An Ahistoric View of Revolution

Author(s): Craig Mc Caughrin

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Nov., 1976), pp. 637-651
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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CRAIG MC CAUGHRIN
University of Pennsylvania
An Ahistoric View of Revolution
Obsolescence in social theories, especially theories on revolution, is explored here. A
plausible cause of obsolescence is unprecedented social change, expressed by the diffu-
sion of power, affluence, and complexity. One effect may be to transform the distinctive
means, end, focus, and scope of revolution, thus rendering its current definition out-
moded. Another effect may be to alter the key motivating, guiding, and activating
conditions for revolution, thus leaving its explanation time-bound. An implication for
builders of theory and policy is to extend research beyond historic (actual) events
toward ahistoric (potential) behavior if their work is to remain relevant over time.
At issue here is the prospect for change in the nature of revolution. What
makes this prospect thinkable is the apparent potential among some societies,
and the promise among others, of moving beyond historical forms of develop-
ment. In turn, the very mechanisms by which these societies change could
undergo change themselves. One such mechanism is revolution. This raises a
concern as to whether the epic social convulsions in history or earlier phases
of development still offer a foretaste of things to come.
It is indeed a concern for the social scientist and the social architect alike.
For the social scientist, priority is given to the realization of "theory"-an
explanatory system that is reliable throughout space and time. Yet if the
development of society transforms events like revolution, then the quest for
explanations that endure across time becomes problematic. At best, some
analyses could remain as elegant expressions of ex post facto knowledge,
admirably germane to societies earlier in development. Even those accounts
that are most reliable across space might turn obsolete over time. The present
paper is a microcosm of this concern: it deals with the chances for change in
the revolutionary pattern which, in turn, govern the chances for an ahistoric
or timeless-hence, theoretic-record of revolution.
For the social architect, there is a different priority-the building of a
responsive society. To be sure, responsiveness is a matter of degree, ranging
from ad hoc adaptations that preserve the existing order to innovation in the
order itself. But even a modicum of responsiveness depends on social indi-
cators to monitor the onset of crises like revolution. Monitoring could bring
an alert early enough to start rectification from within as an alternative to
revolution from without. It would thus avoid the costs of revolution, espe-
cially the drain of valuable human talents. Yet the builder of such an early
warning system has to judge whether the symptoms of earlier social break-
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XX, 4, November 1976 637
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638 Craig McCaughrin
downs will remain or change in the future. That is the question to be
discussed here.
Such a discussion labors under certain conceptual problems concerning its
two major foci-"revolution" and "development." One problem is whether to
treat a newer form of social trauma as sui generis or as a novel species of
revolution. The common or "reportive" definition of revolution suggests an
intense and extensive conflict over the forced restructuring of society. If this
is a "real definition," marking the "essential" traits, then we are not free to
alter it to include newer modes of unrest. If it is a "nominal
definition,"
giving merely "stipulative" traits, then we are free to alter it at will. Lacking
clear guidance from the literature, this paper will treat the current concept as
"stipulative," permitting it to be adapted from the familiar episodes of
history to those events unparalleled in history. Such a concept is more apt to
suit the scientist, if not the historian, of society.
Another difficulty lies in objectively defining the process of "develop-
ment" that may explain the changing profile of revolution. Cultural bias may
result from defining development in general based on the experience of a few
cultures in particular; yet, only a few have to date developed very far. But
those few may be sufficiently heterogeneous for us to suspect that properties
similar to theirs will be shared among later states as well. These similarities
include at minimum the dispersion of social statuses (political), differentia-
tion of functional roles (social), and affluence in living standards (economic);
they are examined here. By the same token, the differences among advanced
states that mark divergent-e.g., communist or pluralist-paths of develop-
ment may apply to later states, too, if only because of a "demonstration
effect." Their import for future revolution will be traced out in a later paper.
