Managing Financial Risk
Managing Financial Risk
1
) (
So, the effective borrowing by the borrower is A -
| |
in
n R i A
+
1
) (
But this is equal to
| |
) 1 ( in
Arn Ain Ain A
+
+ +
or
) 1 (
) 1 (
in
Rn A
+
+
17
At the end of the tenure of the loan, the interest paid and the principal repayment
would together equal
(
+
+
) 1 (
) 1 (
in
Rn A
Or A(1+ Rn)
Thus, the borrower has been able to lock into an effective interest rate equal to R.
Now let us examine a situation where there is a favourable movement in interest
rate for the borrower, i<R. Now, the borrower has to pay compensation.
Compensation payable =
| |
in
n i R A
+
1
) (
So, the effective borrowing is A+A(R-i)n
(l+in)
=
| |
) 1 ( in
Ain ARn Ain A
+
+
or
) 1 (
) 1 (
in
Rn A
+
+
Thus, loan repayment inclusive of interest equals
=
= A(1+Rn)
Thus, we find that the borrower is locked into an effective interest rate, R,
irrespective of whether interest rate movements are adverse or favorable.
Credit derivatives
Developed in the early 1990s, credit derivatives are used to separate and transfer the
credit risk of underlying instruments such as loans and bonds. In spite of their best efforts
to diversify risk, banks are often heavily exposed to specific geographical regions or
industries. If a particular region or industry is going through a bad phase, widespread
defaults may occur. While the mechanics of a credit swap can be quite complicated, the
objective is fairly simple. The bank, which is trying to transfer risk, pays a small fee to
its counter-party at regular intervals. In case of a default, the counter-party compensates
the bank for its losses. Credit derivatives have created interesting possibilities. Consider
an American bank wanting to diversify its portfolio by lending to clients in Europe. It can
tie up with a French bank, which has a much better understanding of local customers.
While the French bank does the actual lending, the American bank can be the counter
party in a credit swap. The increasing sophistication of banks approach to credit risk
management has created tremendous potential for credit derivatives. Today, banks can
quantify their exposures and use credit derivatives to make potentially illiquid loans more
liquid.
Using Insurance to transfer risk
Insurance is a powerful and efficient technique of managing a wide range of risks. In
general, a risk must meet the following requirements before it can be insured:
( ) in 1
in) 1 (
) 1 (
+
(
+
+ Rn
A
18
- There must be many independent and identically distributed exposure units. The
person or entity exposed to the loss is the exposure unit.
- The premium should be economically feasible, significantly less than the expected
loss for the client and must offer reasonable returns for the insurer.
- Only accidental or unintentional losses must be covered. Losses that occur over time,
like the wear and tear to an automobile are not insurable.
- Losses should be easily verifiable and quantifiable. This means the cost of verifying
the loss details should be reasonably low.
Though finance and insurance are considered to be separate fields, they have
much in common. They both look at risk in terms of variations in future cash flows.
They use similar valuation techniques. Both depend on risk pooling and risk transfer. The
linkage between finance and insurance has strengthened in recent times. For example,
options and futures were developed to deal with catastrophe risk in the 1990s.
Meanwhile, life insurers developed products with embedded options on stock portfolios.
While life insurers have taken on investment risks traditionally managed by banks, some
banks have assumed mortality risk. Swiss life insurers for example offer a savings-
oriented product where the principal grows at the higher of a pre defined fixed rate or the
stock index. This is effectively an embedded call option. There has also been integration
of financial and insurance products because of securitisation.
Insurance is becoming more and more important especially in the Indian context.
But a detailed coverage of the principles of insurance is beyond the scope of this book.
Readers would do well to consult a standard textbook in this area to come to grips with
this important subject.
Concluding Notes
In this age of deregulated financial markets, companies have to manage their financial
risks carefully. While the ways of managing risk have multiplied, thanks to the
availability of a plethora of derivative instruments, life has also become more
complicated for treasurers. Treasurers have to invest a lot of time and effort in
understanding the pros and cons of different instruments and choosing the right one in a
given situation. Derivatives, in particular are double-edged swords. If used well, they can
mitigate risk but if used indiscriminately, they can land the company in trouble. In India,
the range of financial instruments available is still limited and markets lack depth. But,
in the near future, however, we can expect to see more and more instruments. Already,
trading of options and futures on stock exchanges has taken off. Restrictions on currency
swaps have also been removed. Corporate treasurers in India are truly headed for exciting
times in the years to come.
19
Case 8.1 - The crisis at Long-Term Capital Management
8
Introduction
In 1998, the crisis at Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund
9
set up by a
group of highly talented traders, created a major turmoil in the financial markets and
nearly blew up the global financial system. The hedge fund had taken such massive
positions ($ 120 billion on balance sheet and several times more off balance sheet
liabilities on a capital base of $4 billion) involving several counter parties. Its imminent
collapse threatened havoc in the financial markets. A single default by LTCM would
have triggered off several defaults. Consequently, the Federal Reserve stepped in to
arrange an unprecedented bailout. The collapse of LTCM is a very interesting case. It
brings out the importance of prudent financial risk management in a highly volatile
environment.
