate
the two superpowers from the rest of the world, even at the risk of
contributing to their further collaboration. Thirdly, so far as the PRC
leadership is concerned, US imperialism has long been the most ferocious
enemy of the people of the whole world, and the Soviet Union has merely
been a renegade clIque for more than a decade. Though the latter is regarded
67
COMMUNIST CHINA
as the more Immediate I.hreat, in the long run, the biggest threat remains the
United States. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States is a
"declining po'er" despite liS awesome military might. Chou En-Iai indicated
m his August 1973 report:
US imperialism started to go downhill after its defeat in the war of
aggression against Korea. It has openly admitted that it is increasingly on the
decline; it could not but pull out of Vietnam.
For the immedIate interest, therefore, Pekmg subtlely does not want
Amencan power to decline too precIpitously.
The uneasy tnangular relationship between the Umted States, the Soviet
Union and Communist China will no doubt continue to be a dominating
factor m the global strategic situatIOn of the 1970s. Any future change could
break up the current Sino.-American ra pprochemen t. However, this is
certamly not merely a bIlateral Issue, and it IS clear that any predicllon
concernmg the long-term future IS extremely hazardous.
Western Europe and Japan
The next Item to be dIscussed IS the so-called Second Intermediate Zone.
In CommunIst Chma's strategic perceptIOn, Western Europe IS considered as a
regIOn that can be separated from the superpowers and caused to play an
mdependent role. In fact, Pekmg does not assign very great weIght to Its
relatIOns with the European nations because Europe hes largely beyond ItS
reach, either geopolitIcally or strategIcally. The most immedillte objective is
to use Western Europe (along wIth Eastern Europe) to check the SovIet
Union and make a dIversion of SovIet strength from the Asian theater.
However, thIS seems to be merely wishful thinking because the SovIet Umon
I)PW has enough forces to sustain a defense on two fronts. The explanatIOn
lies in a continual mcrease m the total proportion of the Soviet gross national
product bemg devoted to defense.
As to Japan, the story is qUIte dIfferent:
Chma regards the liberatIOn of Japan as a matter of grave importance. The
first revolution in the world was the Russian revolution. The second was the
Chinese revolution. The third will be the Japanese revolution. If Japan is
liberated, the Orient will be liberated and the world will be liberated also.
These words were spoken by Mao Tse-tung on 9 February 1961 to a
Japanese delegation from the Association for the Education of Workers on a
visit to Peking. Thus, the liberation of Japan may be considered as the core of
its strategy of world revolution.
In order to achieve its objective, however, Communist China must take a
strategy of Indirect approach. Any nation that seeks to pose a threat to
Japan's existence or to make Japan bend to its will does not need to launch a
direct invasion or incite a. domestic revolution. All that needs to be done is to
68
Military Review
April 1975
COMMUNIST CHINA
halt the supply of raw materials aI)d energy sources. Overseas sources of raw
materials and the maritime life line are absolutely necessary for Japan's
existence. This means that the key to Japan's natIOnal survival lies in the
general area of Southeast Asia.
If Southeast Asia should turn to the left, then Japan could not but follow
suit. Whatever the case, Corrununist China's strategy toward Japan does not
lie in destroying Japan's industrial centers or its citIes, but in placing Japan's
industrial potential under its dominatIOn. If Commumst Chma succeeds in
liberating Japan, and organizes these two countries as an integral unit, the
resultmg combmaiion could easily become a force capable of challenging the
United States or the Soviet Union on an equal basis.
In the near future, Peking will continue its efforts at trade, social and
cultural penetration toward Japan. It will also hope to reduce American
influence m Japan. Furthermore, It could attempt to develop a strong and
mfluential Japanese Commumst party that will orient toward Pekmg rather
than toward Moscow. However, these operations withm Japan, though being
pushed, have not achieved any outstandmg result. This is because Japan is
separated by waters from the Chinese mamland and because there is a lirmt to
the leadership and support that Peking can give to Japanese revolutionary
activities.
But the threat to Japan is rather long-range m nature. Japan cOI,!ld
eventually become the center of gravity m the future global strategy of
Corrununist China. Its future actIon toward Japan could be intended to apply
external pressure and to create mternal trouble at the same tIme. From an
overall standpoint, the conclusion can be reached that armed attack involvmg
large-scale destructIOn could be unnecessary. In the fmal stage, however, It is
possIble that Peking would resort to nuclear blackmail to achieve Its end.
Southeast Asia
It remains to examine Commumst Chma's strategic relatIOns with the
so-called Third World. In one respect, the Third World is treated as a umt by
PekIng and ItS multiple dIVersIties and mternal conflicts are mimrmzed or
Ignored. Commumst China is attempting to achieve alignment and mfluence
m this group of countries. If successful, these would stnke a senous
IdeologIcal and political blow at the Soviet Umon. Yet Its power IS not
enough to achIeve ItS worldwide ambition. When developmg nations or
revolutIOnary movements In the Third World reqUITe concrete rmlitary,
economIc and technical assistance, the PRe's contribution is relatively
limited. At least In the foreseeable future, Peking stIli only can pay lip seTVIce
to its great objective of world revolution.
Nevertheless, Southeast Asia is a umque exception. This region is
contiguous to Communist China and most vulnerable to ItS pohtical and
mliltary actlOns_ When its pronouncements, activities and polemics are
weIghed, it can be seen that Communist China has adhered to a uniform
policy lIne in Southeast Asia SInce the 1950s. The current leaders have once
again made It clear that the PRC has special interests and responsibilIties In
Asia. And this IS particularly true for Southeast Asia.
69
COMMUNIST CHINA
70
Communist China has two major objectives in Southeast Asia. The first is
to protect its flank; the second is to promote the revolution in this
general,area. Security and revolution are interrelated and remain vital factors
in the future policy as well.
Today, Communist China has gIven three types of support to guerrilla
movements in Southeast Asia:
It has permitted clandestme radio stations purporting to be the voice of
the "Free" Malaysians (Thai, Burmese, and so forth) to operate from
locations on the Chinese mainland, broadcasting in indigenous languages in an
effort to culhvate the climate for a Communist revolution.
It has invited as guests and, on occasion, given long-term asylum to
varIOUS CommunIst leaders of thIS region.
Some traming and mIlItary-economic support have been given to various
guerrilla units.
Peking WIshes in the remote future to acquire hegemony over Burma,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North VIetnam and the Republic of Vietnam after
the influence and presence of the United States has been removed. Moreover,
it wishes to control Singapore, Malaysia, and even Indonesia to a certain
extent, and, ultimately, It plans to establIsh "people's democracies" in these
states. ThIS strategIc plan may appear unreahstic or even fantastic to Western
analysts, but the judgment of the PRe's leaders could be qUIte different.
Mao's pnnclple of protracted conflIct entaIls, among other things, a wIlling-
ness to maneuver and walt because, accordIng to Mao, sociahsm's triumph is
"ari objeclIve law Independent of human wIll."
Conclusions
In a nutshell, Communist China's tendency to avoid major military
mvolvements will, In all probability, continue until its domestic political
situation has been stabilized, until its human and material resources have been
organized on a more effective baSIS, and until it really has reached superpower
status politically and mIlItarily.
For some years to come, Communist China wIll rely mainly on what
General Andre Beaufre called "mdirect strategy." That means it will continue
to make use of the limited area of freedom of action to achieve success. It is
interesting to note that General Beaufre's concept of "indirect strategy" runs
parallel to tradItional ChInese strategIC thought.
As soon as the PRe's econormc and technological capability can provide
an adequate nuclear deterrent visa-vis the two superpowers, the Peking
regime will have a freer hand in pursuing its regional objectives. Nuclear
weapons that can reach Soviet targets from mainland China are also capal)le
of reaching other ASIan targets. Acquisition of this capabihty could then pose
a new threat to the Asian nations. If Communist China should take advantage
of its nuclear shield to pursue an expansionist policy in the Asian Pacific
region, the tension or conflict provoked might first be with Japan or the
Soviet Union, for both have important interests in that area. However, it is
unlikely that the United States could remain uninvolved unle" it would agree
to abandon its stat'!s of superpower.
Military Review
A Great Debate
The American General Staff
(1903-16 )
Major Marc B. Powe, United States Army
B
y ACT of Congress in February
1903, the American Army gained
a General Staff which it scarcely knew
how to employ. Ultimately, this devel
opment led to a fundamental change
in American mIlitary policy, but the
path was bumpy and confusing. While
an inexperienced Secretary of War
hafl the foresight to design the Gen
eral Staff, the Army professionals
lacked an understanding of what the
staff could or should do. In solving
this problem, the Army went through
a period of trying introspection. bit-
ter controversy and near abanflonment
of the General Staff concept. In the
end, however, the results clearly justi-
fied all the labor in its creation. The
proof of the staff's worth would come
in 1917 when America entered World
War I.
Setting the Stage
Following the Civil War, the Army
and Navy were quickly reduced to
cadre strength. Even if he had wanted
April 1975
to, the psychological ,md physical
wounds were too great to allow any
Ame1"1can leader to contemplate in
ternationaluse of that military power.
The armies and the fleets were quickb'
disbanded. The Navy was largely "laid
up"; the Army was committed to polic
Ing the South and guarding the fron-
tier. In fact, thiS was a reasonable at-
tHude since there W H ~ no lnternatlOnal
threat to the country. The flaw. how
ever. was that there WllS no plan to
meet any changes on the world scene
which might impose military require-
menb on the United States.
It soon became apparent that (Ic-
velopments in Europe had to be con
sidered. Technical improvements in
arms, the growing lise of "popular
armies," and the rise of the Prussian
General Staff system were creating
rapid changes that the United States
was missing. "The basic problem was
one of management; and the 1870s
stood on the' threshold of what might
be called the management revolution
71
GREAT DEBATE
-in war." 1 In America, the problem
was not tha t there no mili ta ry
"managers"-they would have come
forward upon demand. The problem
was more basic: Americans generally
were uninterested in strategy and
military developments.
Brevet Major General Emory Upton,
only 26 when the Civil War ended and
a suicide at 42, grumbled in writing
about American military policy or the
lack thereof. In his influential Mili-
ta,'Y Policy of the United States (read
in manuscript by many military men
in the 1880s and 1890. but not actually
published until 1!)04), Upton asserted
that there was no American military
policy and that the country blundered
mto each war as unprepared as for the
last. He was sharply critical of the
concept of the citizen-eoldier and be-
lieved that only a large professional
Army could provide security for the
country. Importantly, Upton believed
America needed a German-style Gen-
eral Staff. While we may argue Qver
his theSIS, the fact remains that many
believed in what Upton said, and Sec-
retary of War Elihu Root was to adopt
much of Upton's thinking after the
Spanish-American War.
Naval strategy in America pro-
-gressed more rapidly than the Army's
after the Civil War, largely under the
influence of Captain Alfred T. Mahan.
During the 1880s and early 1890s,
naval officers pushed successfully for
new naval vessels to incorporate new
developments in steam, steel and
weaponry. Mahan, teaching at the US
Naval War College, gave the new tech-
nology a purpose and much greater
scope with his thesis that "command
of the sea" was a good thing in peace
or war. For a commercial and mari-
time nation like the United States, the
idea of "sea control" seemed quite
reasonable. "
72
Upton
By the 1890s, Amel'lcans widely ac
c.::pted the idea of "manifest destin;"
extending beyond the American coast-
line. A combination of mercantile
spirit, benighted Christian evangel-
ism, belief in mili tary force and dem-
ocratic idealigm found expres..;ion in
an increasingly active American for-
eign policy. A number of naval leaders
pointed to the value of a canal aeros,
the Central American and
that inevitably drew American Illter
est to the Caribbean Sea. Only the
weakened Spanish Government seemed
to block the path to complete l'S dom
ination of that vital area-once Cuba
and Puerto Rico were released from
the foreign domination, American in-
terests in the area would be secure. I
A jingoistic American press and
rather crude Spanish foreign policy
had created by early 1898 a "trong
feeling of public antipathy for the
Spanish regime in Cuba and Puerto
Rico. When the USS Maine abruptly
sank in Havana harbor on 15 Febru-
ary, there was no restraining the
clamor for war. While the US Navy
Military Review
was more than capable of doing its
part in any war with Spain, the Army
was not nearly ready for conflict. The
Navy, in addition to having a rela-
tively modern and powerful force, even
had war plans (drawn up in 1895 at
the Naval War College). Furthermore,
the Navy had a well-schooled officer
corps, ready to perform in fleet action,
thanks to Mahan and hir mentor, Arl-
mimI Luce:
The Army was not so fortunate .
. . . Mobilizing, equi.pping and supply-
ing a ... (force increase fmm 26,000
to 275,000) ... placed a seVel'e burden
upon the Wa,' Department. With nei-
ther the planning staff nor the funds
necessary to plan for war in peacetime,
the department inevitably lCUS ill-pre-
pared fO)' any kind of major mob!liza-
tion 01' military operation. FUl'th1'
complicating maiters lCUS a basic dis-
agreement lcithin the department con-
cerning the strategy to be followed
and the lcay mobilization should be
carried out. $
Somehow, things were sorted out,
troops were dispatched to Cuba and
Puerto Rico, and the Spanish were
beaten soundly in less than 60 days of
combat. The Navy played a major
role in this victory, as well as the one
in the Pacific. In the Philippines, the
Army arrived in late July, and, by
August, the Spanish surrendered.
While the Navy victories were im-
pressive, sea control was perhaps more
significant than the destruction of the
ancient Spanish Fleets in both the
Pacific and the Caribbean. Despite the
long supply line from San Francisco
to Manila, for example, there was no
question of supporting the Army.
Sudden victory had a startling ef-
fect. In the space of a few months, it
became essential that Washington get
its military forces organized f,?r sus-
tained, peacetime overseas operations.
April 1975
GREAT DEBATE
Mahan
America suddenly had an empire to
police and defend. President McKinley
recognized that his greatest problem
was in the War Department, and, in
July 1899, he asked the brilliant law-
yer and administrator Elihu Root to
replace the dIscredited Russell Alger
as Secretary of War. This decision set
the stage for a renaissance in the
American Army-an irony since Root
harl no mIlitary experience.