Let us now clarify the place of this study among other treatments of
revolution and advanced social change. Certain inquiries have probed the
"modernity thesis," namely, that revolutionary behavior increases directly
with economic development. This assumes a rising incompatibility of interests
between business and labor in "capitalist" states (Marx, 1933, ch. 25; Mar-
cuse, 1964, chs. 8-10),
or between the polity and society in "communist"
states (Trotsky, 1969).
In both cases, industrial progress is the harbinger of
revolution. Other inquiries have pursued the "modernization thesis," which
locates revolution in the early thrusts of economic growth. Highly industrial
societies are supposedly bereft of basic issues, which brings an end to
ideology and to large-scale political dissatisfaction (Huntington, 1974; Feier-
abend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, 1969). There are also structural constraints
against large-scale conflict, from the crisscross of class interests (Kautsky,
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An Ahistoric View of Revolution 639
1972, chs. 7, 8), to the institutional safety valves for class antagonisms
(Coser, 1956, pp. 152-156). Hence, the birth of modern society is supposed
to effectively end the practice of revolution. Yet other researchers have
studied the "postmodernity thesis" that revolution returns once society
transcends the industrial order. The emerging structure of a "postindustrial"
society presumably threatens older (economic) values of the industrial culture
(Stone, 1966, p. 172) as well as newer (noneconomic) orientations (Johnson,
1966, pp. 166-172; Reich, 1970, ch. 9). The new social structure may also be
so complex as to weaken social communication and thus social community
(Kesselman, 1970). The ascent of a "postindustrial" society may therefore
open a new era of revolution.
Closer to the present topic are works on trends in revolution over time.
These works compare long-term changes in the way societies break down,
though they vary in the time frame or era of development chosen for study.
For instance, the purposes for revolution are said to shift from the classical
emphasis on restoring a just state of affairs to the contemporary stress on
renovating the state altogether (Arendt, 1963, ch. 1; Griewank, 1966). The
procedures are claimed to shift from actively wrecking to passively resisting
the forces that run society (Engels, 1934; Sharp, 1973). The participants
apparently change from economic to noneconomic groupings, from those
most exploited to those most excluded from social life (Brown, 1974, ch. 6).
The form of revolution is thus purported to change as the form of society
becomes increasingly modern.
The present report differs in perspective from the works cited above.
Whereas analyses based on the "modernity," "modernization," and "post-
modernity" themes explore change in the frequency or probability of revolu-
tion as new plateaus of development are attained, this project explores change
in the form or properties of such events. Biologists similarly contrast "phylo-
genic" analyses that explain the existence of given organisms with "mor-
phogenic" accounts of the expression they assume. This, then, is a morpho-
genesis of revolution. Moreover, where other writers have sought a diagnosis
of the change in form from classical to near-contemporary revolutions, the
present exercise seeks a prognosis of transformation in revolutions to come. It
should thus complement rather than counter existing perspectives.
The analysis will first deal with the prospect of change in the character-
istics of revolution-that is, in those traits that make it a discrete phenom-
enon. Next to be examined is the case for change in the conditions for
revolution, traits that together comprise a distinctive process. Data enter into
both analyses, but only as examples of what is plausible and not as prima
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640 Craig McCaughrin
facie evidence of what is probable in the years ahead. The commentary closes
by reconsidering the significance of this inquiry for the builder of theory and
the builder of society in the near future.
Conceptual Change
This section surveys mutation in the character traits of revolution among
industrial societies. The traits that set revolution apart from other patterns of
behavior are its means, end, focus, and scope. For instance, the familiar
antinomy "revolution versus evolution" hints that the former is marked by
such means as violent or out-of-system conduct, in contrast to gradualist or
within-system activity. "Revolution versus reform" highlights such ends as
the inception of a new social structure, as distinct from improvements in the
current structure of society. The line between "revolution" and "insurrec-
tion" often connotes a focus upon highly polarized conflict-typically
between social strata-instead of more atomized acts of strife. And "revolu-
tion versus revolt" seems to stress a society-wide rather than localized scope
of conflict (Stone, 1966; Gurr, 1970, pp. 7-12). Change in the character of
revolution, then, means a change in any of the four traits just described.