Background Note
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was set up in 1994 by John Meriwether, a
former head of fixed income trading at Salomon Brothers. Meriwether, a highly
respected figure on Wall Street, assembled a group of traders and academicians, which
included two Nobel laureates, Robert Merton and Myron Scholes. The team was given
the mandate to manage the hedge fund and earn super normal returns. LTCM levied an
annual charge of two percent of capital and 25% of profits
10
. The incentive was linked to
the end-of-the year Net Asset Value (NAV) and the highest NAV recorded at the end of
any previous year. So, if the NAV declined during a year, this had to be first recovered
before LTCM could claim incentives. In February 1994, when LTCM commenced
trading, it had 11 principals and 30 non-principal employees. By September 1997, the
numbers had increased to 15 and 150 respectively. Many non-US entities had invested in
the fund which was structured as an offshore limited partnership to reduce taxes and
provide limited liability.
There are various types of hedge funds. They can broadly be divided into two
groups: Macro funds and Relative value or arbitrage funds. Macro funds take positions
in financial markets based on their expectations of exchange rate movements, interest rate
movements, etc. Relative value funds use sophisticated models to detect arbitrage
opportunities based on price differentials of similar financial instruments across different
markets. They buy simultaneously under priced instruments and sell over priced
instruments and reverse the transactions at a later date to book profits.
LTCM was set up to exploit market pricing discrepancies using a relative value or
market neutral strategy. Its typical trading philosophy was to provide liquidity by going
long on long-term and short on short-term instruments. Since margins were thin, LTCM
built sufficiently large positions to generate meaningful profits. LTCM also borrowed
heavily to fund such positions.
8
This case draws heavily from the Harvard Business School Case 9-200-007, 008, 009, 010, 1999
prepared by Prof. Andre. F Perold.
9
A hedge fund is typically a partnership of private investors. The fund is available primarily to
institutions and high net worth individuals and is outside the normal regulatory framework.
10
This was higher than the typical one percent of capital and 20% profits charged by other funds.
20
To carve a niche for itself, LTCM invested heavily in research. and formulated
complex proprietary trading strategies based on sophisticated mathematical models. It
had offices across the world in places like London and Tokyo to gather relevant
information and facilitate diversification across markets.
As mentioned earlier, LTCM tried to capitalise on price differentials across
markets. LTCMs deals fell into two categories: Convergence and relative value trades.
In the case of convergence trades, yield differentials were expected to narrow in a
reasonably short period of time while in the case of relative value trading, this would
happen over a longer time horizon. LTCM played on the small differences in prices
between virtually identical bonds. Essentially, it took simultaneous long and short
positions in instruments that could be viewed as close substitutes. Unless there was any
market disruption in the form of a default or some major upheaval, the bond prices would
converge allowing LTCM to book profits. For example, the fund bet that interest rates
would converge within the Euro Zone
11
prior to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
This bet paid off. In some cases, LTCM also pursued directional trades, by taking
specific unhedged positions, i.e, either long or short positions but not both.
Many of LTCMs trading opportunities arose because of the demand for liquidity
by counterparties, LTCM realised that in many of its trades, it would provide liquidity to
the counterparty. So, it needed the capacity to hold positions for an extended period of
time, especially if the spreads moved in an unfavourable direction. LTCM tried to
increase the maturity of its funds by using equity capital with a three year lock in,
unsecured loans with a maturity of about three years and repos with longer term
maturities (6-12 months). It obtained $230 million of unsecured loans with maturities of
about three years and a $700 million unsecured revolving line of credit from a syndicate
of 25 commercial banks.
To generate the high returns it had promised investors, LTCM leveraged its
portfolio. It sold assets for cash, agreeing to buy them back at a later date at an agreed
price. Because it was perceived as safe, its haircut (the difference between the cash
loaned and the collateral) was almost zero. (Normally, the collateral is kept higher than
the cash loaned to account for decreases in collateral value). Essentially, this meant that
LTCM could borrow 100% of the value of any top grade collateral, use the cash to buy
more securities and again use the securities as collateral for more borrowing. Thus,
LTCM could leverage itself indefinitely.
LTCM could not measure risk in terms of the notional size of its positions. Since
it was doing mostly long-short arbitrage trades, risk depended on the extent to which the
profit on one position deviated from the loss on the other. LTCM measured risk in terms
of the probability distribution of potential profits and losses. It also did stress testing for
scenarios such as the break-up of the EMU, scheduled for completion on January 1, 1999.
Sometimes, if these extreme situations indicated big losses, LTCM restructured its
position to reduce risk. LTCM felt that long-run risk of a position was primarily
determined by fundamentals but short-run risk could be affected by factors such as the
need for liquidity. LTCMs stated objective was to take an amount of risk equivalent to a
standard deviation of NAV of 20% per annum.
11
At the time of the launch of the Euro, the Zone consisted of 11 countries Germany, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Ireland.
Greece has joined the Euro Zone subsequently.
21
Confident start
LTCM was confident that its long-term financing structure, careful liquidity
management, large capital base, relative value trading and a diversified portfolio
combined together, would keep risk within manageable proportions. The fund could
negotiate very favourable financing terms.
