Balta Claudia s4302680 Paper no. 5, 18th of March, 2013 Nu !er of "ords# 3.

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&nal'sis on (rance and )un*ar'

+a!le of content# 1. ,ntroduction 2. -iscussin* the concept of populis 3. )un*ar', ideolo*ical spectru 4. (rance, ideolo*ical spectru 5. Conclusion in present .urope

and populis and populis

Politics, it seems to me, for years, or all too long, has been concerned with right or left instead of right or wrong. ~Richard Armour 1

&nal'sis on (rance and )un*ar'

In this paper I will deliver an insight into the political systems that are to be found in France and Hungary, two countries which are members of the European Union; I will discuss several concepts such as the ideological spectrum, political developments, the rise of new parties, new populism, new policies, including latest elections in the two countries. I believe it is important to discuss the issue of politics in nowadays terms given the economic crisis and all when every nation is trying its best. That is even why some EU governments want to be able to close their borders to immigration. It can be argues that till now populism has been used in the EU speeches pointing at immigration as a threat while using it to increase a feeling of fear in the population. For instance, icolas !ar"o#y, former French $resident stated in last electoral campaign that France%s borders should be closed so as to protect the country%s poor from immigration. &ll in all, fear of 'the other( is now not only used in speeches to influence the general population%s mentality, but it is also a threat that EU member states are now beginning to feel.

-iscussin* the concept of populis

in present .urope

Firstly, I would li"e to begin by tac"ling the issue of populism; populism is a political ideology according to which populists support the rights and power of the people in their fight against the privileged elite.) In nowadays society populism is rising due to big changes in the economy because of the economic crisis from the past year on. *ver the last decade, populist parties have been growing in strength in Europe; by and large, these parties are characteri#ed by their opposition to immigration and concern for protecting national and European culture, sometimes ma"ing use of the language of human rights and freedom. +hen it comes to economic policy, they are often critical of globali#ation and the effects of international capitalism on wor"ers% rights. ,oreover, this is mi-ed with 'antiestablishment( rhetoric and language. *ften called 'populist e-tremist parties( or the 'new right(, these parties do not fit easily into the traditional political conte-t. If we want to thin" about the sources of populism we can put it down as it follows. In the international conte-t, globali#ation diminishes space for wor"ing for national political ma.orities in terms of economic policies and foreign relations. +hen it comes to the domestic front, political ma.orities are sub.ect to ever more intense competition from other centers of power/ autonomous central ban"s, powerful constitutional courts, independent .udiciaries and public servants. &ll in all, this combination of international and domestic factors has led the way to the
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http/00www.thefreedictionary.com0populism 1accessed in )2.34.53)46

