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POLITICAL THOUGHT: MEN AND IDEAS

)fc

Westminster, Maryland

MEN AND

IDEA
BY JOHN

A.

ABBO

The Catholic University of America

THE

NEWMAN

PRESS

I960

Chapter 25, "The Fabians," was contributed by Anne Fremantle of Fordham

University; Chapter 27, "Italian Fascism," by Giuseppe Prezzolini of Columbia University; Chapter 28, "American Political Thought," by Milton
Conover of Seton Hall University.

Nihil obstat:

Edward A. Cerny,

S.S.,

S.T.D.

Censor Librorum
Imprimatur: Francis P. Keough, D.D.
Archbishop of Baltimore
October 2, 1959

and imprimatur are official declarations that a book or

moral error. No implication is contained
therein that those who have granted the nihil obstat and imprimatur agree

The

nihil obstat

pamphlet

is

free of doctrinal or

with the opinions expressed.

Copyright

1960 by

The Newman Press

Library of Congress Catalog Card

Number: 59-14754

Printed in the United States of America

Preface

THIS volume attempts to present, through a survey of the great

books from antiquity to the present day, the essential
development of Western political thought.

political

landmarks

in the

Political
its

aims,

its

books are

all

organization,

as individuals

those that deal with the state:

its

power,

its limits, its

and with other groups and

its

origin,

relations with

men

societies, including the

family and the Church.

Of

course, not

all

the significant political books that have been

was the present

written are here discussed. It

writer's intent to

analyze only the select few political works that might be termed
"great"

an extraordinary imprint on
by contributing notably to the making of the Western

in the sense that they left

history either

mind and

state or

by

or issues at the right

articulating

moment

way. The term "great" in

this

contemporary

ideas, feelings,

in a faithful, fitting, yet personal

context

is

not necessarily indicative

of either a positive judgment or intrinsic greatness. In fact,

some

"great" books will be found wanting in soundness and truth, so

much so that the writer feels it his duty to warn that several of
them have been placed on the Index of Forbidden Books (e.g.,
Hobbes' Leviathan, Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, Rousseau's Social Contract). Other works (Marx's and Lenin's, for
example), while not specifically on the Index, are nonetheless condemned by the Church and must be approached with caution by
all concerned, especially by the young and immature reader.

Preface

vi]

While attempting to provide a summary of the most important

expounded in the great political books, the present writer

theories

them

also attempts to appraise

in the light of traditional Christian

is here and there advanced as the occasion warrants. An Appendix, furthermore, offers
in clear, short articles the most important Catholic principles of
politics. Against these principles the reader is invited to check and

thinking. Accordingly, constructive criticism

test for himself

whatever he finds erroneous, obscure, or ambigu-

ous in the works of the philosophers discussed.

The marked

on biographical details is not without its

knowledge of the life and times of an author
undoubtedly makes for a better understanding of his work and

purpose.

insistence

certain

thought.

Although the writer

is

concerned primarily with highlighting

great political figures, books,

and movements,

this

volume

is

not

without a chain of continuity. Taken together, the introductory

chapters to each epoch

precisely chapters 1, 5, 7, 12, 16

trace

a continuous line in the history of political thought through the

centuries.

Making spare but

on the subject matter
titles,

select use of the vast

and rich bibliographies

in the English language, the writer includes

both in footnotes and at the end of each chapter, for further

marked with an asterisk are paperand when they are reprints, data concerning their
original hardbound edition are given in parentheses.
Political Thought: Men and Ideas is intended as an introduction to the study of the evolution and growth of the principal issues
in the history of political philosophy, and as such it should prove
especially valuable in the colleges and universities. It is hoped,
however, that all adult readers in any way interested in the fasciconsultation and study. Titles

bound

editions;

nating subject of politics will find

it

useful.

The volume is, in essence, an outgrowth of lectures given over

a happy decade (1947-1958) at Seton Hall University, South
Orange, New Jersey. The author is very pleased to dedicate it to
his

former students and associates there.

JOHN
The Catholic

University of

Washington, D. C.

America

A.

ABBO

A cknowledgments

THE

author and The

Newman

Press wish to thank the follow-

ing publishers for their kind permission to reprint quotations

from the

titles listed

below. All possible care has been taken to

trace the ownership of every quotation included in the text

and to
acknowledgment for its use. If any errors have accidenoccurred, they will be corrected in subsequent editions.

make
tally

full

George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, for A History of British Socialism, by Max Beer, and for The History of the Fabian Society, by
E. R. Pease.

Apple ton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, for The Statesman's Book

of John of Salisbury, translated by John Dickinson. Copyright,
1927, by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.; copyright, 1955, by Lindsay
Rogers. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

The Catholic Worker, New York, for the article by Ammon Hennacy
which appeared in the January, 1 959, issue of that newspaper.
Press, New York, for Marsilius of Padua:
Defender of Peace, by Alan Gewirth.

The Columbia University

New York, for A Short History of PhilosoThonnard, translated by Edward A. Maziarz.

Desclee Company, Inc.,

phy, by F.

J.

Gerald Duckworth
tarians,

by

& Company,

Leslie Stephen.

Ltd.,

London, for The English

Utili-

Acknowledgments

viii]

New York, for Utilitarianism: On

Government, by John Stuart Mill
(Everyman's Library) and Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes (Everyman's Library).

E. P. Dutton

& Company,

Inc.,

Liberty and Representative

;

The Fabian

Society,

London, for Fabian Essays (1948).

Fathers of the Church, Inc., for The Confessions, by

St. Augustine,
Bourke; and for The City of God, by St.
Augustine, translated by D. B. Zema, G. G. Walsh, and others.

translated

by V.

J.

Fordham Law Review,

the City of
for "The Graeco-Roman Politeia
Men," and "The Catholic Politeia II," by J. F. Costanzo, which
appeared in the June, 1951, and December, 1952, issues of that

journal.

Harvard University

Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, for Cicero: Laws,

Republic (including Somnium Scipionis), translated by Clinton
Walker Keyes (Loeb Classical Library).

Henry Holt & Company,

Thought, by

J.

Inc., for

Main Currents

in

Modern

Political

H. Hallowell.

International Federation of Catholic

Alumnae, for "The Constitution

of the United States," by Miriam T. Rooney, which appeared in

The Catholic Alumnae Quarterly.

International Publishers,

New

York, for State and Revolution, by V.

I.

Lenin.

The

by the School of Canon Law at The Catholic

for "The Relationship Between
Church and State," by Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., which ap-

Jurist (published

University, Washington, D. C.)

peared in the October, 1953, issue of that journal.

Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., London, for The Collected Works of Lenin,
and for Karl Marx: Selected Works.

The

Liberal Arts Press, Inc.,

New

(De Monarchia) by Dante,

,

The Macmillan Company,

tics,

by F.

J.

New

New

York, for Catholic Principles of PoliJ. A. Ryan, and for The Growth
the West, by Charles H. Mcllwain.

Boland, C.S.C., and

of Political Thought in

The

York, for On World Government

by H. W. Schneider.

translated

American Library, New York, for Great Dialogues of

by W. H. D. Rouse.

Plato,

translated

State University Press, Columbus, Ohio, for De Republica,

by Cicero, translated by G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith.

The Ohio

The Oxford University Press, London, for The Utilitarians from

Bentham to Mill, by W. L. Davidson (The Home University
Library)

Acknowledgments

[ix

The Oxford University Press, New York, for Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, by Sir Ernest
Barker; The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon;
The Philosophy of History, by G. W. F. Hegel, and The Philosophy of Right, by G. W. F. Hegel; The Social Contract, by JeanJacques Rousseau, translated by G. Hopkins.

The Philosophical Library,

The

New

York, for Medieval Philosophy, by

Frederick Copleston,

S.J.

Pontifical Institute of

Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Canada, for De

St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by Gerald

regimine principum, by
B. Phelan.

The

New York, for the text of the speech by Robert

which appeared in the September 20, 1958, issue

Tablet, Brooklyn,
J.

Gannon,

S.J.,

of that newspaper.

Theological Studies, Woodstock, Maryland, for "St. Robert Bellarmine

on the Indirect Power," and "The Problem of State Religion," by

John Courtney Murray, S.J., which appeared in the December,
1948, and June, 1951, issues of that journal.

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

vii

part one: Ancient Greece and Rome

I.

Introductory

Homer, Hesiod, Solon, Herodotus

Pythagoreans, SophistsSocratesPlato and ArisPolybius, Livy, Tacitus
The EpicureansThe

Greeks and Romans

Heraclitus,
totle

Stoics

Roman Law
II.

Plato

19

Writings The RepublicThe

LawsUnity of
Thought
Life

Political

The

Politicus

Plato's

III.

Aristotle

31

General Philosophy
WritingsThe
The
Friendship, Good
End, Nature
WillThe CitizenThe Constitution
of ConThe Best Actual Revolutions: How Avoid
ThemThe Ideal
Plato and
Life

Politics

Political

State:

Origin,

Justice,

Classification

stitutions

to

State

State

Aristotle

Contents

xii]

IV. Cicero

50

WritingsThe
An Intermediate AssociationThe
The Roman
The Princeps
Sovereignty of Law
Life

State: Definition

Political

Aim

State:

State

tion

and Origin
and Constitu-

The

Rei Publicae

Stoic Influences

part two:

Christ

and

Christianity

V. Introductory

63

Basic Teachings of Christianity

Christianity and the

State

Early Christian Writers

VI. St.

Augustine

70

The
The
The Two
and
and Peace
Authority
The
A Consequence of Sin?Unity of MankindChurch and
Life

The

State

City of

God

State

Justice

State

Cities

Political

State

part three: The Middle Ages

VII.

Introductory
The Middle Ages

VIII.

The Great ControversyWriters Engaged

Christian

Ages

85

The Early Middle Ages Classic Factors

Factors Germanic Factors The Late Middle
in the

Debate

John of Salisbury

103

The
The CommonwealthThe LawThe
PrinceTyranny and Tyrannicide Church and
Life

Policraticus

State

IX. St.

Thomas Aquinas

The Greatest of

111

The Philosopher
The Theologian: The Summa
Writings
The Two EndsSecond
The Nature of
LawOrigin of the
End of
Authority the
the
and Functions of Government Church and
RelationsInternational Law
Life

the

Church Doctors

First

Political

Principle:

Principle:

State

in

State

State

State

X. Dante

126

Monorchia Characteristics of the World Empire Uncompromising Attitude Benedict XV on Dante Dante, a
Life

Modern Man

Contents

[xiii

XI. Marsilius of
Life

Padua

135

The Defensor PadsPeaceGovernmentLawThe

The Church

People

part four: From Medieval

XII.

to

Modern Times

Introductory

147

AbsolutismMachiavelliLuther
CalvinBodin and HobbesJames and BossuetThe Monarchomacs Erasmus and More The Anabaptists
Suarez,
mine Bellarmine Reappraised Suarez
A

Period of Transition

Bellar-

Vitoria,

Grotius

XIII.

Machiavelli

172

Why The PrinceMachiavelli's Way

Machiavelli's TechniquesFox and Lion The Prince and
The DiscoursesAn Appraisal
Life

Political Writings

XIV. Bodin

187

The PolitiquesThe RepubliqueOrigin of the

SovereigntyMonarchy

Life

State

XV. Hobbes
Life

195

of NatureThe
The LeviathanThe
The SovereignThree Remarks
State

Social

Con-

tract

part five:

Modem

Times

XVI. Introductory

205

tarianism Idealism Positivism SocialismCommunism

Syndicalism Democratic Socialism The Fabian Society
Anarchism Totalitarianism National Socialism Christian
The Fight Against Absolutism The Democratic Revolution
The Conservative Reaction The Liberal Reaction Utili-

Democracy

XVII. Locke

237

Life
General Philosophy Political Writings The State of
Nature The State Origin and Purpose The Community and

Political

Despotic

Power

Power

Locke's Inconsistency

XVIII. Montesquieu
Life

of Governments

246

An Appraisal

The Theory of Laws The Theory

The Theory of Political Liberty The No-

L'Esprit des Lois

tion of the General Spirit

Contents

xiv]

XIX. Rousseau

258

PactThe General Will

The
SovereigntyThe LawThe GovernmentReligion
Life

Political Writings

Social

XX. Burke
Life

271

Dual Basis of Burke's DoctrineBurke and the French

The Example of EnglandBurke's Conservatism

Revolution

XXI. Bentham

283

Ethical

Theory Political Theory The State

and Legislation Government Political Economy

Life

Laws

XXII. Hegel

295

General

Life

State

and

Evolution

Its

The

Concept of Freedom
The State First and Foremost

Philosophy

GovernmentPantheism,

Struggle Between States

ism,

The
The

Rational-

Monism

XXIII. Tocqueville

306

A View of History Democracy

Democracy Democracy
Be

Life

of

in

If

Freedom and

Is

to

Dangers
Safe Man's

America

Made

Responsibility

XXIV. Marx

320

Materialism
Materialism Historical MateThe Class StruggleThe Five Ages of Human HistorySurplus Value Private Property and the Bourgeois
The Social RevolutionThe Communist PartyThe
Dictatorship of the
The New SocietyMarxism
and ChristianityMarxism and Reason
Life

Dialectical

rialism

State

Proletariat

XXV. The
nomics

336

Fabians

The Fabian

Fabian

Society

Fabian Landmarks

Political

Theory

Fabian

Eco-

XXVI. Lenin
Life

349

Theory

and Action

LeninismImperialism

The

Proletarian Revolution

and the

Dictatorship of the Proletariat

XXVII. Italian Fascism

369

and NationalistsThe
Maurras, Kipling, Pareto, Mosca Croce
and Sorel GentileThe Fascist DoctrineCorporativism

In Search of a Philosophy
Antiliberal

Root

Fascists

Contents

[xv

part

six:

American

Political

Thought

XXVIII. American Political Thought

387

The Sources The Colonial Period The Revolutionary Period

The Constitutional Period: 1789 and After The Constitution and Natural Law
The Contract Theory of Government
The Theory of Federal Sovereignty Minor Political Parties

Appendix: Catholic Principles of Politics

Constituent Elements of the State

The

427

Natural Foundation

of Authority The Purpose of Authority in the State The

Free Activity of the Governed Nationalization of Industries

Capitalism, Communism, and SocialismInternational Life

General Bibliography

439

Index

441

part one: Ancient

Greece

and Rome

chapter

Introductory

GREEKS AND ROMANS

THE
European

original

Greeks were a nomadic, pastoral people of IndoFrom about 2000 to 1100 B.C., they left the

origin.

grasslands of southeastern Europe, pushed southward in succes-

bands (Achaeans, Dorians, Ionians, Aeolians), and con-

sive

quered the Aegean world: the Greek peninsula, the shores of Asia
Minor and southern Europe, and the immortal islands whose very

names are music. Gradually, through intermarriage, the primitive

Greeks and the Aegeans became one people the new Greeks.
Having adopted a city-state type of government, they were first

ruled by kings; eventually the kings were for the most part re-

placed by nobles; then the nobles were overthrown and tyrants,

men

of

no royal ancestry, seized

control.

But the

restless

and

free-

dom-loving Greeks soon turned against the tyrants, even the good

and the able ones, and established a new form of government: the
rule of the people (not, however, a democracy in the modern
sense). 1 Unfortunately, the Greeks could not unite. Their indi1

"The Greeks had the form of democracy

that

is

to say, the people

work of government. Their assembly

sovereign body, from which there was no further reference;
were also courts of final reference, from which there was

undertook

the

constituted

the

their Dikasteria

likewise

no ap-

peal whatever. But they did not have the substance of sound democracy.

There was no protection for the minority, much

less

for the individual.

I.

4]

Ancient Greece and

Rome

vidualism was so strong as to keep them apart save in the face of

extreme danger. Thus, they repulsed the Persian invaders at Marathon (490 B.C.), Salamis (480 B.C.), and Plataea (479 B.C.) only

resume their fratricidal quarrels. Finally, weak and divided, they

were defeated by the Macedonians and lost their independence
(338 B.C.). In 281 B.C., Greece regained a precarious freedom.
Even this was definitively lost when she was degraded to the status
of a Roman province in 146 B.C.
The history of the Romans (originally a people of Indo-European extraction, who had come to Italy and fused with her
to

peoples) may be conveniently divided into three periods: (1)

From 753 to 509 B.C. The primitive religious, social, political,

Rome

were established under a constitutional elective monarchy. Tradition mentions seven kings.
The last, Tarquin, who had installed a despotic regime, was
exiled. (2) From 509 to 27 B.C. This was the period of the Republic. Patricians and plebeians were reconciled. Rome moved
out of Latium and conquered Italy. Then, as a result of victorious
wars outside Italy, Rome became mistress of the Mediterranean
world. But beginning with 133 B.C., Rome was torn by civil wars
and it gradually became evident that the old city-state republican
system was to give way to a new form of government. (3) From
27 B.C. to a.d. 476. During this period, the Empire was established and prospered under Octavian Augustus. It passed through
many violent crises and revolutions, was reorganized by Diocletian,
and then started to decline until it finally came to an end in the
West with the removal of the last emperor. It was just about at the
beginning of this last period, while the world was united under
the pax romana, that Christ was born in Bethlehem of Palestine.

and military

The

institutions of

and limiting the funcwere entirely unknown to them. There was no power or
law for making assemblies accountable for their decisions, nor was there
any process of review. ... To every man his own; but the meaning of the
term 'his own' was that the State which was the author of rights and duties
inalienable rights of an individual as defining

tions of the State

could assure the citizen of certain determined barriers against the arbitrary
dealings of his neighbor, but he had no rights against the State; which in
its

own

Politeia

131).

and

remained unchecked by any

"The Graeco-Roman
The City of Men," in Fordham Law Review, XX [June, 1951],

actions

consideration

in

its

of natural

definition of rights

rights"

(J.

F.

Costanzo,

Introductory

[5

I.

HOMER, HESIOD, SOLON, HERODOTUS

Ancient Greece, which gave the Western world philosophy
2
and so much else that pertains to man's cultural domain, also
denned and brought into sharp focus man's political problem.
This it often attempted to solve on both the practical and the
speculative level. One cannot fail to notice the contrast between
the heights to which Greek political thought soared and the
mediocrity of Greek political life in the concrete. It may well be
that the limitations and deficiencies of the historical polis provoked
discussion and investigation on the part of the philosophers and
spurred them to offer new plans and propose new solutions. In
any case, a study of Greek political thought must never lose sight
of the parallel study of Greek institutions, for in ancient Greece
speculative thinking and political reality were always closely
related and often interlocked as cause and effect.
The earliest evidences of Greek interest in ethical and political
matters appear in Homer, Hesiod, Solon, and Herodotus.
Homer (between the tenth and the eighth century B.C.) portrays

the primitive polis:

its

physical

make-up

(the

acropolis,

where king and government resided, and the surrounding territory

inhabited by the people); its social composition (aristocrats, professional men, laborers); its spiritual forces of cohesion (the
aristocrats' concept of honor and their heroic courage in war; the
king's power, sovereign yet limited by divine law and tempered by
the boule, or council of "aristoi").

Hesiod, in the eighth century B.C., broke away from Homer's

No admirer of aristocrats, he anticipated the

soon almost everywhere to replace monarchy with
oligarchic rule. His poems vividly contrast the arrogance and

grandiose morality.
social struggle

venality of the nobles with the solid virtues of the rural class.

They appeal
there
2

is

to the gods, they praise justice

peace and harmony), they exalt

(where there

human

is

justice

labor (work

is

But man's greatest debt, for the moral and religious concepts that

make up

his spiritual world,

is

to the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

From

it

he received two ideas (utterly unknown to the Greeks) that dwarf all
others, for they furnish the only key to reality: the idea of creation ex
nihilo and the idea of personality (both man's and God's).

form of

justice:

an

idle

man

Rome

Ancient Greece and

I.

6]

by

is

this

very fact unjust and harm-

ful to society).

Solon, the great Athenian lawgiver and one of the Seven

Sages of Greece, curbed the insolence of the wealthy and alleviated

the misery of the small landowners

warned

by

his fellow citizens of the only

What

conflicts.

reform (594 B.C.).

his

way

to

end

He

their fratricidal

divine planning did with the physical universe,

he said to them, law does with the

state:

one changed chaos into

cosmos, the other changes confusion and war into order and
peace.
invite

To break a law is to undermine the common good and to

punishment of some sort, sooner or later, upon both offender

and community.
Herodotus (480-425

B.C.),

a friend of Pericles, 3 wrote an

account of the Greco-Persian wars (500-479 B.C.). The

ascertain, through research, investigation,

and

of the events he recorded, he merited the

But he

pessimistically

to

reflection, the truth

title

viewed history as a

first

Father of History.

fatal,

ever-recurring

by divine nemesis: men are envied by the

gods who humble them whenever they think or rise too high. To
Herodotus we owe the first theory, or at least the first classifica-

cycle ruled implacably

tion, of constitutions.

Following the assassination of the usurper

Smerdis, three victorious conspirators

(among them Darius,

future king) discuss the best constitution for Persia.

One

the

favors

democracy, the other oligarchy, the third (Darius) monarchy.

Arguments are exchanged for and against each form. And thus
began the great controversy that has continued through the
centuries.

HERACLITUS, PYTHAGOREANS, SOPHISTS

Greek philosophers awakened
with the beginning of the

About 500

fifth

B.C., Heraclitus

mental principle of

politics

to social

and

political issues

century B.C.

proclaimed eternal

and

history:

strife

the funda-

"We must know

that

war

3 Pericles, born in 490 B.C., was the most prominent figure in Athens
from 461 to 431. A military leader, orator, and statesman, his name and
work are indissolubly bound to the Golden Age of Athens. He died in a
plague in 429 B.C. Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War
(II, 37-41), relates Pericles' famous funeral oration and his immortal
words in praise of Athenian democracy.

Introductory

[7

I.

to all and strife is justice, and that all things come

and pass away through strife." 4
The Pythagoreans 5 probed deeply into the concepts of law
and justice, the two elements that could, according to them, prevent or end public agitation and quarrels. For the Pythagoreans,
especially for Archytas of Tarentum (400-365 B.C.), law is
written (the law of the polis) and unwritten (the law implanted
by the Creator in man's conscience); justice consists in the equality of all (king included) before the law as well as in the com-

common

is

into being

munity of goods.

The
be
in
all

Sophists, 6 the true sophoi or wise

called, suited the

democratic

mood

men

as they wished to

of the time (particularly

Athens) by offering themselves as teachers (for payment) to

who sought distinction in public life. Ambitious young men,

desirous of entering the political arena, flocked to

how

to argue, discuss, persuade.

But

them

to learn

as a rule the Sophists

were

interested only in arguing for the sake of arguing, not caring

whether their point was true or false. Moreover, their "humanistic" boast, "man is the measure of all things," coupled with their
total skepticism "as to the place of

man

in the

scheme of things,"
conclusions. It had

was not at all conducive to clear and satisfying

to end in confusion and contradiction. In politics, they admitted
two directly opposite kinds of justice: justice according to nature
and justice according to law. The former justifies the fulfillment of
passion, the possession of every possible means of gratification,
war and conquest, the imposition of one's will, the elimination of
one's enemies, the subjection of the

not right,
it

consists,

the

is

weak

to the strong. Might,

the basis of this justice: might of whatever elements

might that acquires, expands, maintains power. This was

that would be proposed again centuries later for

justice
4

Quoted in John Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy, 4th ed. (London:

and Charles Black, 1930), p. 137.
5 The Pythagoreans, also adept at mathematics and geometry, were
followers of Pythagoras, the philosopher who about 530 B.C. went from
his native Samos to southern Italy and there founded a society or school
that promoted a "way of life": political, religious, philosophical.
6 Two prominent Sophists were Protagoras of Abdera (480-410 B.C.)
and Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily (who came to Athens in 427 and died in

Adam

375). The latter is known for his threefold assertion: What is, is not; if
anything is, it cannot be known; if anything is known, it cannot be expressed in speech.

I.

8]

Ancient Greece and

Rome

Machiavelli's prince and Nietzsche's superman. Justice according

to

law on the other hand was for the Sophist founded on the conweak and the fearful

ventional and arbitrary rules dictated by the

to restrain the strong

and the brave. The Sophist mentality was

and

decidedly antitraditional, impatient of crystallized systems

privileged conditions.

Opposed

in principle to the status quo,

it

represented an extreme position and had no respect whatsoever

for moral values. Absurdly predicated on the denial both of objective truth and of a reality beyond and above the world of
it was not however without its good effects.
opened critical discussion not only in the philosophical
realm (on such questions as the nature and validity of human
knowledge) but also in the political field. Here it prepared and
encouraged the break from institutions and laws that had become
obsolete and even detrimental.

sense-appearances,

For

it

SOCRATES
Socrates (469-399 B.C.), the first to "bring philosophy down
from the heavens to earth" (Cicero), attempted to determine the
essence of each thing, that is, what it is: and this by means of
inductive reasoning, through analysis and analogy (Xenophon);
he was also the first to raise the problem of universal definitions
(Aristotle).

Insisting

that

"the

soul

is

pregnant with truth,"

Socrates described his mission as "that of a midwife, to bring

other men's thoughts to birth." Against the Sophists, Socrates

upheld that

men can know

that truth, intellectual

things with truth and certainty, and

and moral, once discovered, must be ap-

plied to the practical, everyday problems of

collectively considered.

man

individually or

Socrates believed in both the unwritten

law (the natural law, which man comes to know through right
reasoning) and the positive law (the law of the state). Between
the two, he insisted, there ought not to be the slightest contradiction. For the positive law, while changing from place to place and
from time to time, is to be based on natural law, itself unchangeable. If the laws of the state depart from the rules of
nature, such laws are unreasonable and unjust and therefore not
binding on the citizens. Socrates entertained a high esteem for the
state and the role of political leaders. For him the purpose of
political activity was pre-eminently the intellectual and spiritual

Introductory

[9

I.

first aim, perhaps, was to create a

and to form a competent class of political
leaders able to impart knowledge to their subjects. Hence the
absolute necessity of education. What makes a statesman, he

formation of the individual. His

science of government

argued,

is

not hereditary right or the vote of a majority:

wisdom, and wisdom

As

it

is

comes of education.

a philosopher and as a man, Socrates remained loyal to

his central doctrines.

He

never tired of learning and helping others

to learn: a typical portrayal has

buttonholing

his

fellow

him standing

citizens,

asking

in the

market place,

"innocent"

questions,

challenging the broad statements in their "innocent" replies, in-

sound conclusion all for the purpose of clarifying

When he saw democracy degenerate into demagogy, Socrates opposed it; he showed his utter contempt for the
Athenian method of drawing lots for public offices ("You cannot make an architect this way," he was wont to remark; "how
can you thus create a statesman?"). Likewise, he condemned
tyranny and took a firm stand on other social and religious issues,
though his nonconformist attitude cost him the favor of the men
a

viting

muddled

thinking.

in power.

Condemned

believes"

city

"for not believing in the gods in which the

and for "corrupting" Athenian youth with his

teachings, Socrates refused the opportunity offered

punishment and drank the hemlock as a

behalf of honesty and truth. 7
capital

him

to escape

final protest in

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Socrates'
disciple

search for objective truth was continued by his

and friend

Plato.

marize Plato's doctrine.

It

It

is

impossible adequately to sum-

has been rightly said that Platonism,

rather than a system lending itself to a final characterization,

life

is

"a

that seeks itself in the search for truth": a skepsis, or quest,

that,

while reaching essential certainties and meridian illumina-

tions, unfailingly discovers

penetrate,
7

new summits

new problems

to solve,

to attain. If there

new zones

to

was one thing Plato

For a moving account of Socrates' last day in prison and his death,
Phaedo in Great Dialogues of Plato, translated by W. H. D. Rouse
(New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 460-521. Socrates left no writings.
His doctrine is known especially from Xenophon's Memorabilia and Plato's

see the

dialogues.

10]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

was a marked dislike for intellectual

smugness and complacency. For him as for his teacher, the search
could never end, for the field of knowledge is inexhaustible. As to
politics in particular, P lato aimed at translating the new con ^ptc of reality and man and life, into a complete reform through
learned from Socrates,

he redemption of

stirs

it

political

fe.

His attempt, of lasting

validity,

us to wonder even today. But his imaginative streak led him

to speculative flights so

wide and fancy as to carry him, accordits everyday problems.

ing to some, far from this world and

With
litical

Aristotle, Plato's disciple for

earth where

God, the thought that thinks

flies,

know how

belongs. Aristotle does

it

the visible, the absolute principle

who

about twenty years, po-

down

thought acquires a systematic character and comes

itself

itself

first

to

beyond

(the thought of thought,

eternally); but unlike Plato

Aristotle climbs to the summit.

the principle without

to reach,

He

is

unable to grasp

considering the fact. This

is

particularly

evident in Aristotle's treatment of moral and political problems.

Both his ethics and politics are permeated by a healthy awareness

of and constant respect for reality. This world and man's place in
it are Aristotle's concern. Here lies the most fundamental difference between him and Plato.
Great as they were and immense as is our debt of gratitude to
them, Plato and Aristotle (like those who claimed to be their successors, the Academians and the Peripatetics 8 ) departed from
Socrates' basic teaching on several important questions. Thus
Blato assigns an all-ftmhraring rnle to

trip ctatp

rnndriprg nnly ap

few WOrthv Of attention, and denies prartinally all validity tr.

family life and private property As for Aristotle, it is enough to
mention bjs doctrine of slavery, his identification of ethics with
po litics, his failure to see men and states beyond the horizons o f
t fye Greek polis. Others were to come who would prove that man
gleet

is

more than a

to

and independently of the

endowed with

citizen, that there are in

state, that

him values

existing prior

even a non-citizen

certain rights, that the state

is

not

all,

that

is

man

mankind

8 The Academians were philosophers

who belonged to the school
(Academy) founded by Plato. The Peripatetics were philosophers who
belonged to the Lyceum or Peripatetic school founded by Aristotle. Later
the two schools and the Stoic school merged in the University of Athens.
When this university was closed in a.d. 529 by order of Emperor Justinian,
the cycle of ancient culture came to an end.

Introductory
is

a single family

[11

I.

and each

man

a "citizen of the world." These

developed by the Stoic philosophers and implemented, partially at least, by Alexander the Great and the Romans. But they also grew out of various doctrines favoring political indifference (Epicurean school) or outright cosmopolitanism

were doctrines

fully

(Cynics and Cyrenaics

).

THE EPICUREANS
Epicurus (340-270 B.C.) and his followers wanted no part in
philosopher engage was for them
and political activities.

social

an unhappy philosopher. They gave priority to enjoyment and

pleasure (resulting from the sum total of all delights that keep the
mind at peace), which they sought in a quiet, hidden life, untouched by the problems and struggles of the common people. The
Epicurean attitude of political indifference helped weaken the
prejudices bound up with the institutions of the old polis and facilitated for

many

the acceptance of Stoic principles. 10

THE STOICS
Zeno
his

of Citium

on the

isle

of

Cyprus (334-261 B.C.) opened

school in Athens, in the Stoa Poikile or Painters' Porch

(whence the name "Stoic"). True to his principles, he died a suiThere are three periods in the Stoic school: the Old Stoa,
whose chief representatives were Zeno, Cleanthes of Assos in Troas
(300-232 B.C.), and Chrysippus of Soli in Cilicia (282-202 B.C.);
cide.

made famous by Diogenes, was founded by

combine the ethical doctrine of Socrates with the
theory of Gorgias the Sophist. Both had been his teachers. For the Cynics,
9

The Cynic

Antisthenes.

He

school,

tried to

absolute indifference to things external (including honor, riches, marriage,

government) was the essence of virtue. The Cyrenaic school was founded
in Cyrene by Aristippus, another pupil of Socrates. The hedonism it
preached (man must seek his last end in the refinement of sensual pleasure)
had a measure of influence on Epicurus and his school.
10 Both Epicureans and Stoics (particularly those of the Old Stoa)
believed in some sort of cosmopolitanism. But the former took selfish
refuge in the concept of mankind to free themselves of duties toward their
agonized city. The Stoics, on the contrary, courageously and confidently
accepted the humanitarian ideal lest with the citizen man also be lost. The
Epicurean is humanitarian out of self-interest, the Stoic out of duty.

12]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

the Middle Stoa, whose most prominent men were Panaetius

Rhodes (about 180-110 B.C.) and Posidonius of Apamea

of
in

Syria (135-151 B.C.); the Third Stoa, which flourished in Rome

during the Empire and was made famous by Seneca, Epictetus,

and Marcus Aurelius. 11

Stoic politics

ing terms

is

its most rigid and uncompromisimmediate successors, in its mildest and

expressed in

by Zeno and

his

more reasonable terms by

who

the

Roman

Stoics and, especially, the

humanized Stoic social thought and

passed it to the Roman jurists and the Fathers of the early Church.
In his Republic, Zeno sees mankind as a single family, but a
family divided into two classes: the valiant and the inept, the wise
and the foolish. No amount of education will make the foolish
wise. Even friendship is possible only between the members of
each class. This, and not the unjust separation of free and slave,
or Greek and barbarian, is the true and only division of mankind.
Zeno wants the narrow city-state of the Greeks replaced by a cosmopolitan republic: one world, one society, one state, all men together like one flock pasturing on the same meadow. But in this
eclectic Cicero,

greatly

11

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (3 b.c.-a.d. 65), born in Cordoba, Spain,

Rome and soon became an eminent lawyer.
was the teacher of Nero, at whose order he died a suicide. His writings

studied Stoic philosophy at

He

and essays of

on such topics as Wrath, The Brevity

be considered "the highest and the completest statement of the Stoic views regarding the state in the early imperial epoch"
(C. H. Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West [New York:
Macmillan, 1932], p. 119).
(letters

of Life, Mercy)

practical ethics

may

Epictetus (about a.d. 50-117), a Phrygian slave, was brought to Rome

an early age. His master, Epaphroditus, himself a freedman at Nero's
court, allowed him to study philosophy, and then freed him, but Epictetus
chose to live as a poor man, in conformity with his belief. For him, man's
outlook should be cosmopolitan: men, whoever and wherever they are,
have similar capacities and similar problems; therefore they should be
viewed as beings essentially equal. Epictetus' teachings were put in writing
{Discourses, Life, Manual) by one of his disciples.
Marcus Aurelius (a.d. 121-180), Roman Emperor from 161 to 180,
wrote in a mitigated Stoic vein. His Meditations (in Greek, the language
used even in Rome by the cultivated classes) is a collection of essays on
how to preserve peace of mind through belief in a world ordered by God's
wisdom and preserved by God's providence and how not to fear death.
Marcus Aurelius recommends resignation to God's will and love for humanity. Although as emperor he opposed Christianity, his writings are
more Christian than pagan in character.
at

Introductory

[13

I.

republic only the valiant share in political

come

whether kings,

rulers,

Zeno's Republic

is

priests,

life,

only the wise be-

or legislators.

The law

of

not a law based on social conventions or the

outcome of social progress. It is the ius gentium, the ethical law

founded on the idea of justice and the dignity of the human person

common to all peoples everywhere.

Two traits were generally characteristic
The

of the philosophers of

was their intellectual belief in universality

They believed in it enough to deny validity to any community less
wide than the whole world. But their belief in jnq'ivirinnlisrrj (the
second trait, the more important because of its practicality) made
them lean toward "isolationism" in the broadest sense of the term.
Yes, they were "citizens of the world"; yet they concentrated
solely on their personal lives. The philosophers of the Old Stoa
justified this attitude on the ground that the wise man's first duty
was to be himself; by being himself, they reasoned, man is con formed to the rhythm and order of universal life With the Second
and the Third Stoa, Stoic doctrine was notably softened. Apathy
and indifference (two other characteristics of the Old Stoa) were
tempered to a more serene and balanced attitude: external pnocfc
were no longer despised but subordinated to the pursuit of wi sdom Similarly, stern isolation and proud aloofness were replaced
by positive interventio n^ in so^ja] ljfp (though limited, for some,
to the contribution of their example of honesty, temperance, and

the Old Stoa.

first

endurance). Finally, in the Third Stoa, the humanitarian bent,

which made Stoicism the only philosophy possible in

time when the City was busy gathering all races under

Rome
its

at a

political

man's
brotherhood (homo res sacra homini, warned Seneca) and in a
law common to all became compatible with the recognition of

control, did not destroy the inferior associations. Belief in

one's

own

to

Through

and the existence and fulfillment of concrete duties

new Stoicism, two concepts until then seemingly antithetical
the idea of the state and the theory of man's
unity
were admirably reconciled.
it.

state

this

POLYBIUS, LIVY, TACITUS

In any

summary

of Rome's contribution to the development

some mention must be made of the work of
Polybius, Livy, and Tacitus.

of political thought,
three historians:

14]

I.

Polybiu$ (204-123 B.C.), a Greek brought to

tage

Rome

Ancient Greece and

Rome

when Macedonia and Greece were made Roman

quickly

became an admiring

the

great historian of the rise of

first

Rome and

of her power. His Histories, written in Greek,

in the Mediterranean, in Africa,

and

Of

is

in

later

the consolidation
truly the first in-

Rome's wars and

victories

Greece necessarily brings

and events of many another people

versality.

and

friend of the conquerors

ternational history, for his account of

die lives

as a hos-

provinces,

into the

Roman

special political interest is Polybius' theory of

uni-

con-

He restates the traditional distinction of the forms of

government to prove they are subject to corruption according to
stitutions.

a cyclical process

(since called Polybius' anaciclosis)

This

is

what happens: monarchy degenerates into tyranny, aristocracy

into oligarchy, democracy into ochlocracy or mob rule. Because
these constitutions change, are transformed, and return again to
their original stage through natural and inevitable evolution, "if
a

man have

entirely

a clear grasp of these principles ... he will rarely be

mistaken as to the stages of growth or decay

at

particular constitution] has arrived, or as to the point at

undergo some revolutionary change."

will

12

which
which

[a
it

Polybius concludes

do eventually fail. Then he turns to the

one he considers best: the mixed constitution as he sees it realized and exemplified in Rome
a constitution he masterfully describes and analyzes. Its validity and indestructibility, he asserts,
that simple constitutions

consist not so

much

in the mingling or fusion of political prin-

ciples (such as characterized Aristotle's polity,

was under the supremacy of the middle class)

checks and balances within the three organs
people)

among which

the highest governmental

wherein the
as in the

state

mutual

(consuls,

senate,

power

distrib-

is

uted.

Livy (Titus Livius, 59 b.c.-a.d. 17) wrote the Annals of the

People, a work in 142 books about a third of which is ex-

Roman
tant.

In the events of the past, that

from Romulus

is,

in the

Roman

experience

he seeks lessons and warnings for the

present. He judges governments not by their form but by their
actual behavior, moral and political: that government or state is
good wherein liberty and justice flourish and it might well be a
monarchy; that government is bad wherein pride makes the rulers
to Augustus,

12 Polybius' Histories,

and

New

translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London

York: Macmillan, 1889), Vol. I, Book VI, 9.

Introductory

[15

I.

and this is possible even in a republic. Livy

Rome's political health and ascendancy in the
influence exerted by her great men. They were able to dominate events and to maintain the proper equilibrium between social
classes first in Rome and then in the whole Roman world (always
excluding racist prejudice). They practiced the typical Roman
unjust and despotic
finds the secret of

through obedience to law in peace

and courage in war (virtus); attachment to family and religion
(pietas); determination and perseverance (constantia) moderation, temperance and, in general, self-restraint (gravitas). On the
other hand, he attributes the beginning of Rome's decadence not

virtues: attachment to the state

to

enemy

ness,

strength but to self-perversion through immorality, idle-

and extravagance.

Cornelius Tacitus (about a.d. 55-117), author of Germania

and a history of the reigns of several emperors (Galba to Domitian), centers his political theory in the princeps.

Though

still

in

and its
great men, and while utterly disgusted with the arbitrariness and
irresponsibility of imperial Rome, he realized that the Republic
had to give way to the Empire if Rome was to be saved. In the
face of bleak reality, he hoped for better days; these would come
when, at home, the principate would be reconciled with liberty
and, abroad, the Roman armies would march again and conquer.
Tacitus is against tyranny but he is also against idle peace (immota pax).

love with the Republic of old and

traditional qualities

its

ROMAN LAW
Rome's greatest contribution to political thought is to be
sought in hei "Organizational and administrative genius and in her
system -oflawand jurisprudence. These are sources of political
tholight as genuine" ancTvaluable as political theory. In Greece,

speculative investigation of political issues

to political reality:

was always superior

saw the

there the great philosophers never

Rome, on the other hand, through her

statesmen and arms and laws and institutions, actually created an

realization of their ideals.

ethical

and

political reality to

which no other

in history

is

com-

parable. This she did long before her philosophers attempted a

political

man law

formulation and discussion.

are

its

What

characteristics. Clear,

are admirable in

Ro-

peremptory, reasonable,

it

16]

I.

was able

Ancient Greece and

to adapt, without losing

its

identity

Rome

and compactness, to
it was a

ever changing national, social, and economic conditions;

law so vital and vigorous as to grow, over a period of about a

thousand years, from municipal law into the law of a world-wide
empire, while retaining, in the process, its basic principles and
balanced harmony. Undoubtedly a law with such exacting features
could not be the result of a casual amalgam of day-by-day rules

and

judicial decisions.

At

its

roots

unwritten body of ideas expressing

was a profound wisdom, an

itself logically

not in formal

was to survive the decay and

Empire and that was, with the changes inserted by Christianity, to pass on to the Middle Ages and then to
the modern world. Today Roman law still lives in many legal principles of the Church (the Code of Canon Law) and still holds sway
over many nations in Europe, America, Africa, and Asia.
The major principles of the Roman legal system, finally codified by Justinian in his Corpus luris Civilis, 1Z are: the existenc e
of a universal law, the rule of right reason, binding upon all men
the, necessity th at, to be ust, all other laws conform to it: the essential premise that the state is a partnership, a sort of compact
a community of men associated in consent to .law; the emerging
theories but in a legal system that

disintegration of the

(the law that regards the political constitution

the state)

^dius

and organization of

privatum (the law that concerns the relations

between individuals); and, in turn, the division of private law

i us civ ile (the law proper to the citizens of a particular state

into

as a rule, the

(the law the

law proper

Roman

to the

Roman people), ius gentium

common with the whole

people have in

human

race), and ius^aotumle (the law of reason, derived from

man's rational nature: what is invariably fair and good); 14 the

13

The Corpus

luris Civilis comprises four collections or compilations:

Digesta or Pandectae

Roman

jurists,

(533), fragments of the works of the principal

Codex (second edition, 534), the imperial

in fifty books;

laws or constitutions, in twelve books; lnstitutiones (533), a manual for

new decrees of Justinian
from 535 to 565.

the study of the law, in four books; Novellae, the

14 In the

second century A.D., the majority of Roman jurists seemed

law of nature with the law of nations; but in the third
century the two laws were regarded as actually differing: the law of nations
to identify the

as originating in the course of history

and the

ius naturale with

human

Introductory

[17

I.

law as "what the populus

definition of

[all

citizens]

command

and have established" and consequently the principle that the

source of

legal authority

all

is

the populus. This last principle (of

incalculable importance for the subsequent development of constitutional theory

Roman

and practice) must be considered central

constitution. It persisted to the very end.

to the

The Lex Regia

nted the, princeps the

fry which the Roman people gra
whole sovereign authority of the same Roman peopl e, remained
forever a proof that the power nf the pmpprnr rip.rivp.ri frnm the

de imperio,

people

The

it is true, became the font of law, but it was

by law, had bestowed upon him the imperium

princeps,

the people who,

and the

potestas. In a sense, the

first if faint

ern concept of democracy are here:

(Roman) people and

exercised by the

is

selves o r .by those (the

emperors) to

origins of the

s overeignty

mod-

belongs to the

(Roman) people themthe (Roman) pe ople

whom

delegated, their power.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Herodotus. The

Histories. Trans, by A. de Selincourt. Baltimore:

Penguin Books, 1954.
Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. Meditations and Enchiridion.
Chicago: Gateway Books, 1956.

* Selections

from

Robinson,

the
Jr.

Greek and Roman Historians, edited by C. A.

York: Rinehart Editions, Reprint Series,

New

1957.
*

The

Stoic Philosophy of Seneca. Trans, with an Introd.

Hadas.

by Moses

York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958.

Agard, W. R. The Greek Mind. Princeton, New Jersey: Van

Nostrand Anvil Books, 1957.
Bury, J. B. The Ancient Greek Historians. New York: Dover Publications, 1957 (New York, 1908).
Costanzo, J. F. "Graeco-Roman Politeia," Fordham Law Review,

XX
*

New

(June, 1951), 119-155.

Fustel de Coulanges, N. D. The Ancient City.

Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956 (Boston, 1873).

nature

itself.

New

York:

The difference was accentuated under Christianity. Then, for

was said to be an institution of the ius gentium (in force

instance, slavery

everywhere) though certainly against the ius naturale (against nature).

18]

I.

Hammond, M.
Political

City-State

Theory

sity Press,

until

Ancient Greece and

Rome

and World State in Greek and Roman

Augustus. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-

1951.

Jolowicz, H. F. Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law.

Cambridge, England: University Press, 1932.
McCoy, C. N. R. "The Turning Point in Political Philosophy,"
American Political Science Review, XLIV (September, 1950),
678-688.
Sinclair, T. A.

Routledge
*

History of Greek Political Thought. London:

& Kegan

Paul, 1951.

Taylor, A. E. Socrates. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books,

1953 (Boston, 1952).
Toynbee, A. J. Greek Historical Thought. New York: New American Library, 1952 (Boston, 1950).

CHAPTER

II

Plato

LIFE

PLATO

was born

in

428 or 427

tinguished Athenian families.

On

B.C. to

one of the most

his father's side

dis-

he was re-

and through his

Athens was still
the great, splendid city of Pericles, and in his youth he must have
heard Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides. Plato saw
the city enriched with the Propylaea, the Odeum, the Erechtheum;
but he was soon to witness also the disastrous effects of the Peloponnesian War and the precipitate decline of an Athens morally
corrupt, ravaged by internal strife, ruled by unscrupulous demagogues and tyrants. His attitude toward Athenian democracy belated to Codrus, the last of the Athenian kings,

mother

came

to Solon.

During the

first

increasingly unfavorable

years of his

while his

life,

admiration turned to

and its legislation. Toward

the end of his life, Plato could not have failed to observe and
ponder upon the growing power of Philip of Macedon.
authoritarian and disciplined Sparta

Plato's education, like that of

literature,

all

wealthy Athenians, comprised

music, painting, and dancing.

athletics, so distinguishing

He was

also trained in

himself that he took an award for wres-

1 His name was Aristocles but he became known as Plato, which

some say was the nickname given him by an athletics teacher because of

his

broad shoulders.

20]

Ancient Greece and

I.

tling in the

cally at

Isthmian games

a Panhellenic contest held periodi-

Corinth to honor Poseidon.

As has happened

and

to others

will continue to

did not immediately recognize his true vocation.

at first to poetry, writing lyrics

man

Rome

and

tragedies.

happen, Plato

He

gave himself

But when a young

met Socrates and, as if suddenly enlightbecame Socrates' disciple, and devoted himself completely to philosophy, remaining however always a poet at heart.
of twenty, Plato

ened, he burned his poems,

Plato spent eight years with his teacher (407-399), but he

was not a man of a single book or a single school. He studied

other systems and became acquainted with other philosophers,
among them Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus.
The harsh, bitter reality of Socrates' tragic end had a profound and lasting influence on Plato. He felt nothing short of contempt for Athenian politics. Perhaps then for the first time he
despaired of ever seeing the concrete realization of the rational

and

just state

he had envisioned in his conversations with his

teacher and friends.

left his native city and traveled
and southern Italy. In Egypt he was
exposed to one of the world's most ancient cultures, and at Tarentum he befriended the Pythagorean Archytas, a staunch advocate of the aristocratic form of government. These contacts were
of no little importance for the maturation of Plato's philosophy,

After Socrates' death, Plato

extensively in Egypt, Sicily,

his political philosophy included.

Plato returned to Athens about the year 387. There, in the

park dedicated to the hero Academus, Plato

a sort of school for philosophical and poemploying both expositive and dialogic methods.

olive grove of a

founded

his

Academy

litical training,

For

forty years Plato's

the great problems of

weak

life,

voice could be heard propounding

ethics,

and

art.

Today, reading the dia-

logues in which he compiled his lessons, the world

at the depths of

still

marvels

knowledge, at the prodigious, almost angelic, in-

tuitions.

Plato twice interrupted his teaching to go to Sicily.

been there a

first

He had

time, probably in 388, during the reign of Dio-

nysius the Elder, but then his mission

had

failed miserably.

Turned

over to Pollio, the Spartan ambassador, to be sold as a slave, he

had been taken to Aegina, where he was soon released for a ran-

Plato
som

[21

II.

equivalent to

little

more than 300

On

dollars.

second

his

(367) and third (361) visits to Syracuse (to the court of DionyYounger), Plato's friend and disciple Dion continued to
encourage him actually to establish in Sicily a true form of govsius the

ernment. Nothing, however, could be accomplished. Dion

met a

the tyrant's disfavor and later

in danger, but the Pythagoreans of

was

and he was permitted

his cause
isle, first

fell

violent death. Plato's

Tarentum

to leave the

into

too

life

strongly pleaded

sunny and beautiful

a source of hope, then of sorrow and delusion.

Back

in

Athens, Plato resumed the speculative work to which he had given

met his unforgettable teacher.

Death claimed him in his eighty-first
who had never married was a guest

himself so completely ever since he

He worked

until his last day.

year (347 B.C.) while he

wedding

at a

feast.

POLITICAL WRITINGS

Among

the

numerous works (more than

thirty) generally at-

tributed to Plato, three are devoted specifically to political philoso-

phy: the Republic, the Politicus (or Statesman), and the Laws.

some question as to the authenticity of the Politicus

probability was written by Plato), there can be no
reasonable doubt about the other two. The Republic is a triumphant expression of his full intellectual maturity. The Politicus
belongs to a somewhat later date. The Laws was written in his old
If there is

(which in

all

age after his last Sicilian

trip.

THE REPUBLIC
In the Republic, Socrates, the narrator, presents the blueprint

founded

for PJato's ideal city,

true, aristocrats, that

is.

totally on justice and governed b y

by philosopher-kings "the best" in the

truest sense of the term.

To

avoid any possible ambiguity,

stated that Plato's city

dream but

is

in the sense of a perfect

never be realized on earth,

idea

is

tme and

square, which

is

real-

it

must be immediately

ideal not in the sense of a chimeric day-

is

mode l

that,

it

may

as

an

the idea, for instance, of a triangle and a

so true and real that

men

are able to

even though no man-made geometric figure

the square.

though

nonetheless true and real

is

draw them

the triangle or

22]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

Plato compares justice in the individual to justice in the per f ect

state.

pJLay

In both individual and state, each component must

if unity is to be achieved. In the former, the

true role

its

lower element (the "appetitive," seeking the gratification of irrational desires, the enjoyment of the senses) and the intermediate
e lemen t (the "spirited" or volitional, inclined to dare and fight for

what

is

their

activities

wrong) must rema in subservient in

to the highest eleme nt, (reason and its considered

right against

what

judgment). In the ideal

is

city the identical elements, in identical

order, constitute the national or collective soul:

by gold) is loyally served by courage

obeyed by appetite (brass).

ized

If this

hierarchy of classes

is

wisdom (symboland cheerfully

(silver)

disregarded, the soul of the city

becomes diseased and unbalanced, political life degenerates, and

deterioration progresses steadily. With admirable insight into the
dynamics of political corruption, Pl ato traces the forms jof government throiighsuccessive ^tag^s^-on^e-4h#-germ--fj decay has
taken

hold of what was the id eal

loving constitution,

wisdom-loving

by the

will,

oligarchy.

moves

class.

in

when

city.

Timocracy, or an honor-

the warnoFcTass supplants the

Inspired by pride and ambition, dominated

divorced from reason and heart,

The

latter,

it

soon produces

better called plutocracy (for

it

is

govern-

knows but the appetite for sensible pleasures.

This in turn gives birth to de mocrac y, that is, mobocracy, the rule
of the undisciplined and envious many. The last offspring is inment by the

evitably

man

rich),

yranny. Tired of lawlessness, the masses turn to a strong

for the restoration of order.

The new master may begin

well,

but absolute power soon degenerates under the urge of dark, un-

comes a

prison,

lust, megalomania, bestiality. The

and an abject slave, devoid of reason,

controllable forces

city

be-

its jailer.

2 In the Republic, Plato's main concern is not so much the state as

man. His main problem is "how can man best live" rather than "which
is the best form of government." The inquiry into what constitutes justice
(universal justice) in the city is but a way of finding out the meaning and
implications of man's nature thereby to reach full knowledge of man's
whole duty. What does Plato discover? Justice consists in a proper order or
hierarchy, in distinction and cooperation. There is justice when among

different elements

(in individual

man)

as well as

among

different classes

each class, realizes its capacities and limits,

and strives to achieve its proper aim without interfering with the other
elements and classes in the performance of its respective task.
(in the city), each element,


Plato

[23

II.

According to Plato, then, the ideal city is composed of three

classes. The first and smallest is that of tiie guardia ns. Their virtue is wisdom, whereby they possess the knowledge of "ideas,"
an active knowledge enabling
that is, of the essence of things

"^tfeem wisely to, direct, public

life.

Then

there

is

the class_of the

uxiliaries or soldiers, the defenders of right against external ene-

mies and internal disturbers. Their virtue

is

courage, whereby they

rationally consider the nature of things to be feared

to

and things not

be feared, according- to the training received from the guardians.

The

third clasj^

,m Jhe _majority_j_ isJthat __of_ the

artisans, farmers,

and trMer^Xthe_^pmmon_^eople^ the worMngjpopulation). Their

virtue_consists in a certain control or moderation of their irrational desires. Their duty is to be contentedly: subject to the judgment and restr ainin g action of the other two classes and to prodp for the city's economic needs.
Pvjf"
These three classes are har moniously bound by the virtue of
justice, which requires that, in contributing to the c ommon good,
eajzh citizenjwork in his proper capacity, doing the one thing for
wtiichjie is best suite d. AnotbeYlortue that~srT6uld extencTTo" the
whole of the city and put all persons in tune is temperance
mastery o f pleasures and desires, "a concord of th e naturally bet^^

ter

and_wore_as__to ffirn^b^ougbt-te-i^ig-Tyfaetlier in a city or

in

any single_person." 3
These virtues (wisdom, courage, t emperance, a nd justice) are
acqiiireri_jTirnjjoh eTlrTratirir^'ar.rnrdirig to Plato the supreme function of Jhejsta te

a function that, as

the state, mu^t_be_jnonopolized^by

state is

not an end in

it is
it.

the very raison d'etre of

It is

evident that Plato's

no matter how all-embracing

itself,

its

over ~the_ individual-citizen, but-an-4ns4rumeni=io:^3ucate

power

men

to

virtue.

Plato's

program of

and__training.

state education

From among

the free

has a dual aspect: selection

men

the state selects those

destined to be soldiers, leaving the remainder to increase the ranks

and expecting nothing of them beyond an exand a modicum of external moderation. The

of the lowest class

ternal obedience

would-be

soldiers,

instead,

are immediately put to a thorough

training to be enjoyed as a recreative

for constraint

is

The Republic,

alien to

in

and pleasant experience,

good education. Their minds are re-

Great Dialogues of Plato,

p. 231.

24]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

fined through the study of music (which also includes dancing

and certain kinds of poetry), their bodies exercised through gymnastics. If they have successfully met their tests, the young trainees
at the age of sixteen are introduced to the study of mathematics
(inclusive of geometry and astronomy) as a means of disentangling their souls from an exclusive attachment to the world of the

them to the enjoyment of the science of unity

and numbers, which stands midway between the "sensible" and

senses and elevating

the "intelligible."

new

selection

diers, the "aristoi,"

is

made

after the age of thirty.

The

best sol-

continue their education through a five-year

period of philosophical studies and a fifteen-year period of pracexperience in government, police duty, and war. This long

tical

training should enable

them

to

become

true philosophers

by the

and then to place their knowledge, if necessary, at the

service of the community in the official capacity of guardians or
magistrates. Philosophers and soldiers alike must be detached
from material goods, earthly comforts, and purely personal pleasures. This exigency is emphasized by Plato when he denies the
members of the higher classes private property and a family of
their own. 4
age of

fifty

They must live in common, attending in messes as if they were in

the field. As to gold and silver, we must tell them that they have these
from the gods as a divine gift in their souls, and they want in addition
no human silver or gold; they must not pollute this treasure by mixing

it

with a treasure of mortal gold.

4 Stretching to the

utmost the rules of the Spartan constitution, Plato

recommends coeducation, the abolition of family life, the introduction of

eugenic breeding, the community of children and of material goods. But
Plato's communism has nothing in common with Marxian communism or
other modern forms of egalitarianism and collectivism. In Plato's ideal
state, private property was denied only to a minority, to the actual and
potential members of the governing class. Their communal life was to be
"more a communism in deprivation than a community of goods," for they
were allowed only the bare necessities. Furthermore, Plato's communism
served moral purposes, not economic ends. To possess material goods was
not a blessing but a curse. Family ties and gold and silver stood in the
way of philosophic pursuit and were to be left to the masses, those incapable of enjoying the only true and lasting pleasures of the spirit. See
Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought
p. 40.
.

The Republic,

pp. 216, 217.

Plato H.
The point
interests

[25

makes here

that Plato

must be

that the ind ividual's private

is

drastically controlled

prime Importance

and reduced. What

of

is

the complete dedication of oneself to the

is

attainment of the supreme goal: the contemplation of the pur

"intelligible" _(as_opposed

tojhe "sensible" ^ world, the world o

essences, andjina llv of th e very.

"essence" but beyond

it,

Good itself

superior to

it

the

Good

in both dignity

that

is

not

and powerl

This was indeed a lofty aim, almost too high for a man of the
pagan world. But what_a jpity that this aim was reserved to a very
few while the rest were abandoned to the animal life of their instincts. And what a degradation for the few to have their lives

and loves so punctiliously regulated in order to attain their goal.

Thus, to build a state where wisdom reigns, Plato would destroy
private property and family life; to
the foundations of society
train the best youths~Tn~tfT<T country, he would resort to inhuman
means. How right was Aristotle in attacking these, the weakest

points in Plato's political philosophy r ^K

It is interesting to

note that Plato's system of education does

not exclude women. In fact, J?lato. could be considered the

feminist.

He

common notion
women are superior

even asserted, against the

many

temporaries, that in

things

first

of his conto

men.

If

they have the required aptitudes and talents, nothing prevents their

same training and eventually discharging the same

men. "Offices are common, of course, to both women
and men." 6 Furthermore, in Plato's ideal city the children of the
members of the lowest class, if gifted and ambitious, may be ad-

receiving the
duties as

mitted to^jhejngjierdasses. Conversely, the children of the philosophers and soldiers will

become members

of the artisan class

should they prove unqualified for government or war. "Sometimes a silver child

may be born from

a golden [parent], or a

and so with all the rest of the breeding

amongst each other." When this happens the guardians "will give
him the value proper to his nature." 7
golden from a

silver

PlatoTnanifests equal concern fonlhe^ preservation of the physical purity of the race.

one~of the others

will

put away as

Ibid., p. 258.
8 Ibid., p.

258.

"The children of

who may be born

is

the inferior sort,

and any

defective, they [the officials]

proper in some mysterious, unknown place."

t Ibid., p. 215.


26]

Rome

Ancient Greece and

I.

number

Similar rules coldly specify that the

decided by the guardians; that

women

of weddings

is

to be

should bear children for

men beget from the

and that children "dumped" illegitimust be disposed of "on the understand-

the state from the age of twenty to forty and

thirtieth to the fifty-fifth year;

mately upon the city

ing that there is no food or nurture"

for them.