Initially, LTCM was quite profitable; it earned fee adjusted returns of 42.8% in
1995 and 40.8% in 1996. The firms principals reinvested their after-tax earnings and
many of the firms employees also opted for a deferred compensation plan, betting on
good performance by the fund in the long run. Dealers actively sought LTCMs business,
sensing an opportunity to make money. By 1997, LTCMs capital had grown from $1
billion to more than $7 billion and total fees earned had grown to $1.9 billion.
By 1997 however, credit spreads had narrowed and convergence trades had
become less profitable. In 1997, the funds return was only 17%, which put pressure on
LTCM to reorient its trading strategies. LTCM felt that turning into a low risk, low return
investment vehicle would not be consistent with its core long-term investment objectives.
To increase the return on equity, LTCM decided to leverage its portfolio by
returning $2.7 billion of capital to investors, thus increasing the proportion of debt.
LTCM also ventured into more risky territories such as mortgage backed securities and
writing equity index options. It took speculative positions in potential take over stocks
and significantly increased its exposure to emerging markets.
The sheer volume of LTCMs trades was mind-boggling. By the end of August,
1998, the Fund had over 60,000 trades on its books. Its gross position was worth $500
billion in futures, $750 billion in swaps and $150 billion in options. In some exchanges,
its positions accounted for 5-10% of the entire open interest
12
. LTCM had 36
counterparties. When unwinding a trade, instead of reversing it with the original
counterparty, it would find a new counterparty to avoid paying spreads. In short, after
starting off as a less risky arbitrage fund, LTCM began to look more and more like a
macro fund as time passed by.
The crisis
LTCM had begun 1997 with about $4.8 billion of capital. The first few months of 1998
were quiet. Trouble for LTCM started in May 1998. In May and June, the company
earned negative gross returns of 6.7% and 10.1% respectively. First, a downturn in the
mortgage-backed-securities market led to a 16% loss in the value of equity. Towards the
end of June, LTCM unwinded some of its positions to reduce risk. The fund recovered in
the first three weeks of July. From July 22, things again started going bad. On August
17, Russia announced it was defaulting on its domestic debt. This was a big surprise.
Normally Government does not default on a debt denominated in its own currency.
Moreover, Russia had issued $3.5 billion of 11% dollar denominated Euro bonds just a
few weeks earlier. Following the default, hot money, which was already jittery because of
the Asian currency crisis fled into high quality instruments. So, credit spreads widened
instead of narrowing.
August 21 turned out to be catastrophic for LTCM. The US treasury swap spread
widened by 19 basis points compared to a typical daily movement of one basis point or
12
Open interest means outstanding positions in an instrument. It gives an idea of the liquidity of the
instrument.
22
less. The UK gilt spread also widened dramatically. These movements had a severe
impact on LTCMs portfolio. LTCM had speculated on the acquisition of telephone
equipment maker, Ciena Corp by Tellabs. When the acquisition failed to come through,
LTCM again suffered a loss. On a single day, LTCM lost $550 million. By the end of
August, the fund had lost 52% of its December 31 (1997) value.
LTCM looked at various alternatives to retrieve the situation. One was to hold on
to its best positions and reduce others. Another was to reduce risk across-the-board and
more aggressively. The third was to raise additional equity capital. The fourth alternative
was to draw down its $810 million credit facility.
In a letter to investors on September 2, 1998, LTCM admitted that it had
experienced a sharp decline in asset value. It explained that the magnitude of the losses
incurred had been unprecedented and added that the losses had been magnified by the
unfavourable timing, due to the increased volatility in the markets and a marked investor
preference for liquidity. Out of the total losses incurred in August, 82% were in relative
value trades and 18% in directional trades. Emerging markets accounted for 16% of the
losses. LTCM admitted that the need for liquidity had increased across the world
13
.
Many of the Funds investment strategies involve providing liquidity to the market,
hence, our losses across strategies were correlated after-the-fact from a sharp increase in
the liquidity premium. LTCM thus believes that it is prudent and opportunistic to
increase the level of the Funds capital to take full advantage of this unusually attractive
environment... Since it is prudent to raise additional capital, the Fund is offering you the
opportunity to invest in the Fund on special terms related to LTCM fees.
Not surprisingly, investors were not interested in LTCMs offer. Meanwhile,
lenders began to panic and since the fund was organised in Cayman Islands, there were
doubts about whether the collateral could be liquidated. With fears looming about the
possibility of huge defaults and losses, the Federal Reserve (Fed) decided to organise a
bail out. On September 23, at the initiative of the Fed, 14 banks invested $3.6 billion for
a 90% stake in the firm. These funds came just in time to avoid a melt down.
Meriwether and his team, who retained a stake of 10% in LTCM were asked to
run the portfolio under the scrutiny of an oversight committee representing the new
shareholding consortium. In the first two weeks after the bailout, LTCM continued to
lose value. Later, the performance of the fund improved. By June 1999, the fund had
increased in value by 14%, net of fees, since September, 1998. On July 6, 1999, LTCM
repaid $300 million to its original investors and $1 billion to the 14 consortium members.