diminishing of the powers of politically elected bodies. 7omestic political, by and large, could ma"e less difference in the nowadays society, than they could previously do. However, citi#ens% e-pectations about what their governments could do are not proportionally decreasing, as you might thin". This is the second fundamental source of the populist condition. !ocieties 8 from &frica to Eastern Europe 8 have formed the belief that governance does matter, and that improvements in the patterns of governance can ma"e a substantial difference in terms of overall social welfare. The combined result of the two sources of populism is the construction of political ma.orities permanently dissatisfied with the performance of political elites. These ma.orities are a fertile ground for the growth of populist movements. +hen it comes to radicali#ing politics, political new comers are inclined to adopt a rather more radical agenda, about the rule of law. They put at 9uestion not only specific policies of the mainstream parties, but the normative .uridical restraints on political will and decision ma"ing. Thus, often populist actions mitigate against e-ternal conditionality and engagements of the state, as well as against domestic competitors of political ma.orities, li"e independent agencies, constitutional courts, central ban"s. &n effect which is not desired of populism on the rule of the law is the tendency of mainstream parties to restrict competition by new comers through constitutional mechanisms. This guides to the politici#ation of the constitution itself and to the blurring of the distinction between routine and constitutional 9uestions. Eventually, this conducts to the undermining of constitutionalism that is the idea that there is a set of basic rules which are not 9uestioned in the course of normal politics. Ta"ing politics beyond the scope of the rule of law refers to the fact that the mainstream parties might themselves turn into a populist threat to the rule of law by adopting some of the policies supported by radical populists and also, to the supporting of opening up of new areas of political decision ma"ing, which are not sub.ect to the rule of law. Instances showing that mainstream parties adopt policies advocated by populist and e-tremist parties are easy to find; the entire issue of immigration was first brought on stage by populist parties. Then, the calls for law and order, rough measures against crime and the struggle against corruption are also such topics. &ll of them have the potential to be transformed into menace to the rule of law, either by the introduction of rules violating individual rights and the separation of powers, or merely by the introduction of rules which have no effect or are consistently disregarded. From what I have seen and read in the press, I can affirm that populist political parties are en.oying unprecedented electoral success and growing membership. It can be said that many populist parties have migrated from the fringes of society to become integral members of coalition governments and important factions, capable of shifting mainstream political debate.
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In France, politician ,arine :e $en is restructuring the French Front ational $arty, describing herself as a defender of the republic and the welfare state and fiercely denying anti; !emitism. !he declares her position against immigration in France and states that it has nothing to do with racism, but rather with the fact that it is an economic problem. !he does not agree with the 'islamification( of France and she is of the opinion that republican values, feminism and secularism must be protected from ,uslim e-tremists. It is also important to mention the fact that opinion polls show that these messages, ,arine :e $en%s statements are resonating in the eyes of the audience. &n opinion poll from ,arch, 53)) reveals that ,arine :e $en with 54 per cent was with points ahead of $resident !ar"o#y.5 &lso, France%s <loc Indentitaire emerged in 5334 which was founded by Fabrice =oberts, a former member of the dissolved Unite =adicale $arty and it campaigns against the islamisation of Europe, illegal immigration and anti;white racism. *ne of their ma.or initiatives was the initiation of a brand of soupe au cochon 1por" soup6 at a $arisian soup "itchen, aimed at e-cluding ,uslims. The group calls itself identitarian, not nationalist, because it defends regional and European identity as well as national identity and also they claim their non;electoral political campaigning.4 &nother e-ample of populism can be observed in the etherlands, where politician >eert +ilder%s 'Freedom $arty(, founded in 533?, now holds 5? out of )23 seats in the 7utch $arliament and received )@ per cent of the vote in 53)3. +ilder has advocated against the Aoran, characteri#ing it as the 'Islamic ,ein Aampf(; he describes his criti9ue of Islam as a defense for human rights, 9uestioning Islam%s attitude on women%s and gay rights and stating that he is only 'intolerant of the intolerant(. Even though, it is not a formal member of the current coalition, the 7utch >overnment relies on the support of 'Freedom $arty(.? )un*ar', ideolo*ical spectru and populis

In the Hungarian parliamentary representative democratic republic, the political spectrum is divided into several political parties. ). Hungarian !ocialist $arty 1Magyar Szocialista Prt, MSZP6; !ocial liberalism 5. Bobbi" ; The ,ovement for a <etter Hungary 1Jobbik Magyarorszgrt mozgalom6; ationalism 4. Fides#;A7 , which consists of/ a6 Fides# 1Fidesz - Magyar Polgri Szvetsg6 b6 Christian 7emocratic $eople%s $arty 1A7 $6 ; ational conservatism
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Bamie <artlett, Bonathan <irdwell, ,ar" :ittler, The e! Face oF "igiTal PoP#lism, :ondon/ 7emos, 53)), pp. 5@;5D 3 Ibidem, p. 5E
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Ibidem, p.5D

