The  European  economy  appears  to  nally  be
emerging out of the long tunnel of stagnation. The eu-
rozones  real  GDP,  after  contracting  for  six  consecu-
tive  quarters  from  the  OctoberDecember  quarter  in
2011, rose on a quarter-on-quarter basis in the April
June  quarter  last  year,  and  went  on  to  post  positive
growth  for  three  consecutive  quarters  until  the  Octo-
berDecember  quarter,  albeit  at  more  modest  levels
around an annualized rate of 1%.
Looking back, Europe has been focusing on scal
reconstruction during the sovereign debt crisis, which
started  with  revelations  of  Greeces  window  dressing
of  its  scal  decit  in  October  2009,  and  it  has  been
facing  deationary  pressure  associated  with  the  cri-
sis.  If  the  European  economy  is  truly  recovering,  Eu-
rope  will  join  the  United  States  and  Japan  in  driving
the  global  economy,  which  is  denitely  very  good
news for the global economy.
Our  conclusion,  however,  is  that  it  could  be  too
early  to  adopt  that  optimistic  view.  This  is  because,
given  a  lack  of  demand,  deationary  pressure  is  in
fact  increasing.  As  a  result,  non-performing  loans  at
nancial institutions continues to rise, and the risk of
a  nancial  system  crisis  occurring  has  not  been  re-
duced at all.
The  chart  shows  trends  in  the  GDP  gap  ratio  in
the  eurozone,  and  outstanding  non-performing  loans
and  the  non-performing  loan  ratio  in  the  ve  most
heavily  indebted  countries  (Portugal,  Italy,  Ireland,
Greece,  and  Spain)  from  2009.  The  rst  thing  that  at-
tracts attention is that the GDP gap ratio shrank from
2009,  hit  a  peak  of  0.764%  in  2011,  and  then  wors-
ened  to  2.749%  in  2013,  roughly  the  same  as  the
level in 2009 in the immediate wake of the Lehman cri-
sis. In fact, although real GDP rose in the OctoberDe-
cember quarter last year on a quarter-on-quarter basis,
the  rise  reected  an  increase  in  foreign  demand,  and
the  contribution  of  domestic  demand  declined.  As  the
effects  of  scal  stimulus  after  the  Lehman  crisis  de-
clined,  scal  policy  changed  to  scal  tightening  with
the  emergence  of  the  sovereign  debt  crisis.  However,
private-sector demand has not recovered sufciently to
offset the effect of deationary pressure. This is shown
by the high unemployment rate of the eurozone, which
remains at a record level of 12%.
The  second  point  is  that  non-performing  loans
have  increased  dramatically.  Outstanding  non-per-
forming loans in the heavily indebted countries are es-
timated to have doubled from around 390 billion euros
in 2009 to approximately 780 billion euros in 2012. The
non-performing  loan  ratio  is  estimated  to  have  risen
from  6.4%  in  2009  to  14.1%  (for  countries  excluding
Italy). The non-performing loan ratio is far higher than
the  peak  seen  in  Japan,  8.9%  in  2002,  during  its  own
nancial crisis, and suggests a heavy burden on the -
nancial institution management in Europe.
History  tells  us  that  a  sovereign  debt  crisis  will
transform  into  a  nancial  system  crisis,  which  ulti-
mately will transform into a burden on taxpayers. Eu-
rope  is  standing  at  the  gateway  to  a  nancial  system
crisis.  In  the  event  nancial  institutions  begin  to  col-
lapse  in  a  chain  reaction,  the  entire  economy  will  in-
evitably  enter  a  deationary  spiral.  The  European
Union  is  not  just  standing  idly  by,  and  responding  to
the  risk  described  above,  it  is  striving  to  rapidly  de-
velop a single resolution mechanism for bank failures.
However,  with  non-performing  loans  of  370  billion
euros, for which no reserves have been set aside in the
ve  most  heavily  indebted  countries,  it  is  reasonable
to  question  whether  a  planned  single  resolution  fund
of 55 billion euros is adequate.
J u n e   2 0 1 4   1
European Economic Outlook: No Room for Optimism
Government  bond  yields  in  the  heavily  indebted
countries,  after  surging  to  dangerously  high  levels,
have stabilized thanks chiey to ECB President Mario
Draghis  announcement  of  an  unlimited  government
bond-buying  program  in  September  2012.  The  debt
crisis  appears  to  have  eased.  Monetary  policy  may
control the market, but its effects on improvements in
the real economy are limited. Since Europe has chosen
to strengthen scal discipline, it will logically have to
pay  the  price  in  the  real  economy.  Europe  may  thus
have  to  be  prepared  for  deation  for  some  time  to
come.
2   J u n e   2 0 1 4