In December 1999, the fund was dissolved. Eighty-eight out of the 100 investors in the
fund made a profit.
Following the bailout, the Fed was criticised for encouraging potential moral
hazard situations. But Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, argued that the arrangement was
not a government bailout since Federal Reserve funds were neither provided nor even
suggested. He added that LTCM would be worth more over time if the liquidation of its
portfolio was orderly. He also mentioned that in view of the volatile markets and investor
panic, a timely resolution of LTCMs problems seemed appropriate as a matter of public
policy. The irony was that Greenspan had remarked just a few weeks before the bailout
that there was little to fear from hedge funds.
13
Harvard Business School Case 9-200-009, 1999.
23
Lessons from LTCM
Various reasons have been given to explain the fall of LTCM. Experts have pointed out
flaws in the way in which LTCM used VAR
14
. It used a 10 day horizon to set the amount
of equity capital. This horizon, which was sufficient for commercial banks to raise
additional funds during a crisis, was clearly inadequate for LTCM. In fairness to LTCM,
it must be mentioned that it had anticipated difficulties in obtaining funds in the case of
an external market disruption. In its loan agreement, it had removed restrictive covenants
such as the Material Adverse Change Clause. Restrictions on drawing funds would apply
only if the NAV fell by more than 50% during a calendar year. In September 1997, the
Funds sources of working capital added up to $7.63 billion, whereas, uses (haircuts,
margins and operational expenses) amounted to only $1.7 billion. But unfortunately,
LTCM did not anticipate the extent of market disruption which took place in August,
1998. LTCM had been confident that its structure of long-term financing and large
capital base was enough to take care of adverse situations. In August 1998, events that
risk models considered to have a very small probability of happening, actually happened.
As Rene Stultz puts it
15
, Any risk management system relies on forecasts of the
distribution of returns of the portfolio or institution, whose risk is managed. In normal
times, forecasting the distribution of returns is much easier the world just keeps
repeating itself with no dramatic surprises. Crisis periods are different the past
becomes much less useful in forecasting the future, volatility often grows dramatically
and correlations become much closer to one. LTCMs principals assumed that the
portfolio was sufficiently diversified across many uncorrelated markets. In most markets,
LTCM was following a similar strategy and when credit spreads widened in practically
every market during August and September 1998, LTCM found itself in big trouble.
Moreover, imitators also undermined LTCMs financial engineering. When LTCM made
a move, imitators copied it, which reduced profits. And when LTCM wanted to unwind a
position, it was not alone. In the summer of 1998, the withdrawal of Salomon from bond
arbitrage trades created a major crisis for LTCM.
The LTCM story brings out clearly the limitations of theoretical models. Large
yield differentials in bond markets are interpreted by models as mispricing, which can be
exploited to create risk free profits. But sometimes models do not consider that investors
have to be paid a premium to hold a particular type of instrument. As Stultz
16
puts it,
Investors who believe in the mispricing theory may make large profits from exploiting
large spreads for a while, even if the mispricing theory is false. Eventually though, if
investors are being compensated for taking risks, their bets will make losses.
LTCM had used stress-testing only for a 10 basis point daily interest rate
movement. LTCM had also considered its 12 biggest deals with its 20 biggest
counterparties. This gentle stress-test had indicated a loss of only $3 billion. And as
mentioned earlier, the VAR model used by LTCM failed to take into account liquidity
risk.
To conclude, models are only as good as the people who use them and the type of
assumptions they make. According to a derivatives expert
17
, It is really the wrong
14
See chapter for detailed explanation of VaR.
15
Financial Times Mastering Risk, Volume I.
16
Financial Times Mastering Risk, Volume I.
17
Leslie Rahl, Capital Market Risk Advisors, Euromoney, November 1998.
24
emphasis to blame the models. Ultimately, this is a business that involves people, not
models. The models are merely tools to help people make better judgments.
25
Case 8.2 - Risk management at J P Morgan
Introduction
J P Morgan (Morgan), one of Americas leading banks emerged as a dominant force in
American finance at the end of the 19
th
century. It effectively ran the American monetary
system before the Federal Reserve was created in 1913. In 1933, following the
introduction of the Glass Stegall Act, it was split into a commercial bank (J P Morgan)
and an investment bank (Morgan Stanley). In 1990, Morgan was the largest bank in the
US by market capitalisation. By 2000 however, its competitive position had seriously
deteriorated. In September 2000, Chase Manhattan announced it was taking over
Morgan. This case provides a brief account of the risk management practices developed
by Morgan. On October 14, 1998, Morgan announced that it would be spinning off its
risk products group (which provided clients with risk methodologies), into a new
independent company called the RiskMetrics Group. Today, RiskMetrics is one of the
leading providers of risk management expertise in the world. It develops methodologies,
conducts online courses and provides various types of data and software.
