A. What is the nature of inhibition?
Inhibition is an act when a judge personally prevents himself from taking cognizance of
the case. This is made through a written petition to inhibit which shall state the
grounds for the same. The explanation of the judge whether or not to take cognizance
of the case must also be in writing. Thus, inhibition is generally voluntary. This
means that determination of whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion
and conscience of the trial judge based on his logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case brought before him. The discretion given to trial judges is an
acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the
issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with parties-litigants in their
courtrooms. People vs. Gallermo, G.R. No. 123546, July 7, 1998, 95 SCA 579!. !owever, a
decision to inhibit must be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and
valid reasons. It is not enough that a party cast some tenuous allegations of partiality
at the judge.
"s a general rule, " litigant is entitled to the fairness and cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. Thus, partiality and pre-judgment can be just and valid reasons for the judge
to voluntarily inhibit himself. !owever, mere suspicion that he is partial is not enough.
There must be "lear a#$ "o#v%#"%#& evidence to prove the charge '(e"u#$o vs. )e#*am%#,
e". 18, 1989! and the burden of proof lies with the complainant to show that there is
bias su#cient to be a ground for inhibition. There is $ias or %rejudice when the
resulting opinion is based upon an extrajudicial source& that is, some in'uence other
than the facts and law presented in the courtroom.
B. Diference between voluntary inhibition and mandatory disqualifcation.
(. "s to grounds. In voluntary inhibition there is no speci)c grounds but the rule
only provides broad basis for inhibition while in mandatory dis*uali)cation there
are speci)c grounds enumerated under the rules of court for dis*uali)cation.
The following are the grounds for mandatory dis*uali)cation+
a. ,hen he, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor, or otherwise-
+. ,hen he is related to either party within the .th degree of consanguinity
or a#nity or to counsel within the /th civil degree-
". ,hen he has been an executor, guardian, administrator, trustee, or
counsel- or
$. ,hen he has presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is
subject to review, without the written consent of the parties. 'Rule 137,
RRC!
0. As to nature. In voluntary inhibition, the matter is left to the judge1s sound
discretion while in the judge has no discretion to sit or try the case. It is
mandatory
2. Section 5 anon ! of the "ew ode of #udicial onduct $or the
%hili&&ine #udiciary, which took e3ect on 4une (, 055/, added the following
grounds to mandatory inhibition&
a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding- and
b. The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the
matter in controversy.
,hen any of the grounds for mandatory inhibition exists, the judge must
dis*ualify himself without any challenge from either party. !e has no option. The only
exception is when all the parties, upon disclosure by the judge of the ground, give
consent in writing and this written consent is entered into the record. This is called
6emittal of 7is*uali)cation.
C. In what cases decided by the Su&reme ourt was the 'ud(e ordered to
inhibit himself?
,y v. )a#"o (%l%p%#o Sav%#&s a#$ -or.&a&e )a#/, e.. al., G.R. Nos. 149797098,
(e+. 13, 2114
o In this case, the judge, by assuming actual receipt by the respondents of
proof of service of the motion for reconsideration, absolving $anco 8ilipino
from paying the expenses of production of documents, and suggesting to
$anco 8ilipino what evidence to present to prove its case, transgressed the
boundaries of impartiality. Thus, the judge should inhibit himself. The rule is
that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and
probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind- he should
conduct a careful self-examination. !e should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people9s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better
course for the judge under such circumstances is to dis*ualify himself. That
way, he avoids being misunderstood- his reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserved. ,hat is more important, the ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up to.
2CA v. Ju$&e (loro, A.-. No. R,J09901461, -ar"3 31, 2116
o In this case, the judge explicitly stated to his court sta3 and the %ublic
"ssistance :#ce %":; lawyer that he is <pro-accused= particularly
concerning detention prisoners, the judge opened himself up to suspicion
regarding his impartiality.
'-ar.%#e4 v. G%ro#ella, G.R. No. 5037635, July 22, 1975;
o The judge1s statement in the decision ac*uitting $ayongan to the e3ect that
the crime was committed by >artinez renders it impossible for the judge to
be free from suspicion that in deciding the case he will be biased
(er#a#$e4 v 6as7ue4
o In this case, %etitioner )led a motion for inhibition before the 6egional
Trial ?ourt of >anila on the grounds of loss of trust and con)dence in the
impartiality of the %residing 4udge manifesting bias and prejudice to the
instant case. The issue concerning the assessment of witness and )ling
fees had already been passed and ruled upon by the ?" in a judicial
proceeding. "lso, the allegations of bias and partiality of respondent
judge in connection with the denial of the motions of inhibition )led by
complainant are matters which are judicial in character and may not be
addressed in this administrative complaint. :rders of inhibition are not
administrative in character- they are judicial in nature. Thus, the propriety
of the action of the judge in denying the motions for inhibition should
have been raised in a judicial proceeding and not in this administrative
action.
-a.eo v 6%llalu4
o The issue before us brings to mind the words of @ugen @hrlich, philosopher, who
stated& AThere is no guaranty of justice except the personality of a judge.A
@hrlich, A8reedom of 7ecisionA, The Bcience of Cegal >ethod, 5 >od. Ceg. %hilos,
Ber. .D, (E(F trans. by $runcken;. Indeed, judicial integrity is the )rst and
highest *uali)cation a judge must possess G integrity maintained especially in
cognizance of the limits ofman. In this wise, we cite the oft *uoted example of a
judge voluntarily inhibiting himself so as to preserve the prized ideal of Athe cold
neutrality of an impartial judgeA implicit in the guarantee of due process.