First of all, revolutionary means could eventually move toward more
subtle forms of illegality. Revolution, like war, is an epitaph upon politics-a
testimony to the failure of due process, in that illegal actions are no longer
illegitimate. But whereas past dissidents emphasized overt coercion, their
heirs in the advanced-industrial era may stress covert manipulation instead.
Among past cases, the French Revolution incurred perhaps 40,000 casualties,
while the Russian and Chinese Revolutions each cost over 300,000 lives; in
fact, over half of the developing nations exhibit outright civil or guerilla war
as their most violent mode of dissent. By contrast, over half of the developed
nations are confined to at most sabotage and assassination of minor officials;
these are also the states where the bloody
forms of
instability
least often
occur (Greer, 1935, pp. 26-27, 37; Richardson, 1960, pp. 32-33; Feierabend
et al., 1969, pp. 650-656). Hence: With progress in social change, revolution-
ary methods may evolve from more to less emphasis on violence.
One reason for this is the increasing complexity of physical and social
technology in the industrial order. The more complex that weapons technol-
ogy becomes, the more difficult it is to duplicate the regime's arsenal on a
homemade basis, and this erodes the feasibility of dissident violence (Engels,
1934, pp. 19-30). Simultaneously, as the human technology of role relation-
ships becomes more complex, so does the ease with which dissidents can
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An Ahistoric View of Revolution 641
"gum up the works" through such veto actions as wildcat strikes, sit-ins, or
economic b-oycotts, thus obviating the necessity for violence (Sharp, 1973).
The intricacy of developed nations, then, may push the cost of violence
beyond its strategic value.
The second prospect is a shift in the revolutionary ends toward nonstruc-
tural aspects of social change. Every revolution is radical in its end, if not in
its end result. But where the epic convulsions of history were radical in
attacking the very power bases of society, their future counterparts could
prove just as radical by assaulting society's value-priorities. Decline in the
importance of power is suggested by the relative paucity of "levelling"
campaigns in modern Nazi Germany, in contrast to their prominence in
premodern France, Russia, and China (Moore, 1966, ch. 2; Brinton, 1965, ch.
9; Schurmann, 1968, pp. xlii-xlv; Groth, 1966). Generally, rising levels of
economic development correlate negatively with strife against the power
structure that controls society, and positively with strife against the policy
priorities that "steer" society (Gurr, 1969, table 17; Brooks, 1969; Levy,
1969, pp. 93-97). Hence: As development proceeds, the aim of revolutionists
may shift from restratification to redirection of society.
The basis for this expectation is the dispersion of inequalities in industrial
society. Differences in position, prestige, and property eventually become less
cumulative for any given social group. With possession of these resources
fragmented, no single group can rule over others, and of necessity consensus
supplants control as a basis for furthering group interests (Dahl, 1970, pp.
105-115; Dye, 1969, table 1). More concretely, restratification of society
perforce gives way to bargaining over public policy. In this way, the diffusion
of inequalities could make policy more salient than power as a rallying point
for revolutionary action.
The third outlook concerns a change in focus away from assaults upon
the advantaged strata of society. All revolutions are intensive enough to
polarize society. So far, they have bifurcated society primarily by social
advantage-oppressors versus oppressed, elites versus masses (or counter-
elites), patricians versus plebians. The crises yet to come may instead divide
society chiefly by social values-culture versus counterculture, ethnic new-
comers versus old stocks, age versus youth. For example, whereas the "losers"
in the revolutions of preindustrial France, Russia, and China were class-
specific, their counterparts in the crises of modern Nazi Germany and Gaullist
France belonged to no single stratum (Groth, 1966; Brown, 1974, ch. 6).
