BRUEGEL WORKING PAPER 2014/13

THE POLICY
DILEMMA OF THE
UNITARY PATENT
JRME DANGUY* AND BRUNO VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA
POTTERIE**

Highlights
This paper provides new evidence about the budgetary consequences
for patent offices of the coexistence of the forthcoming Unitary
Patent (UP) with the current European Patent (EP). Simulation results
illustrate a dilemma between (1) high UP renewal fees to ensure
enough financial income for all national patent offices (NPOs) and (2)
low UP renewal fees to make the UP system affordable, with very few
NPOs losing on financial revenues. The simulations help to understand
the positions of several patent offices, and underline an alternative way
to proceed with the negotiations while reducing financial risks for the
whole system.
JEL Classification: O34, 038, P14
Keywords: patent systems, unitary patent, patenting cost, renewal
fees, maintenance rate.
* Universit libre de Bruxelles (Solvay Brussels School of Economics
and Management, ECARES and iCite). Email: jdanguy@ulb.ac.be
** Universit libre de Bruxelles (Solvay Brussels School of Economics
and Management, ECARES and iCite, Bruegel and CEPR). Email:
bruno.vanpottelsberghe@ulb.ac.be

NOVEMBER 2014

INTRODUCTION

For many years, the European patent system has been recognised as highly fragmented, being the sum of
numerous national patent systems. Only the grant process of European Patents (EP) is centralised at the
European Patent Office (EPO). Once an EP is granted, it is subject to the national rules and practices of each
member state where firms seek patent protection. This fragmentation reduces the effectiveness of the European
patent system, especially because of its prohibitive costs (multiple validation, translation and renewal fees),
substantial legal uncertainty and the economic incongruities it generates (see van Pottelsberghe, 2009; Mejer
and van Pottelsberghe, 2012).
The implementation of the Unitary Patent (UP) a single patent automatically covering the territory of 25 EU
member states, for both the application procedure and the legal enforcement after grant would not only
reduce the cost of patenting in Europe, it would also make the system more attractive. Recent policy
developments could actually be considered as important leaps towards an improved patent system in Europe1.
Two important dimensions are subject to intense political debate2: the level of renewal fees and the operational
design of the Unified Patent Court (UPC). The first dimension, setting up renewal fees, is more complex than
could appear at first sight. Renewal fees are an important factor in the decision to renew a patent from the
applicants viewpoint (for which low renewal fees are expected) and they have a direct effect on patent offices
budgetary prospects. Indeed, since the creation of the European patent system, any EP patent renewed in a
country leads to the payment of renewal fees paid to the national patent office, which in turn retrocedes half the
revenue to the EPO.
The lead question therefore is to assess whether the new UP system would lead to similar revenues at the
aggregate level (the EPO would collect the UP renewal fees). The mechanical subsequent question relates to the
distribution key of half the UP fees to national patent offices (the other half remaining in the EPO budget). This
question is legitimate and worrying for patent offices: will they benefit from higher or smaller revenue streams
than in the past? This question has already been addressed by Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) in case
of a total switch from the EP system to the UP system the authors found that the total income should be higher
with the UP than with the EP. However, as the two systems will coexist, simulations must take stock of the
substitution effect between the two systems: if the most valuable EP (which have a higher chance to be
protected in a large number of countries) switch towards the UP system, then one could expect smaller revenue
streams. This substitution between the two systems will logically depend on the level of renewal fees (Europe
Economics, 2014).
The applied research question addressed in this paper is to assess whether and to what extent the coexistence
of the EP and UP systems will affect the renewal fee incomes for the EPO and for national patent offices. While
Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) provided an overview of the costs and benefits of the unitary patent for
the different stakeholders of the patent system (eg in terms of patenting costs and intermediary costs for
applicants), this paper focuses essentially on the budgetary consequences for patent offices. In particular, it
approximates the conditions under which patent offices would be better off with the forthcoming dual system.
1

In December 2012, the EU Council adopted two regulations with a view to implementing enhanced cooperation (involving
25 EU member states) for the creation of unitary patent protection and its translation arrangements. These regulations
delegate to the EPO the task of granting European patents with unitary effect. In February 2013, the international
agreement for establishing a Unified Patent Court (UPC) was signed to contribute to a greater access to patent protection
and a better patent enforcement at European level. Straathof et al. (2012) suggest that the unitary patent project offers
great opportunities for improvements in patent laws by the adoption of best practises. Nevertheless, there are still
concerns about the unitary patent package (see for example, Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping, and Ullrich, 2012). In particular, the
UP will add an additional layer in the European patent landscape rather than simplify the current system.
2
This policy debate has been recently pointed out by the President of the EPO (see Battistelli, 2013) and by the EPO
Economic and Scientific Advisory Board (see ESAB, 2013).

The simulation results are twofold. On the one hand, the higher the UP fees and the stronger the substitution
between the EP and the UP, the faster the break-even of the system is reached. On the other hand, with very
high fees, applicants would have no incentives to use the UP route and would prefer to continue to enforce their
EP at the national level. Such limited use of the UP route would not lead to a structural improvement of the whole
European patent system, hence on its potential effect on innovation in Europe. With low renewal fees the
German Patent Office might actually lose a significant amount of renewal fees, which exceed by far the income
of other national patent offices under the current system. Alternative mechanisms are presented to mitigate
these financial risks: (1) increasing national renewal fees and, (2) increasing the UP income through greater
attractiveness of the new system.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 compares the renewal fee income generated by an average
European patent (EP) with that generated by an average Unitary patent (UP). The substitution between EP and
UP is investigated in Section 3. At the core of Section 4, a break-even analysis allows identification of the
conditions such that patent offices would not be worse off with the coexistence of the UP and EP patent
systems. The consequences for national patent offices are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and puts
forward policy implications.

AVERAGE EUROPEAN PATENT VS. AVERAGE UNITARY PATENT

Before investigating the coexistence of European Patents (EP) and Unitary Patents (UP), it is necessary to better
understand the differences between these two types of patents. For this purpose, this section compares the
total renewal fee income that would be generated by each type of patent. From a methodological point of view,
this comparison is made at the patent level such that the results are independent of the relative switching
between EP and UP, and of the number of granted patents at the EPO.