Root and the General Stall Concept
Although Root considered himself
to be a complete amateur, he proved
to be a "Quick study." McKinley's
charge to the new Secretary was to
administer the new colonies efficiently,
but Root realized that his primary
tool-the Army-must be repaired
first. One of his first actions was to
attempt to "settle upon the true prin-
ciple which should govern the use to
be made of the Army," or, in short, to
establish the military policy which for
so long had been missing. Root felt
that two fundamental facts had been
missed by everyone concerned: First.
73
GREAT DEBATE
Root
the object of having an Army is to
prepare for war, and, second, that the
Regular Army should not be expected
to fight a war \\,ithout
What was the problem? How had
the Army, which had successfully
prosecuted every American war to
date, gone so wrong? Was there 'no
military system 01' doctrine to resolve
these issues? What Secretary Root
found was that, despite the fact that
Americ"n Army combat abilities had
remained on a pal' with those of their
European peers throughout the 19th
Century, the management of the Army
had not improved much since the Rev-
olutionary War. This high degree of
combat proficiency, as opposed to the
perceived ineptitude of high-level field
headquarters and the War Department
proper, is what so perplexed Emory
Upton. It is also the basis for Briga-
dier General John McAuley Palmer's
comment on the Spanish-American
War:
P"obably no army in Ihe ,,'m'ld e,'eI'
had better companies than those of
the regular army that took pa,'! in the
Sardiago campaign. Yet there was lit-
74
tie or no higher organization, 6
Focusing on the War Department,
Root found that there existed a funda-
mental problem-no one knew who
was in charge. Army regulations pre-
scribed the following relationships:
The military establishment is under
ol'da" of the Commanding General of
the Al'my in thai It'hieh pe1'tains to
discipline and military control, The
fiscal affairs of the Army are r01/-
dl1rted by the Sec)'etary of !Val'
thmuglt the se"pral staff depal'l-
ments. 'i'
This apparently innocent philoso-
phy, which had existed since the Revo-
lution. mad e possible destructive
power fights between the Command-
ing General and the Secretary, unco-
ordimited effort like that between
Lieutenant General Nelson Miles and
Secretary Russell Alger during the
Spanish-American War, and the head-
strong independence of the various
bureau chiefs at all times, k In the
latter case, Secretary Root soon found
that the bureaus were nearly fiefdom',
In theory, they reported to the Sec-
retary, but, in practice, many of the
btll'eau chiefs dealt directly with the
Congress whenever it su ited them,
This situation was possible because
Army regulations permitted and even
encouraged the bureau chiefs to re-
main in the same job for 10, 20 or
more years. Because the bureaus dealt
in money and 'property matters, they
were likely to develop close ties With
certain Congressmen in whose dis-
tricts certain projects might occur,
Not surprisingly, as their power grew,
the bureaus became less and less will-
ing to admit that any military func-.
tion was mOl'e important than that of
The Adjutant General or Quartermas-
ter 01' whomever. A contemporary ob-
server of the situation, Brigadier Gen-
eral Theodore Schwan, reported:
Military Review
When we come to look into the con-
ditions of things at the Wa,' Depa,t-
ment, we find that h"'e the dish'ibu-
tinn of po,,'e,' and influence is almost
reversed. That not the line but ifs
se"vant the staff, is !'iI'lually s"pume
(each staff within its Oli'n presen.ce).
and that there is little correlation be
flceen the various departments nf the
staff. '
Interestingly, Schwan 'concludes his
description of the failings of the hu-
reaus by relieving them of the blame
for their narrow view and disjointed
efforts. "It is not their fault if there
IS no united effort toward a common
end." The fault, Schwan said, lay in
not having a staff to coordinate their
efforts. 10
Recognizing that he must act to cor-
rect the organizational problems
which had plagued the planning and
expansion for the Spanish-American
War, Root decided that the Army must
make several fundamental changes.
Specifically, he wanted the War De-
partment to have a plannmg staff; It
also needed an agency to evaluate
changes in military technology; there
must be a system of procuring and
training an adequate supply of com-
petent officers; and, finally, there must
be a workable Reserve system. 11 For
the most part, we will focus on the
General Staff, but It must be recog-
nized that, to some extent, Root's pro-
gram was indivisible.
Root aVOIded the temptation to go
into the War Department and clean
house. He was qUIte aware that he
neither fully understood the facts of
the situation nor the solutions. He
realized that change in an entrenched
organization like the War Department
would have to be carefully planned.
To educate himself, Root read the
Dodge Commission report on the War
Department's role in the war. He ab-
April 1975
GREAT DEBATE
Miles
sorbed the ideas in Spenser Wilklll
son's The Brain of an AI/lly. But,
most important, he talked to some of
the thoughtful officers serving III the
War Department to find out how they
perceived the problem. Two of the
most influential men Root consulted
were The Adjutant General, Henry C.
Corbin, and his assistant, Major Wil-
liam H. Carter, who was to become
Root's alter ego in the battle for the
General Staff. These men gave Root
the benefit of their extensive "insid-
er's" knowledge; furthermore, Carter
introduced Root to Emory Upton's
Armies of Europe and A . ia. His f,1\'-
arable Impression of that book led to
the discovery-and ultimately govern-
ment publication--{)f The Military
Policy of the U",ted States. While
there is disagreement over the degree
of Root's acceptance of all of Upton's
philosophy, it is clear that Upton was
a primary influence on the Secre-
tary.12
From these various sources, Root
quickly realized that the War Depart-
ment required radical surgery. Carter
wrote later:
Secretary Rnot recognized carly in
75
GREAT DEBATE
Carter
his Sfrl'lre that there /l'as need of rad-
ical )efonn. but hi .. advisors 1I'ere
mainly !nu'eau each indepen-
dent in his own Rphctc, lL'orkmg unde?'
the same uncoordinated system that
had been the subiert of criticism for
a century. I had ueen stUdying and
Il''ritinq on Army lmpl'UVf?ment for
man y years and had come to the seri-
ous cont'iction that we could nel.'er go
tn /I'aT a.s a nation B1 U1 ms unless we
had something in thc nature of a board
of d,rectors to plan and ('rw)'dmate the
actil'ities incident to carrying on a
!J1'eat I('ar . ... I made many notes
and briefs for the Secretary and had
tn.any ('onversations H:itli him on the
subject of the introduction of a Gen-
Clal Staff in our Army. "
As Cal'ter points out, the problem
was that, while many in the Army be-
lieved that a General Staff like the
Germans' was desirable, no one in
Washington understood clearly how to
adapt it to American institutions. Root
and Cartel' both feared that Congres-
sional criticism would focus on the
foreign ant! "monarchial" character
76
of a General Staff. They correctly sur-
mised, too, that conservatives within
the Army-notably General Miles-
would play on this fear IO fight any
change in the existing military sys-
tem. 11 As it turned out,' Miles fought
Root tooth and nail. 1 n the end, the
normally genial Root had to force
Miles out of office to secure passage
of the General Staff bilL ",
To lay the groundwork, Root and
Carter believed that the first step
should be to create an agency to act
as a model of a Genoml Staff, both to
:-.ee ho\\ it would operate Rnd to quiet
potential critics. To that end in Feb-
ruary 1900, Root established a board
of officers undel' Brigadier General
W,lliam Ludlow and tasked it with
creating a War College. The charter
of the Ludlow Board clearly presaged
the General Staff; it required them to
plan for more effectIve Army opera-
tions, improved officer education, joint
operations with the Navy and a stndy
of the nation's mobIlization capability.
The Military Information Division of
The Adjutant General's Office was at-
tached to the War College Board to
provide it current information. After
"yen months of study. the board rec-
ommended that a General Staff be
created WIthin the War Department.
While Carter, who hat! served on the
board, urged Root to submit Immedi-
ately a proposal to rongress. the Sec-
retary felt it would be wiser to wait a
while for the idea to germinate. ,1\
Tn other preliminary steps. Root
asked the Congress in 1901 to abolish
the permanent appOIntments of bu-
reau chiefs and to establish the prin-
ciple of a foul'-year detail of line offi-
cers to the staff. In one stroke, Root
thus provided a solution to the worst
aspects of separatism between the
"field" and the War Department, and,
by retiring the most reactionary offi-
Military Review
cers, he created a more favorable cli
mate for the General Staff concept.
Carter worked on improvements in the
Army officer education system, lead
ing to the establishment of a pyrami-
dal (basic, advanced, War College)
school system similar to the current
approach, Carter saw in the schOOling
program the key to realizing Root's
concepts since officers fOlI the General
Staff must be wellrounded, experi.
enced and educated men, " Meanwhile,
Root continued to woo publIc ,opinion
with various statements praising the
General Staff concept as a traditional
Amel"lcan tool which simply needed
further refinement in the German pat
tel"l1, He WIsely appealed to the tradi
tional American desire for efficiency,
proclaiming that such a sy.tem would
:-.ave lives and money. I"
Early in J Root belIeved that
the time was right and directed Car
ter to prepare a General Staff bIll for
hubmission to Congress, The principal
pllI'pose of the act was to create "a
body of officeI's trained to considel' the
military policy of the country and to
prepare comprehensive plans for de
fense and charged ,pecially with those
dutIes," 1'1 The proposed legislation
ran into an immediate barrage of crit-
Icism in the Congress, with General
Miles adding his influence to the suc
cessful opposition, It took a,lOther
of preparatIOn by Root and Car-
ter, '" well as the retIrement of l\tiles,
bllt the Genel'81 Staff Act was passed
on the second attempt in February
In03.
The prOVISIOns of the bIll varie,1
,omewhat from Root's proposals, but,
believing that "half a loaf was better
than none," Root gratefully accepted
it. The General Staff Act accomplished
several objectives: It created a Gen-
eral Staff Corps of officers detailed
from the lIne; it tacked the Gelleral
April 1975
GREAT DEBATE
Staff to plan for national defense and
most of the various bureaus,
under the direction of the Chief of
Staff; and it specified how many offi
eel'S would be on the General Staff and
designated the tOllr length to be fOllr
years. Although it was not included
III the CongressIOnal action, the War
Department ",Isu yisualizeu aR&igning
General Staff oflkers to the various
geographical departments of the
Arm,,, creatIng a "General Staff WIth
Troops." While there were some dis-
tinct shortcomings III the bill (some
of which were apparently In<erted
covertly by one or more bureau chiefs
afteI' the PI'oposed legislatIOn reached
Congress), the General Staff appeared
to be off to a reasonable start. "n
lIa ving won a landmark battle,
what did Secretary Root and then
Brigadier General Carter anticipate
their brainchild would accomplish?
Root summed up its purpose:
Those are the t 'co g)'PUt duties IIf
Ihe General Staff-first, tn acquire in
forlllation and to arrange it anti fit it
iI/to all pOSSible plans oi operation-, 8'J
77
GREAT DEBATE
that an order ran be intelligently
made, and, second, 11'i1l'-l1 the order has
been made to e.l'Pl'ri,qe constant super-
t,isinn that does not mean command
bllt to inform and advise the different
ppysnns who must conspire to the exe-
cution of the order of holV every other
une is going on with his work."
While this statement is no model of
clanty, it does illustrate Root's desire
that the Gene!'al Staff both plan and
supervise. In the years to come, argu-
ments about these functions greatly
diluted the strength of the General
Staff concept Root had de"eloped.
Relying on his years of service, Car-
ter recognized that the problem within
the Army would come in breaking
down tradition. lIe cautioned that the
bureau chiefs would fight for their
pre ruga ti ves. He urged that the best
utlieer" in the A rmy be selected for the
General Staff-but he also warned
Root that these officers must be per-
suaded that their careers would not be
hurt by service outside the line. Ca!re
must be taken to prevent the General
Staff from boggmg down in adminis-
trath'e details; it must keep itself
free to think. And Carter cautioned
Root to in,i,t that the ,taff system be
made to work-that is, the Secretary
must not allow members 'of the staff
to come to him directly without going
through the chief. "" As it turned out,
Carter correctly anticipated many of
the difficulties which arose over the
next several
The problems of the emerging staff
,system were destined to last for about
15 years. They were largely conceptual
m nature, It product of the confusion
existing in America over what the
General Staff should be and do. There
is some suspicion that Root himself
c1id not understand clearly his own
creation. For example, historian T.
lIar;'}" Williams speculates that Root
78
may not have realized "fully all the
implications of the supervisory func-
tion or understood exactly how his
system would work." Williams goes on
to assert that, whatever he had in
mind, Root did not foresee how the
General Staff concept would function
in \vartirne. There is, it seems, a
more likely explanation: Root, who, of
course, had no military experience of
his own to draw on, applied the man-
agement concepts he had learned in
business and civilian government to
bring order to the War Department
without concel"lling himself greatly
about the details. He saw the German
General Staff as it was interpreted by
Upton and Carter as an excellent gen-
eral guide for action. Root's emphaSIS
for the General Staff was in the areas
of thoughtful, forward-looking plan-
ning and coordination between War
Department agencies. It is also clear
that Root believed in the principle of
full-time civilian control of the mili-
tary. Thus. he did not favor the Ger-
man system of making the chief of
the General Staff the supreme war-
time commander. The [,hief of Staff
was to be the executive of the staff
and an advisor to the Secretary of
War and President. At the same time,
Root implied. but did not specify. that
the Chief of Staff was to be the final
uniformed authority in the Army;
again. his impl'eciRion to cause
trouble later."
Whether or not Root and Carter
understood clearly what the- General
Staff was to do, It is certain that the
majority of young officers detailed
"GS" during the first years of its ex-
istence were confused. General Palmer
commented that:
... it takes mo>"e than an act of
Congress to make an efficient General
Staff . ... Ou>" progress IvaS slow at
Ii"st because very fellf officers in the
Military Review
Army knew the real meaning of the
phrase. I, for one, had no conception
of its I was an instructo>" at
West Point at the time and am satis-
lied that none of the other instructo>"s
01' p>"ofesso,'s understood it any better
than I did. To us, the nell' Geneml
Staff appea1"ed to be a sort of busybody
staff cI'eated to butt into the business
of every othe!' staff activity. A nd this
is precisely ,chat Secretary Root did
not lcant . ... He Icanted an entirely
nCI(' agency to specialize 011 defense
plans and military polzcies. ),
Still another problem arose over
what the relationship was to be be-
t ween the General Staff and the sep-
arate bureaus, notably The Adjutant
General's. Root and Carter uninten-
tionally built this problem into the
situation simply by leaving the issue
vague. The consensus at the time
seems to have been that the various
bureaus should be subordinate to the
General Staff and that they eventually
would This did, of course, occur
later, but not until a major battle was
fought over the question by two pow-
erfu 1 general officers.