?. $olitics Can <e 7ifferent 1$ehet Ms % Politika,$MP6; >reen liberalism2 2. Hungarian 7emocratic Forum; :iberal conservatism *ut of these five, I will tal" about the Bobbi" political party. The ,ovement for a <etter Hungary, Bobbi" is the most successful far;right party to e-ist in the last two decades. It was founded in 5334 and in present it is the third largest political party in Hungary. Its ideology is characteri#ed by strong nationalism, opposition to capitalism and liberalism and ma"es use of anti;!emitic and anti;=roma rhetoric. The Bobbi" party has a strong influence over youngsters, by using online communication and messages to amplify its messages, recruit new members and organi#e. It is a well "nown fact that the online social media on Faceboo" of Bobbi" is bigger than its official membership list. Thus, this mi-ture of virtual and real world political activity is the way many people relate to politics, especially the young generation; it can be said that this form of politics is becoming the norm for a younger, digital generation.@ The brea"through year of Bobbi" was in 533E when with a percentage of )?,F of the vote in the European parliamentary elections. In 53)3, the party got more than F22.333 votes in the Hungarian national election, finishing in the third place, only 5.@ per cent behind the previously governing !ocialist party 1,agyar !#ocialista $Grt or ,!H$6, with )@.D per cent of the vote.D <ecause two elections are not enough to guarantee the party%s continued success, Bobbi" appears to be increasing; in 53)), the party broadened its votes base more successfully than any other opposition party, registering 5) per cent support among active voters with mainstream party preferences.F &s party values, the Bobbi" party claims to represent the interests of ethnic Hungarians, who Bobbi" supporters believe are more and more oppressed in their own country by national and international forces. ,oreover, Aris#tina ,orvai, who is a member of the European $arliament and also front woman of Bobbi"%s European campaing, has stated that Hungarians have become '$alestinians in their own country(.E +hen it comes to ideology, the Bobbi"s are openly anti;liberal; supporter many times re.ect the promotion of human rights, especially those applied to minorities, and are often homophobic, anti;!emitic and anti;=oma. However, at the same time, and this seems to me li"e a parado-, the party argue that democracy and freedom are their guiding principles. Furthermore, the Bobbi" party was a devoted opponent of the government%s draconian media law of 53)3
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http/00en.wi"ipedia.org0wi"i0:istIofIpoliticalIpartiesIinIHungary 1accessed in )2.34.53)46

Bamie <artlett, Bonathan <irdwell, $Jter Are"K, Bac" <enLeld, >abor >yori, Po&#lism i' (#ro&e) *#'gary, :ondon/ 7emos, 53)5, p. )4 7 http/00www..obbi".com0shortIsummaryIaboutI.obbi" 1accessed in )2.34.53)46
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http/00www..obbi".com0shortIsummaryIaboutI.obbi" 1accessed in )2.34.53)46 <artlett, <irdwell, Are"o, <enfield, >yori, p.55

which was sub.ect to criticism all over Europe.)3 <ut, consistent with its nationalist agenda, freedom of speech and freedom to gather are fre9uently reserved for the ethnic Hungarian community. Its support for freedom of e-pression, for instance, is a reflection of its young support base and its concern that the liberal supremacy may loo" to e-tinguish radical or e-treme voices. ,oving on, to economic policy, the Bobbi" party can be described as protectionist, anti; capitalist and anti;globali#ation due to the fact that Bobbi" wants to forbid multinational companies from the Hungarian economy. +hen it comes to foreign policy, Bobbi" is rather anti; European and anti;Israeli; for e-ample, they blamed the Israeli;&merican lobby for the downfall of the Hungarian Florint; moreover, they are in favour of strengthening the connections with regimes li"e those in Iran, =ussia, China and Tur"ey.)) &s part of its anti;!emitic and anti;Hionist attitude, Bobbi" is pro;$alestinian and pro; ,uslim; fact which differentiates the party from many +estern European far;right parties, even though this might be attributed to the fact that there is not a large ,uslim community in Hungary. Bobbi"%s great success in such a short amount of time is the conse9uence of several factors. &mong these we can thin" of/ disillusionment with actual politics, e-ploitation of fears relating to crime and especially =oma criminality, and ma"ing effective use of online media to get to younger voters. I believe it is important to mention that Bobbi" has had part of general disillusionment in the post;transitional political establishment, a fact which was revealed by the European !ocial !urvey data, analysed by the $olitical Capital Institute. !everal countries in Europe in the wa"e of post;Cold +ar transition especially between )EE@ and 533@, Hungarian politics was dominated by two parties/ ,!H$1!ocial liberalism6 and Fides#. The later, the established right wing party was relatively successful at appealing to far right voters through rough anti; communist, anti;globali#ation, nationalist and law and order rhetoric. onetheless, the birth of Bobbil was aided by a scandal entailing the ,!H$ which was governing at that time. In 533@, a secret speech was published in which the ,!H$ prime minister at that time, Ferenc >yurcsany, admitted that continuous lying had been needed by ,!H* to secure re;election. &s a conse9uence, Hungary encountered its worst riots in decades which energi#ed the e-treme right. In the ne-t election, in 53)3 ,!H$ share of vote dramatically fell and young voters became more found of the idea that the established system, based on the rotation of power between centre;right Fides# and centre;left ,!H$ had to be replaced with a new, maybe even radical settlement.
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Ibidem, loc. Cit. Ibidem, loc. Cit.