THE POLITICUS
In the Politicus, which
other dialogues

is

a less abstract continuation of two

an

Parmenides and Sophistes

Eleatic stranger

Two

discusses the definition of a statesman with Socrates.

of government are considered:

first,

king, superior to laws, able to apply his

lar case,

forms

the rule of the philosopher-

wisdom

to each particu-

meeting every new situation with a perfectly

sion; and, second, constitutional rule, a rule

based on

fitting deci-

fixed, written,

be applied equally to all. The conclusion is

which no true philosopher is likely to
perchance he does, he is not likely to be recognized

inviolable law, to

that in actual conditions, in

arise (or,

if

and given the deserved power), the more practical form of government is the supremacy of law. This premise established, the
dialogue goes on to speak of the various forms such government
may assume. They are, in descending priority: monarchy (the
rule of a single person), aristocracy (the rule of a. small competent group), and democracy (the rule of the demos or common
people). Even democracy is not without its merits provided a
fundamental law exists and is respected. But if this basic law is

whims of the ruler, the situation changes

Then, of the perversions of the good types of government, the least dangerous is false democracy; next comes oligarchy; the worst is tyranny, the rule of an irresponsible dictator.
ever set aside for the
entirely.

THE LAWS
The Laws, published posthumously, shows
descent into the heart of actual
cus.

tution

s'

new

life,

Plato's conscious

already initiated in the Politi-

under consideration.

Its consti-

must be framed and regulations adopted for the

right gov-

Ibid., p.

settlement in Crete

259.

is

Plato
emment

[27

II.

of a

community more or

average Greek

less similar to the

city-state of the fourth century.

make

Reluctantly but not ungracefully, Plato tries to

of a given historical reality.

The

ideal of the Republic

is

the best

tempo-

dropped for a more immediate purpose. Class division is

abandoned and, with it, communal life as regards both property

rarily

and family. Speculative philosophy and the knowledge of ideas

are replaced by the popular religion, previously the lot of the
common people. The dominant virtue is no longer wisdom or
courage, but moderation for all.
Plato goes still further. For a society of ordinary men like
that of his time he advocates a "mixed" constitution based on
both the democratic principle of "popular representation" and
the principle of "authority," with due emphasis on the personal
qualifications of the magistrates. Obviously, in this type of state

law must reign supreme, as already explained in the Politicus.

At the same time there are certain features of the Republic to

which Plato

clings tenaciously:

education remains the supreme

function of the state, although curricular

so high; the equality of the sexes

demands

are not pitched

maintained in regard to edu-

is

cation; though Plato does not abolish private ownership or forbid

anyone family
ily

life,

he decidedly favors a

strict limitation

of fam-

patrimonies and a rigid control of marriages and domestic

life.

UNITY OF PLATO'S THOUGHT

Plato's

famous theory of the ideas innate

in

man's soul by

divine~~creatiorijs the foundation of his entire philosophy, includ-

in^rpolrlics ZlThese ideas -{spiritual concepts or forces) the soul

knew

pr eyTousJif&^Jaeioj^Ii^
the prison
and now they can be "remembered." The spark that
wilt possiblylgnite thennemoTy~and~awaken a consciousness never
entirely lost is produced by contact with actual things through
the__senses. These things retain, by way of reflection, some trace
or measure of the ideal; and~thTs~resefflbiance, "however dim, sets
in motion a process of reminiscence that can ultimately make the
individual conscious again of what his free soul once knew so
7
well. "To know," then, is "to remember." "^
intuitiv ely irra

of the body;

This metaphysic-aLdualism-the inteUigible__ajid- the sensible,

:

ideas andjEiTigs

is

also-

an etbicaLdualism:. good and

evil, right

28]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

moral conflict inevitably arises between the world

and__wreng.
of thpjpmp s and th e- gzorld ol the intellect The soul, which once
contemplated the

latter

but

presently the prisoner of the body,

is

man can
and purity and freedom of the intelligible
through study and training, by dying, as it were, to matter and
its base inclinations; in a word, through philosophy, which for

longs to return to

its

transcendent realm. Fortunately,

attain the happiness

Plato has a function of catharsis or purification.

With

this philosophical

system as the framework, Plato builds

For him the pur pose of the sta te is to

virtue, to help them recapture the knowledge

his political philosophy.

educate

ci tizens to

of Tdeasjjr , at least,

Jo Jsupply them

livings-How can

be done

this

if

with a guJdgTfor rational

the rulers are not enlightened?

Consequently, Plato maintains that o nly those-wha-have- escaped

from th e chains and darkness ol the world of the, senses and seen
the fig ht of the wor ld_o_Lthe-mind are-entttl c d to gov ern. 10
r^
Knowledge is for Plato a motivating principle, "a vital, active
principle of virtuous actions" and wise decisions. If all men could
see the light, government in the usual sense would be unnecessary;
all members of human society would need but to follow their rea son "anarchy" would be justified. But men are essentially unequ^h_not all_are _apaJ2Le_JiLattaining true knowledge; in fact,
only a few can go beyond sense experience and soar to the clear
;

contemplation of heavenly, timeless, changeless ideas. Therefore

the few philosophers, they

who know and whose

fectly attuned to universal reason, are

of the vast majority of men,

still

by natural

reason

is

per-

right the rulers

chained in the cave of intellectual

government
is a ristocracy
by the wise, by the. best, according to Jheir discretion* jrather than
accordingjo a b ody of inflexible laws. F or Plato this is the highest
darkness.

Jn,-politics_, then,

the result

state , the ideal sta te , the best state possible

tion could give happiness to

man

"No

or to people."

other constitu-

The philosophers must become kings

are

now

called kings

in our cities ... or those who

and potentates must learn to seek wisdom like

10 This refers to the famous

story of the cave with the chained
prisoners and the shadows being projected on the wall and the escape of
the philosophers. The remarkable image is found in The Republic, at the

beginning of

Book

11 Ibid.,
p. 273.

VII.

Plato

[29

II.

and so political power and intellectual

and the crowds of natures who now
pursue one or the other separately must be excluded. Until that happens
there can be no rest from troubles for the cities, and I think
for the whole human race. 12
true and genuine philosophers,

wisdom
.

will be joined in one;

Unfortunately,

it

is

not impossible, to find a phi-

difficult, if

losopher-king in actual conditions. Hence the need for

men

to

submit to the rule of laws and customs and to bind themselves

in a

form of government

that,

though "untrue," seeks as closely

the second best state,

as possible to resemble the true. This

is

wherein subjection to laws, at

of society, constitutes the

all levels

ultimate criterion of political morality and success, and furnishes

the key for distinguishing

One

justified

is

the three dialogues

good from bad types of government.

then in reconciling the different viewpoints in

on the

state.

The

political

thought of Plato

always remained essentially unchanged. But he was a

among men

man

living

and, though his concept of the perfect state never

suffered defeat in his mind, circumstances constrained him, in the

actual impossibility of attaining the

optimum,

to direct his efforts

achievement of a limited, practical application of the ideal

and thus avoid greater evils.
to the

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Plato. The Republic. Trans, and Introd. by H. D. P. Lee.

more: Penguin Books, 1955.

Balti-

The Republic. New York: Dutton Everyman Paperbacks,

1957 (New York, 1906).
-.
Statesman. Trans, by J. B. Skemp. New York: Liberal
.

Arts Press, 1957.

-.

Great Dialogues of Plato (including The Republic).

W. H. D. Rouse. New York: The New American Li-

Trans, by

brary, 1956.

Barker, E. Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors.

London: Methuen, 1957.
Burnet, J. Platonism. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1928.

12 ibid.

30]

I.

Costanzo,

J.

Rome

Ancient Greece and

F. "Plato: Republic,

Books, ed. by H. C. Gardiner.

Books VI and VII," The Great

New York: Devin-Adair, 1953.

Vol. IV, pp. 14-24.

Drake, H. L. The People's

Plato.

New

York: Philosophical Library,

1958.

Field, G. C. The Philosophy of Plato.

sity Press, 1951.
.

New

Plato and His Contemporaries.

York: Oxford Univer-

New

York: British Book

Center, 1953.

Fireman,

P. Justice in Plato's Republic.

New

York: Philosophical

Library, 1957.

Friedlander, P. Plato: an Introduction.

New

York:

Pantheon

Books, 1958.

Levinson, R. B. In Defense of Plato. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1953.

Nettleship, R. L. Lectures on the Republic of Plato.

New

York:

Macmillan, 1955.
*

Taylor, A. E. Plato: The Man and His Work. New York: Meridian
Books, 1956 (New York, 1949).
Wild, J. D. Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural
Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

chapter in

Aristotle

LIFE

ARISTOTLE

was born in Thrace in 384 B.C. His native town,

on the Chalcidice peninsula, was an old Ionian colony, open to every current of Greek culture. Its language was
Greek and its people were pure Hellenes. His mother came from
Chalcis on the island of Euboea. His father Nicomachus, who
died when Aristotle was still a child, was physician to Amyntas II,
king of Macedonia and father of Philip the Great. In 367, Arisl.

Stagira,

went to Athens and, after a brief interlude at the school of

became one of Plato's pupils at his newly founded
Academy. There for twenty years he studied philosophy and
probably helped in the teaching of rhetoric. His devotion and loyalty to Plato cannot be doubted. But he was a formidable critic
and clashed rather sharply with his teacher on some philosophical
points: Amicus Plato, sed magis arnica Veritas. Plato felt a like admiration for Aristotle, whom he called "the reader," or scholar,
and "the spirit," or intellect.
totle

Isocrates,

After Plato's death, the insignificant Speusippus, a nephew

no relative intellectually, became head of the

was then that Aristotle left the Academy and with
Xenocrates, another of Plato's pupils, went to Asia Minor. For
about three years he lived in various places, studying and teachof the founder but
school.

It

32]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

ing, always in close contact with former members of the Academy, particularly Erastus and Coriscus of Scepsis, and Hermias,
the learned tyrant of Atarneus in Mysia, whose niece and adopted

daughter Pythias he eventually married. In 344 or 343, at the

suggestion of a devoted friend, Theophrastus of Lesbos, also of

went from Assos to Mytilene on the island

was brief. In 342, Aristotle accepted
the invitation of Philip to become tutor to Alexander (then thirteen years of age) and took up his residence at Pella, the capital
of Macedonia. He remained there until about 334, not always,
however, in the capacity of tutor to Alexander. During this Macedonian sojourn he became a friend of Antipater, who was to become regent of Macedonia and Greece upon Alexander's departhe Platonic circle, he

of Lesbos. His stay there

ture for his eastern campaign.

In 335 or 334, shortly after Alexander's accession to the

throne, Aristotle

was back

in Athens. In a

park that Pericles had

destined for the training of soldiers, he established a school of

his

own

called the

Lyceum

for

its

proximity to the temple of

Apollo Lyceus. This school was also termed "peripatetic," because of Aristotle's habit of lecturing as he walked with his students in the garden or, according to some, because of the shady

For twelve years Aristotle gave himself

Nothing in the field of speculative and practical knowledge had ever escaped him. Throughout his young and adult years
in Macedonia, at the Academy,
wandering through Asia Minor, at Pella his had ever been the
insatiable curiosity of the Greek mind for both heavenly and
earthly things. During the last years of his life, there was a marked
shift in his interests. Historical facts and records, actual political
walks that surrounded
to teaching

and

it.

scientific research.

constitutions,

customs of barbarians, natural history, biological

anatomy and physiology

such practical matters formed the primary object of his re-

data, psychology, histories of the sciences,

all

search and treatises.

Then, in 323, came the startling news of Alexander's death

Babylon at the age of thirty-three. Demosthenes, the great
orator and Athens' nationalist leader, immediately led a violent
in

movement

against the Macedonian party. Because of his former

connection with Alexander and his friendship with Antipater,

Aristotle fell

have him

under suspicion. Before his political enemies could

on the trumped-up charge of impiety, he fled so as

tried

Aristotle

[33

III.

not to give the Athenians "another opportunity to sin against philosophy." This time he went to his mother's town, Chalcis, where

he died the following year (322 B.C.) of a stomach ailment. He

had married twice. From the first marriage, to Pythias, was born
a daughter; from the second, a son, Nicomachus.
Aristotle's sixty-two years of life coincided with what was one
of the most critical and dramatic periods of Greek and world history. Sparta had been defeated by Thebes and her allies under
the leadership of Epaminondas (d. 362). The hard- won supremacy of Thebes had been short-lived. In 338, the heroic efforts of
Athens, Thebes, and other Greek cities to stop the march of
Philip of Macedon had failed miserably with the battle of Chaeronea. Greek independence was at an end. Finally, Alexander had
moved rapidly in his conquest of the world. He was about to or-

when death, with equal swiftness, overtook

momentous events, however, seemed to have had
little or no effect on Aristotle's views. Inexplicably, his political
vision of the world remained focused on the Greek city-state. He
ganize his vast empire

him. These

refused to admit the reality of the surging territorial state and

its

condemn

it.

fatal

He

consequences. Aristotle was aware of

never recognized the necessity of a

tions that

it

only to

new approach

to condi-

had definitely destroyed the old concepts of a compact,

and a minority citizenship within the iron fence of

limited state

the polis.

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
Aris totle does not share Plato's belief in the theory of universal forms eternally existing

by themselves-^paft-lrom

things.

He

denies the exis tence of a world of ideas separate from that which

app ears to~5eTguch a world

fiction.

man becomes aware

Sxisls,

a Utopia:

it is

nowhere;
is

world is for him nonsense.

world, the world of sensory things, that world

fective reflection of the ideal

terial

is

Therefore, to say that the material universe

however,

m aterial

is

elemen ts

it is

sheer

but a de-

The ma-

oT which

through experience, truly "existsT Not

all

that

purely mate rial. Ideas exist,Too. They are iminherent and imbedded in thin gs, elements

that the intellect

is able to abstracTlrom individual objects.

ReagtV^&^Js^comtjIjitftd by twn prinri ptes- matter that of
which things are made, and form, that which causes them to be
,

34]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

(motive cause) and that to_v^nch_theyjnd (final cause). With

Supreme Being, 1 who alone is_j2iiie_jdea, pure

the exception of the

form, pure intelligence-jadlli no_admixt ure of matte r,

be

matter exists by
is

itself.

simply that which

thing

is

m a tter_and

both

real, "re quire

Alone neither has a substance. Substance

Only an individual/

substance, and every individual thing

is

the result of

the?

An

absolutely undetermined matter, q

form, does not exist in the whole of crea-

matter without some

Nor does

to

individually determined.

is

union of matter and form.

tion.

all things,

form^ Neither the idea nor the

there exist a form that

is

not the form of some-

thing or in something.

Her e. matter and form, no longer opposed

to each other as in

Plato's system, require^anrLg omplement each o ther.

imp erfect, rudimentary

ger m, the

state_^a_piece_ of

Matter is the
wood, a block

of"marble, an acorn, for example; in relation to a desk, a statue,

an oak); form js_Jhe__Mu^pnrrt1Jhe pattern, the_gnL to which

matter tends (the idea of the desk, the statue, the oak).

par-

comes into existence only when matter and form

umte^Jhrough^ motion or ev olution, that is7~tBfough~a~process of

ticular thing

transition or transfomaliojiJrxmi^)lency_lQ^cJ^ality.
real or concrete only

when

with the realization of

its

the potential

goal, does

it

is

actualized.

become

being

is

Only then,

fully itself.

According to Aristotle, th#4aw_oi^_Jbeings_is^ their instinctive tendency to reach their fullest realization. The seed tends to
become a"plant, the blossom a fruitTthe child a man. Each is directed by nature to

its

"limit," its "finality."

what does man tend? Man, as matter, as potency, to

what form does he tend? Aristotle answers the question in his
ethical and political philosophy. Man tends_to realize himself
fully in thr^tatg__T3l-. state is the supreme forrp pi man anrl of

Now,

For

to

Aristotle,

God

is

the pure act, the pure idea. Outside

God, then,

is

Him, how-

undetermined, multiple matter.

the formal, not the creative, cause of all things. God does

equally eternal, there

ever,

is

informal,

mode. Plato adan eternal God (the Demiurge), the existence of

eternal, archetypal ideas
the exemplary causes of all creatures, which
God, in creating the universe, took as His model. Aristotle has a truer
concept of the Divinity. For him, it is God who is the ultimate exemplar

not give things

mitted, side

of

all

still

all

their being, but only a determinate

side with

creatures. Yet, because of his belief in eternal matter, Aristotle

far

made

by

all

from the Christian concept of

things out of nothing.

creation, according to

which

is

God

Aristotle
all

[35

III.

Juim an associations,

Man

village.

realize s,

in duding_the family, the

household, the

himse lf totally-in the poli ti GaJ-ofgamzation.

Yes,

man

tends to live rationally,_tp Jive morally, to live happily;

but onftrjn social

much

and

political Ufe

so, Aristotle says, th at

happy insofar as he

man

can he attain
is

this goal.

t ruly j-ational,

moral

So
and

a political being.

is

POLITICAL WRITINGS
Aristotle's writings fall into three general classes.

The

exoteric

works, intended for the general public, are dialogues from the

Academic period and were published by the author himself. The

compilations, parts of which were published either by Aristotle or
his disciples, are collections of scientific data and historical facts
and documents meant to serve as research materials at the Lyceum. 2 The esoteric writings originated in the school and were
intended for the initiated
a select group of disciples and friends.
While only fragments of the works of the first and second groups

have reached

us, fortunately those of the third, chiefly the Aris-

totelian production of the

though not

Lyceum

entirety

all in their

and

period, have been preserved,

original form.

THE POLITICS
The

treatise called Politics,

to the last category. It

itself to

is

work

a discussion of politics, belongs

in eight

books that hardly lends

book and at times in each

view expressed by the author are but steps

a clear-cut division, for in each

chapter, the points of

in the searching process of his

and not infrequently

mind, often only loosely connected

However, in order to facilitate a

main features of Politics there are
work into three parts. Books I, II, and III

conflicting.

general understanding of the

reasons for dividing the

present a set of basic principles forming a general introduction

two independent theories advanced in Books IV, V, and VI,

Books VII and VIII respectively: the one practical, departing at times from the basic premises in order to meet, in the
only possible way, an imperfect situation; the other theoretical,
to the

and

in

fitting

the general principles almost perfectly.

2 Cf.

The former

deals

K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and

Related Texts (New York: Hairier, 1950).

36]

Ancient Greece and

I.

Rome

with the best actual state as conditioned by the concrete historical

circumstances of Greek political life; the latter with the best possible state in a strict sense, that

conditions.

The two

is,

among men but under

only in the end they pursue but also in

In the

first

ideal

and differ not

the method they follow.

analyses are clearly distinct

construction the approach

is

empirical, that

is,

based

on experience with constant regard for existing conditions. The second construction marks a definite return to Platonic
concepts and manner for it gives but scant attention to the conprimarily

crete limitations of the human environment. Some editors have

changed the order of Politics, placing the discussion of Books VII
and VIII before that of Books IV, V, and VI. Such an arrangement, they argue, is more consistent with the logical growth and
development of Aristotle's political thought, assuming that those

more

parts of the treatise

than the

closely resembling Plato are earlier

could just as well be assumed that

rest. It

a later date that Aristotle turned

it

was not

until

more sympathetically to Plato's

is the belief of more recent

views as expressed in the Laws. This

editors

who have

restored the traditional order of Politics. 3

THE state: origin, end, nature

not

According to Aristotl e thejjnginof the state is to b e found

vn man's rnntrart hnf |rU2ftn' g natnrp "Th? ^p^p ^ ? crea-

tion of ji ature,

and

man

a poli tical animal,"

is

essentially sociaLbeing. Itis not

he can

live

and

live

wellTThus,

or household

sociation established

wants"

is

the

by nature

that

is,

misola^onT^T'in" society,

ma n's

reasonicuLariy_fQnn_p^^

The family

first

an

that

so cial instinct_is_the true

communal nucleus

state.

"the as-

for the supply of men's everyday

consisting of various relationships

the relation between

master and jrta^e^jnjm_jmdwife, parent and child, property and

3 Cf.

A History of Greek Political Thought (London:

Paul, 1951), p. 237.

T. A. Sinclair,

Routledge

& Kegan

4 Politics

i.

2.

from Aristotle's
The Basic Works of

Selections

translation of B. Jowett in

(New York: Random House,

Politics are taken

Aristotle, ed.

by R.

from the

McKeon

1941).

5 Ibid.

rule

For Aristotle slavery is a natural institution. "For that some should

and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from

Aristotle

[37

III.

domestic economy.

more complex community,

the village

association of several families aiming at something

is

more than

supply of material needs, satisfying, to some degree at

least,

an
the

those

demands whose fulfillment is beyond the power

"when several villages are united in a single
complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self7
This, "the highest of
sufficing, the state comes into existence."
embraces all the rest, aims at good in a
all [communities]
greater degree than any other, and at the highest good." 8 In^it,
and_pnly in it, are man's physical and spiritual exigencies fully
social

and

cultural

of the family. Finally,

met, his et hical virtues completely de velopedTTrTit

himself wholly, thus

fulfilling his true

nature and

man

realizes

f unct ion

as a

So much^soTEaT^'he who by nature is without a

bad man (the worst of all animals) or above
humanity " 9 Phi1n<;npliy-dpp*-^l euen COnsftfe] nrh a monstrous
outcastrAjistotle's doctrine has no room for the man "in the state
of nature" later envisioned by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, or

human

being.

state is either a

for their belief that the state

result of

As

is

human

exclusively a

creation, the

an agreement.

A ristotle

previously explained,

and form inherent

cepts of matter

applies to the

s tate

the con-

in ev ery organism: the matter

beingthe individual angjnjncjr^, associations; and the form, the

politicaPsociety.

Consequently, the state

the hour of their birth,

rule." (Politics

i.

5.) It

some

is

is

and

the

marked out for

in virtue of this duality

constitution of the universe

men

are

destination,

the

subjection, others for

(which originated in the

exists in all living creatures)

"that

some

are by nature free, and others slave, and that for these latter slavery

both expedient and right."

many

(Ibid.)

Aristotle

admitted, however,

that

of the actual slaves in his time were slaves by law, not by nature.

This he could not approve. For him slavery was based on moral and intellectual

He

superiority, not

freely

on conquest,

utility,

lust,

or social convention.

conceded that "some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere"

(Ibid. 6.).

7 Politics
8 Ibid.

i.

2.

In reality, the goal of the state is not the highest good, for
the state aims at the common temporal well-being of the citizens, a limited
good to be realized on earth. Man's highest good is something or Someone transcending earthly life, and the Church (as is known from divine
revelation)

1.

is

the

society

journey to the eternal goal.

Ibid. 2.

concerned with guiding

man

in

his

spiritual

Rome
mo ve

al-

though"TnTim^~sTTcceeding the individuaLTthe family, and the

vil-

38]

I.

Ancient Greece and

consummation, the end toward which

by nature prior

lage, is ideally

necessity prior to the part."

all

other bonds

them "since the whole

to

of

is

10

not easy to classify Aristotle's view according to modern

It is

terminology.

Was he

for the organismic theory,

state a living organism,

an actual

which makes the

living being, or for the organic,

corporate theory, which sees the state as a moral unity, brought

about by a partnership of
part of

ways

its

wills

members?

individual

and

and purposes on the

say. St. Thomas, al-

interests

It is

hard to

conciliatory, tried to explain Aristotle in a sense compatible

with reason and Christian revelation. Others, however,

rate, there is

fail to find

such an optimistic interpretation. At any

sufficient justification for

no doubt that

Aristotle's theory

is

in direct contrast

of the state ad-

with the rnechamsjtic_aniijndividuai[s^

vancegLby_theJSophists an d-^^viveiiJn^j^c^nJLiil^sTb^Tmany potoicji!_writefSr-~

JUSTICE, FRIENDSHIP, GOOD WILL

Arist otle's state
internal,

and
is

moral

is

based _on_|usticej_ universal jus tice, that

nobility, righteousness or virtue in its

p^xjicjilaLJasiice, both

the

bond

of

m en

is,

broad sense;

coimmitatSeZaraljd^^

in states. Ij^cj3nsists-4n.a. right relationship

with_jithex^e^^ml^ajjai_pexsons= ^sb^rjn^_the^ame,.m.anner of
life^Jlis nojL&eJtranscende nt justice of Plat q^ but a justice

nent ^man^s_reason.

It is

not to be

left to

imma-

the discretion of any

one individual, for in most cases this would entail too great a
It is a justice to be embodied and expressed in law.

goodj>tate_must _.akaxestiDiLfriendship and good

will.

risk.

Aris-

Nicomachean TZthics (Books

VIII and IX). "Ppgndshifj whirh cQnsjsjsJna voluntary interchange of senace^^ndepend o nt-oLJe^aJprescriptions, is a most
necessarx-an4- noble viituc. It-a^ds-4o2ejooariess and happiness
totle discusses these at length in his

of the city's mejbers-^r^g41~as-lfi

its

unity and strength. It

ripe fruil^^a4-^eHrighest-an4festatiQn_of justice. It

worthjiyjng.
10 Ibid,

No

solitary

man

is

is

the

makes

life

supremely happy, for "no one

Aristotle

[39

III.

would choose the whole world on condition of being alone." u

Again, it is "better to spend his days with friends and good men
12
Man therefore
than with strangers or any chance persons."
needs virtuous friends with whom to rejoice and grieve as well as
to share in discussion and thought and good deeds. "This is what
living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as
13
Such is the
in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place."
friendship and resultant mutual good will that should permeate
a community, a
the whole city so as to make it a true koinonia
partnership of free, virtuous, happy men. In his obsession with
unity, Plat o had disregarded man's need jor natural affection and

fellow-feeling.
all,

A ristotle

s hould

the state

argues strongly for

make

it

possib le for

life

fulfillment.

to live well

And

ford. himTEelsatisI^

family

its

man

a nd an adequate circle of

good

this

After

and

af-

Requires

fr iends.

THE CITIZEN
Having reached the conclusion that the stat e is a na tural community, the high e st of all communitie s, based__on_ justice, friendship, and good w fil^Aris totle adds that a state is a communit y of

To

citiz ens.

new

explain this

tempts the definition of a

qualification,

citizen.

cause he lives in a certain place,"

"A
14

he immediately

at-

citizen is not a citizen be-

otherwise the resident alien

and the slave would also be citizens. Nor is one a citizen merely
because he possesses certain legal rights such as resident aliens
might enjoy or children born of citizen parents and old men relieved of state duties do.

Nor does freedom

at least in the best state, for free

work

alone

make

the citizen,

persons so taken up with their

that they lack time or skill for state offices should be barred

from

citizenship. The citizen in the s trictes t se-mp is one,

shares in the administra tion of justic eandJrj_offices " 15 one
J

"who
"wh o

has the~power to taKe~part in th e deliberative or judicial admin7

istration

of the state.

11

Nicomachean Ethics ix. 9. Selections from the Nicomachean Ethics

from the translation of W. D. Ross in The Basic Works of
Aristotle, ed. by R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
are taken

12 Ibid.

^Politics
is Ibid.

13 ibid.
iii.

1.

15 ibid.

40]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

THE CONSTITUTION
The

soul of the state,

its

own

vivifying principle,

is

the con-

stitutiorTor poUIeiu=^te arrangement of nragistraeies in a state,

17
Such a disposition of the polls,
especially of the highest of all."
permeating and influencing the whole body politic much more
deeply than what we call a constitution today, determines the

character^ the

state in

way

such a

tb a t a change*, \n pnUtttia

is

tantamou nt to a change in iden tity. "When the form of the government changes, and become? different, then ... the state is no
longer the same." 18 But how is the nature of the constitution to be
discovered so that one may know when the state changes? Aristotle's ans wer is that the nature of the poiiteia is determined by

"The constitution is in fact

The moral viewj^jmrLthe motivations of the

the charact er of -the-governing class.

the government."

19

person or persons in power7 his_o r their poli tical and economic

outlookTlnevitably provTde^t he mold for the constitution. Thus,
the primary classification of states coincides, with the classification
of constitutions; these in turn are condit ioned
those~ yho~exerci se the

by the character of

supreme authority.

CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS
As

from the
good and the bad.

to constitutions in particular, Aristotle departs

old criteria for discriminating between the

Governments which have a regard

to the

common

interest are con-

accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only the interest of the rulers
are all defective and perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a
state is a community of freemen. 20
stituted in

In considering their number and nature, Aristotle uses the old

schemata and most of the old names: kmgsMrvaxislociacy, polity
(a genuine democracy); tyr anny, oliga rchy, democracy (a false

democracy). But here his dependence on predecessors ceases. It

becomes evident that he is not concerned with a numerical basis
but with a qualitative concept, and for practical purposes he limits

^ Ibid.

6.

19 Ibid. 6.

18 Ibid. 3.
20 Ibid.

Aristotle

[41

III.

democracy, and tyranny.

his classification to aristocracy, oligarchy,

A ristocracy^ Jhe

only objectively goo d constitution,

of the_outstaiidingy--^#--ftrie in

Llie

few or jnany_as_the-ease^rrray be, exercised for the best

the commirnjty^^irifeffl^

tial rights

for wealth

and

The

nobility. It

latter,

the governors uncontrolled

little

interests of

on merit.
include monarchy.

also

the rule of the rich or the nobles, with preferen-

is

tional) or extreme.

ment,

the rule
citizens,

privileges solely

Thus understood, aristocracy would

Oligarchy

is

haudsef~ the best

may be moderate

wherein

by law,

is

(constitu-

offices are hereditary

and

a very bad form of govern-

better than tyranny.

Democracy

is

the rule of the

citizens, neither rich

demos (a

particular group of

nor virtuous, the lower class), government by

and uneducated multitude for their own benefit. They beand the will of the majority. There are

the poor

lieve in liberty, equality,

many

varieties of democracies.

The

distinguishing feature

is

re-

spect or lack of respect for law. There are democracies in which

the law

But

if

is

supreme, and they are constitutional though imperfect.

offices are

open

to

all

and the multitude rather than law

supreme, then extreme democracy results

the rule of the

mercy of demagogues. This form of government

the

bad.

It is little better

Tyranny

is

is

mob

is

at

definitely

than extreme oligarchy.

the lawless rule of one usually over unwilling sub-

jects. It relies solely

on

force. It

is

the worst of

all

forms of gov-

ernment.
In keeping with his criterion for judging actual constitutions,
Aristotle admits that even the objectively imperfect forms, such as

moderate oligarchy and constitutional democracy, may be the

right ones under existing conditions, when they are best suited to
the character and needs and conditions of a particular people.
States and peoples may be diseased, Aristotle the scientist seems
to imply; and just as a physician must at times be satisfied, jaute
de mieux, with a sickly patient, so the statesman must make the
best of even a perverted type of constitution.
Aristotle admits also that these various constitutions, however-

by no means static. The political tendency

and the factors on which emphasis is placed often
affect and modify the actual constitution, rendering, for instance,
a democracy less democratic, an oligarchy less oligarchic.

valid in themselves, are

of the citizens

42]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

THE BEST ACTUAL STATE

Greece of his day, Aristotle f avored_a_mixed constitution, a combination of the democratic and
oligarchic, a mean between^ both extre mes, a synthesis or conciliation ot the two warnngclasses. This fusion of various element^^'eaithjmd liberty, privileges andjggu ality he jerms pol-

For the

social conditions of the

ity

(a form of government not to be confused with the correct

kiSToFdemocracy,

also called polity). It leaves to the

m ajority

the jiecis inn on laws a n d g eneral policies ^"^ eateasts the- administratioa_ojL4uibfe- affairs to the \vcakhy-^rid'lh^re~competent few.

The backbone of this, the j^yjggpgf- b pgt Rt7|tf> fof-Heflasris the

middle class, intermediate betw een thft very rich and the ver-y poor.
It is this class,

moderate and law abiding, not envious and not

command a ngjjo obey, that adlLafford the

envi ed, able both to

state stability^

In his constant attention to actual conditions, Aristotle re-

marks that even so

may

typical a state

not be the most practi-

cable in every situation. Yet the general principle he has thus far
insisted

upon

still

revolutions:
Aristotle's

"The more perfect the admixture of

more lasting will be the constitution." 21

obtains:

the political elements, the

how to

concern for the

permanenc e

to emphasize

avoid

them

stability of constitutions leads

at the

expens e of quality.

He

him

seems to

imply that any change, even a chan ge for thlT^etter^JsJXLbe carefull y

avoided, "aQImii^rieasT

At

point he embarks on a

this

They have many

These vary according to the form of government against
which revolutions are directed. But frequently they are reducible
to one: class war resultin g from the desire for equality or the desire for in^uallty

lengthy, masterful survey of political revolutions.

causes.

Men

think that they are equal to others

selves; or

they have not

more but

the

same or

feriors revolt in order that they

may

who have more

than their inferiors. ... Inbe equal, and equals that they

less

may

be superior. 22
21 Ibid. iv.

than them-

conceiving themselves to be superior they think that

12.

22 ibid,

2.

Aristotle

[43

III.

There are also many ways to check rebellion. First of all, the
must be alert to spot incipient discontent and con-

true statesman

23
In_addition,jthe spirit
tention, to discern "the beginning of evil."

of obedience toJajy_jimsiube- jealously, maintained, particularly in

whole and the all "are made up of littles"; 24

the rulers should be on good terms with everyone, never maltreating, always dealing with one another and their fellow-citizens in a
spirit of equality. Because "men are easily spoilt [and] not every
one can bear prosperity," 25 the exaggerated increase of any citismall~niatterT, for the

not to be allowed. "Especially should the laws provide

against any one having too much power, whether derived from

zen

is

friends or

money;

if

he has, he should be sent clean out of the

country." 26

As

to rebellions against tyrannies, they^jareJicewed-Ghiefiy-in

hatr ed and

contem pt. The tyrant has two ways

to

guard against

them. The^ttaditienal method, aimed at making the peopl e unable t o revolt, consists in sowin g distrust am^ng the subjects, in

sp^gonjhek activities, ill laking away their power; in waging

war to keep them occ u pied nr d always in nrr o f a leader, in
humbling them f or fee spmtnafly broken will not conspire. The
rl

second_rneiliQ4,

o be advocated againl)jH^achiavelEpwould ren-

lerthe rule of a tyra nt more similar to a king's tojnake the subjects unwilling to revolt. Power, strong axid_cancentrated. is the

oun^atioiroftyranny whether the people like him or not,

must never relinquish it. However, he should act or
appear as a good ruler. The benevolent dictator should pretend a
care of the public revenues, be wary of wasting money on favorites, strangers, and artists; appear dignified; inspire respect rather

very

the tyrant

than fear; maintain the character of a great soldier; avoid offending against the modesty of the young; check the insolence of the

women

of his family. If he indulges in pleasures, let

him

at least

not parade his vices before the world. Finally, he must adorn and

improve the

city

and appear especially earnest

in the perform-

ance of his religious duties.

At

the end of this

list

of

somber advice on how

ism a going concern, Aristotle warns that there

23 Ibid. 8.
25 ibid.
26 Ibid. Aristotle

24

is

is

to

keep despot-

really

no way

to

ind.

referring to ostracism, the temporary banishment

of a citizen, a policy in use in

some Greek

city-states.

44]
kill

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

the spirit of freedom in men, and soberly notes that of

litical

forms no other has so short a

all

po-

as tyranny.

life

THE IDEAL STATE

In his fragmentary and unfinished sketch of the ideal
Aristotle freely delineates a polls that

is

Books
more imaginary than

zation of the basic principles set forth in

Though

his Politics.

a state

state,

the closest possible realiI,

II,

and

III of

real, it is still in

the realm of the attainable.

Its constitutio n

must be royalty or at least ari stocracy. If there

ajHnjwisdom, he is entitlecLto rule.
If he rules, he is not to be restrained by law. Like Plato's philosopher-king, he mustjoot be boun^tgJheJBrocrustean-bed .of legal

is

a pe7fect ~man,

s urpassing

He i s to govern according to his discretion.

Conceding the practical impossibility of finding such a man,
Aristotle considers pure aristocracythe- second best constitution
for his ideal state. Thisjsjhe-r-ule- of truly good, c ompetent men,
based -aot nn hirth or wealth but orr v irtu e al onef it is still a

prejcriptipjis.

law^-"ATto size, hejj bserves

that a_jtatejs gre at not

when

An

rule of

ulous, but

it

fun ctions well.

hardly be reduced to order, for in

best state

is

moderate in

size,

it

when

i t is

pop-

overpopulated state can

law

is

ineffective.

Hence

the

neither extremely small nor extrava-

gantly large. Its citizens must be sufficient to insure independence

of

life,

yet not so

numerous

as to prevent their

knowing one an-

other and forming a compact and harmonious body.

As

must be of a type

produce of every
It must be
large enough for them "to live at once temperately and liberally
in the enjoyment of leisure," 27 and of such a form that it would
be "difficult of access to the enemy, and easy of egress to the into the land,

it

kind so as to render the inhabitants

to yield

self-sufficient.

habitant." 2S

As to location, the state should communicate with, both the

land a nd the sea for c ommercial and military advantages. It must
be well supplied with pure water.

As to th e-xitizens, they must-be-of-the Hellenic race, for the

Greeks, due^J&HfrelrHnteTmedtate posMefl-4rH7rjth~Terfitory and
character,

combine TheTove for~?reeamn-llrie northempeoples of

27 Ibid. viii. 5.

28 ibid.

Aristotle
Europe with
pectedly adds
state, [it]

man

[45

III.

the^clgyerjisss of the Asiatics^ And Aristotle unex"If

it

[the

would be able

of high intellectual

Greek nation] could be formed into one

29
Since a citizen is a
to rule the world."
and moral standards,

sensitive to beauty

and able to enjoy knowledge, true citizens in the strictest sense

can only be those who belong to the military class (citizens in
their younger years) and the deliberative and judicial classes
(citizens in their more mature years), or those discharging priestly
duties (citizens too old for other responsibilities). Artisans, laborers,

and farmers cannot be

incom-

citizens. Either their lives are

work does not allow them the leisure

virtue requires. But they, like the slaves, are most certainly indispensable elements of the state, for the tasks they perform, however
patible with virtue or their

servile

and menial, are nevertheless

The

m ost

essential.

important function of the ideal state

is

the educa-

make them good both

city. It teaches them how

tion of the citizens^ Jtsjrarpose Js J:q

individuals
rule

and

members

as

and tow~To~obe y;. Education covers

feature of the citizen's

is

of the

thirty-seven, for

women,

ter); his family life

adultery

is

life:

(the

his

eighteen; the proper season

number

of children

is

and

men

is

the win-

limited

by law;

severely punished); and so on. Aristotle pays special

attention to the rearing of children:

posed^and

in detail every facet

marriage (the proper age for

as

to

left to die;

the crippled should be ex-

the healthy accustomed to the cold from

harden them for military service. Their trainprogram Jn state schools (since education is the affair of the
state) has Tour branches: rea_di ng and writi ng, gymnastics, music,
and the art^of^design. Music, particularly, is taught for higher

their early years~to

ing

valtierThan^ractical

utility. It relaxes, it promotes the rational

enjoyment of leisure, it ennobles the soul of the future citizen.
But children should not be taught music to acquire virtuosity or

to take part in public performances. In fact,

should play and sing only in private, for his

enjoyment.

even the adult

own and

citizen

his friends'

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

There are many
of vision

lbid.

similarities in Plato and Aristotle. Their range

was circumscribed by the Greek horizon. Their world
7.

46]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

was compressed within the confines of Hellas. Out side the G reek
pale there was n o salvation.^BoJh re garded-the-ciiy-statev moderate m~the number of it s inhabitan ts and the size of its ter ritory,
as the non plus /traJn_^olitical_^rganization. Both viewed with
dismay and ala rmlhe polkj cinnstaMlty^Mlnoral^o^ption of
the Greek city-states andTound in~education fe e principal rem edy
forJhesgleYils. Both placed virtue at the apex of man's individual
and collective life. Both strongly believed in the ethical purpose oi
man and the state. Both (but particularly Plato) took the So4
cratic view of knowledge as an active element, an intellectual light\
as well as a mover of the will, an unfailing guide to action. To\
know the truth and act accordingly was for them one and the \
same thing. Both believed in the essential inequality of mankind. /
A few were able to live the good life proper to men; the many
were hopelessly doomed to a subhuman existence, without knowledge, virtue, leisure. Slavery was a natural institution. Some are
born free; some are born slaves: it was as simple as that. Even
among free men, only a small number were to enjoy the brilliance and delights of the spirit; the rest had to be content with
manual work and servile tasks. Hence, for all practical purposes,
Aristotle and Plato restricted citizenship to a minority, at least
in their ideal state.

Just as

many

are their divergences. Plato

dogmatist, an extremist.

away, on his

and

own

terms.

limitations. Plato

of his principles.

He

was an

idealist,

He wanted to change the world right

He was impatient with man's weaknesses

had not the

slightest

doubt about the validity

did not need the test of reality. If reality

did not conform to them,

let it

be changed.

If

men

did not suit his

them be dehumanized.
Aristotle was not interested in ideal politics. He was a scien-r
tist, a statesman. At times one would call him a relativist. H9
looked at the world around him, he gathered facts, he deduced
principles from them, he studied actual conditions, he respected
earthly limitations, he relied on "the experience of ages," 30 he
read possibilities for good in the imperfect and vice versa, and he
ideal city, let

understood the necessity of adaptation, adjustment, compromise.

Virtue for him was the mean between two extremes. Aristotle had',
his

to

own ideal, but he was fully if painfully aware that what ought
be was at times unrealizable. More often than not, one must
30 Ibid.

ii.

5.

Aristotle

[47

III.

minor
and demigods.

resign himself to a

for angels
for

evil. Plato's city is laid in

Aristotle's city

on

is

heaven.

It is

terra firma. It

is

men.

Plato had no use fojheJamily_,and. family

noflidvocliteHram^

life.

True, he did
rigorist;

he restricted almost m!oTe7ably^the_sex_relations of married people.

ButTnarriage among the true men and true citizens of his Republic had ~one~~purpo~se: to procreate children for the state. Love,
companionship, the joy of a home, the bond between parents and
between these and their children Plato sacrificed for what he called
justice in the individual
lentlessly,

and

he pursued the unity of the

the deepest

human

state at

needs.

Aristotle defended the opposite view.

a unity in diversity.

damental

The family

cell of the state,

whole. Family

life,

demand

On

for friendship

attain their share of happiness.

its

The

state is a plurality,

a natural institution, the fun-

a beneficial, irreplaceable unit in the

his happiness and, consequently,

ness to

is

love for one's wife and children, do not de-

stroy the unity of the state.

instinctive

and rethe expense of even

in the city. Singlemindedly

the contrary,

and

make him

Why

by meeting man's

affection, they contribute to

willing to help others

the state should deny happi-

"And

if

allowed

it

best citizens Aristotle could not understand.

the guardians are not happy,

who

are?"

31

Pla to was also suspicious of p rivate property.

to those third-class citizens for

whom

itjiTjhR^fjIdiprs and guardians

To

he had

little

this Aristotle

He

use and denied

objected sharply.

Abolition of private property would neitherJoster-unity nor elimi-

na te" dissens ionj_j~would multiply agents and bureaucrats, thus!

causing laziness and disorder. It would remove a powerful in-]
centive to
friends
it

is

work

as well as the opportunity of being of service to

and men

love to be generous, to give freely. Again, since

natural to have private property,

highest natural institution, deny

its

why

should the

state, the

citizens the fulfillment of this

basic instinct, the pleasure of feeling a thing as their

own? Arisaccompany a system of private

property; but he pointedly added that these derive from the manner in which property is used, not from private ownership itself.
Not common property but man's moral reform is the cure.
Aristotle and Plato disagree about the role of women. Plato
totle well

si Ibid.

knew

that evils often

48]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

was a feminist of a sort. He wanted the highest offices of statesmanship open equally to meritorious men and women. He extended to women even the most exacting duties of warfare. He
recognized sex distinction only in regard to the procreation and
rearing of children. Not so Aristotle: "The male is by nature su32
Men command, women obey.
perior, and the female inferior."
He repeated approvingly the poet's words: "Silence is a woman's
glory," and added explicitly that while women have the deliberative faculty, they are nevertheless

cated the equality

pathy for them as

without authority.

is

feel

the

concerned solely with the unity of the

solidarity

One may

more commendable. But when he advoof women Plato was not inspired by any symsuch. He was blind to them. As always, he was

that Plato's opinion

he refused to

women

state,

and

to safeguard

its

the fulfillment of their strongest

love for and of their children. Aristotle, while seemmore primitive and less appreciative, at least recognized
woman's mission in the family and granted her the affection of
her husband and her children.
natural urge
ingly

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Aristotle. The Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. New

York: Hafner, 1950.
Ethics I, Politics I. Chicago: Gateway Books, 1954.
Aristotle's Politics and Poetics. Trans, by B. Jowett (Politics) and
T. Twining (Poetics). New York: Viking Compass Books, 1957
(Cleveland, 1952).
The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. by R. McKeon. New York:
Random House, 1941.
The Politics of Aristotle. Trans, with an Introduction, Notes and Appendixes by Sir Ernest Barker. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
.

Barker, E. The
Russell

&

Political

Thought of Plato and

Aristotle.

New

York:

Russell, 1959.

Hildebrand, D. von.

"Aristotle: Ethics,

Great Books. Ed. by H. Gardiner.

Books

New

II, IV and VI," The

York: Devin-Adair,

1950, Vol. II, pp. 51-57.

Jaeger, W. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Trans, by R. Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.
32 ibid.

i.

5.

Aristotle
Rommen, H.

III.

[49

"Aristotle: Politics, Books III-V," The Great Books.

York: Devin- Adair, 1951, Vol. Ill, pp. 22-29.
Ross, W. D. Aristotle. 5th ed. rev. London: Methuen, 1953.
Schwarz, B. V. "Aristotle: Politics, Book I," The Great Books.
Ed. by H. Gardiner. New York: Devin-Adair, 1949, Vol. I,

New

pp. 28-32.

chapter

iv

Cicero

LIFE

CICERO

was born in Arpinum, a town sixty miles southeast

in 106 B.C. His well-to-do family kept a house in
Rome also, and Cicero spent his boyhood partly in the country
home and partly in the great city that was then the capital and
of

Rome,

mistress of the world.

Cicero's poor health was compensated by an exceptionally keen

mind and an impassioned will to succeed. He studied Latin and
Greek literature, philosophy, rhetoric, and law under eminent
teachers both in Rome and abroad. When he was twenty-five he

made

his first

drew the

appearance at the bar. His speeches immediately

They brought upon him,

one instance, the disfavor of the dictator Sulla. It
may well have been in search of a safer place that Cicero left
Rome about 80 B.C. For two or three years he traveled in Greece
and Asia Minor, giving himself to a further study of philosophy
at Athens and oratory at Rhodes. It was on this island that he
met the famous philosopher Posidonius, representative of the Middle Stoa. Returning to Rome in 77 B.C., he married the rich and
domineering Terentia.
attention of his fellow citizens.

too, at least in

Cicero's political career began two years later with his appoint-

ment

as quaestor in Sicily, in

which capacity he proved himself

Cicero IV.

[51

an honest and efficient civil servant. Back in Rome in 70 B.C.,

Cicero successfully prosecuted Verres for maladministration as

and was elected aedile. In 67 B.C. he was elected

64 consul as the candidate of the senatorial party.
His defeated rival, who had been backed by the radical wing of
the democratic party, was the noble but reckless Catiline, whom
governor of

praetor,

Sicily

and

in

Cicero, while serving his term as consul in 63, vigorously de-

famous orations, charging him with plotting

nounced

in his

seize the

government. Catiline eventually died in battle but some

of his fellow conspirators were summarily executed

to

by order of

Cicero.

Many

applauded Cicero's bold action, but others, particularly

him of not having observed

a certain Publius Clodius, accused

due process of law in ordering the immediate execution of CatiCicero looked to the nobles for help, but in vain.
For them he was a homo novus, self-made, below their class. The
line's associates.

became more precarious with the rise of Caesar, Pompey,

and Crassus (the First Triumvirate). In 58 B.C., Cicero had to
leave Rome and Italy. On his way into exile, he learned that his
beautiful home on the Palatine had been burned and his country
situation

estates confiscated.

more favorable legislation permitting it, Cicero

Rome. He was greeted warmly by his friends and adbut was still shunned by the nobles. For several unhappy

year

later,

returned to
mirers

was a party to the political quarrels of the Roman

and not always consistent in his loyalties. In 51 B.C., he
was appointed proconsul of Cilicia and was active there in war
and peace, but the assignment was not to his liking. When, seizing the first opportunity, he returned to the capital (50 B.C.),
Cicero found it in feverish preparation for the civil war between
Caesar and Pompey. In the course of ensuing events the crossing of the Rubicon in 49, the defeat of Pompey at Pharsalus in
48, Pompey's murder, and Caesar's unchallenged domination
Cicero was forced to make a few painful adjustments. At first he
avoided taking sides; then he went to Pompey's camp; only after
Pompey's defeat did he re-establish friendly relations with Caesar.
In reality, there was a sharp divergence of opinion between the
two, and when the dictator was assassinated in March of 44, Cicero did not conceal his joy at the restored liberty. He hoped great
years, Cicero
factions,

things for the democratic future of the Republic, only to observe,

52]

Ancient Greece and

I.

after a brief illusory

moment,

that "liberty

Rome

had been vindicated

but not saved; the tree of despotism had been cut but not uprooted."

At

to Cicero,

this point, the issues at stake

and

took a stand.

in those, the last

He

months of

became

absolutely clear

his

he courageously

life,

fought for the senate against Antony, and for

the restoration of constitutional government against the rule of the

despot.

The fourteen

Philippic Orations are a record of Cicero's

But Cicwas defeated

in 43 when Antony and Octavian (the later Augustus) were reconciled and, with Lepidus, formed the Second Triumvirate. As a
finest political action

and

his brilliant eloquence as well.

ero had chosen the losing side.

The

senatorial policy

price for this arrangement, Octavian consented to Antony's re-

quest that Cicero's

name be

included in the

list

of political op-

ponents to be purged. Antony's henchmen hastened to his

Formiae. There, on December

villa

43 B.C., they killed him, and

cut off his head and hands to bring them to Rome to be nailed to
the rostrum. Before proceeding to this macabre exhibition, Fulvia,
Clodius' widow and Antony's wife, put a hairpin through the
tongue of the most famous Latin orator.
at

7,

POLITICAL WRITINGS
The Republic and
years of his

life,

are the chief expression of Cicero's political

thought. These works

in part.

They

the Laws, 1 written during the last twelve

both probably

in six

books

survive only

are in dialogue form. In the Republic the garden of

129 B.C. is the scene of a conversation between

famous Roman general and statesman, Scipio Africanus the
Younger, and members of his circle, one of whom is Caius Laelius, prominent in literature and politics. In the Laws
a posthu-

Scipio's villa in

the

mous work

it is

Cicero

who

converses with his brother Quintus

and a close friend Atticus.

1 De republica was
written between 55 and 51 B.C. De legibus was
begun in 52 B.C. For many centuries only short fragments of the Republic
were thought extant, but in 1822 Angelo Mai, of the Vatican Library,
found considerable portions (imperfectly erased and fortunately still

visible)
St.

of Cicero's book in a palimpsest under the superimposed text of

Augustine's

Commentary on

the Psalms.

to one-third of the original work.

What we have today amounts

Cicero IV.
The purpose

[53
of the Republic

is

to determine the best type of

constitution, to define the duties of the statesman,

gate the principles of justice and

and to

investi-

morality basic to every political

system.

As far as can be ascertained from the fragments, the Laws is

concerned with a further analysis of justice and virtue, and a
search for a perfect code of laws. It is copiously illustrated with

Roman

references to ancient

Roman

institutions

and

from early

citations

law.

the state: definition and origin

For Cicero the_ state_.js_.jh-people's afiair.-Res publico, is the
populi, and by "people" is to_.be undeistood^nQlLeverv group
o f men in any way come^together^ but a considerable number of
men unite d_by a dual bond: thejuri dical, which i s_th_-Common
ag reement as to law, and the u tilitarian^ which is the communion
res

of interests or advantages. 2 This

is

a typically

Roman

definition,

concise and down-to-earth, a striking contrast to the lengthy and

abstruse lucubrations of the Greeks.

Cicero traces the origin of the state not so

much

to

man's

weakness as to an_in born so cia l inclina ti on. Humankind is not

solitary and its members do not live in isolation. Though men
should possess material comforts in abundance, th ey
theless

come

ment of

together in social groups. Life's purpose

th e su

in society.

The

mmum
state

bonum, the highest

is,

goodis

mu st

none-

the attain-

possible only

then, an outgrowth, a natural consequence

of man's grega rious tendencies. It did not

come

into existence of a

sudden.

It

evolved slowly through a long line of generations, each

making

its

contribution. Before the actual appearance of the state

in history,

men grouped

hold, the village.

But

this

together around the family, the house-

gradual evolution had

its

roots

and ex-

planation in the depths of man's very nature.

2 "The commonwealth, then, is the
people's affair; and the people is
not every group of men, associated in any manner, but is the coming together of a considerable number of men who are united by a common

agreement about law and rights and by the desire to participate in mutual
advantages." Republic i. 25. The selections from De republica are taken

from the translation of G. H. Sabine and

Ohio State University Press, 1929).

S. B.

Smith (Columbus, Ohio:

54]

I.

Ancient Greece and

Rome

AN INTERMEDIATE ASSOCIATION
The^jtate^^ceording-ta-CiGerQ,
ciation s",

and an

is

bu t one type-o#-man's asso-

inter mgdiate_Qpp- at that

Plato considered the

and m orals; Aristotle viewed

embodiment
ol man's social exisupreme
ultimate
and
it as the
For,
he reasserts in his
bothTdoctrines.
as
gencies. Cicero rejects
De ojficils and De natura deorum, there exist other forms of
association inclusive of and beyond the state: the society~of* states
with a colnm^h^lanUiLge^lifi__socIetv of men at large, and finally
the society of men and gods. "We must conceive of the whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and men are
members." 3
polis thejfinal arbiter in education

Cicem's^mphasisjs_jjmj-eason ("There

man and

is

God"

nothing better than

4

), on law ("Right
on justice ("We are born for justice" 6 ), on
the supre me dominion of God as well as on Jhe bond between
GodjmcLrnan. 7 Accordingly, he insists on un iversality and equality.
Cicero speaks of "man's fellowship and union with his fellowmen." s Plato's and Aristotle's stress__on the e s^sgjTtial inequality

reason ...
reason

is

it

exists

law"

both in

in

),

manMnd_is^wept_^ay_b y Cicero^s_reireshing a,nrl liberating

doctrine that "th e whole human_jg ce ^ s -Jiiid_jQgetiier m
unity," ^ reason "is certainly common to us all," 10 and "there is*
of

noTiumajnTenTjj of any
tain to virtue/'

race,

who,

if

he finds

a. guide,

cannot

at-

Consequently Cicero denie s that slaye rvjsa nat-

uraT institution, though he

ciple of international

justifies it to some extent on a prinlaw in virtue of which those vanquished in

war are enslaved instead of

3

Laws

tion of C.

i.

7.

Selections

killed.

from De legibus are taken from the translaMass.: The Harvard University Press,

W. Keyes (Cambridge,

1928).
4 Ibid.

5 ibid.

*lbid. 10.
7 Cicero's

concept of God, and his clear, definite idea of immortality,

human mind during the three centuries
between him and Plato. As Petrarch said of Cicero: "You would fancy
sometimes it was not a pagan philosopher but a Christian apostle . .

show

the spiritual progress of the

speaking."

*Laws

i.

10.

io Ibid. 10.

9 Ibid.
ii Ibid.

11.

Cicero IV.

[55

the state: aim and constitution

Theaim

of the Stat?, iilhfi promotion of tha-paoplft^ welfare,

which embraces, over and above the possession and enjoyment of

material goods, the_att ainm ent .and_exercise ol virtue. It follows
that the statesman's, mission is to ennoble and enrich human life.
Through the medium of the state, it becomes possible for men to
enjoy a

life

"secure

guished in virtue."

rich in wealth, great in renown, distin-

12

Political_authority

is

ess enti al to every state.

commonwealth cannot endure.

Without

the

it

This. .ajajiLarity-jriay-rest with one,

with a sele^t^Wj_jir_w4th-the-^eople-4hemselves. Patently, the

basic

racy

Torms^i^ovemme nt are the ^traditional monarchy, aristocand dem ocracy No one form is without its advantages, no
.

one without

its

deficiencies; consequently

perfect or best. Each, however,

is

no one

in particular

is

acceptable as long as th e jurid-

bond ho^d^the^eopletogethcr, and one naay be better than

another. Of the unmixed forms, Cicero__^oul4-choose monarchy
where there isjvnjtyjrf command, and love between king and subjectsrHiTabsolute preference, however, is a mixed form
a comical

bining, a balancing, a blending of the three.

I

hold

it

desirable,

first,

that there should be a

dominant and royal

element in the commonwealth; second, that some powers should be

granted and assigned to the influence of the aristocracy; and third,
that certain matters should be reserved to the people for decision

and

judgment. Such a government insures at once an element of equality,

without which the people can hardly be free, and an element of
strength. 13

This element of strength, the corollary of each individual's being*

firmly set in his proper place, guarantees the stability of the state/

and
den

mixed form of government from the danger of sudand revolution: a danger ever present in the three form:
of the simple state, making it easy for them to lapse into thei
perverted forms
tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy.
Of these, the worst is tyranny. The tyrant is one
frees the
shift

who

has adopted a form of rule which is unjust and arbitrary

no creature more foul, or loathsome, or detested to gods or men can
.

12

Republic

v. 6.

13 ibid.

i.

45.

56]

I.

Though he

Ancient Greece and

Rome

image of man, the monstrous

Who can
justly give the title of human being to one who, in his dealings with
his fellow citizens and indeed with the entire human race, does not
desire the bond of a common law and the relationships involved in
be imagined.

is

formed

in the

ferocity of his character surpasses that of the wildest beasts.

civilized life? 14

Despotic rule

is

Cicero's nightmare. It so haunts

him

that he

warns even against adopting monarchy, the best of the unmixed

forms, lest

a single

The

degenerate into tyranny. Concentration of power in

it

man

dangerous and usually

is

fatal to the people's liberty.

hang over them that the king may become an

fear will always

arbitrary ruler, as generally happens. Precarious, therefore,

of a people which
single

is

the lot

dependent ... on the caprice or character of a

is

man. 15

THE ROMAN STATE

The_besj^form of governm ent (the mixed or composite form)
is

exemplified

m, the j^oman

stated

w ith

its

system_of magistrates

(the royal element), senate (the arist o^ratia_lenienlX^

and the

people (the democratic element). Plato's state was beautiful

fic-

an actuaLcxeation of the practical genius of

the Romans. They had built it, not in heaven but on earth, through
their own efforts
"by deliberation and discipline." "Our commonwealth
was the product not of one genius but of many;
it was not established within the lifetime of one man but was the
tion; Cicer o's state

is

work of

several

men

in several generations."

16

THE PRINCEPS REI PUBLICAE

But even the great Roman state (the embodiment of the ideal
was evolving. At Cicero's time it had germs of infection
and corruption as well as strong ferments and potent forces rapidly moving in new directions. It seemed in need of drastic
changes. Cicero was aware of this and, searching for the right
means to meet such an emergency, he introduced into his scheme
of government a new, puzzling figure: the rector or moderator or
state)

14 Jbid.

ii.

16 ibid.

1.

26.

is Ibid. 28.

Cicero IV.

[57

princeps rei publicae

at

the ideal statesman, the farsighted pilot

the~lieTnTqF^e_ship of

lectual qualities

wealth.

and

state,

man remarkable
He was to save

practicality.