Generally, the association (r2) between decreasing social advantage (increas-
ing "representativeness") and turmoil is over three times greater in modern
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642 Craig McCaughrin
states than in premodern ones (Cooper, 1974, p. 281). Hence: With develop-
ment, the revolutionary focus could shift from a hierarchical to a nonhier-
archical axis of conflict.
This shift is foreseeable from the dispersion tendency described earlier.
Once the more irksome inequities of privilege are dispersed among ever more
groups, their efforts to shape public policy become more evenly competitive.
For instance, the economic might of business becomes matched by the
numerical strength of labor and by the expertise of intellectuals. But this
balancing act does not ipso facto entail policies that bear equally upon all
segments of society. Even the egalitarian or classless society might labor
under a "tyranny of the majority," whose decisions can systematically or
severely inveigh upon the interests of a minority. Abortion, the draft, prohibi-
tion, and immigration laws all promote skewed advantages and disadvantages
(Dahl, 1970, pp. 8-28). Thus, as vertical divisions become dispersed, certain
horizontal cleavages could in turn become too oppressive to endure.
Lastly, we might witness a shift in scope away from mass participation. To
date, revolutions have been those conflicts with high enough mobilization and
organization to become society-wide; revolts have been conflicts with too
little organization ("turmoil") or mobilization ("conspiracy") to gain more
than localized significance (Gurr, 1970, pp. 10-12; Rummel, 1965). But
tomorrow's society-wide conflict could be waged via extensive organization
yet only marginal mobilization. This specifically involves an organization in
which tasks formerly met by mass participation are now met through mass
technologies of communication and control. In fact, as nations turn modern,
participation in "internal wars" drops by about 84%, while new techniques
arise such as "satellite television" covering 160 million square kilometers,
and "wide-band communication systems" carrying thousands of video
channels at once (Gurr, 1969, p. 580). Hence: As nations develop, dissidence
is expected to become society-wide not in size but in structure.
This outlook stems from the complex form of industrial society. Com-
plexity promotes specialized interests that obscure the mass interest, and
specialized languages that obstruct common intercourse (Kautsky, 1972, pp.
195-196; Ross, 1975, pp. 6-7). With society so "compartmentalized," mass
mobilization becomes rather costly, thus deflating the size of dissident
movements. This in turn prompts such movements to switch from human to
nonhuman capabilities, from mass participation to technologies of mass
manipulation. These "labor saving" technologies permit the addition of new
revolutionary "cells" across society with only a marginal addition of person-
nel, thus expanding the structure of rebel movements. In a complex milieu,
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An Ahistoric View of Revolution 643
then, the rebels may opt for pervasive organization without massive participa-
tion.
Overall, today's defining traits of revolution can become transformed at
tomorrow's levels of social change. That is, higher levels of complexity and
dispersion in the social structure can modify the means, ends, focus, and
scope that distinguish the most ambitious acts of social dissidence. Other
prospects might be even more plausible, such as a shift from national to
international ends (Johnson, 1966, pp. 171-172; Neumann, 1949). The
current concept could be reworked to capture these newer patterns of
upheaval, allowing us to differentiate revolution as-we-know-it from revolu-
tion de novo. Until then, such a concept remains historical, adequately
depicting past but not prospective crises of the social order.
Theoretical Change
Let us now discuss whether the conditions rather than the concept of
revolution become transfigured in the industrial world. The conditions cur-
rently cited in explaining revolutionary crises are: the motivating drive to
rebel, often identified as an incongruence between social values and social
reality; the conduit for revolution, typically expressed as an ideology that
"steers" the drive to rebel toward a revolutionary commitment; and the
catalyst or revolutionary spark, usually a shift in power from the regime to
the rebels, that triggers the revolutionary commitment into revolution. Con-
sider the loaded pistol, wherein gunpowder drives the bullet outward as the
gun barrel steers it homeward-provided that a trigger can set the powder off.
