[G.R. No. 143994.

July 11, 2002]

LOS BAOS RURAL BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. PACITA O.
AFRICA, GLORIA AFRICA, ANTONIO AFRICA, ARISTEO AFRICA,
SOCORRO AFRICA, CONSUELO AFRICA, AND LOURDES
AFRICA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status
quo ante, upon an applicants showing of two important requisite
conditions; namely, (1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be
prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the June 30, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53355. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated April
19, 1999 insofar as it denied the petitioners application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, is hereby
RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
Let a writ of preliminary injunction issue in this case to restrain
the respondent bank from proceeding with the foreclosure and
consolidation of the title over the subject property upon posting
by petitioners of a bond in the amount of Php20,000.00.[3]
The Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
(Branch 220), which was reversed by the CA, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Court
dated July 22, 1997 is hereby recalled and set aside. The
application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby DENIED.
Issues in this case having been joined, let this case be set for
pre-trial on May 28, 1999 at 8:30 o clock in the morning. Send
notice of pre-trial to the parties and counsels.[4]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court
of Appeals in this wise:
Petitioner Pacita Africa (Pacita for brevity) is the widow of
Alberto Africa and the rest of her co-petitioners are their
children.

Records disclose that sometime in June 1989, the Quezon City

Hall building where the Register of Deeds was then holding office
was razed by fire, destroying some of its records/documents
among which was the original Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 203492 covering a parcel of land situated in Diliman,
Quezon City, and registered in the name of petitioner
Pacita. The aforesaid property was part of the conjugal property
of petitioner Pacita and her late husband Alberto Africa.
On request of Pacita, private respondent Macy Africa, the
common-law wife of petitioner Antonio Africa, worked for the
reconstitution of the aforesaid TCT No. 203492. The same was
done and a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-76140
(203492) PR-36463 was issued in the name of Pacita
Africa. While the reconstituted title was in her possession, Macy
allegedly forged, or caused the forgery of, Pacitas signature on a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, purporting to
transfer ownership of the subject property to Macy. On the
strength of the forged Deed of Absolute Sale, Macy was able to
cause the issuance of TCT No. 81519 in her name, without the
knowledge of any of herein petitioners.
Still as part of the scheme to defraud petitioners, Macy caused
the preparation of a fake TCT No. 81519 in the name of Pacita,
which the former showed to the latter to make Pacita believe that
the said title was issued in her (Pacitas) name.
Sometime in March 1994, petitioners discovered private
respondents fraudulent act. They (petitioners) likewise came to
know that the subject property was mortgaged by Macy to the
respondent bank. To protect their interests over the subject
property, petitioners lodged an action in court against Macy and
the respondent bank for Annulment of Title, Deed of Absolute
Sale and Deed of Mortgage. The case was originally assigned to
Branch 99 of the RTC of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-94-20898.
After the filing of the aforesaid case, the respondent bank in
utter bad faith, foreclosed the subject property on June 11, 1996
without due notice to the petitioners, prompting the petitioners
to amend [their] complaint, this time incorporating therein a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, to stop the respondent bank from,
among others, consolidating title to the subject property.

On July 2, 1997, RTC Branch 99 issued an Order granting

petitioners
application
for
a
temporary
restraining
order. Meanwhile, the respondent bank filed its Manifestation,
Opposition and Motion to Postpone dated July 11, 1997,
praying, inter alia, for the denial of petitioners application for a
writ of preliminary injunction, or in the alternative, for the
cancellation of the hearing thereon. On July 18, 1997, the
aforesaid court denied the respondent banks motion to postpone
and
proceeded
with
the
hearing
of
petitioners
application. Thereafter, petitioners application was considered
submitted for resolution.
On July 22, 1997, the Court issued an Order granting
petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction to
which respondent bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 11, 1997 followed by a Motion for Inhibition on January 1,
1998 praying that Hon. Felix M. de Guzman, presiding judge of
RTC, Branch 99, inhibit himself from further trying the
case. This latter motion was granted, and the case was reraffled and assigned to Branch 220.
On April 19, 1999, RTC Branch 220, public respondent herein,
issued the questioned Order. [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA overturned the RTC Order dated April 19, 1999, and
granted the issuance of a preliminary injunction to restrain
petitioner from proceeding with the foreclosure and the
consolidation of title over the subject property. The CA ruled
that respondents had title to and possession of the property and
were deprived thereof by petitioner. Thus, respondents had a
clear and unmistakable right to protect their title and
possession.[6]
Hence, this Petition.[7]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the
Courts consideration:
I
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with patent grave abuse of
discretion in applying the ruling in Verzosa vs. Court of Appeals,
(299 SCRA 100), to the instant case to justify its reversal of the
19 April 1999 Order of Branch 220 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20898[;]
II