The people were tojook

to

him

for both intel-

the

common-

for le adership

advice,

and example.
Unfortunately the passages treating of the princeps are too
short

and fragmentary. Even the most careful commentators have

not found any conclusive or satisfying answers to the

tions

about his true nature.

power? Was he

to

be the

What was

official

make

such with direct power to

many

ques-

to be the range of his

head of the

state,

endowed

as

binding decisions, or was he to

play the role of an elderly statesman drawing his indirect power

from the esteem and prestige he enjoyed among the people?

when he wrote about the
moderator rei publicae? Was he prophetically anticipating the
Augustan principate, or was he trying to provide an ideological
platform for Pompey, who in 52 had been appointed consul sine
collega? Or was Cicero merely in a nostalgic mood and did his
Again, had Cicero some one in mind

plea for the rector

mean

a return to the age of Scipio, a defense

of the rights of the optimates, the principes of the state, without

any concession to the monarchical element? Probably even Cicero

would have hesitated clearly to define his thought. Writing when a
tremendous transition was at hand, he undoubtedly understood
the need for a new type of statesman. He spoke with pathetic
longing, yet in veiled and guarded terms. The only sure thing is
that Cicero saw in the princeps a man (or several) with a historic mission. Within the framework of constitutionality he was
to apply his exceptional talent and knowledge to the problems
confronting Rome at the very moment of her spiritual and political revolution. Perhaps Cicero himself was puzzled. Perhaps he
was waiting for events to unfold before committing himself definitely.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW

The ^founda ti o n -e the

state is insiicL_and justice is

other than the acceptance^ ofjaw by

all

nothing

concerned. The polit ical

17 See Republic v. 3, 6, 7. Cicero's moderator makes one think of

Rousseau's legislator (The Social Contract, Book II, chap. 7). Of course,

the two differ greatly in

many

respects.

58]

I.

bond

is

the juridical

Ancient Greece and

bon&JIWhat, indeed,

is

a state,

Rome
if it is

not

by law?" 18 Now, law for Cicero

and
necessarily
the body of customs, written
exclusively
is not
effect
at a given time in a given
decrees, and judicial decisions in
place. Law is, primarily__and basi cally, the standarrjj^Lliy nature,
disco veredT>y reason through a study_oi^man's natural inclinat ions
mutu al service and by
partt c^IIa^ljLjJie^incJinatic^
reason applied to action. Its features are not diversity and selfish
an association of

citizens united

utiiity7T)ut unityTTianriony, reasonableness. Its J ustification is

the

Law

consentofj^majorit^^

not

is

an

abs olute value, supreme, timeless, changeless, universal. All other

laws, even the laws of
flict

with

Rome,

are valid only

if

they are not in con-

This law has an inherent, inescapable sanction of

it.

its

own: one cannot-disebey it without-den ying-his-jvefy-^ature and

becomingjess than_a_man. This law has likewise its own reward:
ultimately, it willJarjrLg-eyery man tr> virtue and all man-*cu unity
rather than paraphrase Cicero, let us read his masterly description of natural law in the third

dom, even

man

book

of the Republic.

Very selmere

in the best pages of the greatest books, has a

said so

much

so well:

There is in fact a true law namely, right reason which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and
eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance
of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong.
Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are
without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its
operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. Neither the senate nor
the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law, and
it requires no Sextus Aelius to expound and interpret it. It will not
lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one
rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal
and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will
be, as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God,
who is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor. The
man who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in denying the true nature of a man, will thereby suffer the severest of
is

Republic

i.

32.

Cicero IV.

[59

penalties, though he has escaped

call

all

the other consequences

which men

punishment. 19

For Cicero it is law a body of rules above the state and the
government and prior to them that provides the determining factor for judging the legitimacy of the state and its governmental
forms. Aristotle, insisting on the moral values inherent in each

had adopted a qualitative criterion. Cicero greatly

problem of constitutions. For him, in a sense at
least, the question was of secondary importance, a numerical one,
since all constitutions are good or tolerable so long as natural law
is sovereign. Government is only a means to determine and enforce this fundamental law. Whether government is entrusted to
one or to a few or to the many becomes a question not of principle but of prudence and expediency. The principle for Cicero
is that law must be supreme. As to the form of government, that
constitution,

simplified the

one should be chosen which,

all

things considered, affords the

state the greatest stability.

STOIC INFLUENCES
There

is

no mistaking a

Stoic influence in Cicero's philosophy.

His doctrine- on4aw7inVbelief in nranVeqnality, his vision of man-

kind as a universal family, his condemnation of slavery

all

of

denmtelyto Stoic sources. If, however, meaningor unjust generalizations are to be avoided, several remarks

these point very

less

and

qualifications are in order.

The

Stoic concepts Cicero accepts are those of the

further tempered

by

Roman common

sense.

reinstated the polis, albeit in a secondary place,

compatible with the society of

doctrines to
tius of

Roman

men

is

at large.

and considered

it

Cicero adapts these

ways, mitigating markedly, more than Panae-

Rhodes and Posidonius, the

Stoa. It

Middle Stoa

The Middle Stoa had

and
was able

rigidity

to Cicero's credit that he

severity of the

Old

to bring these hu-

manized Stoic precepts to bear on political life. He was impatient

of the narrowness of outlook common to most Stoics. Ironically
enough, these Stoics, while seeing mankind as one big family, were
shutting the individual in an ivory tower of

Ibid.

iii.

22.

proud aloofness and

60]

Ancient Greece and

I.

unconcerned

isolation.

Together with the Stoics, Cicero breaks

chains of Plato's and Aristotle's political

the

bound within

man

the suffocating limits of the city-state.

counter to the old Stoic doctrine, that

drawn

to the state

Rome

by nature

man

is

inexorably

Yet he holds,

also a political being

Moreover, Cicero insists, not

that while philosophy is good, law is better

without originality,

itself.

and that greater than the philosopher's is the mission of the statesman. "There is, indeed, nothing in which human excellence can

more nearly approximate

the divine than in the foundation of

states or in the preservation of states already

we owe Cicero

founded."

20

new

Finally,

unqualified praise for having transmitted, with re-

markable freshness and in terse terms of his own coinage, the

best of classic and Stoic political thought to the Roman jurists
and the Fathers of the Christian Church. The West is indebted to
Cicero in no small measure. It is regrettable that this debt is not

more graciously admitted.

better recognized or

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
De

republica. Trans,

by G. H. Sabine and

S. B.

Smith. Columbus,

Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1929.

De

legibus. Trans,

by C. W. Keyes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1928.

Cowell,

F.

R.

Cicero

and

the

Roman

Republic.

Baltimore:

Penguin Books, 1956 (London, 1948).

Haskell, H. J. This Was Cicero. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1942.
20 Ibid.

i.

7. Cicero's praises

and frequent; see Republic

i.

20;

of the role of the statesman are

iii.

3, 4; v.

13.

warm

part two:

Christ

and

Christianity

chapter v

Introductory

BASIC TEACHINGS OF CHRISTIANITY

THE
colony marks

birth of Christ

in

an obscure

village of a

remote

Roman

the central fact and the highest point in man's

and the world's history. For it is Christ who gives both the human
and cosmic phenomena the sense and the direction they need,
while

He

Himself represents the greatest, unsurpassable,

final

measure of their achievement and evolution.

The pagan philosophers had spoken to limited audiences of
initiates

and, at their best, voiced only partial truths in terms

often cryptic

and ambiguous.

Christ's teaching

was simple and

men. As such,

clear in style, universal in content, addressed to all

was a message capable of completely renewing man's life in its

aspects
religious, ethical, social, and political. These
were its fundamental ideas. God is our Father who is in heaven.!
Man is a child of God, a free and immortal spirit, a sacred and inviolable person capable of and called to unlimited perfection.
God's kingdom is a kingdom of souls whose territory is the world;

it

multiple

1 According to
the calculation of the sixth-century monk Dionysius
Exiguus, Christ was born in the year 754 A.u.c. But this could not have
been, for it is certain that Herod died in 750 A.u.c, which corresponds to

the year 4 B.C. In all probability Christ

was born a

before Herod's death, in the year 6 B.C.

little less

than two years

64]

II.

Christ

and

Christianity

whose membership, open to all, depends on interior assent and

on conditions of internal purity, humility, and love; whose strength
and riches are not material but spiritual. Suffering is not a tragedy but an opportunity. Labor, even manual labor, is given a dignity it has never known. Death itself is not to be feared but welcomed as the beginning of a new and richer life. Also of extreme
importance are the obvious corollaries of these principles: not
blind fate but God's wisdom and providence rule man's destiny;
all

men

and equal, and as children of the same Father,

and so close a bond demands that each not only
(justice)
own
but that he be dealt with liberally and

are free

they are brothers

be given his

generously in a

spirit of

brotherly love (charity); in everything

the primacy belongs to the spiritual; labor and suffering are

of redemption

and

means

sanctification.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE

was responsiWith Him religion~an3~politics
were sharply distinguished: "Render to Caesar the things that
are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's." 2 Not that
politics was rendered independent of religion (although in a sense
the state was declared independent of the Church), for even kings
and peoples were to obey God and God's laws. What Christ made
absolutely and definitively clear was that the state must not invade the world of religion and claim man's allegiance in the things
Concerning the social and

political issue, Christ

ble fox^seculajizing!i-feestate.

that are not Caesar's.

politics.

Goneis

Gonejsjhe-u niori

;,

Ike idcnLiflcatTon of ethics with

in t rie-person

oLQ aesar,

of the royal

no longer under the control of

the state. Obedience- taGaesar-4s no longer obedience to God. It
might happen that disobedience to Caesar is obedience to God.
an's spiritual liber ty_b ecomes compatible with social order. In
aridjhe priestly power. Religion

is

place of the

monism

of old, a duajity

Half of jnan^so to speak,

is

is

introduced into society.

freeoLfrom the secular ju risdiction,

for the ^ slate-4s-competent- -onlyin

emporal-matter s

hierarchy of
spiritual

C hrist's

The other
the sacred

Church, th e society established for man's

nejds,-4o-help-hrm-Te^^^

Matt. 22:21.

halfj_hisJbetter part,- is-entrustedJtQLanQther authority

eternal salva-

Introductory V.
tion.

And

state

[65

and Church, although they have power over man,

they exist simply to

are in reality servants:

make him

totally

happy.

Not

till

the advent of Christianity could

Roman

voluntarism

politeia.

How

when
into

could

the individual

a World-Soul?

personal existence,

man

Greek

break through the

and
which bound the ultimate Good within the
pagan society thrive on the vitality of its citizens
was caught up within a World-State or absorbed
Without any certainty about the meaning of
constant demands on individual and collective

all-enclosed system of naturalism born of

intellectualism

allegiance cannot but exhaust the positive energies of

human

nature,

and societies inevitably surrender

apathetically to sheer activism. For in the recognition that there is in
each man a final essence that is to say, an immortal soul which
only God can judge, a limit was set upon the dominion of men over
men. The prerogatives of supremacy were radically undermined. The
inviolability of the human person was declared, endowed with authentic and transcendent purposes and inalienable rights. The acknowledgment of a higher law, of which the State is not the oracle, is in
effect an immaterial power which an actual ruler or government can
be compelled to respect by the conscience of those in whom it reveals
itself. In the hierarchy of orders, political science and jurisprudence
shrank to its narrower limits and subordinate and subsidiary levels.
Law was to be born of the idea of justice not of religion. For while
Christianity provided a higher moral ingredient and purpose for law
and government, it disclaimed to be either its source or premise. The
and

consequently,

individuals

Christian faith did not absorb nor eliminate but rather preserved the
exigencies and dictates of the order of nature within the supernatural

order of grace.

Man was

liberated

from the nightmare involved in

by its own ex-

the concept of nature as a closed system, determined

clusive laws,

and of the perplexing antithesis between the spiritual

and the pagan cosmological necessitarianism.

aspiration for liberty

Christianity released the positive energies of

human

nature for the

development of a Christian polity of the City of Men which is not

the City of God but ever looks toward it for light and guidance in the
realization of a just order among men. 3

In the words of Christ and His

first

authoritative interpreters,

Peter and Paul, 4 Christianity recognizes and upholds the author3 J. F. Costanzo,
4 St. Peter: "Be

"The Graeco-Roman
subject to

every

Politeia," 155.

human

creature for God's sake,

66]

Christ

II.

ity of the state

and

Christianity

on the one hand, while on the other

it

establishes

a limit beyond which the state cannot proceed without violating

man's

spiritual liberty.

The fundamental

ideas of Christian poli-

number: (1) the recognition of state au thority as__ujdmajely_derivin g from God andjriming at the adequate
promotioji_oMhejCi]jnmcawtem^e ral good of-the-eitizens (hence
the state's au tono my in its proper domain ); (2) the limitation of
tics are,

stat e

then,

two

in

authority-within the

r ange-allotted4o-4t

aim, so thalJh^inalienable-rigfets of

jer-the-jmrsuk of

man and-the-rights

its

of Christ's

Church befuUy^espected.

EARLY CHRISTIAN WRITERS

These basic principles were explored and elaborated by early
as well as by the Fathers of
the Church. Soon, by developing logical implications, they were

Christian writers (the Apologists)

able to formulate

more or

less precise

answers to current social

and political problems and to begin discussions of other issues that

were to continue into the Middle Ages.
Writing from Africa at a time when the Church was being
cruelly persecuted, Tertullian (145-220) asserted that all kingdoms are from God and that all Christians owe obedience to the
faith. Therefore "we respect in
God, who has set them over the
nations" but "never will I call the emperor God." Tertullian emphasized another point: even though the Christians were unjustly
persecuted and though, as he somberly warned, "a single night
with a torch or two could achieve an ample vengeance," they
would never have recourse to violence, for it is forbidden them
"to repay evil by evil." 5

civil rulers

except in matters of

the emperors the ordinance of

In his Contra Celsum, Origen (185?-?254) clearly stated the

."
whether to the king as supreme, or to governors as sent through him
(I Peter 2:13-14); "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29).
St. Paul: "Let everyone be subject to the higher authorities, for there
exists no authority except from God.
Therefore he who resists the
authority resists the ordinance of God" (Rom. 13: If; see also I Tim. 3:1;
.

Titus 3:1).
5 Apology, chaps. 32, 33, and 37, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. by
Roberts and Donaldson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), Vol.
Ill,

pp. 43, 45.

Introductory V.
same doctrine about
for

[67

civil law.

their fellow citizens,

all

He added that Christians must pray

and more than others promote the

cause of the emperor, not, however, for worldly reasons. In general, it is their duty not to refuse any service asked of them so
long as

it

does not oppose God's law. Finally, Origen was not

mention the moral responsibility of the civil ruler. He

would be called to account not only for his own sins but also for
the sins of his people if he in any way contributed to their comafraid to

mission or spread.

St.

Following the Edict of Milan by Emperor Constantine (313),

further interpreted the Pauline principle.

Ambrose (340-397)

is not in itself an evil thing. What is wrong is the libido

dominandi, the lust for power, the desire to put it to selfish use

Authority

But

for illegitimate ends.

law

is

civil

authority

definitely limited.

is

God's

superior to every other; there are things forbidden even to

no voice and therefore

the emperor; in religious matters he has

he should carefully abstain from pressing any claim to man's

spirit-

from interference in any form.

To St. John Chrysostom (344-407), bishop of Constantinople,
Christian political thought owes a great debt for a pointed explanation of St. Paul's words and for one of the first arguments
ual allegiance and

against the so-called divine right of kings theory:

For
it

there

may

is

no power, he

be said;

am

he answers. Nor
the thing in

itself.

but of God; but

but of God.
It

it is

And

[St.

now
.

What say you?

God? This I do not say,

Paul] says, but of God.

every ruler then elected by

is

speaking about individual rulers, but about

Hence he does not

say, for there is

the thing he speaks of, and says, there

the

powers

must be noted

that be, are ordained of

is

no ruler
no power

God. G

that the Christian writers of the

first

three or

four centuries clung tenaciously to what antiquity had taught.

What

they could not otherwise reconcile with Christ's teaching

they corrected, adapted, or mitigated, discarding only what was

absolutely incompatible. Even in the unyielding and radical St.
Jerome (340-420) one detects a certain sense of satisfaction

when he can

assert that "our theories

agree with the [ancient]

philosophers" and "the Stoics agree on most points with our

Homily XXIII on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, quoted by
Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought
pp. 152f.
.

68]

II.

dogma."

Christ

and

Christianity

Indeed, Christianity (which did not demolish the

Roman*

temples or level the arches and forums to the ground) retained

the best features of Greek classical thought, the Stoic concepts of
the universality of law
ciples of the

Roman

and the equality of men, and most prin-\

Yet Christianity always man-

legal system.

aged to see the old theories in a

it

were, a

God

is

new dimension,

the measure of

new

perspective, to give them, as

new meaning

to inject a

Ma n's

all things.

duty

first

own

state or_eyerj_Jx>_the_jam^

salus publica

is still

essarily always) the

to

do_goodJs_ even

into them.

is_ not to the

a sacred duty but

suprema

lex.

bette r. ^Love,

To

no longer

know_thejtrjilh

which

soul.

The

(at least, not necis

good, but

the ancient philosophers

eyed suspiciously and even scorned as a "spiritual infirmity," becomes the deepest impulse and the positive criterion of one's life
provided its object is not the creature but the Creator. The law of
nature, universally valid, remains intact but

an"abstract rule of reason:

it

becomes

it

ceases to be merely

the^expr^ssion_i)f_a- provi-

dent Father's con cern for His beloved^hlidrenZancLthe penetrat-

ingljgEf oTReyeiation-disOvers4fl4t^ew- depths of-content. Moreover, parallel to the law of nature, another divine4aw (completely

unknown

to the ancient philosophers)

on men and kings and

God

states:

emerges, equally binding

the r^.sith^~law--premulgated

at various intervals in the ronrsp. of time.

civil

by

law that

and void. All-embracing as is

the range of divine law
neither state nor man can ever escape
its obligation
it now becomes clear that in order to be just and
valid the temporal civil law need only conform to and not necessarily be identical with it. A new and eminently dynamic relationship between temporal and eternal law is thus discovered and the
basis provided for the solution of one of the most difficult problems that had ever tortured ancient philosophers and statesmen.
For, when it was understood that justice consists not in identity
but in conformity with the eternal law, politics was at once freed
from the danger of dismal immobility and periodic upheavals.
Politics became suddenly a creative art, the science of the perfectible. It was St. Augustine who finally brought to light this excontradicts either of the

two

is

null

tremely important concept: that_an_obje^tiye_4u5tice-xojild exist

"whicJ^-Av^&-^emporalr-4ransieiit>-and--mu table " provided

it was
grounded on the eternal law, in turn "comprehensive
!)

ultimately
7

Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. XXIV, column 147.

Introductory V.

[69
8

of all human_exigpies~ anc^ historical contingencies";

concept

itself

thatwas and

Not

is

was already there

but the

in the inexhaustible treasure

the very core of Christian doctrine

and philosophy.

infrequently such revaluation and changes called for re-

appraisal and qualification.

forbid private property,

For

instance, Christianity does not

although

highly praises detachment

it

from worldly goods and monastic collectivism

freely

embraced

but the right use of private property, while extended to man's

and

his family's needs, is limited

neighbors,

whom

similar correction

To

it is

and

by the needs of

less fortunate

a duty to help. Other concepts underwent

clarification,

among them

justice

and peace.

these and to Christian political thought in general at the very

eve of the Middle Ages,

St.

Augustine gave eloquent and articu-

late expression.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ancient Christian Writers. Ed. by Johannes Quasten,
and Walter J. Burghardt, SJ. Westminster (Md.)

J.
:

C. Plumpe,

The Newman

Press: in progress since 1946.

Fathers of the Church. Ed. by Ludwig Schopp and others.

Fathers of the Church, Inc.: in progress since 1947.

Costanzo,

J.

F. "Catholic Politeia I,"

New

York:

Fordham Law Review, XXI

(June, 1952), 91-155.

Parsons, W. "The Influence of Romans XIII on Christian Political

Thought," Theological Studies, II (September, 1941), 325-346.
Ryan, E. A. "The Rejection of Military Service by the Early Christians," Theological Studies,
8 J.

XIII (March, 1952), 1-32.

F. Costanzo, "Catholic Politeia I,"

Fordham Law Review, XXI

1952), pp. 98, 102. Anyone interested in the revolution brought

about by Christianity in the social and political field should read Costanzo's
(June,

scholarly article.

chapter

vi

St Augustine
LIFE

THE son

pagan converted to Christianity only

and of Monica, a saintly Christian woman, Aurelius Augustine was born in Tagaste, the modern
Souk-Ahras in Algeria, on November 13, 354. Monica enrolled
him among the catechumens but many years were to pass before
his baptism. It was customary in those days to postpone its reception until an adult age. Augustine attended elementary school in
his native city and continued his education in Madaura, the present Mdaourouch, until he moved to Carthage (nearly on the site
of Patricius, a

shortly before death (371),

of

modern Tunis) to study rhetoric in the fall of 370.

Augustine was then sixteen years old and his "craving

for

found an easy outlet in that semi-pagan and

licentious city. It was there that he began his relations with the
woman who bore him a son, Adeodatus, and who was to follow

hellish satisfactions"

him

until practically the eve of his conversion.

It

was

studies,

in

Carthage also

that,

while pursuing his literary

Augustine chanced upon the Hortensius of Cicero.

Its

exhortation to philosophy changed his outlook. "Suddenly, every

vain hope became worthless to

me and

yearned with unbeliev-

able ardor of heart for the immortality of wisdom."

1

Confessions

iii.

4.

Selections

from

St.

In quest of

Augustine's Confessions are

St.

Augustine VI.

[71

he directed his attention to the Bible, but "my unhealthy pride

shunned its style and my intellectual vision failed to penetrate its
inner parts." 2 He found the doctrine of the Manichaeans more
palatable and from 373 to 382 he was associated with them
though only as an auditor. Augustine had fallen "among men mad
with pride, extremely carnal and talkative." 3 Their fundamental
belief in the two eternal principles of Good and Evil, Light and
Darkness, appealed to him as a rational solution to the problem of
evil and relieved him of all personal moral responsibility.
it

me

not we who sin, but some other unknown

was a joy to my pride to be set apart from
culpability and, when I had done some evil thing ... I loved to excuse myself and accuse some other unknown being, which existed with
me and yet was not I. 4
It

seemed

to

nature within us.

that
.

it

is

It

This was indeed a far cry from the Augustine

that "evil
evil

who would

observe

but the privatio n of the good, even to the extent that

is

doesnbt

exisi_ax-all.

len he completed his studies, Augustine taught at Tagaste

and Carthage.
fill

He won

the void or

still

friends

and admirers, but they could not

the restlessness deep in his heart. His keen

mind was soon tortured by doubts about the Manichaean explanation of the problem of evil, and no one was able to help him
clarify or resolve these and other matters that troubled him considerably.

taken from the translation of V.

J.

Bourke (New York: The Fathers of

the Church, Inc., 1953).

2 Ibid. 5.
3 Ibid.

Persian

6.

who

The founder of Manichaeanism was Manes or Mani,

lived in the third century a.d.

and taught the eternal existence

of two opposite substances, light and darkness, as well as reincarnation.

4 Ibid. v. 10.
5 Ibid.

iii.

7.

Against the Manichaeans,

Christian Augustine insisted on

man's free

its

who had

divinized evil, the

negative character. Evil, a product of

has not been created or willed by God; evil

is not; it is a
God's prescience does
not destroy man's freedom and responsibility, for man's act is not performed because God has foreseen it; rather, it is foreseen by God because
man will perform it. But God, St. Augustine continues, in His infinite
goodness and power, brings good even from evil and makes everything
work for His glory and man's ultimate happiness.

will,

deprivation, a negation, a denial of that

which

is.

72]

Christ

II.

and

Christianity

of 384 Augustine proceeded to Rome. The

there
had to be closed almost immediately beopened
school he
cause many of his pupils failed to pay their fees. Seeking a new
teaching position, he asked for and obtained it in the important
city of Milan, then the residence of the Western Roman emperors.

In the

"So

summer

came

to Milan, to

Ambrose

known throughout
At Milan he was joined by

the bishop,

the world as one of the best men."

meantime a skeptical Augustine was drifting

and farther from Manichaeanism. He felt that perhaps the
Academic philosophers 7 were right in holding that one should
doubt everything, for truth is ever elusive. Plotinus and the NeoPlatonists 8 rescued him from his despair and gave him new confidence in the positive power of the human mind. Ambrose,
through public sermons and private conversations, made him
aware of the hidden riches of the Christian faith. The prayerful
Monica and his dear friend Alypius were constantly at his side,
encouraging him in his battle against the flesh. The woman he had
lived with for a good number of years had returned to Africa,
vowing to God that she would never know another man and leaving Adeodatus with him. The time was ripe for the return of the
prodigal. After several violent crises, he finally broke with his
past, and on Holy Saturday, April 25, 387, together with Adeodatus and Alypius (who was to become, in 394, the bishop of
Tagaste), he was baptized by Ambrose. Monica had at last reaped
the fruit of her many tears. She died shortly afterward at Ostia,
while waiting with Augustine to sail back to Africa.
In Africa, Augustine withdrew, with a few friends and disciples, to a secluded place near Tagaste and gave himself to
prayer and study. In 391 he was ordained a priest by Valerius,
Bishop of Hippo, a city in ancient Numidia about a mile southhis mother. In the

farther

*lbid. v. 13.
7 The Academic philosophers, such as Arcesilaus of the Middle
Academy in the third century B.C. and Carneades of Cyrene of the New
Academy in the second century B.C., agreed, against Stoic dogmatism, that
is impossible: man can prove nothing, be sure of nothing, not
even of the fact that he is certain of nothing.
8 Plotinus, born in Egypt (a.d. 203-269), is called the Father of NeoPlatonism. He believed that man, through detachment from sensory things
and a life of asceticism, can unite himself to the highest One and reach a
state of mysterious beatitude or ecstasy. His most famous disciple was

knowledge

Porphyry (232-304).

St.

Augustine VI.

west of the

[73

modern Bone in Algeria. Soon afterward he was conon Valerius' death, succeeded him. For more

secrated bishop and,

than twenty years the great bishop labored in his diocese, preaching and writing and valiantly combating heresies wherever they
appeared.

He

forcefully attacked the

Manichaeans, the Donatists, 9

and the Pelagians. 10 One cannot but marvel at the fertility of his
mind and at his almost unbelievable activity. Death put an end
to it on August 28, 430, while his beloved city was surrounded

by the Vandals.

month

later

Hippo

fell

to the barbarians.

THE CITY OF GOD

On

August 24, 410, Alaric entered Rome. After long centuunmolested supremacy the greatest of cities fell, an easy
prey to the invaders. The outrageous pillaging lasted three days
during which Christians and pagans alike took refuge in the shrines
ries of

of the martyrs

and

in the basilicas of St. Peter

on Vatican

Hill

the
and St. Paul on the Ostian Way. But when
pagans turned rabidly on the Christians, blaming them for the
catastrophe. Rome had been left unprotected because of the Christian doctrine of renunciation of the world; moreover, the gods,
betrayed by the acceptance of the new religion, had avenged
the Visigoths

left,

Rome this dreadful punishment. It

Roman and Christian, assumed the diffi-

themselves by inflicting on

was then that Augustine,

and restoring courage to

and dismayed Christians. This he did with his De
Civitate Dei, the City of God, a work divided into twenty-two
books and published in various installments between 413 and 426.
The City of God is Augustine's masterpiece. In it he goes beyond his initial purpose and plan. Broadening the defense of Christianity and the condemnation of paganism into a process and
judgment of universal history, Augustine takes a unified view of
the complex events of all ages and sees th e destiny of mankin d

cult task of refuting these accusations

the bewildered

The Donatists were

Carthage,

followers of Donatus the Great, Archbishop of

and of Donatus, Bishop of Casae Nigrae in North Africa

(fourth century A.D.). They held that heretics, being deprived of grace,
could not validly administer baptism and the other sacraments.
10 Pelagianism, sponsored by the fourth-century
British monk Pelagius,
denied the transmission of original sin to Adam's descendants and asserted
that

man

is

the author of his

own

salvation.

74]

II.

Christ

and

inextricably linkedto_the Christian religion.

his soul,

man's

Christianity

As

in the history of

Augustine read in the history of mankind ihe account of

flight

to_orJranuGod. According to this theological view,

from the contrast of two cities built and sustained

history results

by two conflictingjoves: the heave^y^gityTtii e city ot Tjod, coinpose^Ql5^ryZfderid_oJ_Go^^n^despiser ofself in~aIT places and
times, andJjie--dty-Qf-ma n, t h e wQrIdIy^^lty^ssuMJrorn_a selfish
loviTand formed by all the enemies of God, likewise in every
country and age.

THE TWO CITIES

The two

men

cities

or societies, into one or the other of which

without exception

fall,

know no

all

physical frontiers nor are

they necessarily coextensive with Church and

state.

11

On

earth,

good and bad are intermingled: they live together, they work together; and yet one city is constantly warring against the other
one dominated by a power urge and boasting of its self-sufficiency,
the other relying on God and all its members serving one another
in charity. Their "great divide"

is

in the

human

heart; their cardi-

nal distinction, wheth"eT~one looks To~e^rth~or~tolieaven as his last

end The same standard of determination is applicable to peoples

or states. To the earthly city belongs that people or state that is
heldtogejhfiiLby a .selfishJbve_an5Ise~eks excTujiy^lyjor_aFIeast preponderaiilly-JJie-acqui sition of

wojldbLgoods. To

the heavenly city

belongsJha t_people or jstate that-is-uriifi ed by a bond of love for

GodTis^Qrganized--Jof -a s upernatural end. and aspires after the
goods of heaven.
-

11 It is true that at

Augustine uses the two terms in a more

signifies.. the-jChurch and "city of man"
or "terre strial city^jneans^the' state. But in such instances the context
clearly shows that between the two (Church and state) there is no necessary and inevitable conflict. To avoid confused reading it should be kept in
mind that the term "Church" also has two senses. It may mean the spiritual agency and spiritual power instituted by Christ to apply the fruits of
His redemption. It may mean the Christian people, the multitude of the
concrete sense: "city of

times

Church members. In the

lated to the city of

principles of the

God

two are

not necessarily are

all

St.

God" then

first

sense, the

Church

(the society of
identical. In the

all

is

those

always essentially re-

who

love

God): the

second sense, not always and

Christians seekers and friends of

God.

Augustine VI.

St.

[75

St. Augustine thus introduces his theological view of the state.

Far more than a political philosopher in the narrow, definite sense
of the term, this Christian theologian casts the light of faith on the

concepts of ancient writers, keeping what

reshaping what

is

wrong.

It is interesting to

right, discarding

is

see

how he

or

proceeds.

THE STATE
First of all

Augustine defines the

state.

"A people

is

a multi-

tude of reasonable beings voluntarily associated in jhe pursuit of

common

interests." 12

St.

Augustine was constrained to modify

Cicero's definition, 13 which, though in a sense better and

more

had hardly been calculated to fit all or even most historical

states. The more realistic Augustine broadened the basis of the

ideal,

all p eoples, even those l acking justice, could be

man, he seems to say, is a man whether good or bad.
A~staTe or a people is a state or a p eople w hethex-good or bad
whetheT-uTne mbjflolJne^eav^nlyLi)r of the ear thly city. But his
definition is not by any means to be construed as eliminating or
disregarding the moral concept in his own theory of the state.
Augustine's view of the state is not circumscribed by the limits of

concept so that

included.

this definition.

This

is

As

but the beginning, the

man

first

step in a long

him a
endowed with life, reas on, and ind ividual existence and then
proceegs~tU3how "wEaT makes him good or bad, so, Augustine,
afte r defining the state in the most generic terms, goes on to distingu ish between good and_bad states.
analytical process.

a study of

begins by defining

being

THE STATE AND JUSTICE

J ustice

is

what makes-a_gaod

state.

"Ubi

justitia

non

est,

non

est respublica." 14
12 City

God

xix. 24. Selections from The City of God are taken from
D. B. Zema, G. G. Walsh and others (New York: The
Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1950).
13 "A multitude bound together by
a mutual recognition of law and
rights and a mutual co-operation for the common good." (De republica

of

the translation of

i.

25.)
14

of

"Where there

God

xix. 21.

is

no

justice, there is

no

[true]

commonwealth." City

76]

II.

Christ

and

Christianity

In the absence of justice, what

is sovereignty but organized brigandage? For, what are bands of brigands but petty kingdoms? They
also are groups of men, under the rule of a leader, bound together by
a common agreement, dividing their booty according to a settled
principle. If this band of criminals, by recruiting more criminals,
acquires enough power to occupy regions, to capture cities, and to
subdue whole populations, then it can with fuller right assume the

of kingdom, which in the

title
it,

common

estimation

is

conferred upon

not by renunciation of greed, but by the increase of impunity.

The answer which a captured pirate gave to the celebrated Alexander

the Great was perfectly accurate and correct. When that king asked
the man what he meant by infesting the sea, he boldly replied: "What
you mean by warring on the whole world. I do my fighting on a tiny
ship,

and they

they call you

But what
man's

call

me

a pirate; you do yours with a large

Commander."
is

justice? It

rela tions with

fleet,

and

15

is-

not so

muck

the-vdrtiie regulating

man; primarily and fundamentally

it

is

the

virtue regulating mar?s~relations to Godr~A~5~a~ consequence of

when itjs_rooted in Him~can justice exist as a virtue

among mehTX manj^i^a^^t^&-^^^mgISQ^^lo~^ true God
and obedience to His laws cannotbejust. The Roman state was,

this,^onIy

by
and be-

then, always a state, though not always in the sense defined

Cicero, for at certain times

come a "sink
make them

to

Rome had abandoned

of iniquity," tearing

justice

men away from God

in order

subject to dirty demons.

THE STATE AND PEACE

end of the state (and m anj_ _Aiigiistine admits of
"the calm that comes of order." 16 But then he
shafply" divides^peacelnto two kinds. There is an earthly peace
anoLthefe-4s--arheaven4y peace. One need not militate against the
other. Individuals and states may and should desire both. Unfortunately, however, there are men and states who pursue worldly
peace to the exclusion of heavenly peace. These are unjust and

As

only

to the

!L

onepeace,

belong to the earthly

Augustine thus brings into sharp focus

city.

the Cm4s4iaaJda__Qiai_the state_andjhe_state's aims are

^

no more

than jglatiyejmd siihsiriiary-Azalues^^^d^only as iong_as_they re-

main such. The

!5 Ibid. iv. 4.

really important thing is

never to lose sight of

16 ibid. xix. 13.

Augustine VI.

St.

[77

ma^VHmpernatiiral purpose and

make

to

everything work,

ulti-

matelj^jojts attainments^

Of

God

course, the City of

heaven. For this

is

subordinates

earthly peace to that of

not merely true peace, but,

speaking, for

strictly

the perfectly
any rational creature the only real peace, since it is
ordered and harmonious communion of those who find their joy in
God and in one another in God. 17
.

POLITICAL AUTHORITY
To

needs authority Without it the

impos sible. God, who willed man to
be social, willed alsothe means that make life in common useful
and benenciairTHerefore, au thority i s from G od. He is the source
nttnin

itr,

end,, civ il society

body

unity of the social

is

of all power. But, except in special cases of direct intervention,

He

alloyys_se^gndajy_causestQ^ designate. ihe-ruleiv-sudL as elec-

tion,Jiej^ditary-stteees^kmT-oTnDth^

As

no preference.
all are good

to forms of government, St. Augustine has

Mon archy,

aristocracy

ri

pm or racv

provided the rulere are good

St.

a mixed form

Augustine

lists

carefully the

qualities of the ideal rulers: they

govern with justice

remember

sovereignty as a ministry of
.

God

that they are

.

are slow to punish, quick to forgive

revenge, but only

public

men

think of

fear and love and worship

.

God

punish, not out of private

when forced by

[and] temper with

the order and security of the remercy and generosity the inevitable

hardness of their decrees. 18

CONSEQUENCE OF

Many seem

convinced that

as a consequence of sin,
clination

jo 'society

SIN?
St.

Augustine ooked upon the state

and not the

r es ult of man's natural inkuch an interpretation would imply that Au-

gustine viewed the political organization as a violation of natural

law, that man's nature not only does not call for the state but virtually rejects
17 Ibid. 17.

it,

and that the

state

somehow

mibid.

v. 24.

finds

its

justification

78]

II.

Christ

in the facijthat,men having sin ned,

ganize them against

sin.

it

and

Christianity

became necessary

Had Adam and Eve

not

to or-

then,

fallen,

wuuld have been no need whatever of a common political

association and authority.
It must be admitted that there are texts of St. Augustine that
appear to support this view. For instance, Chapter 15 of Book

thei'e

XIX

reads:

God wanted

rational

man, made

to His image, to

have no dominion

He meant no man, therefore, to have

man over beasts. So it fell out that those

except over irrational nature.

dominion over man, but only

who were

holy in primitive times became shepherds over sheep rather

than monarchs over men, because

God

wishes in this

way

to teach us

from

that which
punishment for sin has made imperative. For, when subjection came,
it was merely a condition deservedly imposed on sinful man.
that the normal hierarchy of creatures

is

different

According to others, however, a careful study of

all

pertinent

passages would point up quite a different interpretation. Augustine

mean that man's life was originally to have been apolitical

and that sin created a need for the state. He meant simply to condemn thgjiolcnt, cruel, unjust domination of the weak by the
strong, to condemn the greed and the power urge that drive men
and--grrjups~of men to found nations and empires oF to extend
did not

themj3y_JQjxe--e-tfeachery.

Though

certain of St. Augustine's

statements seem very general and all-inclusive, one must explain

them

and condemnation of most hisand during his time. Such states had been
founded, extended, and held in blood and terror. It is these Augustine disapproves and condemns, not the state in the abstract. In
fact, he unequivocally and repeatedly asserts that social organization derives from a precept o f na tural law and is-mandato rv to
in the light of his scrutiny

torical states before

prnviHp. hTrmgrT-rpings, wit h

men

Ibelripans

indisp en sa bl e to

li fe

Be-/

b onds of kinship and

friendshi p for the purp ose of attaining peace
the ultimate law ofl
all and every^ nature "By the very laws of his nature man seems]
cause

are^ social beings, they join in

so to^speak, forced into fellowship, and, as far as in

peace with every man."

19 Ibid. xix. 12.

19

But

if

him

lies,

into

man's association with other

men

St.

Augustine VI.

is

to be orderly, beneficial,

Thus the state

ensure"lmrnEej3la(2
authority.

human needs

and peaceful, there is need of law and

born born of m an's_ social inst inct to

Neither of these

that necessitate the existence of the state

is

attendant

on earth. Bothjgrecededit. They are

They would have drawnTiim, even had
AdShT and hve not disobeyed God's command and mankind not
lost original justice, into some sort of political organization, excluon the appearance of

is

[79

sin

part of man's very nature.

sive, of course,

How

of a strict coercive element.

then can the

be considered a consequence of sin when it is wholly consonant with a law the natural law made by God Himself and
pursues ends in themselves good? Slavery is always a product of
sin; some actual states are a result of sin; but not the state as
such. St. Augustine even speaks of true civil sovereignty as "a
state

ministry of

God"

vine providence.

20

and of human kingdoms

as established

by

di-

21

UNITY OF MANKIND
The political theology of St. Augustine has a solution for the
problem of international relations. Mankind's undying dream- of
world unity^rrthe pacific coexistence of all men, families, and nations^can become a realityonly_ when Christ is unanimous lyacp.pptedjW[His te3rhings^arefaithfH44y^fAl]nwp.fL--Thp. many bonds
maT~could effect unification will 4ait to keep mankind together if
the^HmiirjlEondy^
rejected. Peace is~ a gift of
God. We cannot have it without Him. As Etienne Gilson says so
wel
conceivable that a number of men, more or less large, be unified
under the domination of other men or even of one individual; however if we are striving toward the unity of all men, we must look
beyond mankind for the unifying principle. The only possible source

It is

of future unity

lies

impossible without

not in multiplicity, but above

One God and One Church.

ever timely message conveyed to

man by

St.

it.

One World

In this truth

lies

is

the

Augustine's City of

God. 2 *
lbid.

v. 24.
21 "Prorsus divina providentia regno constituuntur
22 Ibid., Foreword. The entire Foreword

humana." Ibid. 1.
by Gilson is worth reading.

80]

II.

Christ

and

Christianity

was the supreme aspiration ofjt^Augustine: that all aspectsjofjOEiaii's individual and collective life be permeated by the
love an d spirit of ChrisL-or, that all-men- ancLall states belong to
but one city-the city of God.
___._.
This,

CHURCH AND STATE

This -divine-eity- even
.

not do-aw-ay-wife-thc

Some medieval
cratic state

if

univer sally realizecLon earth, would

state-as

s ociety dis tinct

fiuui the Church.

writers argued that St. Augustine favored a theo-

and the

identification of the state with the

Church,

should ideal conditions obtain. Quite the contrary, the Bishop of

Hippo had a

clear understanding of the

two powers and

guished between them, assigning to each specific functions

distin-

to the

power, temporal interests, and to the spiritual power, those

above the order of time.
St. Augustine admitted that conflicts arise between Church and

civic

and that in extreme cases no compromise is possible. Then

Church has "no choice but to dissent
and so to become a
nuisance to those who think otherwise." 23 But ordinarily the
Church
state

the

no issue with that diversity of customs, laws, and traditions

whereby human peace is sought and maintained. Instead of nullifying
or tearing down, she preserves and appropriates whatever in the
diversities of divers races is aimed at one and the same objective of
human peace, provided only that they do not stand in the way of the
faith and worship of the one supreme and true God. 24
takes

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
The City of God. Trans. M. Dods.

Modern

Bourke, V.

Introd.

by T. Merton.

New

York:

Library, 1950.

J.

Augustine's Quest of Wisdom. Milwaukee: Bruce,

1945.

Cary-Elwes, C. Law, Liberty and Love.

1951 (Chapter on St. Augustine).

23 Ibid. xix. 17.

24 ibid.

New

York: Devin-Adair,

St.
*

Augustine VI.

[81

D'Arcy, M. C. and others. St. Augustine. New York: Meridian

Books, 1957 (New York, 1930).
Figgis, J. N. The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's "City of God."
London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921.
Versfeld, M. A Guide to "The City of God." New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1958.

part three: The Middle A ges

chapter

vii

Introductory

THE MIDDLE AGES

ANARCHY,

chaos, disintegration marked the Middle Ages

from the beginning of the sixth to the end of the tenth century. But these were also centuries of Christian penetration and
root-taking and germination. Throughout the Roman Empire, now
the home of "barbarians," Christianity was at work through its
bishops and priests and particularly the monks of St. Benedict
(480?-?550), the true educators of the West. Foremost among
the new nations they reclaimed was France. On Christmas 496,
Clovis was baptized in Rheims; on Christmas 800, Charlemagne
was crowned emperor in Rome. The eleventh and the twelfth centuries constitute the creative phase of the Middle Ages, first with
feudalism, then with the restoration of the state, finally with popular emancipation. France led again, closely followed by England,
Northern Spain, and Southern Italy. These years featured Cluny,

II

Romanesque style, the Crusades, the chansons de geste, the

medieval mysteries, the new languages, the cities, the guilds, Gregory VII, St. Peter Damian, St. Bernard, Abelard. The thirteenth

the

century saw the end product of medieval evolution. It began with

Innocent III (1198-1216), Francis of Assisi (1182-1226), and

Dominic (1170-1221).
France,

St.

It

was made glorious by St. Louis of

St. Bonaventure, Dante Alighieri,

Thomas Aquinas,

III.

86]
the cathedrals, the universities, the

The Middle Ages

summae. The fourteenth and

The medieval syn-

the fifteenth centuries brought radical changes.

thesis

was

dissolved; the Christian process of evolution broken.

by Luther, the via moderna had its formal beginning. Christendom was divided. And the society that
replaced the old was realistic and utilitarian, a society of the bourgeoisie and legists, of merchants and bankers, of absolute monarchies and sovereign nations. 1
Finally, in 1517, heralded

THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

To
litical

trace the

thought

it

main
is

lines in the

development of medieval po-

necessary to distinguish between the early

Middle Ages (roughly from the fall of the Roman Empire of the
West in 476 to the first decades of the eleventh century) and the
late Middle Ages (from about the middle of the eleventh to the
end of the fifteenth century). The early period was dominated by
the slow confluence of three major factors (the Greco-Roman, the
Christian, the Germano-feudal) into a fairly clear body of doctrine
dealing particularly with the issues of society and state and Church,
of justice and law, of civil authority and the people in relation to
it. The late Middle Ages, while retaining and further developing
many of the previous features, was characterized by a brisker pace,
a wider range of interests, a moving in new and different directions, a gathering from new and more copious sources. Predominant, however, were one question and one struggle: the question
of Church and state relations, the struggle first between pope and
emperor, and later, more specifically, between the pope and the
French king.

CLASSIC FACTORS
During the early period the Aristotelian idea of society as natural and necessary to man was rigidly maintained. Not so, at least
in the opinion of
institution.

ganization
lessness
1

some, Aristotle's idea of the state as a natural

Gaining favor was Seneca's belief that the political or-

is

not natural but only necessary, in view of man's rest-

and concupiscence

the lasting consequences of an origi-

See J. Chevalier, Histoire de la pensee, Vol.

chretienm (Paris: Flammarion, 1956), pp. 133-141.

II,

La Pensee

Introductory VII.
nal

fall.

At

the

same

[87

time,

to be legitimate, that

is,

it

was commonly held with Cicero

that

be a legitimate means of restoring justwo essential conditions: the governed

to

a state must fulfill

must consent to the association and the rulers must govern justly.
These verified, it makes little or no difference what the form of
tice,

the

state,

monarchical,

aristocratic,

keeping with the Stoic and the

Roman

or

democratic.

mentality,

Finally,

human

in

relations

(therefore also political) were unalterably viewed in terms of law,

never in the Platonic or even Aristotelian terms of an

a law unto themselves and govern

are

wisdom

at the discretion of their superior

elite

who

according to universal

minds.

CHRISTIAN FACTORS
must be noted that in general the outlook of medieval thinkwas essentially conditioned by a common adherence to the
Christian faith, and that indisputable principles of Christian theology were invariably their first and final criteria for the acceptance
or rejection of any idea, old or new. It may be added that often
It

ers

the philosophers of this period, although conscious of the differ-

ence (primarily a difference in method) between theology and

philosophy, drew no clear distinction between the two disciplines. 2

In addition to maintaining the fuller explanation of natural

law and reaffirming the existence of a new kind of divine law

(known through Revelation), the political philosophy of the early
Middle Ages introduced a new concept of society that gave this

and the succeeding period one of their most typical features, if not
their most characteristic trait: the concept of Christian society as
one. St. Augustine, at the

had already hinted

end of one era and the

at the idea. In his City of

Christians as forming a single spiritual society,

labore

monachorum he

asserts that "the

start of another,

God he
and

regards

all

in his

De

commonwealth

of

all

"One of the main factors which brought about the drawing of a

and methodical distinction between the sciences was the introduction
of the main body of Aristotelianism to the knowledge of Christian thinkers
in the second half of the twelfth and the early part of the thirteenth
century. For acquaintance with a grand-scale philosophical system which
obviously owed nothing to the Christian religion drew their attention
sharply to the need of delimiting the two sciences in a methodical manner."
(F. Copleston, Mediaeval Philosophy [New York: Philosophical Library,

clear

1952], p. 13.)

88]

III.

Christians

is

The Middle Ages

but one." But what in Augustine's times was

still

became
vague idea and, at any rate,
true and alive during the course of the Middle Ages. Then all
Christian peoples and nations of the world, as John VIII (d. 882)

more a hope than a

reality,

proclaimed, were considered one community, for they belonged to

Rome

as to their only mother. This is the meaning

and Peter Damian's "populus christianus" the
Christian people, that is, all, wherever they may be, who profess
the Christian faith. For medieval thought the religious factor was
paramount: faith in Christ and membership in the Church were
the indispensable prerequisites for any one, person or nation, to
belong to Christendom. The society of all Christians was, however, under two governments, two authorities: one for temporal,
the other for spiritual matters; and the respective functions of
these authorities, as well as the principles regulating their mutual
relations, continued to be, at least in theory, those which Pope
Gelasius I had so comprehensively stated in 494 at a time when
the two societies (the Church and the state) had not yet given
way to one society. This is the famous Gelasian formula:

Church of

the

of Gregory VII's

He

each [power], assigning to each its

power remains far removed
from the temptations of the world, and, campaigning for God, does
[Christl divided the functions of

proper task and dignity.

The

spiritual

not mix into the affairs of the world, while on its side the secular
power takes care not to undertake the direction of divine things. By
each one resting modestly in his place, each power avoids the pride of
seizing absolute power, and thus holds a greater competence in the
things that are his own. 3

Another Christian factor that greatly influenced the

political

thought of the early Middle Ages was the idea of the divine origin

from the classical text

had nothing in common with the pagan exaltation of
the prince as voiced by Seneca and Pliny. Christians, of course,
could no longer consider the ruler a sharer in the divinity. They

of the king's power. This concept, derived

of

St.

568.

Paul,

Tractatus de anathematis vinculo, ed. by Theil (1868), Vol. I, p.

Byzantine Emperor Anastasius I, Gelasius re-

In a letter to the

same principle in the famous passage that begins: "There are

two powers, August Emperor, by which the world is chiefly ruled, the
sacred authority of the Pontiffs and the royal power." See this letter in
Church and State Through the Centuries, ed. by Ehler and Morrall (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1954), p. 11.
affirmed the

Introductory

[89

VII.

viewed him as a vicar or a lieutenant of the true God, the representative of God's will. Again, it is obvious that this doctrine had
no relation to the divine right of kings theory in vogue in the seventeenth century. In the Middle Ages
of the king, that

was

it

the

power

One would

the political writers of the early Middle

make

office,

of divine right, not the king himself as an in-

dividual vested with civil authority.

to

was the

venture to add that

Ages did not even intend

a case in favor of the divine right of kingship as such.

For them monarchy was not, in principle, the only form of government; but as it was the rule of the day, they employed the
term "kingship" in a broad sense, as synonymous with "power"
in general rather than in the narrow and exclusive sense of "monarchy." Be that as it may, kingship as such or political power in
general was highly regarded by the writers of the early Middle
Ages and he in whom it was vested was highly extolled and revered. The reason for this was primarily the lofty purpose assigned
to civil authority. Its end, established by God, was justice. The
king's aim was to secure, to enforce, to mete out justice among
his subjects
so much so that his power was legitimate only insofar as it pursued this divinely appointed mission.
Moreover, the medieval philosophers gradually came to believe that the king, high as his office was, was accountable not
only to God but also to the people, in some way at least, for his
administration of justice. Thus they introduced the distinction between the just ruler (the king) and the unjust ruler (the tyrant).
Obviously, in their view, the tyrant could not be the vicar of God,
for he was not securing or enforcing justice. On the contrary, he
was the vicar of the devil. To resist him, then, was not tantamount
to resisting God. In the end, some medieval writers came to the
conclusion that putting aside or even killing the tyrant was an act
meritorious before God.

GERMANIC FACTORS
But what was the meaning of "justice" and "just" in that conwas not only embodied in the divine law (natural
and positive) but also in the human law of the realm. Until that
time the king had but to observe God's precepts to be considered
just. Above the law of the state, he could have amended it or
text? Justice

derogated to

it,

salva iustitia of course.

Now, however,

new

ele-

The Middle Ages

III.

90]

ment, Germanic in mentality and practice, enters into the definition of justice. God's law, yes; but, in addition, the law of the

law of the realm; and, furthermore, the law of the realm

customary law: the law observed from time immemorial. The Germanic idea, eventually incorporated in the political thought of the early Middle Ages, was that the term "law"
no longer meant the law or decree made by the king but the laws

tribe, the
is

identified with

of the nation

made by

the people as a whole.

This Germanic concept of the law, so alien in a sense to that

of imperial

and

Rome, had another consequence:

practically suppressed the legislative

state.

The law having been

owed

its

it

greatly curtailed

power of the

identified with consuetudo,

origin to the king. His function

ing, to interpreting, to enforcing the

was reduced

ruler in the
it

no longer

to discover-

customs of the nation and

judging according to them. Again, since the laws were no longer

he was now bound by them like everyone else. Thus customary law held sway over each and every member of the community the king as well as the humblest freeman. In other words,
what constituted justice was no longer the sovereign's will but the
law, which in turn had its origin and justification in the will of the

his,

people.

These various principles (about the nature of the law and the
had already found expression,
though not completely and systematically, in the ninth century
with Alcuin (735-804), Rhabanus Maurus (784-856), John
Scotus Erigena (810-877), Hincmar of Rheims (8067-882). But
the theory embodying these doctrines was to be formulated more
explicitly by the political writers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, especially Manegold of Lautenbach (d. 71103) and John
of Salisbury (11207-1180), under the converging impetus of
another factor the revival of the Roman law in Bologna and the
work of the glossatores (writers of what was termed the glossa, the
marginal and interlinear notes in the Corpus Juris Civilis). These
new forces were to emphasize a legal principle dormant for so
extent of the king's authority)

many
all

centuries: the old

Roman

principle that the only source of

and law is the people.

Indeed, if there was at any time

authority

in the period immediately preceding

right of kings theory,

doctrine

was

in the early
it

Middle Ages or

even a trace of a divine

it

fast disappeared.

that kings

were not legibus

The prevalent medieval

they were bound

soluti:

Introductory
to the

VII.

law and responsible to

[91

God and

the people in their admin-

istration of justice. If unjust, the king ceases to

God and becomes

be a minister of

a minister of the devil. Consequently, resist-

ance to tyrannical rule becomes an act of justice

for

its

aim

is

the restoration of the justice that conforms to God's and the

people's will.

But

to say that the king (the despotic king)

deposed or ultimately disposed of

by the people

is

may be

equivalent to

having his authority derive from them. Obviously totalitarianism

was unknown

Middle Ages. As Mcllwain observes:

to the

is an achievement of modern times. The Middle

Ages would have none of it. But with medieval monarchy, as with
feudal relations, the prevailing theory was one thing, the actual facts
were often quite another. A nobler conception of kingship a higher
conception of government even has seldom been expressed than that
of the middle ages.
The main political defect of the time was not
a lack of principles, but an almost total absence of any effective
sanction for them.
Though the king was under law in theory,
there was little effective machinery in existence to make this theory a

Political absolutism

practical reality. 4

THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

Unlike the early Middle Ages, which saw political thought
emerge slowly and laboriously from the confluence of three clearly
identifiable factors, the late Middle Ages was a period of intense
intellectual activity and multiform experience in political and other
closely related matters.

of

With the second half of the eleventh century, the University

Bologna had become the center of a revival of Roman law.

4 Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West, p. 197. In

a sense, then, "the Middle Ages are not dead" (Barker) and one can there-

fore refer to "the eternal Middle Ages" (F. Kern).

live

in the following political principles:

(1)

As

to politics, these

the maintenance of justice

is the purpose of the political organization; (2) the law as the concrete
embodiment of justice is supreme (even the king is under God and the
law); (3) power is a political responsibility: the subjects must observe the
law and the king must maintain justice; (4) the state cannot touch certain
aspects of the moral and spiritual life of man and must leave the Church
free and independent. "No epoch was ever more free from 'totalitarianism'
than the period which knew Catholic 'domination' at its highest." (J.
Courtney Murray, "Contemporary Orientations of Catholic Thought, etc.,"

in Cross Currents, 5 [Fall, 1951], p. 52.)

III.

92]

The Middle Ages

Soon the glossatores added the weight of that law and jurisprudence to the emperor's pretensions. On the other hand the papal
claims obtained new help and ammunition from the canonists, who,
also in Bologna and not too much later, revived the study of canon
law. Prominent among them was Gratian, a Camaldolese monk of
Tuscan origin, who between 1140 and 1150 wrote his famous
Concordia discordantium canonum (later called Decretum Gratiani, hence the word "decretists" applied to those who commented
on it), in which the entire mass of canonical legislation was collected and rearranged. 5
This is the period when, at the end of a long detour, Aristotle's
works became available in Latin Europe; and with them, through
the translations and commentaries of the Scholastics, many aspects of ancient culture were providentially rediscovered and assimilated.

At

this

some

time also, there were important indications of a new,

venturesome Europe. The Crusades, ephemeral though

vibrant,

of their gains were, reopened for

good the whole of the

Mediterranean, which Islam had closed for some centuries, and

from then on maritime commerce became generalized. The medieval cities (in England, Italy, Provence, Germany, and Flanders)
grew rapidly with trade and industry, and thanks to these a new
the

order,

came
clergy

middle class

(merchants,

manufacturers,

artisans),

to be recognized as an active part of society alongside the

and the

nobility. It

was such English

cities as

were in posby Stephen

session of charters of self-government that in 1215, led

Langton

(11507-1228), Archbishop of Canterbury, stood up

King John and, at Runnymede, extorted from him the
Magna Charta the Great Charter of English liberty, which solemnly recognized that lex is superior to rex. It contained in its
final form thirty-seven clauses, among them the surrender of the
royal claim to arbitrary taxation; the obligation to set up and
make use of a general council; the institution of "due process,"
against

5 The Decretum Gratiani was supplemented, between the thirteenth

and the sixteenth century, by several collections of subsequent Church
laws: the Decretals of Gregory IX (1234); the Liber Sextus promulgated
by Boniface VIII (1298); the Constitutions of Clement V, called
Clementinae, promulgated by John XXII in 1317; the Extravagantes of
John XXII (1500); and the Extravagantes Communes (1500). To all these
collections Gregory XIII in 1580 gave the title Corpus luris Canonici.

Introductory

[93

VII.

whereby one's imprisonment or exile or expropriation was to be

sanctioned by the "lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of
the land." 6 In several countries of Europe, especially in France
and England, the royal power became so consolidated as to cause
a decline of feudal institutions and to challenge not only the emperor's authority but also certain traditional claims of the Church
such as immunity from taxation. Suddenly the pope saw the national monarch, in a sense more redoubtable than the head of the
Holy Roman Empire, standing up to him, refusing to submit or
even to accept a compromise.
Finally, in the late

Middle Ages a system of common law was

its content and binding force from

developed in England, drawing

age-old usage and universal reception, while in almost

all

nations

Europe representative parliaments began to make their appearance. These were parliaments of "estates," that is, representative
of the classes that composed medieval society: the noble, the
knight, the priest, and the burgess. Only the low rural class was

of

not represented, at least not directly.

THE GREAT CONTROVERSY

But from a

strictly political

viewpoint, what dramatically domi-

nated the late Middle Ages was the great controversy between
the

Church and the

state.

This struggle had several aspects or

many

participants. It was, first of all, an

between the pope and the emperor. The issues at
stake were sufficiently clear and definite. What each contestant
sought was independence of the other. Thus Gregory VII, pope
from 1073 to 1085, fought Henry IV in the so-called "Investi-

levels,

open

various chapters,

conflict

The Magna Charta

"rests directly upon certain fundamental pringovernment which are part of Christian society. The Charter is
in essence an admission by an anointed king that he is not an absolute
ruler not only by reason of the moral law but also by reason of the terms
of the coronation oath; that he has a master in the laws he has violated but
now once more swears to obey; that his prerogative is defined and limited
by principles more sacred than the will of kings; and that the community
of the realm through their natural leaders, the barons, have the right to
compel him to respect the essential equality of men by guaranteeing immunity from the arbitrary in a rule according to law." (J. F. Costanzo,
"Catholic Politeia II," Fordham Law Review, XXI [December, 1952], p.
ciples of

260.)

III.