2.1

TOTAL RENEWAL FEE INCOME AND MAINTENANCE RATE MODEL

As described in Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a), the total renewal fee income generated by an average
European patent (EP) in 25 EU National Patent Offices (NPOs) depends on three main factors (see equation (1)):

The validation rate ( ): the probability that the patent is validated in country i;
The maintenance rate (1 ): the probability that it is maintained each year t for a maximum of 20
years3 (given the depreciation rate ) ;
The level of renewal fees ( ) in each country and over time.
=

(1

(1)

This total renewal fee income is shared between EPO and NPO. Indeed, half of the renewal fee income generated
by EP at each NPO is transferred to the EPO and the other half is for the NPO itself.
Concerning the unitary patent (UP), a similar formula (see equation (2)) can be used with the exception that the
validation rate of the UP is by definition equal to 100 percent. As the UP renewal fees would be collected by the
EPO, half of the amount generated would be transferred back to the NPOs.

We assumed that any European patent starts to generate renewal fees income for national patent offices from its 6th year.
This assumption corresponds to the average grant duration at the EPO (Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007; van
Zeebroeck, 2011).

(1

(2)

The major determinants of the total income generated by UP after grant are its maintenance rates over time and
the level of renewal fees. Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) showed that the former parameter partly
depends on the latter one, as confirmed by an econometric model evaluating the impact of renewal fees on the
aggregate maintenance rate of patents across countries (see equation (3)).
(1

)=

(3)

The dependent variable is the average maintenance rate of granted patents validated in country i at year t.4 In
addition to the renewal fees5 (F), this model takes into account the age of the patent and three country-level
explanatory variables: the gross domestic product (GDP), an indicator of the strength of the national patent
system (IPI, most recent series provided by Park, 2008, of an index that was introduced in Ginarte and Park,
1997), and the age of membership of the country in the European Patent Convention (NPOAGE). We performed
this estimation with a database composed of the most up-to-date information for 30 countries presenting
enough availability of maintenance information. Table 1 presents the econometric results.
The updated model confirms for a larger sample of countries the results of Danguy and van Pottelsberghe
(2011a). First, GDP has a positive and significant impact on the maintenance rates, illustrating the role of market
attractiveness for patent enforcement strategies (see Harhoff, Hoisl, Reichl, and van Pottelsberghe, 2009, for
similar results in terms of the validation behaviour). Second, the level of renewal fees (FEES) significantly
impacts the maintenance rates. High fees reduce the maintenance rate (or increase the drop-out rate). Third,
countries that have been part of the EPC for a longer period of time (NPOAGE) have higher maintenance rates,
thanks to a learning curve: a longer experience with the European patent system increases the attractiveness of
the country for patent protection (de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2007). Fourth, PATAGE captures the
life cycle of patented technologies. The older a patent, the lower its maintenance rate is. Finally, the strength of
national patent system in terms of subject matter, enforcement and reliability (measured by IPI) has a
positive and significant impact. The stronger the enforcement of patent rights, the longer patents are maintained
at the national patent office.

See Appendix B of Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a) for more details on the computation of average maintenance
rates at the country level. For the current paper, this computation has been repeated with the most up-to-date data.
5
Note that for some countries, a validation fee has to be paid in addition to the renewal fees. This validation fee has been
taken into consideration at year 6 of the patent age. See Appendix Table A.1 for the renewal fees currently in place in the 25
EU countries.

Table 1: Results of the maintenance rate econometric model

Dependent variable: MAINTENANCE RATES
Danguy and van
Variables
Pottelsberghe (2011a)
GDP
0.0637***
(0.007)
FEES
-0.11912***
(0.026)
NPOAGE
0.00791***
(0.001)
PATAGE
-0.02944***
(0.002)
IPI
0.17181***
(0.044)
Constant
-0.25616
(0.207)
Observations
243
Number of countries
17
Adjusted R-squared
0.756

Updated data

explanation

0.0654***
(0.00434)
-0.150***
(0.0239)
0.00541***
(0.000580)
-0.0128***
(0.00161)
0.0322*
(0.0200)
0.165**
(0.0839)
438
30
0.670

country size
fee elasticity
learning curve
technology cycle
enforcement

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The
dependent variable is the maintenance rate (own calculation based on EPO statistics and trilateral statistical report); GDP is
expressed in 000 billion $ (World development indicators 2012); FEES stands for the national annual renewal fees and are
expressed in 000 (EPO statistics, see Appendix Table A. 1); NPOAGE is the age of membership in the EPC; IPI corresponds
to the value of the Intellectual Property Index in 2005 (Park, 2008).

2.2

RENEWAL FEES SCHEDULES AND SIMULATED MAINTENANCE RATES FOR UP

Beyond the impact of renewal fees on the maintenance rates, the level and the structure of renewal fees
remains at the core of the policy discussion about the unitary patent system6. Two structures of renewal fees for
UP can be considered: (1) summing up the fees of X countries, for instance those in which most of the patents
are validated in the current European patent system; (2) adding a constant increment of X each additional year
in the patent age. Figure 1 illustrates four alternatives for the former structure the sum of fees of the first 2 (4,
8, or 12) countries and four alternatives for the latter one starting fee of 600 on year 6 and then an
increment of 100 (200, 400 or 1000) each additional year.

See Europe Economics (2010), Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011b), and de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe
(2013) for a discussion on the optimal patent fee structure.

Figure 1: Renewal fees schedules for UP

16 000

UP(2)
UP(100)

14 000

UP(4)
UP(200)

UP(8)
UP(400)

UP(12)
UP(1000)

Yearly renewal fee

12 000
10 000
8 000
6 000
4 000
2 000
6

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Patent age
Note: Dashed lines show fees structures which sum the fees of X countries. Plain lines show the fees structures with fixed
annual increment.

In Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a), we already argued that the proposed UP(200) is the most
appropriate fees schedule since it has the advantage of being simpler than the additive fees structures and it
corresponds to what the business sector is currently paying. Indeed, van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck
(2008) showed that the average geographical scope of protection is about four countries UP(4) is similar to
UP(200) for a 15-year old patent. With UP(200), the applicant would pay total renewal fees of about 30,000
to keep its patent enforced for 20 years in the 25 EU member states. This absolute renewal patent cost is
relatively affordable in comparison with current patenting costs in Europe7 and given the large geographical
scope of protection provided by UP.
Based on the new econometric results presented in Table 1 and the alternative fees schedules displayed in
Figure 1, we simulated the maintenance rates of the UP given by equation (3). Figure 2 illustrates the results of
these simulations. Maintenance rates for UP vary according to the chosen renewal fees structure. The higher the
fees, the lower the maintenance rates. Note also that the lower bound of maintenance rates is assumed to be 10
percent for all fees schedules. The higher the fees, the faster the simulated maintenance rates converges
towards this lower bound.

