FACTS
ISSUE
VIDAL V. COMELEC and ERAP
Background:
Is the petition
Erap was convicted of Plunder.
for certiorari
Pardoned by GMA on 10.25.07.
proper? Why?
Erap accepted pardon on 10.26.07
Filed his COC for Mayor Manila on 10.2.12
Penalty: Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is
present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the act,
the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another in consideration of their number and
HELD
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the
President expressly granted by the Constitution; that the text of the pardon granted to him
substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal
Code as it was categorically stated in the said document that he was restored to his civil and
political rights; that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be construed favorably in favor of the
grantee; and that his disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the hundreds of
thousands of Manileos who voted for him.
Presidents power to Pardon = Consti > RPC
No. The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation
of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidl v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015,
Leonardo de Castro, J).
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty
in accordance with the preceding rules, according
to the result of such compensation.
Atty. Risos-Vidal filed before COMELEC against Erap
on the grounds of:
LGC 1991 Sec 40:
Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic;
Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
Art. 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. The death
penalty, when it is not executed by reason of
commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of
perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil
interdiction during thirty years following the date
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
dsadas
CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
Cristobal said the pardoning
The CFI of Rizal found respondent
power of the Executive does
Santos guilty of estafa and was confined
not apply to legislative
in the provincial jail for 6 months.
However, he continued to be a registered prohibitions and would amount
to an unlawful exercise of the
elector in the city of Malabon, Rizal and
Executive of a legislative
was seated as the municipal president
function.
from 1934 to 1937. On 1938,
Commonwealth Act No 357 or the
Election Code, was approved by the
National
Assembly.
Section
94,
paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the
respondent from voting for having been
declared by final judgment guilty of any
crime against property. In view of this
provision, the respondent applied to the
President for an absolute pardon. Upon
favorable recommendation of the Sec of
Justice, the President granted the
petition
on
1939,
restoring
the
respondent to his full civil and political
rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment,
he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or
The Court ruled that the Constitution imposes only two limits on the power of clemency: that it be
exercised after conviction, and that it does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action.
Held: Saying that paragraph b of section 94 of Commonwealth Act no 357 does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive would lead to the impairment of this power.
property responsibility.
On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the
exclusion of the name of Santos from the
list of voters in precinct no. 11 of
Malabon, Rizal on the ground that the
latter is disqualified under par (b) of Sec
94 of the Election Code. After hearing,
the court denied the petition for exclusion
and declared that the pardon extended in
favor of respondent has had the effect pf
excluding him from the disqualification
created by the Election Code.
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for
certiorari in which he impugns the
decision of the court.
Garcia vs. Exec. Secretary
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military
personnel is a clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However,
although the law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the
deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such
is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC, held the Court.
The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period
of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner
was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the
President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
The Court held that the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and
acts as a criminal court. As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not
provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. [A]bsent
any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the
General Court Martials decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29
should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioners (Garcia) period of confinement to his
sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.
The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. [T]he concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification, held the Court.
Finally, the Court found without merit Garcias contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his
case was violated. It noted that Garcia did not allege any delay during the trial only the delay in the
confirmation of the sentence by the President. The Court found such delay to Garcias advantage
because his sentence could not be served absent such confirmation. (GR No. 198554, Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, July 30, 2012)
Enrile vs. Salazar
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director
Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.
The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day
filed by a panel of prosecutors composed
of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor
Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the
crime of rebellion with murder and
(a) Whether the petitioner has
committed complex crimes
(delito compleio) arising from
an offense being a necessary
means for committing another,
which is referred to in the
second clause of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code?
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in
the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of
Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before
the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on
Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February
28, 1990, he was brought to Camp
Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he
was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990,
Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which
was followed by a supplemental petition
filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Lacuna v. Abes
The
eligibility
of
Abes,
the
mayor-elect
of
Pearanda, Nueva Ecija, was challenged on the
grounds that he was he had been convicted of the
crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, eight (8)
months, and (1) day of prision mayor, and to pay
a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). After he
had partially served his sentence, he was released
from confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of a
conditional pardon granted by the President of the
Philippines, remitting only the unexpired portion of
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional
in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.
w/n Abes is qualified to be a
mayor?
In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellees conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried
the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal
Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more
of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last
only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This
accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word
the prison term and fine. Abes applied as voter in
Penaranda but he was denied by the Election
Registration Board, however, he was able to run
and even win the mayoral elections Lacuna filed a
quo
warranto
petition
against
Abes.On
December 1967, on the same day when hearing
was held on the application for preliminary
injunction, the President of the Philippines granted
to the respondent, Benjamin Abes, an absolute
and unconditional pardon and restored to him "full
civil and political rights". The lower court favored
Abes, hence the petition.
Parulan v. Dir. Of Prisons
Pp v. Dela Torre
Pp v. Tabaco
People v. Talusa
Santiago v. Garchitorena
"perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special
disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging
their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether the penalty is the
perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually.
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity
of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence
of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the
judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes
vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he
became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The
judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on
1 December 2009 . 26
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is
an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under
oath in his certificate of candidacy.
kidnapping with illegal detention is considered a continuing crime where the deprivation of
liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another
