NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME FORFILING
MOTION FORREHEARINGEXPTRES.
OR, IF FILED,DISPOSEDOF.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF Tr uF
ELEVENTHJUDICIALCIRCUITATA\E
FORMI,AMI-DADECOUNTY,FI,ORIDA
i_, 6
CARLOSMILLER
APPELLATEDIVISION
Appellant,
CASENO. 08-326AP
LowerTribunalCaseNo.M07I 0544
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
filed: I a ll blol
opinion
An appealfrom a Final Judgmentby the CountyCourtof Miami-badeCounty,Florida.
CarlosMiller, pro se,Appellant.
KatherineFernandezRundle,StateAttorney,and IgnacioJ.Yazquez,Jr., AssistantState
Attomey,for Appellee.
BeforePLATZER, SCOLA andFREEMAN,JJ.
PERCURIAM.
Carlos Miller, Appellantand Defendantbelow, appealshis convictionand sentencefor
ResistingArrest and Obstru#$li of a Public Sheet. Finding error in both the conviction and
we reverse.
sentence,
Miller, a photojournalist,
wasarrestedfollowing anencounter
betweenhimselfandfive City
of Miami policeofficers.Theofficerswereinvestigatinganaccidenton a heavilytraveledroadway.
Miller wasatternptingto photographthemdoingso. TheofficersinstructedMiller to leavethe area
and an argumentensued.At one point, while being moved from the roadwaSMiller snappeda
PageI of5
photographat closerange,with the flashengaged,
of theoffrcer. Miller wassubsequently
arrested
r
andchargedwith multiple criminalandcivil infractions.
At the trial, Miller testifiedin his own defense.Duringcross-examination,
theCourtallowed
the State,over objection,to questionMiller aboutthe contentsof a blog createdby him several
monthsafter the incident.In theblog, Miller questioned
policetacticsacrossthecountry. In some
postings,officerswerereferredto as"Gestapo"or "Nazis". Additionally,the Statewaspermittedto
questionMiller concemingan articlehe wrote over a yearafterhis arrestin which he expressed
negativeopinionsaboutthepoliceanddiscussed
policebrutalityin Los Angeles.
At closing,the Stateargued:
...(I)in someway or anotherwe're all studentsof history. Whenthe
Nazis andtheir Gestapoput someone'sheadto theground,it didn't
look like this. It did not. But that'sthewayMr. Miller ashe saidin
his own unvarnishedopinionfeelsaboutthe police. And that's the
story that he's writing about the police, and that's the story that
you're goingto hearaboutthepoliceon carlosmiller.com ....
The Statearguesthatthe questionswerepe(missibleasimpeachment
to showbias against
policeoffrcers. Courtshavelong allowedwitnessbiasto be exploredthroughcollateralevidence.
For example,in Tanziv. State,964So.2d 106,115 (Fla.2007),theStatewaspermittedto impeach
venue.'No areais moredesaving
thetestimonyof a witnessby raisingactscommittedin a separate
ability in a criminalcaseto arguethe'credibilityandbiasesof
of 'wide latitude'thanthedefen$4g*:s
the witnesseswho testifiedat trial.' lfilliams v. State,9l2 So. 2d 66,6E(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
(quotingGoodrichv. State,854So.2d 663,665(Fla.3d DCA 2003). SeealsoCarlylev. State,945
So.2d 540 (Fla. }ilDCA2006) (a defendanthasthe absoluteright to fully cross-examine
adverse
witnessesto discreditthemby showingbias,prejudice,or interest);Gravesv. State,937So.2d 1286
(Fla.4th DCA 2006)(a criminaldefendanthasconsiderable
latitudein crossexaminationto elicit
testimonyshowingthebiasof a witness);Minusv. State,901So.2d344(Fla.4th DCA 2005)(for
Page2 of5
r
' the purpose of discrediting a witness, the Sixth Amendment allows a defendant a wide range of
,/' cross-examinationas a matter of ri.ghtin regard to his motives, interest,or animus.)
I
f
However,eventhisright is not withoutlimits. See
Nelsonv. State,704So. 2d752(Fla.5th
DCA 1998)(biason partof prosecutionwitnessis valid point of inquiryin cross-examination,
but
prospectof biasdoesnotopendoorto everyquestionthatmightpossiblydevelopsubject;evidence
of bias may be inadmissibleif it unfairly prejudicesor misleadsthetrier of fact).
Moreover,we find a materialdistinctionbetweenattackinga witnessby collateralattackand
doing so to a defendant. Expett witrrcssescan be replacedand fact witnessesmay be discredited
without impugning the defendant. Further,juries cannotpunish witnessesthernselvesfor their
collateralwrongs,butmaybeledto do sowhenthecollateralwrongis committedby thedefendant.In
sum,introductionof a defendant's
collateralactprofoundlyincreases
therisk thatthecollateralactwill
.grosslyovershadow
whateverbiasit wasintendedto prove.
The standardofreview of a trial court'sevidentiaryrulingsis abuseof discretion..
Fitzpatrick
v. state. 900 so.Zd 495.514-15(F1a.2005\.
The hial court'sdiscretionis limited, however,by the
rulesof evidence,
Johnston.863So.2d,
at278.andby theprinciplesof staredecisis.Section90.402.