For more discussion on the absolute and relative patenting costs, see van Pottelsberghe and Franois (2009), van
Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2010), and Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2011a).

Figure 2 - Simulated maintenance rates for UP

100%
90%
80%

Maitenance rate

70%
60%

UP(2)
UP(4)
UP(8)
UP(12)
UP(100)
UP(200)
UP(400)
UP(1000)

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
6

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Patent age
Note: the simulated maintenance rates for UP were normalised to 100 percent at year 6 and the lower bound is assumed to
be equal to 10 percent.

2.3

SIMULATED UP RENEWAL FEES INCOME

The estimated parameters of Table 1 are used to simulate the total renewal fee income generated by an average
UP (according to equation (2)). Figure 3 presents this total income for different fee structures and compares the
incomes generated by UP (see VUP bars) with the one generated by a current average EP (VEP according to
equation (1)).
Figure 3 confirms that the UP would generate at least the same total renewal fee income as the current EP and
most likely significantly more, thanks to higher maintenance rates and higher renewal fees. Renewal fees have
a positive impact on the total income generated by granted patents. The patent offices could thus have a
preference for higher fees since it would increase the level of their total income. Note that these total fee
incomes do not include the part related to the EPC member states which are not part of the unitary patent
system (Spain, Italy, and Croatia, and non-EU member states such as Switzerland and Turkey) because this part
of renewal fee income is not supposed to change with the new unitary patent. For the sake of clarity, the
remainder of this analysis will rely on incremental fees schedules only.

 35 000
30 000
25 000
20 000
15 000

10 416
11 832
14 108
16 656
19 195
19 597
19 868
20 520
22 667
23 537
26 823
27 417
27 872
31 838
14 927
17 152
18 615
19 317
19 259
18 516
17 865
17 371
17 041
16 733
17 721
19 262
21 060
23 149
25 229

Figure 3: Simulated total renewal fee income for an average EP and an average UP

10 000
5 000
VEP
VUP(2)
VUP(3)
VUP(4)
VUP(5)
VUP(6)
VUP(7)
VUP(8)
VUP(9)
VUP(10)
VUP(11)
VUP(12)
VUP(13)
VUP(14)
VUP(100)
VUP(150)
VUP(200)
VUP(250)
VUP(300)
VUP(350)
VUP(400)
VUP(450)
VUP(500)
VUP(750)
VUP(1000)
VUP(1250)
VUP(1500)
VUP(1750)
VUP(2000)

Note: for VEP, own calculation based on equation (1) with the observed data for the 25 EU member states. For VUP, own
calculation based on equation (2) with the simulated maintenance rates and different fees schedules (the parentheses (1)
to (14) show the impact with UP renewal fees computed as the sum of (1) to (14) EP renewal fees in the current system;
the parentheses (100) to (2000) show the total income of an average UP with steady yearly increases of renewal fees).

These simulations are actually valid in the frame of a total switch from the current EP system towards the UP
system. The reality is that the two systems will coexist and hence the degree of substitution between the two
must be taken into account.

THE SUBSTITUTION EFFECT

Although an average UP would generate more income than an average EP, the total renewal fees collected by
patent offices within the unitary patent system (including UP and EP) might even be lower than the income with
the current EP system. If both types of patent coexist, applicants will have the opportunity to choose either to
validate the granted European patent in individual countries (ie the current EP situation) or to validate the patent
with unitary effect across the 25 EU countries (the UP system). This choice would be made for each patent
according to the expected market for the protected technology and the desired geographical scope of
protection. The fear of patent offices is that only the patents that are currently validated in a large number of
countries (and hence generate significant renewal fees income) would opt for the unitary patent. In other words,
national patent offices could be worse off with the UP if the most valuable current EP switch to UP (with lower
absolute fees than the current cumulative fees paid for a large geographical scope of protection in the EU).
This paper precisely aims to better understand the budgetary consequences of this substitution effect between
EP and UP on the total renewal fees income collected by patent offices. In particular, this section extends the
comparison between one average UP and one average EP (introduced in Danguy and van Pottelsberghe, 2011a,
and presented in Section 2) by taking into consideration the relative distribution between the two types of
patents.

3.1

RENEWAL FEES INCOME UNDER THE DUAL SYSTEM

Given the coexistence of UP and EP, the total renewal fee income collected by patent offices after the grant of
European patents would depend on three key factors:

the renewal fee income generated by the EP,

(which depends on their validation and
maintenance rates);
the renewal fee income generated by the UP,
(and hence their maintenance rates and the level of
UP fees);
) and the share of UP (
) in the total number of granted patents by the EPO.
the share of EP (

The total income for patent offices would also depend on the total number of granted patents. For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that the number of granted patents is stable. More precisely, the focus is on the total
renewal fee income generated by one average granted patent at the EPO given by the weighted sum defined in
equation (4). This methodological choice is a conservative assumption since it does not take into account the
potential increase in patent applications due to an improved attractiveness of the European patent system,
thanks to the unitary patent.

3.2

(4)

WORKING HYPOTHESES

In addition to performing simulations at the patent level, three working hypotheses are at the core of the
analysis, ensuring cautious lower bounds estimates:
)
The upper bound of the maintenance rates for
corresponds to the case of an average EP (
estimated in Section 2;
The lower bound of maintenance rate for
corresponds to the case of an average UP (
)
estimated in Section 2;
The lower the share of UP (
), the higher the maintenance rates for those UP.
In other words, it is assumed that the first patents which will opt for the UP route would be those that would have
been validated in a larger number of countries (with respect to their sectorial benchmark) and maintained for a
longer duration in the current EP system. This kind of patents would most largely benefit from the unitary patent
system. On the one hand, it means that the first UP would generate on average a higher renewal fees income
simulated in
(
due to a higher maintenance) than the average UP patent in case of a total switch (
Section 2). On the other hand, it means that the remaining EP would generate on average a lower renewal fees
income (
would be smaller due to smaller validation and maintenance rates) than the current situation with
computed in Section 2).
only EP (
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of simulated maintenance rates related to UP, according to the last three
working hypotheses. The lowest curve represents the maintenance rate of an average UP if all patents opt for
the UP system. It is obtained through the simulations performed in Section 2. The upper lines correspond to
varying between 10 percent and 90 percent) in total EPO
different scenarios in terms of the share of UP (
granted patents.