The above rulings of the Bupreme ?ourt are founded on the following provision under
the Hew ?ode of 4udicial ?onduct&
Se". 5, Ca#o# 3, NCJC8 Ju$&es s3all $%s7ual%9y .3emselves 9rom par.%"%pa.%#& %# a#y
pro"ee$%#& %# :3%"3 .3ey are u#a+le .o $e"%$e .3e ma..er %mpar.%ally or %# :3%"3 %.
may appear .o a reaso#a+le o+server .3a. .3ey are u#a+le .o $e"%$e .3e ma..er
%mpar.%ally. Such proceedings include, but are NOT limited to, instances where:
(. .3e *u$&e 3as a".ual +%as or pre*u$%"e "o#"er#%#& a par.y or perso#al /#o:le$&e
o9 $%spu.e$ ev%$e#.%ary 9a".s "o#"er#%#& .3e pro"ee$%#&s;
0. .3e *u$&e prev%ously serve$ as a la:yer or :as a ma.er%al :%.#ess %# .3e ma..er
%# "o#.roversy;
2. .3e *u$&e, or a mem+er o9 3%s or 3er 9am%ly, 3as a# e"o#om%" %#.eres. %# .3e
ou."ome o9 .3e ma..er %# "o#.roversy;
/. .3e *u$&e serve$ as e<e"u.or, a$m%#%s.ra.or, &uar$%a#, .rus.ee, or la:yer %# .3e
"ase or ma..er %# "o#.roversy, or a 9ormer asso"%a.e o9 .3e *u$&e serve$ as
"ou#sel $ur%#& .3e%r asso"%a.%o#, or .3e *u$&e or la:yer :as a ma.er%al :%.#ess
.3ere%#;
D. .3e *u$&e=s rul%#& %# a lo:er "our. %s .3e su+*e". o9 rev%e:;
.. .3e *u$&e %s rela.e$ +y "o#sa#&u%#%.y or a>#%.y .o a par.y l%.%&a#. :%.3%# .3e
s%<.3 "%v%l $e&ree or .o "ou#sel :%.3%# .3e 9our.3 "%v%l $e&ree; or
F. .3e *u$&e /#o:s .3a. 3%s or 3er spouse or "3%l$ 3as a ?#a#"%al %#.eres., as 3e%r,
le&a.ee, "re$%.or, ?$u"%ary, or o.3er:%se, %# .3e su+*e". ma..er %# "o#.roversy or
%# a par.y .o .3e pro"ee$%#&, or a#y o.3er %#.eres. .3a. "oul$ +e su+s.a#.%ally
a@e".e$ +y .3e ou."ome o9 .3e pro"ee$%#&s.
D. ,hat are the available options+ Bupport your options with legal provisions and
jurisprudence+
)%*I)"S I$ *+,-, IS A .-)/"D *) I"+I0I*
Remittal of Disqualifcation - %ursuant to Bection . of ?anon 2 of the Hew
?ode of 4udicial ?onduct, " judge that might be dis*uali)ed may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of
dis*uali)cation. If based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers
independently of the judge1s participation, all agree in writing that the reason
for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate
in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
)%*I)"S I$ *+,-, IS A .-)/"D *) I"+I0I* 0/* *+, #/D., $AI1,D *)
I"+I0I* +I2S,1$
Mandamus lie to com&el a 'ud(e to inhibit himself? - If there is a valid
ground that would render mandatory dis*uali)cation not just mere voluntary or
discretionary inhibition, a judge may by ma#$amus be compelled to act on
*uestions regarding his dis*uali)cation from sitting in a case.
Inder Bection 2 of 6ule .D of the 6ules of ?ourt, ,hen any tribunal, corporation,
board, o#cer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law speci)cally enjoins as a duty resulting from an o#ce, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or o#ce to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and ade*uate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may )le a
veri)ed petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be speci)ed by the court, to do the act re*uired to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent
)%*I)"S I$ *+,-, IS A .-)/"D *) I"+I0I* 0/* *+, #/D., $AI1,D *)
I"+I0I* +I2S,1$ *+," %-),,D *) +,A- *+, AS,
New Trial - If the complaint was deprived of a fair and Impartial trial in a
criminal case he may )le a motion of Hew Trial. Hew Trial is the rehearing of a
case already decided by the court but before the judgment rendered thereon
becomes )nal and executory, whereby errors of law or irregularities are
expunged from the record, or new evidence is introduced, or both steps are
taken. It may be granted at any time before the judgment of conviction
becomes )nal on the motion of the accused or on motion of the court but with
the consent of the accused.
Bection 0 of 6ule (0( provides the grounds for new trial, to wit&
,3e "our. s3all &ra#. a #e: .r%al o# a#y o9 .3e 9ollo:%#& &rou#$s8
A 'a! ,3a. errors o9 la: or %rre&ular%.%es pre*u$%"%al .o .3e su+s.a#.%al r%&3.s o9
.3e a""use$ 3ave +ee# "omm%..e$ $ur%#& .3e .r%al;A
Bec. . of the same rule provides the e3ects of granting a new trial, to wit&
J B3e# a #e: .r%al %s &ra#.e$ o# .3e &rou#$ o9 errors o9 la: or %rre&ular%.%es
"omm%..e$ $ur%#& .3e .r%al, all .3e pro"ee$%#&s a#$ ev%$e#"e a@e".e$ .3ere+y s3all
+e se. as%$e a#$ .a/e# a#e:. ,3e "our. may, %# .3e %#.eres. o9 *us.%"e, allo: .3e
%#.ro$u".%o# o9 a$$%.%o#al ev%$e#"e.