Florida Statutes(2005)providesthat all relevantevidenceis admissibleexceptasprovidedbylaw.
However,relevantevidenceis inadmissibleif its probativevalueis substantiallyoutweighedby the
dangerofunfair prejudice.Thecourtmustconducta balancingtestin orderto applythis discretion.
Despitebareattemptsto link Miller's commentsto testimonialbias,theStateplacedCarlos
Miller's abstractedcommentson trial. Miller's comments,admittedfor the limited purposeof
impeachment, evidenceofhis guilt. "[S]uchauseofimpeachment
ultimatelybecame testimonyhas
beenheld to be reversibleerror."Merrill v. State,228So.2d 305,307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)(citing
Adamsv. State,l5 So.905,908(Fla.I 894);Whorelyv. State,33So.849(Fla.1903);Hernandezv.
state,22 So.2d 781,786(Fla. I 945)).
Page3 of5
the purposeof discreditinga witness,the SixthAmendmentallowsa defendanta wide rangeof
cross-examination
asa matterof ri'ghtin regardto his motives,interest,or animus.)
However,eventhisrightis not withoutlimits. SeeNelsonv. State,704So.2d752(Fla.5th
DCA 1998)(biason partof prosecution
witnessis validpointof inquiryin cross-examination,
but
prospectof biasdoesnotopendoorto everyquestionthatrnightpossiblydevelopsubject;evidence
of biasmay be inadmissibleif it unfairly prejudicesor misleadsthetrier of fact).
Moreover,we find a materialdistinctionbetweenattackinga witnessby collateralattackand
doing so to a defendant.Expertwitnessescanbe replacedand fact witnessesmay be discredited
without impugning the defendant. Further,juries cannotpunish witnessesthernselvesfor their
collateralwrongs,butmaybeledto do sowhenthecollateralwrongis committedby thedefendant.In
sum,introductionof a defendant's
collateralactprofoundlyincreases
theriskthatthecollateralactwill
grosslyovershadow
whateverbiasit wasintendedto prove.
The standardofreview of a hial court'sevidentiaryrulingsis abuseof discretion..Fitzpatrick
v. state. 900 so.Zd 495.514-15$1a.2005).The trial court'sdiscretionis limited, however,by the
rulesof evidence,Johnston.863So.Zdat278.andby theprinciplesof staredecisis.Section90.402.
Florida Statutes(2005)providesthat all relevantevidenceis admissibleexceptasprovidedby law.
However,relevantevidenceis inadmissibleif its probativevalueis substantiallyoutweighedby the
dangerofunfair prejudice.Thecourtmustconducta balancingtestin orderto applyfhis discretion.
Despitebareatternptsto link Miller's commentsto testimonialbias,theStateplacedCarlos
Miller's abstractedcommentson trial. Miller's comments,admittedfor the limited purposeof
impeachment, evidenceofhis guilt. "[S]ucha useof impeachment
ultimatelybecame testimonyhas
beenheld to be reversibleerror."Merrill v. State,228So.2d 305,307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)(citing
Adamsv. State,l5 So.905,908(Fla.1894);Whorelyv. State,33So.849(Fla.1903);Hernandezv.
state,22 So.2d 781,786(Fla. I 945)).
Page3 of5
The jury having found you guilty, I'm adjudicatingyou guilty. I'm
imposing a $250 fine, there's Court costsandsurcharges.I'm placing
you on one (year) reporting probation, a special condition anger
course,a specialcondition 100 hours of community service at arate
/
of ten hours minimum per month and all conditionsto be completed
with ten months of todav.
The courtimposedan additionalfine andadditionalcourtcostson the civil infraction.
It is constitutionallyimpermissiblefor a trial court to imposea sentencebasedupon a
defendant'sassertion before,during,andafteriial. Ritterv. State,885So.2d413(Fla.
of innocence
200$; Holtonv. State,573So.2d 284,292(Fla.I 990).TheStatecontends
this did not occur,stating
". . . the courtreviewedthetotaltrial evidenceandenteredits sentence
with a merepassingrernarkon
remorsein the contextof a commenton the Appellant'smisbehaviorand demeanor." On the
assumptionthatwe havereviewedthesametranscript,werejecttheState'sinterpretationoftherecord.
SeeU.S.Fire Ins.Co.v.Beltmnnn
NorthAm. Co.,1nc..703F. Supp.681,685,n.15(N.D.I11.,
1988).
TheStatelooksto Meltonv.State,949So.2d994,1015(FIa.2006)andShellitov.
State,70l
So.2d 837,842(Fla.1997),to supportthepropositionthata passingor de minimr,s to a
reference
guiltyparty'slackofremorsewillnotconstituteerror.
We agreewithMeltonandShellito,butfind
theyhaveno applicationhere.As evidencedby thesentencing
colloquy,thetrial court'sconcern,in
largepart,wasfor the 'real' heroesat Arlington,for Miller's supporterc,
andfor Miller's 'shocking'
lack of remorse. The trial court's commentswerenot so muchpassingreferences,
but, instead,
groundsfor sentencing.
REVERSEDwith directionsthat Defendantbe tried and,if necessary, beforea
sentenced
differentjudge. (PLATZER.,SCOLA andFREEMAN,JJ.,CONCUR)
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