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&lso, the Bobbi" party has many times attac"ed the =roma minority, which has fre9uently appealed to rural voters. In this manner, the party managed to e-pand its support in orth Eastern Hungary; this is important to bear in mind because Bobbi" supporters come from very different layers of society. +ith its anti;crime rherotic, the Bobbi" party has reacted to a growing societal sentiment of fear. Mery important to "now is that Hungary enacted a new Constitution in 53)) with three following changes until 53)4, even though it was a very controversial pro.ect 9uestioned by the European Union and the European Council. This new constitution has been sub.ect of controversy, both within the Hungarian borders and internationally. The critics pointed at the fact that it was adopted without sufficient input from the opposition and society in general, that it shows the ideology of the ruling party that is rooted in a conservative Christian view, despite Hungary not being a particularly pious country, and that it politici#es prior independent institutions. &s a response to this, the government that enacted the charter has dismissed such assertions, saying it was enshrined lawfully and that it respects the popular will.)5 In the elections of 53)5, in Hungary, &ttila ,esterhG#y said that his !ocialist $arty will not field a candidate for head of state because the <asic :aw re9uires the support of DF ,$s rather than the previous re9uirement of 23 ,$s as the party does not have that representation in parliament. *ne day earlier they had suggested former head of state :Gs#lK !Klyom for the nomination, who was president before !chmitt but whose candidacy was not supported by the party in 5332. The party said that they would also accept $astor >Gbor IvGnyi, who has been suggested by the 7emocratic Coalition. The !ocialist $arty, $olitics Can <e 7ifferent and the 7emocratic Coalition agreed about the opposition partiesN guarantees for having a meaningful say in the presidential election. The !ocialist $arty also submitted a bill to mandate a four;fifths ma.ority in order to elect a new head of state instead of the current two;thirds ma.ority so as to stymie Fides#; A7 $Ns ability to unilaterally elect a new president without the opposition. Bobbi" nominated ,E$ Aris#tina ,orvai and former ,inister of 7efence :a.os FOr as the partyNs candidates to the presidential position on ? &pril. However, FOr later announced that he would not accept the nomination. Fides# announced that will nominate ,E$ BGnos Pder. He was criticised for his close relationship with $rime ,inister Mi"tor *rbGn on the grounds that he would not serve as a chec" on the power of the prime minister.)4

