Research Note Policing Elections in India

Arvind Verma India Review 4(3-4): 354-376, 2005 Introduction Elections in India involve complex political, mobilizational and organizational logistics that remain unparalleled in the world. In the May 2004 national elections, for instance, there were 5435 candidates from 230 registered national and State-level political parties. 1 Of the estimated 650 million voters, approximately 56%, or 380 million people, actually cast their votes. The Election Commission employed almost 3.5 million personnel to administer the elections and an estimated 2 million civilian police and security forces were deployed for order maintenance during the elections 2 . The direct cost of deployment and organizing the election amounted to approximately $245 million. 3 Further, in view of isolated geographical conditions election arrangements involved various modes of transport and deployment of thousands of security personnel to counter threats by insurgents to set up some 700,000 polling booths. 4 The police forces in India face considerable burden due to the competitive nature of elections, difficult terrain, poor infrastructure, limited resources and organizational limitations. Protecting the security of voters and candidates, not to mention maintaining order during the electioneering period, presents extraordinary challenges. Policing arrangements must be planned meticulously so elections can be conducted freely and fairly, for security lapses can and do affect the outcome. Police must also closely

Arvind Verma is Assoc. Prof. in the Dept. of Criminal Justice and the Associate Director of India Studies program at Indiana University, Bloomington.

supervise political parties and their candidates, since they adopt ways and means not always fair to win votes. The publicand invariably heatednature of the campaign process often generates situations where police interference is necessary to defuse problems and maintain order. The police must exercise discretion to control crowds, deal with often rowdy thugs, and prevent illegal forms of vote influencing. This role requires the complete impartiality of police personnel. Violence is also not uncommon in Indian elections. States like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, and Jammu and Kashmir are particularly notorious, although violent clashes have occurred everywhere during elections at some point. Many groups attempt to prevent people from voting, or try to influence the final decision, by using violent means. Seen in this light, the quality of policing has a direct impact on the democratic rights of the people. This essay examines the Indian police and their role in the election process, presenting the many peculiar aspects of Indian elections that pose challenges to the free and fair selection of the peoples representatives. After a brief comment upon the limitations of the Election Commission, the discretionary role of the police in maintaining order during election rallies, public meetings and political mobilization as well as during the voting period will be presented. 5 This essay makes use of primary data from the Election Commission of India, secondary data reported in Indian newspapers, both of which are supplemented by my own experiences in the Indian police. I have served several years in the Indian police and have considerable experience of policing the national, provincial and local elections in the country. Many observations and in-house organizational communications referenced

here derived from my direct knowledge of the police. I have attempted, of course, to be as objective as possible in relating these experiences. The Election Commission and its Limitations Indias independent Election Commission has long been seen as a threat and nuisance by the political parties. The period of T.N. Seshan, chief election commissioner from 1990-96, was particularly marked by acrimony and antagonism since he was perceived to be too independent by politicians. In order to dilute the chief election commissioners powers, the then-government of P.V. Narsimha Rao created two additional commissioner posts. However, the Election Commission continues to retain considerable power and autonomy in its functions. Though politically independent, the Election Commission does not have its own staff for the administration of elections. This imposes serious limitations on its independence and effectiveness. Except for its small office staff, personnel must be requisitioned from provincial and central government to handle all electoral arrangements including voter registration, preparation of electoral rolls, conduct of elections, scrutiny of candidates, supervision during the campaigning process and the counting of votes. Some personnel are also drawn from different ministries, as well as public and quasi-state organizations. The diversity amongst the personnel prevents uniformity and professionalism. It also entails serious problems of supervision and accountability. In every election a large number of personnel have to be trained to handle tasks of ballot preparation, voter registration and identification. They have to be educated about election laws and rules for counting of votes.

Due to Indias size and geographic diversity, officers deputed from other States and regions are often unfamiliar with local conditions that affect the electoral process. Their competence and integrity is therefore open to question. There are frequent complaints against such officers for their lapses some of which at times have been very serious. The case of Assam State elections in 1983 illustrates the problem: In the seventies, a regional civil disobedience movement, Asom Gana Parishad [AGP], brought the State government to halt over the so-called foreigners issue, relating to the influx of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. A vast majority of provincial government employees, sympathetic to the AGP party stayed away from election duty during the 1983 assembly elections. Indira Gandhis government decided to proceed anyway, and sent personnel from different parts of the country to administer the elections. Jagannath Misra, former Chief Minister of Bihar, sent a large contingent of civilian and police officials to conduct the Assam elections in a bid for Indira Gandhis patronage. These contingents of more than 1500 personnel were sent by special trains to different districts. I was deputed for security duty to Debrugarh and my force escorted the trains from Begusari-Bihar to Tinsukhia-Assam. It took us four days to make the journey as the tracks were damaged by agitators at several places. Despite additional personnel from several public sector undertakings and central government ministries, flown by chartered flights at the last moment, the shortage of staff to conduct the elections remained. Due to this shortage election booths were grouped in large centers. This increased the distance citizens had to travel to

