Policy Brief

May 2014















Balkans in Europe
Policy Advisory
Group

COMPLETING ENLARGEMENT: A
USERS MANUAL TO THE BALKANS
FOR THE NEW EU COMMISSION AND
PARLIAMENT
Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group
Completing Enlargement: A Users Manual to the Balkans for the New EU Commission and Parliament
2

Completing Enlargement:
A Users Manual to the Balkans for the
New EU Commission and Parliament
In 2003, in Thessaloniki, the countries of the Balkans
were offered a clear perspective for membership
when EU heads of state and government declared
their unequivocal support to the European perspec-
tive of the Western Balkan countries. The future of
the Balkans is within the European Union.

Eleven years later, only Croatia has joined the EU.
Accession talks are on-going with Serbia and Monte-
negro, but neither will be able to accede before the
end of the decade. Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia
have a formal integration perspective, but remain
blocked on their respective paths for different rea-
sons. For Macedonia and Kosovo, the difficulty in
moving forward towards full membership is largely to
blame on EU member states. Kosovo lacks universal
recognition by all the EU states and thus its member-
ship perspective remains remote. Macedonia remains
blocked primarily due to one member state, namely
Greece. In Bosnia, domestic political elites are unable
or unwilling to fulfil EU conditions that could help the
country advance its membership bid. Albania finds
itself somewhere in between, potentially catching up
with Montenegro and Serbia, but for now outside a
formal accession process.

Thus it seems unlikely that most of the Balkan coun-
tries will be in the position to enter the EU only twen-
ty years after Thessaloniki and thirty years since the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The process of accession
has continued in recent years due to the persistence
of the European Commission, nevertheless, the cur-
rent pace throws the Thessaloniki promise into doubt.

The slow pace of integration is not only a result of
some countries in the region lagging behind with
reforms, but also due to lukewarm commitment to
accession in the EU member states. Increasingly,
individual member states have raised the bar, often
with the claim to increase standards, but with the
effect that the countries of the region are locked out
for long periods of time.

Turkey and Ukraine highlight the risks of uncertainty.
While Ukraine never had the prospect of full mem-

bership as the Balkans have, in Turkey formal com-
mitment to accession has been jeopardized by the
open rejection of membership by some member
states: With no clear prospect of EU accession, the
benefits of closer ties to the EU can mobilize some
citizens, while other turn to alternatives. Outside
powers can use this uncertainty and lack of firm po-
litical and security integration to promote instability
and conflict. Although the countries of the Balkans
have firmer foothold in the EU than Ukraine has,
they are not yet members and thus the risk persists
that an outside actor, such as Russia, might seek to
foster instability, if only to distract the EU. Similarly,
stagnation can lead to the impression among citizens
and elites in the Balkans that the EU membership is
too remote to be realistic.

Turkeys case highlights the authoritarian temptation
if EU accession becomes make-believe. If EU member-
ship becomes improbable, the incentives for playing
by democratic rules, respecting the rule of law and
human rights decrease. Turkey is a vivid reminder of
this risk where the same government moved from
being an energetic reformer in the first years in power
to displaying strong authoritarian features in recent
times. While the stalling accession process cannot
be the sole cause, it has certainly contributed to the
authoritarian drift. Similar tendencies are already
apparent in the Balkans, in particular where acces-
sion remains remote, for instance in Macedonia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile, in some coun-
tries of the region, authoritarian elites have at times
used the accession process to justify the reversal of
reforms in key areas such as rule of law.

As EU accession has slowed to a crawl, there is the risk
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Warnings of enlargement
sceptics that the countries are not ready and that
additional conditions and a longer accession process-
es are necessary, might encourage outsiders to gain
a foothold in the region and local elites to resort to
populist and authoritarian practices. This alliance of
convenience between enlargement-sceptics in the
EU and semi-authoritarian elites in the Balkans can
ruin EU enlargement.
Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group
Completing Enlargement: A Users Manual to the Balkans for the New EU Commission and Parliament
3

The breakdown of EU enlargement would not just
be a serious threat to stability and reform in the
Balkans, but also a considerable failure for the EU.
Its largest success story of the past decades has been
its ability to enlarge and bring property and stability
to Europe. It would also seriously challenge the EU
ambition as a global player.

