Metaphysical realism
Introduction
The broad definition of metaphysical realism would rest on two fundamental dimensions: existence
and independence. Existence would be the claim that the world has intrinsic structures, which would
have existed even if we had not. While independence could be related as the world and its features
are as they are, not dependent on our beliefs, attitude and perceptions. As such, there is a world
(reality) external to the mental or phenomenal realm of us (cognisors)
1
.
To understand the plausibility of a metaphysical reality, the essay will look into some stands of the
metaphysical realists while addressing its limitations.
The 2 main arguments
2
against the fundamental dimensions of metaphysical realism would be
1) To deny that anything exists at all and/ or
2) Even if things exist, neither their existence nor any of their features can be independent of the
operations of a mind.
The first argument is inherently flawed. A view of non-existence is self-refuting in the sense that if
one can claim nothing exists, then at the very least, the claim or belief must exist
3
.
As such, the main focus of argument against a metaphysical reality would concern the ontological
status of things/entities (whether they can mind-independent), instead of their existence. For
example, a metaphysical realist and anti-realist might agree that trees do exist but differ in their
metaphysical import of such an existence.
Arguments and limitations
The first instance of an independence nature of reality can be related to Platos concept of Forms
which is considered to be the ideal archetypes or essences of everything that exist. Forms could also
be seen as universals in which objects in our nature world exemplify or participate in.
Universals are seen as repeatable or recurrent entities beyond the mind-dependent world that can
be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things in our world. To have a mind-dependent
reality or to have objects to interpret, there must exist an independent reality (universals) which we
can relate our mind to, or to interpret from.
However, the definition of universals and the link between universals and reality faces several issues.
A universal entity is caught between being divisible among all the places it is exemplified, or that it is
indivisible but somehow present in multiple places at the same time. Furthermore, in trying to
explain the relation of exemplification, an infinite regress arises
4
. The inherent problems of
universals (definition and relation to reality) would show that it is not a sufficient condition to prove
the existence of a mind-independent reality.
1
Ferralolo, William (2001). Metaphysical Realism. Dilogos 77
2
Smith, Deborah Colleen (1996). Metaphysical realism and antirealism: an analysis of the contemporary
debate. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington
3
Lowe, E. Jonathan (2011). "Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism."Philosophia
Scientiae The Metaphysical Issue: 9-33.
4
Donagan, Alan (1963). Universals and Metaphysical Realism Metaphysics Today The Monist, 47(2): 211-246
Another argument for a mind-independent reality could be summarised by John Nolt. In his
argument for metaphysical realism, Nolt states the following 2 premises
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:
1) The cosmos existed and had structure before we existed
2) During some of this time, it was possible that we would never exist
From these premises it follows that
1) The cosmos has structure that would have existed even if we never had
Therefore,
2) The cosmos has structure that is independent of our cognition i.e., intrinsic structure.
Nolt argues that it is evident the structure of cosmos is independent from human cognition as we
knew that stars and evolving life had existed long before human beings, while human beings
existence had hinged on a series of probable events (asteroid impact and various mutations). Since
human nonexistence was physically possible, the cosmos and structure would have existed even if
we did not. Effectively, cosmos existence could exist beyond/ independently of our existence and
cognition.
However, a limitation to Nolts argument would be the interpretations of a distant past structured
comos. An anti-realist would argue that the structure is actually a product of our current
manipulative and interpretive activities. The structure of the comos, history and time is conceptually
dependent on our cognition. Sense data of the cosmos, such as carbon-dating fossil records can only
be understood in relation to history and time, which is cognitive dependent. As such, the universe
does not exist independently of us in some objective expanse of time, but rather in an arrangement
of sense data which is dependent on our cognitive understanding of time and space
6
.
In relation to Nolts argument, Smith states a common conflict between metaphysical realists and
anti-realists.
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An argument often stated by realist such as Nolt would be that even if all minded individuals cease
to exist, it would be intuitive to suppose entities and objects would continue to exist. This is
problematic due to two presuppositions: Firstly, the intuition is based on the assumption that we are
not mistaken by the genuine ontological status of mind independent entities that we pre-reflectively
take to exist. Secondly, this assumption is further related to the assumption that we can succeed in
making accurate references to independent entities.