Risk Management
Morgan categorized its risks as market, liquidity, credit, legal, fiduciary and agency and
operational. The bank had established comprehensive risk management processes to
facilitate, control, and monitor risk taking. It attempted to identify risks in the early
stages and measure them in each of its businesses. Control mechanisms were in place at
different levels throughout the organization. The Corporate Risk Management Group
(CRMG), individual businesses, as well as the audit, legal, financial, and operations
groups, were all involved in monitoring risks from various perspectives and ensuring that
businesses conformed to corporate policies and limits. New businesses and material
changes to existing businesses were reviewed to ensure that all significant risks had been
identified and adequate control measures put in place.
The CRMG acted independent of business groups and was managed by the head
of the Risk Management Committee, who in turn reported to the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer. In addition to the CRMG, Morgan used a number of committees
comprising senior management staff to handle risk. These included the Risk Management
Committee, Capital Committee and Investment Committee.
Types of Risk
This section covers the various types of risk faced by Morgan and the processes it had put
in place to manage them.
Market Risk
Market risk referred to the uncertainty to which future earnings were vulnerable as a
result of changes in the value of portfolios of financial instruments. This risk resulted
from trading and asset and liability management activities in the interest rate, foreign
exchange, equity, and commodity markets.
The primary tool used by Morgan for measuring and monitoring market risk was
called Daily Earnings at Risk (DEaR). It estimated the firm's exposure to market risk
26
within a given level of confidence, over a defined time period. DEaR took into
consideration almost all financial instruments, which exposed the firm to market risk.
Liquidity Risk
Morgan divided liquidity risk into two components - the risk of being unable to fund
portfolios of assets at appropriate maturities and rates; and the risk of being unable to
liquidate a position in a timely manner at a reasonable price.
The Global Liquidity Management group was responsible for identifying,
measuring and monitoring the liquidity profile. The group also ensured that the current
and future funding requirements were met. Morgan raised funds through a variety of
instruments - deposits, commercial paper, bank notes, repurchase agreements, federal
funds, long-term debts and capital securities.
The liquidity policy attempted to maintain sufficient capital in addition to long-
term debt and capital securities, to ensure that there was adequate capacity to fund the
institution on a fully collateralized basis, if necessary. Morgan performed stress tests on
its liquidity profile on a weekly basis to evaluate the accuracy of projections and its
ability to raise funds under adverse circumstances.
Credit Risk
Credit risk arose from the possibility that counterparties could default on their obligations
to the firm. These obligations arose in the context of lending activities, the extension of
credit in trading and investment activities, and payment and securities settlement
transactions for itself and on behalf of its clients. Morgan actively managed credit risk
using a variety of qualitative and quantitative measures.
Morgan measured credit exposure in terms of both current and potential exposure.
Current exposure was generally represented by the notional or principal value of on-
balance sheet financial instruments and off-balance sheet direct credit substitutes, standby
letters of credit and guarantees. It included the positive fair value of derivative
instruments. Many of the exposures varied with changes in market prices and the
borrowing needs of the clients. Hence, Morgan also estimated the potential credit
exposure over the remaining term of the transactions through statistical analyses of
market prices and borrowing patterns.
Morgan also considered collateral and master netting agreements utilized to
reduce individual counterparty risk, especially for derivatives. Under master netting
agreements, gains and losses in transactions with the same counterparty were offset. The
exposure was limited to the net of all the gains and losses with the counterparty.
The most important step in the management of credit risk was the credit granting
decision. Based on an evaluation of the counterpartys creditworthiness and the type of
credit arrangement desired, credit limits were assigned by experienced credit officers.
The credit review procedures aimed to identify early, counterparty, country, industry and
product exposures that required closer scrutiny. In managing credit risk, Morgan
estimated potential default losses using an expected loss methodology.
On April 2, 1997, Morgan introduced a sophisticated new tool for credit risk
measurement -- CreditMetrics -- which provided methodology, data, and software to
evaluate credit risks individually or across an entire portfolio. CreditMetrics could
evaluate credit risk in an integrated fashion across the entire organization and product
27
spectrum. It provided a useful tool for managers to handle a growing number of and more
complex forms of credit risk. It also measured credit risk across a wide range of
instruments, including traditional loans, commitments and letters of credit, bonds,
commercial contracts, and derivatives.
Legal Risk
Legal risk arose due to the difficulties in enforcing the contractual obligations of
Morgans clients and counterparties through legal or judicial processes. Morgan
attempted to minimize such uncertainty through continuous consultation with internal and
external legal advisors in all countries in which it conducted business.
Fiduciary and Agency Risk
Fiduciary agencies and agents had obligations to act on behalf of others. Fiduciary or
agency risks existed in Morgan's investment management activities and to a lesser extent
in many of the agency and brokerage activities. The firm attempted to ensure that
obligations to clients were discharged in compliance with applicable legal and regulatory
requirements. This included, setting policies with respect to the creation, sale, and
management of the firms investment products, trade execution, counterparty selection,
and the evaluation of potential investment opportunities.
Operational Risk
Operational risk referred to the potential loss caused by a breakdown in information,
communication, transaction processing, settlement systems and procedures. Morgan used
a comprehensive system of internal controls to mitigate such risk.
The Operating Risk Committee set the firms overall agenda and monitored its
progress. The Committee met regularly to discuss the most significant operating risks
facing the firm, to monitor control mechanisms, and to take necessary steps to offset
risks.
