FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, 
SAMAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and 
CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA 
G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000 
Facts: 
  The  Forest  Protection  and  Law  Enforcement  Team  of  the  Community 
Environment  and  Natural  Resources  Office  (CENRO)  of  the  DENR  apprehended  two 
motor vehicles. One is loaded with 1,026 board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at 
P8,544.75, with Plate No. HAK-733, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by Jose 
Vargas.  The  other  is  loaded  with  1,224.97  board  feet  of  illegally-sourced  lumber  valued 
at  P9,187.27,  with  plate  number  FCN  143,  being  driven  by  one  Constancio  Abuganda 
and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present 
proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded 
the  vehicles  and  its  load  of  lumber  at  the  DENR-PENR  (Department  of  Environment 
and  Natural  Resources-Provincial  Environment  and  Natural  Resources)  Office  in 
Catbalogan.  Seizure  receipts  were  issued  but  the  drivers  refused  to  accept  the  receipts. 
Felipe  Calub,  Provincial  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  Officer,  then  filed  before 
the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar,  a criminal complaint  against Abuganda for 
violation  of  Section  68  [78),  Presidential  Decree  705  as  amended  by  Executive  Order 
277,  otherwise  known  as  the  Revised  Forestry  Code.  On  January  31,  1992,  the 
impounded  vehicles  were  forcibly  taken  by  Gabon  and  Abuganda  from  the  custody  of 
the  DENR,  prompting  DENR  Officer  Calub  this  time  to  file  a  criminal  complaint  for 
grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by 
the Public Prosecutor.  
  The  vehicle  driven  by  Constancio  Abuganda  was  again  apprehended  by  a 
composite  team  of  DENR-CENR  in  Catbalogan  and  Philippine  Army  elements  of  the 
802nd  Infantry  Brigade  at  Barangay  Buray,  Paranas,  Samar.  It  was  again  loaded  with 
forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. 
Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, 
and  several  John  for  violation  of  Section  68  [78],  Presidential  Decree  705  as  amended 
by  Executive  Order  277,  otherwise  known  as  the  Revised  Forestry  Code.  Although 
Abegonia  and  Abuganda  were  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  reasonable,  the  trial  court 
ordered  that  a  copy  of  the  decision  be  furnished  the  Secretary  of  Justice,  in  order  that 
the  necessary  criminal  action  may  be  filed  against  Noe  Pagarao  and  all  other  persons 
responsible  for  violation  of  the  Revised  Forestry  Code.  It  appeared  that  it  was  Pagarao 
who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it. 
Issue: 
(1)  Whether  or  not  the  DENR-seized  motor  vehicle  ,  with  plate  number  FCN  143,  is  in 
custodia legis. 
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, 
with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State. 
Held: 
  The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in 
the  commission  of  an  offense  in  violation  of  Section  78.  In  addition,  Section  78  makes 
mere  possession  of  timber  or  other  forest  products  without  the  accompanying  legal 
documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as 
prescribed  in  Articles  309-310  of  the  Revised  Penal  Code.  In  the  present  case,  the 
subject  vehicles  were  loaded  with  forest  products  at  the  time  of  the  seizure.  But 
admittedly  no  permit  evidencing  authority  to  possess  and  transport  said  load  of  forest 
products  was  duly  presented.  These  products,  in  turn,  were  deemed  illegally  sourced. 
Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, 
although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not 
the ones charged by the public prosecutor. 
The  corresponding  authority  of  the  DENR  to  seize  all  conveyances  used  in  the 
commission  of  an  offense  in  violation  of  Section  78  of  the  Revised  Forestry  Code  is 
pursuant  to  Sections  78-A  and  89  of  the  same  Code.  The  DENR  Administrative  Order 
No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code. 
Upon  apprehension  of  the  illegally-cut  timber  while  being  transported  without 
pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a 
warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 
and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.  
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR 
Administrative  Order  No.  59,  series  of  1990  was  justifiably  explained.  Petitioners  did 
not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner 
of  the  vehicle  because  on  the  3rd  day  following  the  seizure,  Gabon  and  Abuganda, 
drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of 
the  DENR.  Then  again,  when  one  of  the  motor  vehicles  was  apprehended  and 
impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure 
to  the  DENR  Secretary  nor  give  a  written  notice  to  the  owner  of  the  vehicle  because 
private  respondents  immediately  went  to  court  and  applied  for  a  writ  of  replevin.  The 
seizure  of  the  vehicles  and  their  load  was  done  upon  their  apprehension  for  a  violation 
of  the  Revised  Forestry  Code.  It  would  be  absurd  to  require  a  confiscation  order  or 
notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances. 