vote. More significantly, most of these deputed officials had no knowledge of the local Assamese language in which the voter lists were written. The Bihar officials were given a crash course in recognizing Assamese letters and the Assamese terms for male and female. However, it was impossible for them to verify eligibility of voters and carry out other basic responsibilities. Moreover, at many places roads and bridges had been damaged that prevented polling parties from reaching their destinations. Nevertheless, the officials received strict orders to hold the elections. Fearful of venturing into the hinterlandbecause of the obvious hostility of local peoplemany of the imported officials simply pitched tents wherever they managed to reach, and established election booths on the spot. Further, they permitted any person to vote, irrespective of the voters eligibility. Names were simply ticked on the electoral rolls and all documents were formally completed to present a picture of normal election. A complete election was reported from this constituency, though it was clear that the electoral process was badly compromised. 6 Similar malpractice took place in most parts of Assam. The local population and Assamese officials boycotted the elections. The sentiments against the government and in particular against the foreigners from Bangladesh were strong factors in this election. Unfortunately, way in which this election was imposed (with obvious irregularities) led the Assamese to retaliate. Lalung tribals killed more than a thousand Bangladeshi immigrants at the village of Nelli in 1983. Over the opposition of the Assamese, and despite their clear rejection of the electoral process, Indira Gandhi forced Assam to accept the

results of that flawed election. (The results were later overturned by Rajiv Gandhi in a negotiated pact with AGP in 1985).

As the Assam example shows, the Election Commissions dependence on officials serving at the State level, and in public sector undertakings, clearly compromises its effectiveness. All the returning officers (such as District Magistrates) and presiding officers (subordinate officers in charge of polling booths) deputed for election duty remain loyal to their parent organization and their political masters. In order to prevent local political rivalries from influencing these officials, they are generally deputed away from their region of work. This, however, creates situations where the deputed officials have little knowledge of local conditions, and are even unable to identify eligible voters. They rely upon agents of the candidates to verify the identities. Not surprisingly, bogus and deliberately targeted voting is fairly common in many regions. Since few voters have personal identification cards, the discretionary powers of these subordinate officers to permit or deny a citizen the opportunity to vote is considerable. This power is abused frequently. The location of election booths is also determined by the office of the District Magistrate. Politicization of the bureaucracy implies that there is considerable malpractice in location selection. Although little research has been done on the geography of booths and its impact upon voting patterns, some believe that many officials in connivance with politicians select booths at locations where a particular caste has a dominating position. 7 This helps the caste leaders to prevent members from other communities from approaching the booths to cast their votes. 8 Few election officers care to study old voting patterns to determine if genuine voters of specific communities have

been prevented from exercising their rights in previous elections. Moreover, many officers are not only sympathetic to particular party but also act in a partisan manner to favor a candidate. For example, in Bihar, a District Magistrate did not accept the objections of an opposition party candidate and declared victory for the ruling party candidate. The only option in such cases is to challenge the official decision in a court of law. However, in Indian courts trials can take years, giving the declared winner ample time to exercise executive power. The challenge to Indira Gandhis election in 1971 is an apt example. Raj Narain, the losing candidate, filed a case of corrupt election practice against her. The trial court took four years to decide, setting aside her election in 1975, a decision that precipitated the Emergency. 9 Most other similar cases fail because the aggrieved candidates do not have the resources to pursue the matter in court. Hence the decisions made by the returning and presiding officers directly affect Indian elections. The importance of these deputed officers may be deduced from the fact that before elections are announced, State governments transfer personnel around, placing their loyal and most trusted bureaucrats in crucial positions. 10 Recognizing this conflict of interests, the Election Commission itself has observed that ...certain State governments[s] appoint pliable and politically motivated persons in sensitive posts. They also transfer forthright officers, who do not work according to the dictates of the ruling political party or influential political leaders. This tendency specially manifests itself during the period when the election becomes imminent. 11 Once election dates are announced by the Commission, senior bureaucrats gain considerable power under the election laws. Individual officers, acting on behalf of the

Election Commission, begin taking decisions that affect the electoral process. For example, in the recent 2004 parliamentary elections, the District Magistrate of Patna prevented Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] leader L.K. Advani from continuing his meeting beyond 10 pm, the stipulated time schedule set by the Commission. Yet in many places meetings continued for longer periods, as officers sympathetic to specific parties did not intervene. This adversely affected the political campaign of the BJP in Bihar, a province important for its large number of seats in the parliament. Despite the best efforts of the Commission, the election process continues to be affected by several peculiar features of electoral laws and administrative rules. The nomination process, simple and inexpensive, was designed to encourage greater participation. Unfortunately, this enables large numbers of frivolous candidates to stand and divide the votes. Similarly, for the benefit of the large number of illiterate voters every candidate is assigned a recognizable symbol. This presents many unforeseen problems for the police. During the Tamil Nadu State assembly elections in 1996, there were 1033 candidates contesting a single seat in the Modaurichi constituency. To accommodate all the names, parties, and symbols, the ballot had to be designed in the form of a booklet. 12 This, in turn, introduced the problem of ballot boxes large enough to accommodate the oversized ballot. It fell to the police to exercise strict supervision from over the ballots printing as well as the vote counting in order to maintain the integrity of this election. Criminalization of Politics Indian law prohibits a person from contesting election if he or she has been convicted of any criminal charges. This provision is easily circumvented, however. A