94]

The Middle Ages

and the form

and time of their investiture by the emperor. The pope wanted to
purify and strengthen the ecclesiastical hierarchy by freeing it of
ture Controversy" over the appointment of bishops

Henry IV read in the pope's policy a threat

rights and an insult to civil authority in
general. He refused submission and had a group of German and
Italian bishops depose Gregory. Then he dispatched an emissary to
Rome to command the pope "to descend from the apostolic chair
usurped by fraud, simony, and violence" and to tell the
bishops assembled at the Lateran Synod (1076) that a new pope
was soon to be elected: Gregory was "not a shepherd but a rapacious wolf." The message was delivered. The following day
Gregory excommunicated "Henry the King, son of Henry the Emperor," forbade him the government of Germany and Italy, and
all

secular interference.

to his feudal

and imperial

freed his subjects from their oath of loyalty. These were stunning

and they were followed by equally courageous deeds

and hater of iniquity, died as a
consequence in exile. But on what principle was Gregory's action
based? The common and more sensible explanation is that he
acted on what was later termed, neither too accurately nor happily however, the Church's "indirect power"
an extension of the
spiritual, which, although bearing on temporal matters, does so
for a purely spiritual purpose. In fact, in deposing Henry, Gregory did not appeal to medieval public law but only to priestly
authority, and he regarded the deposition not as an effect of the
excommunication but as a distinct and true exercise of power. He
had pondered Christ's words "Whatever thou shalt bind on earth
shall be bound in heaven" and he had not found kings excepted:
".
are they not sheep of the flock which the Son of God comdeclarations,

until their author, a lover of justice

mitted to the blessed Peter?"

Another struggle took place during the pontificate of Innocent

When he became pope in 1198, he was thirty-seven years old,
a cardinal, but not yet a priest. It was under him that the effective sovereignty of the pope over the whole public life of Christen-

III.

dom

reached

its

zenith. Innocent clashed first with the electors of

the empire. Claiming a right of intervention in the election

and

coronation of the emperor on two grounds (one historical

the

transfer of the imperial authority

fected by the

Holy See; the other

from the East

juridical

to the

West

ef-

the granting of the

Introductory

[95

VII.

imperial crown also by the

Holy See), 7 he supported Otto of

Brunswick against Philip of Swabia. Later Innocent clashed with

Emperor Otto, whom he excommunicated in 1210, and with
Philip Augustus of France and John Lackland of England, both
guilty of bigamy, whom he tried to bring to their senses by placing their countries under most severe interdicts. These new and
were based on the nature of papal jurisdicand temporal only per accidens: "a power
grounded on the pope's duty as Vicar of God to judge of the sins
[de peccato] of all Christians, not on his rights as a temporal ruler

forceful interventions

tion, spiritual in itself

to administer

law for

tion that entitled the

guilty of a grave

pope

to

was this kind of jurisdicintervene whenever a Catholic was

his subjects."

It

crime or scandal, Innocent III claimed; but he

made no claim

to any direct authority in temporal affairs.

Another phase of the conflict saw a Genoese pope, Innocent
IV, struggling fiercely against a shrewd, skeptical, and extremely
intelligent emperor, Frederick II (1212-1250). Frederick aimed
at destroying the Church as a society independent of the state and

reviving the old, pagan, all-powerful state.

He

repeatedly asserted

emperor was above all laws and responsible only to God

("omnibus legibus imperialiter est solutus"). In 1245 Innocent
convoked a general council at Lyons. Frederick was tried and

that the

found guilty (perjurer, persecutor of the Church, invader of the

papal

states,

suspect of heresy, protector of the Saracens). Inno-

cent pronounced the sentence: excommunication and deposition.

In so doing he seemed to lean toward the idea that the pope had
7 Innocent's stand

on the election of the emperor is clear in the dePer venerabilem (1202). The electors (princes and bishops of the
empire) were free to elect the king of Germany but it was within the
pope's power to examine and even to reject their candidate for the imperial office. The king becomes emperor only upon consecration, and the
pope judges him worthy of this lofty office only if he be a friend and
protector of the Church.
8 Mcllwain, The Growth
of Political Thought in the West, p. 233.
cretal

Innocent's attitude

is

further explained in his decretal Novit Hie (1204):

was not our intention to judge about the fief, for such judgment
longs to him [the emperor], but to judge about the sin: undoubtedly
censuring of the sin belongs to us and we can and must exercise
power on anyone." The text of this decretal, as well as that of
venerabilem and Unam sanctam, appears in Ehler-Morrall, Church
"It

State

pp. 69-71, 67-69, 90-92.

bethe
this

Per

and

The Middle Ages

III.

96]

jurisdiction in temporal matters, but unlike

was only

make

Gregory VII and In-

power
power
on
Nor did he clearly assert the pope's
be direct, but undoubtedly he was moving in

nocent III before him, he did not

indirect.

secular affairs to

it

clear that such

that direction.

In the fourth phase of the Church-state controversy the dra-

matis personae were Boniface VIII, a

man somewhat rough and

impulsive by nature, and Philip IV, called the Fair (1285-1314),

on extending the royal power.

(1296-1297) the conflict had to do with the temporalities
of the clergy and the question of the French king's right to levy
taxes on ecclesiastical property. Without consulting the pope,
Philip had exacted such contributions. The French clergy appealed
to Rome, and Boniface issued a famous bull, Clericis laicos
(1296). It was a restatement of the traditional doctrine: the secular power must not levy taxes on the Church and the clergy witha proud and ambitious king bent

At

first

out the Church's consent. In defiant response, the king proclaimed

the supremacy of the state in

none

in this

world

is

terms that

ciliatory

it

was

Philip's rights as king; that

and safeguard the

its

own domain:

in

temporal matters,

superior to the king. Boniface replied in confar

from

his intention to

principle; that, in fact,

he was ready to allow

the king to levy taxes even without consulting the

certain cases.

Then

in

challenge

he wanted merely to prevent abuses

Holy See

in

There followed a four-year period of uneasy peace.

1301 the

conflict flared

up

again. Philip

had not only con-

tinued to claim the ius regaliae (the right to receive the income of
ecclesiastical benefices during their

vacancy) but had gone so far

as to order the arrest of the bishop of the

of Pamiers.

When

newly created diocese

Boniface saw his protest disregarded, he sent

fili, in which the king's subjection to

pope ratione peccati was again vindicated and the latter was

the king the bull Ausculta

the

said to be a sort of spiritual director to the temporal rulers. In

addition,

the bull listed Philip's public crimes

and threatened

deposition.
Ill-advised

by

his

henchmen, especially the French civil lawyer

had a false bull circulated whereby the pope

Pierre Flotte, the king

was made

to claim direct authority over France. Also, the king

and nobility to defy such an absurd pretension.

This both estates did: the clergy wrote to the pope, the nobles to

invited clergy

the cardinals. Replying to the French clergy, Boniface denied the

Introductory

[97

VII.

"For forty years now we have been trained

two powers ordained by God.
in law, and we know
The king cannot deny, nor any other of the faithful whoso9
ever he is, that he is subject to us on the ground of sin." Shortly
afterward (October 1302) Boniface VIII issued the bull Unam

falsely ascribed claims:

that there are

sanctam, whose

same

that for every

final

"We

doctrine:

statement

declare,

human

we

creature

is

a solemn proclamation of the

affirm,

it is

we

define,

and pronounce

absolutely necessary for salva-

be subject to the Roman Pontiff." A careful reading of the

shows that Boniface abstained from any explicit claim to a
direct authority in temporal affairs. The theory he put forward in

tion to
bull

document and particularly in its find definition is not new

but repeats more or less the doctrine advanced by Innocent III
in his decretal Per venerabilem. Some reject this conclusion and
consider the bull Unam sanctam a clear, official formulation of
the theory of the pope's plenitudo potestatis
his fullness of power
both in spiritual and temporal matters. Others, while conceding
that Boniface VIII never officially asserted in word that the pope
possessed a direct power over temporaliti&s, wonder if he did so
in action, or at least believed this as a private person. One would

this

rather say that

it

colored his thought to a certain extent; yet,

him nor with other popes did

the direct power theory

become Catholic doctrine in the strict sense.
The last chapter in the medieval Church-state contest saw
Pope John XXII (1316-1334) in conflict with the Emperor
Louis of Bavaria. This struggle was marked by much bitterness
and resentment and acridity on both sides. The situation was complicated by the fact that the pope was a Frenchman and, though
bishop of Rome, had never visited it, choosing to reside with his
Curia (composed mainly of French cardinals and prelates) in

neither with

ever

Avignon, practically under the control of the French king.

Many

and Germany resentfully rallied to Louis against the pope.

The number and the power of the discontented forces were increased by a split in the Franciscan order over the issue of pov-

in Italy

erty:

the extremists or Spirituals

(who wanted absolute poverty

restored in the order) joined the ranks of the imperial opposition

to the pope,

who had approved some mitigations of the old FranAs to the specific claims of pope and emperor,

ciscan rigidity.

they remained unaltered.

9

Quoted by Mcllwain, op.

cit.,

p. 245.

III.

98]

The Middle Ages

WRITERS ENGAGED IN THE DEBATE

was not limited to the duel
It was also a passionate
contest between two currents or schools, an obstinate and often
angry polemic between the supporters of the ecclesiastical side
(variously called canonists, decretalists, curialists, papalists) and

The medieval Church-state

between

conflict

their highest representatives.

the emperor's or king's partisans (called legists, civilians, royal or

lawyers). 10 Here, on this lower level, the contestants gen-

civil

went much farther than their leaders, discussing not only

the problems at issue but probing into all possible ramifications,
direct or indirect, of thw subject of authority, drawing their arguments not too discriminately or scrupulously from all kinds of
sources (Sacred Scripture, theology, philosophy, history, canon
law, Roman law, mythology), often making wild statements and
extravagant claims. For instance, some canonists of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries held that the power of the state was completely and directly subordinate to the Church and the papacy
erally

even in temporal matters a doctrine never endorsed in official

papal documents. And some of the lawyers saw the Church as a

mere department of the state and asserted that the body of all the
faithful was the source of all ecclesiastical authority and that the
clergy lacked any potestas iurisdictionis. At some point or other
the dispute was bound to become almost hopelessly confused and
embittered. Perhaps the problem between the libertas ecclesiastica
and the libertas regalis remained unresolved because both factions were unable or unwilling to confine their respective claims
within the range of theological truth and the field of political
reality.

Notwithstanding the heated discussions, the controversialists

agreed on several points: Church and state were two aspects of

one society

Christendom, men's

universal

community

at least in

destiny; both institutions

were legitimate and necessary; they owed

their existence to God's ordinance. It was even granted that, in a
sense, the spiritual power, embodied in the pope and the bishops,
was somewhat superior to the secular. Strange as it seems, it was
this

very agreement on certain fundamental principles that kept

the debate in progress.

10

When,

This controversy gave

popular.

v/ith Marsilius, the true distinction

rise to a

new kind

of political literature: the

Introductory
between the

faithful

[99

VII.

and the hierarchy was repudiated and when,

with the emergence and strengthening of the

the idea of a single society

troversy as

it

had raged

became

modern

nation-states,

obsolete, the Church-state con-

in the medieval context

came suddenly

an end.
The writers who engaged in the debate fall into three classes.
There were representatives of the extreme curialist view, who affirmed the supremacy of the Church even in temporalibus. There

and inevitably

to

were the representatives of the extreme imperialist or regalist view,

who minimized the power of the Church even in spiritualibus.
And finally, mediating between the canonists and the lawyers, the
representatives of the via media asserted the supremacy of the

Church without diminishing the normal independence of the state.

To the first class belonged, among others, John of Salisbury,
Henricus de Segusia, Aegidius Romanus, and James of Viterbo.
John's ideas will be discussed at length in a separate chapter.

Henricus de Segusia (Henry of Susa), Cardinal of Ostia (Hostiensis), is the

author of a

Summa

views the emperor as the

super

official

titulis

Decretalium. In

it

he

or vicar of the pope, and the

only head "we ought to have, the lord of things spiritand temporal." These ideas were later reaffirmed and more
fully developed by Aegidius Romanus. Henricus died in 1271.
Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome, 12437-1316), of the Colonna family, was a member of the Order of the Hermits of St.
Augustine and a doctor of civil and canon laws. In 1295 he was
latter as the

ual

appointed archbishop of Bourges. His

De

ecclesiastica potestate

most rigid expression

makes the pope competent in all matters, spiritual and temporal: he rules the world as
supreme lord in his own right; the princes are subject to him even
in their secular administration. In a word, the ecclesiastical power
is unlimited: "the fullness of the power in the Church is such
that it is without weight, number, and measure." Aegidius also
wrote De regimine principum, published probably between 1277
and 1279. This political treatise, on the norms that must regulate
the private and public life of a civil ruler and on the essence of
the royal power, was dedicated to Philip the Fair, then not yet
king. Significantly there is in it no treatment whatever of Church
and state relations. But De regimine principum rapidly became
widely read and very influential. Mcllwain defines it as "one of the
(1301), dedicated to Boniface VIII,

is

the

of the medieval hierocratic theory. Aegidius


100]

III.

ablest

and most

Ages."

The Middle Ages

interesting political treatises of the

whole Middle

"

James of Viterbo (1256?-?1308) was

also a

member

of the

Augustinian order and a doctor in theology from the University

of Paris. In 1302, Boniface VIII appointed him archbishop first

and then of Naples. His De regimine christiano

on the Church conceived as a spiritual power
(1302)
congregatio
politica
and a
as well. Both spiritual salvation and
political life are possible only within the Church. The pope is
priest (through the power of orders) as well as king (through the
power of jurisdiction); and his royal power is so all-embracing
that even civil rulers are subject to him. Always concerned with
the concept of a unitary social order (in line with the law of unity
so inherent in medieval thought), James does not admit any
dyarchy even in the government of mankind: at the summit of the
two hierarchies, secular and ecclesiastical, he places the Roman
pontiff. The temporal power is from God but only mediately
mediante papa. Consequently, "every human power is imperfect
unless it is approved and made perfect by the spiritual power,
whose fullness is possessed by the pope." Human law can entitle
one to govern mere men; but one can govern Christians only by
divine law, and the pope is its custodian and dispenser. Him the
rulers of this world must obey as they would Christ Himself, and
should a conflict arise between these and the pope, their subjects
must side with him.
Of all who wrote against the papal claims the most radical
was Marsilius of Padua, the physician and theologian who supported Louis of Bavaria against Pope John XXII. In his Defensor
Pads (1324), Marsilius maintained that God is the ultimate and
the people the immediate source of all power, including the power
of the Church. The Church hierarchy was denied any power of
jurisdiction and made directly to rely on the people and the state
for the formulation of her dogmas, the enactment of her laws,
and the appointment of her bishops.
of Benevento
is

a treatise

In favor of a strong and independent secular power and in

favor also of the independence of the spiritual power were Dante

and John of Paris. Dante, in Monarchia, insisted on the

and mutual independence of the two authorities
(each sovereign in its respective field). He also emphasized the

Alighieri

rigid distinction

11

Mcllwain, op.

cit.,

p. 248.

Introductory
emperor's duty of
Quidort;

d.

filial

1306)

[101

VII.

reverence to the pope. John of Paris (Jean

in his

De

potestate regia et papali, alongside

imprudent suggestions and incorrect principles later used by Gallican theorists, sketched the main lines of a system of Church-state
relations worthy of consideration even today. Bellarmine himself

compower of the Church

praised John as one of the supporters of the "middle ground

mon

to Catholic theologians" in regard to the

in temporal matters.

One

could add that John's synthesis, though

incomplete and by no means completely original,

freshing

is

the most re-

and modern of the medieval revaluations of Gelasius'

against the extremists of both sides: those

formula. Basically, he

is

who

power as to forbid any influence in

and those who so extended it as to make

so confined ecclesiastical

the temporal sphere,

the pope, in principle at least, the final arbiter of

all

temporal

and the emperor a mere minister of the priests. This is the

gist of John's doctrine. The two powers are truly distinguished,
both derive immediately from God, neither is contained in the
other. The temporal power is competent in whatever concerns the
end of civil society: justice, peace, and prosperity in the human
temporal order. Outside this area the king or emperor is totally
incompetent. On the other hand, the power of the Church, also
direct from God, extends to all matters pertinent to eternal salvation. It is a power spiritual in character and purpose; and as such,
in principle, it has no right to intervene in purely temporal affairs.
Yet, because of the primacy of the spiritual order (and the

issues

Church's purpose

is

definitely superior to the state's), there

may

be occasions when the power of the Church reaches, although indirectly (not per se but per accidens), into the temporal order.

Thus the pope, though without authority in governmental matters,

instructs even kings in matters of faith and morals. While incompetent to judge transgressions of human law (civil crimes) as
such,

it

is

within his exclusive jurisdiction to judge whether or

a sin. As to the Church's sanctioning her judgments

with penalties bearing upon the temporal order (especially with

not an act

is

the deposition of kings),

may happen

John denies so direct a power. But it

an ecclesiastical censure

that the pope, in inflicting

(excommunication, suspension, interdict penalties that per se

and directly are only spiritual), indirectly and per accidens produces some effect on the temporal and political life of the community. Thus, in actual depositions, the king is directly deposed

102]

III.

The Middle Ages

not by the pope but by the people "acting with a conscience informed by the pope." 12
Among the political writers of the late Middle Ages, St.
Thomas, the greatest Catholic philosopher and theologian, occupies a special place. His contribution to political thought

is

an-

other remarkable indication of his depth of realism and universal

range of vision.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Cassirer, E. The

Books, 1952

Costanzo,

J.

F.,

Myth of the State. New York: Doubleday Anchor

(New Haven, 1946).
"Catholic Politeia I" and "Catholic Politeia II,"

Fordham Law Review, XXI

(June, 1952), 91-155, and

(Decem-

ber, 1952), 236-281.

*

C. The Making of Europe. New York: Meridian Books,

1956 (New York, 1945).
D'Entreves, A. P. The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought.
London: Oxford University Press, 1939.
Gierke, O. Political Theories of the Middle Age. Trans, by F. W.
Maitland. Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1900.
Hearnshaw, F. J. C. The Social and Political Ideas of Some
Great Mediaeval Thinkers. London: Harrap and Company,

Dawson,

1923.

Kantorowicz. E. H. The King's Two Bodies:

Political Theology. Princeton,

N.

J.:

Study in Mediaeval

Princeton University Press,

1957.
*

Pirenne, H. Medieval Cities. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books,

1956 (Princeton, 1925).
Stephenson, C. Mediaeval Feudalism. Ithaca, N. Y. Cornell University Press, 1956 (Ithaca, 1942).
Ullmann, W. The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle
Ages. London: Methuen, 1955.
:

12

For a good summary of John of

John Courtney Murray's article

state, see

Paris' theories

about Church and

(in Theological Studies,

1949]; reprinted in Cross Currents [Fall, 1951]) quoted above.

[June,

chapter

viii

John of Salisbury
LIFE

JOHN

PETIT, commonly known

as

John of Salisbury from the

place of his birth in or about 1120, studied logic in Paris un-

der Abelard from 1136 to 1138, and Latin

from 1138 to 1140. In 1141 he returned to

literature in Chartres

Paris,

where he con-

tinued his studies, probably until 1145. In 1148, at the Council of

Rheims, Bernard of Clairvaux introduced him to Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury. Returning to England in 1150, John became Theobald's secretary and from time to time was engaged by
the king in the diplomatic service. In both capacities he traveled

frequently to

Rome

and several times met Adrian IV (1154-

1159), the only English pontiff in history. In his Policraticus,

John tells that the pope admitted him "to his closest friendship"
and once kept him at the papal court in Benevento for almost
three months.
Another of John's friends was Thomas a Becket, then chancellor of King Henry II, and later (1162), on the death of Theobald, his successor in the see of Canterbury. In time both

Thomas

and John incurred the king's disfavor by their firm defense of the
rights of the Church and were eventually forced to leave England.
After about six years in France they returned to Canterbury in
1170. On November 29 of that year, Thomas was murdered in
his cathedral by the king's emissaries.

104]

III.

The Middle Ages

In 1176 John was appointed bishop of Chartres, the city of

His episcopate was a brief one, for he

his humanistic studies.

died in 1180 at the age of sixty.

THE POLICRATICUS
John's writings, most of them in Latin, treat of a variety of
subjects

history, logic, poetry, politics

diversified culture

and

interests.

His

in the Policraticus or "Statesman's

and bear

witness to his

political views are expressed

Book," a work

in eight

books

that he finished in 1159.

The

most comprehensive and systematic

political treatise written in the Middle Ages before the rediscovery
of Aristotle's Politics. Its main topics are the nature of the commonwealth, the concept and obligation of a "higher" law, rights
and duties of the ruler, tyranny and tyrannicide, and Church
and state relations.

Most

Policraticus

is

the

of John's opinions are a faithful reflection of the medi-

had evolved from the time of Augustine. Also

John's heavy reliance on quotations and examples from Scripture and from classical and ecclesiastical history.
But while adhering strictly to ideas and methods of his age, John's
discussion is characterized by a healthy respect for reality. He sees
danger in overstressing theory; he knows how to find compromises
for even opposite points of view; he is not blind to errors and
eval tradition as

it

typically medieval

is

vices in whatever

camp

they appear; he

is

unusually frank with

the powerful and yet possessed of a refreshing sense of balance

and humor. His Policraticus reads smoothly and

interestingly

even

today.

THE COMMONWEALTH

commonwealth

by the

"i s

a cert ain body whir.h

is

endowed. vAth

which acts at the prompting of

-theTughest equity, and is ruled by what may be called the moderating power of reason." 1 John likens the body politic to a natural organism. It is made up of various parts hierarchically and
life

benefit of divine favor,

1 Policraticus, Book
V, chap. 2. Selections from the Policraticus are
taken from the translation of J. Dickinson in The Statesman's Book of

John of Salisbury (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927).

John of Salisbury

[105

VIII.

harmoniously related in their functions. There is a soul in that

body the priests, who are God's ministers and have "rulership

over the whole."

God and

There

is

a head

who

the prince,

"who

is

subject

and represent
Him on earth." 3 There is a heart the senate. There are eyes,
ears, and tongue (judges and provincial governors), hands (officials and soldiers), stomach and intestines (officers in charge of
public finances), and feet (husbandmen). In addition, the commonwealth is firmly united by a spiritual bond, "an enduring union
only to

to those

exercise His office

of wills ... a cementing together of souls ... a real spirit of helpfulness." 4

The working together of the various parts, necessary

would not be enough to make the commonwealth prosper.
"The solidest union is that which is cemented with the glue of faith
and love, and stands wholly upon the foundation of virtue." 5
John's treatment of the nature of the commonwealth re-echoes
Platonic and Aristotelian concepts. Both Plato and Aristotle speak
of a state consisting of parts and having an ethical purpose. But
then John departs from the classic view by making both state and
virtue essentially Christian and granting the priests the dominant
position in the body politic. As to the functions assigned the various parts, John is more consonant with Plato than with Aristotle.
His scheme is rigid and static, for the farmers and traders and
as

it is,

artisans lack

There

is

any collective voice in the ordering of the

no way

for

them

state.

actively to participate in government.

Their status in the organism

is

a passive one.

They have only

duties.

THE LAW
Cicero had transmitted to the Christian world the Stoic concept of a universal law of reason binding

every

human

this concept.

association.

By John

upon every man and

and perfected
was common belief

Christianity developed

of Salisbury's time

it

that a hrghex4aw^teQd=a35gge^dt5arthly powers, indisputably rul-

ing over

them

as well as over each individual. This

the different levels of Christendom

law cut across

and permeated the various

orders of authority. Private persons, families, lower communities,

md.

2 ibid.

* Ibid., 7.

5 ibid.

106]

The Middle Ages

III.

national states, empire, and

this subjection to the

Church

all

were subject to

it.

It

was

higher law that gave unity to the otherwise

parceled medieval society and served as a counterpoise to the

centrifugal force of feudalism.

The

had great
precepts. For the

Stoic asserted the existence of a higher law but

difficulty in finding

out what precisely were

Christian the solution of the problem

was

its

greatly simplified.

The

law of nature and reason was the law of God. God had spoken.
There was a record of His statements: Scripture and Tradition.
Moreover God had instituted a Church visible, hierarchic, indestructible. It was her task infallibly to interpret the content of Revelation and therefore the rules of divine law, both natural and

positive, included therein.

Now

John, in his discussion of law, conforms

strictly to

medieval view. For him and his contemporaries "law

God, the model of

equity, a standard of justice, a likeness of the

divine will, the guardian of well-being, a

darity

among

the

the gift of

is

bond

of union

and

soli-

peoples, a rule defining duties, a barrier against the

and the destroyer thereof, a punishment of violence and all

6
When law is attacked or undermined, "it is the
grace of God which is being assailed ... it is God himself who in
a sense is challenged to battle." 7 This higher law is superior to all,
individual and state, pope and king, faithful and priest, vassal and
lord. Its rules are found in the Bible and, in part, restated in the
Corpus luris, the body of Roman law compiled by order of
Justinian I (a.d. 483-565). The priests are their official interpreters. Consequently, the prince must listen to God's ministers as
a disciple to his teachers. He must obey the higher law under
penalty of becoming a tyrant. He must always act in conformity to
it not out of fear of human punishments, to which as ruler he is

vices

wrong-doing."

not subject, but out of love for

All are
it

is

bound by the

said that the prince

justice.

necessity of keeping the law.

is

However,

absolved from the obligation of the law;

but this
acts,

is not true in the sense that it is lawful for him to do unjust

but only in the sense that his character should be such as to

cause him to practice equity not through fear of the penalties of the

law but through love of

e Ibi d., VIII, 17.

%Ibid., IV, 2.

justice. 8

t Ibid.

John of Salisbury

[107

VIII.

THE PRINCE
John recognizes is monarchy.
rights
of the prince while insistand
He greatly extols the person
ing no less earnestly on his duties. "The prince stands on a pingreat and high
nacle which is exalted and made splendid with
9
"The prince is the public power, and a kind of likeprivileges."
u
ness on earth of the divine majesty." 10 His is a "religious office"

The only form

of government

for it is concerned with the execution of the sacred laws. "Great

honor and reverence are to be shown to him." 12 At the same time,
"the prince ... is the minister of the common interest and the

bond-servant of equity [law], and he bears the public person."

He

is

responsible for the state.

He

is

13

the servant of the people.

With regard to public matters he has no will of his own "apart

from that which the law or equity enjoins, or the calculation of
the

common

interest requires." 14

But in a sense he is not answerable to the commonwealth.

There is no positive law in the land whereby he can be judged, no
legal machinery in the state whereby he can be taken to task for
his actions. The prince is the guardian, the commonwealth is the
ward. He is accountable solely to God. "Therefore let the prince
15
fear God
[for] the prince is the Lord's servant."
He must
also excel in the practice of virtue so as to please God and make
the entire community happy. John's list of the king's virtues is
long and detailed. It includes chastity, liberality, knowledge of
letters and law, humility, impartiality, justice tempered with mercy,
concern for the poor and the helpless, love and zeal for the
Church and the propagation of the faith. True to medieval custom,
John does not distinguish between public and private virtues. Personal and political morality are both required of the prince if he is
to be worthy of God's trust and successful in his administration.
.

In answer to the question "does the prince receive his title

from election or from inheritance?" John evades the rigid terms in
which the issue was debated in his time. He seeks a compromise.

He

excludes neither the hereditary nor the elective principle. Ac-

cording to him
9 Ibid.,

l.

it is

God who

gives the royal

io ibid,

uibid.,

3.

12 Ibid.

^Ibid.,

2.

uibid.

is Ibid., 7.

title

and authority

to

The Middle Ages

III.

108]

has been designated king through election by the

people or the priests, or through succession. Circumstances dictate
the choice of one or the other means. Thus John, while condemn-

who

the one

ing the theory of absolute inheritability of public offices, grants the

king's children a presumptive right to the throne. "It
to pass over, in favor of
entitled

by

new men,

by the divine promise and

own

their

not right

who

are

be succeeded
they have walked in the

right of family to

children, provided that

judgments of the Lord."

is

the blood of princes

16

TYRANNY AND TYRANNICIDE

John

sees the possibility of tyranny in every power, whether

in the state, the

As

ship.

human

Church, the family, or any other

to tyranny in the state,

it

obtains

when

governing in conformity to divine law for the

presses the people

by rulership based upon force

no longer

one,

common
.

relation-

good, "op-

[and] thinks

nothing done unless he brings the laws to nought and reduces the

people to slavery."
vinity";
sary,

18

17

the tyrant

is

The

prince "is a kind of likeness of di-

"a likeness of the boldness of the Adver-

even of the wickedness of Lucifer."

tyranny."

What

19

"Nothing

is

worse than

20
is

to

be done with tyrants? John counsels passive re-

sistance to their unjust laws,

humble prayer

to

God

that the

scourge of tyranny be turned aside, conversion of morals, and

must be left to God, the source

power (even of the power that the tyrant so flagrantly
abuses), who knows how to use "our ills for His own good purposes." 21 In due time Providence will put an end to tyranny by
either destroying or converting the despot. There is no doubt in
John's mind that if the tyrant persists in malice God will punish
him. All tyrants, he claims, come to a bad end. "Wickedness is always punished by the Lord; but sometimes it is His own, and at
others it is a human hand, which He employs as a weapon wherewith to administer punishment to the unrighteous." 22 Thus tyranpatient waiting. Positive action

of

all

16 Ibid.,
18 Ibid.

V,

2 <> Ibid.,

18.

6.

17 ibid., VIII, 17.

19 ibid.

22 Ibid., 21.

21 ibid.

John of Salisbury

[109

VIII.

becomes an act of God performed through the instrumentality of an individual citizen.

John had to find a way out of his dilemma. His concept of
government did not recognize any positive agency whereby the
nicide

body

politic

could judge the lawfulness of the ruler's actions, or

means for his correction or deposition.

Yet the prince, once turned tyrant, might so oppress the community as to become unbearable. The only way out was to see
in the tyrant's killer an agent of God. Thus tyrannicide was justified, not in terms of human law but in terms of God's will and
inescapable justice. In reality, as St. Thomas was to point out, this
doctrine was dangerous, for it could easily lead to rash and irresponsible deeds on the part of individuals acting on their private
any

legal,

constitutional

judgment.

CHURCH AND STATE

John of Salisbury

definitely favors the

extreme view of the

papal plenitude of power. His theory confuses the competencies of

the
in

Church and the

its

own

the other.

state

(each in reality distinct and independent

sphere), or at least exaggerates one at the expense of

For him

ecclesiastical authority is truly

direct not only in spiritual but also in

supreme and

temporal matters. John's

statements to this effect are frequent and unambiguous.

He

argues for the primacy of the priesthood by reason of the

pre-eminence of the Church's end and function. The Church has

the higher aims

and

tasks. Religious as

it is,

the prince's office

is

and therefore
seems to be typified in the person of the hangman." 23 In the organic body to which John analogically compares the Christian
commonwealth, the priests, as God's ministers, hold the place of
the soul; and "since the soul is
the prince of the body, and has
rulership over the whole thereof so [the priests] preside over the
"inferior,"

for

it

"consists

punishing crimes,

in

entire

body."

24

Accordingly, the prince, although

filling

the place

same body, "is subject only to God and to those

who exercise His office and represent Him on earth, even as in the
human body the head is quickened and governed by the soul." 25

of the

head

in the

23 Ibid., IV, 3.
25 Ibid.

24 Ibid., V, 2.

110]

III.

The Middle Ages

John uses another analogy, that of the two swords symbolic of the
spiritual and the temporal power, to make his point for ecclesiastical

supremacy.

This [temporal] sword

Church.
prince,

She has

the prince receives

this

sword, but she uses

upon him she confers

the

from the hand of the

by the hand of the

it

power of bodily coercion, retaining

to herself authority over spiritual things in the person of the pontiffs.

The

prince

is,

then, as

it

were, a minister of the priestly power, and

one who exercises that side of the sacred

of the hands of the priesthood. 26
It is

Church a

strict legal

or simply moral authority. His

state

which seems unworthy

debatable whether John actually intended with these as-

sertions to grant the

logically to call for the

was

offices

careful not to

draw

sovereignty over the

sweeping premises seem

former conclusion. John himself, however,

it

explicitly.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Policraticus.

Trans, with an Introduction by John Dickinson

Statesman's

Book of John of

Salisbury).

New

(The
York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1927.
J. B. Frivolities of Courtiers and Footprints of Philosophers.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938. (A transla-

Pike,

tion of

Books

I,

II, III,

and selections from Books VII and VIII

of John of Salisbury's Policraticus.)

Poole, R. L.

Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and

Learning. 2nd Edition. New York: Macmillan Company, 1920.

(See especially Chapter VII, on John of Salisbury, pp. 176-197.)

Influence of John of Salisbury on Medieval

Ullmann, W. "The
Italian

Jurists,"

English

Historical

Review,

LIX

(September,

1944), 384-392.
Webb, C. C. J. John of Salisbury. London: Methuen, 1932.
26 ibid., IV, 3.

chapterix

St.

Thomas Aquinas
LIFE

THOMAS,

the great tower of knowledge and wisdom, was

1225 in the ancestral castle at Roccasecca, near
Naples, to an old and noble family. At the age of five he was sent
to the famous Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino. There, under the direction of his uncle, Abbot Sinebald, he received his
first education. Thomas continued his studies at Naples, where he
met several members of the order newly founded by the Spaniard
St. Dominic. Their holy life coupled with their great love for learning led him to join them. In the spring of 1244 he received the
Dominican habit much against the wishes of his influential family
and he immediately moved to the monastery of Santa Sabina in

ST.born

in

Rome. To escape

the continued opposition of his relatives, he set

out for France, but he was overtaken by his brothers and detained
for a year in a fortress. Finally, having withstood all sorts of pressure, the

young novice was allowed

company

of the general of the order he

philosophers";

and thence

to follow his vocation. In the

to Cologne,

went to Paris, the "city of

where from 1248 to 1252

he studied under Albert the Great.

1 Men of
all races, countries, and walks of life converged at Paris in
quest of wisdom. In the cosmopolitan atmosphere of the lecture rooms of
the City on the Seine one could meet the best representatives of medieval

culture:

Abelard from Brittany;

Hugo and

Albert from Germany; John of

III.

112]

The Middle Ages

His theological studies completed, Thomas spent his time

teaching and writing, first in Paris (1252-1259), then in various
parts of Italy (1259-1269), then again in Paris

and

finally in

Naples (1272-1274). At

summoned by Gregory X, he

left

Naples, and with his faithful

companion Reginald of Piperno proceeded

eral Council held in that city.

On

(1269-1272),

the beginning of 1274,

to

Lyons

the journey he

fell

for the
ill.

At

Gen-

his re-

quest he was brought to the Cistercian monastery of Fossanova,

near Terracina.

He

died there, shortly after midnight, on

March

7,

1274, at the age of forty-nine.

THE GREATEST OF THE CHURCH DOCTORS

During

his relatively short life St.

number of books,

all

Thomas wrote an impressive

more than thirty volumes

in Latin, totaling

which he daringly and serenely probed into the deepest

problems of God and man, faith and reason. Science, philosophy,
and theology found in him a perfect synthesis. A passionate seeker
of truth, Thomas indefatigably searched the most diverse doctrines
until he found a common center and reduced them to unity. He
did this despite difficulties and distractions of every kind. Strange
as it may seem, St. Thomas was bitterly attacked by many of his
contemporaries and, more often than not, drawn into the thick of
furious and protracted controversies. He was a man of peace and
enjoyed nothing more than prayer and study in the sacred solitude
of the cloister, but when truth was at stake he never shirked a
fight or compromised with error. Thus he valiantly resisted the
criticism of those who would have excluded philosophic reasoning from the province of theology; against the younger Franciscan
school, he openly declared himself for the primacy of the intellect
over the will; against the theories of Gerard of Abbeville, who
in folio, in

Salisbury,

Roger Bacon, and Duns Scotus from England; Peter, BonaThomas from Italy. Paris was indeed an international aggre-

venture, and

gate of scholarship, a center of learning for the entire Christian world, a

nationum beyond and above the narrow limits of cities,

and kingdoms. One faith, the Catholic; one language, Latin; one
system, Scholasticism; one pursuit, knowledge; and yet all these unifying
elements did not prevent free, exciting, often tumultuous debate; the formation of conflicting schools and currents; the uninhibited airing of new
theories and ideas. See Henry Osborn Taylor, The Mediaeval Mind, Vol.
II (London: Macmillan, 1930).

truly universitas

regions,

Thomas Aquinas

St.

[113

IX.

with others accused the Mendicants of being innovators and egoists, he extolled the perfection of religious life; against the Latin
Averroists of the University of Paris, chief

among them

Siger of

Brabant, he consistently favored a Christian interpretation of Aristotle.

On

some of

certain issues even

his fellow religious

opposed

him, lectured and preached against him, condemned parts of his

doctrines. But the Church was quick to recognize his eminent
sanctity and his exceptional contribution to Catholic philosophy
and theology. John XXII canonized him in 1323. At the Councils
of Lyons, Vienna, Florence, and The Vatican, his doctrine pro-

vided the best refutations of the schismatic Greeks, the heretics,

the rationalists.

the altar

At

the Council of Trent two books were placed

the Bible and the

Thomas was

Summa. On

April 11,

declared a Doctor of the Church. In 1879,

1567,

on
St.

Leo XIII

issued the encyclical Aeterni Patris, which re-presented Thomistic

thought and recommended

it

to Christianity as the

sure the triumph of religion. Shortly afterward, the

most apt to ensame pope pro-

claimed St. Thomas patron of Catholic schools. The succeeding

popesPius X, Benedict XV, Pius XI, Pius XII, John XXIII

added
of the

their unqualified praise of the Angelic Doctor.

new Code

of

Canon Law

Canon 1366

orders instructors in Catholic

St. Thomas' method, doctrine, and principles

and steadfastly adhere to them."

schools to "follow

THE PHILOSOPHER
In the

field of

achievements

is

philosophy, one of

St.

Thomas' outstanding

that of having Christianized

Aristotle.

The

dis-

covery and appropriation of the Stagirite by the Christians was

not exclusively the work of Thomas, but he contributed most to
the difficult task

and brought

to a brilliant conclusion the pains-

taking efforts of his predecessors.

By

the end of the eleventh century practically all of Aristotle's

works were known in the West through the contact of Christian
scholars with Jewish

and Arabian philosophy. Not only Latin

translations of Aristotle

of commentaries

appeared

at that

time but also translations

on him by Arab and Jewish authors. 2 Unfortu-

2 Most illustrious among the Arabs

are Avicenna of Bokhara (d. 1037),
Al Farabi, and Averroes of Cordoba (d. 1198). Of the Jews, Avicebron
(d. 1070) and Maimonides (d. 1204) are well known.

III.

114]

The Middle Ages

had reached the West deformed by translations

and clouded by incorrect interpretations of nonChristian commentators. No wonder then that Aristotle was regarded with suspicion and incurred the condemnation of popes,

nately his thought

of translations

bishops, and theologians.

They translated his works

They corrected the erroneous
interpretations of the Arab commentators, who had appropriated
the Greek philosopher and used him to fight Christian dogma.

The

directly

Scholastics

from the

Against Averroes,

came

to his rescue.

original Greek. 3

whom Thomas

defined "not a peripatetic but a

perverter of peripatetic philosophy," there rose both Dominicans

and Franciscans, and through a careful study of Aristotle's texts

they came to the conclusion that while some of his ideas had to
be rejected, many could be safely endorsed.
It was chiefly St. Thomas who freed Aristotle of opinions
falsely ascribed to

him, clarified those points that lent themselves

to completion his defective theories on

and natural theology. This newly discovered, true and purified Aristotle became a powerful ally of Christian culture, giving
invaluable support to St. Thomas' thesis that theology does not
destroy philosophy and that the rational contribution of the ancients could be reconciled with Christianity and become more ra-

to ambiguity,

and brought

ethics

tional within

it.

the theologian: the summa

In the field of theology, St. Thomas completed the monumental but fragmentary work of the Fathers of the Church and
codified the entire Catholic doctrine.
this or that truth,

not

all errors. St.

not

all truths;

The Fathers had

illustrated

they had refuted this or that error,

Thomas gathered

all

the available material, in-

cluding the best of the pagan philosophers, enriched his findings

with the fruit of his

own

studies,

arranged the scattered parts into

The Ethics to Nicomachus was translated by Robert Grosseteste

(Robertas grossi capitis sed subtilis intellectus) a teacher at Oxford and
later bishop of Lincoln. Other works of Aristotle were translated, at St.
Thomas' request, by the Dominican William of Moerbecke, who also
revised some previous translations.
4 See Anton C. Pegis, St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth
of the
Catholic Faith, Summa contra Gentiles (Garden City, N.Y.: Hanover
House, 1955), p. 18. The entire General Introduction is worth reading.
,

St.

Thomas Aquinas

[115

IX.

a systematic whole, clarified what was obscure, demonstrated beyond doubt what had not yet been clearly proved. The astound-

was his Summa Theological a unique masterpiece. One

knows not which to admire more: its order or its beauty, its breving result

or

ity

its

completeness,

The Summa
of

of

is

its

profundity or

its lucidity.

divided into three parts treating, respectively,

God in Himself and as the prime cause of

God as the supreme and final end of all

all

creatures (exitus),

things in general

and

of rational creatures in particular (reditus), of Christ the Saviour

in

Himself and as the way to attain supernatural union with

God

and discussed,
all, 612
2,600 theses defended, 10,000 objections raised and refuted. What
amazes the attentive reader is the author's singleness of purpose,
the rigidity and simplicity of his method, the honesty and cogency
basic questions are presented

(via). In

of his argumentation.
tion;

he never

He

shuns

rests or dallies

all superfluity,

digression, repeti-

on the margin; he never hurries over

or forgets what might have even a remote connection with the sub-

hand; he is constantly aware of how far he has gone, where

he has to go, and there he goes, untired, unperturbed, concerned
only with the truth. His reasoning power is evident in the fourfold division of each article: he states the question, he presents

ject at

the possible objections to his position, he solves the proposed

question, he refutes the objections.

With remarkable intellectual

candor and fairness he hears the difficulties raised by the other
side; he never conceals or plays down the arguments in its favor;
he himself finds new and frightful objections to his own stand, so

much

so that one could easily be misled

were to ignore

The Summa
vincing.

if,

in reading them,

he

their brilliant refutation.

is

One must

not an easy book, but

return to the

Summa

it is

clear, logical,

con-

over and again while read-

numerous commentaries written on it.

In the Summa, as in his other works, St. Thomas shows himself a man of moderation, humility, common sense, and courtesy.
He never raises his voice, he never becomes excited; he knows the

ing the

5 The writing
of the Summa Theologica was begun about 1266 and
was continued at intervals until 1273. That year, after having celebrated
Mass on the feast of St. Nicholas, Thomas said to his intimate friend and
secretary, Reginald of Piperno: "I can do no more. After what God has
revealed to me, I look upon my writings as though they were worthless as
straw." He had reached Question 90 of the Third Part. What follows is

the

work of Reginald.

III.

116]

human

limits of

investigation

The Middle Ages

and discovery, and accepts them; he

notes the probable character of some of his arguments, and when

a proposition is undemonstrable, he admits it; in debating with
adversaries he is invariably patient, kind, understanding, seeking
selfish satisfaction of

not the

winning a point but the Christian

joy of enlightening and converting.

POLITICAL WRITINGS
Thomas'

St.

political

Commentary on

On

treatise

views are contained in the

first

half of the

Aristotle's Politics, in the authentic parts of the

more
Rule of Princes (De regimine principum)
first book and in the first half of the second book
a section of the first division of the second part of the
the

precisely in the

and

in

Summa

Theologica (questions 40 to 108). In other works,

Thomas has

further references to the state, government,

St.

and the

nature of law.

philosophy of St. Thomas must be analyzed

background of two basic Thomistic doctrines: one concerns the end of man, the other concerns law.

The

political

against the

first principle: the

As

two ends

end of man, St. Thomas clearly states the Christian

Man, created by God, is destined to return to Him.
Man's aim is the good the total, universal good, wherein perfect
happiness lies. This good, toward which all human appetites and
to the

position.

actions consciously or unconsciously tend,

union with

God

is

fully realized only in

the infinite, completely satisfying good. There-

end of man is God. Any other aim

not subordinate and conducive to this end is to be rejected as
derogatory to man's dignity; any other aim, the fulfillment of

fore the supreme, ultimate

ment
be

man

God, may be

safely pursued. Enjoy-

of perfect happiness (the knowledge

and love of God)"can

man's earthly

which brings

closer to

fully realized only in heaven, at the conclusion of

existence. To_hglp_ him

work our his

eternal destiny, to assist

him

God, the-Qiurch has been divinely

instituted and provided with rt fi m^"* tn ful&U-<4rig mission. But
even here on earth, ma n legitimately seeks some degree of happiness, consisting, am ong other thin g s, in health, external goods,

in his rational jnoyernent-to

St.

Thomas Aquinas

IX.

[117

and peace. One of the reasons the state exists and functioTrs^rfo~Eelpjnen-attain-this imperfect form of happiness. It folItiwTthat the state may in no way interfere with man's ultimate
end, for the pursuit of the intermediate end must never become
friendship,

an obstacle to the pursuit of the final, ultimate one. Partial happimmTnoTconfiict with total happiness. Furthermore, the state

ness

must create such social conditions as are positive helps to virtuous

and successful living, thus affording man the opportunity to attain
his last goal.

This doctrine establishes, then, a hierarchyjmiong the ends or

aims of

man and

provides the true perspective fQr__a_CQrrecL_ap-

praisal of th^lhteTreTatlon^rSie^supernatural

and the

natural, the

mo7aT^noTTTie political order. The

latter definitely plays a

second-

ary ancTsubordinafe role.

second principle: the nature of law

The other Thomistic
if

doctrine, constantly to be kept in

one would well understand

St.

Thomas'

political thought, is

cerned with law. Sixteen questions in the

devoted to

it

Summa

con-

Theologica are

eleven to divine positive law, one to eternal law, one

to natural law,

and three

to

human

law.

In the beginning there is^nlyjjod

the Truth, the Rule, the

Standard. His divine reason^ His divine wisdom,

mind

is

the eternal

law governing Jhe wjiolg_of cre ation^dkecting all actions

an d motions; a law not made but eternally existing anrl identical
with God's very being, therefore unknowable to man in its entiretv~ang ye t the source orarnriielaw_Qn--&arth. Ultimately, right
and wrong in the practical field of man's actions depend on
whether or not these actions conform to eternal law.
Man's rat ional nature allo ws him to have a share o f the Eternal Reason. This human participation in the divine, this practical

law

light, is what Si Thomas calls

bo th in its first, most gen eral principles
derived concjmio ns, man is provided with an

reflection in us of the

naUirajJaw. Through

and

in their closely

heavenly

it,

obj ective, changeless7~universal rule of action. In

precept, natural law
in other words, to

com mands man

to

its

fundamental

do good and avoid

evil, or,

be himself and rationally follow his natural inclinations in order to reach his natural end, which is happiness.
In addition to natural law, St. Thomas distinguishes three

118]

III.

The Middle Ages

kinds of positiyej aw: the divine, the ecclesiastical

Posit^Ta^TIn~geng ral
for the

common

is

an44he-civil.

de_nnejiJ3yJiim-^i-^n-Qdinance of reason

good, promulgated by him

who

has charge of the

community. Divine positive law, another derivation of eternal law,

proceeds from God as legislator. It supplemems^eJimitations of

human

made known to man at differRevelation as the mode of promulga-

reason and consists of rules

ent periods in history with

These rules are contained in Holy Scripture and Tradition.

law is 4he body of rules made by the human legis-

tion.

Ecclesiastical
lators in the
is

Church

for the_spiritual

welfare

of the Christians. It

a derivation and determination both of n atural and divine posi-

tive law. Civil law, the

law issued by the

legislator jn the state, is

a derivationTand determination of naturaTlaw;Jt applies the latter

more

specificallyto particular circumstances; it "corrects" the law

of nature, that

is,

its

lack of suffic ient determination for applica-

by supply ing what is wanting jn natural l aw; to it

belong "those things which are derived from the law of nature by
tion to action,

way

of particular determination."

is just only if and when it conforms

law both as to end and as to means. A law of the state
(or a law of the Church) thaT^ountenFlTfEinciple or violates a
precept of natural law is no law at all. For no human law can
validly exist without justice; and jugti ce consists in con formity to
the rules of right reason; and the first rule of right reason is the
law orHJatureT^This~ls~~w?[ariSt7^1homaTlhiplies when he states
simply that law is a dictate of reason.

It4s evident that civil law

to natural

ORIGIN OF THE STATE

In his treatment of specific political questions,

St.

Thomas

be-

problem of the origin of the state. "ItJ&jiaftiral for

man to_be a social^jn^^pDHtical^nimaUlXMan is sociable, society
requires order, order requires government: hence the need for the
indivIduaiVlntegration into"~sbciety in general and into political
gins with the

6 S.T., I-II,
Q. 95, art. 4. Selections from the Summa Theologica are
taken from the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947, 1948). 3 vols.

7 De regimine principum, Book

I, chap. 1. Selections from De regimine
principum are taken from the translation of Gerald B. Phelan (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949).

Thomas Aquinas

St.

society in particular

if

he

[119

IX.
to

is

be able tn

attain personal perfec-

tion and benefit by a nd contribute tojhe^gnunon good~ It is so naturaTfor man to live in society under law that,

even

would necessarily
have existed, although without the present coercive element. Man's
nature did not change essentially with original sin. It was the same
in the Garden of Eden; then too it was social and consequently
and

in the state of innocence, social

in

need of a

politically

political life

organized society.

Here, in proving his point,

St.

Thomas

closely follows both

and medieval thought. In addition he presents an argument not yet mentioned by the Greek and Christian philosophers
although tied to the traditional view of man's social character^ If a
man is superior to^ojhers 4n-knowledge and prudence, it is unwise
not to^lace_&e^e_a^els_at-the- service-ef-the community.

Aristotle

AUTHORITY IN THE STATE

8

"In every group there must be some governing power"

to

look after those things that concern the good of the community

and

common

toward the proper goal.

The very reasjon(direetly flowing from natural law) that
to channel

efforts

re-

quires -and justifies authorftyr acts as a restraining force in the

exercise of the same.

What

necessitates authority limits

Government must be directed

to the

common

private goocTof the rulef,~irts unjust

takes

makes

difference.

little

are good_piovide d they

or jmoh-Hile.

The

good.

as well.

seeks the

and perverted. The form

Monarch y,

aristo cracy^jpolity

The

criterion remains the

is

that oi:jusl_and

same: whether or

not the one or the several or the multitude_r ule forihe_jgood of

~As to the relative merits~oTeach specific form,

no doubt by the

influenced

it

all

d o not d egenerate intcLtyranny, oligarchy,

distinction that really counts

unjust governments.

it

If it

St.

all.

Thomas,

political institutions of his time, seems,

at least in theory. 9

togive the edge to mgnarchv the just power

according to law, both natural and divine positive, exercised by
onejaloie _However, in his concern for lhe^reventioh~of abuses
and the establishment of guarantees against arbitrary rule, he
i

wisely proposes an elective

monarchy

s ibid.

See S.T., III, Q. 95,

art. 4.

to give the people an op-

120]

The Middle Ages

III.

portunity to choose the best candidate andJo_place, if needed,

b^ pmyp.r In addition, he advises a tempering

newjgstrictJQns on

power by blending

of the royal

it

with aristocratic and democratic

elementsTLet one alone command, but

let

many

participate in the

government according to their abilities. And let it never be forgotten that all may be elected to power and that the right to elect
the rulers

When

is

the right of the people. 10

royal

power becomes

corrupt,

it

gives rise to the worst

form of government-zzityranny, the p oweroi one wEcTseeks his

ownrprlv ate~interests and controls J)y. force instead of ruling with
justice _In_his_a!iscussion of tyranny and the limits of obedience to
!

Thomas carefully distinguishes between principles and

One principle concerns the individual subjects; ancommunity as a whole. When the tyrant commands

tyrants, St.

techniques.
other, the

what a superior law, natural or positive, forbids, the subject is

bound to disobey. When the tyrant commands what is clearly outside his jurisdiction, the subject is not bound to obey. As to the
community's attitude toward tyrannical rule, Thomas argues that
the people who choose or elect their king also have the power to
depose him if he rules unjustly. For St. Thomas, authority is in the
nature of a

trust.

When

the king uses

it

despotically,

he deserves

whereby power was granted him.

11
St. Thomas is extremely clear on this point.
He could never have
subscribed to the later theory of the divine right of kings and its
conclusion that the only recourse against despotic power is humthat the people rescind the pact

10 St. Thomas believed that the right to choose rulers, that is, to
self-government through elected magistrates, belongs to the people, but that

was to be denied them if they proved unfit to exercise

See S.T., III, Q. 97, art. 1.
11 "It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself
the use of this right
it.

him in perpetuity; because he himself has deserved that the covenant

with his subjects should not be kept." {De regimine principum, Book I,
to

This startling reference to a covenant or pact has nothing in

with the contractual theories of Hobbes and Rousseau. St. Thomas
speaks here of the contract implied in the"ruler's election a contract by

chap. 6.)

common

which the actual exercise of power is conferred by the people, a contract

rescindable when the government does not observe its express or implicit
conditions. There is no question here of the very power of the state. This
power,

this

essential

of God.

It is

principle of authority,

resides

in the

Q. 90, art. 3) by a law of nature.

not the product of a pact. It is inalienable.

multitudinis" ; S.T.,

I-II,

people
It is

("ius

ordained

Thomas Aquinas

St.

[121

IX.

ble petition for redress or fervent prayer to

conversion.

The question

how

to deal with

of techniques

him

how

God

for the tyrant's

to get rid of the tyrant or

in particular instances

is

one of

social

and

political prudence. All the elements must be weighed in each specific

case and the course of action adopted that will best redeem

the situation.

To

allow the killing of tyrants by citizens on their

private presumption

turbulent a most

is

and the
government

to offer the wicked, the dissatisfied,

welcome pretext

they dislike, especially the good.

for upsetting any

To

permit popular revolts, par-

motion an unconevil one attempts to remedy. Revolutions do not always succeed; and then
the tyrant rages the more. Revolutions may succeed; but then their
outcome may be the rise of a tyrant more terrible than the overticularly against

minor tyrannies,

is

trollable chain of reactions usually

to set in

worse than the

thrown.

Thomas

St.

make

trariness.

Then

measures that will

government
good
to degenerate into arbi-

definitely favors preventative

difficult for

it

if,

notwithstanding, tyranny sets

in,

the task of

casting out the tyrant, or even of killing him, should not be left to

private initiative but reserved to

justice

some public authority

acting with

and prudence.

Most of the time, St. Thomas seems to imply, people have the
government they deserve. If they really want to, if they use their
power wisely, they can control the government, prevent its perversion, or set things right again in

an orderly manner.

END OF THE STATE AND FUNCTIONS OF

GOVERNMENT
For St. Thomas, as we have seen, the true end of the state is
promote the good life o fjts_xitizens. This good life consists, first
ancTfundamentally, in action according to virtue and, secondly and

to

IQStrUfflentajlVTTffR^iTffirienry nf matprial gnnTTrTrri peryTtiv p. for vir-

tuous action. Government, therefore, which expresses and enforces

thejwiiroflhe_^tate, must stimoJsies^lish^mmtam^j^hnprove
the good life of its subjects.

To

establish virtuous living in a multitude three things are necessary:

First of

all,

that the multitude be established in the unity of peace.

122]

III.

The Middle Ages

Second, that the multitude thus united in the bond of peace, be guided
to good deeds. ... In the third place, it is necessary that there be at
hand a sufficient supply of the things required for proper living, pro-

cured by the ruler's

efforts. 12

The mainten ance of the g oodjjfe^places three responsibilities

on the ruIerTTirst, he mustsee that compe tenLmeriJeplace those
J
offic4als-^io r3ecome incapable ofor unfit for pu blic duties; secondly, by laws and commands and the meting out of just rewards
and punishments, he must keep his subjects frorrTwickedness and
lead them ta^cirks^ofrirtue;jEiraiyLh^niusLkeep his people safe
kingfrom the^nerme^Pwffnoul^
dom. Finally, for the betterment of the good life of its citizens, the
government should be constantly alert to c orrect wha tever is wrong,
supply whateverisjacking andA in general, perfect whatever can be

improved^
Specifically in regard to the legislative function of the state, St.

Thomas

above quoted definition establishes the conditions

must be reasonable, that is,
just, by reason of its conforming to both natural and divine positive law and taking into account the customs, practices, and menin the

essential to the notion of civil law. It

tality

of those for

whom

it is

enacted. It must be for the

common

human needs and

wishes in a sort

of universal, average way; framed for the whole

community and

good, that

is,

proportioned to

not tailored to any individual; suited to the ordinary conditions of

the subjects in such a

manner

that they

may

enjoy peace and be

given the opportunity to achieve happiness and

work

for perfec-

must be made by the legitimate authority, that is, it must

be the work of the whole community or of those to whom the community power has been delegated, for law is in the nature of a direction to an end, and "direction to an end belongs to the one for
whom that end is the goal, to whom that end belongs; and the end
of the state is not the property of any individual but of the community." 13 Finally, the law must be authoritatively promulgated
by the legislator, that is, made known by a public act to those it
tion. It

affects.

law

fulfilling

those subject to

its

12

De

13

Walter Farrell,

these four conditions binds in conscience

authority and

regimine principum,

Ward, 1945), Vol.

II,

Book

A Companion
pp. 370, 371.

I,

is

all

enforceable with sanctions.

chap. 15.

to the

Summa (New

York: Sheed

&


Thomas Aquinas

St.

IX.

[123

and punishable with proporand death. On the contrary,

essentials
is null and void.
of
these
any
one
a law lacking

Disobedience to such a law

is

sinful

tionate penalties, including mutilation

CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONS

St.

Thomasjsjor

the suhoxdination-o^ the state to the Church,

although^he_do^s_jioi--speifieally-set the limits of this subjection.

His' view

fits

on the matter.

the traditional medieval doctrine

avoids the exaggerations of the curialists, and

is

He

not for the direct

power of the Church in temporalibus the theory defended by

John of Salisbury and Aegidius Romanus. Thomas leans rather toward the indirect power theory to be formulated by Cardinal Bellarmine.
St.

Thomas' view, although strongly colored by the

framework,

is

historical

a logical conclusion of his basic theory of thejtwo

ends of man, which are the affair^L^MeandJZ!hurxb_resp^^ively.

"Man, by

living virtuously, is ordained to a higher end,

of the enjoyment of

sists

14

God."

which con-

Therefore the end of the state

(the promotion of virtuous living), important as

it is,

remains per-

force a subordinate, intermediate one.

Now
is

the higher the end to which a government

is

ordained, the loftier

we always find that the one to whom it pertains

end, commands those who execute the things that

that government; for

to achieve the final

are ordained to that end. 15

the

Consequently to the head of the Church, the vicar of Christ,

Roman Pontiff, who by divine ordinance has been entrusted

the task of leading

tian people are to

man

to his last end, "all the kings of the Chris-

be subject as to Our Lord Jesus Christ"

16

even

when these relate to eternal salvation "in his

quae ad salutem animarum pertinent." 17
It is evident that here St. Thomas has the confessional state in
mind. Incidentally, it is to such a state that he refers when he de-

in temporal matters

toward infidels, heretics, and apostates.

For those who have never received the faith there must be tolerance and kind treatment; not so for those who have lapsed into

fines the ruler's attitude

14

De

regimine principum,

15 Ibid.

W Commentary

Book

I,

chap. 14.

ie Ibid.

on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, n, 44.

124]

III.

heresy and apostasy.

He

The Middle Ages

does not hesitate to approve capital pun-

ishment for heretics and apostates who wilfully persist in their rebellion against the Church. Bearing out this same principle, St.

Thomas, while granting the Jews civil rights according

of nature, denies them political rights. In a Christian
are not citizens in the full sense of the term and cannot

to the

law

state they

participate

in government.

INTERNATIONAL LAW
St.

Thomas speaks

of a ius gentium, with precepts closely de-

riv ed from~natural lav/

common

to

cepts of this ius

refer to

i nterstate

and
gentium

all

nations.