These intuitions are based on beliefs that entities do exist. While beliefs are justified via knowledge
that true ontological status exist and we have access to it. These two assumptions would require
that we can acquire true knowledge within our current metaphysical state.
The anti-realist rebuttal could be summed by the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment whereby we
could be brains kept in a vat and hooked up by a supercomputer which provides information about
an external world to the vat. The brain-in-a-vat experiment could thus prove the point that the
genuine ontological status of entities could be radically different and there is no way we can
accurately refer to it.
5
Nolt, John (2004). "An Argument For Metaphysical Realism." Journal for General Philosophy of Science: 71-90
6
Nolt, John (2004). "An Argument For Metaphysical Realism." Journal for General Philosophy of Science: 71-90
7
Smith, Deborah Colleen (1996). Metaphysical realism and antirealism: an analysis of the contemporary
debate. Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington
Smith then goes on to state: the truth of what I am or the truth about the way the world is
impossible due to the fact that my minds constitution makes it impossible for me to acquire the
relevant concepts
The synthesis from Smith brings out the importance of understanding the epistemic issues on a
metaphysical reality. There would be no point in discussing a metaphysical reality if we do not
understand its specifics, namely: 1) what is the ontological status of mind independent entities and
2) whether we can ever know it or make accurate references to these entities.
Scientific epistemology: issues of understanding a metaphysical reality
As the epistemology scope is indefinitely broad, the second part of my essay will assume that a
mind-independent reality exist for simplicity. The essay also will focus mainly on the issues of
scientific epistemology and whether it can bring to light what a metaphysical reality is.
The origins on the scepticism of whether scientific epistemology could be bring us knowledge of the
world has been crystallised by Humes scepticism.
Hume has applied Descartes radical doubt to an empiricist framework whereby scientific knowledge
is flawed as it is based on the belief that principles of universal causation and induction are true but
there is no evidence to warrant the belief.
I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in
fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I
desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive.
David Hume, from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Consider the statement, a fire can burn and hurt you. For someone who has not experienced putting
his hands into flames, no amount of reasoning can provide justification for explaining the pain fire
can cause. While, independently observing fire and pain does not allow one to discover whichever is
the cause or effect. Therefore, understanding knowledge of the world via an empiricist
framework of universal causation and induction is limited, since foundations of the belief is
inherently flawed.
Immanuel Kant then reconciled the limitation by addressing the assumption which Hume had made
the passivity of a human mind. Instead Kant argues, the human mind is an active agent in
constructing knowledge, using faculties of the mind to sort and organise the data from our sense
experience. Universal causation and induction are part of the faculties of mind and an empiricist
approach is viable towards understanding the world.
Kant would go on to state a transcendental idealist world which is essentially a metaphysical state
that distinguishes between a world of appearances and a world of things in themselves. The world of
appearance is constructed in the human mind via sensory matters that we receive passively and a
prior forms that are supplied by our cognitive functions. However, this means we can only have a
priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by
our cognitive faculties. In Kant's words, we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves
have put into them
Kants argument would be that even though a world of things exist (independent reality), we are
limited by our a priori cognitive faculties to a world of appearances. Even though an empiricist
approach could be relevant to understanding the world, the issue whether a scientific approach can
be used to understand an independent reality or can only be limited to appearances, remains.
A contemporary version of the debate will be related to scientific realism.
Contemporary arguments and limitations
Scientific realism has many different definitions. It is generally a positive epistemic attitude towards
the content of best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable
aspects of the world described by the sciences. Observables relates to aspects of the world which we
can perceive using unaided senses. For discussion purpose, we will assume that a scientific realist
also hold the position that science aims to produce true description of things in the world
(Independent reality), or approximately true description.
The two important propositions scientific realist would put forth would be the miracle of science
and its corroboration.
The miracle of science
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states that the best of science theories can be seen to be true due to their
astounding accuracy and intricate causal manipulations of relevant phenomena. That they are able
to facilitate empirical predictions and explain subject matters of scientific investigation. This is
further built on its sense of corroboration.
When an unobservable entity or property is putatively detected by by two or more different forms
of detection such as the apparatuses employed and/or causal mechanisms and processes described,
this may serve as an argument for realism. The fact that the same thing is revealed by distinct modes
of detection suggests that it would be an extraordinary coincidence if the supposed target of these
revelations did not exist. The greater the extent to which detections can be corroborated by
different means, especially through theoretically independent means of detection, the stronger the
argument for realism.