Since  there  was  a  violation  of  the  Revised  Forestry  Code  and  the  seizure  was  in 
accordance  with  law,  in  our  view  the  subject  vehicles  were  validly  deemed  in  custodia 
legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by 
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law. 
On  the  second  issue,  is  the  complaint  for  the  recovery  of  possession  of  the  two 
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State? 
Well  established  is  the  doctrine  that  the  State  may  not  be  sued  without  its 
consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against 
the  State  if  its  purpose  is  to  hold  the  State  ultimately  liable.  However,  the  protection 
afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the 
scope  of  their  authority  in  good  faith  and  without  wilfulness,  malice  or  corruption.  In 
the  present  case,  the  acts  for  which  the  petitioners  are  being  called  to  account  were 
performed  by  them  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties.  The  acts  in  question  are 
clearly  official  in  nature.  In  implementing  and  enforcing  Sections  78-A  and  89  of  the 
Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties 
and  functions  as  officers  of  the  DENR,  and  did  so  within  the  limits  of  their  authority. 
There  was  no  malice  nor  bad  faith  on  their  part.  Hence,  a  suit  against  the  petitioners 
who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States 
consent.                        
G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997 
EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. 
VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City 
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. 
Facts:  
The  petitioners  were  apprehended  on  the  Sitio  Cadiz,  Barangay  Bacungan  Puerto 
Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform Code 
of  the  Philippines.  There  were  1,  800  board  feet  of  lumber  loaded  in  two (2)  passenger 
jeeps  in  different  sizes  and  dimension  that  were  confiscated.  On  August 9,  1991,  all the 
accused were pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Petioner Lalican filed a motion to 
quash the information filed against them contenting that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not 
include  lumber  because  the  wording  of  the  law  categorically  specify  timber  to  be 
collected as to constitute the violation on the said law. He further contends that, the law 
is  vague  because  it  does  specify  the  authority  or  legal  documents  required  by  existing 
forest law and regulation. The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground 
that it is not the courts to determine the wisdom of the law or to set the policy as rest by 
the legislature. He further asserts that the word timber should include lumber which is a 
product  or  derivative  of  a  timber.  The  position  of  the  prosecution  could  result  to  the 
circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a 
lumber. On September 24, 1991, the lower court construed the interpretation of the law 
against  the  State  thus  the  motion  was  granted.  The  prosecution  filed  a  motion  for 
reconsideration  on  the  order  underscoring  the  fact  that  the  accused  presented  Private 
Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while 
the  certificate  of  origin  indicated  Brgy.  Sta.  Cruz,  the  product  actually  came  from  Sitio 
Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of 
transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, 
then  the  accused  could  have  presented  a  certificate  of  lumber  origin,  lumber  sale 
invoices  in  case  of  sale,  tally  sheets  and  delivery  receipts  for  transportation  from  one 
point to another. The motion was approved thus this case.   
Issue:  
Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order to constitute an 
offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of 
the Philippines).   
Ruling:  
NO, The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The primary reason why the 
law  was  enacted  is  to  secure  and  maximize  the  use  of  the  natural  resources;  the  non 
inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for the circumvention of law. Section 68 of 
the said law punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal 
of  timber  or  other  forest  products  from  the  places  therein  mentioned  without  any 
authority;  or  (b)  possession  of  timber  or  other  forest  products  without  the  legal 
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the 
legislative  intent  to  include  possession  of  lumber  in  Sec.  68  is  clearly  gleaned  from  the 
expressed  reasons  for  enacting  the  law  which,  under  Executive  Order  No.  277.  To 
exclude  possession  of  "lumber"  from  the  acts  penalized  in  Sec.  68  would  certainly 
emasculate the law itself.             
PERFECTO PALLADA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000  
Facts: 
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources  (DENR)  office  in  Bukidnon  received  reports  that  illegally  cut  lumber  was 
being  delivered  to  the  warehouse  of  the  Valencia  Golden  Harvest  Corporation  in 
Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and trading. 