The most important misunderstand-
ing about the General Staff, one which
transcended all complaints about the
new agency, was the issue of its actual
functions. Nelson characterizes the
debate effectively by describing it in
terms of whether the General Staff
was to \>e a "thought-organization" or
a "will-organization"-that is, would
it restrict itself to planning or would
it also supervise the execution of plans
and orders? ", This question struck to
the heart of the issue. Nelson con-
cludes that the General Staff was
intended to be both a "will" and a
"thought" organization, but that Root
and Carter's intentions were not real-
ized at once. Before this issue could be
resolved, it also had to be determined
April 1975
GREAT DEBATE
Young
what role the Chief of Staff played.
Was he simply an advisor, or did he
have command authority over the
Army?
The General Staff in Action
Neither the first Chief of Staff,
Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young,
nor the second, Lieutenant General
A. R. Chaffee, were able to resolve the
question. Both men had to make a de-
termined effort simply to preserve
General Staff in the face of hostilit)
from reactionaries within and with-
out. Unfortunately, Root and Carter
departed the scene shortly after the
new system was, inaugurated. Root re-
signed in Augnst 1903 but was not
replaced by William Howard Taft un-
til 1904. Carter left in December
and was replaced by Brigadier General
Tasker Bliss, a former president of the
War
The original orgalllzation of the
new staff was composed of three divi-
sions, one of which was functional,
while the other two received a hodge-
podge of responsibilities. The First
79
GREAT DEBATE
Division handled primarily adminis-
trati,'e matters, absorbing some of
the planning function of the old Ad-
jutant Genel'al. The Secrynd Division,
Military Information, was also an out-
growth of The Adjutant General; it
was charged with collecting and main-
taining information about foreign
countries and the militia. The Third
Division handled military education,
war planning and technical subjects
like coast .artillery. As Nelson points
(Jut, this original structure "showed
no great organizational clarity," con-
fusing functions and also clouding the
issue of whether the staff was to be a
thought Or will agency. '" For example,
the US Army War College, which re-
placed the War College Board in 1903,
existed for a time as a separate entity
from the General Staff even though
the per,onnel assigned to the Third
DIvision composed the War College
faculty. Furthermore, The Adjutant
General continued to be a powerful
and pervasive agency whose misslon
pal'lilleled that of the First Division.
Thus, the seeds of functional confu-
sIOn-if not outright rivalry-were
sown at the outset.
The fllll story of the War College
reqnires a separate study, but it
ohould be noted that it was closely tied
both to the General" Staff and to
another Root reform-military educa-
tion. As noted earlier, Carter had
worked on a better system for edu-
cating career officers. The result of
the effort was a hierarchical school
system with the War College as the
capstone. Root recognized that, for the
General Staff system to work, there
must be an education 'Program de-
signed to create well-rounded officers
(a failing in the American Army un-
til that time). The War College stu-
dents Would "learn by dOing," working
on I:eal war plans, usin!( real military
80
Bliss
information. ObVIOusly, to do this, the
War College must operate Jointly with
the General Staff. There is little ques-
tion today that this was one of the
most important of the Root reforms.
It has been the Army education sys-
tem which, by World War I, as MillIS
phrased it, "provided the nation with
the rudiments of a machine capable of
waging both large-scale and transoce-
anic war." II) It is ahm interesting that
It was over 30 years before the first
graduate of the Root education system
became Chief of Staff {General MaIm
Craig in 1935).:1I This fact explains
some of the organizational difficulties
of the General Staff.
During its first few years of opera-
tion, the General Staff studied a wide
variety of tOPICS, ran gin g from
whether enlisted orderlies should be
mounted to preparation of maps of
the Philippines. The work tended to
be quite detailed and the reports volu-
minous. Secretal'y of Wal' Taft was
enthusiastic about its progress and
described it in glowing terms to Con-
gress in the annual report for 1904 .. ~
But some complaints were registered
Military Review
Craig
again,t the General Staff, mostly re-
lating to the "detail" system of as-
signing officers to it. In Washington,
reactionaries complained that these
young, relatively inexperienced officers
could not perform adequately the tech-
nical functions of the old bureaus. In
the field, the role of the General Staff
officers with troops was ambiguous.
Since only one or two were assigned
to each headquarters, they usually
worked directly for the commander
on speCIal tasks, bu t these tash were
often administrative, not creative. I"
In 1906, the General Staff had ib
first opportunity to prove its worth.
When the government of Cuba ap-
pealed for help agaInst counterrevolu-
tionaries and the Army was required
to send an expeditionary force back
into Cuba, everyone was pleased to
learn that the General Staff already
had plans written. The Acting Secre-
tary of War noted:
We cannot see hOl<' Ice et'er did
without a General Staff. It is an In-
teresting fact that over a yea l' ago,
long before there leas any indication
of an insurrection, the Third Division
April 1975
GREAT DEBATE
of the General Staff pre.pared plans
fOl' the 11lilital'y occupation of Cuba
by the United States. "
It is also noteworthy that much of
that advanced planning was probably
done by the War College students of
the first class 0904-5). This seemed
to confirm the wisdom of having the
War College "learn by doing" with
the General Staff. :l',
The first Chief of Staff to serve four
years arrived in 1906. Major General
J. Franklin Bell'came to the job from
the Fort Leavenworth schools, and he
brought WIth him a complete plan for
his term of office. Nelson suggests that
the peliod 1906-10 saw the General
Staff establish its control over the en-
tire AI'my because Bell had already
thought out his program and used the
staff to implement it. :-.; elson also be-
lieves that, in the long run, this was a
period of dangerous regression; the
staff found itself simply reacting to
Bell's requirements, not planning
ahead .. ,., As an example, the General
Staff in 1908 was charged with col-
lecting data on American unprepared-
ness for wa1' for the White House.
Roosevelt had decided to capitalize on
the public's concern about this'matter
caused by publication of Homer Lea's
The Valor of Ignorance. The staff
paper consisted largely of extracts
from Upton, and. b:-' the time it had
been polished to ,uit General Bell, the
White HOllse no longer wanted it. "
Another example of regression 111
the concepb of the General Staff can
be found in a 1908 reorganization.
The staff was restl'uctured into two
sections, with the old Second and
Third DiVIsions merged and titled the
Second Section. This subjugation of
the military informatIOn was
seen as efficiency by General Bell and
a few others. but most of the staff
were concerned that the collection of
81
GREAT DEBATE
Bell
information \\ould :-ouffer. They were
right. By 1!J1O, there was scarcely an
effort left to plan for the collection of
III formation, and, by ID15, there was
not even all effort to file information
coming in from Pershlllg's Expedition
and f!'Om the European war. ThIS was
a precipItous fan for the old Militdry
Information Division WhICh had been,
since its birth 1Jl 1885, one of the most
productIve staff elements and one
which was praised specifically by each
Secretary of War. In the long run, of
course, the Military Information Di-
vislOn had tu be recreated for World
War I, but It was done late and at
great cost in preparedness for war, "
Finally, a long-simmering threat to
the General Staff mIght be mentioned
here. The Adjutant General retained
much of his authority even after the
. General Staff was created. In 1904,
une of the most able militaQ' admin-
istrators in American experience,
Major General Fred C. Ainsworth, be-
came the chief of that bureau, Ains-
worth, a medical ma n by education,
was determined that nothing would
diminish his authority. During the
nex't seven years, he periodically
82
{'allsed problems for the General StRff
--whenever they seemed to be in-
fringing. The final CrIses involving
Ainsworth did not occur until 1911,
hilt his power clearly undermined the
General Staff throughout the period. 1'1
In 1!J10, another famous surgeon,
Major General Leonard Wood, became
the Chief of Staff. Like Bell before
him, he a rrived with clear-cut ideas
about the function of the General
Staff. He felt that too much "bu,y
\\ork!! \vas being done:
To a man of Wood's tempC1'Umcllt,
the General Staff rould have but onr
Important function-thai of cOO1'dina-
tion. Like most men of action, Wood
knell' what he '''anted; he didn't neer!
a Gcneml Staff to meditate as a
thouuht orgall12ution.He wanted a w.ll
(ll'[!onization which /Could be useful as
an lnstJ urnrnt to Ca?TlJ nut p(Jlil'leS
announced by hhn. i"
Wood reorganized the staff again,
this time into four divisions. The
names Imply the functional responsi-
bilities: Mobile Army, Coast Artillery,
Militia and Wal' College, Under Wood,
the War College Di vision was the
chief planmng agency in the War De-
partment, and it was this body which
produced several forward-looking doc-
uments dealing with preparedness fol'
war. 41 Nelson remains critical of the
philosophy applied to the General Staff
under Wood, seeing it as a reactionary
carry-over from Bell's tenure. The
role of coordination given the staff by
Wood "opened the door to meddling in
administrative details and to act';
which actually came within the oper-
ating rather than the staff sphere." '"
General Wood was, of cou rse, one
of the nation's most ardent spokesmen
for "preparedness." Millis writes crit-
ically that preparedness was "a con-
cept of military strength in the ab-
stract, designed not to meet any spe-
Mililal) Review

..,
" " ...
.. .,/
j'-"
Wood
ciflc or visible military problem but to
master any unforeseeable contin-
gency .... " l3 Wood saw the General
Staff as the wide-ranging vehicle' to
help prepare the military establish-
ment for war. Since his interests quite
naturally included the matter of man-
power and recruiting, it was probably
inevitable that a showdown over the
role and authority of the Chief of
Staff would occur between Wood and
Adjutant General Ainsworth who was
responsible for recruiting. Before the
battle was over, the Army was shaken,
Ainsworth was allowed to retire in
lieu of cou rt-martial, and cerlain
Congressmen were determined to curb
the meddlesome General Staff. H
The Secretary of War at the time.
Henry L. Stimson, summarized the
significance of this conflict:
The relief of Ainsworth was a vital
victnry for the whole concept of a,e
Genem/ Staff. It insured the power of
the Chief of Staff against all the bu-
reau chiefs, and in this sense it ex-
panded his powe;' far beyond that of
the cnmmanding generals of former
days. It also asserted and defined the
duty of the President and the Secre-
April'1975
GREAT DEBATE
tal'y of War under this new system-
they might have any Chief of Staff
they desired, hut they must support
the office>" of their choice. "
With the question of his authority
now clear, General Wood pressed on
vigorously with preparedness. He
turned to one of the recent graduates
of the Fort Leavenworth schools,
then-Captain John McAuley Palmer,
and directed him "to prepare a plan
for the organization of all the land
forces of the United States." Palmer,
after a reason!,ble delay for research
and writing, proposed that the first
step would be to create a tactical or-
ganization which would permit the
immediate assembly and employment
of the scattered companies and bat-
talions of the Regular Army in the
regimental and division formations.
The fact that Palmer's work ulti-
mately resulted in the landmark 1912
report, "The Organization of the Land
Forces of the United States," seems
to argue against Nelson's thesis that
the staff was only coordinating and
not planning. [n any event, the Palmer
proposals envisioned three types of
forces: Regulars, organized into did-
sions and brigades and immediately
ready; the National Guard, with im-
proved organization, traimng in
peacetime; and a national volunteer
Army, planned for bnt not recruited
until an emergency arose. Years later,
Palmer felt strongly that his plan was
sound, that it presaged the National
Defense Act of 1920, and that it rep-
resented the kind of work to be ex-
pected from a General Staff officer
from the Root mold, "'
It is interesting to note that Palmer
had scarcely finished his land forces
plan when he was forced off the staff,
As a result of Congressional resent-
ment over the Ainsworth affairs, a bill
was passed in 1912 reducing the
83
GREAT DEBATE
strength of the General Staff from 45
to 36 and requiring froop duty within
the last two years for General Staff
officers (the "Manchu Act" 1. As Pal-
mer saw it:
Su, in cffect, I /l'OS dismissed (I'nlll
the General Staff because I had taken
thp tlouble to qualify for General Staff
duty by tUJO 1/f'an; of ha'rd u:otk at
Fori Lcavenu'Pl'th, "
In another forward-looking step,
the General Staff-at General Wood's
an active part in plan.
nlng for possible operations in Mexico,
It will be recalled that, ,m I!Hl, he
had ordered the assembl:; in Texas of
units from all o\er the L'nited States,
ThI,t; creatIon of the "Maneuvpr Divi-
sion" was nomInally a rlemonF.tratioll
aimed at keeping the incipient Mexi-
ean Revolution out of the United
States, In reality, Wood and Secretar,'
Stimson used it as a demonstration to
the American people of how badly pre-
pared their Army was. A8 a result of
the Maneuver DIvision exercise, 'Pal-
mer was put to work on his land forces
plan; the War College Division was
told to prepare contingency plans for
a"embly of tadical divisions and op-
erations in Mexico; and effective plans
. were created.
In February 1!)J3, responding to the
\vorsening Mexican the Sec-
ond Division was rapidly and effi-
ciently assembled, based on General
Staff-prepared plans. lk However, the
staff work Was imperfect, and it drew
some complaints (mostly for being lll-
complete) after American fOI'ces ac-
tually invaded Veracruz in April
1914.
10
The planning activities of the
General Staff were given fm'ther ex-
ercise by the Pershing Expedition into
Mexico in 1916, and the staff continued
to improve in the eyes of the "line,"
In, retrospect, the consensus was that
the planning of Mexican operations
84
had served America as an excellent
rehearsal for World War I.