Figure 4 - UP maintenance rates according to its market share

100%
90%
80%

Assumed upper bound

Maintenance rates

70%

10% UP
20% UP
30% UP
40% UP
50% UP
60% UP
70% UP
80% UP
90% UP
100% UP

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
6

Simulated maintenance rate

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Patent age
Note: This figure is based on UP(400) renewal fees. The lowest line (100 percent UP) corresponds to the simulated
maintenance rate presented in Figure 2. The other lines are equally shared between this simulated line and the upper
bound. This upper bound is assumed to correspond to a maintenance rate of 40 percent after 20 years for the lowest share
of UP. For the lowest fees schedules UP(100) and UP(200), this assumption is set up at 80 percent and 60 percent,
respectively.

BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS

This section aims to identify the break-even conditions for patent offices, ie the conditions such that the total
renewal fees income collected by patent offices with the UP would be at least equal to the one generated by the
current situation (100 percent EP). Since the total renewal fee income depends on several factors, our breakeven analysis is presented in four subsections that focus on one particular dimension of the total income.

4.1

EP BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS

The assumptions made in terms of UP maintenance rates (see Figure 4) allow us to compute the renewal fees
income generated per patent by the first UP,
, according to equation (2). The upper rows of Table 2 present
these simulation results for the different UP fees schedule (see Figure 1). First, the row related to a 100 percent
share of UP (in case of a total switch) corresponds to the simulated total income per average patent presented
in Section 2.3. Second, for a given fees schedule, we observe that the lower the share of UP, the higher the
unitary patent income (
). This is due to the fact that the first patents that will opt for UP would be those with
higher maintenance rates (see discussion in Section 3.2) on average. Third, the results presented in Table 2
confirm that the unitary patent income tends to increase with the level of UP fees.
Based on the unitary patent income, one can measure the required EP income per patent that would ensure the
break-even of patent offices with the UP system (see the lower part of Table 2):

10

(5)

Considering the UP(200) fees schedule and assuming that 20 percent of granted patents at the EPO would opt
for the UP, the results presented in Table 2 can be interpreted as follow (cf. the shaded cells):

an average UP would generate about 22,000;

an average remaining EP should generate at least 7,525 (in comparison with 10,416 generated by a
current average EP) to ensure that patent offices will not be worse off.

The interpretations of the break-even conditions in terms of EP are twofold. First, the higher the UP fees, the
faster the break-even of the system is reached. Second, the greater the share of UP, the faster the system
breaks even, because an average UP generates more revenue than an average EP in case of a total switch. To
balance their budgets, national patent offices could have the tendency to put in place very high fees for the UP.
However, very UP high fees would be synonymous with a low attractiveness of the system and hence the share
of UP would tend to be low. The policy arbitrage is to find a balance between (1) high UP fees to have a high
income per average UP and (2) low UP fees to have a large number of patents opting for the UP route.

11

Table 2:

and break-even EP
European Patent
10416

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Unitary Patent income:

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

UP(200)

UP(300)

UP(400)

UP(500)

UP(1000)

UP(1500)

UP(2000)

17150
16903
16656
16409
16162
15915
15668
15421
15174
14927

22400
21979
21559
21138
20718
20297
19877
19456
19036
18615

24750
24140
23530
22920
22309
21699
21089
20479
19869
19259

29640
28453
27267
26080
24893
23707
22520
21333
20147
17865

32760
31163
29567
27970
26373
24777
23180
21583
19987
17041

50360
46824
43289
39753
36218
32682
29147
25611
22076
17721

69750
64375
59000
53625
48250
42875
37500
32125
26750
21060

89920
82749
75578
68407
61236
54064
46893
39722
32551
25229

UP(100)
10416
9667
8794
7741
6420
4670
2167
0

UP(200)
10416
9084
7525
5640
3267
114
0

UP(300)
10416
8823
6985
4795
2080
0

UP(1000)
10416
5977
1314
0

UP(1500)
10416
3823
0

UP(2000)
10416
1582
0

Break-even EP:
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

()

UP(100)

UP(400)
10416
8280
5906
3194
0

UP(500)
10416
7933
5229
2208
0

()

Note: The blank cells concerning the break-even EP correspond to cases for which patent offices will be better off than the current situation regardless of the renewal fees income generated by
remaining EP.

12

4.2

WHAT WOULD EP GENERATE?

The previous subsection showed that the level of EP break-even decreases with the share of UP (the higher the
share of UP the lower the risk of losing renewal fees income). However, the extent to which the real EP fee
income would be decreasing according to the share of UP is not taken into account. The distribution of EP
renewal fee income according to the age of patents provides interesting insights on this matter. Since the level
of annual renewal fees tends to increase with the age of patents, the distribution of income over time is not
uniform. In other words, patents that are maintained for a longer period tend to generate a relatively higher share
of the total income collected by patent offices. Once the UP is be created, we can expect that those valuable
patents would have a high probability to opt for UP. This switch from EP to UP would most probably lead to a
larger relative loss of EP renewal fees than the relative share represented by those valuable patents in the total
granted patents.
In order to estimate the reduction in EP income, we computed the cumulative renewal fee income according to
the maintained patents in three main EU member states (Germany, France and United Kingdom). Figure 5
shows this distribution of current EP renewal fees income. For instance, we observe that the first 15 percent of
patents that are maintained for the longest duration represent more than 30 percent of total renewal fee income
collected in Germany. This curve for Germany is used as a conservative assumption to estimate
according
to the share of UP. It is assumed that the first patents that will opt for UP will be those maintained for a longer
average duration in the current system. This methodology allows us to better approximate the extent to which
the average renewal fee income generated by remaining EP evolves according to the share of UP (see the first
column of Table 3).
Figure 5: Distribution of current EP renewal fees income
100%

Cumulative income

90%
80%
70%
60%

DE
FR
GB

50%
40%

More than 30% of total income

generated by 15% of patents

30%
20%
10%
0%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Percentiles of maintained patents

Note: The cumulative income is the sum of annual renewal fees income generated by patents. Each annual renewal fees
income is to the product of the maintenance rate of patent and the official annual fee corresponding to each age of the
patents.

13

4.3

UP BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS

Based on the EP income within the new system (

), we evaluate the UP income per patent that ensures the
break-even of patent offices (see the last column of Table 3):

Table 3:

(6)

and break-even UP
European patent

10 416
8 124
5 833
3 854
2 500
1 458
833
417
208
104

Unitary patent

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

31 039
28 747
25 727
22 290
19 373
16 804
14 701
12 968
11 561
10 416

Note: The
are computed by considering the distribution of EP renewal fees income in Germany according to the
percentiles of maintained patents (see Figure 5).