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the 
company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a  warrant issued by the 
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by 
a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner 
produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated 
March  6  and  17,  1992.  The  DENR  officers  did  not,  however,  give  credit  to  the  receipts 
considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. 
The  pieces  of  lumber  were  also  cut  by  chain  saw  and  thus  could  not  have  come  from  a 
licensed sawmill operator. 
The  following  day,  September  29,  1992,  the  first  batch  of  lumber,  consisting  of 
162  pieces  measuring  1,954.66  board  feet,  was  taken  and  impounded  at  the  FORE 
stockyard. 
On  October  1,  1992,  the  raiding  team  returned  for  the  remaining  lumber. 
Company  President  Francisco  Tankiko  and  a  certain  Isaias  Valdehueza,  who 
represented  himself  to  be  a  lawyer,  asked  for  a  suspension  of  the  operations  to  enable 
them  to  seek  a  lifting of  the  warrant.  The  motion  was  filed  with the  court  which  issued 
the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied. Accordingly, the remaining 
lumber was confiscated. 
On  February  23,  1993,  petitioner,  as  general  manager,  together  with  Noel  Sy,  as 
assistant  operations  manager,  and  Francisco  Tankiko,  as  president  of  the  Valencia 
Golden  Harvest  Corporation,  and  Isaias  Valdehueza,  were  charged  with  violation  of 
Section 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended. 
Issue: 
Was petitioner guilty of illegal possession of lumber in violation of Section 68 of 
the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended)? 
Held: 
Yes. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents to establish that 
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal: 
1.  Certificate of Timber Origin; 
2.  Auxiliary Invoice; 
3.  Certificate of Transport Agreement; 
4.  Tally Sheet; 
5.  Delivery Receipt; 
6.  Cash Voucher; and 
7.  Official Receipt for Environmental Fee. 
The  Certificates  of  Timber  Origin  presented  by  petitioner  was  not  given  credence 
since  the  lumber  held  by  the  company  should  be  covered  by  Certificates  of  Lumber 
Origin. 
Petitioner  contends  that  the  term  "timber"  includes  lumber  and,  therefore,  the 
Certificates  of  Timber  Origin  and  their  attachments  should  have  been  considered  in 
establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber. 
As BFD Circular No. 10-83 states in pertinent parts: 
In  order  to  provide  an  effective  mechanism  to  pinpoint  accountability  and 
responsibility  for  shipment  of  lumber  .  .  .  and  to  have  uniformity  in  documenting  the 
origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part 
of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized 
BFD officers. . . . 
5.       Lumber  .  .  .  transported/shipped  without  the  necessary  Certificate  of 
Lumber  Origin  (CLO)  .  .  .  as  herein  required  shall  be  considered  as  proceeding  from 
illegal  sources  and  as  such,  shall  be  subject  to  confiscation  and  disposition  in 
accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines. 
Petitioner  invokes  the  SC  ruling  in  Mustang  Lumber,  Inc.  v.  Court  of  Appeals, 
which  says  that  lumber  is  merely  processed  timber  and,  therefore,  the  word  "timber" 
embraces  lumber.  The  question  in  this  case  is  whether  separate  certificates  of  origin 
should  be  issued  for  lumber  and  timber.  Indeed,  different  certificates  of  origin  are 
required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. 
The  SC  also  considered  numerous  irregularities  and  defects  found  in  the 
documents  presented  by  the  petitioner  (i.e.  the  original  typewritten  name  of  the 
consignee  was  clearly  erased  and  changed,  all  the  Auxiliary  Invoice  were  not  properly 
accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank). 
The Certificate of Timber Origin in Exhibit 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears 
the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached 
to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the 
sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber 
from  the  dealers,  thus  belying  the  testimony  of  petitioner  that  when  the  company 
bought the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were 
cut into lumber by the company. 
The  presence  of  such  glaring  irregularities  negates  the  presumption  that  the 
CTOs  were  regularly  executed  by  the  DENR  officials  concerned.  The  presumption 
invoked  by  petitioner  applies  only  when  the  public  documents  are,  on  their  faces, 
regular and properly accomplished. 
The  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  affirmed  and  the  sentence  is  modified  to 
six  (6)  years  of  prision  correccional, as  minimum,  to  twenty  (20)  years  of reclusion 
temporal, as maximum.                                   