N ot

all

rel ations,

the pre-

but even

those that do, such as the obligation to observe pacts, to respect the
inviolability of legates, to spare

women and

no means coextensive with the content

children in war, are

by

of international law as we,

ternational law later

They certainly do however

They are the germs of that indeveloped by the Spaniards Vitoria and

Suarez and the Dutch

Hugo

in a fuller sense, understand

constitute

A
treated

its

today.

it

natural foundation.

Grotius.

more thoroughly
War, even an offen-

question bearing on international law

by

Thomas

St.

is

the question of war.

and may, under the following three

war must be declared by the
prince or ruler who governs the community. It may never be waged
by private persons on their own initiative, for when engaged in
litigations they can always submit their conflicting claims to a
higher authority. Secondly, war must be waged for a just cause,
that is, it must have been deserved by the enemy for some grave
fault. Thirdly, the warring power must have and maintain a good
intention
in general, that of correcting an abuse and laying the
foundation for a just and lasting peace. A spirit of revenge, excessive war,

is

conditions,

not in

become

itself evil

legitimate. First,

sive cruelty in the

an armistice,

conduct of

hostilities,

supremacy
render unjust even an otherwise
lust for

18

unreasonable refusal of

these are evil intents that

justifiable

would

war. 18

For recent views of the problem of war within the perilous permodern age, see J. T. Delos, "The Sociology of Modern
War and the Theory of Just War," Cross Currents, VIII, No. 3 (Summer,
1958), 248-266; J. C. Murray, "Remarks on the Moral Problem of War,"
Theological Studies, XX (March, 1959), 40-61; C. S. Thompson, ed.,
Morals and Missiles (London: J. Clarke and Co., 1959).
spectives of the

St.

Thomas Aquinas

[125

IX.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Aquinas, St. Thomas. Treatise on Law and Truth and

Chicago: Gateway Books, 1956 (Chicago, 1949).

Bigongiari, D. (ed.) The Political Ideas of Saint

Falsity.

Thomas Aquinas.

New York: Hafner, 1953.

D'Entreves, A. P. (ed.) Aquinas, Selected Political Writings. Trans.
J. G. Dawson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1948.

Gilby, T. The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1958.

Gilson, E. The Christian Philosophy of

York: Random House, 1956.

St.

Thomas Aquinas. New

Hutchins, R. M. Saint Thomas and the World

Marquette University Press, 1949.

State.

Milwaukee:

chapter x

Dante

LIFE

DANTE ALIGHIERI was born toward the end of May

1265
between Guelfs and Ghibellines. 1 He
lost his parents at a very young age. When a boy of nine, he met
Beatrice, a year younger than himself, and from that time he never
in a Florence divided

ceased to love her deeply though she never encouraged his atten-

and eventually married someone

tions

else.

She died June

but even after death she continued to inspire him.

immortalized her in the sonnets of his Vita

of his Divine

own
and

Comedy. In 1288,

1,

1290,

A grateful Dante

Nuova and

the cantos

true to family tradition

and

his

bent, he joined the Guelfs against the Ghibellines of Arezzo;

battle of Campaldino, which

1295 Dante married Gemma
dei Donati, by whom he had several children. That same year he
began to be active in the administration of Florence and to engage
in earnest in political life. In 1300, from June 15 to August 15, he

in

1289 he fought in the bloody

resulted in a Florentine victory. In

rulers,

Absolute Guelfism stood for total subordination of all temporal

emperor included, to the pope. Absolute Ghibellinism wanted

prelates subject

pope as

little

thirteenth

first

and foremost to the

more than

political authority

and saw the

the chaplain of the emperor. In the Italy of the

and fourteenth

centuries,

however,

these

served purposes and ends purely selfish and personal.

party

labels

often

Dante X.

[127

was one of the six priors (the city's highest magistrates); and toward the end of 1301 he was sent to Rome, with two others, as
ambassador to Pope Boniface VIII.
After the battle of Campaldino, the Florentine Guelfs had split
into two bitter factions: the nobles or Neri led by the Donati, and
the plebeians or Bianchi led by the Cerchi. Dante's sympathy was
with the Bianchi, who seemed to him more efficiently committed to
restoring peace. But their conciliatory attitude toward the Ghibelaroused the suspicion of Boniface VIII that he called a
French prince, Charles of Valois, to Italy. Charles was to go to
Florence and assay the chances of the right wing Guelfs for undivided power. It was while he was on his way there that the government of Florence, then in the hands of the Bianchi, decided to send
Dante and two other emissaries to Boniface VIII. The embassy was
to convince the pope of Florence's adherence to Guelf traditions
and of her ready acceptance of the pope's overlordship in Tuscany.
At the same time the Florentines could voice their fears about the
proposed action of Charles of Valois. The factious Neri, if allowed

lines so

to return to power, would plunge the city into civil war. Boniface
VIII would more safely rely on the constitutional, moderate power

of the Bianchi.

The embassy failed. While two of the ambassadors returned

to report on negotiations and Dante remained at the papal

home

court, Charles of Valois entered Florence.

He

threw the weight of

sword on the side of the Neri and had stiff sentences pronounced against the leaders of the Bianchi. Dante was himself accused of political corruption, heavily fined, exiled for two years,
and excluded for life from public office. Shortly afterward, on May
10, 1302, he was sentenced in absentia to death. Thus, he was

his

locked out of his beloved Florence, never to enter

Homeless, Dante wandered from

city to city,

it

again.

"a somber guest,

always finding the bread of hospitality bitter," hoping always,

vainly, to return to his "fair sheepfold." In his long exile

if

he con-

men who like him were victims of the Guelf reaction,

and to many he seemed to have embraced Ghibelline ideas and encouraged Ghibelline activities. In reality so great a soul could not
feel at home within the narrow limits of any partisan coterie. One
could say with Ozanam that on some issues he was a Guelf and on
others a Ghibelline. Dante was a Guelf in his respect for the
Church, his dislike for feudalism and the inheritability of offices

sorted with

128]

and

III.

The Middle Ages

He was a Ghibelemperor and the monarchic principle

enmity toward France, his intolerance of the

privileges, his horror of foreign domination.

line in his reverence for the

he embodied,

his

Church's intervention in purely political matters. Neither Guelf nor

Ghibelline, "he did not wander, an irresolute deserter, between the
two rival camps; he set up his tent on independent ground, not that
he might repose in an indifferent neutrality but that he might fight

out the fight alone, with

genius."

all

the strength of his

own

individual

Dante died

Ravenna, probably of malaria, on September 14,

fifty-six. It was not an advanced age, but the
greatness of a life is to be viewed not in terms of years but in terms
of accomplishments. His were many
all great and vast and splendid; each bears the imprint of a prodigious mind. It is in his
in

1321, at the age of

Comedy

that at least once in the history of mankind divine wisdom

and supernatural truth found expression in words of almost un-

surpassable beauty.

MONARCHIA
In October 1310, Henry VII of

Germany

into Italy, there to receive the imperial

crossed the Alps

crown and

re-establish a

needed peace among the Italian republics. From Avignon,

Pope Clement V hailed him as the "defender of the Church," and
Dante was elated at the prospect of a lasting reconciliation between
the two highest powers and the end of the internecine struggles
sorely

that

had so long tortured the peninsula.

On

and peoples
announced an era of harmony and joy, and exhorted
welcome the pacifier sent by God. But his words fell on deaf
that occasion, in a Latin letter to the princes

of Italy, he
all

to

ears. Instead of laying

bickered and fought

down

fratricidal arms, the various factions

became the center of

emperor as other Guelf cities and princes rallied
Dante, in Tuscany at the time, wrote another Latin
all

the more. Florence

resistance to the

around
letter,

her.

dated

March

31, 1311, censuring the "very scelerate" Flor-

entines for their opposition to God's minister.

A few days later,

April 17, he wrote to Henry VII begging him to

come without

on
de-

2 F. Ozanam, Dante
and Catholic Philosophy in the Thirteenth
Century, trans, by L. A. Pychowska (New York: The Cathedral Library

Association, 1913), pp. 381, 382.

Dante X.

[129

lay to punish the rebellious Florence,

who

in attacking

Rome,

seat

was viperously turning on her own mother. Returning to the concepts expressed in these three epistles, Dante systematized them, probably between the years 1310 and 1312, in the
famous Latin treatise Monarchia.
The treatise is divided into three books. In the first, Dante
of the empire,

proves his basic assumption that a universal empire

is

indispen-

sable to the well-being of mankind. According to him, the proper

goal of man, individually or collectively considered,

is

realization of his intellectual potentialities, both in the

ulation

and the way of

action. This

is

the constant

way

of spec-

possible only in an atmos-

phere of universal peace and harmony. World peace, in turn, can

be secured and maintained only through world empire. Finally, the

form of such a universal empire is monarchy the rule of one

prince over

all.

Without mentioning Pierre Dubois, Dante refutes

his

argu-

ments for universal peace through federation and arbitration. 3 Only

a single supreme ruler can authoritatively settle disputes between
states.

Between any two governments, neither of which is in any way subordinate to the other, contention can arise either through their own
fault or that of their subjects. This is evident. And since neither can

know

the affairs of the other, not being subordinated

equals there

is

no authority), there must be a

which can rule both within

its

own

third

(for

among

and wider power

jurisdiction. 4

is the monarch or emperor, who, furthermore,

power and his freedom from fear and cupidity, is
best position to serve the people unselfishly and to main-

This third power

by reason of
in the

3 Pierre

entitled

On

his

Dubois (about 1250-1312), a French lawyer, in a pamphlet

Holy Land (1306), presented his plan for

the Recovery of the

the establishment of universal peace through Christendom.

He

suggested

convoked by the pope and attended by all prelates and Christian princes. This council was to outlaw war among its
members and set up an arbitral tribunal from whose decisions there should
be no appeal but to the pope himself. Dubois' project implied the abolition of imperial prerogative and a position of pre-eminence for the French
that a general council be

king.
4

Monarchy, Book I, 10. Selections from Monarchia are taken from

of H. W. Schneider in On World-Government or De
Monarchia by Dante Alighieri (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950).
the

translation

130]

III.

between

tain

men and between

The Middle Ages

states perfect justice, the infallible

source of peace and liberty.

In the second book Dante proves the existence of a universal

empire in the

Roman

Romans
God (who as man went so far as posilegitimacy of Roman rule by submitting to
Empire. Founded by the ancient

with the consent and help of

tively to recognize the

death under Pilate, the agent of Tiberius),

the Christian world and

and

in their

is still

it

was

duly invested in the

their legacy to

Roman

people

emperor.

Here Dante betrays his love for Italy and his pride in being
Italian. For him the empire is Roman and Italian. "The Roman
people was ordained by nature for rule." 5 It matters little that at

German
The empire, by a natural

the time, through a transitory delegation of powers, the

princes are the electors of the emperor.

is Roman, and the emperor therefore a Roman

supreme pontiff is a Roman bishop. Rome is the
seat of Caesar and of Peter. Thus is Dante's cosmopolitanism
colored and informed by the flame of his patriotic passion, and his
belief in the universal mission of Rome, in both the spiritual and
the temporal order, stated in no uncertain terms. 6
In the third book Dante comes to grips with the question:
"Does the authority of the Roman ruler, who ... is the de jure
ruler of the world, come directly from God or through some vicar
or minister of God, I mean Peter's successor, who truly holds the
keys to the kingdom of heaven?" 7 In his answer Dante bitterly

and

historic right,

prince, just as the

contests the exaggerated claims of the curialists.

5 Ibid.,

Book

II, 7.

different interpretation

is

The author

of

Roman-

given Dante's

ism by Dino Bigongiari: "For the Romans of his day Dante had nothing
but contempt. What counted for him was the ancient city as it survived
under Christian dispensation; he hoped for the restoration of the old

Roman

virtues, the return of the old

Humanism

the love of Ancient

in all
Italy

its

Rome, pagan though

glory, but as the capitol

must abandon

its

nationalistic

part of the world empire.

the 'Garden of the Empire.' "

Dante

Roman

prestige.

or Classicism in this political doctrine.

Thus there

What

is

inflames

much

him

is

must be revived,
of the World, not as an Italian city.
aspirations, must accept its position as
it

had been.

Italy will again

It

be great, yes! but only as

{On World-Government or De Monorchia by

Alighieri, Introduction, xiv.)

This underlying motive of Dante's political thought recurs in Convivio IV, 5 and in the Divine Comedy, particularly in the canto of Justinian, Paradiso, VI.
7

Monarchy, Book

III,

1.

Dante X.

[131

Monarchia denies any subjection

temporal

The emperor's

affairs.

mediately from

God and

of the empire to the

papacy

in

authority derives directly and im-

exercised in complete independence of

is

papal jurisdiction.

These are the main

lines of the treatise.

But

in presenting

and

defending his three theses, Dante touches on various other matters

of interest to the student of politics.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORLD EMPIRE

First of

Dante

all,

sees the entire universe within the

bond

of

is one by nature. There is one God in

one flock on earth. Empire and Church do not
divide the flock, for emperor and pope are moved by a parallel
and concord will; and though sharply distinct and autonomous in
their respective functions, they are united by one love for God and
man.
Secondly, the universal empire (and any government for that
matter) is not an arbitrary rule. Its foundation is not primarily
force but wisdom; its chief characteristic, not despotism but looking after the people's true interests. "For citizens do not live for
their representatives nor peoples for their kings, but on the contrary, representatives exist for citizens and kings for peoples." 8 In
regard to the end of government, kings and rulers, even the emperor, are to be the servants of all.

The human

unity.

heaven and there

race

is

Thirdly, the universal

states.

Rather,

it is

monarchy does not exclude individual

emperor that per-

the unique authority of the

mits their existence and peaceful coexistence.

tion

is

Its

global jurisdic-

directed not to violating the peoples' freedoms

cities' liberties,

and the

but to safeguarding them so that true justice

may

reign everywhere.

Fourthly, the power of the

monarch does not extend

to the in-

terior court of conscience or to the internal constitution of the

Church.

On

the contrary, the church

in its origin, inviolable in

is

its

recognized as a distinct power, divine

action; the priesthood

(each independent of the other in

8 Ibid.,

Book

I,

12.

its

own

and the empire

sphere) are actually sub-

132]

III.

The Middle Ages

ordinated, the one to the other, in their relations: the pontiff is the
temporal vassal of Caesar, but the emperor is of the spiritual flock of
St. Peter. 9

In

fact, in the closing lines of

Monarchia, Dante cautions against

so narrow a reception of the truths he presents as

in certain matters the
pontiff.

Roman

prince

is

would deny

subject to the

"Caesar therefore owes to Peter the piety which a

born son owes to

that

Roman
first-

10

his father."

UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE
Monarchia
rected against

is

all

a polemical

work

who oppose

the

if

only in the sense that

Roman

it is

empire and deny

its

di-

in-

dependence of the papacy and its immediate dependence on God.

Monarchia repudiates, above all, the alleged claims of the Roman
Curia. When the treatise was being written, Boniface VIII had already died, much water had since flowed under the arches of the
Tiber, and the popes had ignominiously left Rome for the gilded
prison of Avignon. This should have been sufficient warning to
anyone who loved the Church not to trust too implicitly in kings,
princes, and emperors; but Dante was still smarting under the
wounds inflicted on him by what he sincerely believed to be the
unfortunate policy of Boniface VIII. This explains his uncompromising attitude, his fierce determination to draw a sharp line of
demarcation, practically to dig a trench, between the ecclesiastical
and the political power.
One cannot doubt Dante's good intentions in his attempt to
solve a controversy that had divided lawyers, philosophers, and
statesmen more than three centuries. But one must also aver that
Dante failed somewhat in translating those intentions into principles. His insistence on the absolute separation of the two powers,
on splitting philosophy and theology, on releasing the emperor
from all earthly restraint, on placing man's heavenly and worldly
happiness on a quasi-equal plane was actually or could at least
easily have become the first step toward the proclamation of the
complete autonomy of reason, the unlimited sovereignty of the
state, the naturalistic and secularist view of human existence.
Without a doubt Dante would have been the first to react to
9

Ozanam,

op.

cit.,

p. 3.

10

Monarchy, Book

III,

16.

Dante X.

[133

such heretical conclusions, just as he would have vigorously reany attempt of the Church's enemies to distort his views and

sisted
enlist

him

in their ranks.

But the

fact remains that in his legitimate

concern to prevent possible abuses on the part of the Church (in

which he faithfully believed and which he fervently loved) he went
so far as to overlook the flagrant abuses

The Church, aware

vited.
if

only germinally, in his treatise,

1554

to half a century ago

some of

his principles in-

of the dangerous principles contained,

had

it

condemned Monarchia, and from

on the Index of Forbidden Books.

BENEDICT XV ON DANTE
Recently Dante had the exceptional honor of being the subject
of a papal encyclical.

XV

Benedict

For the

sixth centenary of his death,

Pope

wrote of him and his works in glowing terms. The

pope praised the purity of Dante's Catholic faith; his constant reliance on Scripture, on the Councils, on the Church Fathers and
Doctors; his burning love for the see of Rome and the papal office.
The pope was not blind to Dante's bitter and scornful indictments
of the pontiffs of his time, particularly in the Divine

he found

this

Let us see what led him to this attitude.

Some

Comedy; but

easy to explain, understand, and forgive:

First, political differences.

of these popes, he was persuaded, were supporters of the fac-

which had expelled him and kept him expelled, from home and
Unmeasured speech, sign of a deeply wounded soul, can
surely be forgiven in a man tossed on such mighty floods of adverse

tion

fatherland.

fortune. Secondly, rumor, as always, so then, led

worst of his enemies. Thirdly,

which

who

will

him

to think the

deny that human weakness,

had its effects on ecclesiastical persons of Dante's

But Dante's indignant complaints and vituperations, based
on truth or not, never in any way diminished the honor he owed to
the Church, the obedience he paid to the Supreme Keys. Listen to the
words wherewith he begins the defense of his own political philosophy: I enter upon this work "with that feeling of reverence which a
loving son owes to his father and mother, with love for Christ, love
for the Church, love for the Shepherd, love for all who profess the
Christian religion, concerned only for the truth that leads to salvatime?

is

universal,
.

tion." 11

11 Encyclical on Dante by Benedict XV, quoted in Dante Theologian

by Patrick Cummins (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 1948), pp. 5-12.

134]

III.

DANTE, A MODERN

MAN

In his encyclical, Benedict

utters a meaningful

ern

man on

political

The Middle Ages

XV

also observes that

message for our own

age.

He

several counts, the least of which

view of the universe. Some

critics

is

Dante

still

indeed a mod-

certainly not his

is

have termed Dante's

preoccupation with unity and peace an idle and idealistic dream.

But a sober appraisal of the human

situation leads

one to see in

Dante's vision a prophetic illumination of the future, a genial anticipation of things to

come.

If

Dante

is

Utopian, everyone

the aspiration to a peaceful coexistence of

urally in all hearts; universal peace
realization,

is,

men and

is

for

states is nat-

in fact, a necessity.

On

its

one way or another, depends the very survival of the

civilized world.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Dante. On World Government (De Monorchia) Trans, by H. W.

Schneider. Introd. by D. Bigongiari. 2nd ed. rev. New York:
.

Liberal Arts Press, 1957.

Monarchy and Three Political Letters.

York: Noonday Press, 1955.

Introd.

by D. Nicholl.

New

D'Entreves, A. P. Dante as a Political Thinker. London and New

York: Oxford University Press, 1952.
Fox, R. M. Dante Lights the Way. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing

Company, 1958.
Gilson, E. Dante the Philosopher. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949.
Rolbiecki, J. J. The Political Philosophy of Dante Alighieri. Washington:

The Catholic University of America

Press, 1921.

chapter

xi

Marsilius of Padua

LIFE

THE son

Bonmatteo dei Mainardini, a notary at the UniPadua, Marsilius was born in that prosperous and
between 1275 and 1280. His studies covered a wide
of

versity of

learned city

range of subjects: law, philosophy, theology, and medicine. For a

months (December 1312 to March 1313)

he was rector of the University of Paris. In 1315 he was appointed
canon in his native city by the newly elected Pope John XXII,
statutory period of three

whom

he later so furiously attacked (but he was then and always

remained a layman). In 1319 Marsilius traveled through Italy
as agent of Can Grande della Scala and Matteo Visconti to promote the Ghibelline League. He returned to Paris, where he lectured on philosophy and practiced medicine. In the meantime he
his most famous work, the Defensor Pads. He finished
June 24, 1324. When it became known in 1326 that he was the
author, he had to leave Paris. He sought refuge in Nuremberg at
the court of Louis of Bavaria. John of Jandun fled with him.

was writing

and supporter, and this led many erroneously

of the Defensor or at least greatly to
exaggerate whatever part he had in its composition. In 1327 both
were declared heretics. That same year Louis marched against
the pope and took Marsilius along as spiritual adviser. In January

John was

to believe

his friend

him co-author

136]

III.

The Middle Ages

1328, Louis entered Rome, deposed John XXII, had himself

crowned emperor by Sciarra Colonna, the "representative" of the
Roman people, appointed an antipope, and violently persecuted
the clergy loyal to John. Marsilius became the spiritual vicar of the
city. Soon, however, the people of Rome revolted and obliged the
emperor to leave. Marsilius also left. He returned to Nuremberg
and spent the rest of his life at the court. The date of his death is
not known, but in the public consistory of April 10, 1343, Clement
VI spoke of him (the worst heretic he had ever known, the pope
said) as deceased.

THE DEFENSOR PACIS

The Defensor Pacis
Discourse
civil

peace and

established

divided into three parts or Discourses.

is

in nineteen chapters, deals with "the general causes of

I,

strife as

by reason."

shown by
*

"the singular cause of civil

tude of power."

the normal structure of the state

Discourse
strife

Discourse

II, in thirty

chapters, treats of

the claim of the papacy to pleni-

III, in

three chapters, contains a re-

view of the principal aims and conclusions of the two preceding

parts.

Viewed in its entirety, the Defensor is mainly directed against

Church and the Roman pontiff. Its tones and overtones are decidedly secularistic if not altogether antireligious. The author's
dream is to set up a unitary state, similar in structure to the free

the

Italian cities

and the French national monarchy, sovereign

in

both

temporal and spiritual matters, holding sway over lay persons and
prelates. Consequently, the

Defensor overthrows the Church hier-

archy, abolishes the privileges

and immunities of the

clergy, re-

duces the pope to a figurehead, and places the "Christian republic"

under the control of the people and

their representatives, the civil

rulers.

PEACE
As

the

title

of his

work

implies, Marsilius' concern

preservation of peace in the state.

1

What

health

is

A. Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace

Columbia University
2 Ibid., xxiv.

Press,

1951,

1956), Vol.

II,

was the

to the animal,

(New York:

Introduction, xxii.

Marsilius of Padua XI.

peace

is

to political society.

sition of the city or state

He

[137

defines peace as "the

whereby each of

its

good dispo-

parts will be able to

perform the operations belonging to it in accordance with reason

and its establishment." 3 Marsilius' peace is neither the theological
peace of St. Augustine (a tranquillitas ordinis deriving from man's
conformity to God's law) nor the universal peace of Dante and

Dubois (a general state of harmony between subjects and rulers

and between states). Marsilius has no extra-temporal, extra-political or "internal" preoccupations. His interest in peace is for the
sake of achieving the "sufficient life," which is the reason for the
state's existence. His peace is not a means to a higher, spiritual
end. Moreover, peace is pursued by Marsilius without any consideration for international relations. In his view, there may be
peace even when states are engaged in mutual war. In other words,
Marsilius equates peace with the external order of the individual
state, that is,

with a mechanical equilibrium. There

is

peace when

the various parts of the state, "the agricultural, the artisan, the
military, the financial, the priestly,
tive,"

and the

judicial or delibera-

are properly engaged in the discharge of their respective

functions.

The

fruits of

peace or tranquillity, then, are the greatest goods

while those of

its

opposite, strife, are unbearable evils.

Hence we

ought to wish for peace, to seek it if we do not already have it, to

conserve it once it is attained, and to repel with all our strength the
strife

which

is

opposed to

it. 5

GOVERNMENT
The maintenance

of peace in the state

is

entrusted to the gov-

ernment. "Without the existence of the government, the

munity cannot endure for long."

It falls to

civil

com-

the pars principalis or

government or rather the execuand judiciary branches of it, to assign each citizen his proper
task, 7 to see that he performs it properly, to judge the disputes that

principalis, as Marsilius calls the

tive

3 Ibid., Discourse
4 Ibid., chap.
5 Ibid.,

chap.

I,

5,

1.

1,

4.

chap. 2,

3.

*Ibid., chap. 15, 6.

7 "For no one must or reasonably can undertake at will the exercise
of the military or priestly function." Ibid., chap. 15, 10.

138]

may

III.

between

arise

citizens, to

The Middle Ages

punish the disturbers of the social

tranquillity.

Even

and bishops are required scrupulously

priests

to

obey the

governmental authority. The medieval school insisted on the two

ends of man, the temporal and the

spiritual,

and on the pre-emi-

The
was made the recipient of privileges, immunities,
and even of a higher power than the temporal ruler. Theoretically,
Marsilius does not deny that there is more dignity or nobility at-

nence of the

priesthood, concerned with the attainment

latter.

of the nobler end,

He argues, however, that the question of

be solved on terms not of moral eminence
political necessity. Of the two, it is government

tached to the priesthood.

power

in society

but of practical,
that

is

ject to

is

to

more necessary. Therefore, the priesthood must be submore explicit on this point. He

the

Marsilius could not be

it.

goes so far as to say that

hood or any other part

civil society

could do without the priest-

of the state, but never without govern-

ment.

The

action of the ruler in the state, like that of the heart in the animal,

For although the actions of the other parts of the

some time cease without any harm to any individual,
group, or community
the primary action of this ruling part and

must never

cease.

state

may

of

virtue can never cease without harm. 8

at

its

Actual government
racy, or polity.

The

may be

last

makes

in the
it

form of monarchy,

possible for

all citizens

aristoc-

to take

good
on the consent of the people and exercise power
for the welfare of the whole. Tyranny, oligarchy, and false democracy are vitiated forms. They are the rule of one, or several,
or many, not based on general consent or directed to the good of
the community.
Government must not corrupt. It must not rule capriciously or
arbitrarily. It must not pursue the interests of only a fraction of the
body politic. It must be one. A plurality of governments would inturns governing. These three varieties of government are

all

for they are based

evitably result in the ruin of the state. This

is

another reason

why

autonomy of the Church. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the traditional sense would lead to strife and
intranquilhty by destroying the very unification of government that

Marsilius

is

is

so opposed to the

indispensable for the peaceful maintenance of society.

8 Ibid.,

chap. 15, 13.

Marsilius of Padua XI.

[139

LAW
To keep government

Law

in line, Marsiiius subjects

it

to the rigid

"an ordinance made by political prudence

concerning matters of justice and benefit and their opposite and
having coercive force." 9 One must pay careful attention to
control of law.

is

Marsilius' definitions. This one shows again a complete break with

the ancient and medieval view according to which law is an ordinance of reason, a command founded on and compatible with justice. Marsilius' concept of law is thoroughly positivistic. For him
its

do

essence consists in coerciveness. Morality has

with law.

particular law

may even be

little

or nothing to

unjust and

still

be a

true law provided a sanction is attached to it and the threatened

punishment can actually be applied. Conversely, every command
that lacks the coercive element or whose coerciveness involves
merely spiritual punishment or punishment in another world is not
worth the name. One cannot fail to notice the direction in which

Marsilius

is

aiming: divine law and canon law, on which

all

Church

supporters so insist in settling the problem of Church and state relations, are

command,

not true laws. Only human, secular law

for coercive

is

a coercive

power here on earth belongs exclusively

to

the state.

THE PEOPLE
The power to make true laws is a prerogative of the people.
"The primary and proper efficient cause of the law, is the people
or the whole body of citizens," 10 and a citizen is anyone able to
participate in government. This, prima facie, is a re-statement of
Aristotle's view. But while for the Stagirite participation in government meant the ability to perform ruling and judicial duties, for
Marsilius it means simply the ability to appraise the ruler's conduct in the discharge of his office and the capacity to decide on the
laws proposed for the state. Thus Marsilius broadens considerably
the concept of citizenship to make room for the farmers and artisans whom Aristotle had excluded. Marsilius, however, shares
Aristotle's disdain for

sense.
9 Ibid., chap.

10, 4.

^lbid., chap. 12,

3.

women:

these are not citizens in the strict

140]

III.

The Middle Ages

Citizens are divided by Marsilius into two classes: the vulgus

and the honor abilitas. The vulgus, corresponding roughly to the
Greek demos and the Roman plebs, comprises the masses, the
multitude, the lower, uneducated body of the people. The honorabilitas comprises the notables, among them the clergy.

The

people, as a whole,

the legislator:

is

least the "weightier part thereof." 1X

all

the people or at

This "valentior pars" has been

variously explained by Marsilius' commentators. In

all

probability,

he had in mind a blending of quality and quantity, that is, the overwhelming majority, the greater number of the citizens, inclusive al-

ways of a substantial portion, perhaps a majority, of the upper

class or notables.

Marsilius gives several reasons for making the people the very
center of the state and trusting
First, "the

common

multitude, because
"that law

is

better

them with the

no one

a law

is

better noted

willingly

have imposed upon himself." 13

There are three steps in the

number

legislative function.

by the entire
harms himself." 12 Secondly,
observed by every citizen which one seems to
utility of

legislative process.

men, discover the laws

The

experts, a

be proposed
for adoption (deliberation). The people, in the general assembly
small

of

all citizens

of competent

to

or of their properly appointed representatives, dis-

cuss the proposed laws and approve or disapprove (judgment).

unanimously or by overwhelming majority affix

approved laws their command under a temporal penalty or
punishment.

Finally, the people

to the

The
is

people's

power

is

not confined to the making of the law.

It

also their right to elect the ruler. Marsilius does not favor heredi-

tary succession.

He

Nor does he

attach

much

value to the ruler's vir-

them but because of the people's

choice. It is merely desirable that he be prudent, just, and equitable. His function is to execute the laws, to apply them in specific

tues.

is

ruler not because of

were clearly determined, even the relative

importance of his possessing some public virtues would fall. At
any rate, Marsilius does not require of him the traditional private
instances. If the laws

or theological virtues.

11 Ibid.

^ibid., chap. 12,

12 Ibid., chap.
6.

12, 5.

Marsilius of Padua XI.

[141

In addition, the people have the right to correct, punish, and

even depose the ruler

if

he violates the law or becomes guilty of a

by no means absolute, for in both source and exercise his power is strictly dependent
on the people's will. He is accountable to them. Yet, government
(the executive and judiciary) is granted no small measure of
power. One could say that in Marsilius' state the ruler and the
people check one another, but the people have the edge, at least
serious dereliction of duty. Marsilius' ruler

is

theoretically.

THE CHURCH
In making his case for the unchallenged sovereignty of the
Marsilius bitterly attacks the papacy and denies any validity

state,

not only to the exaggerated claims of the papalists but to the

erate tenets of the Gelasian doctrine as well. His Defensor

modPads

abounds in virulent invectives and imprecations against both papal

and episcopal power and, by subverting traditional concepts, disfigures the

Church beyond

recognition.

The Defensor Pads

is

un-

doubtedly heretical in both general principles and practical applications.

For Marsilius, the Church is "the whole body of the faithful

believe and invoke the name of Christ, and all the parts of this
whole body in any community, even the household." 14 Whatever
power the Church possesses, it belongs to the universitas fidelium
the whole body of the faithful. Pope, bishops, and priests are but a
part of the Church. They are not the governing body. They lack
the power of jurisdiction. Their task is merely to teach Christian
doctrine and to administer the sacraments. They are "physicians of
souls," not judges. Most important, coercive power is beyond their
competence. In fact, Marsilius repeats over and over again, coercive power on earth belongs only to the state. The control of eccle-

who

siastical affairs, the definition of

doubtful questions of faith, the

and bishops (including the "head bishop") to

their posts, the punishing of sinners even to the inflicting of excommunication and other spiritual penalties, the canonization of
election of pastors

saints

The

all

these pertain to the whole

body of the Christian people.

universitas fidelium acts through the general council, the call14 Ibid., Disc. II, chap.
2, 3.


The Middle Ages

142]

III.

ing of which "does not belong to the

Roman

faithful themselves or their representatives.

persons have the right to take part in

it,

bishop"

Both

and the

15

but to the

priests

and

final decisions

lay

or

binding decrees will be those to which the whole body of participants or the weightier part has adhered.
archic structure of the

Church

is

The

hierarchic

and mon-

completely rejected. So

is

the

fundamental dogma of the primacy of Peter and his successors.

The Church becomes a

who

The very people

republic, a democracy.

and political sovereign in the state

are also the supreme legislator and sovereign in the Church. The
same agency controls both political and ecclesiastical society.
Spiritual power and temporal power are unified in a Church-state
that "is far more a state than a Church." 16 Peace is now possible,
and the
for peace requires unification under one government
papal claims, even to mere independence from the state in religious
matters, have been "proved" null and void. The people and the
state acquire, in Marsilius' theory, a plenitude of power far superior to that granted the pope by the most extreme of papalists.
are the supreme legislator

What Marsilius did by his exaltation of the people was to shift the
whole cast of the traditional medieval church-state debate. Where
that debate had been between two different groups or authorities in
society, each representing a different set of values
regnum and
sacerdotium, temporal power and spiritual power Marsilius subsumed both of these under a universitas which was at once civilis and
fidelis, secular and religious, state and church, and equally infallible
in both spheres, so that it was a single all-inclusive locus and determiner of both spiritual and temporal values. Thereby, also, the
discussion of the comparative value of secular and religious goals was
no longer relevant. But then, having assigned supreme institutional
authority in both secular and religious affairs to this universitas,
Marsilius could allow its "natural desires" free play, and these were

almost exclusively in a secular rather than in a religious direction.

And,

in

addition,

the

"secular" government,

as

exclusive coercive

agent of the will of the universitas, attained a far greater triumph

over the

quondam "spiritual power" than had been possible for earlier

who had confined their discussions to the conflict between

antipapalists

the two powers themselves, without fitting

them

into a larger

as did Marsilius. 17

is ibid., Disc. II, chap. 21, 3.

is Ibid., Vol.

H,

Introd., lxiv.

" Ibid.,

lxv.

whole

Marsilius of Padua XI.

[143

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gewirth, A. Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of Peace.
Columbia University Press, 1951, 1956. 2 vols.

Emerton,

E. The Defensor

Pads of Marsiglio

New

York:

of Padua. Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1920.

Kates, P. The Two Swords: A Study of the Union of Church and

State. Washington, D. C: St. Anselm's Priory, 1928.
Previte-Orton, C. W. Marsilius of Padua. London: Milford, 1935.

part four: From Medieval to Modern Times

chapter

xii

Introductory

A PERIOD OF TRANSITION

THERE was no
modern

times.

sharp division between the Middle Ages and

A line

of demarcation fixed at

1453 (the

fall

of

Constantinople), or at 1492 (the discovery of America), or at

any date in the sixteenth century would have but a relative and
perhaps to say that the period from the

partial validity. Better

middle of the fifteenth to the beginning of the seventeenth cen-

Ages as its turgid and

modern times as its immediate and
Better still, the period was one of transition,

tury belongs to both epochs: to the Middle

revolutionary prolongation, to

tumultuous prelude.
for

it

frequently repeated, complemented, developed, changed, op-

posed old principles and ideas, or combined them, in a variety of

new

thoughts and concepts.

hand the period was, if in its own way, an essentially religious time. Religion and religious matters continued
to be the major concern of many. The Crusades were still preached.
One of Columbus' major purposes in forcing the great sea passage
was to secure means to equip such a vast army as would drive the
Turk from Constantinople and liberate the Holy Sepulchre. The
New World was explored in order to present it to Christ and the
Christian faith. Even the artists were at work for the Church, and
situations, with

On

the one

IV.

148]
almost

all their

From Medieval

Modern Times

to

masterpieces were religious in subject and theme.

The very humanistic bent was,

at least at its origin, a Christian

effort: a

noble endeavor inspired by the ecumenic need to widen

much

as possible the comprehensiveness of Christianity so as to

as

include the

wisdom

of

all

peoples and ages.

The very problems

Europe and made of it two enemy

the momentous questions made so

that convulsed sixteenth-century

camps were theological ones

familiar by the Middle Ages. Spain, for a time politically the
greatest nation and religiously the center of Christianity, produced
men who, in answer to the adversaries of the Church, drew powerful arguments from the philosophia perennis of the Middle Ages
and genially adapted them to current exigences.
On the other hand, this was the time when the old order was
dislocated if not destroyed. The two major truths and principles
(God and man, nature and grace), the grasping of whose distinction and conciliation constituted the incomparable achievement of
the Middle Ages, were fiercely attacked by the Protestant Revolt and the pagan segment of the Renaissance. Each of these
divisive forces attacked what the other kept: the reformers surged
against nature and man utterly to damn them, while some humanists neglected God and grace to cling exclusively to nature and
man. Thus occurred the fracture that is still today the over-all reason for man's and society's tragic plight. For, once the medieval
synthesis was broken and the Church forced to withdraw from
vast geographic areas and to abandon the leadership of intellectual
speculation and pursuit in a world turned against her, Protestantism and pagan humanism opposed each other more bitterly and
fundamentally than they had opposed the Church. One against the
other, each clung to

the

its

human mind was

half-truth as

left

if it

were the

total truth.

drawn by an absurd law of double and

irreconcilable gravity,

passing from one venture to another, alternating between

of exhilaration

and

And

spinning, unable to regain a lost balance,

spells of frustration,

moments

but plunging inexorably

into despair.

At

length, the

new forces defeated the old. By the end

new mode of thinking had replaced the

sixteenth century a
tian vision.

Man became

of the

Chris-

and the measure of all things,

and norms of action he
recognized but two guides, reason and experience.
and

the center

in his search for principles of truth

Introductory XII.

[149

ABSOLUTISM
Three great movements of thought marked this period of transition from medieval to modern times: humanism, the Protestant
revolt, and the Catholic reformation. This was also a time of discovery and colonization. Most important politically, however, were
the consolidation of the modern state and the rise of absolute
monarchy, the latter a hereditary form of government with no
established constitutional authority to check the kings or call them
to account effectively. 1 Rightly, then,

is

the political thought of the

time seen primarily in terms of writers and ideas that either helped
or opposed the triumphant

among

march

of

absolutism.

Outstanding

the champions of absolutism were Machiavelli, Luther,

and Bodin, the last named a French philosopher whose

was to serve as the best support, first of
royal and then of state absolutism. Against absolutism of one form
or other wrote the monarchomacs, the Christian humanists More
and Erasmus, and particularly the Jesuits Francisco Suarez and
Robert Bellarmine. There were others, such as the Anabaptists,
who opposed not only absolutism but the very authority of the
state and the state itself.

James

I,

doctrine of sovereignty

MACHIAVELLI
It is
it is

not only impossible precisely to date the Renaissance, but

also impossible to define

formula.

To

humanism or reduce

it

to a single

was characterized by a this worldly

attitude and point of view. Man gloried in himself and his natural
faculties. He would exercise them to build a world of his own and
to conquer time and space. Humanism, then, meant optimism,
daring vitality, utter confidence in human skill and ability. In one
sense, therefore, Machiavelli was representative of humanism, for
his reality never transcended the worldly and historical range. The
essence of his man was his political nature (for Machiavelli, to
be a true man one had to be a civis, a citizen), and it was on him
a great extent

1 Classic

it

examples of absolutist rulers are the Tudor kings of England

XIV in France (1643-1715), Frederick the Great of
Prussia (1740-1786), Catherine the Great of Russia (1762-1796), and Joseph II of Austria (1780-1790).
(1485-1603), Louis

IV.

150]

From Medieval

that Machiavelli's attention

that,

was constantly

His bleak, one-sided view of

human

Modern Times

riveted. Yet, in another

seems hardly to agree with the humanist men-

sense, Machiavelli
tality.

to

reality led

him

to conclude

nature being so selfish and cowardly and forever

prone to disorder,

man

will

choose order and discipline only under

was an appraisal of human nature

But
Machiavelli returns to the humanistic fold when, to remedy man's
restlessness and wickedness, he turns not to supernatural grace but
to the providential prince
to a man's strength and wisdom and
astuteness and luck {The Prince). While it may be justly argued
that Machiavelli's ideal form of state was not the principate but
the republic, a free government under a strong central authority
such as that of Sparta and republican Rome (The Discourses),
there is no doubt that under both forms the raison d'etat knows no
limitations and the sacred selfishness of the state is to run unchecked. Indeed, public morality has no place in any of Machiaa superior force

the state. It

closer to the Protestant theory than to the Renaissance spirit.

velli's political constitutions.

LUTHER
The

political conditions of the sixteenth century exerted

small influence on the Protestant revolt.

Even

greater

was the

no
in-

on the former and, in general, on the political

thought and practice of modern times.
While Luther (1483-1546) 2 nowhere worked out a political
system, he not infrequently dealt with political questions, parfluence of the latter

Born

into a peasant family in 1483, Luther early entered the

became a

Augus-

graduated from the University of Wittenberg,

where he taught Biblical exegesis from 1511 to 1546. In 1517, on the eve
of All Saints, he nailed to the door of the University church his ninety-five
theses or "Disputations on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences." His

tinian order,

priest,

public heretical teaching and his refusal to obey ecclesiastical superiors

brought him excommunication by order of Leo

(1520). Afterward
Luther broke openly with the Church and gave himself to the organization of the sect he had inaugurated. He died in 1546. "He is an intriguing
figure, nor did his neurosis wipe out a winsome personality. He was of a
brusque, violent nature, but honest, sincere, and kindly. He had deep and
rich insights, but his intellect was always subservient to psychic pressures
which made existence for him an intense anxiety" (Gustave Weigel in The
Great Books, ed. by H. Gardiner [New York: Devin-Adair, 1951], Vol. Ill,
pp. 69, 70).

Introductory XII.
ticularly in his

[151

Concerning

Good Works (1519), Open Letter to

German Nation, Concerning Secular
It Should Be Obeyed (1523), and in

the Christian Nobility of the

What Extent

Authority: to

Peace (1525). There

his Exhortation to

are,

moreover,

political

implications almost everywhere in his theology.

As

already noted,

Luther's idea of
della

Mirandola had

born, that

there

man and

was a sharp divergence between

the philosophy of the Renaissance. Pico

said: "This

is

we can be what we want

the condition in
to be";

and

this

which we were
statement well

epitomized the essence of humanism, both Christian and pagan.

The pagan humanists ignored God, and centered life and the uniman, who could, according to them, do much without divine help and grace. The Christian humanists, on the other
hand, while extolling man's dignity and potentialities, steadfastly
emphasized the need for supernatural faith and assistance. They

verse around

saw man capable of triumph in every field provided that he trusted

God and availed himself of His generous aid. Luther disagreed
with both, rejecting the possibility of man's reaching any truth by
reason and denying his capacity for applying the law thus rationin

discovered.

ally

The German founder

of Protestantism denied

and saw his nature as intrinsically wicked because of

original sin. What Luther did in taking this stand was to tear an
intellectual and moral fabric in whose weaving the greatest minds
of classical, medieval, and humanistic culture had collaborated.
As a further consequence of this grim principle, Luther taught that
man has no value whatever. In 1535 he wrote: "All that is in our

man's free

will

will

is evil, all

possibility of

that

is

in our intellect

good works

traditional sense of

is

error."

He

also denied the

in the external world: "justice," in the

man's free correspondence to divine

will,

had

no place in his theology. The only way to be just was to accept

Christ and cling to Him in the intimacy of one's own soul, allow-

Him

ing

to

work out man's redemption

despite his sins or rather

because of them. All laws became intrinsically invalid, and

all

divine law, which, Luther maintained,

it

first

was impossible

of

for a

Christian to observe.

Applied to the

political realm, these

Lutheran ideas served the

cause of absolutism in no small measure. They provided a theoits moral justification. Yes, Luther separated the
from that of law. In the former, he held, the Chrisking, member of a celestial royalty, free with a liberty and

logical basis for

level of faith

tian

is

IV.

152]

From Medieval

to

Modern Times

sovereignty he must never in the least relinquish. But in the tem-

poral order, the order of law and

divided and uncontrolled.

sin,

The game

the secular authority

of politics

is

game

is

un-

of force

and violence, and the spiritual norm does not apply where brutality
and savagery rule. Yet Luther considered all temporal authority
perfectly legitimate. He accepted and interpreted literally St. Paul's
statement: "There exists no authority except from God." Divine in
origin, authority also has a divine mission: it is a minister of God,
and all who possess it, even the bad, are God's servants. Therefore, the Christian's attitude before authority is one of obedience
and submission, accompanied by internal assent to the ruler's will.
To these principles Luther added an emotional element that
tended sharply to separate ruler from subject, governors from governed.

The

ruler represented

God

in the midst of the external

world, and an aura of divine majesty enveloped

The people were

the

embodiment

consequences of the original

of

fall, its

all evils,

him and

his office.

a mass ridden by the

worst manifestation in the ex-

For them, the ruler's command and punishing sword

were to serve the same purpose as chains and cages for wild animals: they were to check and control the people's exterior behavior so that external peace (the aim of civil authority) could
reign among men. This concept of ruler-subject relations undoubtedly helped introduce a society unknown to the Middle Ages
and the Renaissance: a society whose governing class looked with
scorn upon the masses until it toppled amid blood and cruelty
ternal order.

when popular

reaction understandably exploded against it.

Luther never wavered in his belief in the divine origin and mission of temporal authority. In a world marked by necessity and
marred by iniquity, the temporal authority was for him the sole
guarantor of peaceful living, the sole guide to salvation. Somberly

he proclaimed: "The hand that carries the sword and exterminates

is no longer a human but a divine hand; it is no longer man but

God who

hangs,

fries,

Hence the excessive

beheads,

slits

throats,

and makes war."

and the ruler

exaltation of secular authority

a characteristic element of Lutheranism.

Is this authority unlimited? Just

how

far should

it

extend?

To

the strictly temporal or even into the spiritual? In other words,

does the secular prince's responsibility for his subjects' spiritual

him to intervene in spiritual matters and to exact

obedience to his decisions on religious questions? Although, logiwelfare entitle

Introductory XII.
cally,

[153

Luther's principles were headed in that direction, he himself

resented the secular prince's actual exercise of ecclesiastical su-

premacy. And, when the German Elector proceeded to the visitation in 1528 and in his instruction claimed exclusive competence
(as inherent in his very temporal power) to visit the German
churches, Luther protested a confusion of jurisdictions. But there

on which to base his objection. In 1541 he rallied to the

by accepting the fait accompli and consenting to the
consistory established and controlled by the electoral chancery.
Luther profusely advises the prince on the Christian exercise
of secular authority. He wants him to look after the welfare of
his people and to prefer peace and order to spectacular achievements. Luther warns that his office is a cross, heavy on his neck,
and that more often than not his lot will be misunderstanding, ingratitude, even betrayal. Above all, the prince must not open his
mind to or trust anyone. He is above the law, above the books,
above tradition and precedents, above experts and competents.
He must rely but on God (or His prophet), speaking as it were
into His ear, asking of Him wisdom and understanding. Finally,
Luther insists on dealing with the wicked with exemplary severity.
Luther admits that one seldom finds an intelligent and just
ruler. Usually, secular rulers are the craziest and worst rascals on
earth. Yet, even then, nothing should be done against them: "A
prince may violate all God's commandments; this will not make
him less an emperor or less a prince." It was a hopeless doctrine
rooted in a pessimistic view of man. Man is wicked, restless, un-

was

little

inevitable

disciplined:

how can

the prince govern according to the gospel?

CALVIN
Jean Chauvin or John Calvin (1509-1564) expressed his poideas in his Institutes of the Christian Religion

begun in
France and completed in Basel the following
year. Its first edition, in Latin, published in March 1536 and containing six chapters, was followed by others in French in 1541,

litical

1534

in his native

1559, 1560.
ters. It is in

The last contained fifty-four books and eighty chapBook IV, chapter 20, that Calvin presents his theory

of civil society.
Civil society, the natural

community linked by

political ties,

he distinguished from the Christian community united by super-


IV.

154]

From Medieval

to

Modern Times

natural bonds; but in the final analysis the separation of the two,

already not too pronounced in the Institutes, was practically ef-

faced
ciety

when he

himself held the power in Geneva. Calvin's

at least potentially, a Christian society.

is,

civil so-

The day

it

will

he would wish and as it should, its primary funcbe to defend and protect a single religion and a single
religious group: Calvinism. So much so that Calvin makes his
ideal state completely subservient to religion and reduces secular
exist properly as

tion will

government to a church department.

Calvin's civil society has three elements: the magistrates, the

law, the people.

these

must be

by God

To

ensure the community a beneficent order,

in close collaboration.

The

magistrates are ordained

men. Their office is not only

lawful but exalted and, in a sense, sacred. For they are ministers
of God and their mission is to preserve public tranquillity and
morality. They punish the wicked and do so justly and severely
with "a fully drawn sword." While the magistrate is a living law,
the law is a "silent magistrate." Every just law is to be accepted
and obeyed. Laws that are unjust, laws that violate equity, are null
and void. (It is with this notion of equity that Calvin introduces a
criterion that in due time will make it possible for the citizens to
indicate which laws are to be rejected.) The people obey with
love and reverence. They accept authority willingly and joyfully.
for the welfare of their fellow

Their submission to the magistrates

essary evil but a positive

is

not a resignation to a nec-

homage analogous

to that given

God

Obedience and respect must mark

the people's attitude toward even unworthy and despotic rulers.
Should civil power, then, be abused or should it be inspired by a
spirit other than Christian, let the people remain submissive and
repent and pray. Only when the laws conflict with God's laws are
the citizens dispensed from obedience; but even then their resistance may be only passive and respectfully manifested. Vainly
would one search in Calvin's theory for a justification of active
through the virtue of

religion.

resistance to despots.

Yet Calvinism, as a historical fact, helped the rise of democsome strange way it exercised a powerful impact on
the intellectual movements that led the revolt against absolutism.
The reason for this is to be found in certain elements or factors
that were at the very foundation of Calvinism: a pronounced individualism, expressed especially in the notion of equity, which was

racy, for in

Introductory XII.

[155

and even encourage the free judgment of individual citizens as to which laws should be disregarded in conscience; the
moral responsibility so deeply injected into the doctrine of political action; the very organization of the Calvinist church (the presbytery, a council or court of elders), which rejected the neat
hierarchical pattern and class distinctions. Moreover, though undeniably autocratic in character, Calvin felt an intense dislike for
to permit

royalty

and for whatever leaned

to a class-conscious mentality.

BODIN AND HOBBES

If

Machiavelli and Luther helped the rise of absolutism, Bodin

and Hobbes may be considered its outstanding philosophers, and

James I and Bossuet its most famous portraitists and panegyrists.
Bodin (1530-1596), with his Republique, supplied the modern principle of the state's essence
its sovereignty. He was one of
the first to grasp and give expression to an extremely important
idea
the idea that political authority, the power of the state
whereby laws are established and enforced, is above all human
laws and that, to find out who is the sovereign in the state, one
need only look for the single individual or the collective body
truly and permanently vested with such power by the constitution.
To this idea Hobbes (1588-1679) added a new element that
helped the cause of absolutism as well as that of arbitrariness. For

the author of Leviathan, state sovereignty as vested in the absolute

ruler

is

not only inalienable, indivisible, and unpunishable;

it is

moral limitations, even those deriving from natural

law. Moreover, Hob bes justifi es absolutism on the ground that
man's nature being r^ic^llyjvicious--and nasty and man's instincts
also free of all

_pejiiltemlj;^nJisocjaLJlie--c>^y check
authority.

Without

it

phasized Bodin's contention that

all

the manors, the guilds, the towns,

claim independence vis-a-vis the

JAMES

is

centralized

and absolute

anarchy would reign. Finally, Hobbes emintermediate groups (such as

and even the Church) could not

state.

AND BOSSUET

James I (king of England from 1603 to 1625) was another

champion of absolutism. He is known for his insistence on the
theory of the divine right of kings as the justification for exacting

From Medieval

IV.

156]

to

Modern Times

was almost an
and he defended it in several pamphlets
and books: The True Law of Free Monarchies (1603), An Apolfor the
ogy for the Oath of Allegiance (1607), Declaration
Right of Kings (1615). The divine right theory maintained that
the state is a direct creation of God, its ruler divinely appointed
through dynastic hereditary right and responsible to none but God.
Thus, for James I, obedience to the state and the monarch was
both a civil and a religious duty, and resistance to or rebellion
against them was never morally right no matter how incapable,
wicked, and despotic the ruler. The king was not only under no
man but also under no law. 4
In France, where absolutism reached its zenith with Louis
XIV, the presentation and exaltation of a somewhat modified divine right theory became the task of Bishop Jacques-Benigne
Bossuet (1627-1704), the famous orator of the royal chapel who
was, from 1670 to 1679, tutor to the king's only son. In his Poliperfect obedience

from

obsession with James

his subjects. This doctrine

3 It continued to

was

still

haunt the other Stuarts. As late as 1681 Charles II

believe and maintain that our Kings derive not
from the people but from God; that to him only they are ac-

asserting:

their title

countable; that
to

it

"We

belongs not to subjects, either to create or censure, but

honour and obey

their sovereign,

who comes

to

be so by a fundamental

hereditary right of succession, which no religion, no law, no fault or forfeiture

can

alter or diminish."

Quoted by

the Divine Right of Kings (Cambridge:

J.

N. Figgis

The University

in

The Theory of

Press, 1896), p. 6.

4 Absolute kings and their supporters held that the law was no more
than the will of the sovereign. Against this view were those who believed
in a law of God and nature, as well as in a common law of the land, to
all, kings and subjects, were to bow. This is what Sir Edward Coke
(1552-1634) meant when in 1608, notwithstanding the peril of losing his
head, he dramatically flung in the furious face of absolutist James I, Bracton's immortal words: "The king ought not to be under man, but under
God and the law" (sub Deo et lege). Though not by way of defending a
lost cause, one is tempted to remark that in pre-revolutionary Europe, in
the despised ages of divine right, a king, while claiming to be above the
law, at least recognized his duty to obey God and to respect the basic rules
of the realm. But when a kind of "democracy" came (the Jacobin or totalitarian democracy or continental liberalism), all sovereign powers were
transferred to the "people" without the restrictions that had until then accompanied their exercise (God's law and the sobering thought of God's
judgment). See on this point B. de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, translated by J.
F. Huntington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); also R.
Guardini, Die Macht, Versuch einer Wegweisung (Wurzburg: Werkbund,
1951), pp. 37f.

which


Introductory XII.

[157

Derived from the Sacred Scripture, Bossuet describes monarchy. It is sacred: the king's power comes from God directly; he
tics

God's vicar on earth; not only his office but also his person is
sacred; to revolt, even against the king who rules tyrannically,
is a sacrilege. It is absolute: the king is not obliged to render an
is

is no appeal against his judgment; he

some laws but he is not subject to their penal-

account to anyone; there

may be

subject to

ties. It is

paternalistic: the king is a father to his people; therefore

he must be dedicated to their welfare and deal with them with

kindness and firmness; on the other hand, the people must love

and respect him as children their father. It must be reasonablegovernment is a function that implies knowledge of law and men,
the ability to recognize the opportunity for action and how and
when to speak or listen, the art of gathering information and
choosing good counselors, the science of making decisions alone
all of which require an intelligent, prudent, alert monarch. It
must be just: absolute government must never become arbitrary;
the former is a legitimate regime, for under it the citizens are free
and their property inviolable; the latter is a corruption of power,
for it tramples upon individual freedom and security and has no
respect for the subjects' property.

THE MONARCHOMACS
While some writers favored absolutism for such a wide variety
among them Catholics and Calvinists (not
Lutherans), were fighting it for several and, frequently, differing
of reasons, others,

motives.

As

resisting

it

a rule,

all

agreed on limiting the royal power and even

There are famous expressions

in certain circumstances.

of this doctrine of containment

and

resistance.

Hotman's Franco-Gallia (1573)

than

political, that,

ideal

monarchy

is

a treatise,

more

historical

through a study of French history, sees the

in the elective type subject to the "estates" or na-

tional assembly.

Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579) by Junius Brutus (prob-

pseudonym

for Hubert Languet) presents the idea of the

by which the people made the kings, to show the
legitimate foundation of non-obedience and resistance and revolt

ably a

political contract

not only in matters of religion but also

stake;

it

when

holds the monarch accountable to

natural rights are at

God and

the people,

IV.

158]

and declares the

latter

From Medieval

to

Modern Times

both guarantor of and party to the contract.

This was a

new

political principle that, variously

interpreted,

was

to inspire

and

justify the English,

expounded and
American, and

French revolutions.

De

iure regni

the Scots, 1579),

apud Scotos (On the Law of the Realm among

by George Buchanan, is a defense of the doc-

trine of tyrannicide.

De
Henry

iusta abdicatione Enrici III

III,

1591), a

work by

(On

the Just Abdication of

a Parisian priest, Boucher, defends

the right of the people to depose and even to

he become a despot. Boucher

insists that

kill their

king should

by choosing a king the

people are not deprived of their power and that no other

is

more

De

just

than one undertaken for

home and

civil

war

altar.

(On the Power of

Commonwealth on Kings, 1591), by Rose, Bishop
and member of the League, 5 reasserts the usual mon-

reipublicae christianae in reges potestate

the Christian

of Senlis

archomac

De

principles

and refutes the objections

to them.

rege et regis institutione (1599), by the Spanish Jesuit

Juan de Mariana, emphatically

justifies

the killing of the tyrant

(not only the usurper but also the legitimate ruler

when he abuses

his authority).

Politics Systematically

thusius, sees the

Considered (1609), by Johannes Alstate as neither absolute nor supreme

power of the

but limited by divine positive and natural laws, and the terms of
the pact with the people as the ultimate source of sovereignty.

ERASMUS AND MORE

Two

great Christian humanists also sided with the opposition.

One was the Dutch Desiderius Erasmus (14667-1536), the vagabond monk so bizarre and eccentric, yet the capital and most influential figure of his age; the theologian so

devoted to quiet schol-

arship, yet so passionately dedicated to the regeneration of

man

through the purification of religion and the Christianization of culture.

Erasmus sought,

in his

many books and voluminous

corre-

spondence, to humanize and evangelize politics, always, however,

without abrupt changes and violent revolutions. To the princes he
6 The Catholic League was an association established by intolerant
French Catholics who resented the edict of toleration of Henry III (1576)
and wanted to destroy everything that failed to meet their terms.

Introductory XII.

[159

recommended moderation, prudence, benignity. Although he did

not attack monarchy as such (in fact, he was justly called "the
and censor of monarchy"), he tried nevertheless to
prevent its declining into tyranny. For this purpose he spoke
clearly in favor of an elective monarchy and for a royal government tempered by aristocratic and democratic elements, willing to
respect or grant local freedoms and allowing everyone, especially
poets, scholars, and political philosophers, freedom of opinion and
expression. As to the tyrant, Erasmus approvingly repeats Seneca's
saying: he should hang with thieves and pirates.
A dear friend of Erasmus, Sir Thomas More (1478-1535),
shared his hatred for war and violence and injustice as well as his
desire for perfection and universality. With him More strove to
ameliorate the conditions of Church and society. In his many
treatises and particularly in Utopia (1516), 6 under the guise of
treating of French institutions or the problems of an imaginary
island, More bared the defects of monarchy and presented an ideal
the
country free of political despotism and social exploitation
two glaring evils of the England of his day. To them he opposed a
system of equality and economic control, thus anticipating by centuries general interest in such vital issues as production and distritheoretician

bution.