Similarly, Gurr writes of factors that "generate," "politicize," and "actual-
ize" strife; Eckstein identifies "behavioral," "structural," and "precipitant"
dimensions; and Johnson uses Machiavelli's "virtu" or values, "necessita" or
constraints, and "fortuna" or accelerators (Gurr, 1970, pp. 14-15; Eckstein,
1965, pp. 140-141; Johnson, 1966, pp. 88-92). All allude to a process of
revolution.
One departure from these conditions can be the rise of a new motive for
overturning society. Historically, the drive to rebel was the drive to overcome
a gap between social aspirations for certain values and their accessibility
within the given society (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970, ch. 2; Johnson, 1966,
ch.
2). This gap is variously termed the "J-curve," "systemic frustration," "rela-
tive deprivation,"
or "dissynchronization"-in sum:
value aspirations
> 1. In
vete e
accessibty
our
age, however,
an
altogether
different drive to rebel
may
be the
yearning
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644 Craig McCaughrin
to close a gap between the individual's aspiration for brand-new concepts of
value and their accessibility within the given culture. This gap can be por-
trayed
as:
concept accessitbitsy
> 1. Industrial societies may become assailed
for their failure to gratify not moral demands as currently envisioned but
demands for a new moral vision. Hence: As societies turn modern, the revolu-
tionary impetus may shift from value- to concept-incongruity.
The evidence on this point appears in social critiques that oblige modern
nations to embark on a "search for quality," a "new consciousness," or "the
vision of a world beyond technology" (Rostow, 1971, ch. 6; Reich, 1970,
chs. 5, 11, 12; Keniston, 1965, pp. 425-447). It is the search for new values,
they contend, not a new structure to secure present values, that drives
industrial man to rebel. In Japan, the Netherlands, the United States, and the
Soviet Union, over half of the most modern sector of the population-those
with the most affluence-have already gone beyond more typically "acquisi-
tive" norms and on to "postbourgeois" norms in turn. Such individuals should
already be close to exhausting their repertoire of values as currently con-
ceived, and so more inclined toward dissent. In fact, the average support for
dissent across West Europe and the United States is three and one-half times
stronger among this group than among its "bourgeois" counterpart (Inglehart,
1971, tables 6, 12, 13; Ike, 1973, table 4; Chandler, 1972, pp. 58, 89;
Arutiunian, 1973, table 8). The prognosis thus appears realistic.
The underlying assumption is that advanced nations are creating affluence,
but are not affluent in creativity. They can fulfill an ever-widening panorama
of currently conceived aspirations, such as self-preservation through rising
incomes, self-esteem through social mobility, and self-enhancement through
mass education. But they are not necessarily more apt than their precursors
to invent new dreams once present aspirations become fulfilled. Nor can the
individual find refuge in some intuitive "hierarchy of needs" to guide him,
given its demonstrably dubious validity (Marsh, 1975, pp. 26-30; Ike, 1973,
pp. 1203-1204). Industrial man may thus be frustrated by a normative
vacuum, a plight that could set him against the existing order.
Another changeable cause of revolution may be the conduit that channels
the rebel mind into politics. Across the terrain of history, that channel has
involved "the transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals," manifested in a
moral critique or "ideology." Ideology was meant to focus the individual's
frustration against the institutions of society (Edwards, 1970, ch. 4; Brinton,
1965, pp. 39-50). Contrarily, the industrial context for revolt may not be
ideology but secularity. People become secular when they favor a functional
over a moral loyalty toward public institutions (Inkeles, 1966). The secular-
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An Ahistoric View of Revolution 645
ized individual, being less than absolute in his loyalty, is less hesitant to
focus his discontent against the social order. This obviates the need for
ideology in making the social order a more vulnerable target of attack. Hence:
As societies develop, secularity rather than ideology may steer the rebel into
revolution.
