Digest 4: RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs.

THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, Abad, J.
Admissibility

of

Electronic

Documents

and

Signatures

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUAvs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

IRISH SAGUD, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, Abad, J.
Facts: Petitioner-accused Rustan Ang was charged of a violation against RA 9262 otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act, by sending through
SMS using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to Irish Sagud, who was his former
girlfriend whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene
and pornographic picture.
Issue: Whether or not the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes
an electronic document
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings,
and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives (2008)

Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Thursday, March 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: This case involves the infamous Garci Tapes which

allegedly contained the conversation of PGMA and
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano where the former
instructed the latter to manipulate theelection results in
favor of PGMA. The speech of Cong. Escudero inthe
House of
Reps
jumpstarted
the
congressional
investigation over these tapes. During the inquiry, several
versions of the wiretappedconversation emerged. But on
July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the

lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong
submitted to the respondent House Committees seven
alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed threehour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned
debate by the committee members on the admissibility
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were
eventually played in the chambers of the House. The
HouseCommittee also decided to prepare committee
reports based on the recordings and the testimonies of the
resource persons in thehearings.
In the Senate, Senator Lacson also delivered
a speech regarding the Garci Tapes. On motion of Sen.
Pangilinan, these tapes should be the subject of a
legislative investigation by the Senate. However, Senator
Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible
transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the body
were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. Sen.
Defensor-Santiago also delivered a privilege speech,
articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
Because of these developments, Garcillano, and retired
CA Justices Ranada and Agcaoili filed separate petitions
before the Supreme Court to for Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Garcillano prayed that the

respondent House Committees be restrained from using

these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other
purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and
any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records
of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
directed to desist from further using the recordings in any
of the House proceedings. On the other hand, petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili prayed that the Senate be barred
from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They
argued
in
themain that
the
intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3,
Article III of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the House Committee hearings and
the Senate legislative should be prohibited for violation of
RA No. 4200 (Anti-wiretapping Law) and sec. 3, Art. III of
the Constitution (privacy of communications)
Held: The petition of Garcillano praying that the
House Committeehearings on the Garci tapes be stopped
must be dismissed for being moot and academic. The
Court noted that the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members. There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello
Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees.

However, the petition for prohibition of petitioners Ranada

and Agcaoili must be granted. (However, the ponente did
not touch upon the issue of the admissibility of the Garci
Tapes. The granting of the second petition was based on
the non-compliance of the legislative investigation with
sec. 21, art. VI of the Constitution which requires
that inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance must be
conducted in accordance with the Senates duly published
rules of procedure. Since the Senate did not publish its
rules of procedure, then noinquiry must be allowed lest
violate the given constitutionalrequirement. The phrase
"duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of
every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every
Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since
Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for onehalf of the Senates membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation to be conducted by
the Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. vs.

SSANGYONG CORP. (G.R. No. 170633, October
17, 2007)
FACTS:

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is
engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its
suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with
head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The
two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel
product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on
the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported
stainless steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11,
2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and
demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests
and charges.

Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their
contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining
100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that
Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil
action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that
the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002
Orde and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both
testimonial and documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the
complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible in evidence as such?

DECISION:

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic
document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by
the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the
data accurately.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the

functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data

that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that
in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or
paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paperbased documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original
copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are
considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as
aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based
facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different
legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph,
telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
"electronic data message."We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message"
and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not
include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered
as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document,"

and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a
photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore,
Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"),

which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary
to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.