Whether the Court of Appeals acted with patent grave abuse of

discretion when it rationalized its decision by citing factual
premises therein that are not borne out by the records nor based
on evidence and in fact contrary to reality[;]
III
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with patent grave abuse of
discretion when it ignored, disregarded and/or deviated from
established jurisprudence governing the issuance of preliminary
injunction demanded by private respondents against the
petitioner bank[;]
IV
Whether the Court [of] Appeals acted with patent grave abuse of
discretion when it disregarded the pertinent provisions of
Section 3, Rule 58, of the Revised Rules of Court providing for
the grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.[8]
In sum, the issues boil down to whether the appellate court
erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction to stop
petitioners consolidation of its title to the subject property.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious; it has not shown any reversible
error in the CAs Decision.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Preliminary Injunction
Petitioner argues that respondents do not have a right to the
relief demanded, because they merely have possession of the
property, as the legal title is in the name of Macy
Africa.[9]Furthermore, it claims that the consolidation of title in
its name does not constitute an invasion of a right that is
material and substantial.[10]
On the other hand, respondents maintain that they would suffer
great irreparable damage if the writ of preliminary injunction is
not granted.[11] They likewise contend that if petitioner is allowed
to consolidate its title to the subject property, they would lose
their ancestral home, a loss that would result in unnecessary
and protracted proceedings involving third parties.[12]
We agree with respondents.
The grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
are enumerated in Rule 58, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established;

(a)That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the

whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or
in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b)That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or
(c)That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening,
or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at no other purpose
than to protect the complainants substantive rights and
interests[13] during the pendency of the principal action.[14] A
preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely
temporary.[15] It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.[16]
Moreover, injunction, like other equitable remedies, should be
issued only at the instance of a suitor who has sufficient interest
in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected.[17] It
is proper only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the
relief demanded in the complaint.[18] In particular, the existence
of the right and the violation thereof must appear in the
allegations of the complaint[19] and must constitute at least a
prima facie showing of a right to the final relief.[20] Thus, there
are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, namely, (1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right.[21] It must be proven that the violation sought to be
prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.
Further, while a clear showing of the right is necessary, its
existence need not be conclusively established.[22] In fact, the
evidence required to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
complete. The evidence need only be a sampling intended
merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction, pending the decision of the case on the
merits.[23] Thus, to be entitled to the writ, respondents are only

required to show that they have the ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in their Complaint.[24]
First Requisite:
Existence of the Right
In the case at bar, we find ample justification for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.[25] Evidently, the question on
whether or not respondents possess the requisite right hinges on
the prima facie existence of their legal title to the subject
property.[26] They have shown that they have that right, and that
it is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.[27]
First, as alleged in the Complaint,[28] Respondent Pacita Africa is
the registered owner of the subject property. Her ownership is
evidenced by the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. RT-76140 (203492) PR-36463,[29] issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City. Second, the validity of the Deed of
Sale[30] dated December 29, 1992, is still in dispute because
Respondent Pacita Africa claims that her signature was forged
by the vendee, Macy Africa.[31] Third, there is doubt as to the
validity of the mortgage in favor of petitioner, because there
exists on record two TCTs covering the mortgaged property: (1)
TCT No. 81519[32] registered in the name of Pacita Africa and (2)
TCT No. 81519[33] registered in the name of Macy Africa.
If indeed the Deed of Sale is a forgery, no parcel of land was ever
transferred to the purported buyer[34] who, not being the owner,
could not have validly mortgaged the property.[35]Consequently,
neither has petitioner -- the buyer and mortgagee of the same lot
-- ever acquired any title thereto.[36] Significantly, no evidence
was presented by petitioner to controvert these allegations put
forward by respondents. Clearly then, on the basis of the
evidence presented, respondents possess the right to prevent
petitioner from consolidating the title in its name. The first
requisite -- the existence of a right to be protected -- is thus
present.[37]
Second Requisite:
Violation of Applicants Right
As to the second requisite, what is sought to be enjoined by
respondents is the consolidation of the title to the subject
property in petitioners name. After having discovered that the
property had been mortgaged to petitioner, respondents filed on
June 12, 1994 an action for Annulment of Title, Deed of Sale,
and Mortgage to protect their rights over the property.[38] This

notwithstanding, petitioner foreclosed it on June 11, 1996.[39] To

enjoin petitioner from consolidating the title in its name,
respondents then filed an Amended Complaint,[40] praying for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Unless legally stopped, petitioner may consolidate title to the
property in its name and enjoy the unbridled freedom to dispose
of it to third persons, to the damage and prejudice of
respondents.[41] What respondents stand to lose is material and
substantial.[42] They would lose their ancestral home even
without the benefit of a trial.[43] Clearly, the act sought to be
enjoined is violative of their proprietary right over the
property.[44]
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued precisely to preserve
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.[45] Denial of the application for the writ may make
the Complaint of respondents moot and academic. Furthermore,
it would render ineffectual a final judgment in their favor or, at
the very least, compel them to litigate needlessly with third
persons who may have acquired an interest in the
property.[46] Such a situation cannot be countenanced.[47]
Lis Pendens
Petitioner further contends that respondents are not entitled to
the relief prayed for, because they caused a notice of lis
pendens to be annotated at the back of TCT No. 81519,
registered in the name of Macy P. Africa; thus, that notice
provided ample protection of their rights and interests.[48]
We are not persuaded. A notice of lis pendens serves as an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property
is in litigation and as a warning that those who acquire an
interest in the property do so at their own risk -- they gamble on
the result of the litigation over it.[49] However, the cancellation of
such notice may be ordered by the court that has jurisdiction
over it at any given time.[50] Its continuance or removal -- like the
continuance or the removal of a preliminary attachment or
injunction -- is not contingent on the existence of a final
judgment on the action and ordinarily has no effect on the
merits thereof.[51] Thus, the notice of lis pendens does not suffice
to protect herein respondents rights over the property.[52] It does
not provide complete and ample protection.
Status Quo Ante