A Proper Military Policy and
a New National Defense Act
Strangely, the efforts which con-
cluded the first period of the General
Staff are often deemed a failure even
though they represented "pure" stafl"
work. In 1!l15, the Secretary of War
had directed the War College Division
to look at the total American militar,
policy and formulate solutions to the
problems it identified. After six
months of study, the staff produced
the voluminous docllment, "A State-
ment of the Propel' ;\iilitary Policy
for the United States." Nelson calls it
a landmark work for its thoroughness
and clarity. -,,, By contrast, Millis at-
tacks it (and a companion :-:avy
study) as completely unrealistic be-
caUfle they viewed the European war
incorrectly. ',I It appears that the t\\O
positions are not mutually exclUSive
the staff officers who prepared the
"statement" may have arrived at the
wrong conclusion about the threat.
but it was a unique Amel'lcan effort
to assess military policy in light of
world events, Thus, the "statement"
seems to be an important effort by the
General Staff.
One of the most important pIece,
of military legislation in American
history resulted, in part, from the
"statement"-the NatIOnal Defense
Act of 1!l16. This Act, which was a],;o
lllf\uenced by the European War, the
Mexican situation and the prepared-
ness campaign, was the first compre-
hensive American legislation for na-
tional defense. The Act covered a wide
array of topics and, in some respects,
was quite regressive; for example, it
reduced the size and authority of the
General Staff again just as America
was on the verge of war. More im-
Milit31Y Review
portantly, though, it adopted many of
the ideas which Palmer had espoused
in the 1912 General Staff study "Or-
ganization of the Land Forces of the
United States." It also took the "State-
ment of the Proper Military Policy
for the United States" into account.
And it took the novel step of providing
for economic mobilization.
Nelson contends that the ungrate-
ful Congress, jealous and suspicious
of the General Staff, nearly destroyed
it with the 1916 Act. Palmer, on the
other hand, does not even discuss this
attack despite the fact that he was on
the staff at the time. (Palmer was
primarily grateful that hiS land forces
plan was adopted at last.) ,,, The Con-
gressional attack was short-circuited
by the timely interference of the new
Secretary of War, Newton D. Bakel'.
In response to cries of alarm from hiS
military advisors, Bakel'. who like
Root had no military experience and
who, moreover, came to the job as an
antimilitarist, supported the General
Staff. He overruled the Army Judge
Advocate General (an old-line bureau
chief) and greatly softened the po-
April 1975
GREAT DEBATE
tential impact of the legislation. In
doing so, Baker cited Root's concepts
for the General Staff, committing
himself to the idea of a coordinated,
forward-looking, planning body. :,3
Conclusion
We might end this analysis with
the same basic question which began
It. What was the General Staff in-
tended to be and to do? When America
entered World War I, had the staff
lived up to the hopes and expectations
of Secretary Root and General Carter?
Root and Cartel' had visualized the
General Staff Act as a fundamental
reform to make the Army more re-
sponsive to the needs of the nation.
They theoretically abandoned the idea
of a Commanding General of the
Army, replacing it with the more re-
strictive line of authority from the
President through the Secretary of
War to the field commanders. They
designed the General Staff to be a
body which would IVork in coordina-
tion to address all the basic problems
of fighting a land war, thus rejecting
the independent experts in the various
bureaus. The General Staff would have
time and talent to plan for problems
before they occurred rather than leav-
ing the Army to exist only for what
Root had called "present utility." Fi-
nally, they pictured an education sys-
tem which would produce the kind of
well-roundec officers needed to man
this forward-looking General Staff.
It is qll ite true that the General
Staff Act of 1903 Was vague-as were
Its mentors-about relationships be-
tween the Chief of Staff and the army
in the field and with the bureaus. Sim-
ilarly, relations between the General
Staff and the rest of the Army were
left troublesomely unclear. It appears,
however, that this was more deliberate
than not since the authors might be
85
GREAT DEBATE
certain that the Chief of Staff would
eventually assert himself.
The most ardent c\'itics of the Gen-
eral Staff felt'that it was against the
Army's interests to put youthful offi-
cers on a staff where they could inter-
fere with the experienced bureau
chiefs and field commanders. The
dyed-in-the-wool supporters claimed
that it was the existence of the Gen-
eral Staff which made possible Ameri-
ca's role in World War 1. Most con-
temporary viewers, however, saw it
as an important innovation which was
blessed with a few more virtues than
shortcomings,
As early as 1905, Captain Rhodes,
in his prize-winning essay for the
Journal of the M,lita1'Y Service Inst,-
tution, identified the General Staff as
the most important reform resulting
from the Spanish-American War. Yet
Rhodes, who was then serving with
the Military Information Division.
canrlidly admits that:
... the purpose and operation of 'a
General Staff has hitherto been some-
what of a mystery to our service and
el'en noll' is not thoroughly compre-
hended in all its details,
The labor of the General Staff
tended toward too much administra-
tive detail. but "time and experience
will probably correct it." The work of
the staff Was very Important, but was
little known (01' appreciated) by the
public because of security precautions:
I n short, Rhodes was realistically op-
timistic about the staff. -.,
In 1911, Secretary of War Stimson
inherited a General Staff almost 10
years old. Despite the administrative
problems Wood complained about, and
despite the Ainsworth controversy,
Stimson liked what he saw, The Gen-
eral Staff was the "basic instrument
for modernization of the Army." He
called Root's creation one of the most
86
important acts of the "brilliant career
of the ablest man he ever knew." Stim-
son saw three purposes for the Gen-
eral Staff Act: to provide civilian con-
trol, sound general planning and "con-
stant c,oss-fertilization between the
line of the Army and its high com-
mand in WaS'hington." 5r.
As the period closed, General Car-
tel', by then retired, was able to look
with equanimity upon the progress of
the General Staff. In the first of sev-
eral wartime magazine articles, Car-
tel' admitted just before passage of
the National Defense Act of 1916 that
It was "not a panacea." But he w ~
certain that:
... the General Staff Corps has "'-
creased the accumulation of military
information and perfected plan,. of
campaigns to a degree /l'hich makes
them military assets of the highest
value. ,6
Reviewing the staff's performance
in the war, Cartel' declared in late
1918 that it had been the keystone to
the success of the American command
in France. Parental pride influencerl
him, of course, but Cartel' obviously
believed that what was intended III
1903 had met the test of the war.';
General John J. Pershing held a less
generous, view of the work of the Gen-
eral Staff after he stopped in Wash-
ington on his way to France in May
1917. He found that comparatively
little had been done and that the War
Department was suffering from:
... a killd of inatia ... for 1I'/l1ch
It !l'as 1I0t altogether responsible . ...
Until a few weeks before the declam-
tion of IVaI' neithe?' the General Staff
n01' the War Departmellt had "e('eived
any hint 0/ di"ection to be ,'eady with
,'ecommendations . ... The truth is
that the Gene1'al Staff had not been
properly organized. 58
What about the overseas applica-
Military Review
France, 1918.
Lelt to right:
Brigadier General Hagood,
General Russel, General -- - -,
Bliss, Colonel Bash,
Secretary Newton D. Baker,
Mr. Hosteller, Mr. John D.
Ryan and Major General
James G. Harbord.
tions of the General Staff principles?
General Hagood, who was Chief of
Staff of the Services of Supply, Ameri-
can Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.)
and who had served ~ the General
Staff until 1912, claimed that both the
War Department and the Gpneral
Staff" fen like a house of cards" when
America entered the war. A "new or-
ganization had to be created du ring
the process of the war." However, the
new staff was created in the mold of
the original General Staff, both in the
War Department and the A.E.F .. and
. many of the officers who headed the
staffs were products from the Root
model. ""
A more complimentary view of the
effectiveness of the staff is offered by
Major General James G. Harbord,
Pershing's Chief of Staff in France.
He remarks that the General Staff
system provided men to the A.E.F.
who were "indoctrinated with the pur-
poses of the General Staff and how to
use it" for the first time in American
history. He credits the General Staff
April 1975
wIth a "brilliant and determining part
in winning victory." 60
One complex issue which had
plagued the General Staff since 1903
was resolved, after a fashion, during
World War I; the relationship of the
Chief of Staff to the operating forces
in the field evolved into one of support
but not supervision. This solution re-
sulted more by circumstance than by
plan. It grew as a product of the clash
of two powerful personalities-Gen-
eral Pershing and General Peyton C.
March, the Chief of Staff from March
1918 onward. March believed the
Chief of Staff should be dominant,
while Pershing wanted total indepen-
dence. Secretary Baker was able to
keep them both in harness:-.,and he al-
lowed Pershing most of the freedom
of action he desired. At the same time,
Baker encouraged the planning and
coord inating role of the General Staff
for the administration of the Army. 61
In the final analysis, it may be that
Secretary Baker gives us the most ac-
curate assessment. Coming to the job
87
GREAT DEBATE
as a military novice in 1!l16, he easily
could have been overwhelmed by the
magnitude of the pr<;>blem. Instead, he
became a successful wartime leader:
Baker had been able to act effec-
tively in military matters because the
lVar College had provided him with
,epojts containing valid alternatives,
thus making it possible to reach clear-
cut decisions. Without such mfo1"1na-
tion, no civilian could have acted 'eilh
confidence during those confusing
days. By the end of July 1917, the
Army, at least, '<'as sure of its objec-
ti!"es and had begun to devise mean .
to j'ealize them.
6
'
Describing the General Staff itself,
Baker took into account both its short-
comings and potential:
The organizatwl1 of the General
Staff has nou' gl7.'en us a staff system
,chich ha . stood the test of mobiliza-
tiol1 and 11"01', and ;11 the futu>"e the
function of General Staff will be more
clearly apPI'ehended and its processes
in time of peace more accurately based
upon exact knoll'ledge statistically re-
cMded.
61
After the debacle of the Spanish-
American War, Root and Cartel' had
developed a General Staff system. It
was an imperfect device-clumsy and
slow at times-but it made steady im-
provement. Through the years, it
played a key role in modernizing the
Army. When America entered World
War I, the General Staff was able to
respond with facts and plans. Experi-
enced General Staff officers served
with distinction in both Washington
and France. The A.E.F. staff itself
was an outgrowth of the Root-Carter
concept. By any measure, the General
Staff had accomplished what its spon-
S01'S hoped for by helping pl'epare
America for \\ ar.
MajOl' Marc B. Powe is !eitl! the
Military Personnel Center, Alel'all-
dria, Virginia. He received a B.A.
from Texas A & M, an M.A. from
Kansas State University, and is a 1974
graduate of the USACGSC. He has
served ,cith V Corps in Germany.
Vietnam tours with the 4th Infantry
Division and the US Military Assist-
ance Command, Vietnam, and has in-
structed at the US Army Intelligence
Centel' and School. His altiele "Which
Way /0)' Tactical Intelligence A/tel'
Vietnam?" appeared in the Septembe>"
1974 :\iILITARY REVIEW.
NOTES
1 Walter Millis. AT'ms and Mel1, Mentor Books.
N. Y .. 1956, pp 150-51.
2 Russell F. Weigley. The Amoncan ll'ay of
War A HIstory of Umted States MIlitary StTatrgy
and robey, The MacmIllan Co., N. Y" 1973, pp
167-74
3 C. Joseph BprnaTdo and Eugene H. Bllcon,
AmerO'an Mllitary Poflcll Its Dcvelopme,1t 8111("('
88
177fJ, Mihtary Service Publishing Co .. HSirisburS!'.
Pa. 1955.
-l AmcJ",can Mdltary H!sto1'1J. Edited by Maurice
Matloft'. Office of the Chief of Military Histon,
Dl'partment of the Army. Washington, DC.
1969. P 323.
:i Phdil;J C. Jessup, Eltku Root, Dodd. Mead &
Co .. N. Y . 1938, pp 240-43.
Military Review
6 John McAuley Palmer, Am('Tlca 111 ATms, YalE'
Umversity Press, New Haven, Conn., 1941. p 119.
j War Department, Army Regulations, 1895.
paragraph 187, cited ID DUo L. Nelson, NatIOnal
.'\eCltTlt1/ and the GeneTul Staff, Infantry Journal
Pres&. Washington. D. C., 1946, p- 17.
8 The bureaus were The Adjutant General, Sub-
o.;istence, OrdnanC'e. Medical. Judge Advocate Gen-
('ral. Quartermaster, Pay and In<;p('ctor General.
'-ee Nelson. OPt Cit., p 20.
11 Theodore Schwan, "ThE' Comini! General
Staff," ,Journal of the MllltuTfJ Sen'lce II/Biltutlol/.
.JulyAugust, HI03. p 4.
1H IbId.
11 J pssup, op nt.
12lbld. and Millis. op. itt. pp 158-59.
13 WIlliam Harding Carter, CTentwu of the
AmfTliUll G('llcTal Staff. Sennte Document Number
119. 66th Congress First Se<;!lion. Washmgton.
n. C H124. pp 1-2.
II Ibid.
1;, ,Je\>sup. OIl nt., pp 2114-50
1 r. Carter, op. CIt, pp 3-4.
1'; IbId .. pp 5-6.
IH Report of the Serretal"Y of War. Washington.
DC, 1901, p 165. ,
I!l Carter, op. nt p 26
20 Ibuf., pp 45-50
:!l Cite.! in NdsOll, op CIt" P 60.
!?:.! Carter, op. CIt., pp 51-55
23 T. Harry William'">. AmeTICU)l8 at WUT Thc
Dn:eiopm(!lIt of the AmeTIca>1 :l-tll.tuT1/ H.stoT1J.
LOUisiana State Pre<.,s. Baton Hou!!e.
La . 1900, pp 107-9.
:.'-1 Jcs<.,up, 01' {It, pp
Palmer, 01' (It., pp 124-25.
..!fi Cnptam Charles D Rhodes, "The ExpeTlence ..
fir Our Army Since the Outbreak of the Wnr With
Spatn." Jot/Taal oj the .ll1iltUTII $eTl'1re Instlll,i'oll.
Mal'ehApl'11 1905, p 203
.!T Nelson, 01) CIt, pp 64-66
Ibid .. pp
:.!'j Ibid, pp 67-68
,'In MIllis, 'fJ1l. (It, P 159
:11 PalmC'r, 01'. nt" pp 126-28. ThIS is a partleu,

S. Pappa">, PT1tdcns FutUTI Thc l.]S ATm1/ Jl'aT
Collegc, 1901-1967, The Alumni A%OcmtlOn of thc
US Army War College. Carh"j(, Barraeb, PH
1967.