large number of people, charged with serious crimes such as murder and rape, have still able to contest and win elections in the Indian system. This criminalization of politics has become a peculiar phenomenon of Indian politics with serious consequences for the police. By one estimate in 1997, 700 of 4,120 elected members of 25 State-level assemblies had criminal records. Of these, some 1,555 were accused of heinous crimes such as murder, armed robbery, rape and the like. 13 The 2004 national elections further presented several disturbing examples of this feature. In the district of Siwan, Bihar, the Rastriya Janata Party (RJD) candidate was one of the most dreaded offenders, Mohammad Shahabuddin. Criminal cases pending against him ranged from murder to extortion, kidnapping, violation of prohibitory orders, and theft. According to one report, as many as 32 candidates with pending charges contested the second round of general elections in Uttar Pradesh during May 2004. 14 One candidate, Updesh Singh Chauhan, the Bahujan Samaj Party nominee from Jalesar, had as many as 68 criminal cases pending against him. Atiq Ahmad, with 38 cases, and Babloo Srivastava with 41 cases were two other known dangerous criminals contesting the elections in UP. Interestingly, a number of candidatessuch as Kali Pandey of Gopalganj, Rajen Tiwari of Motihari, Munna Shukla of Vaishali, and Suraj Singh Bhan of Mokamehwere elected while in prison and spent their term in jail rather than the assembly since they were never released. 15 The police are unable to deal with this phenomenon. Every political party in India has resisted the demands to curb entry of people charged with criminal offences. The reason given is that false criminal cases can be lodged to debar any genuine person from contesting, and that many cases are politically grounded. That such reasoning suggests a

lack of faith in the police and criminal justice system by legislatures themselves is an irony that has never been explained. Moreover, people charged by the police in offences such as murder, rape, kidnapping and robbery over a long period of time indicates criminality not stemming from political rivalry. However, such arguments are not being accepted by the political leaders. As a result, a large number of people accused by the police of indulging in serious criminality nevertheless continue to contest and win elections. This invariably compromises the police, who are pressurized to ignore criminals affiliated with politicians. Politicians see an advantage in harboring offenders who can help win elections by force, through booth capturing and voter intimidation. Many criminals, once victorious, are wooed by political parties looking for majority support in the State assembly or even the national parliament. Finally, many elected criminals are still able to gain ministerial positions. 16 Again, there are several such examples from the recent elections. L.K. Advani, Uma Bharti and Murli Manohar Joshi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) faced criminal charges and yet held important cabinet positions. The dependence of the current Congress-led coalition upon parliamentary support from parties such as the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, and the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham enabled many people charged with serious crimes to gain cabinet positions in 2004. 17 In a notorious recent case, Shibu Soren of the Jharkhan Mukti Morcha had to resign his Cabinet position when a warrant for his arrest in a murder case was issued. 18

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Politicization of the Police The outcome is the dangerous politicization of police in independent India. 19 Political leaders brazenly misuse police agencies to settle personal scores and intimidate their opponents. Jayalalitha Jairam, the mercurial Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, upon her return to power sent the police to arrest Karunanidhi, her long time political opponent. Earlier, Karunanidhi had deployed the very the same police department against Jayalalitha in several criminal cases. In Bihar and West Bengal, a number of opposition party workers were killed confronting criminal elements in the ruling party. Little or no police action was taken against the culprits. Not surprisingly, this politicization of police has adversely affected the ability of the police to play the role of neutral broker during elections. A partisan police department enables ruling parties to use and misuse executive power. It also compromises the electoral process. The Campaigning Process The campaigning phase, called electioneering in India, is short, barely two weeks before the poll date. Nevertheless, the intensity and media attention reaches a fever pitch. Parties use catchy slogans, songs, skits and banners to convey their viewpoints. Like elections everywhere, sometimes the process includes running negative campaigns to denounce of the opposition. Parties coin slogans that speak ill of their opponents and highlight the achievements of their own candidates. In most elections, party workers deliberately target banners, billboards, and vehicles of their opponents, tearing them down or destroying them. The police then have to intervene to prevent violence and destruction of property. Clashes between the opposing parties and their workers are

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common features of the elections and place a huge burden upon the police to maintain order. All candidates also organize processions, hold rallies and convene mass

meetings. Prominent political leaders travel through out the length and breadth of the country, addressing large public meetings for their party candidates. In particular, the rallies involving the Prime Minister, Chief Minister of the State, or prominent opposition party leaders are extremely high-profile. Their public meetings are well publicized to Attract large crowds [generally exceeding 30-40 thousand people] and to demonstrate popularity of the leader. In these public meeting grounds, a high platform is constructed so that the VIP is visible to the assembled crowd. Unlike the West where such political rallies could be viewed on television, in India the only possibility for anyone to be seen by the people is to be on that platform. Since all local party leaders wish to be seen next to the VIP it proves a bone of contention between the security officers and these leaders as to who should sit on the platform. Again there are few guidelines and the police officers rely on their knowledge of party who's who to make the decision. 20 Generally, in every meeting some party functionary attempts to slip past security. Attempts to stop them invariably cause a widely publicized incident and therefore must be handled discretely. Security threats to the VIPs forces officers to remain strict, but then this results in unpleasant exchanges with the politicians. Many police officers are known to have fallen out of favor and have lost their current position. Police responsibilities at large rallies also include partitioning the grounds into small enclosures with strong wooden logs. These enclosures are interconnected through narrow pathways controlled by the police. In this manner, a large gathering is broken into