The primary responsibility for managing operating risk rested with business
managers who established and maintained internal control procedures. The objectives of
each business activity were identified and the associated risks were assessed. Considering
the nature and magnitude of these risks, the business managers instituted a series of
policies, standards and procedures to manage these risks. A periodic self-assessment
program and monitoring mechanism attempted to make internal controls effective for
operation in accordance with the established standards.
28
Note 8.3 - A Primer on Futures
Introduction
In a forward contract, a person places an order today for delivery of an item in the future
on a specified date and at a predetermined price. A futures contract works on the same
principle, but is operationally a little different. Just like a forward contract, it is
essentially an understanding that a transaction will take place later. Actual buying or
selling of the underlying instrument does not take place till the settlement date.
To ensure that both parties to a futures contract abide by the terms of the contract,
safeguards are necessary. So the futures exchange collects from both buyers and sellers
an initial margin which has a value of about 5 - 10 % of the contract to ensure that it will
be honoured. At the end of each trading day, the outstanding contracts are repriced on
the basis of the prevailing settlement price. This is referred to as marking to market. The
margin account is accordingly adjusted. If the trader gains, the margin account is
credited and if he loses, the account is debited.
Before the settlement date, the market may move adversely. To prevent the
possibility of default by traders, exchanges stipulate a maintenance margin which is the
minimum amount that must be maintained in the margin account. Once the account
balance dips below the maintenance margin, a margin call is issued and the trader has to
deposit enough money so that the balance reaches the initial margin. This deposit amount
is referred to as the variation margin.
An investor can normally withdraw any balance in the margin account beyond
the initial margin. Further, the amount in the margin account is not an idle balance as
interest is usually paid. In some cases, the exchange may also allow traders to deposit
margin in the form of securities and shares rather than cash. In other words, much money
is not needed to start transacting in the futures market.
While an investor has to deposit the initial margin with a broker, a clearing house
member has to deposit a clearing margin with the clearing house. Each day, the account
balance is adjusted to reflect the change in the number of outstanding contracts. Brokers
who are not clearing house members have to maintain a margin account with a clearing
member.
For each underlying asset, there are several different contracts available, each
designated by a certain month. The closest month is called the front or spot month and
the months further away are called back months. In a normal commodity futures
contract, the further a contract is from the spot month, the higher the price. Otherwise, it
is called an inverted contract. The highest volume of trading occurs in the front months,
and such contracts have the maximum liquidity.
Delivery
In more than 95 % of futures contracts, delivery does not actually take place. Rather, the
deal is canceled through an offsetting transaction. Thus, a farmer who sells wheat futures
to protect himself against a fall in price will buy back his futures on the day his wheat is
ready for sale. He will then sell the wheat in the cash market. He may do this because it
is cumbersome to make the delivery as per the highly standardised terms and conditions
of the futures contract. Even in the unlikely event of actual delivery, the supplier may be
29
allowed to choose a different grade of the commodity or a different destination. In that
case, necessary adjustments are made to the settlement price.
Another important point to note is that in a futures contract, the exact time of
delivery is usually not specified. Though a futures contract is identified by its delivery
month, delivery can be effected during the course of the month on specified days.
Modern futures exchanges
To ensure that transactions are orderly, transparent and honest, modern futures exchanges
operate as per well-defined rules and regulations on various specific issues like:
a) Amount of asset to be delivered as per the contract.
b) How the price of the contract is to be quoted.
c) Limits on the amounts by which prices can move on a single day.
d) Quality ( in case of a commodity).
e) Delivery location ( in case of a commodity).
Exchanges also specify daily price movement limits and position limits. Once the
price limit is reached, trading usually stops for the day. However, in some cases, the
exchange authorities may intervene and change the limits suitably. Exchanges also
specify position limits which refer to the maximum number of contracts that a speculator
might hold. They may also hike the margin requirements during periods of high volatility
like the Dow Jones Industrial Average crash in 1987.
The Clearing House
The Clearing House is an integral part of a futures exchange. All Clearing House
members are members of the exchange, but not every exchange member is a member of
the Clearing House. The Clearing House serves a number of important functions:
i) Exchange of funds as business transactions are executed
ii) Settlement of all transactions
iii) Taking the opposite side of all the contracts traded on a day, thus guaranteeing
the contractual obligations of each transaction.
Exchanges stipulate minimum capital requirements for Clearing House members.
They also closely monitor the financial soundness of each clearing member. Different
exchanges also share vital information with each other in order to minimise the
possibility of default.
Any exchange member wishing to trade on the exchange must either be a clearing
member or have a relationship with a clearing member. All trades must be registered
with and settled through that clearing member.
At the end of each trading day, the Clearing House becomes a seller to all the
buyers and a buyer to all the sellers. When the trade is cleared, traders no longer have an
obligation to the counterparty in the original transaction. This serves three vital
functions. A trader can liquidate his position through an offsetting transaction without
dealing with the original trading partner, who might not be willing to cancel the contract
at that point of time. Delivery is much more easily facilitated and liquidity is
considerably enhanced when the Clearing House is the counterparty. Finally, if one party
30
to a contract defaults for any reason, the fulfillment of the contract is ensured by the
Clearing House.
