Repaso, Jurdelyn C.

LLB-2
CASE DIGEST (Batch 3)

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY


1. GUIAO vs. COMELEC
137 SCRA 366, 1985

FACTS:

After the canvass of the returns for assemblyman in Pampanga, petitioner Ben
Guiao, who lost, submitted his written objections to the inclusion of several returns in the
canvass. He asked that a subpoena be issued to the members of the citizens election
committee. The Board of Canvassers denied the request for the subpoena and dismissed
the objections for failure of petitioner to substantiate them and proclaimed the winners.
Petitioner questioned the proclamation of the private respondent but did not question the
proclamation of other winners who belonged to his political party.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOC should issue a subpoena.

RULING:

Petitioner cannot challenge the proclamation of any one of the candidates. The
proclamation cannot be void as to one and valid with respect to the others. The written
objection of the petitioner was not timely presented. The time to object in writing in any
election return is when it is being examined by the board of canvassers. The board of
canvassers was correct in refusing to subpoena the members of the citizen election
committee. The function of the board of canvassers is purely ministerial. To have acceded to
the request of the petitioner would have made the board a hearing body to ascertain the
issue of duress and other irregularities alleged by petitioner.


2. NICOLAS C. CASTROMAYOR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
250 SCRA 298

FACTS:

Petitioner was a candidate for a seat in the eight-member Sangguniang Bayan of the
municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the elections held on May 8, 1995. On May 10, 1995, the
winners were proclaimed on the basis of the results of the canvass which showed that
petitioner received 5,419 votes and took eighth place in the election for members of the
Sangguniang Bayan. However, when Alice M. Garin, Chairman of the MBC, rechecked the
totals in the Statement of Votes the following day, she discovered that the number of votes
cast for Nilda C. Demorito, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, was 62 more than that
credited to her. The returns from one precinct had been overlooked in the computation of
the totals. As matters stood, therefore, the total number of votes cast for Demorito was
5,470, or 51 more than the 5,419 votes cast for petitioner. Atty. Rodolfo Sarroza, the
Regional Election Director advised Garin to request authority from the COMELEC to
reconvene for the purpose of correcting the error. A formal letter was later sent to the
COMELEC on May 17, 1995. On May 23, 1995, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 95-
2414, directing the Municipal board of Canvassers of said municipality to reconvene to annul
the proclamation of Nicolas C. Castromayor for the number 8 place for councilor; and to
proclaim the winning number eight (8) councilor, and to submit compliance hereof within five
(5)days from receipt of notice. Petitioner protested the proposed action in a letter dated June
5, 1995 to COMELEC Executive Director Resurreccion A. Borra, questioning the legality of
the actuations of Garin. Hence, this petition to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 95-2414.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MBC has the power to reconvene to annul a proclamation upon
prior authorization from the COMELEC.

RULING:

Yes. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a simple
problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the
votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the
correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence any question pertaining to the proceedings
of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its
constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections.


3. SALLY A. LEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA
405 SCRA 363 (2003)

FACTS:

Petitioner Sally A. Lee (Lee) and respondent Leovic R. Dioneda (Dioneda) were
candidates for Mayor of Sorsogon City. During the canvassing of the election returns,
counsel for Dioneda moved for the exclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for Precinct
No. 28A2 from Barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the ground that no entries were
made for the position of congressman and that Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
watchers were utilized to fill up election returns.

The Board of Canvassers (BOC) ruled in favor of Lee on the ground that the
questioned election return was clear and regular on its face, the BOC then proclaimed Lee
as the winning candidate for Mayor of Sorsogon City. Dioneda then filed a petition to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Lees proclamation and the
exclusion of the questioned election return.

The COMELEC Second Division granted Dionedas petition and accordingly excluded
the questioned return from the canvass and nullified the proclamation of Lee. Lee filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in annulling Lees
proclamation and excluded the questioned election return

RULING:

Lee argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC
is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go
[beyond] or behind them and investigate election irregularities, citing the case of Loong v.
Commission on Elections.

The doctrine cited by Lee presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and
duly accomplished on their face. Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie
showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the
questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not
powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.

The doctrine that COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns
and is without jurisdiction to go behind them and investigate election irregularities
presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face
hence, if there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having
been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply.






4. LAGUMBAY V. COMELEC
16 SCRA 175
FACTS:
This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining
to reject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The
Constitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said Commission.
The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns of certain
questioned precincts were "obviously manufactured" In each precinct the number of
registered voters equaled the number of ballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and
tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power, whereas, all the
Nacionalista Party got exactly zero.
ISSUE:
Was the election result in said precincts utterly improbable and clearly incredible?
RULING:
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative stating that said returns were
obviously false or fabricated - prima facie. It opined that the election result to said precincts
as reported, was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. For it is not likely, in the ordinary
course of things, that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all the eight
candidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote to one of the eight candidates of
the Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary coincidence was quite impossible to believe,
knowing that the Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwide organization, with branches in
every province, and was, in previous years, the party in power in these islands.
The SC agreed that frauds in the holding of the election should be handled and
finally settled by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule,
where testimonial or documentary evidence, is necessary; but where the fraud is so
palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur the thing speaks for itself), there is no
reason to accept it and give it prima facie value.