Petitioner further claims that the RTC erred in enjoining the

foreclosure sale of the subject property.[53] It argues that the
foreclosure may no longer be enjoined, because it has long been
effected since 1996.[54] We agree with petitioner.
It is a well-entrenched rule that consummated acts can no
longer be restrained by injunction[55] whose sole objective is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully
heard.[56] Status quo is defined as the last actual peaceful
uncontested situation that precedes a controversy, and its
preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.[57]
In the instant case, the status quo was the situation of the
parties at the time of the filing of the Amended Complaint[58] with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It was that point at
which petitioner had already foreclosed the subject property and,
hence, could no longer be enjoined from going on with the
foreclosure. However, the last actual uncontested status that
preceded the controversy was when the property in dispute was
still registered in the name of Macy Africa, petitioner not having
consolidated in its name the title thereto.[59] Thus, the issuance
of the writ would no doubt preserve the status quo.[60]
We cannot rule on the allegation of petitioner that this case is a
scam perpetrated by private respondents to defraud it.[61] The
truth or the falsity of that assertion cannot be ascertained by
this Court at this time. Verily, we refrain from expressing any
opinion on the merits of the case, pending a full consideration of
the evidence that would be presented by the parties.[62]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Republic
of
the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145874 September 30, 2005
SPS. SALVACION SERRANO LADANGA
LADANGA, Petitioners,
vs.
BERNARDO ASENETA, Respondent.
DECISION

Philippines

and

AGUSTIN

CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the judgment2 of Branch 93, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City.
The facts follow.
Petitioner Salvacion Ladanga and respondent Bernardo Aseneta
were first cousins. They were both reared and educated by their
aunt Clemencia Aseneta. Respondent Bernardo was adopted by
Clemencia on June 30, 1961 in a special proceeding 3 before the
then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila.
In her lifetime, Clemencia Aseneta owned several parcels of land
in Manila, Quezon City and Albay from which she derived
rentals. Among these properties was the disputed parcel of land
located in Diliman, Quezon City.
Respondent Bernardo alleged that sometime in 1974, Clemencia
complained that she was not receiving the rentals from petitioner
spouses to whom she had entrusted the administration of her
properties. Bernardo investigated the matter. He found out that
Clemencia purportedly sold nine parcels of land4 to petitioner
spouses on April 6, 1974. Among the properties sold was the
land in Diliman, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 5813 (Diliman
property). The deed of sale5 showed that the land had been sold
by Clemencia to petitioner Salvacion for only P20,000 although
the market value stated in the tax declaration was P134,130.
TCT No. 197624 was then issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to petitioner Salvacion Serrano Ladanga. The
consideration for the eight other properties sold to petitioner
spouses on the same day amounted to P60,200 which was
supposedly paid in cash to Clemencia.
Respondent Bernardo also found out that a parcel of land in
Cubao, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. 177619 (Cubao
property) had been sold by Clemencia to petitioner Salvacion on
November 8, 1974. The lot was priced at P12,0006 although the
market value stated in the tax declaration was P42,000. TCT No.
204090 was correspondingly issued in the name of petitioner
Salvacion Ladanga for this property.
Respondent Bernardo confronted Clemencia about the
incredulous sales to petitioners. However, the latter denied
selling the properties to and receiving payment from them. This

prompted respondent to file guardianship proceedings7 for

Clemencia before the then JDRC of Quezon City.
In an order8 dated April 17, 1975, the JDRC declared Clemencia
Aseneta, a 76-year-old spinster, an incompetent and an easy
victim of deceit and exploitation. It further directed the issuance
of Letters of Guardianship9 to respondent Bernardo for the
person and properties of Clemencia.
Respondent Bernardo, as guardian of Clemencia, then filed in
various courts actions for reconveyance and accounting of
rentals against petitioner spouses for the ten sales. For the
Diliman and Cubao properties, the action was brought before
Branch 93, RTC Quezon City.10
In their answer11, petitioner spouses alleged that Clemencia was
disgusted with respondent Bernardo who was purportedly
cheating her of the rentals from her properties. She therefore
appointed petitioner Salvacions husband, Dr. Agustin Ladanga,
as administrator in 1969 for the properties in Albay, and in 1972
for the properties in Manila and Quezon City. Petitioner Agustin
paid the income and realty taxes on the properties. He also paid
for the necessary repairs on the leased properties and all other
fees in behalf of Clemencia. According to petitioner spouses,
Clemencia sold her properties to them because of her bitterness
towards respondent Bernardo and also out of gratitude to them
for taking care of her. They further alleged that a certain Atty.
Arambulo prepared all the deeds of sale and that they paid
Clemencia in the presence of the lawyers who notarized the
documents.
When Clemencia died12 during the pendency of the proceedings
in the trial court, respondent Bernardo substituted her in the
action as legal heir.13
At the hearing, respondent Bernardo presented Atty. Dominador
Arambulo who notarized the deeds of sale executed on April 6,
1974 and the deposition of Atty. Efren Barangan who notarized
the deed of sale executed on November 8, 1974. Both lawyers
declared that the deeds of sale were already prepared when they
notarized them in their respective offices. They also denied
witnessing the actual payment allegedly made by petitioner
spouses to Clemencia.
After a prolonged trial lasting 20 years, the court a quo rendered
judgment declaring that no contract of sale was perfected either
for the Diliman or for the Cubao property. According to the trial