Futures and spot prices
As the delivery month approaches, the theoretical difference between futures and spot
prices for the same asset, after adjusting for transaction costs has to be zero. If this is not
the case, arbitraging profits are possible. Supposing dollar futures are priced below the
spot dollar, a smart trader would then buy futures, take delivery and sell it in the spot
market to book profits. Similarly, when the futures price is more than the spot price, a
trader can go short on futures and buy it cheaper in the spot market to give delivery to the
exchange. One of the tests of the quality of a futures contract is how closely its price
converges to the spot price in the cash market at the time of expiration. Some markets
such as the Standard & Poor-500 futures are characterized by almost perfect
convergence.
Hedging
Hedging implies taking a position in the futures market that is opposite to the position
held in the spot market. If we have a foreign currency receivable, we would sell futures.
If exchange rates move adversely, we lose in the spot market but gain in the futures
market. On the other hand, if the exchange rate movements are favourable, we gain in the
spot market but lose in the futures market. Similarly, when we need a currency, say after
three months, we would go long in futures.
Just like currency exposure, interest rate exposure can be hedged using the futures
markets. Interest rate futures involve an underlying debt instrument such as a treasury bill
or a bond. These futures are used to minimise the risk associated with fluctuating interest
rates. When we are net investors, we want to protect ourselves against a fall in interest
rates and when we are net borrowers we want to be insured against a rise in interest rates.
A commonly used interest rate future is based on the US Treasury Bill with a face
value of $1 million and maturity period of 90 days. The price of the future is calculated
as (100 Discount yield in %). Supposing we are a net investor and buy the treasury bill
future, if interest rates fall, we gain from the rise in futures prices. This compensates us
for the loss in interest income. Similarly, if we are a net borrower, we would sell T bill
futures. In this case, if interest rate rises, the futures price falls and we gain from the fall
in price of the futures contracts. This compensates us for the higher borrowing costs.
Another commonly traded interest future has the three month Eurodollar deposit
as the underlying instrument. The standard size is $1 million and the futures price is
calculated as (100 - 3 month LIBOR in %)
A direct currency hedge involves the two currencies which are directly involved
in the transaction. Thus, an Indian firm which has to pay dollars after three months may
buy dollar futures priced in terms of rupees or sell rupee futures priced in terms of dollars
assuming such contracts are available. (Today such contracts are not available). If such
contracts are not available, (owing to the limited trading associated with the rupee), cross
hedging can be used. Let us assume that the rupee and sterling movements are strongly
interlinked. In that case, the firm can buy dollar futures priced in terms of sterlings or sell
sterling futures priced in terms of dollars. For a cross hedge to be effective, the firm has
31
to choose a contract on an underlying currency which is almost perfectly correlated with
the exposure to be hedged.
With contracts of different maturities available for the same underlying asset, the
question naturally arises as to which contract is to be selected. Contrary to common
perception, it may not be advisable to choose a contract whose delivery period coincides
with the end of the period of the exposure. This is because, price fluctuations often tend
to be the largest during the delivery month. Also, in the case of a long position, holding
futures during the delivery month may also imply taking delivery. At the same time, basis
risk, which is possible because of an adverse movement of the gap between futures and
spot prices, often increases with the passage of time. Taking all these factors into
consideration, it may be a good idea to choose a delivery month later than the point of
time at which the hedge expires but as close to it as possible. This rule is however not
sacrosanct. When liquidity becomes the critical parameter, it makes sense to use shorter
maturity futures and keep rolling them forward till such time as necessary.
For a hedge to work perfectly, the basis has to remain constant throughout the
period of hedging. Because the basis is likely to change with time, the hedge will not be
perfect. Even in the unlikely event of the basis remaining constant, the quantities
associated with the standardised futures contracts will often not exactly match the
underlying exposure. Thus, hedging with futures rarely eliminates risk completely.
Let S
1
be the spot price at time t
1
S
2
be the spot price at time t
2
F
l
be the futures price at time t
1
F
2
be the futures price at time t
2
Let S
1
F
1
= b
1
, basis risk at t
1
S
2
- F
2
= b
2,
basis risk at t
2
Suppose we hedge a receivable by going short in futures at time, t
1
Profits made in the futures market by closing out position at time, t
2
= F
1
F
2
(Of course, this represents a loss if F
1
< F
2
)
Price paid for the asset while selling in the spot market = S
2
Then, the effective price at which the asset is sold = S
2
+ (F
1
- F
2
)
= S
2
+ F
1
-
F
2
= F
1
+ (S
2
- F
2
)
= F
l
+ b
2
Since b
2
is unknown, the futures transaction is exposed to basis risk. If b
2
= b
l
,
then the effective price at which the transaction takes place is F
l
+ S
1
- F
l
= S
1
. Thus, the
risk is totally eliminated and the transaction takes place at today's spot price.
In the case of financial assets, the basis risk, which is primarily determined by
interest rates, is usually small. However, for commodities such as oil, there could be
imbalances between supply and demand. In addition, complications may arise due to
difficulties in storing such items. As a result, the basis risk may be much higher.