Assuming that 20 percent of granted patents at the EPO would opt for the UP, the results presented in Table 3
should be read as follows (the shaded cells):

an average remaining EP would generate about 6000 (ie less than 60 percent of the current average
EP income,
);
an average UP should generate at least 28,747 to ensure that patent offices will not be worse off with
the new system (Table 2 shows that this amount would be achieved with fees of UP(400).

Assuming that 80 percent of granted patents at the EPO would opt for the UP, the results presented in Table 3
would then be read as follows (cf. the shaded cells):

4.4

an average remaining EP would generate about 200;

an average UP should generate at least 13,000 to ensure that patent offices will not be worse off with
the new system (Table 2 shows that this amount would already be achieved with fees of UP(100).

SIMULATED TOTAL RENEWAL FEES INCOME

Given the estimations of the UP income (

in Table 2) and the EP income (
in Table 3), simulations
based on equation (4) measure the total renewal fees income generated by an average patent granted at the
EPO. Table 4 and Figure 6 show the sensitivity of these simulations to different UP fees schedules. The first row
(share of EP equal to 100 percent and share of UP equal to 0 percent) corresponds to the current situation. The
interpretations of these simulation results are twofold. First, the higher the level of UP fees, the higher the total
renewal fee income per average patent granted at the EPO, independently from the share of UP. In other words
there is a natural temptation to set high renewal fees. Second, with low UP renewal fees there is a U-shaped
relationship between the share of UP and the total renewal fee income per average patent. This is due to the
substitution effect between the two types of patent. With higher renewal fees (from UP(400) onwards), the
higher the share of UP the higher the total renewal fee income. The total renewal fee income collected by patent

14

offices could actually be lower than the income in the current situation if the unitary patent system is not
attractive enough (ie low share of UP) and has low renewal fees.
At first glance these simulation results strengthen the argument for high UP renewal fees, so that they generate
more income than under the current situation. However, very high fees would lead to a low use of the new
unitary patent. Such situation would most probably not meet the expectations of EU member states which have
asked for a structural improvement in the European patent system8.
Table 4: Simulated total renewal fees income per average patent ()

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

UP(100)
10416
9027
8047
7694
8063
8810
9882
11093
12378
13667
14927

UP(200)
10416
9552
9062
9165
9955
11088
12512
14039
15607
17143
18615

UP(300)
10416
9787
9494
9757
10668
11884
13353
14887
16425
17892
19259

UP(400)
10416
10276
10357
10878
11932
13176
14557
15889
17108
18142
17865

UP(500)
10416
10588
10899
11568
12688
13916
15199
16351
17308
17998
17041

UP(1000)
10416
12348
14031
15684
17401
18838
19943
20528
20531
19878
17721

UP(1500)
10416
14287
17541
20398
22950
24854
26058
26375
25742
24085
21060

Note: the cells which are in bold and italic correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation (

UP(2000)
10416
16304
21216
25371
28863
31347
32772
32950
31819
29306
25229

, 10416).

Figure 6: Simulated total renewal fees income per average patent

20,000

UP(100)

18,000

Total renewal fees income

16,000
14,000

UP(200)

UP(400)

Current
situation

12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

SHARE UP
Note: The bars related to a share UP equal to 0 percent correspond to the current situation (
schedules.

). See Table 4 for more fees

See, for instance, the press release of the Council of the European Union about the creation of unitary patent protection
(17 December 2012).

15

THE FATE OF NATIONAL PATENT OFFICES

While previous sections analyse the total income generated by an average patent, this section focuses on the
budgetary consequences for each national patent office (NPO) and for the EPO. Although the total income within
the unitary patent system could be higher than the current situation, the impact for NPOs could be negative,
depending on how the total income is shared amongst them. This question is actually a key aspect of the
negotiations related to the forthcoming Unitary Patent renewal fees.

5.1

TOTAL RENEWAL FEE INCOME FOR EACH NPO

Since EP and UP will coexist within the European patent system, the sources of income for each NPO and for the
EPO will be twofold. First, regarding European patents, the current situation will continue to prevail. Each NPO
keeps half of the renewal fees paid for maintaining EP enforced in their jurisdiction, the other half being
retroceded to the EPO. Second, for the maintenance of UP, there will be centralised collection of renewal fees
performed by the EPO, which will subsequently retrocede half of these fees to NPOs. The bone of contention is
logically related to the distribution key used by the EPO to allocate the UP renewal fee income amongst NPOs.
Several distribution keys can be considered (according to GDP, to population, or to former share of EP renewal
fees income)9. For the present simulation, we have opted for the GDP distribution key, as it is the most
legitimate and easy to implement (fast growing countries will benefit more). In other words, the share of UP
renewal fees that will be distributed by the EPO back to the NPOs is related to their GDP size. A more complex
distribution key has been created by NPOs representatives: the 2008 politically negotiated distribution key
(European Council, 2008). It is compared with the GDP distribution key in Appendix Table A.2.
The total renewal fees income for each country i with a distribution key
along equation (7):

1
2

for the UP income is computed

(7)

Table 5: Total renewal fees income per average patent for Germany ()
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

UP(100)
2760
2163
1680
1371
1260
1255
1343
1474
1632
1797
1961

UP(200)
2760
2231
1814
1564
1508
1554
1688
1861
2056
2253
2445

UP(300)
2760
2262
1870
1642
1602
1658
1798
1972
2163
2352
2530

UP(400)
2760
2327
1984
1789
1768
1828
1957
2104
2253
2384
2347

UP(500)
2760
2368
2055
1880
1867
1925
2041
2164
2279
2366
2238

UP(1000)
2760
2599
2466
2421
2486
2572
2664
2713
2702
2612
2328

UP(1500)
2760
2853
2927
3040
3215
3362
3467
3481
3387
3165
2766

UP(2000)
2760
3118
3410
3693
3992
4215
4349
4345
4185
3851
3314

Note: the cells which are in bold and italic correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation.

For a discussion on the choice of an appropriate distribution key between NPO, see Danguy and van Pottelsberghe
(2011a).

16

Table 5 shows the simulations for Germany (see Section 5.3 for the EPO and all NPOs). The German patent office
would have a significant drop in its revenues because of the implementation of the UP, because Germany
currently benefits from a leading position within the European patent system (ie being the largest country
within the European Union, which secures higher validation rates and maintenance rate; see Danguy and van
Pottelsberghe, 2011a). Indeed, Germany represents more than half of the current EP renewal fee income (see
Appendix Table A.2 for the 25 member states included in the UP system). The extent to which the German patent
office total income with the UP system is lower than their current EP income (2760 per average patent granted
at the EPO) also depends on the level of UP fees and the share of UP in total EPO granted patents. Table 5 clearly
indicates that if the German patent office wants to keep a similar stream of revenues from the European patents,
it would opt for very high UP renewal fees, with yearly increases of 1,500. This is true with 10 percent to 90
percent of EPO-granted patents opting for the UP.