court, there was "no clear agreement between the parties on the
subject matter and consideration" considering that "while Miss
(Clemencia) Aseneta appear(ed) to have signed the subject
documents, there were strong indications that she was not
aware of the import of the documents that she had signed." The
trial court also observed that the purported considerations of the
properties sold by Clemencia to petitioner spouses were grossly
disproportionate to their market values as indicated in the tax
declarations. The dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered by preponderance of
evidence, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, and hereby orders as follows:
A. For defendants spouses Ladanga to reconvey the titles and
possession to the property now covered (by) TCT Nos. 197624
and 294090 to the plaintiffs for and in behalf of Miss Clemencia
Aseneta;
B. For the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT Nos.
197624 and 204090 and to issue new transfer certificates of title
in lieu of those cancelled, upon payment of the required fees by
the plaintiff, in the name of Miss Clemencia Aseneta;
C. For the defendants spouses Ladanga to render within fifteen
(15) days an accounting of rentals received from the properties
covered by TCT No. 197624 from April, 1974 up to the present
and so with the property under TCT No. 204090 from November,
1974 up to the present and to remit said rentals to the plaintiff
minus any amount paid by the defendants Ladanga as realty
taxes for the period mentioned;
D. For defendants Ladanga to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as
reasonable attorneys fees; and
E. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
In the meantime, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement on the Cubao property and, after securing court
approval, sold it to a third party in 1987.
During the pendency of the appeal, respondent Bernardo filed a
motion to cite petitioners in contempt after they sold the Diliman
property to a certain Bernardo Hizon on July 6, 1996 in spite of
the annotation of lis pendens at the back of the title. Respondent
insisted that the sale amounted to a "fraudulent deception," a
"defiance of court authority" and "obstruction of justice" because

the property was in custodia legis and could not be disposed of

without the necessary court approval.
The motion was denied by the Court of Appeals which held that
the property was not in custodia legis. It, however, observed that
Bernardo Hizon, being a transferee pendente lite, took the
property subject to the outcome of the appeal. The appellate
court thereafter affirmed the trial courts judgment with respect
to the remaining Diliman property.15
Hence, this petition for review centered on the following issues:
(1) whether or not there was a perfected contract [of sale of the
Diliman property];
(2) whether or not petitioners paid the purchase price mentioned
in the contract; and
(3) whether the price was grossly disproportionate to the market
value of the land in question.16
The issues raised by petitioners are purely factual. The Court,
not being a trier of facts, does not normally re-examine the
evidence submitted by the contending parties during the trial of
a case. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, affirming those
of the trial court, are final and conclusive.17 The jurisdiction of
the Court in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless it is shown, inter
alia, that: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd and impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting and (6) the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.18
We decline to review, much more reverse, the trial and appellate
courts findings.
The facts of this case are the same as those of Ladanga v. Court
of Appeals (L-55999)19 promulgated on August 24, 1984. In that
case, we voided the sale between Clemencia and petitioner
Salvacion of a Manila property included in the nine parcels of
land purportedly sold on April 6, 1974.
With respect to the seven remaining parcels of land located in
Albay and ostensibly sold on the same day, the Court of Appeals
ruled in the same manner and nullified the various sales.20 In its
decision, the appellate court held:

Plaintiffs [respondent Bernardos] theory that L-55999 is now

the law of the case is never doubted by this Court.
xxx
And because all lower Courts should take their bearings from
the Supreme Court, this Court has no other choice but to treat
L-55999 as the law of this case, the properties involved being
same properties included in the deed of sale executed in one
single day before the same notary public using identical
witnesses, same parties and same facts. So far there is no
showing that aforesaid ruling has been reversed and this Court
has to meekly follow the light emanating therefrom in order not
to be lost.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Let the decision stand and
disturb not what is already settled. The doctrine ofstare
decisis is a salutary and necessary rule. When a court lays down
a principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must
adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts sued upon are substantially the same.21 Once a case is
decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same
point at issue should be decided the same way.22 It proceeds
from the principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike.23
The ten cases for reconveyance brought by respondent Bernardo
in various courts having jurisdiction over the real properties sold
on April 6, 1974 and November 8, 1974 were similar, except for
the descriptions of the properties. Only one has remained
unresolved. The rest have either been settled or the contracts of
sale declared void by the courts for insufficiency of
consideration. Thus, in Ladanga v. Court of Appeals:24
The questions ventilated by the Ladangas in their briefs and in
their comment of April 3, 1984 may be reduced to the issue of
the validity of the sale which the vendor Clemencia herself
assailed in her testimony on August 16 and December 3, 1976
when she was eighty years old. Her testimony and that of the
notary leave no doubt that the price xxx was never paid.
A contract of sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever
where the price, which appears therein as paid, has in fact never
been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.
Such a sale is inexistent and cannot be considered
consummated.