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smaller segments for better control. Entrances are guarded by police officers who watch for potential troublemakers, and ensure that the crowd remains orderly through the entire event. Since these enclosures are usually packed to capacity, any disturbance within could cause stampedes and large number of casualties. The police therefore have to strictly screen people entering into the enclosures. In absence of electronic gadgets the checking has to be done manually. Thus, based on their local knowledge and experience, police officers stop, question and sometimes even detain likely suspects. Most of these judgments are influenced by the group affiliations of the participants identified through flags, banners, caps etc. Judgment of what constitutes a threat is shaped by an understanding of the local and national politics; officers develop expertise in understanding whether a particular group is likely to disrupt the public meeting of a highranking party member. Since every political party faces dissidence within its fold and group alliances across party lines occur frequently, the task of identifying people likely to disrupt meetings is never easy. Commonly, officers develop contacts within the political parties who inform them about the inter-party alliances and covertly assist in identifying the dissidents. The screening of potential troublemakers based upon political affiliations commonly invites severe criticism from the press which sees police action as arbitrary and discriminatory. However, police arrangements for these large rallies, processions and public meetings during the election period are an important part of keeping elections free, fair, and open to all. Policing lapses in these large crowd settings can lead to conflicts and violence as well as failure to identify dangerous security threats. It was one such

situation where unscreened people were permitted close access to Rajiv Gandhi that

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resulted in his assassination. A member of the crowd turned out to be an LTTE suicide bomber. 21 Yet even after such traumatic incidents, there are few practical guidelines to regulate police discretion in these situations and serious threats to leaders as well as people place extreme strain upon police officers. Further, large scale campaigning requires large financial resources that go much beyond the limit stipulated by the Commission. The role of money has become significant in Indian elections. Sumantra Bose has observed that the culture of corruption is deeply intertwined with the ways in which power is won, exercised and retained in India's democracy. 22 Despite several attempts, the Commission has not been able to force political parties to keep campaign expenditures within the legal limit. It is widely known that large sums of money are being spent in the elections and all political parties are filing false returns to the Commission. Policing efforts to prevent or investigate these crimes have not been successful, largely because the police authorities come under the control of the political parties after the elections and are unable to act independently. Police Mal-practices during Elections The role of the police becomes apparent with the announcement of the elections. Elections provide opportunities for departments engaged in election duties to receive additional funds from the State-level and central governments. Invariably, the police department receives large sums of money since it carries the bulk of responsibilities. Elections therefore become an occasion to fund incomplete projects, buy new equipment and repair existing buildings. Such funds are usually difficult to budget since expenses are incurred at short notices and officers plead helplessness in maintaining fiscal

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discipline during the hectic campaign period. Thus, funds spent in the name of maintaining order during elections do not received much scrutiny. This opens the way for misuse of official funds, not to mention corruption. For example, a large number of vehicles are requisitioned for election duties to carry police personnel and to carry election material like ballot boxes and papers. The common practice is to requisition vehicles and trucks from private businesses and even private citizens. Only those who can claim emergencies (like medical doctors) are able to prevent their vehicles from being impounded. Quite obviously, these practices offer opportunities for police officers to extort money from people against the threat of confiscating their vehicles. On the other hand, a large number of government functionaries give their vehicles for election duty. First, they receive a fair sum of money for the period in which their vehicle is requisitioned. Secondly, in connivance with transport officers they either have the vehicle issued back to them else keep it parked in reserve. 23 The money for vehicles and fuel runs in hundreds of thousands of rupees, and opportunities for corruption abound, whether it be in major purchases like wireless sets, stationary, printing of ballot papers, forms, and other election paraphernalia. Immediately with the announcement of elections, the offices of major political parties and their leaders are besieged by interested candidates seeking official nomination to contest the election. Except for parties like the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) and Communist Party of India (CPI), all other parties rarely hold periodic internal elections to select party leaders and office bearers. Most parties are established around specific charismatic leaders who hold complete control of the organization. Thus,

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decision making is limited to a small coterie around the leader and at the time of elections interested candidates besiege this coterie. This creates tremendous problems maintaining order. Not uncommonly, disgruntled party members rebel and disrupt party meetings. In the case of national parties such as the Congress or the BJP, the number of party members seeking official party nomination can exceed two thousand. All these people swarm to the parties national offices--situated in Delhi-- where large crowds throng for several days. The police have a critical role to play during this period. Order has to be maintained but none of the people involved can be handled roughly as they are all potential election candidates. Even at the State level, a police presence is required around the offices of smaller parties where disgruntled elements and their supporters could threaten to disrupt the proceedings. Such demands of maintaining basic order amplify the importance of police to the political parties. Lax policing leads to disruptions by thugs who can tar the image of party and leadership at the important time of elections. On the other hand, if police personnel act firmly to deal with the crowd they invariably restrict access to the party offices and the leaders. Police officers therefore become important for party leaders since discretion to restrict unwanted entry and to control the crowd of potential candidates seeking nomination-without causing annoyanceis important to maintain good relations with party workers. Inadvertently, the police are drawn into the political process and particular officers become identified with political parties and leaders. Intelligence Gathering and the Special Branch The police department has a unit known as the Special Branch, which specializes in gathering political intelligence. Following independence, this unit has been