THE ANABAPTISTS
Monarchomacs and

Christian humanists were for the limita-

tion of political authority. Others refused to recognize

form.

great

number

at least for a time,

it

in

any

of Anabaptists followed the latter doctrine,

pushing

it

to

its

extreme consequences and giv-

ing rise to the objection of conscience (the total and absolute refusal to collaborate in

any way with the secular authority and the

The word Utopia, the name given by More to the land of his fancy,
comes from the Greek and means nowhere, no place. Other Utopian books
have since made their appearance. The long and interesting series includes
Campanella's City of the Sun (1623), Francis Bacon's New Atlantis
(1627), Harrington's Oceana (1656), Gabriel de Foigny's A New Discovery of Terra Incognita Australis (1676), Ludvig Holberg's Niels Klim's
Journey under the Ground (1741), Etienne Cabet's A Voyage to Icaria
(1845), H. G. Wells' A Modern Utopia (1905). See Negley and Patrick,
The Quest for Utopia: an Anthology of Imaginary Societies (New York:
Henry Schuman, 1952).
6

IV.

160]

The

From Medieval

to

Modern Times

and its power were considered evils in

themselves
military service was refused, no taxes were paid, even
the benefits deriving from membership in the political community
were renounced. Such was the radicalism of Gregory de Brzeziny.
Logically, in politics the Anabaptist became a prisoner of his own
criticism, and could do nothing for the redemption of the state.
Once aware of this, some Anabaptists tried to find a doctrine of
the state that would repudiate absenteeism and make possible cooperation in the promotion of justice in the very area where so
much was possible and necessary. Little by little, in Bohemia, the
secular order).

state

Low

Countries, Lithuania, Poland, the Anabaptists accepted all

burdens and rights of loyal citizens and limited their original radicalism to a humanitarian and egalitarian spirit content with constant evolution

and reform within the law.

BELLARMINE
In the history of political thought, the Italian Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), Jesuit, saint, and Doctor of the Church, is
justly famous for his treatment of two political doctrines one concerns the origin and exercise of political power; the other, the
power of the Church in the temporal order. An advocate of a
mixed monarchy and of freedom, Bellarmine maintained that the
authority of the state or political power is not (as all contractual
theorists affirm) created by men but vested or deposited by God,
following the regular course of nature, in the whole people as soon
as they have organized themselves as a civil community. He further
:

stressed that, in turn, the people, being unable to exercise politi-

bound to "communicate it to one or

was a doctrine much like that of Suarez. But, unlike
Suarez, Bellarmine went on to assert that independently of the

cal authority directly, are

several." It

terms of the "communication," the people always retain the su-

preme power radically (in habitu) and may at times actually retake and re-exercise it {in actu).
As to the power of the Church in temporalibus, Bellarmine
voiced his opinion in two central truths. These are: the Church
enjoys a universal spiritual sovereignty; both emperors and kings
(that

is, all

holders of political authority) are subject to this spirit-

ual sovereignty. His theory of the indirect

power

sequence (a theory, however, of which he

is

is

a natural con-

an outstanding ex-

Introductory XII.

[161

ponent and defender rather than the inventor). By jurisdiction of

an indirect kind Bellarmine meant "the jurisdiction which the pope
has over the temporal in

and

its

relation to the spiritual." Properly

in itself papal jurisdiction concerns the spiritual;

it

is

pos-

Church and her hierarchy only to direct

spiritual journey to eternal life. But the spir-

sessed and used by the

and guide man in his

end has primacy over the temporal end. If a conflict should
arise between the two, there is no question as to which has the last
word. Therefore, the spiritual power may on occasion extend into
the temporal order; and the occasion arises only because of "a
itual

serious reason, especially a concern of faith." Bellarmine leaves

to the

pope the decision,

in a particular instance,

on whether or

not there exists a danger to faith or morals so clear and present

When the pope inand correcting not only

private individuals but also Christian kings and emperors "in such
a way that [and here is an extreme application of Bellarmine's
doctrine] if the cause of Christ and the Church demand it, he can
strip them of their reign and empire, and transfer their royal or imperial power to others." 7
as to justify his intervention in the temporal.

tervenes, he does so

by

directing, judging,

BELLARMINE REAPPRAISED
Bellarmine's theory, directed against the doctrine of total subordination of the state to the Church and expressed in his first
volume of Controversies (in the fifth book "On the Supreme Pontiff"), was at first, to say the least, eyed with suspicion. Sixtus V

thought for a time of placing the entire book on the Index. Soon,
it was accepted by theologians and canonists until it became, throughout the Church, the classic and common dictum that
it remains today.

however,

In expounding the indirect power theory, Bellarmine's

lowers

came

to the conclusion that the state

fol-

must not only publicly

it must also recognize the true (Catholic) reThis would amount to some sort of Church and state union,
but a union not necessarily identical or coextensive with any spe-

profess religion, but

ligion.

form of union that actually obtained in a given country or

cific

period.
7
direct

Quoted

in J. Courtney Murray's "St. Robert Bellarmine on the InPower," in Theological Studies, IX (1948), 534.

IV.

162]

From Medieval

Modern Times

to

All that is essentially comprised in the union of Church and State

can be thus formulated: The State should officially recognize the

Catholic religion as the religion of the commonwealth; accordingly

it

should invite the blessing and the ceremonial participation of the

it should recognize
Church for certain important public functions
.

and sanction the laws of the Church; it should protect the rights of
the Church and the religious as well as the other rights of the Church's
members. 8

Ryan and Boland, Catholic

Principles of Politics

millan, 1948), p. 316. See also ibid., pp. 311-323.

was recently

restated

by the Rev. Francis

should not hesitate to state that even

if

of Catholics in the United States should

J.

(New York: Mac-

The

traditional theory

Connell, C.SS.R.: "Catholics

at some future time the number

become so great that they would

is no reason to believe that

would demand any special governmental favor for the Catholic
Church or restrict the freedom of other religious groups. For it would
still remain true that the evil consequences of any change of our traditional
system of full freedom for all would far outweigh the benefits, so that the
Catholics in such a hypothetical though improbable eventuality would
be acting fully within the norms laid down by their Church if they continued the American tradition of equal rights for all religions. This does
not mean that we should present the American system as ideal. However

possess the balance of voting power, there

they

much we may

praise

it,

as far as our land

is

preferable to the system in which the one true

concerned,

it

is

not per se

Church would be acknowl-

edged and specially favored.

We must not, therefore, regard the
American system as the best, absolutely speaking, even though we may
justly praise the liberty which the Church enjoys in our land. Above all,
we may not condemn the system of concord and cooperation between
Church and State which Christ willed to be the proper situation when
circumstances permit that is, in a land where Catholicism is the religion
of practically all the people and there exists a long-standing Catholic tra.

dition.

Neither should

we

object, at least as far as principles are involved,

which Catholic nations of our own day are placing on

non-Catholic propaganda. We have no reason to be ashamed of the doctrine of Church and State as proclaimed by the Catholic Church. In addition to the fact that it is based on the law laid down by the Son of God,
it is paralleled by the practice of certain non-Catholic sects. Why should
we hesitate to speak of the union of the Catholic Church with the State as
desirable per se in a Catholic land, when we have examples of a union between a Protestant church and the State in Protestant lands, such as England and the Scandinavian nations?
On historical grounds there is much
more reason to expect that a Protestant sect would seek special governmental favors in our land than the Catholic Church, since the only instances of state established churches we have had in America were of
Protestant organizations" ("The Relationship Between Church and State,"
The Jurist, XIII [October, 1953], 412-414). For a brief discussion of
to the restrictions


Introductory XII.

[163

Concerning members of other religions, neither unbaptized persons

nor those born into a non-Catholic sect must ever be coerced to
accept the Catholic faith. Within certain limits at least, the state
should tolerate their mode of worship. But propagandizing the erroneous doctrine among Catholics is to be forbidden. Of course,
these propositions (constituting the Catholic thesis) apply only
in the ideal condition, that

speaking, a state

population

is

is

is,

in a Catholic state

and, roughly

when the overwhelming majority of the

Then the state must permanently and un-

Catholic

Catholic.

by them. In other states the so-called hypothesis

Church is simply to be content with "the more
would
or less generous treatment accorded by the laws of the country to
associations" and with taking advantage "without restrictions or
alterably abide

apply: the

privileges of the rights of the

common

law."

Recently the entire problem of Church and state relations underwent a new scrutiny and Bellarmine's traditional theory was
thoroughly reappraised by some Catholic theologians and philosophers. Outstanding

among them

are the

American

Jesuit

John

Courtney Murray, a theologian, and the French Jacques Maritain,

a philosopher. It is too early even to try to read in their writings
a complete and definitive statement of their view

Both are

still

haps they themselves have not yet reached a

lution.

on the

in the process of crystallizing their concepts,

But on one aspect of the

full

and

subject.

and per-

satisfying so-

issue (whether the state should

choose tolerance or intolerance) Murray and Maritain seem more

or less agreed.

system of legal and friendly (not theological and

inimical) "separation" of
in

America,

may be

Church and

justified

(in hypothesi), but also

state as exists, for instance,

not only on the level of expediency

on the

level of principle

(in thesi). In

other words, should even the condition of an overwhelming Catho-

majority be realized, there is nothing in the Church's doctrine

and tradition that would prevent her from accepting or preferring
a Church-state relationship different from the confessional state

lic

nothing to
its

logical

make her
and

establishment as the unica status religio, with

juridical

consequences (such as a certain degree of

intolerance and, specifically, the governmental repression of hereti-

Church and state relations in general, see Schmandt and Steinbicker,

Fundamentals of Government (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), pp. 189-201.
9

Code of

1952), p. 40.

Social Principles, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Catholic Social Guild,

IV.

164]
cal

From Medieval

Modern Times

to

propaganda), the automatic and necessary choice. This,

at

least in Murray's later view, would not mean that the establishment is to be a priori condemned. It means simply that, in this
question of Church and state, the principles always valid (of them-

selves transtemporal

and not

to

be tampered with in any way) are

its own area and the

the independence of the two societies each in

necessity of their cooperation.

concrete interpretation of these

principles results, in turn, in the positing of three other principles

and permanent: (1) the Church,

and sanctify; the Christian people are free to believe, obey, receive the sacraments and
other means of sanctification; (2) there must be harmony between
state laws and Church laws, whereby man's life is governed, between the social and political institutions of the commonwealth
and the demands of the Christian soul; (3) there must exist an
ordered bilateral cooperation between Church and state. In the fulfillment of these three principles in the best possible way in each
given age and place and situation Murray sees the only and substantially immutable Catholic exigence. What others term thesis
and hypothesis disappear from the system of Church-state relations. The "disjunctive" theory of Bellarmine and his followers is
replaced by Murray's "unitary" view. The confessional state or a
legal separation in a democratic form of political society becomes
but a means whereby the unchanging principles are applied in this
or that historical milieu. Where and when and whether their application should take this or that form becomes a matter of human
prudence. As often as the choice is to be made, one faces a quaestio facti
the question of the public good and of what better suits
it at the moment: and a question of fact refuses by its very essence
an arbitrary or preconceived answer. Indeed, no ideal solution is
that are equally firm, absolute,
as a spiritual power,

is

free to teach, rule,

possible, for a question of fact

with the
pect

is

human

living

condition of error and

evil.

men

deals necessarily

The most one can

ex-

that the solution (intolerance or tolerance, confessional

state or otherwise)

peace.

among

be useful, that

Murray does not say

tolerance, or vice versa. It

is,

conducive to the unity of

that intolerance per se

all

depends:

in a democratic country the ultimate

if

is

better than

the lay statesman (and

statesman

is

the people,

whose mind must be prudently sounded and weighed), having

heard on this matter of mutual concern the head of the Church,
chooses the establishment,

this

might be the better law in that

in-

Introductory XII.

[165

on the other hand, intolerance is rejected (as inviting

faith, sowing confusion and disunity, or bringing
about a universally displeasing and disturbing reversal of a traditional law of the country), then tolerance to other sects and cults
stance.

If,

hatred of the

will

have to be considered the best legal decision in the circumon a policy (an application of

stances. In other words, in deciding

approach to the question of Church and

on an ideal prefabricated thesis, but on the

principles), the proper

state is

not insistence

embody

public usefulness of the law that will

the choice of the

moment. One cannot ask less, or more, of a state (or statesmen)

than that it make a good law
a just, useful, honest law, all things
considered. Any time a good law is made wherein the three absolute principles find a proper application, the Church may well feel
that her inalienable rights are adequately met and protected.
In regard to the American system of Church and state relations (embodied in the first amendment), Murray maintains that
the American Catholic, loyal to his Church and loyal to his country and its political tradition, justly sees therein a good law and
has no desire to change it. The American political tradition has

nothing in

common

with the sectarianism of the Jacobin ideology

or even with the unilateral and secularistic slogan,

"A

free

Church

whether in its rigid form,

by the French Law of Separation of 1905, or in its
moderate form, which holds that in theory Church and state are
supreme societies but in practice each should pursue its aim its
own unconcerned way, was vigorously and repeatedly rejected by
the popes: Gregory XVI with the encyclical Mirari vos (1832);

in a free State." Continental liberalism,

as exemplified

Pius

IX

in the Syllabus

(1864), a

list

of eighty propositions held

erroneous by the Church; Leo XIII in the encyclicals Immortale

Dei (1885), entirely dedicated to the Christian constitution of the

state, and Libertas praestantissimum (1888), on the true meaning
of freedom in general and on the freedom of speech, press, teaching, and conscience in particular; Benedict XV in the encyclical

Ad

beatissimi (1914).

Church and

On

the contrary, the

American policy of
amendment

state relations, as expressed in the first

("Congress shall

make no laws

respecting an establishment of re-

ligion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"), has

no

theological

Leo
no way be
being likewise directed against the American consti-

connotation, sectarian inspiration, or inimical implications.

XIII's condemnation of continental liberalism can in

construed as

IV.

166]

From Medieval

to

tutional provision that places a limitation

power

common

for the sake of the

Leonine

texts

Modern Times
on the governmental

good. In addition to the

and other pertinent documents, an

attentive reading

of Pius XII's addresses to the National Convention of Italian

Catholic Jurists (December

1953) and the Tenth International

7, 1955) is indispensable if one would penetrate the mind of the Church on the whole
subject of tolerance and intolerance. 10
In summary, this is how Murray states the problem and his
6,

Congress of Historical Sciences (September

answer:

Can

the

Church accept

as a valid adaptation of principle to the

legitimate idea of democratic

government and to the

historically de-

veloped idea of "the people" (to which democratic government appeals for

its

legitimacy), a constitutional system of Church-state rela-

tions with these three characteristics:

(1) the freedom of the

Church

guaranteed in a guarantee to the people of the free exercise of religion; (2) the harmony of law and social institutions with the demand
is

of Christian conscience

through the

medium

is

to be effected

by the people themselves

of free political institutions and freedom of asso-

10 For the text of Pius XII's address to Italian Catholic Jurists, see
The Catholic Mind, LII (April, 1954), 244. A bibliography of the recent
controversy on the subject of Church-state relations necessarily includes
Murray's "Governmental Repression of Heresy," Proceedings of the Third
Annual Meeting (Chicago: The Catholic Theological Society of America,
1948), pp. 26-101; his articles in Theological Studies from 1945 to 1954
(important passages from which are found in A Church-State Anthology:
The Work of Father Murray, ed. by V. R. Yanitelli, reprinted from Thought,
XXVII [Spring, 1952]); J. Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1951), chap. VI, "Church and State," pp. 147-187; G. W.
Shea, "Catholic Doctrine and 'Religion of State,' " American Ecclesiastical
Review, CXXIII (1950), 161-174; A. Messineo, "Democrazia e liberta
religiosa," Civiltd Cattolica, CII (1951), 126-137; J. C. Fenton, "The
Status of a Controversy," American Ecclesiastical Review, CXXJV (1951),
451-458; F. J. Connell, "Christ, The King of Civil Rulers," American Ecclesiastical Review, CXIX, No. 4 (October, 1948), 244-253; "Reply to
Father Murray," American Ecclesiastical Review, CXXVI, No. 1 (January,
1953), 49-59; "The Relationship Between Church and State," The Jurist,
XIII, No. 4 (October, 1953). See also A. Leonard, "Liberty of Faith and
Civil Tolerance," Tolerance and the Catholic, ed. by Yves Congar (New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); "L'Eglise et les liberies dans l'histoire,"

L'Eglise et la liberti (Paris: P. Horay, 1952), pp. 195-229; V. White, "Re-

Commonweal, LVTII, No. 22 (September 4, 1953),

531-534; D. Rover, "Religious Tolerance," Commonweal, LIX, No. 18

ligious Tolerance,"

(February

5,

1954), 450-452.

Introductory XII.
ciation;

(3)

[167
Church and

the cooperation between

state takes these

freedom of the
Church and all her institutional activities, (b) the effort of the state
to perform its own function of justice, social welfare, and the favoring
within society of those conditions of order and freedom necessary for
forms:

three

human development,
of a

laity,

protection

constitutional

(a)

its

Christian and civic responsibilities, to effect

that christianization of society in all

and oblige the

Church, through the action

(c) the effort of the

conscious of

of the

its

dimensions which will enable

as the instrument of society, to function in a

state,

Christian sense? This lengthy question

is

not to be transformed into a

Can the Church at last come to terms with ConLiberalism? The answer to that nineteenth-century question is
nineteenth-century answer: No. But when the nineteenth-cen-

brief tendentious one:

tinental
still

the

tury question has been given

tieth-century question

still

nineteenth-century answer, the twen-

its

remains unanswered.

inclined to answer in the affirmative.

To

The Church

it,

can,

as put, I
if

am

she wishes,

permit her principles of freedom, harmony, and cooperation thus to be

applied to the political reality of the democratic state. The application
of each of the three principles (freedom, harmony, cooperation) can

be

justified in

terms of traditional Catholic thought, political and the-

ological. 11

SUAREZ
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617)

is probably the greatest of all

one of the greatest political scientists
of the sixteenth or any other century. His contribution to political
thought is an outstanding example of what Catholic scholarship is
capable of offering. Returning to the doctrinal syntheses of the

Jesuit thinkers

and

certainly

monumental work, placed nature

and man in their proper position ("neither too high nor too low").
But Suarez's return to the purest tradition was not a falling back
thirteenth century, Suarez, in his

or even a slowing

down

of the

march

of intellectual progress.

He

re-presented the truth, eternal and therefore ancient and always

new, and applied

The

political

et legislatore

later

it

to current

philosophy of

Deo (1612) and

work that Suarez analyzes

raised

by the Protestants, and

problems in a remarkable way.

Suarez is found in his De legibus
Dejensio

fidei

(1613).

11 J.

C. Murray, "The Problem

XII (June, 1951), 165.

of

State

Religion,"

the

power

refutes their divine right theory.

developed the arguments advanced by Bellarmine

Studies,

It is in

the question of the origin of

He

and added
Theological

IV.

168]

From Medieval

Modern Times

to

own to prove again that power is not vested immediparticular

individual and that nature does not make
any
ately in
Originally,
he maintains, the public power to rule
princes or kings.
(and especially to make laws) dwells in the community as a whole,
that is, in the general will of the "moral organism" that is the state,
as soon as it has been established in conformity to God's will
through a meeting or consent hie et nunc of human wills. Then,
others of his

by an

act of the

same community,

or that individual or group.

The

acter of both a quasi-alienation

power

that

"delegation"

and a

ever by the terms of the contract.

It

of the right use of the public

it

was

transferred.

The

delegated to this
the char-

howcommunity the
the pact and especially

transfer, conditioned

leaves the

guarantor and judge of the observance of

whom

is

may have

power by the person or persons to

"delegation" bears upon or sets up

any form of government that pleases the consenting general will:

monarchy, even a temporary monarchy (whereby a king is elected
for a time only), aristocracy, democracy; but the choice, once
made, binds future generations. For Suarez constitutional law is
of capital importance and must be adhered to faithfully: once it
has been decided to place the public power in royal or aristocratic
hands, the community no longer has the right to withdraw that authority

and give

it

to others. This

would be

legal only

of delegation the people retained such a right, or

if

if

in the act

customs (which

some countries take the place of a written constitution) entitled

them to do so. Finally, in any case, when tyranny clearly sets in

in

(and there is tyranny when the king or any other person or group
holding supreme authority in the state governs against the com-

mon

good), the public power, which by

to the collective welfare,

is

forfeited

its

very essence

is

directed

by the despot himself. Then

the people find themselves in the exceptional situation of having

power to a new and worthy incumbent.

Suarez does not favor absolute government. In his doctrine, as

to transfer the public

already noted, political authority

essence of public power

is first

of

whose only aim

all
is

limited

by the very

the promotion of the

common temporal happiness of the members of the state. A government that would not promote this end would automatically
outlaw itself. Suarez recognizes other restrictions. An internal
limitation could well arise

dinate communities

from a grant of freedom

(vassal states,

cities,

to

subor-

provinces), in which

case the public power would be morally obliged to respect such

Introductory XII.
local liberties

and

[169
Other limitations, called external

privileges.

because they derive from the relations of the state with other
societies, are the results of the Church's indirect power and the
of the international order.

realities

For Suarez the Church

is

another "perfect" society furnishing the faithful the totality of

means for their spiritual aim: eternal salvation. As such, the

Church possesses a power of jurisdiction that entitles her to certain positive rights: precisely, all rights without which she would
be unable to

fulfill

her mission (the guiding of

men

to eternal

happiness); hence, even the right to reach into matters that are as
a rule of strict secular concern

when (and only when)

they truly

affect in particular instances the spiritual welfare of the faithful.

Suarez wants no confusion of the two societies, the political and

the ecclesiastical, neither confusion at the expense of the

Church

(Luther and James I) nor at the expense of the state (Calvin).

Both societies though they should collaborate closely, for their

combined aim is man's total happiness are clearly distinguished
by reason of their origin, purpose, and organization. The state in
general is from God as Creator and therefore a society willed by

natural law; in particular (this or that state),

human

wills consenting to its establishment.

other hand,
wise,

the

Church's

is

the product of

a supernatural society founded directly by

state's
is

it is

The Church, on

aim

is

the

God. Like-

man's temporal happiness while the

man's supernatural beatitude. Finally, the

ritorially limited; therefore there is

enclosed by set boundaries.

On

extending over the entire earth.

state is ter-

a plurality of political societies

the contrary, the

The other

Church

is

one,

external limitation de-

from the ius gentium the reality of neighboring states with

and customs, and above all from international society as
a whole. Suarez admits that an international society as a supreme,
legal organism with power to issue universal laws does not exist
and never did. Yet he asserts that there is an international life constituted by the relations of nations between themselves that calls
for certain rules of solidarity and mutual aid and gives rise to reciprocal rights and duties. It is the sum total of these rights and
obligations that constitutes the ius gentium, both the law among
nations
ius gentium propriissime dictum or public international
law and the law between citizens of different nations ius gentium proprium or private international law. Suarez adds that all
rives

their laws

international

regulations,

as

found in customary law, emanate

IV.

170]

more or

less

mental rule

From Medieval

from natural law:

is

their

to

Modern Times

most elementary and funda-

"pacta sunt servanda" (agreements must be kept)

while other principal rules concern diplomatic representation, commercial pacts, peace treaties, and even war.

VITORIA, SUAREZ, GROTIUS

In his concern with the laws governing
tions,

states in their interrela-

Suarez continued and perfected the excellent work of a

fel-

low Spaniard, the Dominican Francisco Vitoria (1480-1546),

whose treatises On the Indians Recently Discovered and On the
Law of War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians are classics
in the history of the doctrinal development of international law.
In turn, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who acknowledged and utilized the findings of Vitoria and Suarez,
further developed the science of the law of nations. It was he who
clearly defined the ius gentium as a predominantly human law obtaining inter civitates, that is, between states. Unlike Suarez, who
had represented it as a matter of a few rules deriving more or less
directly from natural law, he saw in it an abundance of precepts
touching international relations in fact, he saw in it many more

rules than those

contained in the

and Suarez, viewed natural

the ultimate foundation of international law and the uni-

natural law.

law as

(affecting relations of states)

But Grotius,

like Vitoria

versally valid criterion for judging the behavior of nations.

Of

meant divine law. But in a

well-known statement he formulated a hypothesis whose weight
and consequences he did not measure: the hypothesis, abhorrent
to him personally, that natural law would be valid even though
"there were no God and human affairs would not concern him."
With this pronouncement he unintentionally opened the way to
naturalism and rationalism. Soon others repeated his statement not
as something assumed merely for the sake of argument but as a
true and undeniable principle. Thus natural law became a product
of human reason. Grotius' justly famous work, De jure belli ac
pads {On the Law of War and Peace, 1625), treats principally
of the law of war ("whether any war is lawful, and what is lawful
in war") and little or only incidentally of the law of peace. 12
course, even for Grotius natural law

On Grotius' life and his and other jurists' contribution to the docdevelopment of the law of nations, see A. Nussbaum, A Concise His-

12
trinal

Introductory XII.

[171

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bellarmine. De laicis or The Treatise on Civil Government. Trans,
by K. E. Murphy. New York: Fordham University Press, 1928.
Calvin, J. On God and Political Duty. Ed. with an Introduction by
J. T. McNeill. 2nd ed. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956.
Grotius, H. Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace. Trans, by
F. W. Kelsey. Introduction by E. Dumbauld. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957 (New York, 1925).
More, T. Utopia. Ed. by H. V. S. Ogden. New York: Crofts Clas1949.

sics,

Pico della Mirandola. Oration on the Dignity of Man. Trans, by

A. R. Caponigri. Introduction by Russell Kirk. Chicago: Gate-

way Books, 1956.

Allen,

J.

tury.

W. A

History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Cen-

London: Methuen, 1928.

Canavan, F.

P. "Subordination of the State to the

ing to Suarez,"

Theological Studies, XII

Church Accord-

(September,

1951),

354-364.

Gough,

J.

W. The

Social Contract:

Critical

Study of

Its

Develop-

ment. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

J. Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau. New
York: Scribner, 1955.
Rager, J. C. Political Philosophy of Bl. Cardinal Bellarmine. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1926.
Weigel, G. "Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, Selections,"
in The Great Books. Ed. by H. Gardiner. New York: Devin-

Maritain,

Adair, 1951. Vol.

Ill,

pp. 69-79.

tory of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954). See also the
various works of James Brown Scott, particularly his Introductions to

Grotius'

De

jure belli ac

pads and

in Classics of International

1925 and 1944).

Selections

from Three Works of Suarez

Law (New York: Oxford

University Press,

chapter

xiii

Machiavelli

LIFE

NICCOLO

MACHIAVELLI, the son of a Florentine lawyer,

in Florence on May 3, 1469. The span of his life

was born

coincided with one of the most vital and crucial periods in man's
history.

Shortly before his birth, Johann Gutenberg

had given

1492 Columbus discovered

opened the Cape route to the
at Newfoundland; in 1500 Cabral disMagellan began his voyage around the
world. These years were also marked by a revival of classical learning and a new artistic movement that literally swept across Europe.
This was the time, too, when the medieval view of a society unified under pope and emperor dimmed, if it did not completely disappear. In Germany and Switzerland there rose new prophets
who challenged the pope's primacy, subverted old principles, and
sought to change the very structure of the Church of Christ. In
Italy, while the great masters enriched the world with paintings
and sculpture, their countrymen were almost constantly in the
throes of civil v/ar
which situation was intolerably aggravated by
the perennial interference of foreign rulers and mercenary troops.
Florence was no exception. Through the work of three generations of Medici, the government of the beautiful city on the Arno
the world the printing
America; in 1497 Vasco
East and Cabot landed
covered Brazil; in 1519

press;

da

in

Gama

Machiavelli
had

drifted into tyranny.

less revolution

[173

XIII.

But

finally, in

1494, a surprisingly blood-

put a temporary end to the Medici dictatorship and

the old civil liberties were restored.

Florence immediately fell under the domination of the ascetic

Girolamo Savonarola. For four years the Dominican friar imposed
his evangelical radicalism on the "subtle minds and restless spirits"
of the Florentine people. He gave them a constitution similar to
that of Venice, based on civil and universal law, and he rapidly
and successfully reformed the republic's internal life. But Savonarola's wide following soon dwindled and he found himself the target of a political and religious storm. It was an indignant and embittered Savonarola

death.

On May

who

after dramatic events

was condemned

to

23, 1498, the prophet with the voice of the whirl-

wind was hanged and burned at the stake.

Machiavelli had witnessed Savonarola's rise and fall. He had
pondered the revolutionary merits of religion only to conclude
that unarmed prophets
prophets relying solely on Christian virtue and prayer
must inevitably fail. Success must look to sterner
means, the chief of which is force. It was a lesson Machiavelli
would not forget.
A few weeks after Savonarola's execution, on June 15, 1498,
the twenty-nine-year-old Machiavelli was appointed Secretary of
the Second Chancery of the Florentine Republic. Soon afterward
he was placed at the disposal of the Ten of Liberty and Peace, a

committee of elected magistrates charged particularly with the

conduct of foreign policy. Machiavelli held this office for fourteen

which he busied himself, as a dutiful bureaucrat,

treaties, and sending instructions to
Florentine diplomats abroad. It was a mediocre position, poorly
remunerated, somewhat dull, with little room for personal initiative and little promise of advancement. Machiavelli was one of the

years, during

keeping records, drafting

many
and

this-worldly philosophers

tell it

who know

the secret of success

to others yet never succeed themselves.

But the Florentine government, not blind to Machiavelli's

on occasion entrust him with a more glamorous
responsibility. From time to time, Machiavelli was sent abroad
with Florentine legations as observer and consultant. These diplomatic missions forty-six in all allowed him to study men and
institutions. From the background he intently watched the game of
politics as it was played in that exuberant and tumultuous age. In
capabilities, did

IV.

174]

1500 we

find

him

From Medieval

to

in France, at the court of

Modern Times

Louis XII; in 1502 he

Caesar Borgia, the Duke of Valentino, "a very splendid and

magnificent lord," fresh from his conquest of Romagna; in 1503

visits

he witnesses the election of Julius II, the archenemy of the Borgia;

in 1504 he is back in France; in 1506 when Julius II is planning
the conquest of Bologna he returns to Rome; and in 1507 he is
sent to the court of Emperor Maximilian. The military spirit and
organization of the

German people

fascinated him. "Their sol-

he wrote, "do not cost them anything, for all their people
are armed and trained." He proposed a similar organization of the
diers,"

Florentines to rid his city of the unreliable mercenaries. Machiavelli

had

his

way, but the people's army proved no better in

its

attempt to save the Republic.

In 1512 the Medici re-entered Florence and regained control.

The

fall

of the Republic brought with

Machiavelli was

first

it

the

fall

of

its

secretary.

deprived of his post and then exiled from

Florence by separate decrees of the

new

regime. And, as

if

this

were not enough, the following year (1513) he was accused of

participation in a conspiracy against Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici.
"I almost lost my life," he writes, "but God and my innocence
saved me. I have experienced all evils, including imprisonment."
He was released from jail when the Cardinal became Pope Leo X.
Machiavelli then retired to a farm near San Casciano with his
wife and children. Making the most of his painful isolation, he devoted himself to the study of the classics. As he confesses in a page
often quoted, he sought in the company of the great of old the
peace he had never found among the living. In this country retreat Machiavelli wrote his famous works, among them The Prince
(the manuscript of which he dedicated in 1514 to Lorenzo de'
Medici, nephew of Leo X) and The Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy.
After

the

death

of

Lorenzo

de'

Medici,

Leo

helped

Machiavelli return to Florence, where he was given a modest posi-

May of 1527 the Medici were again

overthrown and the Republic restored. Machiavelli's old office was
tion in the government. In

man was
head it. Shortly afterward Machiavelli fell violently ill
and on June 22 of the same year, having received the sacraments
of the Church, he died, at the age of 58, leaving his wife and five
also restored but, to his bitter disappointment, another

called to

children.

Machiavelli

[175

XIII.

For more than two centuries Machiavelli's remains lay unhonored. Then, in 1787, a tomb was erected in his memory in
Santa Croce of Florence near monuments to Dante, Galileo, Mi-

and other illustrious Italians. It bears the inNicolaus Machiascription: Tanto nomini nullum par elogium
velli (There is no praise that can do justice to so great a name).

chelangelo, Rossini,

POLITICAL WRITINGS
Machiavelli was a prolific writer. His numerous works, written in excellent style, reveal his varied talents and exceptional culture, as well as a

They may be

keen understanding of men's motives and habits.

and political. In

classed as historical, purely literary,

The Discourses on the First Decade of Titus

The Art of War, and The Prince.
The Discourses consist of three books in which the author,
who saw his political ideal realized in the life and institutions of
ancient Rome, comments on Livy's history. In The Art of War,
Machiavelli praises the military structure of the Romans, voices
the last category are

Livy,

his

contempt for mercenaries, and seeks to present a

scientific

theory of the military strategy and tactics of his time. But

chiefly in

The Prince

velli is universally

that the political doctrine for

known

is

it

is

which Machia-

contained. This treatise of less than

a hundred pages discusses, in twenty-six short chapters, what a

principality

quired,

how

is,

the varieties of principalities,

held,

how

how

they are ac-

lost.

WHY THE PRINCE

Why did Machiavelli write The Prince? The immediate motive
was a personal one. It was a plea directed to the Medici to be allowed to return to Florence and to public life in any kind of governmental

office.

This bid

larly in the closing lines,

to his forced inactivity at

patriotic

was

is

apparent in the dedication, particu-

when he

alludes, not without resentment,

San Casciano.

second motive

the

Machiavelli's love for Italy: his great passion to

see her free of barbarians, united under a capable leader, mistress

of her fate.

The concluding chapter is a fiery exhortation to LoDuke of Urbino, to become the new prince of an

renzo de' Medici,

Italy

From Medieval

IV.

176]

Modern Times

to

more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Permore scattered than the Athenians; without a head, without

sians,

order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated,

to follow

Then

any standard

there

was a

if

and overrun

ready and willing

only there be some one to raise

third motive, not less important,

the subtlest. Machiavelli's psychological motive

was

it.

and probably
redeem the

to

and vindicate his own political philosophy,. Two prophets, one unarmed, the other armed, had made an
indelible impression on Machiavelli. Savonarola had been guilty
/ of the unpardonable sin, for in politics there is no order unless it
Vis backed and, if necessary, enforced by arms. When Machiavelli,
the man of ideas, met Caesar Borgia, the man of action, he im-

memory

of Caesar Borgia

i.

mediately recognized the messiah of his expectations, the prince

beyond good and

evil.

All that he had looked for in a

Machiavelli saw in the son of Alexander VI.

trine could

be put to the acid

Now

test of reality,

new

and he was nothing

but sanguine about the outcome. Yet Caesar Borgia, the

should have succeeded,

failed.

He

failed

leader,

his political doc-

man who

"through no fault of his

own but only by the most extraordinary malignity of fortune." 2

What an epitaph for the man of his dreams! Machiavelli had
seen him at the height of his career of intrigue, war, and terror,

had
and misfortune, a

splendid as a dark angel in his criminal impunity, and then he

seen him again, a last time, broken by

prisoner of the most redoubtable

illness

enemy of his family. The absohad happened. Machiavelli,

lutely unpredictable, the impossible,

a "realist"

if

there has ever been one in history, should have

not the monopoly of unarmed

learned at this point that failure

is

prophets; the armed

But

this was one lesson Machiahe had a moment of doubt and consternation, he soon came back stronger than ever in his old belief. Yes,
Borgia had been defeated, but his spirit and the policies he incarnated were still alive. In politics there is only one way:
velli

could not learn.

fail as well.

If

Borgia's way, Machiavelli's way.

who

the Medici, or any other

unify Italy, must follow

it.

has found the

infallible system, applies

it

most favorable conditions and

i

Even

who would

leader

The

XXVI,

loses but

is

Like the gambler

carefully

under the
some-

not convinced

from The Prince and The Discourses are taken from the translation of Luigi Ricci as revised by E. R. P.
Vincent and published by The Modern Library (New York: 1940).
Prince,

2 Ibid., VII, 3.

1,

2. Selections

Machiavelli XIII.
thing,

he

tells

a sure thing

himself,

[177

went wrong today, but tomorrow

Machiavelli clung

it

will

be

obstinately to his political scheme.

In the solitude of San Casciano he returned to his

first

love and

wrote the book that was a vindication of his own theory and of
Borgia's ill-fated venture. That is why it has been said, so rightly,

The Prince is a melancholy book, a book born of defeat. 3

It was not the first time that a great book had its genesis in a
social or personal catastrophe. The City of God had been an immediate result of the fall of Rome. St. Augustine realized the impact this outrage would have on the civilized world but he did not
despair. There is another Rome, he reassured the fearful and bewildered, that can be built and that will never be destroyed. We
still believe in Rome, the eternal Rome of Christ, built in the soul
of every man, in the soul of every nation. So Machiavelli (although on a quite different plane), after witnessing the shameful
fall of his idol, the man who had given Italy a gleam of hope, set
himself to show that another Borgia would succeed where the
that

first failed.

MACHIAVELLl'S WAY
way

is best understood by contrasting it with [/

For Machiavelli is at the very antipode of Christian philosophy and theology. To the gospel of Christ, he prefers \
the precepts of Epicurus; to the Fathers of the Church, the Greek \
and Roman classics. Machiavelli is anthropocentric, not theocentric^ Worse than pagan, he ignores morality as an absolute, objective, universal value; he disregards man's transcendent ends and
immortal destiny; he refuses to see the light of Revelation. With
glaring cynicism he proclaims the inequality of men: there are the
few genial, wise, ruthless, magnificent individuals who know the

Machiavelli's

the Christian way.

and there is the "vulgo," the amorphous, gullible

mass that sees only appearances. Machiavelli's Prince must stop
at nothing. Treachery, fraud, murder
all are licit so long as they
help secure or maintain or extend power. He even finds beauty and
grandeur in certain crimes skillfully masterminded and elegantly
reality of things,

executed. Briefly, Machiavelli replaces the

the

norm

norm

of justice with

of utility (the utility of the state), sin with failure, moral

3 R. Roeder,

The

Press, 1933), p. 296.

Man

of the Renaissance

(New York: The Viking


IV.

178]

From Medieval

greatness with political success.

The

to

Modern Times

makes man's life a march to God and

ness, gives way to the cyclic vision, whereby man's

eternal order

stant return to

which
and happi-

lineal vision of history,

the point of departure,

life

a continual

is*a con-

movement

around himself and consequently toward disorder. The concept of

infallible, merciful wisdom,

Providence, based on God's supreme,

degenerates into the principle of fortune^ an arbitrary principle,

an

even more voluble than

irrational, tragic element,

God's grace and man's

self.

succeeded by

free,

man

conscious cooperation with

himit

are

which ,in the specific Machiavellian sense is

nothing more than man's ability to discover, to guess, to foresee
fortune's

virtu,

movement

in order to avail himself of

it

or offset

it.

has been said that Machiavelli secularized politics by divorc-

It

and morality. This is to put it mildly. He

life of man, for "morality" is indivisible. The
standard is one; and the failure to center any one segment of life
in God is fatal to the whole moral system, bringing its collapse in
ing

it

from

religion

secularized the entire

all

other segments as well.

It

has also been said that Machiavelli

justifies

the abandon-

The term fortuna is used by Machiavelli in various senses. Usually

means either the combination and play of historical circumstances within
which one must act, or some sort of strange, variable, and blind fatality
governing man and history. Not infrequently it means both. Thus it may
happen that the same fortune that offers certain men the opportunity to
perform great deeds suddenly turns against them and works their ruin.
Fortune is most surely mastered by bold and daring action. Audaces fortuna juvat. "Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master
her, to conquer her by force.
And therefore, like a woman, she is always a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and
master her with greater audacity." (The Prince, XXV, 9.)
it

Machiavelli's virtu

is

the personal ability (strength, talent, prudence,

man to dominate fortune to some extent

common with the classic or Stoic or Christian

audacity, efficiency) that enables

at least. It has

nothing in

It is a vital spirit, a universal and dynamic quality. The

and in all places, it invariably makes men act in a magnificent manner and for outstanding goals. Liberating their deeds from the
"narrowness" of Christian morality, it always gives them a new dimension
the dimension of greatness which makes even a crime a spectacular and
glorious act. Irrational fortuna and rational virtu share in the government
of world events. "I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half
our actions, but that she allows the other half or thereabouts to be governed by us." {The Prince, XXV, 1.) When all has been said, however, it is
fortune that carries the day. See G. Prezzolini, Machiavelli anticristo,

concept of virtue.

same

at all ages

(Roma: Casini

Editore, 1954), pp. 25-30, 67-72.

Machiavelli

Xm.

[179

ment of moral criteria in the political field only. He does not counsel evil, some argue, in the pursuit of private interests. The establishment and maintenance of the commonwealth are for him the
supreme law; and it is in working for these goals that moral considerations are to be left aside. Even were it possible to draw so|
fine a distinction between public and private morality, Machiavelli's doctrine would still contradict God's natural and positive
law. Evil

is

evil

though performed for the best of purposes. To

grant the state moral sovereignty or independence from a superior

law would mean to do away, in principle

at least,

with man's

In practice, this would be extremely dangerhe who bears the person of the nation, he who will
decide when to defy moral principles for the common good, is
none but an imperfect being, tempted more than others perhaps by

fundamental
ous. After

rights.

all,

furious passions that

may

adversely affect his judgment.

One

in-

from the idea of granting such absolute immunity and impunity to any individual, and particularly to one
with whom rests the life, liberty, and happiness of his fellow men.
stinctively recoils

It is

true that Machiavelli

is

the son of his century, that

many

were shared by corrupt and unprincipled Italian rulers

of the Renaissance. True, too, he lived in a time characterized by
instability, disorder, and strife. To be understood, The Prince must
be seen against that unfortunate and ever-changing background.
The book was an extreme remedy for an extreme evil. The game
was crooked, the stake too high, and the players had to be advised accordingly. But this, at best, explains the dramatic plight of
a statesman. It does not justify his advocating insidious and perfidious means to meet the challenge. And the fact remains that
of his ideas

Machiavelli accepted them wholeheartedly, considered them the

only valid ones, proclaimed them openly, expressed them systematically,

taught them with a cold and intense passion worthy of a

better cause.

Machiavelli had his

own

theory of knowledge.

He saw

it

as a

grasping of the true nature of things; and because their very nature
is

perennial movement, to

know the nature of things is to know

to know is to rediscover, to remember.

movement. For Plato,

For Machiavelli, to know is
their

therefore, at least in part, a

and to foresee. The Prince

manual of techniques wherewith

to see

master both present and future

Machiavelli's wisdom.

reality.

The second

is

This

is

the

first

is,

to

aspect of

the ability to use truth well.

m4.

From Medieval

IV.

180]
Machiavelli's

pragmatic. 5

wisdom

To know

is

not only positive and technical:

the truth of things

knowledge is not
touchstone of wisdom.

efficiently

this

Modern Times

to

is

applied.

of

little

it is

also

consequence

Success, then,

if

the

is

machiavelli's techniques
Machiavelli's techniques are found in chapters fifteen to twenty

The

Prince. His Prince must beware of two ever-threatening

one proceeds from the internal fife of the state and the behavior of his subjects, the other from the exterior and is tied to

of

crises:

the designs of the surrounding or contiguous powers. This

stark reality that conditions the Prince's attitudes

disregard this reality

may

and with

to court disaster

But Machiavelli

agrees.

these dangers,

significantly

this

Machiavelli holds that frequently

the

is

actions.

To

no one

dis-

adds that the Prince, to check

resort to whatever

means circumstances

human

In a characteristically pessimistic view of

tate.
,

is

and

men

dic-

nature,

are less than men, acting,

The new Prince should therefore exploit man's dual nature and, divesting himself of humane qualities,
deal with the wicked as they would deal with him. The situation
Jeaves him no alternative but to walk the road of moral relativity.
as they often do, like beasts.

would be highly praiseworthy

It

in a prince to possess all the

qualities that are reputed good, but as they

cannot

be possessed or
necessary that he

all

human conditions not permitting of it, it is

should be prudent enough to avoid the scandal of those vices which
observed,

would
which

him the

and guard himself if possible against those

if not able to, he can indulge them with
less scruple. And yet he must not mind incurring the scandal of those
vices, without which it would be difficult to save the state, for if one
considers well, it will be found that some things which seem virtues
would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear
vices result in one's greater security and well-being. 6
lose

will

not lose

state,

it

him, but

The Machiavellian

principle

is

stated.

Its

consequences in-

evitably follow.

(IX Must

the Prince seek to be considered generous or mi-

5 J.
litico

Conde, "La Sagesse Machiavelique," in Umanesimo e scienza po(Milano: Marzorati, 1951), p. 87.

The

Prince,

XV,

2.

Machiavelli
serly? As_pariinDny

XIII.
is-

[181

one of the

vices that safeguard the Prince's

power, a reputation for niggardliness is to be preferred to a reputation for liberality. Liberality wins the Prince few friends, renders

him odious to the majority, and

tually poor and despised.

(2^ Must
would be

men

to

in the long

run makes him ac-

the Prince seek to be feared or loved?

command

both fear and love. But

The

ideal

this is difficult, for

are

ungrateful,

voluble,

anxious

dissemblers,

to

avoid

danger,

and

covetous of gain; as long as you benefit them, they are entirely yours;
they offer you their blood, their goods, their
.

when

the necessity

is

remote; but

when

life,
it

and

their children

approaches, they re-

volt. 7

For Machi aveUi, love i s generally a fair-weather commodity. It

has TocT uncertain and shifting a base. Woe to those who trust its
promises! Moreover "men1iave"Iess scruple in offending one who
makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared." 8 Finally, love being dependent on the subjects' will ("men love at
their free will" "Pf while fear can be bred in them at the Prince's
will, the latter shall felj on what lies in his power, not in the
power of others.
Machiavelli carefully distinguishes fear from hatred. The
Prince must be feared b ut not hated. Insofar as possible the Prince
must avoid whatever would excite the hatred of his subjects. Men
resent nothing more than the loss of their patrimony; and of the
honors that are taken from them, "that of their wives is what they
feel most." 10 But the warring Prince need not fear being reputed
cruel and pitiless. Hannibal's inhumanity "made him always venerated and terrible in the sight of his soldiers." n
(Vf Must jthe Prince always keep his word? Machiavelli's
famous answer is the quintessence of his philosophy. Nothing in a
Prince, he says, is more laudable than "to keep good faith and live
witfrinteg rityT andjaoTwith astuteness." K But experience teaches
that one thereby expose^JiimseJLtarude^wakenings_while history
testifiesjhat success- has crowned the efforts of those "who have
i Ibid.,

XVII,

2.

8 Ibid.

10
ii

The Discourses, Book

The Prince, XVTI, 4.

Ibid., 5.
III,

chap.

6.

12 Ibid.,

XVIII,

1.

IV.

182]

had

little

From Medieval

regard for good

to confuse men's brains."

faith,

to

Modem

Times

and have been able by astuteness

13

FOX AND LION

There are two methods, Machiaveili continues, for reaching
and keeping power: one, proper to men, is founded on law; the
other, proper to beasts, on force. "As the first method is often
insufficient, one must have recourse to the second. It is therefore
necessary for a prince to know well how to use both the beast and
the

man."

14

To know

well

how

and the man what

Here Machiaveili
makes the choice between

to use both the beast

succinct phrasing of tremendous implications!

touches the very heart of the matter.

moral duty and public

<

interest

He

unmistakably clear: "a prudent

ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against

his interest." 15 His ground for justification is always the intrinsic

wickedness of men: "they are bad and would not observe their

you are not bound to keep faith with them." 16

Machiaveili counsels the use and imitation of the beast. But
which of the beasts and which of the beastly ways? The way of the
fox and the way of the lion would serve the Prince best. With the
shrewdness of the one he must recognize and escape snares and
stratagems; with the strength and bravery of the other he must terrorize, defeat, and destroy who would dare resort to violence or
challenge his will. As regards promises and agreements, therefore,
the Prince must be a fox, that is, ready, whenever the state's interest requires it, to forget or renege his word. But the way of the
V fox must be practiced slyly with a cunning that camouflages it beyond detection. "It is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler." 17
Understandably, then, another of Machiavelli's heroes was
Alexander VI a man who read wisdom in the old saying "vulgus
vult decipi" and
faith with you, so

did nothing else but deceive men, and found the occasion for

man was

ever

more

13 Ibid.

14 ibid., 2.

is Ibid., 3.

is Ibid.

" Ibid.

it;

no

able to give assurances, or affirmed things with

Machiavelli

XIII.

[183

man

stronger oaths, and no

observed them

succeeded in his deceptions, as he well knew

less;

however, he always

this aspect of things. 18

Chapter XVIII of The Prince ends with a concise summary of

Machiavelli's view:
It is not,

named

therefore, necessary for a prince to have

qualities,

but

it is

all

the above-

very necessary to seem to have them.

would

even be bold to say that to possess them and always to observe them
dangerous, but to appear to possess them

seem merciful,

faithful,

humane,

is

useful.

sincere, religious,

but you must have the mind so disposed that

when

Thus it
and also
it

is

is

is

well to

to be so;

needful to be

may be able to change to the opposite qualities. And it

must be understood that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot
observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often
otherwise you

obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against

charity,

against humanity,

must have a mind disposed

and against

religion.

as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as

from what

is

good,

if

And,

therefore, he

to adapt itself according to the wind,

I

possible, but be able to

and

said before, not deviate

do

evil if constrained. 19

THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES

The Prince and The Distells "how to
establish the state"; in the latter, "which is the best form of the
state." Machiavelli starts with a fragile principality good enough to
bring some order out of chaos and to provide for the ruler's personal stability; then he goes on to build a durable republic (or
Is there

courses?

free

It

a contradiction between

seems not. In the former, Machiavelli

government) under the indispensable aegis of a providential

founder. Machiavelli's political trajectory could well be inscribed:

from dictatorship to republic. The constitution of The Discourses

would suit a popular regime administered by a vigorous central
power helped in turn by a strong hierarchical organization. The result would be a democratic institution of the type commonly labeled
"authoritarian republic": a republic that follows the example of

Rome. But in the end, Machiavelli's fundamental prin-f

(upon which are predicated both the principality and thej

Sparta and
ciple

republic) crudely flashes across his political board: the state, what]

ever

its

form (the exceptional or the normal and

pletely free of every

18 Ibid., 4.

norm

ideal),

is

of morality. Or, rather, the state

19 ibid.

comH
is

the

From Medieval

IV.

184]

rery foundation of morality:

/to

it

Modern Times

to

decides what

is

to be

done or not

be done sheerly on the limited and relative criterion of

its self-

/ish utility. 20

AN APPRAISAL
Machiavelli

Renaissance.

and

of history,

father of the

representative of the extreme position of the

is

He marks
in the

a sharp break in the Christian continuity

development of

modern theory

political

thought he

of the absolute state

a state

is

the

com-

from every idea of objective morality, a sovereign state released from the restraint of a higher law.
The moral and religious deficiencies of Machiavelli's system
have been noted. But even from the purely political standpoint,
Machiavelli is far from deserving the praises certain authors heap
on his alleged political realism.
His is a simplistic concept of politics. Politics considered and
evaluated in a vacuum, pursued sheerly for its own sake, directed
exclusively to attaining power, is hardly realistic and successful.
It does not work. It spells ultimate failure. History abounds with
examples of men and nations who followed Machiavelli's way to
their doom. The heroes of the Gordian knot, the statesmen of the
shortcuts, the politicians of the means and the stratagems are not
so smart as they appear to their votaries and victims.
Several recurring themes in Machiavelli illustrate his political
abstraction. He exaggerated the problem of mercenary troops. To
them preponderantly if not exclusively he attributed Italy's ruin.
But her decadence had other and graver causes. Machiavelli himself, having persuaded the Florentine government to dismiss the
mercenaries and establish an army of citizens, witnessed the latter's
poor showing when they were unable to save the Republic in
1512. Machiavelli's preoccupation with war as the paramount and
most reliable instrument of state policy borders on obsession: "A
prince should
have no other aim or thought, nor take up any
pletely disanchored

20 See

The Discourses, Book

which Machiavelli
lished in

The

III,

chaps.

3,

41, 42, for passages in

refers to the rules of political morality already estab-

Prince.

On

this point

and on Machiavelli

in general, see the

masterful chapter "Machiavel: Fortune et dictature" in Pierre Mesnard,

L'Essor de la philosophic politique au XVI" siecle (Paris: Librairie Philo-

sophique

J.

Vrin, 1952), pp. 2-85.

Machiavelli XIII.

[185

other thing for his study, but war and

its

organization and disci-

pline, for that is the only art that is necessary to

He

mands." 2 ^
the ancient

also felt that the

one who com-

road to success lay in imitating

Romans. But where was

the "realism" in presenting

sixteenth-century Italian republics a pattern of government that

had flourished so many centuries before in so different a cultural

and political climate? Finally, MachiaveUi's doctrine does not take
into account realities of an international order. His state is not
conscious of other states except to bring them war and destruction.
This extreme individualism denies any idea of international relations and makes of the world a jungle wherein wild beasts, foxes
and lions, lurk stealthily for the prey.
Indeed, for all his lucidity in probing some of men's motives
and despite his passion for a unified Italy, Machiavelli cannot be
extolled as a great political philosopher except in a qualified sense.

He

is

unsurpassed and perhaps unsurpassable in his cynical pres-

entation and wholehearted praise of a political doctrine that

than any other has advanced the

rise of

more

despots and the social de-

mankind. To Machiavelli goes the dubious credit of "^

having sharpened the weapon of political immoralism, with which
terioration of

peoples have been and continue to be tortured by unscrupulous

men.
Perhaps Machiavelli has, after all, rendered mankind a service.
His terrible and "logical" Prince is a reminder that once the state
is granted an absolute value, once politics is divorced from God's
law, there is no dam that can arrest the waters of brutality and
despotism.
solve

One cannot believe in man's inalienable rights and abOne cannot condemn MachiaveUi's political

Machiavelli.

doctrine

and

at the

same time accept

its

fundamental principle. 22

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Machiavelli, N. The Prince and The Discourses. Trans, by L.

Ricci. New York: Modern Library College Editions, 1950 (New
York, 1940).
The Prince. Introduction by C. Gauss. New York:
.

Mentor Books, 1957.

21

The

22 See

(New

Prince,

XTV,

1.

K. Ryan, "Machiavelli: The Prince," in The Great Books

York: Devin- Adair, 1949), Vol. I, pp. 50-59.
J.

IV.

186]

From Medieval

to

Modern Times

Butterfield, H. The Statecraft of Machiavelli.

New

York: Mac-

millan, 1956.

McCoy,

C. N. R. "The Place of Machiavelli in the History of Po-

litical

Thought,"

XXXVII, No. 4
Meinecke,

The

American

Political

Science

Review,

(August, 1943), 626-641.

F. Machiavellism.

New

Haven: Yale University

Press,

1957.

Villari, P. The Life and Times of Niccolo Machiavelli. Trans, by

L. Villari. London: 1892. 2 vols.

chapter xiv

Bodin

LIFE

JEAN BODIN was born at Angers,

class parents.

France, in 1530, of middle-

His formative years were spent at Toulouse,

where he studied law and for a brief period taught jurisprudence.

Afterward he moved to Paris for a career at the bar but soon
turned to scholarly writing and practical politics. In 1566 he published his Method for the Easy Understanding of History. In it, he
rejected the classic idea of a golden age as well as the Christian

doctrine of the Fall and advocated the optimistic view of man's

steady progress.
litical

theories

He

need to break with old pokeep pace with a continuously ad-

also stressed the

and patterns

to

vancing civilization.
In the meantime Bodin had become favorably

known

at the

Henry III and particularly his brother, the Duke d'Alencon,

held him in high regard and relied on his counsels. It was these
connections that won him several official positions. In 1576 he was
appointed attorney for the crown at Laon. In 1581, as secretary to
the duke, he accompanied him on a journey to England. In 1584
he returned to Laon, where he married and continued in the cacourt.

pacity of king's attorney. Delegated to represent the third estate of

Vermandois

at the Provincial States-General of Blois,

he consis-

From Medieval

IV.

188]

tently favored a policy of

to

Modern Times

moderation and pacification between the

He died in Laon, a victim of the

Catholic and the Protestant party.

plague, in 1596.

Throughout Bodin's lifetime, France was torn by civil wars

caused by the mutual hatred of Catholics and Huguenots and
marked by a tragic sequence of conspiracies, assassinations, betrayals, and massacres. The religious conflicts were compounded
by the political rivalries of two families, the Guise and the Bourthe Guise leading the Catholics, and the
bon. Each of these
Bourbon the Huguenots was aiming for uncontested power and
eventual succession to the crown. At the time, the throne of France
was occupied by the last kings of the Valois dynasty who had
reigned long years under the influence of the Queen Mother,

Caterina de' Medici, a true Machiavellian, devoid of religious convictions,

unscrupulous in her choice of means, concerned only with

keeping her authority

intact.

Never following a

straight policy,

cunningly oscillating between the two factions, she favored at times

one, at times the other,

now

procrastinating,

now

inexorably re-

pressing, always conspiring. 1 In their bid for victory, both

Huguenumber eight
civil wars from 1562 to 1594, the year that the Bourbon Henry
IV (author of the Edict of Nantes in 1598) became king and apnots and Catholics resorted to violence. Historians

plied himself to restoring peace.

THE POLITIQUES
While the savage struggle between Catholics and Huguenots
raged, Bodin, nominally a Catholic, shunned the fanaticism of both

and joined a

third party. 2

Having accepted the fait accompli of the

break in Christian unity, the Politiques (as the members of the

new

force were sarcastically termed) preached religious tolerance,

insisted
1

on the supreme authority of the

The

Saint

Bartholomew Massacre,

in

king,

and opposed

his in-

which several thousand Hugue-

nots were killed, was planned by Caterina de' Medici during the reign of
her son Charles IX (1560-1574), then twenty-two years old. It began on

August 24, 1572, and lasted seven days. Caterina had told her weak son
of a plot according to which the Huguenot conspirators, at the order of

Admiral Coligny, would

rise

throughout France, assassinate the royal

family, and destroy the Catholic nobility.

2 In

1589 Bodin joined the Catholic League but he was soon expelled.

Bodin XIV.

[189

For them the king was an arbiter,

be kept above the debate. Their
defense of royal power became even more spirited upon the publication of Franco-Gallia, a pamphlet on the origins of the French
monarchy, issued at Geneva in 1573 by the monarchomac Francis
Hotman. 3 Arguing from the fact that originally French kings owed
their crown to election and were bound by certain conditions in
the exercise of their power, Hotman concluded that the people had
the right to depose their rulers whenever the latter departed from
volvement in religious
not a partisan.

conflicts.

He was and had

to

the restricting clauses.

Bodin, an enthusiastic advocate of the toleration policy of the

became their political philosopher and gave their ideas

Politiques,

a systematic base and scholarly support in his famous Les Six

de

livres

republique*

la

THE REPUBLIQUE
The Republique
(1576) and
republica

is

a monumental

later extensively revised

libri sex,

1586). Even

work

written in French

and published

in Latin

a cursory glance at

its

{De

forty-two

chapters shows an encyclopedic range of juridical and political

topics.

won immediate

recognition. It was
and by 1580 was already in its
Unfortunately the work is heavy, difficult, and unin-

Bodin's masterpiece

translated into several languages

fifth edition.

viting.

It

has nothing of the nervous, striking incisiveness of

Machiavelli's Prince.
in

its

Today very few have

the courage to read

it

entirety.

Among

Bodin's chief contributions to political thought are his

theory on the origin of the state and,

more important,

his doctrine

of sovereignty.
3

Another monarchomac or

"monarch-fighter"

was the author of

Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579), a French Protestant, probably Hubert

Languet or Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, who concealed his identity under
the

pseudonym of Stephanus Junius Brutus. With arguments drawn from the

Old Testament, he defended the right of the peo-

Bible, particularly the

ple

(or rather the people's natural representatives

the

barons, doctors,

and heads of municipalities) to depose the ruler when the latter failed to
keep his pact with God or with his subjects.
4 It must be noted that the term "republique" is used by Bodin in the
Latin sense of

commonwealth or

state.