It was not shown that Clemencia intended to donate the xxx

property to the Ladangas. Her testimony and the notarys
testimony destroyed any presumption that the sale was fair and
regular and for a true consideration.
xxx. [T]he Ladangas abused Clemencias confidence and
defrauded her of properties with a market value ofP393,559.25
when she was already 78 years old. (citations omitted)
Hence, for the sake of certainty and the stability of case law, the
conclusions reached in that earlier case should be followed here.
As to the issue of contempt, suffice it to say that the Court of
Appeals was correct. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement
to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation
and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
said property does so at his own risk25, or that he gambles on
the result of the litigation. The property subject of litigation is
not by that fact alone in custodia legis. It is only when property
is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process that it becomes
in custodia legis, and not otherwise.
Considering that the disputed property was not in the custody of
the court, petitioner spouses cannot be held liable for contempt
when they sold it to a third person. The transferee Bernardo
Hizon, however, being presumed by law to be aware of the
ongoing litigation over the property, is bound by this decision
and shall transfer the Diliman property back to the estate of
Clemencia Aseneta, with financial recourse to petitioner
spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
W E C O N C U R:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
SUPERLINES
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
C.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

IN

G.R. No. 169596

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairpers
on,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
Promulgated:
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
PEDRO BALUBAL,
March 28, 2007
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------- - - - - - -x

Assailed via petition for review is the Court of Appeals

Decision[1] dated September 6, 2005 dismissing for lack of merit
the appeal of petitioner Superlines Transportation Company, Inc.
(petitioner), docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61144.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing
public transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses,
while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound
exit lane, swerved and crashed into the radio room of respondent
Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).
The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCCs toll
way patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent Pedro Balubal
(Balubal), then head of traffic control and security department of
the South Luzon tollway.[2] The bus[3] was thereafter turned over
to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own
investigation of the incident. Because of lack of adequate space,
the bus was, on request of traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera
(Lopera), towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound where it was
stored.[4]
Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to
release the bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same,
despite petitioners undertaking to repair the damaged radio
room. Respondent Balubal instead demanded the sum
of P40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value, representing
respondent PNCCs estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the
damaged radio room. By petitioners estimate, however, the
damage amounted to P10,000.00 only.[5]
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property
(replevin) with damages[6] against respondents PNCC and
Balubal with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon,
praying as follows:

DECISION
xxxx
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

2.

after trial on the issues, judgment be rendered

a)
adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the
possession of subject personal property and awarding the
material possession of said property to plaintiff as the sole and
absolute owner thereof;

By Decision of December 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed

petitioners complaint. On respondents Counterclaim, it ordered
petitioner to pay respondent PNCC the amount of P40,320.00
representing actual damages to the radio room.

b)
ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiff the following:

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals[9] which held that the

storage of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the
nature of a deposit, hence, custody or authority over it remained
with Lopera who ordered its safekeeping; and that Lopera acted
as respondent PNCCs agent, hence, absent any instruction from
him, respondent PNCC may not release the bus.

(1)
the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized
income as of the date of the filing of the instant complaint and,
thereafter, the sum of P7,500.00 daily until subject passenger
bus shall have been delivered to and in actual material
possession of plaintiff;
(2)

the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fees;

The appellate court thus concluded that the case should have
been brought against the police authorities instead of
respondents.

(3)

the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and

Hence, the present petition for review.

(4)

the cost of suit.[7]

The petition is impressed with merit.

In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a

writ of replevin, petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait
for the courts final judgment.

Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the

petition, the Court resolves to dispose first the procedural issues
raised by respondents in their Comment.[10]

In respondents Answer[8] to the complaint, they claimed that

they merely towed the bus to the PNCC compound for
safekeeping pursuant to an order from the police authorities;
that respondent Balubal did not release the bus to petitioner in
the absence of an order from the police authorities; that
petitioner, in claiming the bus, failed to present the certificate of
registration and official receipt of payment to establish
ownership thereof; and that the bus subject of the complaint
was not the same bus involved in the December 13, 1990
accident.

Respondents contend that the petition raises only questions of

fact and suffers from a procedural defect in that it failed to
include such material portions of the record as would support
the petition as required under Section 4, Rule 45[11] of the Rules
of Court, hence, it should be dismissed outright.
Contrary to respondents contention, the petition raises
questions of law foremost of which is whether the owner of a
personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a
depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint.

By way of Counterclaim, respondents prayed for the award

of P40,326.54 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary
damages, and P130,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.