5.2

BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY

While there are intense political negotiations concerning the UP fees schedule and the distribution key, an
alternative approach is rarely coined by policy makers. Instead of focusing exclusively on UP renewal fees,
negotiators could also consider a change in EP renewal fees (national renewal fees used for the maintenance of
the EP and national patents). At the level of NPOs, the potential losses due to the creation of UP could actually be
compensated for through two channels:
(1) increasing the EP income by increasing the national renewal fees;
(2) increasing the UP income by:
increasing the UP renewal fees (see the right columns in Table 5 for Germany);
increasing the number of patents opting for UP thanks to a better attractiveness of the
European patent system.
These alternatives are investigated in this section for Germany (see Section 5.3 for results concerning all NPOs).
Table 6 presents the increase in EP fees that would allow a stable revenue stream to be maintained for the
German patent office. Since the increase in fees concerns only EP, we observe that the lower the share of EP, the
higher the required increase in EP fees in order to compensate similar losses in total income. For instance, with
UP(100), the increase in EP fees corresponds to a multiplier of 1.3 if only 10 percent of the patents opt for the
UP route, and to 121 if 80 percent of the patents opt for the UP route. In other words, Germany has a financial
incentive to argue for very high UP renewal fees, and to reduce the use of the UP route.
Table 6: Required EP renewal fee multiplier in order to secure break-even in Germany
SH EP
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

SH UP
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

UP(100)
1.36
2.03
3.29
5.44
10.17
19.88
46.68
121.23
411.55

UP(200)
1.32
1.90
2.97
4.71
8.34
15.28
32.93
76.04
216.92

UP(300)
1.30
1.85
2.84
4.43
7.71
13.80
28.97
64.59
174.95

UP(400)
1.26
1.74
2.60
3.94
6.67
11.70
24.30
55.02
160.93

UP(500)
1.24
1.67
2.45
3.64
6.08
10.57
22.14
52.22
169.00

UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000)

1.10
1.28
1.56
1.81
2.14
2.27
2.65
7.11
63.72

Note: The blank cells correspond to cases for which patent offices will be better off than the current situation.

An alternative solution would be to have more patents granted by the EPO. The increase in EPO granted patents
(compared to the case with 60,000 granted patents at the EPO) that would allow for a stable revenue stream in

17

Germany is displayed in Table 7. For instance, with UP(100), and if the share of UP is equal to 10 percent of total
patents granted by the EPO, one would need 1.3 times more patents granted in order to maintain Germany's
revenue stream.
Table 7: Required multiplier for total EPO granted patents in order to secure break-even in Germany
SH EP
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

SH UP
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

UP(100)

UP(200)

UP(300)

UP(400)

UP(500)

1.27
1.49
1.63
1.70
1.71
1.68
1.62
1.56
1.48
1.41

1.18
1.33
1.42
1.45
1.44
1.40
1.34
1.28
1.20
1.13

1.15
1.28
1.36
1.38
1.38
1.34
1.28
1.22
1.16
1.09

1.11
1.21
1.27
1.29
1.28
1.26
1.22
1.18
1.14
1.18

1.09
1.17
1.23
1.24
1.24
1.22
1.20
1.17
1.15
1.23

UP(1000) UP(1500) UP(2000)

1.02
1.05
1.06
1.05
1.04
1.02
1.01
1.02
1.05
1.19

Note: The blank cells correspond to cases for which patent offices will be better off than the current situation.

5.3

BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS FOR ALL PATENT OFFICES

Table 8 presents the simulation results for the EPO and the 25 NPOs of the unitary patent system, with the
UP(200) renewal fees schedule and the GDP distribution key (see Appendix Table A.3 for the simulations with
the politically agreed distribution key). The results show that only a handful of NPOs could be negatively
impacted by the creation of the unitary patent system. Except for the German case, the budgetary losses for
these patent offices are very low and correspond to cases with relatively low shares of UPs.
The first part of Table 8 shows that with a renewal fee of UP(200) the EPO would have a slight reduction of its
revenue stream if less than 50 percent of the EPO-granted patents would opt for the UP. In order to secure a
permanent break-even, the EP renewal fees should be subject to a multiplier of maximum 1.55 (or a 55 percent
increase). Or, if the EP renewal fees are not subject to any change, the number of patents granted should
increase by maximum 6 percent (multiplier of 1.06).

18

Table 8: EPO and all NPO simulations with UP(200) and a GDP DISTRIBUTION KEY
Total renewal fees income per average patent for patent offices with UP(200) ()
EPO
DE
SH EP
SH UP
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
100%
0%
5208 2760 814 747 284 100
55 111
22
90%
10%
78 110
54
4776 2231 787 753 264 110
80%
20%
4531 1814 787 783 255 123 101 113
86
70%
30%
4583 1564 833 854 262 141 127 122 118
60%
40%
4978 1508 930 971 287 165 155 138 150
50%
50%
5544 1554 1053 1110 321 192 184 157 182
40%
60%
6256 1688 1197 1267 363 220 214 179 213
30%
70%
7019 1861 1347 1430 408 249 243 202 243
20%
80%
7803 2056 1499 1592 454 278 271 225 271
10%
90%
8571 2253 1648 1750 499 306 298 247 298
0%
100%
9308 2445 1789 1901 542 332 324 269 324
Required EP renewal fee multiplier in order to secure break-even
EPO
DE
SH EP
SH UP
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
100%
0%
90%
10%
1.14
1.32 1.06
1.11
1.01
80%
20%
1.34
1.90 1.09
1.27
70%
30%
1.55
2.97
1.35
60%
40%
1.36
4.71
50%
50%
8.34
40%
60%
15.28
30%
70%
32.93
20%
80%
76.04
10%
90%
216.92
0%
100%
Required multiplier for total EPO granted patents in order to secure break-even
EPO
DE
SH EP
SH UP
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
100%
0%
90%
10%
1.04
1.18 1.01
1.03
1.002
80%
20%
1.06
1.33 1.01
1.04
70%
30%
1.06
1.42
1.04
60%
40%
1.02
1.45
50%
50%
1.44
40%
60%
1.40
30%
70%
1.34
20%
80%
1.28
10%
90%
1.20
0%
100%
1.13