G.R. No. 136142 October 24, 2000 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO 
DATOR et.al , Accused- Appelant 
Facts:  
with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise 
known as the Revised Forestry Code. The accused while transporting pieces of lumber 
bound to Maasin Souther Leyte, they were apprehended by the police officer and seized 
pieces of lumber. As a result SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering the fifty-one 
(51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck 
with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were 
turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte 
who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern 
Leyte. The accused Telan alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of 
land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to 
use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. He 
further contends that he secured verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge 
of the DENR. The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD  
705 sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, 
with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than 
PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to 
pay the costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.   
Issue:  
Whether the penalty imposed to Telan the accused is correct in violation of PD 705   
Ruling:  
No, In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and 
Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not 
premium quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the 
appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not 
for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not 
appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other 
pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised 
Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of 
this case, and in the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the 
appellant should be the minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the 
Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum  
and medium periods for simple theft. Considering that the crime of violation of Section 
68 of PD No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the 
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant 
shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and 
medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.                  
G.R. No. 161798 October 20, 2004 
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, 
Presiding Judge, respondent  
Facts: 
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp 
and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-
issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest 
Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-
manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the 
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. The Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 
1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 designating the petitioner as DENR 
depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its 
concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered 
into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural Guidelines in the 
Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The MOA provided, among others, 
that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates of Private Tree wnership 
(CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, 
and petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were 
deputized as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and 
conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed 
and possessed by the offenders. In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid 
Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous 
occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area. These illegally cut 
forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOPs impounding area. 
A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary 
mandatory Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null 
and void and sought to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from 
enforcing the said memoranda.  
Issue; 
Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the virtue 
of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private 
Tree Plantation.  
Ruling: 
Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and 
conveyances. Petitioners compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated 
logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the 
confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted 
that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases 
pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government Prosecution- 
Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioners interest in the confiscated forest products was 
merely contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of 
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that private respondents 
intrusion was in violation of petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license 
agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, 
and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession 
area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary 
interest pursuant to these license agreements.        
G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990 
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. 
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY 
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE 
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT 
and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY 
CORPORATION, respondents. 
FACTS:  
Petitioner  entered  into  a  timber  license  agreement  with  the  Department  of  Agriculture 
and  Natural  Resources,  represented  by  then  Secretary  Jose  Feliciano,  wherein  it  was 
issued  an  exclusive  license  to  cut,  collect  and  remove  timber  except  prohibited  species 
within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in 
the  municipality  of  Maddela,  province  of  Nueva  Vizcaya  from  October  12,  1965  until 
June  30,  1990.  However,  on  August  18,  1983,  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Forest 
Development  (Bureau),  Director  Edmundo  Cortes,  issued  a  memorandum  order 
stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling 
the  logging  concession  of  petitioner  and  nine  other  forest  concessionaires,  pursuant  to 
presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources 
Teodoro Pena.  
Subsequently,  petitioners  timber  license  agreement  was  cancelled.  He  sent  a  letter 
addressed  to  then  President  Ferdinand  Marcos  which  sought  reconsideration  of  the 
Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and 
alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its 
logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;  
Barely  one  year  thereafter,  approximately  one-half  of  the  area  formerly  covered  by 
petitioners  TLA  was  re-awarded  to  Twin  Peaks  Development  and  Realty  Corporation 
under  a  new  TLA  which  was  set  to  expire  on  July  31,  2009,  while  the  other  half  was 
allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or 
license.  The  latter  entities  were  controlled  or  owned  by  relatives  or  cronies  of  deposed 
President  Ferdinand  Marcos.  Soon  after  the  change  of  government  in  February  1986, 
petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another 
letter  dated  April  2,  1986  to  Minister  Ernesto  Maceda  of  the  Ministry  of  Natural 
Resources [MNR],  seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which 
was  cancelled  in  August  1983  during  the  Marcos  administration;  (2)  the  revocation  of 
TLA  No.  356  which  was  issued  to  Twin  Peaks  Development  and  Realty  Corporation 
without  public  bidding  and  in  violation  of  forestry  laws,  rules  and  regulations;  and,  (3) 
the  issuance  of  an  order  allowing  petitioner  to  take  possession  of  all  logs  found  in  the 
concession  area.  However,  petitioner's  request  was  denied.  Petitioner  moved  for 
reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license agreement 
issued  to  private  respondent  be  declared  null  and  void.  The  MNR  however  denied  this 
motion.   