32
Note 8.4 - Using Adjusted Present Value
The conventional Net Present Value (NPV) technique, which is very commonly used in
project appraisal, suffers from certain disadvantages. The main difficulty with the NPV
method is that it discounts all cash flows at the required rate of return or cost of capital.
While appraising international projects or projects with a great amount of uncertainty, we
need more flexibility to take into account the different degrees of risk associated with
different types of cash flows. We need a method which can make suitable adjustments to
cash flows and which can also allow the use of multiple discount rates. The Adjusted
Present Value (APV) technique, which is more flexible than NPV, can be used in such
situations.
Cash Flows
For an international investor, it makes sense to view the project from a home country
perspective (Home country is the country to which the investor belongs. Host country is
the country in which the project will be executed.) Let us consider briefly some of the
important factors, which influence cash flows from the investors perspective.
Blocked funds:
If funds that are otherwise blocked, can be used for a project, there is a gain for the
investor. This gain is essentially the difference between the face value of the funds and
the present value of cash flows generated, if the funds can be profitably used in some
other project. This gain can be deducted from the cost of the project. For instance, if there
is no possibility of repatriation of blocked funds, but the host country government is
prepared to release the total amount of funds for investment in the project, the money is
effectively available at zero cost. As such, the full quantum of the blocked funds can be
deducted from the project cost.
Lost sales:
It often happens that a company first exports from its home base before setting up full-
fledged operations in the host country. As soon as the foreign facilities become
operational, the earlier exports would cease. The impact of such lost sales must be
considered while computing the cash flows. In other words, profits attributable to lost
sales must be deducted from the cash flows generated by the project.
Repatriation restrictions:
We need to keep in mind that for the parent company, which has set up the foreign
subsidiary, what matters is the quantum of repatriable cash flows, i.e., profits which can
be taken back to the home country. Sometimes, there may be restrictions on repatriation
of income generated by the investment. This impact must be duly considered while
evaluating the project.
Tax rates:
Tax rates vary across countries. If a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement exists, what
is relevant is the higher of the tax rates in the two countries. Suppose the tax rate in USA
33
is 30%. An US MNC invests in Thailand where the tax rate is say 40%. Thus, the MNC
will pay 40% tax on profits in Thailand while none will be charged back home. On the
other hand, if it invests in Luxembourg, where the tax rate is say 20%, it will get a tax
credit for an equivalent amount, but will have to pay 10% tax to the US revenue
authorities. Thus, the effective tax rate is 20 + 10 = 30% which is again the higher of the
two tax rates.
Increase in borrowing capacity:
By generating profits, the project will increase the parent companys borrowing capacity,
assuming that the current degree of leverage will be maintained. Even if the company
does not raise additional debt for the project in question, it can use debt elsewhere. Since
interest on debt is a tax deductible expense, these tax shields can be computed and their
present values added while appraising the project.
Concessional loans:
Countries often give concessional loans to attract foreign investment. If we compute the
interest and principal payments associated with the loan and discount these outflows at
the competitive market rate of interest in the host country, we get the effective present
value of the loan. The difference between the face value of the loan and the present value
of the loan payments is a gain which should be added while determining the viability of
the project.
Depreciation:
Depreciation is a tax-deductible expense. Tax shields on depreciation can be claimed on
the basis of the higher tax rate, if the parent company can consolidate the financial
statements of the subsidiary. On the other hand, if this is not the case as in India,
depreciation tax shields may be calculated on the basis of the tax rate in the host country.
Discount rates
Unlike the NPV method, which uses a single discount rate, the APV method is far more
flexible. It uses different discount rates for different cash flows depending on the degree
of uncertainty. Typically, the following guidelines are used while selecting the discount
rate.
Cash flows from operations:
Rate of return expected by the company's equity investors can be taken as the discount
rate.
Depreciation:
The riskless rate of interest in the home country can be taken as the discount rate,
provided we are confident about the projects ability to generate sufficient profits. Tax
shields can be absorbed only if adequate profits are generated.
Borrowing capacity:
The same argument as in the case of depreciation tax shields is applicable.
34
Concessional loan:
To determine the effective present value of the concessional loan, the discount rate used
is the competitive market rate of interest in the host country for similar loans.
Computation of Adjusted Present Value
To sum up, the Adjusted Present Value, APV, in most cases can be calculated as follows:
APV
= - Initial investment adjusted for blocked funds released by the project
+
Present value of cash flows generated from the projects operations after adjusting
for lost sales
+
Present value of tax shields available due to depreciation
+
Present value of tax shields due to increased borrowing capacity
+
Present value of concessional loan.
In some specific cases, additional adjustments are made to take into account the specific
circumstances (like salvage value) associated with the project.
To start with, APV can be worked out on the basis of the most conservative figures. If
the APV is positive, the project can be accepted straightaway. On the other hand, if it is
negative, cash flows and discount rates can be adjusted to see if the APV becomes
positive. The APV technique is thus more flexible and convenient to use than the NPV
method, especially in the case of international projects where the risks involved are
greater.
35
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