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increasingly used by the various States Chief Ministers and even by Prime Minister (via the Intelligence Bureau) for political purposes. Chief Ministers rely upon the InspectorGeneral of Special Branch, known as the IG-intelligence, to keep tabs on their political opponents as well as members of their own party. Since there is little internal cohesion and organization in Indian political parties, Chief Ministers rely upon the police agency to keep them informed about the level of dissidence within their own party and about the plans of the opposition parties. The IG-intelligence is always a carefully chosen Indian Police Service officer who enjoys complete confidence of the Chief Minister. 24 He acts as the eyes and ears of the Chief Minister, providing daily briefings about emerging political developments. His reports and analyses carry considerable weight and play a major role in shaping government policies. During elections, the Special Branch plays a significant role in assessing the ability of the candidates to gain substantial support of the electorate. The intelligence officers go down to the districts and gather information from the ground to determine the popularity and even the chances of winning of specific candidates from a particular constituency. Since the political organization in most places is non-existent or revolves around a few local leaders the information provided by the police officers is important. There have been cases where Special Branch officers have played major roles in getting party nominations for candidates aspiring to stand in the elections. Furthermore, the Special Branch is also asked to keep an eye on the financial resources parties provide their candidates. Since this money is invariably cash, there is little book-keeping that is maintained. Police officers gather intelligence for the party regarding ways in which the cash is being spent. In some instances, the Special Branch

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actually act as conduit for money transfer since its own accounts are not supervised by the comptroller generals office. Such activities have contributed to politicizing the police and affecting its performance. This problem has drawn attention of the National Police Commission, 25 and has been commented by the Saxena Committee. 26 Not surprisingly, a large number of police officers after retirement have made their way into politics using these political networks forged during their time gathering political intelligence. 27 Booth Capturing Elections in India are frequently marred by violence. Booth capturing (the forcible casting of votes in favor of a particular candidate) and the use of force to prevent genuine voters from exercising their franchise has become a serious problem in most parts of India, and especially in States like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Sen informs that it was in Begusarai, in 1957 that election booths were captured for the first time in independent India. 28 A group of upper-caste Bhumihars chased away Yadav voters at the Khas Mahal Kacheri booth in Rachiahee village and voted on their behalf. Booth capturing now occurs in a systematic and planned manner. Generally, in large parts of India local patterns of caste and affiliations determine voting behavior 29 . People of one caste tend to support or oppose a particular candidate depending upon caste affiliations and local politics. Largely, people vote for candidates belonging to their own caste, although different castes do join hands to build alliances. In the process, local caste leaders play a critical role in mobilizing support, creating favorable alliances and influencing voters to support a specific candidate or political party through the offer of incentives 30 . These local leaders act as vote banks and play an important role in getting people of their area to vote a specific candidate or political party 31 . If these leaders

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support a particular candidate then booth capture becomes easier; the leaders use their influence and power to have votes polled for their candidate. If the leader denies support or fails to deliver then force is used. In many places only a pre-determined electorate has the opportunity to cast their vote. Booth capturing is carried out by hired criminals in a very organized way. First, booths are chosen carefully to minimize confrontation with the police and where citizen resistance is likely to be minimal. Second, those booths are targeted which are isolated or guarded by a small police force. Since a single booth is unlikely to affect the overall results most candidates plan targeting as many booths as possible. Thus, the logistics of transportation, quick getaway, local caste based support and preparations for any kind of resistance are planned meticulously in advance. The candidates hire armed criminals, obtain vehicles and guns before the elections start, and spend considerable amount of money on these resources. The threat of booth capture, conflict among the contesting groups and the harassment of polling staff as well as ordinary voters is real and poses formidable challenge to police authorities. Another form of booth capturing is the silent threat against electorates who are perceived to be supporters of the opposing candidate. Again, this perception is based upon caste alliances and electoral pacts that local and regional level leaders make at the time of elections. The unobtrusive but forcible capture is facilitated by the geography of Indian villages where residences are effectively segregated according to caste divisions. Members of same caste reside together and away from other castes. This makes it easier for one caste to physically block the movement of their opponents towards the polling booth. By placing armed gunmen and criminals in strategic locations, they prevent the

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other groups from reaching the polling booths. Once genuine voters are sacred away, it becomes easier for the criminals to forcibly cast votes in the name of registered voters. In this, the election officials are bribed or intimidated to give up the ballot papers that are quickly stamped and stuffed in the boxes. Officials are also coerced into submitting all the concerned reports to show that normal voting has taken place at that booth. As Thakur observes, The security officers [and polling officials] standing guard to ensure the sanctity of the voting process are either bribed into active connivance or intimidated into passive acquiescence. 32 After such an operation, all the voter registration papers, left over ballot papers, boxes and log reports are submitted to superior officials with the report that voting had been normal. This makes it difficult for anyone to challenge the results from that particular booth. 33 In 2004, some special officers appointed by the Election Commission found blatant evidence of violence, intimidation and silent booth capturing in the Chapra constituency from which Rashtriya Janata Dal leader Laloo Yadav contested. 34 The inquiry prompted the Election Commission to invalidate the results and order repolling. However, in most cases it is not easy to detect such wellorganized operations. Providing security to voters and guarding the polling booths is extremely difficult because the number of booths run into thousands. Typically, in parliamentary elections, large provinces like UP with more than 110 million registered voters will have almost 102,359 election booths 35 . A large number will be located in isolated areas where paved roads are non-existent. It takes hours to reach such spots, which makes it imperative that stationary police guards be posted to as many booths as possible. Even if 3-4 policemen