POST-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY

1. CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA
G.R. No. 150605, 2002
FACTS:

Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed
against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used
the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose
of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still
pending so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he
garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended
by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and
ordered disqualified.

Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly
elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely
Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsins
proclamation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a
Representative.
2. Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the
legally elected Representative
RULING:

First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.

Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc
was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second
Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot,
thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no
jurisdiction in the instant case.

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has
not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of
the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal
that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of
Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the
validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has
no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a
division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is
no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility
is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot
be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the
petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature
assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from
the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner
Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but
nevertheless unproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file
a verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition for mandamus to
prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or
duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district
of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts
are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second
Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not
been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final
and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all
officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and
confusion.








2. JAVIER vs. COMELEC
(144 SCRA 194)
FACTS:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be
members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of
massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of
election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated
by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On
the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd
Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC,
the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having
been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably
made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before
proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as
he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2
nd

Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb
1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have
the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

RULING:
Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides that: The COMELEC may
sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases maybe heard and decided by divisions
except contests involving members of the BatasangPambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc.
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all.
They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants
shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

3. UTTO V. COMELEC
G. R. No. 150111, 2002
FACTS:
This petition seeks to annul the resolutions of the Commission on directing the
inclusion of five election returns excluded by the municipal board of canvassers during the
canvass of votes for the May 14, 2001 election in the municipality of Sultan saBarongis,
Maguindanao and finding petitioners proclamation to be illegal and void ab initio. Petitioner
Utto and respondent Angas were candidates for the position of mayor. For the canvassing of
votes of the May 14 election returns, the original municipal board of canvassers was
composed of Alid as chairman with Abo and Gonina, as members. During the canvassing
on May 16, election returns in Precinct Nos. 15A, 25A/26A, 66A, and 68A/69A were
presented. On May 18, respondent filed a petition to inhibit Alid and Abo, which resulted in
the suspension of the canvassing. Alid and Abo inhibited themselves from the proceeding.
Mamalinta took over as chairperson, with Khalid and Gonina, as members of the municipal
board of canvassers.
The canvassing was again suspended when both Khalid and Gonina inhibited
themselves from participating in the proceedings. The provincial election supervisor
designated Mangelenand Diolanen as members of the municipal board of canvassers. In
an affidavit executed, Diolanen stated that chairperson Mamalinta called him up and
informed him that she would convene the board of canvassers, with instructions for him not
to attend because he was already replaced. He further stated that Mangelen called him up
to tell him of his (Mangelen) decision to inhibit himself as member of the board of
canvassers due to pressure exerted by chairperson Mamalinta. The municipal board of
canvassers convened with chairpersonMamalinta and member Reneido were present. The
other member was absent.
Before the start of the canvass, chairperson Mamalinta distributed to the parties
present a report on the status of canvassing. Out of the 98 precincts, the municipal board of
canvassers issued four (4) separate rulings excluding the above-cited five (5) election
returns. Particularly, the municipal board of canvassers ruled that the Election Returns were
tampered with or were not original. Despite respondents manifestation, the municipal board
of canvassers proceeded with the proclamation of the candidates for municipal offices. The
board proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of the municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said proclamation is valid.
HELD:
NO. It is provided that the procedure in the disposition of contested election returns
and certificate of canvass. The Comelec precludes the board of canvassers from
proclaiming any candidate as winner, except upon its authorization after it has ruled on the
appeal of the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation thereof shall be void ab initio,
unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. This
provision is mandatory and requires strict observance.
Section 20 (i), Republic Act No. 7166 where COMELEC Resolution No.3848 finds basis
further states:
SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.--(a) x xx(i) The board of
canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the
Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing
party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the
contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.
Consequently, petitioners proclamation was null and void. It was made on May 31,
2001 after respondent manifested his intention to appeal the ruling of the board of
canvassers. On the day of the proclamation, respondent attempted to file a verified notice
of appeal, but the chairperson of the municipal board of canvassers refused to accept the
appeal. Within the reglementary period for filing an appeal, respondent went to the
COMELEC. Pursuant to said section, the municipal board of canvassers may not proclaim
any candidate without waiting for the authorization of the COMELEC. Considering that
petitioner had a very small margin of 149 votes over respondent, and there were 944
registered voters from the five excluded election returns, the results of the municipal election
would be undoubtedly adversely affected by the contested returns. The proclamation thus
made is void ab initio. It is now settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitted. When the municipal board
of canvassers disregarded the five election returns, it in effect disenfranchised the voters of
the excluded precincts.
Time and again, the Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is
with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally made. The fact that a
candidate illegally proclaimed has assumed office is not a bar to the exercise of such power.
It is also true that after proclamation, the remedy of a party aggrieved in an election is an
election protest. This is on the assumption, however, that there has been a valid
proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidates
assumption of office cannot deprive COMELEC of the power to declare such proclamation a
nullity


4. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the
league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Salvador Estuye,
who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded
the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law
Dictators agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his
title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus
Election Code.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as
provincial governor of Sorsogon.



RULING:

The Court decided in the negative. If he really wanted to disavow his American
citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and
PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. However, it appears that Frivaldo has not taken these
categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had,
without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the
formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is
not that cheaply recovered.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people
as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

The petition is dismissed and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is declared not a citizen
of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly
elected Vice-Governor of the said province.