From Medieval

IV.

190]

Modern Times

to

ORIGIN OF THE STATE

"a multitude

of families and their common affairs,

power and by reason" 5 is the result of force.
"Reason itself shows us that governments and states owed their
first establishment to force; and this lesson we learn also from
history." 6 Bodin does not deny the gregarious instinct in man, but

The

state

ruled by a supreme

he holds it directly responsible only for the organization of the

family and the household. Man's passage from a free and independent status in the household as pater-jamilias to a free but restrained status in the state as citizen 7 is a consequence of the sub-

by the stronger. "Force and the lust for

power, as well as cupidity and the passion for revenge, pitched one
against the other; then, as a result of war, the defeated was obliged
jugation of the weaker

to serve the stronger."

SOVEREIGNTY
Bodin's doctrine of sovereignty can be quite simply

summa-

supreme power, unrestrained by laws, over

citizens and subjects," 9 has two essential characteristics: perpetuity and absoluteness. This does not mean that the sovereign is
literally free from all restraint. There are certain laws that limit
him in the exercise of power. Theoretically, sovereignty can be invested in a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy. In practice,
for several compelling reasons, monarchy is the form to be preferred
a royal monarchy in itself absolute and indivisible, yet
not arbitrary, and in its exercise balanced by a political system
rized. Sovereignty, "the

wherein the best in the various classes share in the government.

Bodin's definition
of

petual, unrestrained

there
5

is

very clear,

explanation. Sovereignty

its

is

De

power

is

much

clearer than

some

parts

the undivided, supreme, per-

of the state. Within the state territory

a single source of authority: none, person or association,

I, 1. Quotations from Bodin were translated by the
from the Latin version of his work (De republica libri sex,

republica,

present writer

1586).
lbid., 6.
7

"A

citizen

preme power."
8 Ibid.

is

nothing but a free

man bound

{Ibid.)
Ibid., 8.

to the authority of a su-

Bodin XIV.
can escape

[191

ultimate control;

its

no external force may

all-embracing range or otherwise interfere with

Both the
Bodin

restrict its

exercise.

and the practical implications of this

must not be underestimated. With one masterful

theoretical

terse definition

stroke

its

rules out

whatever could threaten the monolithic

structure of the state. Thus, within the state he dealt the

but

still

blow.

waning

powerfully encroaching vestiges of feudalism a deadly

The

true concept of sovereignty cannot recognize the valid-

ity of special privileges for

the noble or admit the legitimacy of

special rights for the city, the guild, the corporation.

plaisir of the sovereign

may

The bon

grant privileges to this or that portion

privileges by no means inalienable.

The sovereign who dispenses such exemptions and immunities may
revoke them at will. As to the forces threatening the state from
without the pope and the emperor Bodin is equally uncompromising. Neither can curtail the power of the sovereign "who is
accountable only to God." 10 The independence of the national
state is built on and safeguarded by the principle that, brought

of the

community but they are

to

its

logical conclusion, will

produce in Protestant countries a

"national church" under direct control of the ruler, and in Catholic

countries

the

excesses

of

Gallicanism,

Febronianism,

and Jo-

sephinism. 11
10 ibid.
11 Bossuet, the court theologian of royal absolutism, dictated the

Four

(Declaration of the French Clergy, 1682), which

(1) asserted the king's freedom from any direct or indirect spiritual power,
(2) limited the pope's power by subordinating it to the general council, (3)

Articles of Gallicanism

further limited the pope's

power by subordinating

it

to the

common law

of

the whole Church, and the customs of the local churches, and (4) made
the pope's use of the privilege of infallibility in matters of faith dependent

on the

For the text of the Declaration, see

Through the Centuries, pp. 207, 208.
Febronianism (from Febronius, a pseudonym of von Hontheim, Auxiliary
assent of the entire Church.

Ehler-Morrall, Church and State

Bishop of Trier,

macy and

who

infallibility)

in

1763 published a work attacking the pope's

repeated the Gallican Four Articles.

pri-

To them

it

added a detailed plan for civil rulers' resistance to what it called the papal
abuses and encroachments. Through the regium placet, all papal documents
would not be released until passed by the prince's censorship. Through the
exequatur, every papal order, prior to its execution, would have to be approved by the prince. Through the recursus ab abusu, appeals from the
decisions of any ecclesiastical superior could be taken to secular courts.
The Febronian program was literally translated into fact by Joseph II
(1765-1790), Emperor of Austria. Hence the term Josephinism to signify

From Medieval

IV.

192]

True sovereignty

to

Modern Times

perpetual and absolute. First,

is

limited in time, for the state cannot exist without

democracy, sovereignty

perpetual because

is

it

it.

it

is

un-

Thus, in a

always resides in

power resides permanently in the

privileged class of the nobles. In a monarchy, sovereignty is perpetual only when monarchy is hereditary or at least (and here
Bodin considerably narrows his idea of perpetuity) when the king
has unqualified power for life. Tyranny is not sovereign, for it is
the people. In an aristocracy the

As

always temporary.

who hold

to those

authority for a defined

time or until revocation, they are not truly sovereigns but merely

and keepers
Bodin distinguishes

delegates exercising sovereign functions, "custodians

of sovereignty,"

12

trustees for a given period.

between government in the state and state sovereignty. The latter

becomes identified with the ruler only when he is not bound by
limitations of either time or law.

Power unrestrained by laws such is absolute sovereignty. In

this second, more important characteristic, Bodin
stoutly maintains that "a prince is not bound by the laws of his

explaining

... by the laws he himself has

made." 13 The sovereign cannot tie his own hands without ceasing
to be sovereign. He binds his subjects, but he cannot bind himself.
Moreover, a sovereign is absolute when lawmaking belongs expredecessors [and] even less

To

clusively to him.

allow legislators besides himself, within or

without the territory of the

state,

would obviously destroy the very

concept of sovereignty. Therefore the making and breaking of laws

within the realm
eignty.

is

the

The essence

of

first
its

and paramount prerogative of sover-

absoluteness

is

this

whether

very faculty. All the

war or makon magistrates,

bestowing immunities, exercising the power of life and death,
fixing the value, name, and form of money
are included in it.
When Bodin defines sovereignty as the "supreme power unother functions of the sovereign

declaring

ing peace, receiving appeals, conferring authority

a theory and a policy set to enslave and suffocate the Church. Joseph's ex-

travagant measures and reforms were copied by the rulers of Spain, Sar-

and other states. "By 1790, outside the States of the Church
and the new United States of America, there was not a single country in
the world where the Catholic religion was free to live fully its own life"
(Philip Hughes, A Popular History of the Catholic Church [New York:
Doubleday Image Books, 1954]).
dinia, Naples,

12

De

republica,

I,

8.

is Ibid.

Bodin XIV.

[193

by laws," he means unrestrained by human laws only.

"Concerning natural and divine laws, all princes and peoples are
restrained

equally obliged to keep them."

In principle, Bodin

is

14

very definite in granting the state and the

them moral sovereignty. His

The trouble is that
nowhere in the Republique are these natural and divine laws sufficiently defined. At one point, murder is mentioned as forbidden
by the laws of God and nature; also enjoined by God is the obligation of keeping certain promises, pacts, and contracts, but it is not
clear how far these are safe from violation. Of course, they cease
to bind by mutual consent; and the sovereign has ways of eliciting
prince legal sovereignty and in denying

ruler

is

decidedly absolute but not immoral.

the consent of the other party. Moreover, the prince's obligation

ends

when

more: and

conditions change and the reason for the promise

who

when Bodin
sovereign

is

will

challenge the prince's judgment?

It

is

is

no

only

declares the inviolability of private property that his

confronted with any

real, concrete, far-reaching limita-

may

not seize or dis-

pose of the property of another. For Bodin the

citizen's right to

tion.

Except for a

private property

just

reason the sovereign

stems directly from natural law and

is

valid

against the state and the prince to such a degree that there can be

no

direct taxation without the subject's previous consent. This

indeed an astonishing claim from one

who

the absoluteness of sovereignty. Other moral limitations

sovereign are the leges imperii

ticularly the Salic

Law

is

has laid such stress on

upon the

the basic laws of the realm, par-

containing the rules of succession to the

French crown.

MONARCHY
Theoretically, sovereignty
tional forms:

may

reside in any of the three tradi-

democracy, whereby power

is

vested in the multi-

whereby power is vested in a privileged minority;

monarchy, whereby power is held by one alone. In practice, however, monarchy is to be preferred because more in conformity with
nature ("all the laws of nature point to monarchy") and with the
tude; aristocracy,

principle of unity, essential to the concept of sovereignty. Further-

more, monarchy affords a firmer guarantee of order,

to

meet emergencies, and allows greater freedom

14 ibid.

is

better able

in the choice of

IV.

194]

From Medieval

Modern Times

to

men

as advisers and governors. Popular and aristocratic

on the contrary, must too often rely on the counsel
and help of both the wise and the foolish.
Bodin's monarchy is the royal, legitimate monarchy that owes
its origin to royal descent or to lawful war and in which the king
obeys the laws of God and nature, and the subjects obey the laws
of the king while retaining their natural liberty and property. On
these points the author of the Republique and Machiavelli are
poles apart. The Florentine has no moral scruples about how
power is grasped or kept. Bodin insists on absolute power but with
equal emphasis he condemns despotic rule and aggressive states.
His ideal monarchy is marked by the employment, in government
offices, of men of integrity freely chosen by the king from both
nobles and commons in such a way that the former enjoy some
advantages over the latter, and the rich receive positions affording
more honor than financial benefit, the poor more profit than honor.
So far as government is concerned, Bodin wishes his monarch to
be assisted by a permanent council a senate or parliament or the
States-General
existing by permission of the sovereign, devoid of
power to make or to veto decisions, having the sole role of consuitors and advisers.
This is the true, sacred monarchy of Bodin; and its sovereign
holds the highest office on earth, so much so that "he who despises
his sovereign prince, despises God."

competent

sovereignties,

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bodin,

M.

J.

Books of the Commonwealth. Trans, and abridged by

Tooley. Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1955.

Six

J.

Baldwin,

S.

"Jean Bodin and the League," Catholic Historical Re-

XXIII (1937), 160-184.

Mosse, G. L. "The Influence of J. Bodin's Republique on English Poview,

litical

5,

Thought," Medievalia

et

humanistica. Boulder: 1948. Fasc.

pp. 73-83.

Reynolds,

B. Proponents of Limited

France: F.

Hotman and

versity Press, 1931.

J.

Monarchy

Bodin.

New

in

Sixteenth-Century

York: Columbia Uni-

chapter xv

Hohbes

LIFE

THOMAS HOBBES was

born

at Westport,

near Malmesbury

on April 5, 1588, shortly before the defeat of

Armada. Reports of the enemy fleet moving toward
English shores so frightened his mother that she gave birth to him
prematurely. "She brought forth twins: myself and fear," Hobbes
in Wiltshire,

the Spanish

used to say to explain his timid disposition. His father, the parish
vicar, a strange, unpredictable character, left

town and family

in

consequence of a scandal, and the future philosopher was brought

up

in

Malmesbury by a well-to-do

uncle.

At

the age of fifteen he

entered Magdalen Hall at Oxford, already well versed in Latin

and Greek

him

literature;

but

all his

to like the University

love for learning could not bring

atmosphere and methods. After his

graduation in 1608, Hobbes was engaged as private tutor to William Cavendish, later the second Earl of Devonshire, and in 1610
he traveled with him through France, Germany, and Italy. On his

young lord as companion and

was during this time that Hobbes
set himself to become a scholar, translated Thucydides, and gained
admission to the company of the leading men of his time including
Bacon. After the Earl's death in 1628, Hobbes toured the conti-

return to England he lived with his

secretary for eighteen years. It

nent with a

new

pupil. In

1631 he re-entered the Cavendish house-

IV.

196]

From Medieval

to

Modem

Times

this time to the son of his former charge. From 1634

1637 he traveled through France and Italy with the young Earl
of Devonshire. In Paris he met Mersenne and Gassendi; in Florence, Galileo. These contacts turned him more decidedly to the
study of the physical sciences and philosophy, and he resolved to
write a comprehensive treatise on physical phenomena (De corpore), on man {De homine), and on political society {De cive).
Back in England in 1637, Hobbes witnessed the bitter fight
between king and parliament and even entered the debate, writing
and privately circulating a pamphlet on The Elements of Law,
Natural and Politique. He championed the prerogatives of the
monarch, proving the point not with the divine right of kings

hold as tutor,
to

theory but with the doctrine of the social contract, in virtue of

which, Hobbes argued,

the ruler.

when

He

full

the political waters

thought

it

and irrevocable sovereignty

is

granted

succeeded only in displeasing both parties. In 1640,

became dangerously hot and agitated, he

"The first of all who fled," he

best to leave England.

went to France and for the next eleven years resided in Paris.
There he taught mathematics to Charles, the prince of Wales, the
future Charles II; wrote De Cive (1642); and prepared his greatest work, Leviathan, which he published in 1651, the year of his
return from exile. He fled from France because he thought the
Catholic clergy were after him for his criticism of the papacy.
During the last twenty-eight years of his life, in England,

Hobbes became happily involved in a maze of controversies. He

had a special talent for arousing his adversaries and stirring up
endless debate. It is no wonder that the amazing number of books
he wrote during this period on geometry (he tried to prove the

possibility of

squaring the circle), politics, and religion

mostly polemical.

and wrote

his

wick, at the

He

were

also translated the Iliad and the Odyssey

autobiography in Latin verse. Hobbes died in Har-

home

of his former pupil

and

faithful protector, the

who had
and everywhere seen plots
and dangers, he had done exceptionally well. He had lived ninetyone years, fighting lustily, not with the sword but with the pen,
until his last day. He had never married because he wished to devote himself, he confessed, to philosophy.
third Earl of Devonshire,

on December

3,

1679. For one

lived in constant fear of losing his life

Hobbes
litical

lived in chaotic times and, to a certain extent, his po-

works were inspired by the desire

to

end the stormy quarrels

Hobbes XV.

[197

between the fanatic Puritans and the conservative wing of the

English church, between parliament and the crown. The conflict
dated back to the first Stuart, James I, who became king of England in 1603. In his bid for victory, Charles I, the second Stuart,
had openly defied the House of Commons and tried to assume

war

despotic powers, thus precipitating a civil

1642. In the en-

in

suing struggle, the Puritans, the country squires, the jurists,

and

the radical wing of the intellectuals sided with the opposition.

The

and the new mercantile

class rallied to the king. In 1649 Charles I was beheaded; the
commonwealth was established; and Cromwell, the leader of the
parliamentary party, started his ten-year dictatorship. In 1660 the

peers, the prelates of the Anglican church,

monarchy was restored with Charles II as the new king. He was

succeeded, in 1685, by his brother James II, who reigned but
three years. As a result of the Glorious Revolution (1688) the
Stuart king was deposed, a constitutional monarchy established,
and William of Orange invited to head it (1689).

THE LEVIATHAN
Hobbes' Leviathan was published
Cromwell's

rule.

The Book

in

London

in

1651 during

of Job furnished the strange

well as the motto that runs over the

title

page:

Non

title

as

est potestas

super terram quae comparetur

ei ("There is no power on earth

comparable to it"). In its original meaning, the Leviathan is a
marine monster, a sort of big whale; according to Hobbes, it is the

an

state,

One

artificial

animal created by man:

Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Cove-

made themselves every one the Author,

end he may have the strength and means of them all, as he
think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defense. 1

nants one with another, have

to the
shall

The Leviathan,

divided into four parts, describes the nature of

is the commonwealth. The first part conand its artificer, both of which are man; the second, how and by what covenants it is made, the rights and just
power of its sovereign, what preserves and dissolves it; the third
explains a Christian commonwealth; the fourth, the "kingdom of

this artificial

person that

siders its matter

Thomas Hobbes (New York: Dutton, 1914), chap.

from Leviathan are taken from this edition.

Leviathan by

All quotations

17.

From Medieval

IV.

198]
darkness."

The book

to

Modern Times

contains a dedication and an introduction,

forty-seven chapters, a review and a conclusion.

THE STATE OF NATURE

According to Hobbes, the fundamental law of nature is selffrom this and is valid and

preservation. Every other law derives

binding only insofar as

right

and duty. In

it

aids the fulfillment of man's primary

reality, self-preservation is the

only inviolable

law of nature, the only inalienable right of man. "Stay alive" is

Hobbes' categorical imperative. Death is the supreme evil.
Reason suggests the best way to preserve oneself: to be at
peace with all, living amicably, doing to others what one expects
from them. Unfortunately, the nature of man is such that left to
himself and to his antisocial, destructive instincts, he is unable to
enjoy even a minimum of peace. In the state of nature, man is ati
the mercy of fear, vanity, lust for power. Relying solely on fraud
and force, he is at war with every other man, never safe, never
sure, always haunted by anxiety and suspicion, always ready to
strike lest someone first strike him. In such beastly conditions,
man is a wolf to other men {"homo homini lupus") and his life
2
is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

To

escape

this situation,

association_c omes

man

establishes the state. Political

then, as the answerto"lrIaTii's q uest for deliver-

a nce a n d sa fety. ISmce

no

"natural""

man

trusts other

men, each

being skeptical of any mutual pledge backed only by the alleged

good will of the parties ("covenants, without the sword, are but
words" 3 ), each^ag^eesjvatli-ev-ery-other to introduce a third power,
strong, sovereign, and impartial, to which the maintenance of peace
is committed. This common authority set o ver all provides the
neededf check on man's selfish tendencies. Natural man h aving become~s ocTal and political, he can now live peaceably with others
for heTmows th.ai_thejlaw will punish those who do not reciproi

cate.

2 Ibid., chap. 13.

3 ibid., chap. 17.

Hobbes XV.

[199

The com monwealth is therefore, a product oLraaa^-vohHrtary

and calculated choicer-expressed through a contract "between
fear
every one and every one." Byj:hjs_cjOJiti3x^b.a^
and not on mutual attraction and love, the ab^olule_right of nature that everyone p ossesses ov er eve r ything is tr ansferred to a
wh ose wiJL replaces
a single man or an assembly
third person
the ind ividual wills of all for the purpose of protecting all from
,

without and safeguaidlrig, wrTrrTn^fiaiie-ameng

This

more

is

all.

the generation of that great Leviathan or rather, to speak

reverently, of that mortal god, to

which we owe under the im-

mortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him
by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so

much power and

is

strength conferred

enabled to form the wills of them

on him,
all,

that

by terror thereof, he
home, and mutual

to peace at

aid against their enemies abroad. 4

The contract is be tween each natural man and e very other, not
between these and the sovereign. The sovereigriis the res ult of th e
p act, not a party to it. Consequently, while men are bound to the
master they have created, he is not bound to therrr^The maintenance of peace

is

to choose whatever

his only dutyf in fulfilling

means and

to issue

it,

he

is

perfectly free

whatever laws he considers

most appropriate.

THE SOVEREIGN
As

to the

form of the state, theoretically it does not matter

is one man (monarchy) or an assembly

whether the sovereign

(democracy or aristocracy). In practice, however, for almost the

same reasons advanced by Bodin, Hobbe s strongly favors monarchy
a monarchy wherein "the disposing of the successor is always left to the judgment and will of the present possessor." 5
Whether the sovereign is a monarch or an assembly, his rights
are equally absolute. They logically stem from the motives and
contents of that pact whereof he is the product. For the sake of
peace and protection men have ceded him everything (except the
inalienable right of self-defense) definitely and irrevocably. The
sovere ign ha s, ther^fo^jrnhmited pov/er. The subjects are bound

4 Ibid.

5 ibid.,

chap. 19.

From Medieval

IV.

200]
to all his laws.

sovereign

is

No

revocation of the pact

able to maintain

peaceKNo

to
is

Modern Times

possible so long as the

right of revolt

is

allowed,

and tyrannicide is inadmissible, for the sovereign is incapable of

wrongdoing and, consequently, can never be deserving of punishment. Hobbes goes so far as to grant him the right to interpret
the laws of nature and ultimately makes him the arbiter of what
is just and what is unjust. For Hobbes, these laws of nature are
not immutable principles of action but mere means to the end of
self-preservation in society. They are valid only within the framej
of the social compact. Should there be any conflict between the,
conscience of the subject and the laws of the sovereign, these hold
sway. Thus the relation between law and morality is reversed:
morality rests on law, not vice versa.
Even less restraint on the master's will (if less is possible)
have the principles of common law as formulated in the courts and
the sacred canons issued by the Church. The power of Hobbes'
sovereign does not admit of any limitation. It cannot be shared
with any other legislator. It is incommunicable and indivisible. It
encompasses man's whole life and range of interests. The sovereign
is both absolute ruler and infallible pontiff. It is to be noted that/
while Hobbes' strongest and sharpest opposition is directed at thel
Catholic Church (the "kingdom of darkness" or "kingdom of fairy/
tales") and the papacy ("the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire
sitting crowned upon the grave thereof"), 6 he also violently atj
tacks the Protestant doctrine of private judgment.

every church

is

The ChurchI

under the immediate and absolute control of the

sovereign.

Compared with Hobbes', even Bodin's sovereignty appears less?

embracing, less absolute. Yet Hobbes asserts that in the state man\
is free,

because he has himself willed these conditions:

Fear and

liberty are consistent: as

when

man

into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he does
willingly,

and may refuse to do

of one that was free.

And

it if

he

will:

Ibid., chap. 47.

7 Ibid., chap. 21.

actions,

throws his goods

nevertheless very

therefore the action,

which men do in
which the doers had

generally, all actions

commonwealths, for fear of the law, are

liberty to omit. 7

it is

it

Hobbes XV.

[201

THREE REMARKS
For a correct appraisal of Hobbes' political theory, several remarks are in order. First, admitting for the sake of the argument
that peace is realized and maintained under the conditions he describes, it is highly questionable whether life is worth living in the
Hobbesian

state.

The

loss of true mdivi4ual_and_social

the total surrender of

all

righTsJoJhe sovereign,

freedom,

too great a

is

pay forlnere physical safety. Self-preservation is indeed

a fundamental laV^oTnature but there are other goods to which
man is naturally and supernaturally inclined higher goods that

price to

man

cherishes to the point of disregarding

in pursuing

life itself

or defending them. LibertyJs, on&; justice -andobedience to God's

natural and rev ealed laws are others. Experience proves the falsity
_
of HobbeT a^sumption. There have always been men who did not

value security above

had adequate

all else

and

feel satisfied

simply because they

police protection.

Secondly, the very foundation of Hobbes' theory

Man

is

by nature

social

and

is

untenable.

political, as Aristotle, St.

Thomas,

and countless other philosophers have clearly proved. He seeks

the company of his fellow men; he trusts them, at least to some
extent. Everyday life is a series of acts of faith in mutual understanding and confidence. Hobbes' decision to entrust man's security to the sovereign is a refutation of his major premise.
Thirdly, Hobbes, in another of his typically contradictory
statements, again demolishes his own theory when he admits instances in which the s ubjects may resist the sovereign and virtually
consider themselves freed of

all

obligation to him.

preservation, the reason for the original surrender,

Then

justification for the eventual dissolution of the contract. It

happen
is

may

that the sovereign threatens the life of his subjects, that he

decides to send

he

self-

becomes the

them

to die

on the

battlefield, or,

worst of all/that

unable, to protect thenl In these cases the citizen

from obedience to the master to

He moves

then in a vicious

whom

circle.

is

released

he had confided his

safety.

Anxiety, fear, and suspicion are

never entirely cast aside. The very sovereign

who is to keep peace

and provide protection may at any time become the offender, the
disturber, the enemy. What guarantee is there against him?
In other words,

From Medieval

IV.

202]

to

Modern Times

which the sovereign ensures perfect

who obey him, has never existed, and
the obligations incident to it do not exist either. Hobbes' theory depends on the assumption that men desire security above all things, that
there is nothing for which men would think it worthwhile to risk their
lives. He thinks that men would never rebel if they thought they would
lose their lives in the process. Society is never in danger from such
men. It is the men who will die rather than tolerate what they hold to
be an injustice who endanger the state. If men were as careful of their
lives as Hobbes makes out, there would be no need of a sovereign
power. If they were restless, except when they had perfect security,
there would be no possibility of one. On Hobbes' own showing, what
security have they against the sovereign? Only the probability that it
will not be worth the while to kill them if they do whatever he tells
them. No one who has studied history could take that probability for
the

Leviathan,

that

security against other

state

in

men

to all

a certainty. 8

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I and II. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958
Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. Introduction by A. D. Lindsay. New
York: Dutton, 1914.

Hobbes, T. Leviathan

Bowle,

Hobbes and His Critics (A Study in Seventeenth-Century

London: Cape, 1952.
Catlin, G. E. G. Thomas Hobbes as Philosopher, Publicist and Man
J.

Constitutionalism)

of Letters. Oxford: Blackwell, 1922.

Gurian, W. "Hobbes: Leviathan," The Great Books, ed. by H.

Gardiner. New York: Devin-Adair, 1950, Vol. II, pp. 74-80.
Laird, J. Hobbes. London: E. Benn, 1934.
Oakeshott, M. "Introduction" in Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1955, pp. vii-lxvi.
Peters, R. Hobbes. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956.
Strauss, L. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1936.

Warrender, H.

The

Political

Philosophy

Clarendon Press, 1957.

8 Ibid.,

Introduction by A. D. Lindsay, xxi.

of

Hobbes.

Oxford:

part five: Modern Times

chapter xvi

Introductory

THE FIGHT AGAINST ABSOLUTISM

THE

significance of the first period in the history of

political

modern

thought was heightened by the victorious fight against

The men who provided the intellectual, spiritual, and

psychological weapons were Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.
absolutism.

Then,

in

America, Jefferson, aided by

marized in a momentous manifesto of

Adams and Franklin, sumhuman freedom the reasons

why

the people had the right and the duty to rise against despotism
and establish themselves in a government with restricted powers.
In France it was Sieyes who fixed the immediate issues at stake
and led the final charge.
Locke (1632-1704), to whom the foundation of modern liberalism and constitutionalism is attributed, expressed his political
philosophy in Two Treatises of Civil Government, a widely read
and influential work. Many of his principles were old ones, but some
traditional elements were dropped and others, mirroring a new and
empiristic mentality, added.

The conclusions

thus reached, or sug-

and partly were repellent to classical or

medieval thought. It was in this vein that Locke and his followers
upheld religion and specifically Christianity, regarding it more as
"a new promulgation of the moral law" than a system transcendgested, partly agreed with

V. Modern Times

206]
ing the limits of

man

lation of

The

human knowledge

to his

Maker."

or "a revelation of the true re-

early liberals reduced Christian faith to a prosaic, thor-

oughly tamed, acceptable, bourgeois religion:

whose

a religion

only province was morality, a religion further limited so as to be

not the font but the convenient safeguard of morality. Through

their intellectual

means

alchemy, religion became a completely reasonable

of keeping

mankind out

by adding the

of mischief

fear of

God's punishment and the expectation of His reward to the

straining or stimulating force of other social considerations. It

re-

was

a feat of Lilliputian magnitude that dwarfed Christianity, a divine

and

divinizing

religion,

to

the measurements

of natural

(Logically and inevitably, the late liberals, guided by David

What

discarded even this shred of theology.)

is

more,

man.

Hume,

man was
human

seen as an individual rather than as a social being, and his

reason was proclaimed autonomous to the point of minimizing or

denying the invaluable support given

reduced to individual experience

by

it

and

faith.

Everything was

intellectual

investigation

on reason unaided by Revelation. The exaltation of

reason meant the exaltation of man. Although avoiding the heavy
preoccupation with guilt and the total damning of man proper to
Lutheranism, orthodox Christianity had always insisted on the
reality of sin (original and actual) and its consequences on man
and society. The new men shunned the mere mention of sin: evil
was not an act of the will but of the intellect; evil was but ignorance and ignorance was to be cured by education. Social and political institutions, rather than men, were to be improved or reformed in order to change the face of the earth. Locke and his
was

to rely

tended also to emphasize the rights of

disciples

of his duties;

means

and

right

was

to achieve a divinely appointed purpose.

the inalienable rights are granted

gation

men

the obligation to live well, that

inescapably belongs.)

The

at the

expense

is,

(In reality, even

to

fulfill

an

obli-

in conformity to the

whom

each and everyone

L. Stephen, History of English

(New York: Putnam's

means

as

loving and yet exacting plan of God, to

man

viewed as an end instead of a

in turn

Thought

Sons, 1927), vol.

liberals' crucial test

I,

p.

in the

came when they

lar sovereignty that included both legal

Eighteenth Century

100.
fell

for a

dogma

and moral sovereignty.

of popucould

How

they reconcile the theory of inalienable rights with the belief that the peo-

Introductory XVI.

[207

Another feature of liberalism

was

to

be seen in

community

its

men

principles that
in a

as officially introduced

conception of the

by Locke

Ignored were the

state.

organically tend to be united in the

bond so strong

make

as to

human

their living with others

the necessary condition for a rational existence; that the full reali-

zation of man's physical, intellectual, and moral needs depends

upon

this living

with his fellow men. Displacing them was a con-

tractual theory that

made

the origin of the state exclusively a free

by mutual consent of individual men. The state was said

creation. The state of nature was opposed to the poman's
to be
litical state. The atomistic concept of society had its beginning in
decision

this idea so

dear to Locke.

to live in the state

And

man's having chosen

this idea (of

and even of having given origin

to state

and

government) had as a possible conclusion (a conclusion not envisioned by Locke) that he who had established the state for the
better protection of natural rights could, if he so chose, change
this direction

and use the same contrivance

to

deny or destroy

them. 3

are not

pie (or, for that matter, the state or the nation)

bound by any

ones they impose on themselves? How can a right

be inalienable if the people possess absolute and undivided sovereignty
sovereignty that is not limited by any law, human or divine? See, on this

restrictions except the

and related points, John H. Hallowell's Main Currents in Modern Political

Thought (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950), chap. 4, "The Rise of Liberalism," pp. 84-117.
3

"So long as conscience retains a valid role in the scheme of things

its integral character, but with the disintegration of conscience and the denial of the existence of eternal truth and justice the

liberalism retains

liberal

the

is

driven by his

sovereign

(anarchy).

absolute

own

logic to either of

(tyranny)

or

With the acceptance of a

to

two conclusions:

make

the

positivistic

individual

to

make

absolute

point of view which

denies the existence of objective truth and justice the relationship between
individuals and the sovereign can no longer be regarded as a contractual

one since no means of interpreting the contract are

tion of metaphysics the positivist rejects at the

left. With the rejecsame time any possibility

of evaluating the acts of the sovereign in terms of justice or injustice for

justice

is

a metaphysical concept. Since for the positivist the only rights

of individuals are those secured by the positive law, he cannot evaluate the

observance or violation of individual

a matter of fact disappears. Compulsion

acts of the sovereign in terms of the

rights. All basis of obligation as
is

substituted for obligation

and the coercive force behind the law becomes

the distinguishing characteristic of legality. Thus, ultimately, the liberal

who

accepts the positivistic perspective has

no choice but

to

make

either

V. Modern Times

208]

As to constitutionalism, Locke as well as Montesquieu (16891755) insisted on the doctrine of limited government or the rule
of law and not of men, and roundly condemned absolutism in
every form. Montesquieu added his invaluable and detailed doctrine of the separation of powers and called for its incorporation
in the state constitution through a practical system of checks and
balances. What Montesquieu proposed and erroneously thought
had been already realized in England was finally adopted and embodied on a national basis in the constitution of the United States. 4
In the fight against royal absolutism, Rousseau (1712-1778)
joined forces with Locke and Montesquieu. More poet than philosopher, he differed from them in that he represented not liberalism or rationalism but the extremest kind of romanticism (a
romanticism that gave the primacy to the instincts, feelings, emotions, and impulses, and contrasted the natural goodness of man
with the wickedness of society and its institutions). Furthermore
Rousseau, although opposed to royal absolutism and calling for
a revolution to get rid of the old tyrannical order, built up a political theory implicit in which was another and perhaps worse
absolutism the absolutism of the majority. Unlike Locke's, his
man, once a citizen, retained no natural right. Unlike Montesquieu's,

was absolute, indivisible, incapable of alienation

and of representation. Thus what had started as a recovery of the
worth of the individual ended by surrendering him totally to a
his sovereignty

mystical

"general will" or all-powerful "sovereign" that,

ceivably, might

have no way to express

itself

con-

save the will of the

There is no guarantee against numerical quantity's becoming the ultimate criterion of what is right or wrong, of what
are man's rights and obligations. Against it there is no appeal.

majority.

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

At

the very eve of the French Revolution, the grievances and

claims of the French people were itemized by E.

the sovereign or the individual absolute and his

whether

explicitly or not, to

own

J.

Sieyes in a

logic forces him,

an espousal either of tyranny or of unbridled

subjectivism." Ibid., pp. 114, 115.

4 The leading principles
of the

American Constitution were defended

and discussed in The Federalist, a collection of essays by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. For American political thought, see Chapter XXVHI in this
volume.

Introductory XVI.

[209

pamphlet of 127 pages and six chapters, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers

Etat? ("What is the Third Estate?"), published December 27,
1788. A masterpiece of popular political literature and an unexcelled bit of skihful propaganda, it clearly and incisively presented
the issues for all to see and grasp and remember. Born in 1748, a
priest

Sieyes

whom

and hence a member of a privileged order (the clergy),

was early touched by the plight of the common people, to
he in reality belonged. The opening lines of the booklet show

the tone of the writing and the plan of the writer:

work
1st. What
is

is

"The plan

of this

We

have three questions to ask ourselves:

the third estate? Everything. 2nd. What has it been

very simple:

What does it demand?

made three requests in the

hitherto in the political order? Nothing. 3rd.

To become something
name of the common

therein." Sieyes

people: the third estate was to be repre-

sented by deputies chosen from and by the people (a truly popular representation); these deputies

representatives of clergy

and

were to equal in number the

nobility (a double representation);

had
1789) was to be by heads and not by
order (a new method of voting). Sieyes' requests were accompanied by a dark warning for the privileged orders: "If the right
principles were followed, the three estates could not vote together,
neither by head nor by order." The true principles he listed in the
last three chapters, which deal with what the government attempted and others proposed on the matter, what should have
been done, and what there remained to do. On the last point, Sieyes
the voting (in the Estates General, the convocation of which

been promised for

asserted there were

May

two ways open

to the third estate to gain

legitimate place in the nation: to assemble alone

and

its

legislate in

name of the entire nation, or to appeal to the nation and let it,
through extraordinary and specially convoked delegates, decide
the issue once forever.
the

17,

There was something prophetic in Sieyes' Tiers Etat. On June

1789 (at his urging: "The time has come let us cut the

rope"), the third estate proclaimed

Assembly
and soon afterward the Constituent Assembly. Then the Declaration des droits de Vhomme et du citoyen of 1789 and the Constitution of 1791 laid the foundation of French public law with the prinitself

the National

ciples that the whole sovereignty resides essentially in the nation

and that the nation has the imprescriptible right to change its constitution. Thus Sieyes' "nation" replaced the king. But in 1793 it

V.

210]

Modem

Times

was replaced by the "people" of the Jacobin constitution. By then

the revolution had accomplished its task. The new concepts of
liberty and democracy had won over the "gothic" mentality and
the tyranny of the ancien regime. But sovereignty survived intact,
political power lost nothing of its strength, "and the monstrous
Leviathan could continue to smile

strange smile."

On

the not

was perhaps already visible the

and furious galloping of the first modem man on horseback,

too distant
swift

its

Napoleon,

hills

l'

of history, there

enfant de la Revolution.

With the French Revolution the fight for democracy against

absolutism reached one of its most electrifying climaxes. But, prior
to it, other events had already immensely helped the progress of
democratic ideas and the establishment of constitutional practices.
These challenging and liberating events were the English Revolution (1688) and the American Revolution (1776). The significance and implications of the former were not immediately and
fully grasped, for in England the monarchy, though limited, remained, and the landed nobility continued until 1832 to control
the parliament. But none could fail to understand the meaning and
feel the impact of the American and the French revolution. True,
there were great diversities between the two: their underlying philosophies were not exactly the same; the American was not marred
by the follies and excesses that marked the French and it was followed by the establishment of a stable political order. But both
revolutions made one thing unequivocally clear: the people of two
great countries had established a society dedicated to the realization of the principles of equality and opportunity for ail. Monarchy
and aristocracy were absent in the new America. Monarchy and
aristocracy were being eliminated in France.

THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION

had quickened the demowas inevitable especially in regard to

the French Revolution. For some it marked the end of a corrupt
era characterized by injustice and exploitation, and the beginning
of a new epoch of freedom, prosperity, and happiness. Some conreaction to the dramatic acts that

cratic processes of history

sidered

it

one of the worst disasters in human history

5 J.-J. Chevallier,

Colin, 1949), p. 184.

political

Les Grandes oeuvres politiques (Paris: Librairie A.

entire Chapter IV, on Sieyes, is excellent.

The

[211

Introductory XVI.
upheaval wrong in
strophic in

premises, revolting in

its

its

methods, cata-

its results.

and the "revolutionary abstractism" grounded in the Age of Enlightenment, Burke was foremost for both influence and eloquence. It was he who started the

Of

all

critics

of the Revolution

"reactionary" crusade and continued

mission, in the

name

practical experience,

it,

as

if

invested with a divine

of history, realism, tradition, prescription,

common

sense, order,

and hierarchy. Some

some of his reflections emiEven some of his forecasts were vindicated (he predicted, among other things, that the Revolution would soon end in
a military dictatorship). But in general one gets the impression
that Burke was afraid of change and that he wanted even the necessary changes to be but a return to the past. Burke was more in
sympathy with the American Revolution: he found it legitimate,
and justified it because, so he maintained, it brought forth no new

of his principles were eminently true,

nently wise.

idea and because love for freedom

is

characteristic of the

Ameri-

can people inasmuch as the majority are of English origin and

Protestant. But he mistrusted the men of the continent, most of
whom were Catholics, and did not recognize their right to revolt.

Also representative of the conservative reaction were Joseph de

Maistre (1753-1821) and Viscount de Bonald (1754-1840).

De

Maistre, in particular, a most able and intelligent man, gave expression to his political doctrine in the Nights of St. Petersburg

and Considerations on France.

He

of nature prior to society. Society

denies the existence of a state

is

not the work of

man

but of

God, who from the very beginning made man social. The constitution of each nation is to be exactly tailored to its needs, customs,
religious belief, geographic features, and moral characteristics. A
constitution based on preconceived ideas and theoretical principles
will not have a long life. According to de Maistre, the French constitution of 1795 was prepared for man in general (in the abstract)
and not for France and Frenchmen in particular. It did not embody and respond to the history of that nation; it paid no attention to the mentality and traditions of its people. He also maintained that sovereignty

form.

He

is

one, inviolable, absolute

favored hereditary monarchy.

He

whatever

its

intensely disliked de-

mocracy: he saw in the "people" the harshest, most despotic and

intolerant monarch.

More

recently the Revolution and

its

parliamentarism and re-

V. Modern Times

212]

publicanism found a stout adversary in Charles Maurras (18681952), organizer of Action Frangaise (1898) and author of Enqueue sur la monarchic (1900-1909). Doctrinaire and demagogue,
he was the last (or was he next to the last?) of a long list of remarkable Frenchmen who each in his own way opposed the atomization or fragmentation of the French nation and tried to undo
what they considered the evils of the Revolution. Like de Maistre,
de Bonald, Comte, Taine, and even more than these, Maurras was
a reactionary of the right, dead set against liberalism, democratic
constitutionalism, individualism. In addition he stressed a highly
emotional and almost irrational factor already advocated by
Maurice Barres (1862-1923): integral nationalism, a sort of national dictatorship based on traditionalism and regionalism, to
unite the entire nation and lead it to greater glory. For Maurras
the love of the nation was the overwhelming criterion for decision
and action. His motto could literally have been Machiavelli's
words: "I love my country more than my soul." Maurras cultivated and encouraged to the nth degree hatred of alien influences
within France. He wanted French culture to be nourished with the
Greek and Roman classic spirit and to recognize institutional Catholicism as part and parcel of its tradition. But he wrote blasphemously against the "Hebrew Christ," the "redeemer of slaves and
the dethroner of the strong," and refused to acknowledge Christianity as a supernatural faith.

To make

the French nation

what he wanted

it

to be.

strongly advocated a return to monarchy, through force

Maurras
if

neces-

His monarchy was to be traditional, hereditary, antiparliamentary, decentralized. The king was to be a representative of the
sary.

nation but one

find a

who both

reigns

more extreme and rabid

and governs. Indeed,

it is

nationalist than Maurras.

he exerted a powerful influence on

hard to

As

such,

Fascism (which he
called "a magnificent explosion of Italy's youth") and on Mussolini who, when Pius XI condemned Action Frangaise in 1926, is
said to have remarked: "I felt the wind from the bullets that hit
Maurras." 6
Italian

Another writer who similarly opposed the French Revolution while

same time insisting on the cult of the nation was Giuseppe Mazzini
(1805-1872). Against the Revolution's emphasis on rights, he emphasized
men's duties, and instead of "individuals" he spoke enthusiastically of "collective humanity." It was Mazzini's contention that humanity manifests
6

at the

Introductory XVI.

[213

THE LIBERAL REACTION

The democratic and revolutionary creed was fully endorsed by
Thomas Paine and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Paine (1737-1809),
born in England, came to America in 1774. In 1776 he published

Common

Sense, advocating the separation of the colonies from

England and their establishment as a republic. In the same pamphlet he pleaded, on grounds of both justice and utility, for popular
government (equated by him with the rule of reason) against
hereditary government (equated by him with rule by ignorance).
This doctrine of popular sovereignty and limited government was
also the main theme of his Rights of Man, written after his return
to England, in answer to Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in
France. On Burke's acid comment on French happenings, he remarked: "He pities the plumage but forgets the dying bird." A
follower of Rousseau and a convinced revolutionist, Paine found
his political ideal expressed in the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen. While in France and in jail (he belonged to the Girondin faction and was almost guillotined by
Robespierre), Paine wrote The Age of Reason, a condemnation of
orthodox Christianity and a defense of deism. He returned to the
United States in 1802 and remained there the rest of his life.
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), in his Essay on the
Limits to the Action of the State (written in 1792, published in
1850), radically opposed all the prerogatives of the absolute state
and any governmental intervention in the life of the citizens except
to safeguard their internal and external security. Humboldt separated politics from morality and religion. He wanted the state to be
preoccupied only with the observance of the laws and not with religion and religious matters. Even the control of the morals of the
citizens is out of bounds for his state. (As will be evident, this
doctrine had many points in common with that of the utilitarians.)

According to him, every people has a particular misand that mission is what constitutes its nationality. But Mazzini, unMaurras, advocated a liberal, humanitarian type of nationalism

itself in nationalities.

sion
like

nationalism compatible with or rather calling for "the alliance of the peoples in order to work out their mission in peace and love
each supporting and profiting by the other's aid" {Giuseppe Mazzini: Selected Writ.

ings, ed.

by N. Gangulee [London: Drummond, 1945],

p. 139).

V. Modern Times

214]

Reasons for justifying and praising the French Revolution were

brought forward in quantity by another German philosopher,
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Later Fichte advocated
ideas not consonant with democratic tenets, highly extolled the

and called for a rigid regulation of all its economic

activities. By welcoming the democratic revolution, however, and
defending the right of the people to change their political constitution, he put himself on record as a believer in liberal individualism and economic liberalism.
A liberal but cautious reaction was voiced by Alexis de Tocqueville. While accepting the democratic principle, he warned

nation-state,

against the dangers inherent in

its

egalitarian principle (uniformity

and conformity, excessive individualism, tyranny of the majority).

To make democracy safe he appealed to man's passion for liberty
and to firm religious convictions. Tocqueville's ideas are found in
his Democracy in America
an unexcelled study by a foreign observer of a nation's institutions and culture, probably the best ever
written, whose value remains undiminished even today.

UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism

Hume

was prepared by David

(1711-1776);

its

formulation was anticipated by the French philosopher Claude

Helvetius (1715-1771); but

it

was Bentham (1748-1832) who

in his Treatise of Human Nature

(1739) and Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751),
denied the existence of rational principles of justice or moral laws

gave

it

classic expression.

Hume,

of nature and, therefore, the rational basis of the so-called rules

of morality. These he explained as
social utility.

Nor

mere conventions or

dictates of

did he admit the validity of reason or conscience

action. For Hume the

"Reason is, and ought
only to be, the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any
other office than to serve and obey them." 7 Helvetius, in his Of
the Spirit (1758), repeated Hume's denial of absolute right or
justice and saw in self-interest (seeking what is pleasurable, avoiding what is painful) the sole determinant of men's actions. But he

as a link

between natural law and human

spring of any action

is its

agreeableness

7 Hume's Moral and

Political Philosophy,
Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner, 1948):

p. 25.

ed. with

an Introduction by

Treatise of

Human

Nature,

Introductory XVI.
added

although self-loving and born without "innate prin-

that,

ciples of virtue,"

by

[215

men can be

so educated and guided and helped

legislation as to seek their happiness in the

happiness of others.

As

to

Bentham,

promotion of the

in his lengthy presentation t

of the utilitarian theory he held that the test of the goodness of any

action

contribution to

is its

human

happiness.

He

disregarded the

idea that the state originated through a primitive contract for the
rights. Rather, he conceived
from the purely hedonistic angle of having been established
because of its usefulness to men, for the specific purpose of promoting "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."
One of Bentham's most faithful and brilliant supporters and
one of the most fervent apostles of the utilitarian creed was John
Stuart Mill (1806-1873), son of James Mill. He added precision

purpose of protecting man's natural

it

to the notion of happiness with his qualitative concept of pleasure

Bentham for whom pleasures are all of the same

insisted on its social characteristics. Mill was a firm

(here correcting

and

species)

believer in sociology, in his view the unique social science. His

most famous essays (Utilitarianism, 1861; On Liberty, 1859; Considerations on Representative Government, 1861) reveal an extreme individualist. His definition of freedom is well-known: "The
only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their effort to obtain it." 8 Except
in very special cases Mill rules out all interference with the liberty

of action of any

man

or group:

the only purpose for which

power can be rightfully exercised over

any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
.

individual

is

sovereign. 9

Consequently, governmental activities are to be limited to the minimum. To help men remain free, to provide an opportunity for a
"variety of situations," Mill recommends representative government, adding however that such government is possible only
among highly developed peoples. In his concern for individualism,
8

On

Liberty, in

Utilitarianism, Liberty,

ment (London: Everyman

9 Ibid.,
p. 73.

and Representative Govern-

Edition, 1929), p. 25.

V. Modern Times

216]

Mill warns against the danger of mass democracy and of the con-

sequent ascendancy of public opinion: "they

things, listen to the

same

places,

"

jects

have

same

their

now

same

read the same

go to the
hopes and fears directed to the same obthings, see the

things,

10

IDEALISM
As

a philosophical system, idealism represented a reaction to

empiricism (championed by Gassendi, Hobbes, Locke, and especially

Hume),

that

is,

against the emphasis

on sense experience

at

the expense of thought in the learning process. According to the

idealists,

ideas are the essential factors in knowledge:

nothing beyond our idea and our knowledge, and

tellectual activity alone that everything

is

there

is

by our inexplained. As an ethical

it is

doctrine, idealism struck hard at the hedonistic concept of utili-

tarian liberalism (life

spring of

on

human

is

a pursuit of self-interest, and pleasure the

action).

The

idealists

gratification or calculation or

put the accent on duty, not

even

right.

They saw

life

as a

tremendously exacting and heroic affair. For them, man's purpose

was to achieve perfect spiritual freedom a purpose to be realized
by stages with the help of law, morality, society, and religion. As
a political theory, idealism was an extreme effort to turn away
from the individualistic outlook and atomism of the democratic
revolution, which had limited and therefore in a sense minimized
the authority and the functions of the state. The idealists (pantheists, mystics, and romantics combined) extolled the national state
to unparalleled heights. They denied its creation by individuals or
families or other social groups. They viewed its authority as unlimited, its law as the infallible expression of justice, its citizens as
absorbed by and in it so as to become fully free.
Prominent idealist philosophers were the German Herder,
Fichte, and Hegel. Johann G. Herder (1744-1803) featured in
politics the indefinable element Volk and called for the German
people's recapture of the essence of their Volkstum and the pur-

suit of its destiny, following the intense fervor of their primitive

feelings

and subjective

intuitions.

Herder's state

is

totalitarian:

abroad are regulated by state plan, foreign trade is a state

monopoly, citizens' occupations and professions are decided by
trips

Ibid., pp. 130, 131.

Introductory XVI.
the state.

[217

Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814)

in his

Addresses to the

German Nation (1807-1808), fourteen discourses delivered at the

Academy of Berlin and intended for the entire nation, gave much
importance to the national

state.

He wanted

the individual to sub-

widen its sphere of authority, particularly in regard to property and production and trade, to
the point of setting in motion a system of state socialism. With
Hegel, German idealistic and nationalistic thought reached its climax. As the separate chapter on Hegel explains, the state became
"the realization of freedom," the absolute power on earth, "der
Gang Gottes in der Welt" ("the march of God in this world").

merge

into a collectivity

and the

Individuals were completely at

state to

its

mercy, without rights against

it. The omnipotence of the

was incarnate in the ruler in him the spirit of the people
lived and expressed itself. Nations were independent one of another. In their mutual relations, the rules of conventional morality
had neither meaning nor place. Perpetual peace was not to be desired, for by stopping the progress of evolution it would bring stagnation and corruption. History is explained in terms of divine

it,

deriving

all spiritual reality

state

from

judgment: the nation that triumphed over the others in a given

was the one predestined to impose its will and to

push forward the frontiers of the Spirit.
Outside Germany, outstanding representatives of the idealistic
view of the state were (in England) Thomas Hill (1836-1882),
F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923),
and (in Italy) Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944). It was Gentile who

historical period

gave Italian fascism

its

philosophical ideology and, at Mussolini's

request, formulated the so-called fascist doctrine.

POSITIVISM
The founder

From 1818

to

of positivism was Auguste Comte (1798-1857).

1824 he was a disciple of Saint-Simon (1760-

1825), whose ideas for the organization of a new society much

impressed him. But unlike Saint-Simon, who wanted to reform society immediately, Comte realized, after a reading of de Maistre,

some unity of
among men. Since

that

faith

and thought had

first

to be re-established

MidAges was out of the question, mankind was to be provided

with a new basis from which to project itself into the golden age.
dle

a return to the "theological" unity of the

V. Modern Times

218]
This

is

why and how Comte founded

his philosophical system.

and
and
explains all human behavior in terms of scientific laws immanent
in the things themselves. It was Comte's fundamental thesis that
determinism rules natural phenomena as well as man and society:
human life and activities are unalterably governed by certain natPositivism repudiates

all

traces of metaphysical speculation

moral appraisal, considers experience the sole source of

ural immutable laws just as physical

phenomena

truth,

are constantly

by equally necessary, immutable, and immanent laws

of nature. It was also Comte's belief that through observation and
description of human events (the data of experience) it was posa reliable
sible to reach the knowledge of their laws and relations
the
whole
body
of
which
knowledge,
constitutes
invariable
and
positive philosophy and includes all positive sciences: mathematand then astronomy, physics,
ics, their broadest foundation,
chemistry, physiology, and finally, for their apex and ruler, sociology, a term which Comte himself coined. The last specifically
studies human facts and draws on the findings of the other sciences. Its object is the "observation of intellectual and moral facts,
through which human societies are constituted and by which they
are progressive." u Its purpose is synthesized in Comte's famous
phrase: "Savoir pour prevoir, afin de pourvoir" ("To know in
order to foresee, and therefore to provide"). It has the role
theology had in the Middle Ages.
Comte speaks of a static and a dynamic sociology. The former
controlled

deals with institutions (the conditions of social existence: property,

the family, language) or objective

lish

means needed by man

to estab-

himself in society, and with junctions (the conditions of social

equilibrium: social forces, material, intellectual, moral; authority;

and

religion).

Dynamic

sociology deals with the laws of social

progress: in general, the law of evolution; in particular, the laws

of intellectual progress, progress in activity, affective progress. It
is

according to the law of affective progress that man's natural

sentiment of altruism will grow so strong as completely to dominate egoism, the other natural sentiment. Here, in Comte's fourth
law,

is

the essence of his morality

a morality that consists in

duty: the duty to live for others.

11 F. J. Thonnard, A Short History of Philosophy (Tournai and New
York: Desclee, 1955), p. 762. The whole chapter on "The Synthesis of
Auguste Comte" (pp. 752-776) is worth reading.

Introductory XVI.
Comte saw

[219

in the history of

humanity the law of progress or

it in his so-called "law

continuous development and he expressed

of the three stages" in the evolution of the mind.

is

The

stage

first

the theological (wherein facts are explained by reference to the

wills of

ond

personal beings, especially supernatural beings).

The

sec-

the metaphysical (wherein things are explained in terms of

is

impersonal forces and general concepts, such as causes, substances, faculties).

study

is

made not

The

third stage

of the

first

is

the positive: in

causes of facts (the

it

a rigorous

why) but

of the

laws by which they are controlled (the how).

Comte's philosophy is contained in his Course of Positive Phi(1830-1842) and System of Positive Politics (18511854). In the later work he expresses his disapproval of democ-

losophy

racy and in particular of delegating sovereign powers through

popular suffrage.

He

also developed a strange plan for a political

and religious organization of society under the intellectual and

moral direction of a scientific priesthood (sociologists) helped
by an elite of industrial leaders and bankers. Comte attempted to
construct a positive religion to supplant Christianity.

He

gave

a trinity: humanity, earth, air; priests (the supreme pontiff

Comte

himself

and

it

was

he received annual suband ceremonies, and saints (the

in his later years

from his followers); rites

was a woman with whom he had been intimately associated).
A derivative form of positivism, although quite independent
of some of Comte's philosophical positions, was the doctrine of
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). He was convinced that evolution,
"a single metamorphosis universally progressing," was the magic
principle capable of bringing together in a unified whole all sciences from astronomy and biology to ethics, sociology, and politics. For him society and political institutions were the result of a
slow inevitable process of certain laws immanent in nature. Prinsidies

first

cipal

among

these were Darwin's law of the survival of the

and, consequently, of the extermination of

all

who

fittest

are unwilling

or unable to adapt themselves to the social milieu, and Lamarck's

law of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, according to
which the surviving individuals and society at large cannot fail to
become better from generation to generation. State and government are temporary evils, for men still labor under violent instincts inherited from previous forms of existence. But because
the process of evolution must take place unhampered, the func-

V. Modern Times

220]
tions of the state are to

be limited to the

men

the maintenance of order. Ultimately

minimum

necessary for

be divested of their

will

predatory tendencies; ultimately the state will disappear. Then

men and

nations, having reached the ultimate stage of social evo-

an

lution, will enjoy the blessings of

economy

industrial

that will

provide work and food and leisure for everyone to live together
happily and peacefully.
equilibrium

is

reached a

At least for a time:

new process sets in

for once the ultimate

backward process,

a process of dissolution.

SOCIALISM

A wide

variety of

modern

socialist doctrines

developed during

the latter half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century.

As

rule, socialism in all its

forms

that turns to politics only as a

is

primarily an economic theory

means

to

its

economic

goal. It

originated as a protest against such evils or defects of capitalism

and opportunity; insecurity and

unemployment; production not for use but for profit; antagonism between employers and employed. It has, as a common
fund and inspiration, a positivist and materialistic morality: "placing the ideal of human life on this earth in economic prosperity,"
socialism attempts "to procure this status by a new organization
of society in which the right of private property will be suppressed
as inequality of wealth, income,

cyclic

completely or in part."

12

Writing in 1928, F.

J.

C. Hearnshaw

13

described the essentials of socialism as the six E's: the exaltation

of the

community above the

individual, the equalization of

human

conditions, the elimination of the capitalist, the expropriation of

the landlord, the extinction of private enterprise,

and the eradica-

tion of competition. In other words, socialism seeks (1) the abolition of all

forms of private capital and with

it

the incentive to

private profit; (2) the public or collective ownership at least of

all

the great industries and the land.

third essential has

been

more recently, added: the organization of a central planning system to direct all economic activities in view of the common good.
While all socialists agree on these general principles (except
for the anarchist-socialists and the syndicalists, who would not
12 Ibid., p. 810; see entire

13 In his

chapter on Socialism, pp. 808-826.

Survey of Socialism, Analytical, Historical, Critical (London:

Macmillan, 1928), chap.

2,

"The Six Essentials of Socialism," pp. 34-70.

Introductory XVI.

[221

accept the emphasis on central planning), they disagree on the

how

to do it. Communists and

violence and revolution
on
syndicalists and some
guild socialists, and
Collectivists,
means.
as the most important
and non-violent
a
gradual
socialism
by
some anarchists try to build

kind of society to re-create and

anarchists rely

process of "evolution."

COMMUNISM
Marx (1818-1883)
scientific socialism,

14

lowing the dogmatic

( 1 )

(2)

The
The

is

commonly recognized

or communism.

He and

as the father of

Engels

denial of

social processes of

The

the fol-

God and

everything spiritual in man.

materialistic interpretation of history, according to

which the economic structure of society determines

(3)

made

articles of its creed:

all

human and

life.

class struggle,

which began with the establishment of

and finds expression today in the irreconcilable

antagonism (arising from the appropriation of the "surplus value"
by a handful of exploiters) between capitalists and proletarians.
private property

(4)

The

class.

of a social revolution as

inevitability

which the proletariat

will

a result of

overthrow and expropriate the

capitalist

15

(5) The dictatorship of the proletariat, whereby the proletariat

organized as the ruling class will liquidate the bourgeoisie

and develop socialism into communism.

(6)

The withering away of the state.

The emergence of the new society

the ultimate, Godform of human society.

Marxian socialism was further developed and applied to the
changed economic and political situation of the world by Lenin
(1870-1924). He is credited with the elaboration of a new theory

(7)

less, classless, stateless

14

This kind of socialism

is

contrasted with what

socialism," a socialism that has for

siderations

and

relies

its

is

called "Utopian

bases humanitarian and moral con-

on voluntary acceptance arrived at by means of perIts most famous advocates were Francis (Gracchus)

suasion and education.

Babeuf (1760-1797), Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Charles Fourier

(1772-1837), Robert Owen (1771-1858), Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (18091865).
15 In this regard, the Communist Party has the catalytic function of
hastening and quickening the tempo of the revolution.

V. Modern Times

222]

and with a study of the state, both the

and the proletarian state, from the point of view of

of proletarian revolution
capitalist

Marx's premises.

SYNDICALISM
Syndicalism, the theory that regards the trade union organiza-

new society and as

was born in France. Its most
influential figure was Georges Sorel (1847-1922), an engineer
by profession and also a philosopher but above all a moralist,
severe, intransigent, harsh, gloomy, and passionate. He expressed
his social theory in Reflections on Violence, a series of articles
that appeared in 1906 and were published in a revised form in
tions or syndicates as the foundation of the

the instrument for

its

realization,

many

of the socialist beliefs: contemporary sotwo irreconcilable classes, the state was a
tool at the service of a few exploiters, private capital was the root
of all evils. But he refused to accept collective ownership of the
means of production, and favored, in the new society, a system of
producers' cooperatives controlling industry and operating as
independent units. He also went his own way in choosing the methods by which capitalism was to be replaced by socialism. Antiparliamentary, aristocratic, and revolutionary, Sorel despised political parties. He could not stomach the Parliamentary Socialists,
who had compromised with the exploiters' world and abandoned

1908. Sorel shared

ciety

was divided

into

the revolutionary idea. Originally a bourgeois, Sorel envisioned

salvation only through the
ers'

"autonomous development of the work-

syndicates" and their insurrection or "direct action" against a

corrupt and unjust social organization. Their action was to take the

forms of boycott, sabotage,

strikes, and ultimately of the general

combined and simultaneous strike of the workers of key
industries, such as electricity, gas, and transport). This general

strike (a

strike Sorel

proposed to labor as

their

myth: an apocalyptic vision

of the capitalistic world falling to pieces, ending shamefully be-

cause of the total paralysis of economic

life.