HELD:  
NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period 
of  time  renders  the  petitioner  susceptible  to  the  adverse  legal  consequences  of  laches. 
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of 
time  to  do  that  which  by  exercising  due  diligence,  could  or  should  have  been  done 
earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the 
party  entitled  thereto  has  either  abandoned  it  of  declined  to  assert  it.  The  rule  is  that 
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, 
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did 
these  who  are  vigilant,  not  those  who  sleep  upon  their  rights.  In  the  case  at  bar, 
petitioner  waited  for  at  least  three  years  before  it  finally  filed  a  petition  for  certiorari 
with  the  Court  attacking  the  validity  of  the  assailed  Bureau  actions  in  1983  and  1984. 
Considering  that  petitioner,  throughout  the  period  of  its  inaction,  was  not  deprived  of 
the  opportunity  to  seek  relief  from  the  courts  which  were  normally  operating  at  the 
time,  its  delay  constitutes  unreasonable  and  inexcusable  neglect,  tantamount to laches. 
Accordingly,  the  writ  of  certiorari  requiring  the  reversal  of  these  orders  will  not  lie. 
There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor 
of  petitioner  and  against  public  respondents  herein.  A  long  line  of  cases  establish  the 
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound 
discretion  of  government  agencies  entrusted  with  the  regulation  of  activities  coming 
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as 
in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of 
the public at large on  
the  pressing  public  policy  issue  of  forest  conservation.  For  this  Court  recognizes  the 
wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate 
actions  to  be  taken  to  preserve  and  manage  natural  resources,  and  the  proper  parties 
who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and 
license  agreements  are  the  principal  instruments  by  which  the  State  regulates  the 
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. 
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State 
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the 
particular  concession  area  and  the  forest  products  therein.  They  may  be  validly 
amended,  modified,  replaced  or  rescinded  by  the  Chief  Executive  when  national 
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due 
process of law clause.                                        
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed 
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents petitioners, 
vs. 
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the 
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and 
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, 
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.  
Facts 
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, 
claiming that they bring the case in the name of their generation as well as those 
generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary 
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources HYPERLINK 
"http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php? 
title=Department_of_Environment_and_Natural_Resources" \t "_blank" , seeking to 
have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease 
and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children 
invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in 
its capacity as parens patriae. 
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to 
stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law and 
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was 
dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was 
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.  
Issue 
Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?  
Ruling 
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal 
standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their 
right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that 
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing 
to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment 
of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest 
of public welfare.                      
GR 152160 
Bon vs. People of the Philippines 
Jan 13, 2014  
Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 
of PD 705, as amended,together with Rosalio Bon under an Information. The petitioners 
cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, 
and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at 
approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita 
Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper authorities the 
necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and 
prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount 
of P25,000.00.  
Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into 
lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to 
investigate the report. Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain, who in 
turn wrote a letter to one of the barangay tanod to assist and investigate Teresitas 
complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian 
Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon 
repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation, the 
group discovered six (6) stumps of trees: four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and 
one amugis tree. Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into 
lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction 
of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of 
Teresita for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land and found four stumps of trees.   
Issues 
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are 
not police operatives or media representatives is admissible in evidence against the 
author   
Ruling 
The Petition has no merit. The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and 
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected 
because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified. 
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, 
collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein 
mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products 
without the legal documents.  
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the prosecution 
to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees. 
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, 
is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings 
of guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the 
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable 
conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
34 
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the 
following elements concur: 
1. There is more than one circumstance. 
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. 
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction 
beyond reasonable doubt.
35 
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the 
affirmative.     
Chu vs. Judge Tamin 
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003  
Facts:  
  Chu filed administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, 
and  grave  abuse  of  discretion  against  Judge  Camilo  E.  Tamin  of  the  Regional  Trial 
Court,  Branch  23,  Molave,  Zamboanga  del  Sur.  Judge  Tamin  issued  search  warrant 
against Chu for possession of forest products of dubious origin in violation of PD 705 
as  applied  for  by  Communty  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  Officer  Michael  dela 
Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz). On the strength of the warrant, 576 pieces of pagtapat lumber 
(mangrove  specie)  was  seized  from  Chu.      Chu  assailed  the  validity  of  the  warrant  for 
violating  Sec.  5,  Rule  126  of  the  Revised  Rules  of  Criminal  Procedure  because  the 
certified copies he obtained from the court did not contain any transcript of the judges 
examination  of  CENRO  dela  Cruz  or  his  witness  Cuaresma.  Judge  Tamins  contention: 
the certified copies of the records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript 
of  his  examination  because  the  clerical  staff  in  his  office  who  prepared  the  certified 
copies inadvertently failed to do so. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)s findings: 
Judge  Tamin  is  liable  for  gross  ignorance  of  the  law.  Respondent  judge  apparently 
believes that searching questions need not be in writing.    