Nelson. 01.1. Cit, pp and 94.
:-13 Rhodes, op. ('It., pp 200-204.
:i4 Nelson, op. ('It. P 101.
;!:i Allan B. Millett. "The General Staff and the
Cuban InterventIOn of 1906\" MllltaT'1/ AffUlT8,
Fall 1967, pp 113-19 By 1906, the Wal College and
April 1975
GREAT DEBATE
ThIrd Division Were one functional entitl'. usually
('alied the War College DIVIsion.
:!6 Nehwn. 01/. e!t., pp 102-3.
:17 Johnson Hagood, The S('Tt'ices of SUI'ply.
Houghton MifflIn Co Cambridge, Mass, 1927, p
17 Hagood served on the General Staff under both
Bell and Leonard Wood and offers interegting in-
.. lghts mto the staff problems. No fan of the Gen_
('I'al Staff. Hagood was one of the few offi('('rs nr
the pel'lOd wilhng to admit liking Ainsworth.
:U:I Bruce W Etdwell. HIstory of thc M,litary I,,
tf'UIgc)tce DW181011. DepaTtment of the Army r.CIi-
(Tal Staff, 1961, Part I, pp IX-1-IX-30.
.19 Nelson, op. Cit., pp 109-31.
-In Ibid" p 134.
-41 Bernardo and Bacon, op Cit '. pp 322-24
-4:! Nelson. 01/. Cit, p 135.
-1.1 Millis. op. elt., p 1.9.
H Ru'\sell F. Weigley, HI8tory of the Umted
States AT'my, The Macmillan Co N. Y., 1967, pp
330-33.
t:-, Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundl'. On
ActiL'C SeT'VlCe HI Peace and War, Harper & Bros_,
N. Y 1947. p 36.
to Palmer, OPt dt., pp 135-48.
.{'i' IbId, p 148.
48 Weigley. HI8tOT1/ 0/ the United States Army.
011. ('It., pp 333-35,
H) Ibid., pp
;Hl Nelson. op. CIt., pp 1,7-78.
-,1 M!lhs. op elt., p- 195.
:i:.! Nel!lon. op Cit., pp 180-83, and Palmer, op.
rit., pp 161-64.
Danipl R. DE'aver, N('wto1! D. BakeT alld the
AmCTl('tllt WaT Eff,ort. 1917-1919, UDiverslty of
Nebra .. kn Prt>-.s, Lincoln. Nebr. 1966, pp 14-15,
and Nelson, op. CIt. pp 187-210 .
-,,J. Rhodes, 01'. CIt, p 201. He retir('d in 1929 m.
a maJor general.
;,:; Stimson and Bundy. O}I. Cit. p 32
:;0 Wtlham H. Carter, "Can the GE'nerlll Staff
Corps Fulfill Its MtS>ilOn?," JoltTllal oj the llJ,llttlTY
S( rt'l('e instztldlon. Mnl'-June 1916, pp 350-51
.H Wilham H CartE'r. the War:: NOT'th
AmeTlCan R('l}ICW, July-December HJl8. pp fl54-57
.-,8 J. Per-.hing, ."-Iy EXPCT1C1UC8 tJI the
World WUT. FrC'derick A. Stokes, NY, 1931, Vol-
ume I, pro 16-1-;.
Hagood, 0]'. Cit pp 25_27
Gil James G HarbOl'd. The AmCTICtll! ATmy HI
Fra,,(c. 191119, Little. Brown & Co., Boston,
Mm,!, . 1936, pp XV and 21-24
(11 Peyton C. Mar('h, Thf' NutlOn ut WaT, Dou-
bleday, Doran & Co N. Y .. 1932. pp and
Pen.hing, OJ). CIt" pp 182-85.
62 Deaver, 011. CIt .. P 49.
89
Democraclzing and Democracy
By Dr. Johannes Anderegg
ASMZ, October 1974 (Switzerland)
Democratic reforms in higher educa-
tion that have been debated in West
Germany since World War II aho may
affect the milItary.
Attempts at maki,?g universities more
democratic by permlttmg more student
particip'ation m policy making have not
produced the anticipated peaceful,ness .
This demoC1acizing serves the interests of
that small, Jctive, goaldirected group
which manages to put the reforms
through with the aid of another larger
group of people who Jre easily swayed by
_ a seemingly solIdifying and often extreme
"cause." Sometimes. these students stnke
out at the system as J means of venting
frustrations caused by the often pdinful
transition from rheir parents' home to the
big new world of university hfe. They
seek security in the conformlty of a
group gUided by an Ideology or a clear
picture of the enemy In order to balance
out mundane realities. But, then, the
more they become integrated into the
group, the more they lose the mdividu
ality which IS baSiC to a democracy.
Such groups require an imperative
mandate to be at a decision-
32
making forum open to the public in order
to discourage objective discussion a;med
at compromise. The opposition often
must resort to this tactic. resultmg in
rigld fronts and lJ1creased aggressIveness.
This situatIOn form, the groundwork for
compensating for private frustrations at
the expense of the schoo! and thus the
government by attempts to acquire spe-
CIfic personal objectives from "the en
emy."
The army, with its inherent emphasis
on authority and performance. has expe
rienced SImilar demands for change. The
problem of dissatisfactlOn among memo
bers of the army. however, seems to be
one of credIbility. Superficial concessions
or "revolutIonary" policy changes. such
as longer hair or offering Brecht lectures.,
will not solve the underlying problem.
The government should set forth clear
declaratlOns of fau standards 10 relation
to the army's mISSIon. The impor
tant credibihty factor is whether the
democracy Itself is worth defending and
perfecting. not whether its external tradi
tional form could or should be altered. A
democracy will endure and profit from
these trials and modificatIons and flourish
so long as the individual can and wants to
bear responsibility for the whole.
The author is Professor of Germanic
Literature at the Gesamthochschule Kas
sel.
Military Review
Can International Law Keep Pace
With the. Evolution of MOd)'n Conflicts?
By Colonel
Defense Nationale, July 197rFrancel
Translated and condensed by
COL John W. Price, USAR
Since the 1949 signing of the Geneva
Conventions on the rules of war, new
questions have been raised about the
status of guerrillas, the definition of "just
wars" and the implication!'. of nuclear
weapons.
There is unanimous agreement that
the choice of means of combat is not
unlimited, but it has been dIfficult to
decIde which to ban in an era of rapid
technologIcal change. It is Increasingly
dIfficult to protect civilians and their
property during milItary operatIons. In
fact, with the advent of partisans and
guerrillas, it is difficult to draw a line
between civl.itans and soldiers.
Three general propositions have been
advanced by experts recently assembled
at Geneva under the auspices of the Red
Cross;
The rights of regular soldiers ,hould
remain. and therr rights as prisoners
should not be less than tho,e of other
combatants.
Partlsans should be treated a> reg-
ulars if they r!;spect the laws of war,
either carry arms openly or wear a dis-
tinctive sign, and act in an organized
fashion under the orders of a responsible
leader.
MIscellaneous civilians who take up
arms have no protection other than the
conscience or good will of their captors.
In the case of internal conflicts. many
states refuse to accord any legitimacy to
rebellion though they themselves may
have recently engaged in a "just war"
against colonial powers.
In general. powerful countries resist
further limitations on their means of
combat; poor countries stand up for
right, of the guerrilla; and revolutionary
movements want the laws of war ex-
tended to protect all Civilians.
These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort
is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for
more detailed accounts, readers should refer to the original articles. No
official endorsement of the views, opinions. or factual statements in
these items is intended or should be inferred.-The Editor.
April 1975 33
MILITARY
NOTES
UNITED STATES
ARTILLERY LOCATORS
The proleot manager for mortar/artillery
locating radars recently announced that
_ Hughes Aircraft Company verSIOn
two competing models of the artillery
locating radar, ANITPG37, were ready
to enter a comprehensive test phase. The
Hughes Aircraft Company version,
shown dismounted, and the Sperry Gyro
scope deSign are currently undergoing
shakedown and checkout at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma. Successful tracking of artil
lery projectiles In flight Indicates that,
for the first time, the Army will have the
capability to locate enemy artillery rap
idly and accurately at extended ranges.
These radars, which use a phasedarray
antenna, rely on highspeed digital proc
essing to perform the complex opera
Sperry Gyroscope deSIgn
tions which enable the radars to track
multiple targets simultaneously. The
competitive development program will
culminate in a single production contract
scheduled for 1977.-US Army release,
The MILITARY REVIEW end the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College assume
no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the MILITARY NOTES section
of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readeR. No official endorsement of
the views, opinions. or factual statements is intended.-The Editor.
90
Military Review
NOTES ~ t
YF17 FOR NAVY
Northrop Corporation and McDonnell Douglas Corporation have signed an agreement under which
they will develop and propose a carrier-suitable version of the YF17 to meet the Navy's air combat
fighter (V FAX) requirement. The twin-engined, twin-talied YF17 is currently being evaluated by the
US Air Force at Edwards Air Force Base, California. Over the past 20 years, both companies have
concentrated their fighter design efforts on the development of high-performance, twinengined
aircraft.
Al0 INTO PRODUCTION
Air Force plans to proceed with productIOn of the A 10 close air support aircraft
were authorized by the Department of Defense (DOD) in Dece",ber 1974. DOD
approved the production of 52 aircraft during Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976. At the
same time, approval was also granted to proceed with the Fiscal Year 1975 buy of
30mm ammunition for the GAUD gun system upon successful completion of the
critical design review and verification of the propellant mixture.
April 1975
91
~ NOTES
CONTRACT FOR DRONEk
Northrop 'Corporation has received an
$8.4mlllion contract from the government of
Iran to provide aerial target drones and as
She/duck
sodated services for the next several years.
Northrop will proVIde its Chukar " and
Shelduck target drones to the I mperial Iranian
Navy. The Imperial Iranian Air Force has been
using the Shelduck target drone since 196B.
The turbojetpowered Chukar II can fly to
speeds of 560 mIles per hour and to altItudes of
40,000 feet. The Shelduck is a propellerdriven
drone which can reach speeds of 230 miles per
hour and fly to altitudes of 27,000 feet.
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
The US Army recently awarded a
$lOBmilllon contract for development of a
forward area shortrange allweather air defense
system (SHORAOSI.
The proposed system is based on an existing
EuropeandeSlgned system called Roland (MR,
Jan 1973, p 95).
The announcement culminated a threeyear
competition in which four proposals were
received by the US Army Missile Command.
Competitors included the Crotale, a Frenchde
signed missile system licensed to Rockwell
International; the Rapier, a British system
92
proposed by United Aircraft and McDonnell
Douglas; and an al/-weather verSIon of the
Phi/coFord Chaparral.
The Roland was developed jOintly by two
European firms-SNI Aerospatiale of France
and MesserschmidtBoelkowBlohm of Ger
many-and one version already is in production
In Europe. Hughes and Boeing are lIcensed
Jointly to adapt and bUIld the system to meet
US defense needs.
The system consists of a turret assembly and
equipment module to be mounted on a single
vehicle. A three man crew is the system's
Military Review
normal complement, but a single individual can
operate the Roland if necessary.
Two automatic missile launchers, a lowfre
quencyband pulsedoppler search radar and
two-channel pulse-doppler track radar are
mounted on the turret. A command transmitter
and computer, command and gunner consoles
with associated target displays and control
equipment make up the fire cortrol module.
Each vehicle can carry 10 eight-
foot-long high-velocity mISsiles for the close-in
Intercept mission. A booster motor will provide
initial missile thrust, with a sustainer motor to
keep the speed constant for the duratIOn of the
flight. Reloading is automatic.
The system Will be able to search for enemy
aircraft while on the move, but may also be
NOTES
placed In semipermanent installations to pro-
tect airfields or supply depots.
The search radar supplies raw target data to
the system computer for evaluation. Determina
tion of friend or foe and pinpoint representa-
tion of the target location is generated on the
operator console screen by the system com
puter.
The Roland Unit commander then selects a
target and slews the turret to proper azimuth.
A second radar tracks the target at night or in
heavy weather. An optical tracker is provided
for clear weather use.
Missile guidance commands are generated by
the system computer and beamed to the missile
via radio frequency link.
CAMOUFLAGE PATTERNS
April 1975
Camouflage patterns have been deSigned by the US Army Mobility Equipment
Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for vehicles used by a
standard armored divISion. The deSigns disrupt the signature characteristics of
vehicles, reduce contrasts with sOil and vegetation, and dIStort internal shadow
areas.
The patterns will replace the olive drab and white star on all major tactical items.
The paints will be sprayed or brushed on in colors that blend with the particular
environment.-US Army release.
93
.,ar NOTES
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
BUDGET INCREASE,D
South Africa's defense budget is being in-
creased by about 50 percent. During the last
fiscal year, 500 million rand were spent on de-
fense. This year, 730 million rand are planned
for defense, with 310 million to be spent on
armaments.-ASMZ, 1974.
DENMARK
LEOPARDS PURCHASED
Denmark became the sixth NATO nation to
purchase the German Leopard tank. Since Den-
mark and the German 6th Mechanized Infantry
Division are under one command in the north-
ern sector, Denmark's order for 120 Leopards
means an advance in NATO equipment stand-
ardization. Besides the Bundeswehr, Belgium,
Norway, Italy and the Netherlands have Leop-
ards.-ASMZ, 1974.
POLAND
DEFENSE FORCES
The armed forces of the People's Republic
of Poland are composed of active duty troops
and territorial defense forces. While the first op-
erates within the framework of the Warsaw Pact
in the event of war, the territorial defense
forces are responsible for protecting national
and political command centers, industrial areas
and traffic arteries, as well as defending against
enemy airborne troops.
These units are equipped with fighter planes,
antiaircraft miSSiles, antiaircraft guns and radar.
Within the territorial defense forces, there
are well-equipped and highly mobile internal
defense troops; border patrol troops; and terri-
torial defense troops.
Territorial defense garrisons are located in
all the cities and in many counties. Self-defense
units are organized by the national authorities
94
in the cities and communities. There are also
the industrial self-defense units in factories with
more than 100 employees. These organizations
take the place of the so-called workers' militia
which does not exist in Poland.