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are posted at one booth (which usually tend to attract approximately 1,000 registered voters each) the personnel requirement is in hundreds of thousands of police officers. Naturally, police officers in such large numbers are simply not available. India's ratio of policemen to population is still one of the lowest in the world, with around 1 policeman per every 1400 people. This figure includes home guards, volunteer forces and village watchmen. 36 The common practice is to bring policemen from other provinces, but in national elections this practice too is severely limited. Election laws prohibit the use of the army, so police managers have only their own personnel to ensure peaceful and fair exercise of the democratic process. The procedure adopted by every Superintendent of police is then to determine the sensitivity of the booths according to the likelihood of expected violence in its vicinity. Sensitivity is calculated on the basis of past election violence, current disputes and also intelligence reports whose validity is questionable. For example, according to one report on the 2004 elections, Of the over 20,000 polling booths in Bihar, 8,000 were declared hypersensitive and 6,000 sensitive - the terms used for areas most prone to violence. 37 Depending upon the scale, Superintendents of police decide the nature and amount of police force to be deployed at these booths. That is, whether these units should be armed, unarmed, auxiliary or guarded only symbolically (like with a village watchman). But even then, a large number of booths have to be left unguarded where even a symbolic presence cannot be deployed. In addition, patrolling parties and reserve backups also have to be maintained. The deployment of force is thus a crucial decision for it determines the location and extent of violence which can take place since the likelihood of some violence somewhere is almost a given. The presence of armed police for example provides full

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security while its absence or mere symbolic presence leaves open the opportunity for booth capturing or preventing others from reaching and casting their votes. Police authorities also make large scale preventive arrests before the election, to control unsavory party henchmen from compromising the election process. All political parties recruit musclemen to protect, or capture polling booths and thus, police end up effectively adjudicating which party would lose more such henchmen in comparison to others through preventive arrests. Police decisions are thus extremely important factors in influencing the overall outcome of the elections since loss or gain of even 10% of the booths affects the final results. Tully reports that police decisions to impound vehicles for election duty or register criminal cases were all seen by local voters as guided by caste [political] considerations. 38 Naturally, such perceptions have further politicized the organization to the extent where police officers are openly aligned with one or more political groups. Preventive Measures The Election Commission and police authorities have taken a number of measures to prevent election fraud, violence and other problems. A major innovation has been the introduction of electronic voting machines to prevent ballot manipulation and booth capturing. The marking of the ballot paper is always fraught with uncertainty everywhere-- as Floridas hanging chads demonstrated in the US presidential elections of 2000. Indistinct marking or confusion about the symbol allotted to a particular candidate causes misjudgment amongst the voters. More significantly, it leaves important discretionary decisions in the hands of officers who determine whether the vote was validly cast in favor of a particular candidate. In comparison, the stamping of a ballot

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paper is a simple process that barely takes any time. However, criminals have, over the years, perfected the techniques of capturing booths, snatching ballot papers and stamping as many as they could handle before the arrival of the police. All such problems have prompted the Election Commission to deploy Electronic Voting Machines [EVM]. The Electronic Corporation of India, in association with the Election Commission has designed a simple electronic machine that is reliable, easy to operate and difficult to manipulate. The machine registers one vote at a time and is designed to accept only a fixed number of votes in a stipulated time period. This ensures that even if criminals overpower the polling officer it will still take them almost the whole day to cast all the votes. This time period is large enough for police and polling supervisors to reach the venue and prevent forcible casting of votes. Electronic counting and instant display of results are further advantages of this machine. In the 2004 national and assembly elections almost 1.075 million EVMs were used, which prevented booth capturing and reduced the need for discretionary judgments of the polling personnel. 39

The Commission has also made a policy decision to spread the voting over a number of days. This helps in moving security forces from one part of the country to another and in strengthening policing arrangements at sensitive polling booths. The 2004 elections were spread over 3 weeks. In chronically unstable areas like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and the North-Eastern States the voting was staggered over four phases. 40 Furthermore, the Commission has also begun deputing officers from one State to another in order to maintain their autonomy and impartiality. As described above, local police forces experience political interference in their operations in comparison to central forces that enjoy greater autonomy. Accordingly, the

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Commission is deputing larger numbers of para-military forces such as the Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan border Security Force and even the Central Industrial Security Force in sensitive areas to ensure independence of action. Moreover, once the elections are called, all officers requisitioned from any government, quasi-government or other organization function under the exclusive control of the Commission. This enables greater control and supervision over the personnel and helps shield them from political influences. This provision played an important role in ensuring fair Assembly elections in Jammu & Kashmir in 2002. 41

As mentioned earlier, the police collect intelligence to determine the sensitivity of different polling booths. This helps minimize security threats by choosing an appropriate type of police force. The Election Commission is also taking action against politicians for using State resources to win elections, whether by announcing new development programs in the run up to an election (as in the Kalka by-election in Haryana in 1993) or using State vehicles or airplanes in campaigning. 42