However, there are certain inherent limitations of scientific methodology that could lead to its
biasness.
For example, the techniques of detection are often constructed and calibrated precisely with the
intention of reproducing specific outputs
9
. Or they could be constructed based on certain scientific
theories or within theory paradigms and thus could result in bias corroboration results.
While the inference to best explanation states that every theory has empirically equivalent rivals
which could be determined by its explanatory superiority
10
In order to judge that theory
phenomenon explanatory superiority some criteria is used, on the basis of which the judgement is
made. Criteria such as simplicity, consistency and coherence, scope and unity .
However, the criteria brings across two issues. Firstly, what reason is there to think that a certain
criteria is an indicator of truth? Thus, the ability to rank theories with respect to their likelihood of
being true may be questioned. Secondly, theories usually come within a paradigm or as pools of
theories. Even if criteria is reliable with respect to the truth, a true theory might still not be
considered. One may simply, as van Fraassen notes11, end up with the best of a bad lot.
8
Brown, J. R., 1982, The Miracle of Science, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 232244.
9
van Fraassen , B. C., 1985, Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science, in Churchland & Hooker (eds.), Images of
Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, (with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen), Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
10
Laudan, L., 1990, Demystifying Underdetermination, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories,Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
11
van Fraassen, B. C., 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon.
Thomas Kuhns introduction of the paradigm shift could sum up the issues scientific realism faces.
Kuhn
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argued that periods of normal science, are punctuated by revolutions which lead scientific
communities from one period of normal science into another.
Two different periods of normal science, he said, are incommensurable with one another, in such
a way as to render the world importantly different after a revolution. Kuhn held that if two theories
are incommensurable, they are not comparable in a way that would permit the judgement that one
is epistemically superior to the other, because different periods of normal science are characterized
by different paradigms
As a consequence, scientists in different periods of normal science generally employ different
methods and standards, experience the world differently via theory laden perceptions, and most
importantly, differ with respect to the very meanings of their terms.
A relation to neo-Kantian argument would be that paradigms function so as to create the reality of
scientific phenomena, thereby allowing scientists to engage with this reality. To summarise,
empirical reality has always been structured by scientific paradigms (techniques of detection,
explanatory criteria ), and this violates the metaphysical commitment of realism to the existence of
a mind-independent world.
That is to say, all logical rules and methodological values are part of the paradigm and cannot be
used as evidence for it. While perception is always situated in and transformed by our paradigm or
concepts. Hence we will be unable to find some rule of logic or scientific method that transcends all
paradigms (independent reality) and can be defended outside of them.
Even though a scientific approach could be limited in finding a true reality, it still could be useful.
Carnap argues we could retreat to an instrumentalist approach whereby scientific explanations of
evidential consilience may be accepted without the explanations themselves being understood as
true. He holds that our best theories likely do not correctly describe the natures of unobservable
entities, but do successfully describe certain relations between them. Ontological questions
external to the frameworks for knowledge represented by theories could then be meaningless.
Framework choices could be made solely on pragmatic grounds, as long as things work within the
existing paradigm, the metaphysical dimension of realism could be rejected.
13
Conclusion
It seems that, with all aspects of knowledge being lensed via our cognition and perception, we could
never be able to determine or find out what true reality is. An afterthought: If all of reality that is
known to us comes through our mind and perception (such as words and thoughts), what about the
origins of our mind?
12
Horwich, P. (ed.), 1993, World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
13
Carnap, R., 1950, Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, Revue Intrnationale de Philosophie, 4: 2040.
Reprinted in Carnap, R. 1956: Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
In his argument, Lowe states
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that:
How could it be that there is a fact of the matter as to our identities, and the identities of our words
and thoughts, but not as to the identities of the mind-independent entities that we try to capture in
language and thought? On the other hand, how could there not be any fact of the matter as to our
identities and the identities of our words and thoughts?
Lowe argues that Identity means individual essence, which John Locke has characterized as the
very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is.
For our mind to come into existence, could there be some form of origin or essence or identity. Even
though reality and concepts can be mind-dependent, the very being of the mind could come from
some origin beyond the mind, some mind-independent existence (essence).
14
Lowe, E. Jonathan (2011). "Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of
Conceptualism."Philosophia Scientiae The Metaphysical Issue: 9-33.