The available data reveal a near-linear relation between modernizing
change in society and secularized loyalty toward the state. While 91.1% of
those sampled in the poorest nation (Mexico) would sacrifice personal in
behalf of civic welfare, only one quarter of those in the richest state (U.S.)
are so disposed. In modern Japan, too, the youth tend to turn their allegiance
from "communal ties" to "privatization." In the United States, it is just such
youths, particularly those who "reject outright" disagreeable laws, that make
up over two-thirds of the advocates of revolution (Sherrill, 1969, table 1;
Maruyama, 1965, p. 494; Chandler, 1972, p. 98). These findings show a
"cost-benefit" approach to civic loyalty that may supplant ideology in
directing discontent against the industrial state.
The source of this hypothesis lies in the complex latticework of industrial
life. In developing areas, the interface between polity and society is simple
enough to allow for more face-to-face communication and personalized, even
charismatic, rule. This should make the polity-society bond relatively secure.
Intervention by the ideologue is thereby necessary in fomenting revolution.
Yet, in the industrial world, complex role patterns require impersonal net-
works of communication, linking faceless politicians with equally faceless
citizens. The end result is incivisme-with or without the ideologue's mani-
festo. It may vary from "retreatism" upon "increasing bureaucratization" as
in Japan, to the rise of "countercultures" as in America (Ike, 1973, pp.
1201-1203; Reich, 1970, ch. 9). The national polity thus becomes a contin-
gency rather than a commitment in the eyes of modern man.
Lastly, we should allow for a turn in the immediate events that trigger
revolution. Past triggers have been actions that dramatize the regime's inepti-
tude vis-a-vis the rebels, or, more formally, actions that reveal a drop in the
ratio of regime to rebel capabilities (Gurr, 1970, ch. 10; Korpi, 1974, p.
1574). Future precipitants may instead be events that dramatize the regime's
intransigence vis-A-vis the rebels, or, more precisely, events that reveal a drop
in the regime's own ratio of responsive to total capabilities. In industrial
societies, then, revolution may be triggered by signs of not decay but closure
among those who rule.
Comparison of the immediate antecedents to strife, past and present, bears
this out. Typical antecedents of earlier episodes were the regime's defeat in
foreign war or civil strife that sapped its preponderance of force, notably in
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646 Craig McCaughrin
England (1640), France (1871), Russia (1905, 1917), Hungary (1918), Ger-
many (1918), and Turkey (1918) (Brinton, 1965, pp. 86-91; Johnson, 1966,
pp. 98-104). Many such "internal wars" were more subtly touched off by a
downturn in the economy that sapped the regime's base of support, particu-
larly in America (1774), France (1787), and Egypt (1952) (Eckstein, 1965,
pp. 141-142). Contrarily, the precursor of more modern crises has been not
defeat but stalemate over the issues of university reform in France (1968),
worker-democracy in the smaller European states, or foreign policy in the
United States (1967) (Brown, 1974, ch. 1; Heisler, 1975, pp. 24-27; Brooks,
1969, pp. 543-546). Here, rigidity rather than reduction in power helped to
stir up dissident currents.
This change in the revolutionary precipitant stems from the "dispersion
effect" of a modern social order. Political inequalities were previously accu-
mulated around a cohesive regime, and this assured a "zero-sum game" where
regime losses were the rebels' gains. Such gains emboldened the rebels enough
to incite revolution. For example, collapse of the court aristocracies in Paris
and Petrograd could alone incite social revolution in France and Russia
(Schurmann, 1968, pp. xlii-xlv). Yet, tomorrow's inequalities may get dis-
persed among parts of a less cohesive regime that includes even such "quasi
regimes" as corporate conglomerates, union federations, network media, and
multiversities. For instance, in America, some 300 businesses outstrip the
GNP of all countries save the U.S., most newspapers are merged into chains,
and less than 5% of the universities coordinate 40% of all students and 93% of
all research (Pirages and Ehrlich, 1974, ch. 6; Bell, 1973, pp. 244-245, 484).
This assures a "non-zero-sum game," where losses by any one quasi regime are
not ipso facto the rebels' gains. Such a stalemate may antagonize the rebels
enough to spur them into action.