District police authorities also collect firearms from the citizens and keep a strict watch over illegal sale of bullets and cartridges from licensed shops. Many suspected criminals, as well as those with existing criminal records, are detained under preventive detention laws for the duration of the elections. The police also serve notices under sections 107 and 109 of the Criminal Penal Code to those suspected of causing possible disruptions during this period. These preventive actions help police keep a large number of people under surveillance. Since candidates hire criminals to intimidate their opponents and cast forcible ballots in their favor, the police also proactively check road

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crossings, borders and known establishments to deal with such individuals. The combination of all these factors and the experience gained from previous elections is becoming helpful in reducing election-related violence and malpractice. Even in the violence-prone State of Bihar, problems associated with conducting elections appear to have been reduced in recent elections. The then Election Commissioner TS Krishna Murthy claimed "as compared to last [sic] -Parliamentary elections, the extent of violence is less now [sic]". 43 The number of re-polls was also considerably reduced, suggesting that preventive efforts have been effective. A notable feature of policing the elections has been the involvement of nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, taking an active interest in electoral reforms. 44 NGOs are playing a role in opposing criminal elements and helping genuine voters to exercise their rights. Further, they are beginning to keep surveillance over the conduct of individual candidates and political parties to ensure that they follow election rules. Citizens groups are becoming active in bringing about a cleaner electoral process. One such group, Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) formed by the faculty of business administration from the prestigious Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad recently played a significant role in changing the election law, winning two judgments from the Supreme Court that now require full background disclosure of candidates, including criminal, financial, and educational details. 45 These decisions have strengthened the Election Commissions powers to force the candidates to reveal all criminal charges filed against them, as well declare all assets possessed by them and their spouses. Furthermore, new administrative rules have been formulated that empower the returning officers to conduct independent enquiries about disclosures made by the

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candidates. The officer has powers to disqualify a candidate for furnishing false information or distorting the facts. 46 Many other NGOs, such as Lok Satta in Andhra Pradesh, Nav Bharat Jagriti Kendra in Bihar, Lok Chetna Manch in UP and Citizens for Democracy are organizing the citizens to cleanse the political process. 47 The role of NGOs in monitoring the elections and involving people in the democratic process is thus gaining ground in India. 48 A variety of reforms have also been suggested 49 that promote legal and political steps to prevent entry of criminals and anti-social elements into the electoral process. However, little attention appears to have been given to the administrative shortcomings that too compromise the process. As explained earlier, the Election Commission does not have its own administrative machinery to conduct elections. It relies upon the existing bureaucracy, largely working for the provincial governments for this task. However, this body, commanded by the elite Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service fraternities remains beholden to the regional politicians. The election needs to do away with its dependency upon this body and instead assert the right to hire senior personnel from public and private sectors who are likely to be more independent of political pressures. Furthermore, openness of decision making and public access to official data are factors that help make bureaucracies more accountable. The success in Maharastra elections has been exposed by a Pune-based editor-journalist, Shahid Burney, who used the Maharastra Right to Information Act (2002) to precipitate the transfer of a number of police officers whose postings violated Election Commission norms. 50 Data about deployment of force, posting of officials, public complaints and police investigations into electoral crimes are routinely collected by various agencies, but never made public. Even

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within the police departments there is no systematic way of maintaining election related records. For example, incidents of violence are simply classified in existing criminal categories - such as murder or assault - but not registered as incidents related to the election process. This hinders any serious analysis of electoral malpractices by scholars and policy makers. Although the Election Commission has improved its web site and now provides considerable information about election results and voting patterns, it does not give information about complaints of malpractices, intimidation and violence. A body of knowledge of these issues requires to be built so that serious shortcomings and misconduct during the elections can be curtailed. Conclusion Despite the efforts of the Election Commission, the police agencies and citizen groups, elections in India still cannot be said to be completely fair nor free from malpractices. The failures of the police agencies to provide adequate security and protection during the elections continue to erode public faith in the democratic process. The States of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh have become virtually lawless, and electoral malpractices take place regularly. Shortcomings of the Election Commission and the abuse of power by all political parties tend towards the continued criminalization of politics. An equally serious concern is indifference towards reliance on discretionary powers that go largely unchecked. It is well known that most of this discretionary power is exercised by the lower functionaries. 51 The criminal attempts to interrupt the democratic process in the country succeed because of ineffective policing and because these lower personnel are more vulnerable to political pressures. The partisan use of

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police in everyday maintenance of order and crime control functions remains an old problem. 52 In the last few decades, this problem has become more noticeable during the elections, and particularly in Bihar where political expediency is used for personal gains. Clearly, the need to structure and confine discretionary power is urgent for it does play a major role in determining the final results. Moreover, violent elections, booth capturing and official connivance significantly erode the faith of people in the electoral process. For real democracy to be institutionalized, elections must be seen as expressing the will of the people and allowing every citizen the right to participate freely. Indian elections do reflect the choice of the people as indicated by frequent change in governments, the incumbency factor and the defeat of major political figures. However, as described above, police decisions and actions clearly affect the political process. There is little research upon these issues and the impact of police discretion remains unknown. Clearly, there is the need for more examination of these issues. Endnotes
1

The Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports on General Elections 2004, to the 14th Lok Sabha vol. 1. www.eci.gov.in, pp. 4-14. 2 The world's biggest election begins, The Guardian, April 19, 2004. www.guardian.co.uk 3 Ramesh Thakur, India Girds For World's Biggest Tamasha, The Japan Times, April 11, 2004. www.japantimes.co.jp 4 India Elections, Yahoo News-India, April 18, 2004. www.in.news.yahoo.com 5 The Indian police functions at the district level under the general control and guidance of District Magistrate [DM] who is the chief administrator and election officer in the district. In this research note, whenever the role of the police is discussed it includes the role played by the DM and the Home Ministry that controls the police department. 6 I was deputed for security duties and this observation is based on personal knowledge 7 Abdul Qadir, Scale of Poll Violence Baffles Gaya Watchers, Times of India, April 30, 2002. www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com 8 Ayanjit Sen, Wednesday voting around India, BBC-news, May 5, 2004. www.news.bbc.co.uk 9 Kuldip Nayar, Yes, Prime Minister, Indian Express, June 25, 2000. www.indianexpress.com 10 Police officers now file complaint on transfers, Deccan Herald, March 8, 2004. www.deccanherald.com 11 Election Commissions Letter No. 434/1/96, Dated 8 February 1996, addressed to the Chief Secretaries of all States and Union Territories. www.eci.gov.in. 12 Election Trivia, 2004: Interesting Facts about Indian Elections, Indian Elections, 2004. www.indianelections.com

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13 14

Rajeev Dhavan, Fraud by Ordinance, The Hindu, September 6, 2003. www.hindu.com. Sharat Pradhan, Criminal Tag Dogs 32 Uttar Pradesh Candidates, South Asia Monitor, June 22, 2004. www.southasiamonitor.org 15 MJ Akbar, Crime and Reward, Asian Age, Sunday May 2, 2004. www.asianage.com 16 Vir Sanghvi, The Myth of Political Morality, Mid-Day, June 13, 2004. ww1.mid-day.com 17 AT Jayanti, PM for law to keep tainted out of Cabinet, Deccan Chronicle, August 1, 2004. www.deccan.com 18 Jharkhand Cops Chasing Union Minister with Arrest Warrant, Rediff.com, July 21, 2004. www.rediff.com. 19 Ministry of Home Affairs, Report I of the National Police Commission, (New Delhi, 1979). 20 Arvind Verma, Policing of Public Order in India, International Journal of Police Science and Management Vol. 3 No. 3 (2001), pp. 213-225. 21 Shashi Ahluwalia and Meenakshi Ahluwalia, Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1991). 22 Sumantra Bose, A Culture of Corruption? Democracy and Power in India, Global Policy, 2002. www.globalpolicy.org 23 Personal observation 24 IPS- Indian Police Service; IPS officers hold all senior positions in the police organization. 25 Ministry of Home Affairs, Report I of the National Police Commission 26 Praveen Swami, National Security: Stalled Reforms, Frontline, Vol. 20, No. 9, (April 26 - May 09, 2003). www.frontlineonnet.com 27 K. Subrahmanua, Top Cops Brace for Election Encounters, The Telegraph, April 5, 2004. www.telegraphindia.com 28 Ayanjit Sen, Wednesday Voting around India 29 Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). 30 Paul Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of California, 1965). 31 Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1967). 32 Ramesh Thakur, India Girds For World's Biggest Tamasha 33 Significance of Chapra, The Hindu, May 13, 2004. www.hindu.com 34 Onkar Singh, Repoll in Chapra on May 31, Rediff.com, May 10, 2004. www.rediff.com 35 The Election Commission, Statistical Reports on General Elections 2004 36 National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India 2002, (Faridabad: Government of India Press, 2003). 37 Imran Khan, Rigging, Violence Mar Polling in Bihar; Three killed, South Asia Monitor, June 22, 2004. www.southasiamonitor.org 38 Mark Tully, Gandhi Dwarfed by Caste in Stone The Telegraph, April 26, 2004. www.telegraphindia.com 39 The Election Commission, Statistical Reports on General Elections 2004 40 The Election Commission, Statistical Reports on General Elections 2004 41 James Michael Lyngdoh, Chronicle of an Impossible Election (New Delhi: Penguin-Viking, 2004). 42 Steve Wilkinson, Cleansing Political Institutions, Seminar Number 506, 2001. www.indiaseminar.com 43 Not much Poll Violence in Bihar during the 2nd Phase: CEC, Hindustan Times, May 7, 2004. www.hindustantimes.com 44 Role of NGOs in panchayat polls debated, India Social, 2004. www.indiasocial.org 45 Work done and results, Association for Democratic Reforms, 2004. www.adrindia.org 46 Debashish Mukerji, We, The People: Voters Support Supreme Court Verdict On Candidates' Antecedents, The Week, March 30, 2003. www.the-week.com 47 see www.indiandemocracy.com; www.indianngos.com; www.braintrustindia.com 48 Patralekha Chatterjee, Civil Society in India: A Necessary Corrective in a Representative Democracy, Development and Cooperation, No. 6, (November/December 2001), p. 23-24. 49 Election Watch, Lok Satta: People Power, 2005. www.loksatta.org 50 This journalist demands his rights, Indiatogether, September 2004. www.Indiatogether.org,

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51

KC Davis, Discretionary Justice- A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1969). 52 Kirpal Dhillon, Police and Politics in India: Colonial Concepts, Democratic Compulsions- Indian Police 1947-2002 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2005).

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