In times of the Ukraine crisis and increased tensions
with Russia, the EU needs to be aware that Rus-
sias capacity for disruption in the Balkans remains
strong. A new, active approach based on accelerating
the EU accession processes and underlining the EU
core values of open society in times of crisis can
strengthen the EUs stance in the region and send
Russia the message that the Balkans are off limits
for new conflicts.

The newly elected EU institutions need to ensure that
enlargement is completed and the EU does good on its
Thessaloniki promise. In order to re-energize enlarge-
ment, the EU should consider the following policies:


Policy Recommendations
Commissioner for Enlargement. The Commission
needs a high-profile Commissioner for Enlargement.
She or he has to be the spokesperson for enlarge-
ment and also be involved together with the High
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy in
mediating outstanding disputes. Together with Tur-
key, there are six Balkan countries waiting to join the
EU, they merit a Commission focused on completing
accession. In spite of the fact that even in the best
case scenario no enlargement is likely to occur during
the mandate of the new Commission, it will have the
crucial responsibility to keep the momentum going.

Keeping the Caravan Moving. There is a risk that
the Balkans might split into two, the countries on
the train to membership, and the Restern Balkans,
the countries that have no prospect of joining soon
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia). If
the laggards are not helped to stay on track, the gap
will grow and positive dynamics in Montenegro and
Serbia (as well as possibly Albania) will not encourage
the others, but rather unfold negative, destabilizing
dynamics, i.e. secessionist movements in the laggards.

Re-energizing the Enlargement Process. The 2004
enlargement process was successful because it in-
cluded a large number of countries all competing
with each other to join the EU. The current gradualist
process lacks this dynamic and countries are not in
direct competition. Such dynamics could be created
by starting accession talks with all the countries of
the region. Short of opening accession negotiations
with all the aspirant Balkan countries, tools could
be developed to identify progress in different areas
that would allow for such a competition to develop.

Ending Early Additional Conditionality. In addition
to the conditions set out by the accession process
itself, the Commission has added additional specific
conditions for individual countries. While these have
occasionally been successful, they carry high risks and
should be abandoned. For example, in the past the
police reform conditionality and more recently over
the Sejdi-Finci case of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) has resulted in a deadlock in Bosnia,
where the EU integration process is delayed for years.

Resolving Outstanding International and Bilateral
Problems through Mediation. The successful EU en-
gagement in Kosovo and Serbia was an example of
the EU not using conditionality, but rather the com-
bination of a window of opportunity and incentives
to resolve a bilateral dispute. The EU should build on
this success to address other such political problems
in the region that hinder the completion of EU en-
largement. Acting as fast as possible to find a creative
and workable solution for the deep crisis in Bosnia
and Macedonia should be a top priority for the EU.

Removing Bilateral Disputes from the Accession
Agenda. The Commission should lobby for mem-
ber states to not pursue bilateral disputes with can-
didates during the accession talks. Such disputes
should instead be resolved either through arbitration
and mediation mechanisms or in the absence of
effective tools at the EU level, by a number of EU
member states with potential support by other third
parties mediating these disputes.

Monitoring the State of Democracy. The EU needs
to pay greater attention to the state of democracy.
Serious backsliding of democracy and freedom of the
media can be observed and needs to be vigorously
pursued by the EU. Noting shortfalls reminds citizens
of the core reason for joining the EU: stable and
prosperous democracy governed by the rule of law.
For example, the European Union Agency for Fun-
damental Rights could expand its scope of work to
all the candidate and potential candidate countries.
Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group
Completing Enlargement: A Users Manual to the Balkans for the New EU Commission and Parliament
4

Breathe Fresh Life Into Regional Cooperation. There
is a need to revitalize the concept of regional cooper-
ation in the Western Balkans. While stronger support
for the Regional Cooperation Council and its 2020
Southeast Europe Strategy has to be one way to go,
the EU also needs to explore possibilities for elevating
regional dialogue to a higher political level. Annual
high level summits with heads of government and
foreign ministers from the region, for example, could
help addressing open disputes, problems and set a
common policy agenda more efficiently.
Communicating with Citizens. A very elite centred
approach of the EU in its communication with future
member states has often empowered gatekeeper
political leaders with limited genuine interest in ac-
cession. Communicating with citizens directly will be
essential in ensuring that the performance of govern-
ments comes under greater public scrutiny. Such a
new approach to public outreach and communication
should also include grassroots social movements as
they might become a crucial partner in EU reforms.


