G.R. No.
l-13288
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1918/sep1918/gr_13288_1918.html
Today is Saturday, November 01, 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. l-13288
September 25, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALENTIN GINER CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Aurelio A. Torres for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
Section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila enumerates eleven classes of individuals who shall be
deemed to be vagrants. The section includes any person who "acts as pimp or procurer." The words "pimp" and
"procurer," practically synonymous in signification, are terms of opprobrium. The commonly accepted definition of
the word "pimp" (alcahuete) is "one who provides gratification for the lust of others; a procurer; a panderer." (6
Words and Phrases, 5379.) The clause in question standing alone within semi-colons, it is not essential, in order to
convict one of vagarancy because a pimp or procurer, that this person have no visible means of support, or be an
agent for a keeper of a house of prostitution, etc.
A comparison of section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila of 1917 with the corresponding section
of the preceding Revised Ordinances discloses that the phrase "or acts as pimp or procurer" was not found in the
old ordinances. Since the legislative body of the city of Manila has taken the pains to include these words in the new
ordinances, it must have done so for a purpose, which plainly is to put a stop to vile traffic in human flesh. Such a
laudable object on the part of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila should now be effectuated by judicial
enforcement.
The defendant, a cochero, having solicited an American soldier to go with him in his rig to find a woman of loose
moral and having secured a Deliah for the soldier, is "a pimp or procurer," guilty of the offense punished by section
733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila. Although this fact was only shown by the testimony of one to
support a judgment of conviction if, as in this instance, it satisfies beyond a reasonable doubt. (U.S. vs. Olais [1917],
36 Phil., 828.)
For this offense, the defendant was sentenced in the Municipal Court and again in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila to three months' imprisonment and the costs. Although both of these judges apparently took into
consideration in fixing the penalty that the defendant was as recidivist, and although we are unable to find any
demonstration of this fact in the record, nevertheless, as the penalty is within the limitations permitted by the
Ordinances, and as the offense of the defendant merits no judicial sympathy, it results that the judgment appealed
from should be affirmed with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Torres, Araullo, Street, Avancea and Fisher, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
1 of 1
11/1/14, 2:04 AM