USSR
BRIDGE-LAYING TANKS
The Soviet bridgelaying tank M55 was in-
troduced into the Polish and Czechoslovakian
Armed Forces recently. In contrast to the older
Soviet MTU bridge-laying tank which uses the
hull of a T54 and is equipped with a platform
bridge, the M55 uses a folding bridge. ne top
picture shows the M55 in action with the Polish
Armed Forces and a T54 with a shovel attach-
ment in the foreground. The bottom picture
shows the Soviet M55 bridge-laying tank during
a maneuver by the Czechoslovakian Armed
Forces.--Soldat und Technik, 1974.
Military Review
NOTES
FRANCE
Gil,
;--,\0,- .. '.;;;
MDF1 GRENADE
pi'

Ii ...
-
tn
cs
The Losfeld Company has developed a new
multipurpose grenade for the French Army.
The weapon, which has been designated MDFI,
consists of two explosive parts and one tail
section.
The plastic body (M), with 87 grams of ex
plosives and the PFA5 fUle, weighs 260 grams,
is 150 millimeters long and 48 millimeters in
diameter, and may .be used as a concussion
hand grenade.
Screwing the prefragmented metal sleeve (0)
around part M forms a defensive hand grenade
M 0
which weighs 400 grams and sprays 280 splin
ters of about .4 grams each and many smaller
spltnters in a radius of 20 meters.
Mounting the tail section (F) with plastic
guides onto the back of part M turns the gre
nade into a weapons grenade which weighs 500
grams and is 275 millimeters long. The tall sec
tion contains a power charge and is fired from
weapons with 22mm barrels.
The weapons grenade can be fired With an
Impact fuze or a time fuze.-Soldat und Tech
nik, 1974.
JAPAN
AAM1 MISSILE
- .,
. -.-\ ..
The Japanese Air Force is receiving an
improved version of the AAM T airtoair mis
sile.
The AAM T is the first Japanesebuilt guided
missile and is similar to the AIM98 Sidewinder.
It can be mounted on the FT04J and F86F
aircraft and has an infrared homing guidance.
The missile weighs about 167 pounds and is
April 1975
about 2.5 meters long and about 15 centimeters
in diameter.
A new AAM2 is now In the development
stage. It is similar to the AIM4D Falcon and can
be mounted on the F4EJ. It will be able to
attack from all directions and will have an
infrared homing guidance. it weighs about 163
is about 2.2 meters long and about
16 centimeters in diameter.
95
~ t NOTES
96
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
The German manufacturer Faun-Werke de-
livered 762 new 3/4-ton cross-country multi-
purpose vehicles to the Bundeswehr airborne
uhits last year_
This vehicle is 2_78 meters long, 1_51 meters
wide and 1_28 meters high with a 28-centimeter
ground clearance_ Powered by a 26-hqrsepower
VEHICLES FOR AIRBORNE UNITS
(4500 revolutions per minute) BMW427 engine,
the vehicle can attain a maximum speed of 55
kilometers per hour and has the capabilities of
climbing 55-degree slopes, wading in 50 centi-
meters of water and turning an 8_5-meter circle_
The vehicle collapses to twothirds of its size
for easier transport by air. Interchangeable op-
tions are available for modifying the vehicle ac-
cording to mission requirements_-Soldat und
Technik, 1974_
Military Review
NOTES ~ f
HUNGARY
WORKERS' MILITIA
The Hungarian Workers' Militia has been reorganized and is beong
equipped with modern light infantry weapons. Steel helmets,
Kalatschnikov-type machine pistols and machineguns are part of
the standard equipment issued to the Hungarian Workers' Militia.
The militia holds regular exercises aimed primarily at securing
the rear areas, protecting specific oblectives and arresting
"imperialists."
UNITED KINGDOM
NAVAL VESSELS
The British Royal Navy's ninth nuclear-
powered fleet submarine, HMS Superb, has
been launched at Barrow_ ThIS class submarine
can make 30 knots and carries a crew of 12
officers and 68 enlisted men.
Work continues on Britain's first antisub-
marine "through deck" cruiser, the Invincible.
The Invincible Will be capable of carrying 20
Sea King antisubmarine helicopters or vertical
take-off fighters. Upon completion, it will be
the world's largest warship powered by gas tur-
bines_ It is scheduled to enter service In 1978.
The Iranian Navy has shown considerable in-
terest in this type of ship and may order one or
more.
BELGIUM
SERVICE SHORTENED
The Belgian Government is trying to shorten
the length of military service from 12 to 6
months by 1978. The determining factor is
whether 21,000 volunteers enlist for minimum
two-year tours by that time.
Belgium then would have the shortes\d1lili-
tary service time in NATO. Denmark has
April 1975
shortened ItS service time from 12 to 9 months,
and the Netherlands want to reduce its military
time from 16 to 12 months by 1977.
The Belgian Government also has decided to
recruit about 5000 women as volunteers for the
army_-Die Bundeswehr_
97
BOOKS
LA W, MORALITY AND VIETNAM:
The Peace Militants and the Courts
By John F. Bannan and Rosemarv S. Bannan.
2+ I Pages. Indiana G niversity Press. 197+. $10.00.
La/{', Morality and Vietnam: The
Peace Mihtants and thE Courts is a
well-written and copiously footnoted
indictment of the United States' in-
volvement in Vietnam through an in-
dictment of the American judicial sys-
tem. The authors' basic thesis seems
to be that the American judicial sys-
tem is faulty because the government
could not be tried for what the Ban-
nans see as war crimes and other vio-
lations of international law committed
by the UnIted States Government in
its activities in Vietnam.
As their vehicle in leveling their at-
tack on the court system, the authors
use analyses of several criminal trials
-in both Federal and state courts-
of what they call "peace militants"
such as David Henry :'.fitchell Ill,
David John Miller, "The Oakland
Seven" and "The Catonsville Nine."
After a rather blithe assumption that
the Vietnam episode in American his-
tory was immoral, unlawful and/or
un-American, the book starts its at-
tack with a general survey-and cas-
tigation-of the law and the judicial
98
system as seen by the For
example. they condemn the rules of
evidence by saying that the "Jury's
independent judgement, its l:ight to
decide according to all the facts and
its own lights, is thwarted by the rules
of evidence." To the Bannans, this
fau It in the system is apparently an
extension of a more basic fault:
" ... the trial remains the trial of the
accused and not of the government."
This latter comment almost slips by
the reader as it is hidden in the midst
of some of the authors' u biqu itous,
weeping claptrap. One should remem-
ber, however, as the authors appar-
ently have forgotten, or disagree with
as is more likely, that that statement
embodies, essentially, the philosophy
of the American criminal court sys-
tem. Fortunately, or unfortunately, if
the reader agrees with the authors,
the governmental system in the United
States was designed for the govern-
ment to be tried at the poBs, not in
the criminal courts.
The reader of Law, Morality and
Vietnam: The Peace Militants and the
Military Review
Courts has an excellent example of
inductive reasoning. The argument
fails, however, when one remembers
one's high school civics and compares
that course's content with the content
of this book. Nonetheless, it is inter-
esting reading and of particular value
to the student of sophism.
LTC(P) A. A. McNAMEE,
j/epartment of CommarJ,d, USAcesc
ATLAS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Edited by
Kenneth Nebenzahl. Text by Don Higginbotham.
218 Pages. Rand McNally & Co 1974. $3500
The Rand McNally Atlas of the
American Revolutwn is not just an-
other of those "coffee table" acquisi-
tions destined to be seen and hardly
read. The cartographic artistry com-
plements the rich and perceptive his-
torical text provided by Professor Don
Higginbotham, one of America's lead-
ing scholars on the Revolutionary
era. The maps describe in intricate
and fascinating detail the world of the
American colonies. Moreover, Profes-
sor Higginbotham's narrative guides
the reader from the outbreak of the
Revolution in the years following the
French-Indian War (1756-63) to
Philadelphia in 1787.
The A tlas graphically depicts the
geographical and demographlcal fea-
tures found in the northern, middle
and southern colonies on the maps Qf
the period. One can see how life fol-
lowed the course of rivers to the in-
terior, the growth of towns, the Amer-
ican wilderness and terrain, and the
course of military campaigns that in-
fluenced the destiny of a young nation.
The Atlas also contains innumerable
color plates and etchings from the
Revolutionary period which add spice
while the reader is involved in the
panorama of history in the making.
battle maps unfold the course of
April 1975
BOOKS
the conflict in terms that military
buffs, students of cartography, and the
general reader can readily follow and
appreciate.
This is a work that will appeal to
all ages and levels of sophistication.
In a time when many works are on
the market, or soon will be, the Atlas
of the AlIIerican Revolution is one of
the better books available that blends
cartography, scholarship and history
into a fascmating and profitable ex-
perience for the reader.
JOSEPH R. GOLDMAN,
Depal'lment of Slmtegy, USAcesc
THE ARMY OF THE CAESARS by Michael Grant.
365 Pages Scribner's 1974 $1500
Modern military profeSSIOnals gen-
erally avoid analysis of military af-
fairs antedating the present century.
Yet there are compellIng reasons why
soldiers today would do well to heed
the lessons provided by the military
affairs of ancient Rome. The remark-
able story of the Roman Army and
its conquests has been told before, and
most general histories of Rome re-
count the intimate connection of mili-
tary and Civil power. But classic
scholar Michael Grant provides a mod-
ern analysis of the Roman Army as a
vital force in the internal functions
and structure of Roman society, par-
ticularly in the realm of kingmaking.
:-lever before have we been able to
view the quality of Roman emperors
as the military, not the civilian chron-
Iclers of Rome, viewed them. Grant's
work has great utility for understand-
ing how the army played an enormous
part in the poliCIes and political deci-
of successive emperors of Rome,
and in the multifarious and variety of
events that flowed from these policies
and decisions--often thwarting and
reversing their intentions in the proc-
99
BOOKS
es"" No student of modern military
institutions can avoirl the pro-
vided by such an' adroit example of
modern scholarship applied to the rlis-
tant past. The Roman Army comes
alive not just as a band of soldiers,
bnt as 11 vital and Vibrant element in
a and advanced civiliza-
tion.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN COOLiNG,
USA Milltnl'!! History Research
('lIllr('tinn.
A JAPANESE VIEW OF DETENTE by Hisahiko Okazaki
117 Pages L"mgton Books 1974 '$1200
Ideology is still Important, anrl a
big ,tick must remain the ke)'stone of
\Vef'tCl'll !"ectlnty for a long hme to
{'orne. These are thoughts which are
familial' enough to an),one brought up
during the "late" Cold War but not
much evirlent in recent \Ve::;tern lItera-
ture on international relations. Yet
these thoughts and others like them do
take a prom1l1ent place in Hisahikn
A VieH' Ili Detentf.'.
Okazaki, now44 years old, was erlu-
eated at the University of Tokyo anrl
In England. He is a career diplomat
ldth a flair for writing and a "realist"
view of international affairs. He was
erlueaterl in the law and senerl the
Japanese Millistry of Foreign Alfa,,"
in Lonrlon, Manila, Washington, Korea
and Paris. His purpose in writing A
.Tal'ane"e l"ifl(' of Detente was to pro-
virle it broarler analysis of detente di-
plomacy than the typical bilateral
, (Uniterl States versus USSR) view.
He says that intel'l1ational relations
are gradually moving toward more of
'a worldwide system, and thus the new
analysis is appropriate.
The first part of the book deals with
peaceful coexistence and detente di-
plomacy in the abstrl!ct. Central to
this analysis are the rlefinitions of the
100
two terms. He asks whether detente
diplomacy is merely the Westel'l1 reac-
tion to the peaceful coexistence of the
or IS It beyond
that. Probably. Okazaki wonlrl count
himself among those who say that it
is .indeerl something more than' ,( mere
reaelion. This school of thought woulrl
hold that coexistence is harrlly more
than an armed truce. but the Western
detente rliplomacy strives to ,mprove
upon the status quo by l'ul-
tural promotHlg increa-.:erl
trade anct trying to bring about n per-
manent reo.uL'tlOn of Hl'maments. The
author probes the unrledying theOl')'
of rletente anrl condurles that it mu,t
rest upon one of two possible irleas:
the notion of convergence or the Gaul-
li"t concept. The latter was the ea dier
Idea In time. ano. It was-Recording" to
Okazaki-rliscrerlited b)' the Czerho-
"lovakian invasion of 1968, De Gaulle's
view \\'as that the West had to keep
,ts p(m rler dry. so integrate the Ger-
man nation into European !-'oclety a.;:
to remove all fear of revanchlsm from
the minrls of the Eastern Europeans
and then wait for the nationalistJ('
and cultural values of the Soviet satel-
lites to cau;;e the dbintegration of the
Communist empire. The glue of the
\Vars(lw Pact was the fear of Ger-
many. Okazaki said that th,s theory
dIsproved when the
marrherl on Czechoslovakm, showing
that. in a twinkling of nn eye, a
sian political rlechnon could [ll\\"a \ .....
overrirle all of the cllltllral anrl eco-
nomic forces of Eastern Ellrope, The
convergence theory is the one favorerl
by the author. but even here his en-
thusiasm is limited. The idea is that
the economic systems of both the Com-
munist and the Free Worlrls are mov-
1I1g toward one another. The Commu-
nists are finding that their system is
too cumbersome anrl are, therefore.
Military Review
decentralizin'g its management; the
Western democracies are continually
increasing the role of the state in the
economy and thus are moving away
from the decentralization of old-thus,
the two systems are supposed to meet
somewhere in the middle, Okazaki has
his reservations here, and one of the
chief ones is that the theory is too
dependent upon economic feterminism,
There are many other political and
cultural factors which may well retard
conv'ergence even if the economic an-
Rlysis were correct.
