Chapter 14: Protection
Chapter 14: Protection
 Goals of Protection  Principles of Protection  Domain of Protection
 Access Matrix
 Implementation of Access Matrix  Access Control  Revocation of Access Rights
 Capability-Based Systems
 Language-Based Protection
Operating System Concepts
14.2
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Objectives
 Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern
computer system
 Explain how protection domains combined with an access matrix
are used to specify the resources a process may access
 Examine capability and language-based protection systems
Operating System Concepts
14.3
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Goals of Protection
 Operating system consists of a collection of objects, hardware or
software
 Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a
well-defined set of operations.
 Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly
and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.
Operating System Concepts
14.4
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Principles of Protection
 Guiding principle  principle of least privilege
Programs, users and systems should be given just enough privileges to perform their tasks
Operating System Concepts
14.5
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Domain Structure
 Access-right = <object-name, rights-set>
where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object.
 Domain = set of access-rights
Operating System Concepts
14.6
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Domain Implementation (UNIX)
 System consists of 2 domains:
User
Supervisor
 UNIX
Domain = user-id
Domain switch accomplished via file system.
 
Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit). When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed. When execution completes user-id is reset.
Operating System Concepts
14.7
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Domain Implementation (Multics)
 Let Di and Dj be any two domain rings.  If j < I
Di
Dj
Multics Rings
Operating System Concepts 14.8 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Access Matrix
 View protection as a matrix (access matrix)  Rows represent domains  Columns represent objects  Access(i, j) is the set of operations that a process executing in
Domaini can invoke on Objectj
Operating System Concepts
14.9
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Access Matrix
Figure A
Operating System Concepts 14.10 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Use of Access Matrix
 If a process in Domain Di tries to do op on object Oj, then op
must be in the access matrix.
 Can be expanded to dynamic protection. 
Operations to add, delete access rights. Special access rights:
   owner of Oi copy op from Oi to Oj control  Di can modify Dj access rights
transfer  switch from domain Di to Dj
Operating System Concepts
14.11
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)
 Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy.
Mechanism
 
Operating system provides access-matrix + rules. If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced. User dictates policy. Who can access what object and in what mode.
Policy
 
Operating System Concepts
14.12
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Implementation of Access Matrix
 Each column = Access-control list for one object
Defines who can perform what operation.
Domain 1 = Read, Write Domain 2 = Read Domain 3 = Read 
 Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
Fore each domain, what operations allowed on what objects.
Object 1  Read Object 4  Read, Write, Execute Object 5  Read, Write, Delete, Copy
Operating System Concepts
14.13
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Access Matrix of Figure A With Domains as Objects
Figure B
Operating System Concepts
14.14
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Access Matrix with Copy Rights
Operating System Concepts
14.15
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Access Matrix With Owner Rights
Operating System Concepts
14.16
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Modified Access Matrix of Figure B
Operating System Concepts
14.17
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Access Control
 Protection can be applied to non-file resources
 Solaris 10 provides role-based access control to implement least
privilege
  
Privilege is right to execute system call or use an option within a system call Can be assigned to processes Users assigned roles granting access to privileges and programs
Operating System Concepts
14.18
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Role-based Access Control in Solaris 10
Operating System Concepts
14.19
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Revocation of Access Rights
 Access List  Delete access rights from access list.
Simple
Immediate
 Capability List  Scheme required to locate capability in the system
before capability can be revoked.
  Reacquisition Back-pointers Indirection
Keys
Operating System Concepts
14.20
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Capability-Based Systems
 Hydra
Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system.
Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's program; system provides access protection for use of these rights.
 Cambridge CAP System
Data capability - provides standard read, write, execute of individual storage segments associated with object.
Software capability -interpretation left to the subsystem, through its protected procedures.
Operating System Concepts
14.21
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Language-Based Protection
 Specification of protection in a programming language allows the
high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources.
 Language implementation can provide software for protection
enforcement when automatic hardware-supported checking is unavailable.
 Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever
protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system.
Operating System Concepts
14.22
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Protection in Java 2
 Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)  A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by the
JVM.
 The protection domain indicates what operations the class can
(and cannot) perform.
 If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged operation,
the stack is inspected to ensure the operation can be performed by the library.
Operating System Concepts
14.23
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
Stack Inspection
Operating System Concepts
14.24
Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne 2005
End of Chapter 14