Issue: Whether Judge Tamin properly issued the search warrant against Chu.   
 Held:    SC  held  that  Judge  Tamin  is  grossly  ignorant  of  the  law  and  ordered  to  pay 
P5,000.00 fine. Art. III, Sec. 2 of Constitution and Rule 126, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules 
of  Criminal  Procedure  implements  the  proscription  against  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures.  The  Court,  in  Pendon  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  reiterated  the  requirements  of 
Section  2  on  the  issuance  of  search  warrants,  which  judges  must  strictly  observe,  as 
follows:    Under  the  above  provision,  the  issuance  of  a  search  warrant  is  justified  only 
upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In determining  
the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x 
x  x  witnesses  personally;  (2)  the  examination  must  be  under  oath;  and  (3)  the 
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers                              
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs  
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII) 
G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992  
FACTS:  
The  private  respondents  were  charged  with  the  crime  of  qualified  theft  of  logs, 
defined  and  punished  under  Section  68  of  Presidential  Decree  No.  705,  otherwise 
known as the Revised  Forestry Code of the Philippines. On July 28, 29 and 30, 1976 at 
Barangay  Mahabang  Lalim  Municipality  of  General  Nakar,  Province  of  Quezon  City, 
Godofredo  Arrozal  and  Luis  Flores  together  with  20  other  whose  identities  are  still 
unknown  enter  the  privately-owned  land  of  Felicitacion  Pujalte.  Inside  the  privately-
owned land  they illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away without consent of the 
owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, 60 
logs of different species consisting of about 541.48 cubic.   
On  March  23,   1977,   the  named  accused  fil ed  a  motion  to  quash  the 
information  on  two  (2)grounds,  to  wit:  (1)  that  the  facts  charged  do  not  , 
constitute  an  offense;  and,  (2)  that  the  informationdoes  not  conform  substantially 
to  the  prescribed  form.  The  Trial  court  dismissed  the  information  on  thegrounds 
invoked and the reconsideration sought was denied.Hence this petition.  
ISSUE:  
  Whether or not the information charged an offense.  
RULING: 
The  information  substantially  alleged  all  the  elements  of  the  crime  of  qualified 
theft  of  logs  as  described  in  Section  68  of  P.D.  705.  While  it  was  admitted  that  the 
information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without 
the  consent  of  the  state,"  nevertheless,  said  information  expressly  stated  that  the 
accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent 
of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, lease, license 
or  permit,  sixty  (60)  logs  of  different  species.  .  .  ."  Since  only  the  state  can  grant  the 
lease,  license,  license  agreement  or  permit  for  utilization  of  forest  resources,  including 
timber,  then  the  allegation  in  the  information  that  the  asportation  of  the  logs  was 
"without  any  authority"  under  a  license  agreement,  lease,  license  or  permit,  is 
tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.  
While  it  is  only  the  state  which  can  grant  a  license  or  authority  to  cut,  gather, 
collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the 
state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands 
is  retained  under  the  principle  in  civil  law  that  ownership  of  the  land  includes 
everything found on its surface.  
Ownership  is  not  an  essential  element  of  the  offense  as  defined  in  Section  60  of 
P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the  information to allege the true owner of the forest 
products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any 
authority or license from the government.            
People vs. Que 
G.R. No. 120365, December 17, 1996   
Facts:  
 A  member  of  the  Provincial  Task  Force  on  Illegal  Logging  received  a  reliable 
information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal 
lumber  would  pass  through  Ilocos  Norte.  Two  weeks  later,  while  members  of  the 
Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-
wheeler  truck  described  by  the  informant.  When  they  apprehended  it  at  the  Marcos 
Bridge,  Que,  the  owner  of  the  truck  and  the  cargo,  admitted  that  there  were  sawn 
lumber  in  between  the  coconut  slabs.  When  the  police  officers  asked  for  the  lumber's 
supporting  documents,  accused-appellant  could  not  present  any.    Que  was  charged  of 
and convicted for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 for possession of illegally cut lumbers.  