DK
48
59
70
84
101
118
136
155
173
190
206

IE
33
44
55
67
81
96
111
126
141
155
168

FI
51
56
62
71
83
96
110
124
139
152
165

CZ
25
32
39
48
58
68
79
89
100
110
119

PT
27
37
47
59
72
85
99
112
125
138
150

HU
37
36
37
40
45
51
58
65
73
80
87

GR
22
35
49
64
79
94
110
125
139
153
167

LU
10
11
12
14
16
19
22
25
28
30
33

RO
13
21
28
36
45
54
62
71
79
87
95

SK
11
16
20
25
31
36
42
48
54
59
64

SI
8
9
11
13
15
18
20
23
26
28
30

BG
10
11
11
12
14
16
18
20
23
25
27

CY
5
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
13
14
15

EE
6
6
6
6
7
7
8
9
11
12
13

LT
4
6
8
9
11
14
16
18
20
22
24

LV
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
13
14

MT
0
1
1
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
5

DK

IE

FI

CZ

PT

HU

GR

LU

RO

SK

SI

BG

CY

EE

LT

LV

MT

LT

LV

MT

1.02

DK

IE

FI

CZ

PT

HU

1.06
1.09

GR

LU

RO

SK

SI

BG

CY

1.01

Note: The bold and italic cells correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation. The blank cells correspond to cases which are better off than the current situation.
19

EE
1.01
1.01

SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The main research question addressed in this paper is to assess whether the forthcoming European patent
landscape, composed of two parallel systems (the new UP and the classical EP), would lead to similar renewal
fee revenues for both the EPO and NPOs. This question has been addressed by Danguy and van Pottelsberghe
(2011a) for the scenario of a total switch from the current EP system towards the UP system, showing that
under such extreme circumstances most patent offices should be better off (with the exception of Germany).
However, as the EP and the UP will coexist, simulations must take stock of the substitution effect between the
two systems: if the most valuable EP (which are likely to be protected in a large number of countries) switch
towards the UP system, then one could expect smaller revenue streams.
The paper starts with a description of the various options for the UP renewal fee schedule, a particularly
sensitive issue for the stakeholders of the system. The debate between member states is related to the number
of cumulated renewal fees taken to define the forthcoming UP renewal fees. Some countries would opt for the
sum of 8 (or more) national renewal fees (defined as UP(8) in this paper), while others would prefer the
equivalent of four countries (UP(4)). An alternative and simpler scheme suggested in this paper is to start with a
600 renewal fee for the first year of enforcement and then add each year a fixed amount. The smallest would
be 100 added each year (or UP(100)) and the highest would be to add each year 2,000 (defined as
UP(2000)). Our preferred renewal fee schedule is UP(200), because it is relatively low and is close to UP(4).
Four countries is what the industry is ready to pay, as the patents granted 15 years ago by the EPO are currently
being enforced in 4 countries.
The simulations presented in this paper lead to the following conclusions. First, a total switch towards the UP
system will always generate much higher aggregate revenues for the whole patent system and for all NPOs,
except Germany and a few other NPOs. Second, taking into account the substitution effect leads to smaller
aggregate revenues, following a U-shaped relationship with respect to the percentage use of UP (for instance,
with relatively low renewal fees, the aggregate fee income would be higher than with the current system only if
more than 40 percent of the patents granted by the EPO would opt for the UP). Higher renewal fees would
mitigate this effect, and actually secure higher aggregate revenues than in the past. Third, there are large
discrepancies between patent offices, whereby smaller countries should gain more than in the past and larger
countries, especially Germany, would have smaller renewal fee income. Extremely high UP renewal fees would
mitigate this effect and secure that all countries earn more than with the current system.
In a nutshell, the simulations help to understand the most likely positions of several stakeholders. Smaller
countries would opt for smaller renewal fees (say, UP(100) or UP(200)); the EPO would opt for medium level
renewal fees (ie UP(400) or UP(500)), whereas Germany would opt for very high fees (probably UP(1500) or
more). In other words, one could imagine that the political negotiations would converge towards a situation
slightly above the EPO preferences, more than UP(500), as it would reduce the losses for Germany and
drastically reduce the risks for the EPO.
But this approach would be ill-founded, because it falls short of taking into account what innovators need. After
all, the renewal fee revenues of NPOs should be a secondary or tertiary element, not the primary one. This is
however not the case; negotiations essentially consider the UP renewal fee structure, and whether the new
bimodal system would generate enough resources for the sustainability of NPOs.
An alternative approach might be more efficient, and show a real political will to transform the UP into an
attractive patenting route for applicants. Instead of leveraging the UP renewal fees schedule, policymakers
should rather leverage national renewal fee schedules, also used for the EP. This would allow countries to adopt
a local policy towards patent systems. For UP patents a low renewal fee structure should be set (maximum

20

UP(200)), and each national patent office should then leverage the EP renewal fees, increasing them to secure
at the same time higher revenue streams and make the UP more attractive than the EP.
The main office that might still see a significant drop in its renewal fee income is the German Patent Office, which
has historically benefited from its largest economy status in Europe and hence generates higher than expected
validation and maintenance rates, or an undeserved share of renewal fee income. In order to secure its revenue
stream, with UP(200) and a 40 percent use of the UP, Germany should multiply its EP renewal fees by 4.5, which
is probably too high. An alternative route to mitigate the potential losses is to have more patent applications at
the EPO, which is likely to be the case if low UP renewal fees are set. Germany might be the only country to lose
what it was probably not supposed to earn in the first place.

21

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22

APPENDIX TABLES
Table A. 1: Renewal fees at the European national patent offices ()
Patent
office
DE
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
DK
IE
FI
CZ
PT
HU
GR
LU
RO
SK
SI
BG
CY
EE
LT
LV
MT

Y6

Y7

Y8

Y9

Y10

Y11

Y12

Y13

Y14

Y15

Y16

Y17

Y18

Y19

Y20

130
72
112
185
342
85
104
112
329
134
545
155
129
562
440
66
300
232
150
173
200
160
188
189
105

180
92
137
220
194
100
208
99
215
150
245
73
103
479
100
82
220
133
60
128
120
134
165
171
82

240
130
161
280
237
125
313
112
242
176
290
73
154
479
115
99
240
149
70
154
140
153
188
213
93

290
170
186
340
269
145
417
137
276
194
320
109
308
479
140
115
260
166
80
206
160
179
212
256
105

350
210
211
400
301
150
522
161
309
220
360
146
360
479
190
131
280
199
110
257
180
205
235
320
116