All in all, the now-familiar revolutionary process may become remolded at
advanced levels of social change. Specifically, advanced levels of material
affluence, role complexity, and power dispersion may together alter the
known motivating, directing, and triggering forces behind revolution. This
would make the current theory history-bound, relevant to the earlier but not
the eventual birth-process of revolutions.
Implications
The foregoing pages have probed discontinuities in revolution among
"developed" nations, especially nations with a complex, dispersed, and afflu-
ent social base. Certain discontinuities concern the very concept of revolution
(Table 1); others pertain to the causes of revolution (Table 2). The validity of
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An Ahistoric View of Revolution 647
TABLE 1
Conceptual Changes in Revolution
Means End Focus Scope
Historic violent reconstruction vertical extensive
Concept coercion of society conflict in size
Ahistoric nonviolent redirection horizontal extensive in
Concept coercion of society conflict structure
these outcomes is for now unknown, but their plausibility is apparent from
the present discussion.
Possible implications for the social architect and social scientist can now
be stated more concretely than at the outset. Recall that the social architect
seeks a "responsive society," one that is quick to remedy crises due to its
crisis-monitoring potential. Judging from Table 1, the potential for detecting
modern crises may be enhanced by revising the indicators of crisis itself.
To illustrate, the coercive theme of former revolutions made casualties an
important measure, while the manipulative tactics of future upheavals may
make such a measure useless. According to Table 2, the potential for predict-
ing modern crises can be heightened by revising the indicators for the causes
of crisis. For instance, frustration of aspirations as portrayed by a drop in
income could serve to foretell prior revolutions, while the exhaustion of
aspirations as marked by rising income may predict prospective upheavals
instead. Hence, one implication of this study bears on the timely exposure of
social disorders in the future.
TABLE 2
Causative Changes in Revolution
Drive to Conduit for Revolutionary
Rebel Revolution Spark
Historic value- shift in
Conditions frustration ideology power
Ahistoric value- stalemate in
Conditions exhaustion secularity power
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648 Craig McCaughrin
The social scientist rather prefers a "social theory" that explains disorders
past and future alike. Apparently, such a theory is not gained simply by
extrapolating past uniformities onto the future; in fact, Tables 1 and 2
suggest that past uniformities are upset by the advent of a modern society.
Definitions and propositions for revolutionary theory are to be gained not
just from historic reality but from ahistoric or alternate realities as expressed
in, say, the Delphi Technique, gaming, simulation, and Gedankenexperiments.
To illustrate, violent assaults upon the state evidently recede with successful
development (Feierabend, et al., 1969). Given the historic concept of revolu-
tion, this means a decline of revolutions in toto; but given an ahistoric
concept sensitive to both past and potential modes of strife, it only means a
decline in revolutions as now recognized. In general, the data of times past
cannot alone provide a timeless theory. Thus, another implication of this
inquiry affects the timeless explanation of social disorders.
Both the architect and the scientist of society, then, must account for not
only precedented but unprecedented forms of revolutionary behavior. Besides
revolution, other phenomena may show unprecedented forms, too, particu-
larly "social mobilization," "civil war," and perhaps the process of "develop-
ment" itself (Inglehart, 1970; Neumann, 1949; Bell, 1973, ch. 1). Still more
cases may appear as man takes on a more plastic and innovative personality
(Inkeles, 1966; Lifton, 1970). We might even need a new mode of concept
formation, one that takes not just past occurrences or (by extension) com-
mon discourse, but the full range of possible alternatives as its point of
departure. Concepts would no longer be formed a posteriori, from actual
events alone, but a priori, from all events deemed possible. This seems to
convert the search for social fact into a work of science fiction. Yet it is just
such a step that enables physicists and biologists to predict new forms of
matter and life far beyond the bounds of common sense or intuition. It is
now time for the student of society to take that step too.
Manuscript submitted July 7, 1975.
Final manuscript received December 22, 1975.
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