Having completed his analysis of
the state of international relations,
Okazaki devotes the last two chapters
of his tome to a brief analysis of Ja-
pan's place in the society of nations
and to his recommendations for future
Japanese policy, He concludes that
Japan is not a superpower and thus
cannot have complete control over its
destiny. Since security is paramount,
and since neither "good neighborism"
nor the United Nations can yet be
counted upon to preserve that secur-
ity, Japan must depend upon deter-
rence for a long time to come. Because
the creation of a Japanese nuclear
force is out of the question, this deter-
rence must be based upon the alliance
with the United States, along with the
maintenance of the Self-Defense
Force. Though the United Nations
will not be a supranational peace-
keeping organization in the foresee-
able future, he thinks that Japan
must, nevertheless, do everything it
can to cooperate with that agency. He
recognizes that Japan cannot make a
military contribution to the preserva-
tion of stability among China's neigh-
bors, but it can and must take signifi-
cant economic and psychological meas-
ures to help the Southeast Asian
nations and Korea achieve stable and
prosperous societies. This is not to sal'
April 1975
BDDKS ~
that Japan must follow a policy an-
tagonistic to China. Okazaki holds that
Japan should understand that ideology
will be an important factor for a long
time to come, but that this need not
cause war. Rather, both Japan and
China should recognize that what is
good for one nation is not necessarily
good for another. Thus, China can con-
tinue with the development of a Com-
munist society while Japan builds an
ever more prosperous and free demo-
cratic system. He maintains that only
in this way can peace be sustained,
and Japan, because of the extreme vul-
nerability of its lines of communica-
tions, needs peace above all other na-
tions.
A Japanese View of Detente is a
splendid little book which shOUld be
valuable to any officer interested in
either international relations in gen-
eral or In Japanese diplomacy. The
analyses are clear and seem sound.
The author's writing style is outstand-
Ing. One only wishes that the chapters
on Japanese policy were as detailed
and penetrating as those on peaceful
coexistence and detente diplomacy.
LTC DAVID R. METS, USAF
WHITE AGAINST REO; A Biography 01 General Anton
Oenikin by Dimitry Lehovich 556 Pages. W W
Norton & Co 1974, $1250
Some very ordinary officers have,
because of war, been propelled into
positions of extraordinary military
and administrative power out of all
proportion to nath'e abilities, Such
was :Denikin during and after World
War I. Last in his Academy class, he
was all but dropped from the czarist
peacetime army. He was, however, a
very successful division commander
against the Germans on the Southwest
Front in 1914-16. In 1917, when the
government sought a winning combat
101
lit BOOKS
soldier of humble birth to counter the
revolutionary rot of the army, the
finger of fate settled' on the relatively
obscure figpre of' Denikin who sud-
denly became Chief of Staff of the
Imperial Army.
In this position, the author in a
flight of sympathetic fancy, compared
Denikin to Lee. Grant was the more
accurate analogue.
When the political revolution de-
stroyed the Russian Army and its so-
ciety, Denikin, with a conservatism
characteristic of the poor boy made
good, sided with the Whites. The most
poignant part of the book is Denikin's
search for an ethical jUstification for
opposing the government of his coun-
try. He became the military rallying
point in Southern Russia for the
Whites where, for a time, his ordeals
with a few advocates were similar to
Mao's Long March, He inherited-and
expanded-the White Southern Army
which, at its high-water mark in Oc-
tober 1918, was on the road to Moscow.
It Was defeated more by poor civilian
administration behind the lines than
on the battlefield.
This bIg book is as much a military
history of Russia's role in World War
J and its subsequent revolution, as it
'is a portrait of Denikin. Dozens of
pages go by with no mention of Deni-
kin whom the reader gets to know only
superficially. Denikin allowed no one
the privilege of a second person sin-
gular "thou" basis, Certainly, the
reader doesn't rate the intimacy.
This scholarly book is based on
Denikin's five-volume history of the
Russian role in World War I and his
unfinished but published biography.
The author, who served briefly under
Denikin, also had access to many of
Denikin's private papers. It is a thor-
oughly sympathetic portrayal which
often refers to the inaccu racies of So-
102
viet historical portrayal of General
Denikin, The author's style is jerky,
circling back in the middle of a good
story to pick up unfinished themes,
He loses the pace of a good yarn by
interspersed background material.
The military professional will find
few strategic or tactical details of
value, Its merit lies in analyzing the
dilemma of a combat commander
called by the Peter Principle to a post
beyond his wildest previous ambitions.
Curiously, the author apparentl) in-
tendd no such analogy-but it is
there.
The book' is worth reading by the
professional interested in campaigns
in Southern Russia where most source
material is not in English.
RADM BEN EISEMAN, USNR,
Unit'ersity of Colorado Medical
Cenler
TRUE AMERICANISM: Green Berets and War Re
sisters. A Study of Commitment by DaVid Mark
Mantell 285 Pages. Teachers College Press 1974
$10.00 clothbound. $5.95 paperbound.
Psychologists have said that events
and conditions experienced during
childhood determine significant, long-
lasting attitudes and traits which we
carry with us through life. Positing
the idea "that the reactions of indi-
vidual Americans to the war in Viet-
nam were wittingly and unwittingly
created within the American family,"
Mantell's conclusions, although. some-
times suspect and oftentimes incon-
clusive, tend to support the relation-
ship of attitudes learned as a child
and those practiced as an adult.
The basis of this study is an in-
vestigation of the family backgrounds
of 25 Green Berets and a like number
of war resisters. In an effort to ex-
plain how their youthful experiences
promote later-life personal and politi-
Military Review
cal commitments to war and peace, a
good deal of Mantell's examination has
to do with child-parent relationships,
particularly those centered upon rigid
rules, traditional and formal value
systems, independency-versus author-
ity, and fear and violence. Concentrat-
ing primarily upon this latter aspect,
this study reveals a definite correla-
tion between the extent to which chil-
dren have been exposed'to arbitrary
authority, intimidation and physical
violence and their later acceptance of
and submission to these practices as
justified conditions of social reality.
When asked to describe the domi-
nance-submission relationship of their
parehts, 15 Green Bel'ets said their
fathers were clearly dominant while
only one described a marriage in
which the partners appeared to be
equal in authority. Twelve war re-
sisters described their parents' rela-
tionship as that of equals.
Even more significantly, whereas
the parents of the Green Berets gen-
erally threatened their sons and de-
manded obed ience from them, the war
resisters' parents usually did not do
either. Instead, they normally at-
tempted to rationalize differences and
justify their actions. However, be-
cause the dominance-submission rela-
tionships were not predominant, these
attempts oftentImes failed, thus open-
ing parents to criticism and removing
the aura of infallibIlity with which
most parents tend to surround their
behavior.
Accordingly, the war resisters' par-
ents introduced to their children the
idea that power and authority not only
demand Justification but often cannot
be Justified. Because many of their
parents usually did not employ threats
or violence when disciplining them,
few war resisters had an ingrainerl
feal' of their parents and the need to
April 1975
BOOKS ~ t
use counterviolence against them. As-
pects of mutuality, affection, patience,
understanding, regard for individual-
ity and freedom, and commonality of
pursuits were prevalent in the filial
backgrounds of the war resisters.
These aspects contrasted sharply
with the conditions known to the
Green Berets. They expressed fear of
their parents, and they seemed to have
absorbed and accepted the entire sys-
tem of parental values and standards
laid down for them without question
or opposition. Mantell asserts that the
arbitrariness and punitiveness of par-
ents, the delimitating conditions of
family life, and the concomitant shap-
mg of a child's attitudes and behavior
with respect to the use of violence in
social settings promotes acceptance of
violence, As the Green Berets viewed
the prospects of constant threats of
physical violence, they determined
that the defensive use of force is both
necessary and legitimized, especially
in terms of survival. Hence, violence
probably Justified theIr youthful be-
havior for the most part and had
something to do with their choice of
career. Because this study IS often too
tenuous and its sample is too small,
such an exacting conclusion is difficult
to make. Vet Mantell's revelatIOns are
Important.
MAJ GORDON T. BRATZ.
Headquarters, 6th Battalion.
.l2d Armor
A BRIDGE TOO FAR by Cornelius Ryan 670 Pages
Simon & Schuster 1974 $1250
Measured in terms of its strategic
implications, Operation Mal'ket-Gal'-
den offered the World War II Allies a
quick end to the war in Europe. Out-
flanking the Seigfried Line, 'Mal'ket-
Gal'den's success would open a back-
door route into the Reichland, permit-
103
I!It BOOKS
ting F;ield Marshal Montgomery's
Twenty-first Army Group to dash into
the industrial Ruhr and finish the war
in 1944. '
On a tactical level, however. the
risks were grave indeed. The plan
aimed at driving a 64-mile-Iong wedge
into a questionable German defense to
secure a bridgehead over the Rhi ne
River at Arnhem. The airborne forces
("Market") would drop along a pencil-
thin corridor to ("apt me vital bridges
along the route. Then. an armored
linkup force ("Garden") \\'ould speed
overland to exploit the airborne ~ t
cess. Surprise. early linkup ("two
days." Monty said) and capturing all
bridges int"l"t were the crucial ingre-
dients to the plan.
A well-known tactical axiom hold, .,
that even the best of plans rarely sur
vIves the first round fired In anger-
and. to begIn \\'ith. Jfarket-Ga"den was
not a good plan. Violating the princi
pIes of mass, maneuver and simplicity.
the plan fell apart almost immedia\ely.
Although some 5000 aircraft were
mustered at 24 different airfields to
shuttle the 35,000 airborne troops and
their equipment to their destinations
between the Dutch border and Arn-
hem I it was the largest airborne op-
'eration ever launched I, only 700 men
reached the main objective at Arnhem.
Major General "Roy" Crquhart,
whose British 1st Airborne Division
was assigned the deep objective at
Arnhem, allowed the air force to talk
hIm out of landing near the Arnhem
bridge. Instead, to the incredulity of
veteran airborne officers, Urquhart
opted in favor of drop zones from 6
to 8 miles away; this was his first air-
borne command.
Intelligence was faulty 01'. when ac-
curate, brushed aside by Allied plan-
ner,s who were eager to employ the
airborne force again before the war
104
ended. Since D-day, 6 June, some 17
airborne operations had been planned
and canceled for various reasons.
Hence, intelligence reports indicating
that enemy armor was in the Arnhem
area was discarded. Intelligence offi
eel'S who pushed the issue were simply
told to stop "rocking the boat." One
,aid that it was "like being at lhe pole
at the start of a horse race." The
British 1st Airborne DIvision, whose
heroics at Arnhem have Since become
legend, found itself decisively engaged
by two Panzer divisions. Nine days
later, the shattered remnants of the
British division were withdrawn.
The ground linkup force was ter-
ribly slow and has since received jus-
tIfiable criticism for its lack of mis-
sIOn urgency. They fought a tidy bat-
tle throughout, were prone to stop at
night, and made excuses for timId be-
havior along the corridor toward Arn-
hem. For example, after securing the
bridge over the Waal River at NiJme-
gen on the evening of 20 September
\ the operation was sprung on the
17th), the ground spearhead halted
for 18 hours-hours which spelled the
doom and destruction of the 1st Air-
borne Division-despite being but 11
mileR from linkup at Arnhem.
Against the background of an op-
eration which promised so much and
realized so little, Cornelius Ryan,
author of the popular story of the'
:-.!ormandy invasion, The Longest Day,
has achieved in A Bridge Too Far the
capstone of a brilliant career. Doing
that which he does so well-namely,
reconstructIng history from the per-
,pective of the "little people," the par-
tIcIpants at the fighting level-Ryan
has delivered a superb piece of popu-
lar history. The sights, smells and
sounds of battle; the agonies and the
ecstasies of men in battle; the gal-
lantry, frustrations, anger and incre-
Military Review
dulities of war are very skillfully in-
terwoven into this fine tapestry of
historical reporting. The product of
seven years work and over 1200 inter-
views, this first complete version of
the operation whose battle losses ex-
ceeded Allied losses at Normandy is
"must" reading for anyone interested
in tactical planning and its relation-
ship to the realities of Ithe battlefield,
or for anyone interested in, simply,
men at war.
LTC JOHN G. FOWLER JR.,
Department of Tactics, USACGSC
WIll AMERICA SURRENDER? by Siobodan Drasko
vlch 451 Pages DevinAdair. 1973. $995
The author succinctly summarizes
the message of his work "Will Amer-
ica Surrender?" when he notes that
the treasured American phrase, "Give
me liberty or give me death" has been
replaced in recent years WIth the Jib-
eral phrase "rather red than dead."
Slobodan Draskovich, a dedicated con-
servative, came to the United States
from Yugoslavia in 1947 to escape
communism. An economist and sociol-
ogist, he has lectured, authored sev-
eral texts and testified before Congress
on Communist strategy and tactics.
Using numerous post-World War II
examples, Draskovich presents a con-
vincing case that our country, through
its uninformed leaders, is negotiating
away our freedom and world leader-
ship to the Communists to whom peace
is only another form of the global
struggle that will lead eventually to
Communist victory. After tabulating
an impressive amount of evidence that
we no longer have the will to oppose
communism even in the political arena,
the author covers, in detail, the nature
of communism, pointing out that, de-
spite the diplomatic smokescreen laid
by Soviet leaders, a basic premise is
April 1975
BOOKS ~
that capitalism must lose to commu-
nism and that the inexorable fate of
the Free World is to disappear from
the stage of history. Since World War
II, the Soviet strategy for this victory
has stressed coexistence, a world at
peace within which the Communist
way has achieved first legitimacy and
then equality by means of a cleverly
orchestrated psychological and politi-
cal offensive. This offensive has
stressed communism as the waVe of
the future and has continually ques-
tioned our motives, values and will.
Draskovich feels that the Soviet,
ha ve succeeded partially because of
the current age of "cienrc and tech
nology wherein practitIOners :-;ee one
world united with international poli-
tics and a worldwide unity of goals
and partIally because we are a tech-
nologically strong but politically naIve
nation. The answer to our near-fatal
predicament, the author says, is self-
assertion, polItics WIth a backbone.
We must stop grasping every straw of
hope offered by the Communists and
start to assert ourselves. regain con-
viction in our way of life and challenge
communism by political warfare. The
author gives assurances that this po-
litical warfare will not lead to nuclear
warfare but to a Western political
dominance so cohesive that the Soviets
will not dare to attack.