470
250
236
500
334
195
626
186
343
242
425
219
360
479
240
148
300
232
154
308
200
243
294
320
128

620
290
261
600
366
220
731
199
376
265
485
292
411
479
300
165
320
266
200
360
240
281
294
320
140

760
330
310
700
409
250
835
224
410
285
540
364
463
496
400
180
340
299
234
411
280
320
294
320
151

910
380
360
800
441
290
940
236
444
311
600
437
514
496
500
198
370
332
274
462
320
358
294
320
163

1060
430
435
900
474
330
1044
261
484
335
650
510
565
496
600
213
400
365
310
514
360
403
294
320
175

1230
490
509
1000
506
370
1148
286
524
356
700
583
565
496
700
230
500
398
390
565
420
447
353
427
186

1410
550
571
1100
538
410
1253
311
565
382
750
656
668
514
800
246
500
465
510
617
480
492
353
427
198

1590
620
633
1200
581
455
1357
335
605
408
800
729
668
514
900
262
500
531
654
668
540
537
353
427
210

1760
690
695
1300
614
500
1566
360
645
438
850
802
720
531
1000
281
500
597
870
771
600
582
353
427
221

1940
760
745
1400
646
545
1775
385
686
468
900
875
720
531
1100
300
500
664
1100
874
660
626
353
427
233

Notes: The validations fees are included in the renewal fees for year 6.
Source: EPO statistics available on http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/natlaw/en/vi/index.htm

23

Table A. 2: Distribution keys across the national patent offices (%)

Unitary patent

Patent
office

EP

DE
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
DK
IE
FI
CZ
PT
HU
GR
LU
RO
SK
SI
BG
CY
EE
LT
LV
MT

52.99%
15.64%
14.33%
5.45%
1.91%
1.06%
2.13%
0.42%
0.93%
0.64%
0.98%
0.48%
0.51%
0.71%
0.42%
0.19%
0.25%
0.21%
0.16%
0.20%
0.10%
0.11%
0.08%
0.08%
0.01%

GDP
26.27%
19.22%
20.42%
5.82%
3.57%
3.48%
2.89%
3.48%
2.21%
1.81%
1.78%
1.28%
1.61%
0.93%
1.79%
0.35%
1.02%
0.69%
0.33%
0.29%
0.16%
0.14%
0.26%
0.15%
0.06%

policy
proposal
30.94%
12.94%
11.53%
8.71%
4.12%
3.18%
6.71%
1.88%
3.06%
1.65%
1.65%
0.94%
2.00%
1.06%
1.76%
0.59%
1.41%
0.82%
0.47%
0.94%
0.71%
0.82%
0.82%
0.71%
0.59%

Note: The column entitled EP corresponds to the current distribution of EP renewal fees income (computed as in equation
(1) with most-up-to-date information about validation and maintenance of EP); the GDP distribution key is based on the
GDP series provided in the World development indicators 2012; and the policy proposal is a rescaling (due to the absence
of Spain and Italy in the current simulations) of the proposition made by the European Council (2008).

24

Table A. 3: EPO and all NPO simulations with UP(200) and POLICY PROPOSAL DISTRIBUTION KEY
Total renewal fees income per average patent for patent offices with UP(200) ()
EPO
DE
SH EP
SH UP
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
100%
0%
5208 2760 814 747 284 100
55 111
22
90%
10%
74 153
36
4776 2284 717 653 297 116
80%
20%
4531 1916 649 588 318 135
95 197
51
70%
30%
4583 1715 629 566 355 159 117 246
67
60%
40%
4978 1705 664 595 409 188 142 299
83
50%
50%
5544 1796 727 649 471 220 168 355
99
40%
60%
6256 1972 814 726 539 254 195 412 115
30%
70%
7019 2186 910 811 609 288 222 468 131
20%
80%
7803 2419 1010 900 679 321 247 522 147
10%
90%
8571 2653 1109 988 746 353 272 575 161
0%
100%
9308 2880 1205 1073 810 383 296 624 175
Required EP renewal fee multiplier in order to secure break-even
EPO
DE
SH EP
SH UP
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
100%
0%
90%
10%
1.14 1.29 1.20 1.21
80%
20%
1.34 1.80 1.53 1.56
70%
30%
1.55 2.72 2.03 2.10
60%
40%
1.36 4.12 2.50 2.66
50%
50%
6.87 2.80 3.19
40%
60%
11.49 1.01 2.01
30%
70%
21.39
20%
80%
37.30
10%
90%
46.36
0%
100%
Required multiplier for total EPO granted patents in order to secure break-even
EPO
DE
SH EP
SH UP
FR
GB
NL
SE
BE
AT
PL
100%
0%
90%
10%
1.04 1.14 1.07 1.07
80%
20%
1.06 1.25 1.12 1.13
70%
30%
1.06 1.31 1.13 1.15
60%
40%
1.02 1.32 1.11 1.12
50%
50%
1.30 1.06 1.08
40%
60%
1.25 1.00 1.02
30%
70%
1.19
20%
80%
1.11
10%
90%
1.04
0%
100%

DK
48
68
89
111
136
162
188
213
238
262
285

IE
33
42
51
62
74
88
101
115
128
141
153

FI
51
54
59
66
77
89
102
115
128
141
153

CZ
25
28
32
37
43
51
58
66
73
81
88

PT
27
41
56
72
88
105
123
139
156
171
186

HU
37
38
40
44
50
57
66
74
83
91
99

GR
22
35
49
63
78
93
108
123
137
151
164

LU
10
14
17
22
26
31
36
41
46
50
55

RO
13
25
37
49
62
74
86
98
110
121
131

SK
11
17
23
30
36
43
51
57
64
71
77

SI
8
11
14
17
21
25
29
33
37
40
44

BG
10
18
25
33
41
49
58
66
73
81
88

CY
5
11
18
24
31
37
43
49
55
60
66

EE
6
13
21
28
36
43
50
57
64
71
77

LT
4
12
20
28
35
43
50
57
64
71
77

LV
4
11
17
24
30
37
43
49
55
60
66

MT
0
7
13
19
25
30
36
41
46
50
55

DK

IE

FI

CZ

PT

HU

GR

LU

RO

SK

SI

BG

CY

EE

LT

LV

MT

DK

IE

FI

CZ

PT

HU

GR

LU

RO

SK

SI

BG

CY

EE

LT

LV

MT

Note: The bold and italic cells correspond to cases which are worse than the current situation. The blank cells correspond to cases which are better off than the current situation.
25