About the Report
This Report was written by members of the Balkans in
Europe Policy Advisory Group and its contents were dis-
cussed at several meetings of the group in Graz (October
2013), Brussels (November 2013), Zagreb (January 2014)
and Belgrade (February 2014). The primary contributors
to this report are Florian Bieber, Marko Kmezi and for
Scenario 1: Corina Stratulat; Scenario 2: Leon Malazogu;
Scenario 3: Dimitar Bechev and Vedran Dihi; Scenario
4: Dejan Jovi.

About the Balkans in Europe
Policy Advisory Group
The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) is a
co-operation project of the European Fund for the Balkans
(EFB) and Centre for the Southeast European Studies of
the University of Graz (CSEES) with the aim to promote
the European integration of the Western Balkans and the
consolidation of democratic, open countries in the region.
BiEPAG is composed by young researchers from the Western
Balkans and wider Europe that have established themselves
for their knowledge and understanding of the Western
Balkans and the processes that shape the region. Current
members of the BiEPAG are: Florian Bieber, Arolda Elbasani,
Dimitar Bechev, Dejan Jovi, Marko Kmezi, Nermin Oru,
Leon Malazogu, Corina Stratulat, Milan Ni, Marija Risteska,
Nenad Koprivica, Neboja Lazarevi and Vedran Dihi.

About the European Fund for the Balkans
The European Fund for the Balkans is a multi-year joint ini-
tiative of European Foundations including the Robert Bosch
Stiftung, the King Baudouin Foundation, the Compagnia di
San Paolo and the ERSTE Foundation. It is designed to under-
take and support initiatives aimed at bringing the Western
Balkans closer to the European Union through grant-giving
and operational programmes. The Funds objectives are:
to encourage broader and stronger commitment to the
European integration of the Western Balkan countries and
societies; to strengthen the efforts undertaken by a range of
stakeholders in this process also with a view to developing
effective policies and practices in the region and in the EU;
and to support the process of member state building as
envisaged by the International Commission on the Balkans,
in particular by building constituencies in the societies of
Southeast Europe who will be offered an opportunity to
experience and learn about Europe.
Contact:
Igor Bandovic
Senior Programme Manager,
European Fund for the Balkans
Igor.bandovic@balkanfund.org
+381 (0) 69 62 64 65
European Fund for the Balkans
Resavska 35, 11 000 Belgrade, Serbia
Phone/Fax: +381 (0)11 3033662
www.balkanfund.org
About the Centre for Southeast European
Studies, University of Graz
The Centre for Southeast European Studies was set up in
November 2008 following the establishment of Southeast
Europe as a strategic priority at the University of Graz in
2000. The Centre is an interdisciplinary and cross-faculty
institution for research and education, established with
the goal to provide space for the rich teaching and re-
search activities at the university on and with Southeast
Europe and to promote interdisciplinary collaboration.
Since its establishment, the centre also aimed to pro-
vide information and documentation and to be a point of
contact for media and the public interested in Southeast
Europe, in terms of political, legal, economic and cultural
developments. An interdisciplinary team of lawyers, his-
torians, and political scientists working at the Centre has
contributed to research on Southeast Europe, through
numerous articles, monographs and other publications.
In addition, the centre regularly organizes international
conferences and workshops to promote cutting edge
research on Southeast Europe.
Contact:
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Florian Bieber,
Professor of Southeast European Studies
florian.bieber@uni-graz.at +43/316/380 6822
Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of
Graz, Universittsstrae 15/K3 A-8010 Graz
www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at

Disclaimer:
All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent the views of the EFB or
CSEES.
Published: May 2014