Although repetitious, and occasion-
ally overstated, this appeal to the
United States to oppose the Commu-
nist wave pohtically before we have
nothing left to fight for militarily is
convincing. The author succeeded in
his intent, at least with this reader,
to alert all citizens to the potentially
lethal changes that have taken place
in our perceptions of the Communist
world as well as our own and to the
dangers inherent in our well-intended
but unwise political moves toward
105
BOOKS
further accomodatJ(ln with the Com-
munists. To the cOn8erV:ltlve. thi8 text
mu"t be abo\'e reproach; to the liberal.
an anathema, Hopelully, those in the
middle will receive Dr. llraskovich's
message \\ith an open minrl.
MAJ JAMES R. FAIRCHILD.
Offir'c of the Dcput/I Chi{,( of Staff
for
LEADERSHIP IN WAR. 19391945, The Generals in
Victory and Defeat by Bngadier Sir John Smyth
247 Pages SI Martln's Press 1974 $895
The ",bt,tle to this book is The GC>1-
ciol." in \'/I:'fol'!f and Dffcat., unrl it IS
certallll?, a book about generals. The
authol' awarded the VictorIa
fought In both world and,
In the COUI'He of hlH long career, he
perf'onallv klIe\\ nearly all the men
who led the Bntlsh Army in World
War II. He \\Tlte, about them, not in
the :-'Pll"lt of a carpIng critic attempt-
Ing to rewrite hlstOl'y, but with the
understanding and knowledge of a
tomnatriot. It IS a lnterestlhg
book. and ,t bl'ings to light mm'h new
material in the personal hiHtorieH.
Perhaps it is unfortunate for the
American market that General Smyth
has confined himself to British gen
ei'als, but. with the intimate and in-
rhvidualistic approach that he uses.
he had no option. He was not at Staff
College with the US leaders. nor did
he serve with them in the prewar
period. He u"es this knowledge in his
explanations of character and atti-
tudes. His book gives the reader a new
. slant on many of the apparently baf-
tling periods of Rritish leadership in
\Yorlu War II, particularly that un
.happy time in 1942 when it seemed as
if the general in command of the
North African Desert Campaign was
being changed every time there was a
full' moon. From there, the author
106
turn" to Burma, where he. commanded
a division himself. and the agonies
ann blunders of that first ,Japanese in-
vasion are clearly laid out ann dis-
sected.
The book takes a little time to get
mto its stride, and the latter period
of the war is dealt with less precisely
than are the first two years. One would
haw liked a few maps so that the
campaigns could have been followed
more easily, and, in the last chapters.
the author ,eems happier to <jllote
from others rather than employ hl<
own crisp narrative and
sharp penetrating observations. Rut It
an book to read.
COL .JOliN S. WEEKS. British Army.
-'finish 1/ nf Deferlce
KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents by
John Barron. 462 Pages. Reade,'s Digest Press
J974 $1095
This book is must reading for all
those who seek to understand the So-
viet system. The author. a senror edi-
tor of Reader's Digest and a former
naval intelligence officer, spent folll'
years compiling thi, work. lie has reo
lied heavily on testimony of former
Soviet citizens, who were KGB officer,
or agents, and security Rervires. slieh
as the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The KGB (Komitet Gosudarstven-
noy Bezopasnosti) , or Committee for
State Security. affects the lives of al-
most every Soviet citizen and spreads
its tentacles throughout the world. Mr.
Rarron describes in detail KGB opera-
tions which have impacted on the se-
curity of the United States. He notes
that no American recruit "acted out
of an affinity for communism or the
Soviet Union. Each sought in espio-
nage an escape from the consequences
Military Review
of his Qwn misconduct in turn,
resulted from problems of marriage,
sex, alcohol 01' sheer greed, That is
why the KGB now lays such strong
stress on recruitment of Americans
on the basis of theil' "personal weak-

One case concerns the Armed Forces
Courier Center at Orly Airport out-
sIde Paris which was lpenetrated be,
cause of the vulnerability of one
trusted CS Army sergeant. The sensI-
tive docnments stolen here were
rushed to Moscow for Khru<hchev',
personal perusal.
There are other fasclllating ac-
counts, including one in which a
blonde seductress was as,igned the
task of penetrating the WhIte Hou,e,
only to be 'topped after she began
making alarming progress III official
Washington circles,
English author, Robert Conquest,
who wrote the introduction to KGB:
The SeCl'rt W()rk of S()t'irt Sccret
Agents, rteclares:
But e1'cn such coups as that at Orly,
hOff'erer skilfully m'ya1llzt-d. could not
hal'p succeeded but fur Amerzrun
lapses of "il/ilance and failure, ">'en
In an e.rtrcmely secret {ocatwn, to ob
l ..;en:e to the lcttf?l' and nn all occasivns
the ""Ie" laid down, For those II'ho
I/uard the West's seerris, no ,e/a.ra-
tlon IS posslhle. Fnr the O1'dinary citl-
zpu no! per.;;nnally ull:(JilJrd, at least a
realizatiml of the need for these pre-
cautions. a reiertion of any campaign
agamst the necessitu's of the Rituatioil,
are lVe arc in no posituJ1l to
fall 111 /l'ith those slbperjicial argu-
ments which would deny the state the
right to guard its secunty, let alone
relax the legal prol'isions against be
t!'ayillg it.
COL OTTO P. CHANEY, DLIWC
April 1975
BOOKS
A FIELDMARSHAL IN THE FAMILy by Bnan Mont
gomery 372 Pages Taplinger 1974 $1495
The author. Fielrt Mal'Rbal Mont-
gomery's younger brother, in the
lIltroduction that tbls book IS Intended
to be- an " ... explanation of ho\\
hererlity and environment together
produced a Fielrl-;\!ar,hal who ne\'er
a campaign." The e\ idence
in stlpport of the lIltl'nt
i...; weak. A few chal';}cte}",stlC'S commlHI
to Montgomel':v aHn are
highhghted but 1I0t to tbe extent one
would expect in a \\ork thi ....
HH its main
This critlcl:-:;m I .... not to ..;.ny, ho\\-
e,er. that tbe book IS not a \\ultb-
\\ bile study. FIeld Marshal Mont-
gomery 1:-:1 one of the most controver-
figure:' Ilf \Vorld 'Val' II. and, Ht-.
;-;1Il'h. mUl'h has been \\Tltten on him
anrt \\ e can exped more in the future.
The I'0l'"onal lIlsights based on the
:Iuthnj"<'; intimacy with his fa-
mO\1:-; brother are significant to under-
..;tanrhng the lattel'\;; RctlOns Hnrl attl-

Thl,:;i 1,:;i not a rompl'ehem:;ive biogra-
phy or " detailed bistory of ;\iont-
gomery's battles and campaigns. The
emphasis is on the field marshal's de-
velopment as a commander with pri-
mary attention paid to the personali-
tIes and major events influencing bis
rtevelopment.
The first thIrd of the book IS devoted
to a d/"cussion of the ;\!ontgomer),
family, emphasizing the field mar-
sbal's Immediate ancestOls. Several of
these men, lllcluding Montgomery's
father, \\ere themselves men of con-
SIderable note in either church or go\'-
el'llment. It is from tbe discussion of
the more prominent ancestors that the
author identifies characteristics later
reflected in the field marshal's views
_ and conduct. The latter part of the
107
BOOKS
book is directly concerned with the
field marshal's life and' career.
Although naturally sympathetic to-
ward his subject, the author does not
hesitate to criticize his brother when
he feels it appropriate. Field Marshal
Montgomery's bias against the Indian
Army, difficulties with his American
colleagues, desire for publicity and
eccentricitIes are of the
areas covered.
Montgomery's theories of command,
employment of large forces, and staff
organization aud procedure are ad
dressed throughout. Many oLhls theo-
ries and practices stemmer! from the
field mar,hal's World War I experi-
ences and others from his long and
scholarly study of mIlitary history.
The author emphasizes his brother's
total devotlOll to the stud:, of hIS pro-
fe::-:sion which was a major factor in
Montgomery's rise to prominence.
For the World War II buff or his-
torian, this hook is interesting and
worthwhile reading. Its principal
value, however, lies in the personal
insights into one of the most distin-
gUIshed soldiers Bntam has produced
insights that Brian is
uniquely qualified to provide.
MAJ JOliN A. HARDAWAY,
Dppollment or Strategy, USACGSC
KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: The last Testament
by Nlklta S Khrushchev Translated and Edited
by Strobe Talbot!. 602 Pages. Little, Brown & Co.
1974 $1295
The sequel to the first volume of
Khrushchev's memOll'S published in
1970, The Last Testament is merely a
continuance of the rambling, bullyish
reminiscences which comprised that
earlier work. Although .the extensive
set of voice tapes which provide the
basis fot the text itself have been veri-
fied here in the US as that of the de-
108
posed Soviet dictator, their editing
and collation in the Soviet Union re-
main as obscure as before'. To be sure,
Khrushchev scarcely deviates from
the current Soviet Communist party
line.
Presented as final rellections during
his last year of life, this second volume
attempts to cover the post-World War
II period and particularly Khru-
shchev's own reign as ruler. However,
as with the first volume, there is a
large measure of skipping ahead and
back again in terms of time. RepetI-
tions and sLlmmaries of matters al-
ready covc>rert in the 1070 work appear
and one cannot help but
surmise that these may be reheated
leftovers from the earlier volume.
Most significantly, there is no mention
of circumstances surroundIng hiH own
ouster in 1%4. In any case, there is
nothing of substance in this work that
equals Khrushchev's sharp and bitter
portrayal of the Stalinist era which
highlighted the first volume.
For military readers and analy,ts
of Soviet military affairs, there are
some key areas. There are extensive
passages on such topics as the devel-
opment of the Soviet missIle and ail'
forces and the rise of the Soviet Navy
under the aegis of Admiral GorshkO\.
Similarly, the formation of the Wm'-
saw Pact and the militarization of the
Soviet scientific intelligentsia during
the developmental period of Soviet nu-
clear weaponry are treated in some
detail. Of particular interest are his
views on Sino-Soviet conllict, the ori-
gins of which Khrushchev sets com-
pletely at the door of Mao Tse-tung
while describing Mao's leadership as
a "sickness which has befallen" the
Communist Party of China. However
unique from the personal standpOint,
one is continually aware that these re-
lIections of things military are strictly
MifitafY Review
Khrushchev's Own views which may
or may not always conform to the
mandamus of the German historian
Ranke to write history "as it really
was."
If one major trait of Soviet politico-
military leadership is clear through-
out, it is that it was (and is) a to-
talitarian apparatus which rules ab-
solutely and far removed from the
influencing strictures lof legislative
oversight and public opinion on its
policies and decisionmaking powers.
While hardly a new observation, hear-
ing it "from the horse's mouth" rein-
forces the credibility of this viewpoint
as nothing else can.
MAJ JOSEPH E. THACH, USAR
DER WIND KA'M YOM WESTEN by Gerd Kobe. 208
Pages. Holzner-Verlag, 1974 $1231
In this autobiographical account, the
author, a retired major general and
former panzer division commander in
the Bundeslcehr, describes the post
World War 11 years in Germany-
from the time the first "breeze" came
from the West in 1948 to the time
when the wind picked up speed, push-
ing the Germans in the back in Oc-
tober 1957. The author uses a pen
name and renames some of his com-
panions, but this does not distract
from his message.
The first chapters deal with the
problems Kobe's generation had when
they came home from World War Il-
their only possession, a college degree;
many with a family and children to
support, and a lot of war experience.
They were not in high demand because
they were in abundance at the time.
With determination and skill, most of
these men made a living and rose to
respectable positions in all branches
of civilian life. Kobe describes in dia
April 1975
BOOKS ~ n
logue form with former fellow officers
the mental torments which he and
others went through before making
their decisions to follow "the call"
even when their former commanders
were still serving sentences in West-
ern prisons.
With the Korean War, the breeze
became stronger, and the Western na-
tions began looking for an active Ger-
man participation in the defense of
Europe. In fact, Dr. Adenauer ini-
tially offered a German contmgent to
support European defenses. Kobe was
assigned to the Ministry of Defence
and spent most of his time m the
training division. This book concen-
trates on the training of the new Ger-
man Army.
As a member of the first group to
visit the United States to see CS of-
ficer and unit field training, Kobe VIS-
ited such places as West Point, Fort
Campbell, Fort Sill and other service
schools. Fort Leavenworth impressed
these early visitors with its prepara-
tion and conduct of instruction, as well
as the number of students and class-
rooms-a scale totally unfamiliar to
these former students of the K1'1CIISa-
kademie.
The book ends with the descnption
of an exercise in which the new Ger-
man Army demonstrates that the suc-
eeSR in opel'ations l i ~ in good training
of officers, NCOs and enlisted men.
Gerd Kobe's book shows the events
in the early Fifties as seen by one of
the actual partlcipants in the Bundes-
weill'.
The introduction by General Heu-
singer, the first Chief of the Armed
Forces, is proof that The Winds Came
Fl'Om the West is a serious work.
Certainly, it is most interesting read-
ing.
COL WOLFGANG GERHARDT,
Gaman Liaison OfjiceT, USACGSC
109
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232 Pages. Harvard UniverSity Press 1974 $7.95
URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA
by James Kohl and John Lilt 425 Pages. The MIT
Press 1974 $1250
WILLIAM PENN by Harry Emerson Wildes 469
Pages Macmillan 1974 $1495
WW 2. Edited by Theodore A Wilson 515 Pages.
Scnbner's 1974 $1250
. YEARBOOK ON INtERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AF
FAIRS, 1974. Edited by Richard F Staar. 648 Pages
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EVIDENCE IN CAMERA, The Story of Photographic
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ton Smith 256 Pages DaVid & Charles. 1974
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FIOEL CASTRO'S PERSONAL REVOLUTION IN CUBA:
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Nelson 349 Pages Alfred A Knopf. 1975,
$3 95
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Mailiere, Retned 328 Pages Bernard & Graefe
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109 231 Pages Stem & Day 1974 $895
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IN BOOKS & PERIOOICALS. Compiled by David
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Jewish Life by Zosa Szalkowski 397 Pages. KTAV
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179 Pages Bernard & Graefe 1974 $6.9.2
110
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LINE OF DEPARTURE, by Martin Russ 201
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Book Co 1975. $19 95
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many 19451949, Volume One. Edited by Jean
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Co 1975 $795
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by General S" ,nthony Read. 131 Pages Royal
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