(rance, ideolo*ical spectru

and populis

+hen it comes to France, the situation is 9uite different from Hungary. The French state has a multi;party political system which means there are several political parties and thus, in
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order to ta"e part in the e-ercise of power the parties must be ready to negotiate among them so as to form electoral alliances or coalition agreements. The dominant French political parties are described by a significant degree of intra;party factionalism, ma"ing each of them effectively a coalition in itself. From )EF3s on, the French government has alternated between two stable coalitions/ ). *n the centre;left, the !ocialist $arty with minor partners li"e Europe Ecology; The >reens, the :eft $arty and the =adical $arty of the :eft. 5. *n the centre;right, one led by the Union for a $opular ,ovement and previously its predecessors =ally for the =epublic and the Union for French 7emocracy, with support from the ew Centre.)? For outsiders, the French political system can fre9uently be difficult to follow because politicians who are supposed to be of right orientation, may defend positions more often held by political parties in the left in other countries and an e-ample, we can thin" of the fact that in recent French history, a good proportion of the economic liberali#ation that has ta"en place in France has been pushed through by governments of the left.)2% Ever since, ,arine :e $en has become leader of France%s Front ational, she began to shift her party away from the far right. !he has not only dropped the overt racism and islamophobia of her father, but also adopted hard;left economic policies. &ctually, she even declared to the press the following statement/ Q:eft and right donNt mean anything anymore 8 both left and right are for the European Union, the euro, free trade and immigration. For 43 years, left and right have been the same. The real fracture is now between those who support globali#ation and nationalists.Q)@ Even though :e $en changes her party%s brand, she cannot be compared to >ianfranco Fini 1he led his party away from neo;fascism towards the pro;European centre of Italian politics6; rather than that, :e $en%s European policies are still e-treme, she wants France to leave not only the euro, but also the EU. It can be said that her economic platform is one of national economic autarchy. Her desire is to protect France from globali#ation by raising high tariff barriers. If we want compare her strategy, it can be done by comparing it to the economic platform of Bean; $ierre Chevenement, the veteran anti;European and former !ocialist minister.)D &ctually, :e $en wants France to leave the euro so that it can devalue and become more competitive. &ccording to her, while the Unites !tates and China benefit from being able to
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http/00en.wi"ipedia.org0wi"i0:istIofIpoliticalIpartiesIinIFrance 1accessed in )D.34.53)46 http/00about;france.com0political;parties.htm 1accessed in )D.34.53)46 http/00www.publicserviceeurope.com0article0@?D0marine;le;pen;leads;rise;in;populism1accessed 1in )D.34.53)46 http/00www.publicserviceeurope.com0article0@?D0marine;le;pen;leads;rise;in;populism 1accessed in )D.34.53)46

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devalue, the euro#one suffers from law economic growth. !he states in the press the following/ QTo save the euro we are as"ing the >ree"s to ma"e huge sacrifices through austerity, and soon we will as" the same of people elsewhere, even in France. The euro will lead to war.Q )F In her opinion, only the fashionable middle class would complain about devaluation and also stressed upon the sovereignty draining away from <russels and that we live in a Union !ovieti9ue Europeenne. &lso, another important issue on her agenda, was that the EU represents the interests of big financial groups and encourages immigration so as to put downward pressure on salaries. :e $en strongly believes that her country is in need of a French agricultural policy, rather than a Common &gricultural $olicy, since the C&$ was aiding so much Central Europe. ,oreover, in her opinion the ultra;liberals who are in charge of running the EU will not let the French to protect their industries. ,arine :e $en would also advise France to leave &T*; but if France would actually do that, the country would have to raise defense spending enormous amounts of money so as to have a comparable level of security to that provided by &T*. &nother point made by her was that she is not against immigration; however, this should not lead to lower salaries and moreover, French people have priority in .obs.)E !ome might say that :e $en is right when saying that the main political divide in Europe is between nationalists and globalisers, but on the other hand she offers way to superficial solutions, as her language resonates with the common man by being on the side of the little people against foreigners, international bureaucrats and big capitalists. <ut it must also be said that her economic nationalism goes down 9uite well in France, in a country which more hostile to globali#ation than any other European country. &ccording to critics, :e $en%s theory lac"s some important things; she has nothing to say about global governance or what to do about transnational threats li"e organi#ed crime, climate change, proliferation or international terrorism. &lso, critics suggest that France had its benefits from globali#ation, something that :e $en cannot conceive. $rior to the elections in &pril 53)5, opinion polls revealed that ,arine :e $en had a good chance of getting into the second round of ,ay 53)5, presidential election. In conclusion, she has advocated national preference for French citi#ens over foreign residents for access to .obs and social services, as well as withdrawing from the euro and the European Union. !he was in favour of reducing legal immigration by E2R abolishing the right to family reunification, and reinstating the death penalty which was abolished in )EF. However, the held the third place in opinion polls for much of the campaign, occasionally going to forth behind Bean;:uc ,elenchon, but remained consistently far behind Hollande and !ar"o#y.

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Conclusion Eventually, my research reveals that in the two countries that I have analysed, Hungary and France, the following concepts are the ones that govern in nowadays politics, in a society in which the voices of populist actors are becoming more and more important.

)/N0&12
!trong nationalism; *pposition to capitalism and liberalism; Use of anti;!emitic and anti;=roma theroric.

(1&NC.
7efending =epublican values; *pposition to immigration *pposition to islamification

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