In any event, while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of

facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the
evidence presented by the parties, a number of exceptions have
nevertheless been recognized by the Court. These exceptions are
enumerated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals:[12]

It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts

power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized
several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x x (Italics in
original; underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As will be discussed below, number 11 of the foregoing
enumeration applies in the present case.
Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of
a petitioner to comply with any of the requirements under
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the petition
constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal.[13]
In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, procedural
lapses may be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its
merits. As
held
in Durban
Apartments
Corporation
v.
Catacutan:[14]

It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has

consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits,
after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes
and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better
served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted
to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby
defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of
the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The facts and circumstances attendant to the case dictate that,
in the interest of substantial justice, this Court resolves it on the
merits.
On
to
the
substantive
issues. Tillson
v.
Court of
Appeals[15] discusses the term replevin as follows:
The term replevin is popularly understood as the return to or
recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to
be wrongfully taken or detained upon the persons giving
security to try the matter in court and return the goods if
defeated in the action; the writ by or the common-law action in
which goods and chattels are replevied, i.e., taken or gotten
back by a writ for replevin; and to replevy, means to recover
possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of
goods or chattels under a replevin order. Bouviers Law
Dictionary defines replevin as a form of action which lies to
regain the possession of personal chattels which have been
taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by
virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of
the property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff
upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to
prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the
same authority states that the term, to replevy means to redeliver goods which have been distrained to the original

possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of

replevin. The term therefore may refer either to the action
itself, for the recovery of personality, or the provisional
remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession
of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and
retained during the pendency of the action. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. (Underscoring supplied)

In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show

that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of
the object sought to be recovered,[16]and that the defendant, who
is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same.[17]

The seizure and impounding of petitioners bus, on Loperas

request, were unquestionably violative of the right to be let
alone by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.[21]

Petitioners ownership of the bus being admitted by

respondents,[18] consideration of whether respondents have been
wrongfully detaining it is in order.

Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the

bus was towed by respondents on the request of Lopera.[19] It
was thus not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or
preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia
legis.
In upholding the dismissal of petitioners complaint, the Court of
Appeals held that while there is no law authorizing the
impounding of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police
authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the impounding
of vehicles involved in accidents illegal. It added that the
Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy
or rule on the matter.[20] The appellate court is mistaken.
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures.
Thus, Section 2, Article III provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers,
and
effects against
unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be

The Court of Appeals reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v.

Bellosillo [22] to justify the impounding of vehicles involved in
accidents by police authorities is misplaced. TheVictory
Liner case was an administrative case against a trial court
judge. This Court explicitly declined to rule on the legality of
such an order:
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum
to determine the issue of the legality of respondents order
requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its
impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the
proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an
administrative case. x x x
xxxx
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling
thereon directly from us through an administrative case would
be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of
procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be
able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the
filing of a property petition, including the payment of docket
fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issue in this
case.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
This Courts statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a clear-cut
policy refers to the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court
judges of issuing orders for the impounding of vehicles involved
in accidents. It has no application to the instant case which

involves the seizure and distraint implemented by respondents

upon a verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or color of
legality afforded by a court process, writ or order.
That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was
criminally charged for reckless imprudence resulting to damage
to property in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence
does not affect the outcome of this case.[24] As explained
in Bagalihog v. Fernandez:[25]
It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case
cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where the
property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the
rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted
exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone
in custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, [26] A
thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been
and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal
writ. Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of
legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and
not otherwise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in
the original; citations omitted)
Petitioners prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in
light of the foregoing discussion, thus in order.
As for petitioners claim for damages, the Court finds that it
cannot pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and any
other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and
distraint
of
the
bus. The
police
authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to
respondents for safekeeping, a contract of deposit[27] was
perfected between them and respondents.
Petitioners failure to implead indispensable parties is not, of
course, fatal to its cause of action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
parties not being a ground for its dismissal.[28] Domingo v.
Scheer[29] elucidates:

However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a

ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added
by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are
just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs
failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
For petitioner to pursue its claim for damages then, it or the trial
court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable
parties Lopera and any other responsible police officers.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

of

Appeals

Decision

The prayer of petitioner, Superlines Transportation Company,

Inc., for recovery of possession of personal property
is GRANTED.
The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which
is DIRECTED to REINSTATEpetitioners complaint to its docket
if petitioner is still interested to pursue its claim for damages
and to act in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement of
the Court.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 182572

On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio

A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128 of the Register of Deeds of
- versus Present:
Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an
area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of
CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,
165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was
HON. ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, in his BRION,
placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161
capacity as Presiding Judge of the PEREZ,
hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at
1,512,575.05.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San SERENO, and
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, JOSEFINA S. REYES, JJ.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the
LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
Federico
Suntay,
NENITA
SUNTAY Promulgated:
conducted
summary
administrative
proceedings
for
TAEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the
Respondents.
PARAD
fixed
the
preliminary
just
compensation
at
June 18, 2012
51,800,286.43
for
the
311.7682
hectares
(TCT
No.
T-31)
and
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).
- - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003,
SERENO, J.:
two separate petitions for judicial determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
In the present case, petitioner does not question the jurisdiction
of Branch 46, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Fourth
Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court,
Judicial Region, Occidental Mindoro to order the transfer of
docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and
custody to the clerk of court of the deposit representing the just
Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to
compensation provisionally determined by the Provincial
Branch 46 thereof.
Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Rather, petitioner merely
questions the RTCs Order to physically turn over the deposit.
Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657
The present case is a sequel to G.R. No. 170220 promulgated on
(1988) and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP
20 November 2006.[1] We adopt the findings of facts as follows:[2]
deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee of Federico C.
On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order granting
Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta.
petitioners motion x x x.
Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of
x x x
x x x
x
3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
x x.
No. T-31 (T-1326) of the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro.
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in
In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682
favor of the petitioners xxx.
hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to
x x x
x x x
x
Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972) and Executive Order No. 228
xx
(1987). The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered
farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the
and the LBP fixed the value of the land at 5,056,833.54 which
PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit
amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation. It
also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the

deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of the

properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as
early as 1972.
We granted the Petition stating as follows:[3]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special
Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally
determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution
denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the
May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondents
Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the
March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as
Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in
the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to
compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on
the aforementioned formula.
Thereafter, petitioner deposited the balance of the amount of
73.4 million representing the PARAD valuation and subject of
the 31 March 2003 Order to Deposit.
Apparently, another case, docketed as Sp. Proc. N-705, was
pending with Branch 17 of the RTC of Cavite City. In this case,
TCT No. T-31 was alleged to be part of the estate of Emilio
Aguinaldo and Maria Agoncillo. Thus, on 29 April 2005, Branch
17 issued an Order:[4]
Finally, considering that counsel for the administrator has joined
counsel for Delfin Aguinaldo and Heirs of Angel Aguinaldo in the
latters motion, as prayed for, the president of the Landbank of
the Philippines is hereby directed to hold in abeyance any
further releases of the proceeds of the compulsory acquisition by
the DAR of that parcel of land located in Sablayan, Occidental
Mindoro covered by T-31 (T-1326) until such time that the issue
is resolved.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 97052, a Petition for annulment of judgment
was also filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) by the surviving
heirs of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, the deceased spouse of
Federico Suntay. Therein petitioners, Isabel Cojuangco Suntay

and Emilio Cojuangco Suntay, Jr., alleged that the parcels of

land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-31 and
T-128 registered in the name of Cristina were among her
paraphernal properties that had been illegally included as part of
the estate of Federico C. Suntay and had been subject of
agrarian reform land distribution.
On 5 March 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97052, through a
Resolution,[5] issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
enjoining private respondents Emilio A.M. Suntay III and Nenita
Taedo from collecting or receiving the land compensation
proceeds of the subject property. It stated as follows:
WHEREFORE, a temporary
restraining
order is
hereby
issued, effective upon service and for a period of sixty (60) days,
unless sooner lifted, ENJOINING private respondents and their
representatives from collecting or receiving the land
compensation proceeds of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-31 (1326) and T-128 registered in the
name of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. A bond for the temporary
restraining order in the amount of 250,000.00 is hereby set
pursuant to Section 4(b) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. In lieu
of a hearing, both parties are required to file simultaneous
memoranda within ten (10) days from receipt hereof with respect
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Manifestation[6] dated 16 April
2007 informing Branch 46 of the Decision of this Court in G.R.
No. 170220; of the issuance by the CA of a TRO in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97052, as well as by Branch 17 of the 29 April Order; and of
petitioners
deposit
totalling
73.4
million in cash and bonds representing the PARAD valuation
and subject of the 31 March 2003 Order to Deposit.
Acting on the Manifestation, Branch 46 issued this Order on 26
April 2007:[7]
In the interest of the expeditious resolution of the above-entitled
cases, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to take possession of
the cash deposits and original Agrarian Reform bonds as stated
in paragraph 2, page 3 of the Manifestation of the Petitioner; and
the petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to
turn over the said cash deposits and bonds to the Clerk of Court
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, on 21 May 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97052

issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, effective upon service
until sooner lifted.[8] Subsequently, on 14 August 2007, the CA
clarified its 21 May 2007 Resolution to include the land
compensation proceeds of the property covered by TCT No. T-31
in the coverage of the preliminary injunction, to wit:[9]
Conditioned on petitioners filing of a bond in the sum of
2,000,000.00, a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby issued,
effective upon service and until sooner lifted, ENJOININGprivate
respondents and their representatives from collecting or
receiving the land compensation proceeds of the property
covered by Tran[s]fer Certificate of Title No. T-128 registered in
the name of Crist[i]na Aguinaldo Suntay.
Consequently,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration,[10] alleging that the 26 April 2007 Order would
be a violation of the TRO issued by the appellate court in CAG.R. SP No. 97052 and the 29 April 2005 Order issued by
Branch 17; that the Order was inconsistent with this Courts
Decision in G.R. No. 170220; that there was still a pending
ownership issue in the intestate proceedings; and that Branch
46 had no jurisdiction to award the proceeds of the subject
properties pending resolution of this issue; and, finally, that
there was no need to physically turn over the deposit to the clerk
of court, since it was made in the name of the Clerk of Court
anyway.
On 26 September 2007, Branch 46 denied the Motion, stating as
follows:[11]
The deposit is in the name of the Clerk of Court, and is therefore
meant to be in custodia legis. The Court sees no point in placing
the deposit in the name of the Clerk of Court if it is actually
beyond his power and control since it is kept in the vault of the
LBP in the National Capital Region, outside the territorial
jurisdiction and judicial region of this Court.
The LBP is not an officer of the Court, nor is it a disinterested
person. On the contrary, it is very much an interested party,
being a party litigant. It is the very party ordered to make the
deposit. By making the deposit with itself[,] it has merged in its
person the adverse personalities of the depositor and the
depositary, a situation that should not be allowed to continue.
The LBP argues that custody by the Clerk of Court is a violation
of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97052, and the Order dated April 29,
2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite
City. This Court cannot see the logic in LBPs argument. The
mere transfer of the deposit from the Clerk of Court to an
interested party may be a violation, but mere transfer from
the LBP to the Clerk of Court for purposes of custodia
legis is perfectly legal, logical and proper.
The LBP does not claim to be a party in the cases that it is
citing. The parties therein have their own counsel and have no
need of the LBP to defend them. More importantly, this Court is
not directing the payment to any interested party. It is merely
directing that the deposit, which is nominally with the Clerk of
Court, be placed in his actual, physical custody, or custodia
legis.
The Supreme Court held in Camara v. Pagayatan, G.R. No.
176563, April 2, 2007:
x x x. That the cash deposit was made under its account in
trust for, and the bond made payable to respondents judges
Clerk of Court is not a contumacious disregard of the 4 March
2005 Order not only because that Order is silent in whose name
the deposit should be made but also because the Branch Clerk
of Court is under respondent Judges control. If LBPs supposed
transgression is in not placing the cash deposit under the
account
of, and the bond may payable to, Lubrica, respondent judge
could have readily remedied the problem by directing LBP to
turn over the managers check and LBP bond to the Branch
Clerk of Court x x x (Resolution dated April 2, 2007, Camara v.
Pagayatan, G.R. No. 176563).
xxx
xxx
xxx
The reason this Court did not order the release of Camara
from detention was the perceived refusal of LBP to
relinquish possession of the deposit to the Clerk of Court.
The Supreme Court corrected this Court. It said that the
Clerk of Court in whose name the deposit has been made is
under the control of the Court, and the Court can always
order the LBP to turn over the deposit to the Clerk of Court.
That is precisely what this Court did in its order dated April 26,
2007. It ordered the LBP to turn over the deposit to the
Clerk of Court. In doing so, the Court took its cue from

Camara v. Pagayatan, G.R. No. 176563, April 2, 2007.

(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101506. It
alleged that Presiding Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of Branch 46
committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the 26 April
2007 and 26 September 2007 Orders directing the physical
turnover of the deposits and reiterating the grounds it had
earlier cited in its Motion for Reconsideration.
On 31 January 2008, the CA dismissed the Petition.[12] It held
that the assailed Orders were issued after the finality of the
Decision in G. R. No. 170220. It also ruled that respondent judge
had fully explained the basis of his reliance on this Courts
ruling in G.R. No. 176563, as quoted above, where we said that
the trial court may direct petitioner to turn over the Managers
Check and bond to the branch clerk of court. Moreover,
petitioners perceived violation of the injunctive Writ issued by
the CA or the Order issued by Branch 17 was supposedly
without factual basis. The CA opined that the pendency of a
suit involving ownership of the expropriated lands provides even
greater
justification
for
the
court
to
take
possession of the disputed funds representing partial payment of
the just compensation due the landowners pursuant to agrarian
reform laws. Finally, it held that it is only when property is
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process that it becomes
in custodia legis. The CA likewise denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration through the assailed Resolution dated 17 April
2008.[13]
Hence, this Petition.
We have repeatedly said that grave abuse of discretion implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[14]
The CA has correctly held that petitioner failed to show any
basis for the latters allegations. It cannot be said that
respondent judge acted in an arbitrary or despotic manner, as
he clearly based the assailed Orders on this Courts Decision

in Camara v. Pagayatan, G.R. No. 176563. In that case, we

recognized the trial courts jurisdiction in ordering the deposits
to be put under custodia legis; that is, by turning over the
deposits to the Clerk of Court.
Moreover, we cannot subscribe to petitioners assertions when it
does not even question the Order of respondent judge for it to
place the deposits under custodia legis, but only on the condition
that these deposits could not be physically turned over to the
clerk of court. For property to be in custodia legis, it must have
been lawfully seized and taken by legal process and authority,
and placed in the possession of a public officer such as a sheriff,
or of an officer of the court empowered to hold it such as a
receiver.[15]Therefore, it was only a natural consequence for
respondent judge to order the physical turnover of the deposits,
which had already been placed under the name of the Clerk of
Court in partial compliance with the 26 April 2007 Order.
Petitioners fear that the deposits would be released to the
litigants is premature and unfounded. No order of release was
ever made by respondent judge; thus, no violation of the
outstanding writ of preliminary injunction has been committed.
Neither can we subscribe to petitioners theory that the Order for
the physical turnover was violative of our Decision in Lubrica v.
Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 170220), as that case did
not even touch on the ownership dispute, which was not raised
by the parties. Indeed, in Lubrica, we ordered petitioner to
deposit the provisionally determined land compensation to its
office in Manila. In that case, however, the issue was simply
whether the computation for just compensation was correct. The
order to deposit the compensation to petitioners Manila office
was intended to facilitate the immediate release of the funds to
the landowner. Considering the circumstances that arose after
our ruling in Lubrica, respondent Judge Pagayatan issued the
Order placing the deposit in custodia legis to prevent any
wrongful release thereof.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 31
January 2008 and Resolution dated 17 April 2008 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101506 are hereby AFFIRMED.