  Ques contention: He argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of 
P.D.  705  because  E.O.  277  which  amended  Section  68  to  penalize  the  possession  of 
timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the 
particular  documents  necessary  to  make  the  possession  legal.  Neither  did  the  other 
forest laws and regulations existing at the time  
of its enactment. He also contended that the lumbers were fruits of an illegal search and 
seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.    
Issue:  
  Whether the search and seizure violated his constitutional rights;  
  Whether he violated Sec. 68 pf PD 705.    
Held:  
 Que was held guilty and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.    
SC  reject  appellant's  argument  that  the  law  only  penalizes  possession  of  illegal  forest 
products  and  that  the  possessor  cannot  be  held  liable  if  he  proves  that  the  cutting, 
gathering,  collecting  or  removal  of  such  forest  products  is  legal.  There  are  two  (2) 
distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:    
 (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any 
forest  land,  or  timber  from  alienable  or  disposable  public  land,  or  from  private  land 
without any authority; and  
 (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required 
under existing forest laws and regulations. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense 
the legality of the acts of  
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting 
the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,  however, it is  immaterial 
whether  the  cutting,  gathering,  collecting  and  removal  of  the forest  products  is  legal  or 
not. Mere possession of forest  
products  without  the  proper  documents  consummates  the  crime.  Whether  or  not  the 
lumber  comes  from  a  legal  source  is  immaterial  because  E.O  277  considers  the  mere 
possession  of  timber  or  other  forest  products  without  the  proper  legal  documents  as 
malum  prohibitum.  The  constitutional  proscription  against  warrantless  searches  and 
seizures  admits  of  certain  exceptions.  Aside  from  a  search  incident  to  a  lawful  arrest,  a 
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles,  
and the seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, 
this  had  been  justified  on  the  ground  that  the  mobility  of  motor  vehicles  makes  it 
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which 
the warrant must be sought.      
ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA 
G.R. No. 152989 
September 4, 2002   
 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about 60,000 square 
meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. TP-331 which he bought from a 
certain Ildefonso O. Maglasang. On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private 
Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his 
property. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly informed by 
some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) 
that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still 
awaiting approval. Consequently,petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and 
bulldozing of the roadway.He used the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages. 
About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural 
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of 
Tacloban City raided petitioner's place, allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory 
of the cut trees was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were entrusted to a 
barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at that time. Several days 
thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a search 
warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board 
feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per 
board foot. Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation of Section 
68 of PD 705 as amended was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City 
Prosecutor of Ormoc City.   
ISSUES & RULINGS:  
 (1) whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this case, is criminally liable 
under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property;  
YES, he is still liable. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that 
the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. Articles 
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the purpose of 
determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts which constitute qualified 
theft. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise known as the Revised 
Forestry Code of the Philippines provides: SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting 
Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, 
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from 
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or 
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under 
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under 
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:Provided, That in case of partnerships, 
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection 
or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the 
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on 
Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of 
the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, 
or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used 
in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied) The said 
law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable 
acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in 
determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or 
charged with its violation POSSESSES THE REQUIRED PERMIT, LICENSE OR 
AUTHORIZATION FROM DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or 
other forest products. (2) whether the owner of the private property is dministratively 
liable under Sec. 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he 
did not transport the logs out of his property and just used them for his own agricultural 
purposes therein and the aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act of 
transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an 
offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of 
petitioner that he never transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to say that 
such is a factual issue which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine. We are limited 
to resolving questions of law. Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the 
"Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private 
Land Timber Permit," provides: SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-
wood products covered by these regulations which are transported without the 
prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation 
in favor of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and 
regulations governing the matter. DENR Officials found issuing defective certificate of 
origin and other transport documents required in this Order shall be subject to 
suspension without prejudice to the imposition of other penalties as may be warranted 
by extant Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations. (3) whether the logs confiscated by 
the DENR should be returned to the petitioner considering that the same were not 
transported out and merely used for his own agricultural purposes.  any pronouncement 
thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt of the petitioner has not been 
legally established.