In summary, two

ideas dominate Sorel's Reflections and, in general, his syndicalist

doctrine:
a negative idea, which
is

like the light.

The

is

like

the shadow, a positive idea, which

negative idea

is

the violent, angry, bitter rejec-

Introductory XVI.

[223

tion of the democratic compromise and of parliamentary socialism, its

most odious form. The positive idea is the exaltation of proletarian
Only this violence, guided by the idea or more precisely
violence.
.

by the myth of the general strike, will be capable of giving rise to that
new morality which will save socialism from sinking down and maintaining the revolutionary ideology on an even keel. 16

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM
The communists and

the syndicalists believed in revolutionary

socialism and, viewing even the democratic state as a product of

force and an instrument to perpetuate exploitation,

collaborate with

it

in

any way. But other

selves in favor of attaining the desired

socialists

refused to

expressed them-

end through gradual and

peaceful changes constitutionally effected.

Of

these socialists, Karl

Holland in 1938) was

the leading mind behind the Second International founded in Paris
in 1899 and later repudiated by the extreme radicals. An implacable foe of Lenin and Russian communism, he remained all his

Kautsky (born

life

in

Prague

an orthodox Marxist:

in 1854, died in

at least, so

he claimed. In

reality,

he

accepted Marx's materialistic interpretation of history and the belief in

the inevitable disintegration of capitalism.

On

other issues,

however (Marx's meaning and timetable of the proletarian revolution and the organization of the new society), which form the
core of his opposition to Lenin and Russian communism, Kautsky's love for democracy and hatred of physical violence and
moral coercion made him perhaps wander away from true Marxism. Thus Lenin seems right in accusing Kautsky of misunderstanding and even betraying Marx's teachings. 17

THE FABIAN SOCIETY

Other democratic socialists consciously and definitely abandoned the Marxian platform. Prominent in this group are the
Fabians or members of the Fabian Society founded in 1884 in
16 Chevallier, op.

cit.,

p. 318; see the entire

chapter on Sorel, pp. 313-

332.
17

The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade (1919) was

Lenin gave his answer to Kautsky's The Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1918), an indictment of Russian dictatorship. Kautsky also wrote,

the

title

V. Modern Times

224]

England. They reject the materialistic and atheistic philosophy

communism

economic theory and are against

They also differ from
communism in their attitude and approach to public ownership of
the means of production. They are for it when and insofar as there
are practical and verifiable justifications (in view of the common
good) for transferring this or that industry from private to public
ownership. Above all, the Fabians seem to believe more in individual freedom than in socialization. They implement their program only with the consent of the people, whom they, in the meantime, seek to inform, educate, and persuade. Finally, while
of

as a basis of their

violence and other unconstitutional methods.

communism advocates

the ultimate disappearance of the state, the

Fabians seem to suggest that the democratic state will remain

in-

added functions as required by the increased reof more abundant production and a more equitable

definitely with

sponsibility

distribution of wealth than presently exist.

ANARCHISM
Etymologically, anarchy means "without rule." As a theory,
anarchism advocates a society without government, wherein men

and harmoniously together not by submitting to

law or by obeying an authority but through agreements, freely
concluded and kept, between the various territorial and profes-

live peacefully

sional groups, for the sake of providing for man's material

intellectual needs. 18

Of

the extreme anarchism of

in the

same

vein, Terrorism

Marx wanted

and

course, this definition does not apply to

Max

Stirner

(1806-1856), the author

and Communism (1919).

It

was

the socialist revolution to take place only

his thesis that

when

the prole-

would represent the majority of the population and when, as a consequence, the victorious proletariat must not and need not rule by force.
18 See in the Encyclopaedia Britannica the
article on Anarchism, written by P. Kropotkin. One of the first modern writers to give expression
to anarchist thought was William Godwin (1756-1836), the author of Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793). Starting with the liberal dogmas
(autonomy of human reason, its independence from revelation, man's indefinite perfectibility), he ended, not inconsistently, by repudiating all authority and asserting that human institutions are the greatest obstacle to
justice. Godwin's ideal was to make tabula rasa of the whole structure of
political and religious belief and to replace it with a new social arrangement entirely derived from and based on pure speculative reasoning.
tariat

Introductory XVI.

against every form of state; he conand communism. He centers his docexclusively around the individual considered as unique and

of Unico (1845). Stirner

demns
trine

[225

is

liberalism, socialism,

master of his destiny. Everyone, in Stirner's opinion, defrom himself; hence, everyone has the right to be

literally

rives his rights

what he wants and can

is

even entitled to

kill if

fuses every social law

vidual.

He

be,

and

also to

do whatever he wishes.

He

he authorizes himself to do so. Stirner re-

and

sees in society the

enemy

of the indi-

proclaims the perfection of man, rejects sin and guilt

any limitation on the individual's

and freedom. But almost all other anarchists admit that
man is gregarious by nature, that men must be united by good
will and mutual help; and for the maintenance of this bond (which
will safeguard the common good of all) they rely only on voluntary cooperation. Almost all anarchists share a marked belief in
socialism. Next to the abolition of the state and every form of government, they look to the abolition of private capital and to a
society wherein each will work according to his capacity and receive according to his need. Where they disagree is on the method
as meaningless, does not accept

activity

to reach

anarchy and in their attitude toward

The two famous Russian

religion.

Bakunin (18141876) and Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921), were atheistic and revoanarchists, Mikhail

The former considered belief in God the prinfreedom and made atheism and its propaganda

lutionary anarchists.
cipal obstacle to
first

of his chief principles

state); the latter

morality.

wanted

Both had,

(next comes the destruction of the

religion replaced

in theory

and

by a natural,

instinctive

in practice, insurrectional tend-

encies.

Leo

Tolstoi (1828-1910), although denouncing the state as

"the domination of the wicked, supported by brute force" and asserting that "robbers

are less dangerous than

a well-organized

government," proposed to reach universal anarchy through persuasion or the illumination of the heart of each individual and,

once the

light is seen,

Tolstoi's

anarchy was compatible with belief in

through passive resistance to government.

on the Sermon on the Mount

literally interpreted.

God and

based

similar theory,

although highly personalized and interpreted with a touch of

Thoreau's and Gandhi's ideas and ideals,

is preached by the
Hennacy, a Catholic pacifist, and some of his
associates in "The Catholic Worker" movement. Hennacy's prin-

American

Ammon

V. Modern Times

226]
and

ciples

life

are interestingly told in his Autobiography of a

The following

Catholic Anarchist.

nacy on

We

his group's doctrine

is

a recent statement of

Hen-

and policy:

are motivated by Christ and St. Francis to a life of voluntary

poverty with no reliance upon bullets or ballots or formal organization to achieve our ideals.

Gandhian

We

feel that

we have

dialectic in taking the thesis of the

creatively used
Counsels of Perfection

of the early Christians as contrasted to the antithesis of the acceptance

of the industrial-capitalist system by most of the clergy today; and

we have emerged with

the synthesis of living poor, in the vanguard

of civil disobedience to air-raid

drills,

payment of income taxes for

war, and in the absolutist stand of refusal to register for the draft,
creating

the

society "within the shell of the old." 19

new

TOTALITARIANISM
Both

in the theory

and the practice of

politics,

recent times

have been characterized by three notable features: the rise and

development of democracy, nationalism, dictatorship. The growth
of democracy decisively marks the period between the French
Revolution and the outbreak of World War I and, again, the period subsequent to

World War

II.

The

universal emergence and

consolidation of nationalism (the political principle that organization into an independent statehood

constituting a nationality)

past 150 years.

The

is

the right of every people

have vividly colored the history of the

national idea and sentiment

peoples everywhere and provide leaders of

slogans, at times deceptive, always fiery.

all

The

still

deeply

stir

kinds with facile

rise of dictatorship

dominant feature of the period that began in 1917. Under

cover of virulent nationalism or under the mask of democracy,
totalitarianism (in one form or another) has become a common if
is

ugly political fixture in too

many

countries.

There are three major types of totalitarianism in the modern

sense of the word: the communist, the fascist, the national socialist.

20

The

first

seized

all

power

in the

name

of the proletarian

The Catholic Worker, New York (January, 1959).

forms of totalitarianism were officially condemned by Pius
XI (1922-1939): fascism, with the encyclical Non abbiamo bisogno of
June 29, 1931 (The Conflict in Italy, N.C.W.C., Washington, D. C, 1931);
national socialism, with the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge of March 14,
19

20 All three

Introductory XVI.
class, the

[227

second on behalf of the nation, the third in the name

The communist type advocated by Marx and realized

of the race.

described elsewhere in this book. Italian

in Russia

by Lenin

fascism

also treated separately.

to

its

is

is

The Nazi

dictatorship carried

ultimate conclusions the theory of totalitarianism elaborated

by the Italian fascists as they went along. But national socialism

no mere copy. In applying the fascist pattern to their problems,
the Germans added elements of their own, such as racism, panGermanism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Christianism.
is

NATIONAL SOCIALISM
Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) was chiefly responsible for the rise
and development of national socialism. From 1933, the year he
became chancellor of the Reich, to 1945, the year that saw his
tragic end and the end of his regime, party, and war, Hitler applied his political doctrine in Germany. But he had long before
put it into writing in Mein Kampf (1925-1927), an autobiography
and a statement of principles. In this work, and especially in Chapter XI ("Volk unci Rasse") of the first volume, Hitler presented
to Germans 21 everywhere a new conception of the world. This
Weltanschauung is based on the dogma of race, according to
which the blood of a social group is the only true determinant of
its outlook and mode of thought. The race, its blood: this is the
exclusive influence on history, and indeed the basis for a new interpretation of history. What the mode of production is to Marx,
race and blood are for Hitler.
There is a superior breed of men: those of the Aryan race and
primarily the German people, the "depository of the development
of human civilization." They are a race of masters, men whose
greatness consists not so

much

in intellectual talents as in their

idealism or capacity to sacrifice themselves for the community.

1937 (The Church in Germany, N.C.W.C, Washington, D. C, 1937);
communism, with the encyclical Divini Redemptoris of March 19, 1937
{Atheistic Communism, N.C.W.C, Washington, D. C, 1937). The text of
these three encyclicals appears also in Church and State Through the Cen-

by Ehler and Morrall.

was addressed exclusively to the Germans. It
was not an article for exportation or a philosophy for universal adoption.
But it was a theory that concerned all men, for ultimately it wanted them
divided into two classes: the slaves and the masters.
turies, ed.

21 Hitler's racist doctrine

V. Modern Times

228]
(It is

here that Hitler sees the essential difference between the

Aryans and the Jews: the

latter

have no "idealism"; they use

intelligence only "to destroy.") It

race be kept pure, uncontaminated.

is

their

imperative that the superior

is

The

loss of the purity of

blood

the irreparable loss, the unforgivable sin.

This fundamental premise established, Hitler gives his view of

the mission of the state. Hitler's state ("the

German

nation")

is

German

state of the

"ethical," antiliberal, antiparliamentary, anti-

and corporative. It is totalitarian or alland all-governing. It offers an answer to all questions,

a solution to all problems. It is a one party state; and that party
egalitarian, hierarchical,

inclusive

the German national socialist, "the bearer of the idea

German state and inseparably connected with the state."

is

of the
It is

one mysteriously anointed by God to be the mediator between heaven and

the German people. From him all government stems. He is always
right. He cannot be contradicted. He is to be unconditionally accepted: obey or perish. To him personally all citizens are responsible. Actually, in the Nazi state, all state officials were to take an

leader-state: the Fiihrer

is

constitution, law, court: the

oath to the Fiihrer.

It

should be kept in mind that in Hitler's doctrine, exalted

though the

state

is, it is

not an end in

ment, a "container": what counts

immense

is

itself. It is

what

it

merely an instru-

contains.

And

here

is

between Mussolini's and Hitler's state.

The fascist idea of the state was not new: it went back to Machiavelli; it re-presented the classical idea of the state-nation, an end
in itself. Fascism, to believe its theoretical assertions, was
statolatry
and the worship of the state is not new in Western
political history. But for Hitler the real thing is the Volk or Volkstum, a term pregnant with deep and dark meanings, a term reaching back to primitive times to discover the tribal essentials of the
the

difference

people considered as "the racial unity resting on the community

of blood."
Hitler assigns the state a dual function. Internally,

serve the purity of the

German

blood. This

of appropriately ruthless measures:

it

it

must pre-

does through a series

(1) legislation and vigilance

blood mixtures or contaminations; (2) clever and unrelenting propaganda to make the masses race-conscious and to
against

free

all

them of

all

restraining considerations (conscience, morality,

humanitarian principles, respect for truth, natural rights) in the

Introductory XVI.
pursuit of their

German

[229

(imperialistic)

destiny; (3)

the forma-

tion of the character of individual citizens so that each

feel the

and

all

incomparable pride of belonging to the German nation.

Externally, the racist state

expand adequately for

must defend the German people and

their sake. This at the

expense of France,

an irreversiand of communist Russia, to provide the Germans

with needed Lebensraum. As allies of Germany for the realization
of this foreign policy, Hitler recommended Great Britain and Italy.
to cancel forever the humiliation of past defeats with

ble victory;

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY
Christian Democracy is an idea and a movement both social
and political. Founded on Christian principles and committed to
a method of freedom, it aims at a synthesis of individual rights
and social duties, and works for the creation of a state wherein
all classes cooperate and all members are free under the law.
Born in Europe in the nineteenth century and slowly developed
in the first

War

decades of the twentieth,

it

came

of age after

World

II.

of pioneers and champions opens with the names

Lamennais (1782-1854), Jean-Baptiste Lacordaire
(1802-1861), and Charles-Forbes-Rene de Montalembert (18101870). Writing in their newspaper L'Avenir, these men attacked
both the Gallican heresy and the theory of absolutism. Ultramontanes and democrats, they stood for separation of Church and
state, for universal suffrage, for legislative power in the hands of
the people, and for absolute control of government by the people.
Some of their views and methods were justly condemned (by
Gregory XVI in his encyclical Mirari vos) others, eminently right
and timely, did not and could not die and would again be forcefully presented by the leaders of Christian democracy.
Christian democracy is also a social and economic theory directed to the protection and betterment of the weaker classes
the
working classes both urban and rural. Here, in regard to this aspect, those who provided the spark and outlined a plan of action
were the French Antoine Frederic Ozanam (1813-1853) and
Leon Harmel (1829-1915), the German Wilhelm Emmanuel von
Ketteler (1811-1877), Bishop of Mainz, and his disciple Canon
Christopher Moufang (1817-1890), the English Henry Cardinal
Its

of

long

list

Felicite

V. Modern Times

230]

Manning (1808-1892), and the Italian Giuseppe Toniolo (18451918). They bitterly opposed the unbridled laissez-faire economies, fought selflessly to end oppression and exploitation, championed the workers' right to organize, to just wages, to decent
hours and working conditions.

Perhaps most responsible for the modern

and systematic

formulation of Christian democratic principles and goals, and for

meet
was the scholarly
Sicilian priest Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959). At the end of World
War I he founded a political party of Catholic laymen called the
Popular Party. After World War II similar parties sprang up in
and Western Europe, instead of
almost all European countries
going socialist as predicted, was carried out of chaos to salvation.
The principles fundamental to Christian democracy are not
new. They form the core of what is generally termed the JudaeoChristian heritage: the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of
man, the essential dignity of the human person, man's duties to
himself and to society, the right to private ownership and the social
function of property, the relationship between morality and politics. But as a modern force Christian democracy strives valiantly
to apply the old principles to today's problems and to supply the
needed alternative to a Godless communism and a secularistic and
capitalistic liberalism. Christian democrats refuse to see only two
irreconcilable ways in politics and economics. They contend that
there is a third and right way, which is equally against the dic-

the establishment of a Christian democratic party able to

the challenges of the present century in Europe,

tatorship of
profit

money

or the materialistic philosophy of unlimited

and the dictatorship of the

Christian democracy's
tion.

The

first

dictates of charity

nity, the idea of the

state or class.

characteristic

and of

common

is its

Christian founda-

justice, the sense of

vidualism, of hedonism, and of a secularistic mentality

to vivify

and

and purify

these are

and contribute

to

man's personal

second characteristic

is

the

political life

social happiness. Its

commu-

good, the rejection of narrow indi-

method

freedom. Force, fraud, stratagem are outlawed as means to

cal

and economic

goals. All such goals are to

of

politi-

be pursued constitu-

Thus Christian democracy strikes simultaneously at both secularistic liberalism and

atheistic communism: at the former's materialistic outlook and its
divorce from an objective norm of morality, at the latter's total
tionally in a free, gradual, orderly fashion.

Introductory XVI.

God and

denial of
liance

on

[231

of everything spiritual in

violence, terrorism,

and

man

as well as

its

re-

deceit.

Christian democracy attacks the economic right and the eco-

nomic
it

is

conform
is

with equal vigor. Contrary to extreme individualism,

left

ready to change established economic norms and patterns to

to the needs of the time. It insists that private property

to be used not only for one's

own good

but also for the good of

the community. It admits the state's right to regulate economic

life.

Contrary to excessive collectivism,

it

believes that

man

has a

sacred, though limited, right to private property. It opposes the

total transfer of the

view the

means

of production to the state. It does not

state as a "repressive force" at the service of a single

class.

In

its

formation and growth and progress, Christian democracy

owed much

to the Church. Firstly, of all forms of government,

democracy for the Christian democrats seemed to embody the best
norms of a Christian (and therefore Catholic) order. The Chris-

tian doctrine of

brotherhood of

all

men

in Christ, Christ's pre-

occupation for the humble and defenseless, His preaching the

gospel to the poor, the Christian idea that greatness consists in
serving rather than in being served, the long Christian tradition
of equality

and freedom through the Middle Ages and into the

all this seemed naturally to call for a secular

sixteenth century

arrangement devoted not

service of the

to the

human person

triumph of abstractions but to the

recognized as a free and equal being,

a possessor of natural rights, inextricably bound to the social

framework within which he lives and works. It seemed also that
a democratic form of society constituted an almost ideal milieu
wherein the Church could expand and fulfill her mission, and men
reach their full natural and Christian stature. Secondly, there were
official declarations of the Church to praise and recommend principles and policies advocated by the Christian democrats. The social concern so essential to the democratic idea and movement obtained invaluable support in Rerum novarum (May 15, 1891),
the famous encyclical of Leo XIII on the condition of the working
classes. The pope was as determined as his predecessors to resist
anti-Christian tendencies in
liberalism

and Marxist

modern society especially secularistic

But he did not limit himself to

socialism.

a defensive posture, to a condemnation of error, or even to the

restatement of principles good and valid in themselves but of

little

V.

232]

Modem

Times

contemporary
by a siege men-

efficacy unless daringly applied to the solution of

problems. Not a man to have

tality, Leo XIII presented a
Christian order able to

his strategy dictated

and constructive pattern of

provide the needed alternative to both
positive

rapacious capitalism and totalitarian socialism. Great as

his

all

(and they explore every aspect of social, political,

and economic life), it is in this that he was truly revolutionary,

encyclicals are

ahead of

his contemporaries, setting

even the most social-minded

entirety.

states

up a program

of reforms that

have not yet carried out in

its

His charter of labor revived the social conscience of the

Catholic laity and gave a tremendous impetus to Catholic social

thinking and to
free the

all

threat of Godless

The

men

of

good

will:

it

spurred them to act to

world from the curse of unrestricted capitalism and the

communism.

democracy received new support

Quadragesimo anno (May 15, 1931), the encyclical

social ideals of Christian

in Pius XI's

on the reconstruction

of the social order.

In his exposition of the fallacies of both capitalism and socialism,

Pius

XI continued

the social "middle

sor in the encyclical

way" enunciated by

Rerum novarum.

his predeces-

Meditating over the papal rec-

ommendations, a number of competent observers, both Catholic and

non-Catholic, have

come

to believe that the solution to

modern

eco-

nomic problems actually lies in a system of corporative organizations

which would curb individualist excesses while guarding against undue
encroachments by the state. If they are right, then the encyclical Quadragesimo anno may be regarded in future epochs as one of the most
significant documents of the twentieth century. 22

As

for the political aspect of Christian democracy, that

is,

con-

cerning democracy as a form of government (government of the

people, by the people, for the people),

it was not until the pontifiXII that the Church explicitly proclaimed it the political
system best conformed to the modern temperament. In his many
pronouncements (which still await a scholarly exploration and
evaluation), Pius XII insisted time and again that the people are
responsible for the government and the laws of their country. He
saw the people not as a confused, helpless, and inert mass to be
moved at will by a body of governors or rulers, but as a dynamic
whole, masters sub Deo et lege of their being and of their activity.

cate of Pius

22 Ehler

and Morrall, op.

cit.,

p. 412.

Introductory XVI.

He

called

on them

to

make

[233
the legal system Christian

national and the international level.

He

on both the

expected them to trans-

form the old environment by injecting into it the principles of a

higher law and the values of Christian morality. At this point,
Pius XII towers above all his predecessors. Even Leo XIII, who
was so aware of the historical evolution of the social question,
limited his survey of the political question to a reality that was
soon to vanish. He seemed to take into account only one form of
government: the paternalistic, monarchical, authoritarian. Leo had

made

the great breakthrough in regard to the social problem. Pius

XII made it in regard to the political. Each in his own way gave
Christian democracy approbation and help.
This does not at all mean that the Church has endorsed Christian democracy as her own social and political doctrine and party.
Strictly speaking the Church is of no political color. For her the
theory and form of government in a given country are immaterial
so long as its principles do not conflict with Christian ethics and
she

left free

is

interests

to pursue her mission.

Her unchanging

spiritual

cannot be identified with the contingent purposes of a

nation, party, organization, or

her diplomacy never

movement,

falls in line

just as the

conduct of

with (although at times

it

may

run parallel to) the policies and moods determined by momentary

preoccupations and sheerly political reasons. Yet it remains true
that Christian

democracy

policies that admirably

is

based on principles and advocates

respond to the exigencies of the Christian

conscience as illuminated by the constant teaching of the Church

throughout the two thousand years of her history. 23

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

David Hume's

Political Essays. Ed.

by C. W. Hendel.

New

York:

Liberal Arts Press, 1953.

*

Hitler, A. Mein Kampf. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939.

Mill, J. S. On Liberty. Ed. by C. V. Shields. New York: Liberal
Arts Press, 1956.

Representative Government. Ed. by C. V. Shields.

York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958.
.

23

See Conrad Bonacina, "The Catholic Church and

racy," Cross Currents,

ley,

New

Modern Democ-

No. 5 (Fall, 1951), pp. 1-14; J. V. Langmead Casser"Christianity and Democracy," ibid., IV (Fall, 1954), 310-326.

V. Modern Times

234]
*

Utilitarianism. Ed.

by O.

Piest.

New

York: Liberal Arts

Press, 1957.

Our Bishops Speak. Ed. by R. M. Huber. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952.

Papal Pronouncements on the Political Order. Ed. by F. J. Powers.
Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1952.
Sorel, G. Reflections on Violence. West Rindge, N. H.: Richard R.
Smith, 1941.

Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations: Selections. Ed. by G. J. Stigler.

New York: Crofts Classics, 1957.
Sturzo, L. Politics and Morality. London: Burns, Oates, 1938.
Church and State. New York: Longmans, 1939.
Nationalism and Internationalism. New York: Roy, 1946.
The Federalist. Introduction by E. M. Earle. New York: The Mod.

ern Library, 1937.

The

Political

Writings of John

Adams.

New

York: Liberal Arts

Press, 1954.

The

Political Writings of

Thomas

Jefferson.

New

York: Liberal Arts

Press, 1955.

A Code

of Social Principles. 3rd ed. Prepared by the International

Union of Social Studies. Oxford: Catholic Social Guild, 1952.
Bayal, J. J. The Catholic Church and the Modern State. Rochester,

N. Y.: St. Bernard's Seminary, 1955.

Brecht, A. Political Theory: The Foundations of 20th-century Political

Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Carlen, C. M. Dictionary of Papal Pronouncements: Leo XIII to

Pius XII {1878-1957). New York: Kenedy, 1958.
Code of International Ethics. Compiled by the International Union
of Social Studies. Trans, and ed., with a Commentary, by J.
Eppstein. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1953.
Cole, G. D. H. A History of Socialist Thought, 4 vols. New York:
St.

Martin's Press, 1953-58.

Collins,

J.

History of

Modem

European Philosophy. Milwaukee:

Bruce, 1954.

Cronin, J. F. Catholic Social Principles. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950.

D'Arcy, M. C. Communism and Christianity. Baltimore: Penguin,
1956.

Duff, E. The Social Thought of

the World Council of Churches.

York: Association Press, 1956.
Einaudi, M., and Goguel, F. Christian Democracy in France and
Italy. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952.
Ferrero, G. The Principles of Power: The Great Political Crises of
History. New York: Putnam, 1942.

New

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[235

Fogarty, M. P. Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953.

South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957.
Fremantle, A. (ed.) The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical
Context. New York: New American Library, 1956.
Friedrich, C. J., and Brzezinski, Z. K. Totalitarian Dictatorship
and Autocracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1956.

Gentz. F. The French and American Revolutions Compared. Trans.

by John Quincy Adams. Chicago: Gateway Books, 1955.
Gurian, W. Bolshevism, an Introduction to Soviet Communism.
South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952.
J. Papal Social Principles: A Guide and a Digest. Milwau-

Harte, T.

kee: Bruce, 1956.

Hughes, H. S. Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of

European Social Thought, 1890-1930. New York: Knopf, 1959.

Humphrey,

R. Georges Sorel, Prophet Without Honor. Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.

From Burke

Kirk, R. The Conservative Mind:

to

Santayana. Chi-

cago: Regnery, 1953.

G., and others. The Philosophy of Communism. New
York: Fordham University Press, 1952.
Laski, H. J. Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham.
New York: Holt, 1920.
The Rise of European Liberalism. 2nd ed. London: Allen
and Unwin, 1947.
Lecler, J. The Two Sovereignties: A Study of the Relationship Between Church and State. New York: Philosophical Library,

La

Pira,

1952.

MacKinnon, D. M.

(ed.) Christian Faith and Communist Faith.

London: Macmillan, 1953.
Maritain, J. Man and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951.
.

The Social and

Political Philosophy of

Selected Readings. Ed. by

J.

W. Evans and

Jacques Maritain:
L. R.

Ward.

New

York: Scribner, 1955.

Menczer,

B.

(ed)

minster, Md.:

Moody,

J.

litical

Inc.,

1789-1848. West-

1952.

N. (ed.) Church and Society, Catholic Social and PoThought and Movements, 1789-1950, New York: Arts,

1953.

Nuesse, C.

J.

The Social Thought of American

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Osgniach, A.
1950.

Catholic Political Thought,

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J.

Catholics. West-

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Pareto, V. The Mind and Society, 4 vols. Ed. by A. Livingston.

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Pollock, R. C. "Luigi Sturzo,

Thought,

An

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Anthology of His Writings,"

165-208.

Rocker, R. Nationalism and Culture. 2nd

ed.

Los Angeles: Rocker

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Rogers, E.

Christian

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Praeger, 1952.

Shewring, W. Rich and Poor

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Zizzamia, A. "Catholicism and Internationalism, a Papal Anthology," Thought, XXVIII (1953-1954), 485-527.

CHAPTER XVII

Locke

LIFE

JOHN

LOCKE,

philosophy a
tol, in

the powerful

new

direction,

mind who was to give European

was born at Wrington, near Bris-

Somerset, on August 29, 1632. His father, a landed notary,

was a dedicated Puritan; a captain in the Parliamentary Army, he

civil war of 1642, which brought death to Charles I
and power to Cromwell. For his studies Locke went first to Westminster College in 1646; then, in 1652, to Christ Church at Oxford, where he received his bachelor's and master's degrees and
taught Greek and moral philosophy for several years. While at
Oxford he also studied medicine but he did not take the regular
course and so never obtained a medical degree.
In 1664, during the first Dutch war, Locke accompanied Sir
Walter Vane on a diplomatic mission to the court of Brandenburg.
In 1666 he met Anthony Ashley, the future Earl of Shaftesbury.
It was the beginning of a lifelong friendship. Lord Ashley made
him a member of his household, his counselor and companion, his
family physician, tutor to his grandson and, after he was named
Lord Chancellor (1672), took Locke as secretary. The philosofought in the

pher thus found himself a close witness of the

critical

events of

that fateful period. Shaftesbury sided with Charles II until the

latter

broke with parliament. Then he supported the Whig re-

V. Modern Times

238]

sistance to the king's efforts to extend the royal prerogative. After

a short-lived reconciliation with the court, Shaftesbury

and, though

was accused

acquitted

of

the

charge of treason, forced to leave England for the continent.

He

of

conspiratorial

activities,

tried

repaired to Holland, where he died in January 1683.

Locke's fortunes followed those of his patron and friend.

lost

the

king's

favor,

(1675), journeyed to
tired to

He

was dismissed from government office

France, returned to England (1679), re-

Oxford and, in 1683, resenting the suspicions of the Stuart

went to Holland, where he remained five years. The exiled

partisans,

Locke joined

man who

the party of William of Orange, the

stood

and parliament, and helped prepare the

expedition that, in November 1688, saw the fall of James II, the
victory of the liberal Whigs, and William's accession to the throne.
In February 1689, on the ship that was carrying Princess Mary
home, Locke returned to England. There, serenely, he spent the
remaining years of his life. He was seventy-two when he died in
October 1704 at Oates, near London, in the home of Sir Francis
and Lady Masham.
for liberty, Protestantism,

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
The most important
philosopher

is

his

of the works of this prolific and versatile

Essay Concerning Human Understanding writ-

The Essay introduced a new theory of knowledge and is credited with having begun
the rationalistic movement, which was to become so fashionable
in the eighteenth century and whose tenets would so influence the
philosophers and doctrines of the French Revolution.

ten in Holland (1687) and published in 1690.

This cultural

and

movement

tried to explain

phenomena, through reason

emancipated from tradition and revealed
social

life,

as well as natural

Human

alone.
religion,

reason,

was considered

capable of understanding everything within the realm of experience.

In his Essay,

,qgke mrn.paresjhe soul t o a tabula ra sa

experie nce gr adually imprints ideas, that

standing^

He

is,

all

whereon

objects of under-

denies any validity to Descartes' theory of innate

ideas^Ifthere were such ideas in man, Locke's theory runs, these

woujdjje^eguafjj^jr^^
atheists

and-polythcists are numerous

is

He

noLjnnate, for

likewise denies the ex-


Locke XVII.
istence

[239

o {^universally Jaioj\yn_jrioral principles, for, he argues,

principles

and customs vary from nation

to nation.

POLITICAL WRITINGS
Locke's political doctrines are closely related to his general
philosophy. 1

As knowledge comes

exclusively through man's rea-

son by the combination of simple ideas, political power derives

solelyJrpm

man's

will

by the

free association of c onsenting individ-

is expressed in his four Letters on

was written in Holland) and especially in his
famous Two Treatises on Government. In the Letters he is for the
separation of civil and religious power. Locke wants to fix exact
limits for both. He is against force and constriction of every sort as
a means of spreading or maintaining religion, ah(T advocates toleratiofribr-afr^XcepXaiheists (whose promises and oaths are~groundless and therefore valueless), Turks and "papists" (whose beliefs
impose on them an external temporal authority), and all who
undermine the state's security. 2
Of the Two Treatises, the first, with its severe and exhaustive

uals.

Locke's political thought

Toleration (the

first

criticism of Filmer's theory of absolute power,

is

now

obsolete

and seldom read. The second, a theoretical justification of the

Orange regime, advances a new political doctrine, always and
everywhere applicable, concerning the origin, extent, and purpose
of state power. It is this doctrine that makes Locke the father of
modern liberalism and constitutionalism, and opens the way for
the eighteenth-century philosophers and their war on absolutism.

THE STATE OF NATURE

Following the ideas of his time, Locke begins his inquiry into
the origin of the state with a description of the state of nature

"that state

all

men

are naturally in."

cording to reason without a

1

There

common

"Men

living together ac-

superior on earth with au-

however, exceptions. The empirical philosophy of the Essay,

by no means be reconciled with the theory of natural law
as expounded in the second treatise on government.
are,

for example, can

2

Note the

similarity to

Rousseau's propositions in the chapter "Of

Civil Religion" in the Social Contract.

V. Modern Times

240]
to

thority

nature."

judge between them,

are

properly in the

Contrary to the traditional doctrine, which considers

and

social

Locke

of

state

being intrinsically bound to

political

(like_J-Iqbbes

life

man

in civil society,

jino^Rousseau) jees^^QliticaLsociety as the

^

For him
But
of Hobbes

resutrofjajree contract, not_as-anatural social organism.

it is

a matter of convenience and- expediency^ not of necessity.

Locke's state of nature has

and Rousseau.

It is

little

in

common

with that

a_sjate_o|_perfect Jreedom, for in

it

men "can

order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons

as they think

other man.

fit"

and are not dependent upon the

It is a_state

will of

any

of equal ity, in which^all power_is_reciprocal.

No

one has more than another. All are born to the same natural
advantages. It is a state of reason and not of license, a state ruled

by a_la^j^ njatuTejJri^^
one ought to harm another in his life, health, -liberty or possessions." 5 As everyone is God's property, he is bound to preserve
himself and,

when

his preservation is not endangered,

preserve the rest of mankind. In other words, each

he ought to

man

has^a right

These rights exist simultaneously in

all: each enjoys them, each must respect them in others. Notice
how closely Locke's concern for freedom and equality is tied up
to l^ejjibejrj^an^pioperty.

with the concept of law.

as to

La w,

in turn ,

is

sojfreed of arbitrariness

become an expr essio n^ol order an^La-guarantee of freedom.

ManTiaTTurtEerrnore a fourth and a fifth right: to^ execute the

law of nature by resisting and punishing transgressors jind to exact
reparationToT^5y~violaiion "oTrm inviolaWe claims. This means
that in the state of nature each
tioner.

As

man

own

judge and execuby calm reason and

nothing here of the uncon-

is

his

such, hbwever7Tie~must T5e~guided

the dictates of conscience. There

is

Hobbes' helium omnium contra omnes.

The state of^aJurj,Jhe^eJo^js_not L or at least jhpuld not be,
a state pi wajL But should a state of war, a state of enmity, malice,
violence, and mutual destruction emerge, then men would find
trolled passion of

Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of

Government, 19. Selections from the second of the two treatises
on civil government are taken from the edition published by the Oxford
University Press (London, 1952), in the volume entitled Social Contract,
with an introduction by Sir Ernest Barker.
3

Civil

4 Ibid.,

4.

5 ibid., 6.

Locke XVII.

[241

themselves in a bad way. The conflicting parties, especially the

weaker contenders, have no authority on earth to which to appeal;

which to resort for a settlement of the

judges on whom to call for a just and
binding sentence. The lack of such authority, laws, and judges
does not necessarily lead to war, but if, due to human frailty and

no

clear positive laws to

controversy; no

common

a faulty interpretation of the law of reason, war comes, in the state

of nature

mankind would

suffer the

more and

the longer.

THE STATE: ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

avoid such_a_pje^ic^rrienl-^ndjp_remedy the deficien-

It is to

cond ition that men voluntarily, through mutual

consent and agreerngn^decide to abandon the state of nature and
forln/a pbTI ticarsocigty under a common power able to settle their
litigations. 6 In so doing, each man resigns his natural role of
judge and executioner to the community, which is to act as "umcies oj-trre jiaUi r al

pire" according to

Locke's

its

surrender

self-imposed standards.
is

from the complete surrender of

far

Kobbes and Rousseau. 7 It affects only the fourth and the fifth
right. The first three, the rights to life, liberty, and property, remain untouched, untouchable. The limited surrender has a single
purpose: that these fundamental rights, belonging inalienably to
every man,
is

may be

the better maintained and protected. Tjiejstate

created for^specific end, a legal, juridical end: to translate into

J

concrete" terms the enactments of naturaLiaw ancLto safeguard

the individuaTlInmlglcil^
Man's basic rights

many

constitute so

containment of

state

barriers to the sovereignty of the state. This

power

is

heart of his thesis, the key to

Locke's constant preoccupation, the

all

his political doctrines.

THE COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL POWER

In the

new commonwealth,

criterion of right
6

while natural law

and wrong, the community

is.

is still

the final

sovereign. It

is

the

Locke believes that the

state of nature has actually existed. In his

today among independent states: "All princes and
rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of

opinion,

it

still

nature." Ibid.,
7

exists

14;

see also 145.

man completely to the government; Rousseau's surrenders him completely to the community.
Hobbes' social contract surrenders

V. Modern Times

242]
depositary of

all

To

authority.

associate

its

members, acting on

the principle of majority, belongs the right to choose the govern-

ment, as well as the right to

of that

resist

same natural law, which

ignore or

amend

preme power

to

and overthrow

it,

in the

name

may

never

positive enactments

or abrogate. "There remains in the people a su-

remove or

alter the legislative,

legislative act contrary to the trust

when

reposed in them."

they find the

8

fortiori,

this holds for the other branches of government. Locke makes itT

clear that despotic

power. Only the

all

men had

power

is

latter is valid

not to be identified with political

and

legitimate. It

community and

express or tacit trust, that

it

power

that

therein to the governors "with the

shall

be employed for their good and

the preservation of their property."

community

The

the

individually in the state of nature but subsequently

shifted to the

the

is

is

Government

is

the trustee,

both the creator and the beneficiary of the

trustee has nothing save duties

trust.

toward the beneficiary.

Political power includes the power to make laws, the power;

war and peace, the power to execute the laws. Legislative
power, the most important, "is that which has a right to direct
how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it." 10 The power of war
and peace, otherwise termed "federative," is the power to deal
with other states or with persons outside the community. The executive power, inclusive of the judiciary, is the power that sees to
the execution of the laws that remain in force. Locke notes that
the federative and executive powers, though in themselves distinct,
are almost always lodged in the same persons. As to the legislative
power, he insists that, in a well-ordered commonwealth, this should
be separate from the others and entrusted to different persons: if
the same persons have the authority to make and to execute laws,
there is danger that they exempt themselves from obedience to
their own enactments, and suit the law, both in its framing and
its execution, to their selfish advantage. Locke adds that there is
no need for the legislative power to be always in session, since
there is not always business to transact. Lawmaking, he says, takes

of

little

time.

8 Ibid., 149.

*lbid., 171.
io Ibid., 143.

\\

Locke XVII.

[243

DESPOTIC POWER
Despotic power

"an absolute, arbitrary power one man has

life whenever he pleases, and this

is

over another, to take away his

is

power which

distinction

vey."

comes

neither nature gives, for

man and

between one

Despotic power

into being

tyrannical power;

is

when one

to achieve unjust ends, or

it

has

made no such

another, nor compact can conit

is

usurpation.

It

(the legislator or the prince) uses force

makes

No

ends, tyranny begins."

12

right to disregard the

bounds of

his will the law.

"Wherever law

one, petty officer or king, has the

authority. Should this happen,

should the legislative or the executive power, either of them, act

contrary to

trust,

its

left

men

against force

resume

the people are freed from obedience.

common

to the

"are

refuge which

and violence."

13

their original liberty. In the

become masters

of their fate.

God

Power

name

returns to them.

all

They

of natural law they again

They may even

resort to force to de-

new government

that

provide safety and security. Thus rebellion, insurrection,

civil

fend their natural rights and to establish a

will

They

hath provided for

war are
tectors

justified against those who were to have been the proand guardians of law and peace but proved instead in-

vaders, thieves, ravagers.

Locke is usually calm and dispassionate in making his points.

But on this particular question his voice becomes vibrant, metallic,
tense. He is under the stress of a powerful emotion that does not,
however, impair the force of his arguments but rather makes them
burst forth, bulletlike, straight to the target. Here Locke answers
those who object to his doctrine as a threat to the peace of the
world:

They may

as well say

or pirates, because this

that honest

may

mischief comes in such cases,

defends his

own

right,

men may

not oppose robbers

occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any

it

is

not to be charged upon him

who

but on him that invades his neighbor's. If the

man must

quietly quit all he has for peace sake to him

hands upon it, I desire it may be considered what
a kind of peace there will be in the world which consists only in vio-

innocent honest

who

will lay violent

11 Ibid., 172.
12 Ibid., 202.
is Ibid., 222.

V. Modern Times

244]
lence and rapine, and which

of robbers and oppressors.

is

Who

to be maintained only for the benefit

would not think

betwixt the mighty and the mean,

when

it

an admirable peace

the lamb, without resistance,

yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus' den

gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace. 14

LOCKE'S INCONSISTENCY

When one

recovers from this dramatic passage and coolly

peruses the second treatise, Locke's concern for the containment

of state

power appears

in a

more sober

denying his honest passion for life

the

same

level as life,

possessions, which

which

is

is

and

perspective.
liberty;

an absolute

There

is

no

but he places on

right, the right to one's

not so perfectly constituted and absolute.

One always has a right to life versus the state. Not even the safety
of the state may be bought directly at the price of an innocent person's

life.

But the natural

right to private

ownership must be sub-

ordinated to no small extent to the public interest.

much more than

The

the duty to protect private possessions

state

has

accumu-

by some of its members. It has the

and the duty to inquire into the manner of their accumulaIt has further the right and the duty to see to an equitable

lated in the state of nature

right
tion.

and proportionate
cial justice, of

distribution, according to the principles of so-

national and private wealth.

This Locke denies, despite certain texts to the contrary, for he

is

not always consistent. His natural

men

enter political society

divided into two classes: the wealthy and the poor. His state
easily degenerate into

may

an instrument of exploitation. For, in his

on the protection of the natural right of property on the

one hand and his defense of "free enterprise" significantly coupled
insistence

with a plea to stop "competitors with us for the sea" on the other

hand, he creates a commonwealth for the perpetuation of a condition favoring only a minority (in Locke's England, the prop-

Whigs). One may even honestly doubt

whether in Locke's commonwealth there is a place, say, for the
ertied aristocracy of the

members

of the laboring class: whether they are or will ever be

full citizens

or have a right to be. Thus Locke saps the very es-

sence of both state and political power, which, in the true view,
14 Ibid., 228; see entire chapter XIX, "Of the Dissolution of Government," 211-243.

Locke XVII.

[245
not for the

exist only for the welfare of all,

few. It

commonly

is

selfish benefit of the

aim

said that Locke's primary

ciliation of the citizen's liberty

is

the recon-

with the political order, that he

championed the independence of the individual. But while his

defense of man's life and liberty against the encroachments of
the state is commendable, one must take exception to his refusal
to allow the state to make man's economic activities consonant
with the collective good. The state, as the promoter of the common good, cannot relinquish its function (of regulating economic
to private enterprise and,

activities)

still less,

to the free play of

economic forces. Class warfare would be the inevitable result and

man's fundamental rights would lay hopelessly open to abuse and
violation.

Perhaps Locke did not realize the ambiguity of the moral and
social implications of several of his postulates.

to

see

premises:

inherent

contradiction

the

men have

(1)

two of

in

Perhaps he failed
his fundamental

equal natural rights; (2)

men have an

equal natural right to unlimited and unchallenged proprietorship.

But the ambiguity and the contradiction are

make Locke's

extent they

political

there.

To no

small

system confused and inadequate.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Locke,

The Second

J.

Treatise of

Government.

New

York: Liberal

Arts Press, 1952.

*
.

Letter Concerning Toleration.

New

York: Liberal Arts

Press, 1950.
*
.

Two

Treatises of

Government and Supplement.

New

York: Hafner, 1956.

Aaron, R.

I.

John Locke. London and

sity Press,

Gough,

J.

New

York: Oxford Univer-

1955.

W. John

Locke's Political Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1950.

Hartnett, R. "Locke: Of Civil Government," The Great Books.

Ed. by H. Gardiner. New York: Devin- Adair, 1949, Vol. I, pp.
78-84.

Kendall, W. John Locke and

Urbana: University of

the

Doctrine of Majority Rule.

1941.

Illinois Press,

chapter xviii

Montesquieu

LIFE

CHARLES

LOUIS DE SECONDAT, Baron

de Montesquieu, was born

Bordeaux, on January 18, 1689.

at the castle of

From 1700

to

La Brede et
La Brede, near

de

1711 he attended

the Oratorian school at Juilly and afterward, following family

1714 he entered the judicial career and

was appointed counselor at the parliament (high judicial court)
of Bordeaux. In 1716, upon the death of his uncle, the Baron de
Montesquieu, he inherited his title, his rich estate, and the office
of president (head-judge) of the Bordeaux parliament. Thereafter the young La Brede was known as Baron de Montesquieu.
That same year his wife, Jeanne de Lartigue, a Calvinist whom
he had married in the Catholic rite in 1715, presented him with a
son. In Bordeaux, Montesquieu became a member of the local
Academy, to which he contributed several papers on philosophical
and scientific topics.
In 1721 he published anonymously Les Lettres persanes, a
pungent satire of the frivolous French society of his day. The
book, which immediately became a best seller, contains the letters
exchanged between two Persians traveling abroad and their
tradition, studied law. In

friends in Asia.

The

travelers report their impressions of the cus-

toms, the people, and the political and religious institutions of

Montesquieu XVIII.

[247

Europe and are kept informed of the happenings

at

home. Many
Regency *

of these letters acquaint the reader with the spirit of the

its air

of elegant corruption,

oblique smile,

its

quest for

its

cold and refined impudicity,

titillating

scandals.

its

Les Lettres persanes

man, one would say at times, a man of great

and subtlety but cynical and almost passionless. And
the philosoyet, in this work, another Montesquieu is discovered
pher, the sociologist, the earnest student of politics concerned
with the idea of justice and liberty, the origin of societies, the dynamics of the various forms of government. 2
It soon became known that Montesquieu was the author of
this strange work. His literary fame assured, he sold his office in
the parliament of Bordeaux and moved to Paris, where he continued his social and literary studies and published several other
books. In January 1728, he made a solemn entrance into the
French Academy and then started a long journey through Europe.
In May of that year he was in Vienna, in August in Venice, in
September at Rome. During his four months in Rome he met the
Protestant pastor Jacob Vernet, who later assisted him in the publication of L' Esprit des lois. In the fall of 1729, Montesquieu was
in England for an eighteen-month sojourn. He was shown the utmost respect and felt in turn much admiration for the English way
of life and political institutions. Undoubtedly his stay in England
had a great deal of influence on the development of his political
is

book

the

of an old

intelligence

thought.

In 1731 Montesquieu returned to

La

Brede. In the quiet of

he wrote Considerations on the Greatness and

Decline of Rome, an important essay on the philosophy of history
that, though not equal to, compares well with Bossuet's and Vico's
works on the subject. This book, divided into twenty-three chapters
and published anonymously in Amsterdam in 1734, treats the hishis country retreat

tory of
pire.

Rome from

The Romans

its

beginning to the end of the Western

Em-

attained unsurpassable greatness with their love

1 Upon his death in

1715, Louis XTV was succeeded by his great grandson Louis XV, a boy of five. During the minority of the young king,
France was governed by a regent, Philip II, Duke of Orleans (1674-1723),

and by

Dubois, future archbishop of Cambrai and

Regency (1715-1723) mark one of the most cor-

his all-powerful minister

cardinal.

The years of

the

rupt periods in French history.

2 See Letters 94, 102, 103, 131.

V. Modern Times

248]
for liberty, discipline,

and work;

tion; their dedication to the

destiny of

Rome;

their perfect military organiza-

common

good; their confidence in the

their sense of justice; their respect for the cus-

toms and institutions of the peoples they defeated and conquered.

Their decadence was due, on the other hand, to the over-extension
of state boundaries, wars in foreign lands and at home, the proscriptions of Sulla, the division of the Empire.
After completing this work, Montesquieu devoted himself to
what was to be his masterpiece. Its first ten books had already
been prepared between 1724 and 1728. In June 1747,
Esprit
des his was finished. It appeared in Geneva, in two volumes, in
November 1748, without the name of the author. But everyone
knew who he was.
During the last years of his life, Montesquieu suffered from
cataracts and almost completely lost his sight. Toward the end
of 1754 he went to Paris. He died there, probably of pneumonia,
on February 10, 1755, after having received the last rites of the
Church. Before administering them, the priest addressed him:

"See, Sir,

"Yes, and

how great God is" to which Montesquieu answered:

how small men are." He was buried in the church of

St. Sulpice,

but his body disappeared during the revolutionary agi-

tations of 1793.

l'esprit des LOIS

The

full title

of Montesquieu's major work, as

the original editions, capsules

the Spirit of the Laws, that
to the constitution of

its

is,

it

appears in

general idea and purpose:

"About

the relation that the laws must have

each government, to customs, to climate, to

commerce, etc." A Latin phrase proudly follows the

title: Prolem Sine Matre Creatam (A Child Created Without a
Mother). Thus Montesquieu, who had worked on the book for
actually twenty years but, as he said, virtually all his life, made it
clear that he alone was the first to treat so vast a subject.
The thirty-one books of L'Esprit des lois can be divided into
two sections (Books 1 to 20, and Books 21 to 31) or, following
some old editions, into six parts. Part One, comprising the first
eight Books, presents Montesquieu's theory of governments
the
fundamental notion, so long and painstakingly sought, so jubilantly
discovered, of the nature and the principle of each system of govreligion, to

Montesquieu XVIII.

[249

ernment and the relation of these

to the laws. Part

Two, Books 9

to 13, explains the theory of political liberty guaranteed

tribution of powers.

Laws

by a

dis-

are here considered in their relation to

and liberty of the state, as well as to the ways

and means of government, such as public taxes and revenues.
Part Three, Books 14 to 19, deals with the physical and moral
causes of laws. "These must conform to geographical factors (the
configuration of the land, its climate, its size) and to the mentality
or general spirit of the respective peoples and nations. Part Four,
Books 20 to 23, shows the connection between laws and economic
matters. Part Five, Books 24 to 26, is concerned with laws in their
relation to religion and other specific domains. The last part,
Books 27 to 31, a sort of appendix, concentrates on several historical and legal questions (Roman laws of succession, origin of
French laws, Frankish feudal laws and their relation to monarchy)
the defense, safety,

and advises how laws ought to be made and applied.

There are four essential points to Montesquieu's political doctrine: the

theory of the laws in general, the theory of governments,

the theory of political liberty based

and the theory of the "general

on the separation of powers,

spirit."

THE THEORY OF LAWS

"Laws, in

most general signification, are the necessary

from the nature of the things." 3 They are universal, and therefore uniform even in their diversity, and constant
even in their changes. There are various kinds of laws. The fundatheir

relations arising

mental are the laws of nature, the laws that "derive their force entirely

and are received by man

They result from man's awareweakness. Montesquieu mentions among them religion,

from our frame and existence"

before the establishment of society.

ness of his

self-preservation, peace,

and

sociability. It is interesting to

note

Montesquieu's admission of the existence of laws prior to the issuance of positive laws. "We must acknowledge relations of justice
antecedent to the positive law."

As soon
3

as

man

enters into a state of society, he loses his

The

Spirit of the Laws, I, 1. Selections from The Spirit of the Laws

from the translation of Thomas Nugent (revised by J. V. Prichard), published by George Bell and Sons (London, 1878).

are taken

4 Ibid., I, 2.

5 ibid.,

1.

V. Modern Times

250]

sense of weakness; equality ceases, and at least potentially a state

of

war begins

a state of

war between

nations, a state of

war be-

tween individuals. This gives rise to human laws, man-made laws,

classed by Montesquieu as the law of nations (relating to the mutual intercourse of nations both in peace and war), political or
constitutional law (concerned with governors and governed, defining their mutual rights and duties), and civil law (determining

between the individual members of society).

In his general treatment of law, Montesquieu, despite his
beautiful phrasing, is more brilliant than deep. He seems not to
relations

ground of pure philosophy.

relish the

He

draws the impressive

lines of a vestibule, the stately pillars of a portico,

but then rushes

ahead.

He

human

reason, while political and civil laws are applications and

says however, clearly enough, that law in general

is

adaptations of human reason in particular cases. These applications

and adaptations are necessarily variable, for positive laws must
conform to different situations and conditions; so much so that
"it should be a great chance if the laws of one nation suit another." 6 But even in their various adjustments, the laws are uniform and constant if only in the sense that they always take into
consideration certain basic factors. Such factors are the nature and
principle of each government; the climate of each country,

cation and size, the quality of

its soil;

its

lo-

the religion and occupation

of the citizens; the degree of liberty of which they are capable;

their wealth

and commerce, as well

and customs,

in a

as their traditions, manners,

word, their mentality or characteristic

addition, positive laws

must be so

interrelated as to

spirit.

In

form a co-

ordinated and well-balanced legal system. These various necessary

which Montesquieu examines

what he terms "the spirit of laws."

relations,

tute

in detail, together consti-

THE THEORY OF GOVERNMENTS

Of

all

of things,
structure

proud of

"Many

the relations that positive laws must bear to the nature

no other is more important than that deriving from the
and principle of each government. Montesquieu is very
this

discovery that he claims exclusively as his own.

times I have started, and

Ibid., 3.

many

times I have abandoned

Montesquieu XVIII.

[251

my

work; but when I discovered

seeking came to me." The laws, he

principles as

from

my

was
from these

principles, all that I

states further, flow

their source.

His theory of the systems of governments has three parts.

First,

he distinguishes the forms of government; second, he explains the

nature of each form and inquires into the laws that directly con-

form

to this nature; third,

he investigates the central principle or

motivating spring of each form and shows which laws relate to

that principle.

Abandoning the

traditional classification,

Montesquieu divides

the government system into three major types: republican,

mon-

and despotic. Republican government he subdivides into

democracy and aristocracy. In every government one must carefully distinguish the nature and the principle. "There is this difference between the nature and principle of government, that the
former is that by which it is constituted, the latter that by which
it is made to act. One is its particular structure, and the other the
human passions which set it in motion." 7
The nature of each government is made clear by its definition.
Thus
archical,

a republican government

is

that

in

which the body (democracy)

or only the part (aristocracy) of the people,

is

possessed of the su-

preme power; monarchy, that in which a single person governs by

fixed and established laws; a despotic government, that in which a
single person directs everything by his own will and caprice. 8
In the democratic government, since the people are in some
respects the sovereigns

and manifest

their will

through their suf-

fundamental laws establish the right of suffrage: how,

by whom, and when it is to be exercised. Such laws also determine
frages, the

and those to be entrusted to

by them.
There are things the people are unable to do or to manage. This
inability may concern the very thing to be performed or administered, or the manner in which it is to be done or conducted.
the functions to be left to the people

their representatives, the magistrates or ministers elected

The public

business must be carried

on with a

certain motion,

neither too quick nor too slow. But the motion of the people

ways

either too

7 Ibid., Ill, 1.

is

al-

remiss or too violent. Sometimes with a hundred

s ibid.,

n,

1.

V. Modern Times

252]

thousand arms they overturn all before them; and sometimes with a
hundred thousand feet they creep like insects. 9

At

the

same time Montesquieu

choose those upon

whom

believes in the people's ability to

the direction of the public business

is

to devolve.

They can

when

tell

a person has fought

crowned with success; they

eral.

They can

satisfaction

when

tell

many

battles,

and been

are, therefore, capable of electing

a judge

is

assiduous in his

office, gives

and has never been charged with bribery;

a gengeneral

this is sufficient

for choosing a praetor. 10

Likewise,

fundamental to democratic republics that the peopower to enact laws. However, Montesquieu

it is

ple have the sole

maintains that the assemblies or senate should be allowed to issue

decrees binding until they
ratification

become permanent laws through proper

by the people.

In the aristocratic republic, where supreme power

is

lodged

in the hands of a certain group of citizens, the fundamental laws

establish the

these are

number

many

(the

of persons forming the governing class. If

more

the better), there

empowered

viding for a senate or council

body of nobles
the entire body

must be a law pro-

to act

when

the entire

incapable of a decision or, at least, to prepare

is

for a decision.

To

prevent abuses the senate should

of the legislators

its own members, and the term

and magistrates must be of short duration. Most

important of

in every kind of aristocratic republic, aristocratic

not be granted the right to choose

all,

families should tone

down

rather than emphasize any class dis-

tinction to level themselves, as

"The more an
approaches

its

much

aristocracy borders

perfection."

and

civil,

it

In a monarchy, where the prince

political

as possible, with the people.

on democracy, the nearer

is

the source of

the essential laws establish

all

power,

and regulate the

in-

termediate channels of the supreme power: the nobility, the clergy,

the municipal corporations. Their well-defined prerogatives and
functions will act as barriers to an overflow of the monarch's au-

They prevent the prince from becoming arbitrary and

Not satisfied with these intermediate powers, Montesquieu requests a distinct, strong judiciary body, constituted by
thority.

whimsical.

*lbid., 2.

uibid.,

3.

10 ibid,

Montesquieu XVIII.

[253

the judges of the supreme court of justice, responsible for the

promulgation, custody, and defense of the laws of the land.
In a despotic form of government, where one alone rules unrestrained, according to his caprice, the

fundamental law

is

that

power be committed to a single person. If the power were committed to many, there would be intrigues and jealousies and the despot would have to take things
again into his own hands. Only when he entrusts the cares of government to one alone is the despot (a lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant ruler) able to give himself undisturbed to his most brutal pasthe execution of the despot's

sions

and capricious extravagances.

As

to the principles of governments, probity

By

of a democratic republic.
virtue, a universal sense of
is

the lifeblood

is

means civic
whereby each citizen

probity Montesquieu

moral

rectitude,

so devoted to the state as to sacrifice to the

common

interest his

his tendencies to undisciplined behavior, his

selfish inclinations,

personal ambitions and cupidity. Without probity a democracy

is

democracy is popular government, government by the

greatest number; and if corruption, selfishness, avarice, love of
opulence and luxury (all things contrary to probity) are rife, the
state is certainly lost. As a consequence, the laws of a democracy

doomed,

for

should foster virtue, that

is,

frugality, austerity of life, equality in

wealth, public morality, and forbid not only vice but even the

semblance of

The

vice.

central principle of aristocratic

or restraint in those

government

who command. Only

ity re-established that

in this

is

way

moderation

is

the equal-

the constitution has necessarily removed.

Accordingly, the laws must aim to prevent or repress

and

all

gross in-

There should be no discrimination for marriage; taxes should be levied according to

wealth, while wages and salaries should be proportioned to need.
The central principle of monarchy is honor or ambition the
aspiration to social preferments, the desire for recognition and reward, the gratification of self-love by the bestowal of a title, a
dignity, a rank. In such a government, clearly reminiscent of
French life under Louis XIV, all eyes are fixed on the king, the
equalities

between

rulers

subjects.

generous dispenser of favors. The shallow and fragile foundation

assigned to

monarchy

requires laws defining the social standing

of the various classes, skillfully scaling their privileges

exactly doling out their measure of glory

and applause.

and honors,

V. Modern Times

254]

The

government

central principle of despotic

man

such a system

is

a creature

who

is

fear.

Under

submits blindly to the abso-

"Man's portion here, like that of beasts,

and punishment." 12 Consequently, the
laws directed by fear to breed fear are few; and they are all uniform, repressive laws. Their aim is to break even the desire to
contradict so as to produce instant and passive obedience. When
you instruct a beast, says Montesquieu (with an understanding of
despotism that his hatred for it renders amazingly clear), you take
good care not to change the master, the lessons, the method; you
beat his brains by two or three motions, and no more.
lute will of the sovereign.
is

compliance,

instinct,

THE THEORY OF POLITICAL LIBERTY

In a celebrated discussion, Montesquieu treats of those laws
that establish political liberty as
Briefly, this

is

how he

relates to

it

the constitution.

states his theory: political liberty

does not

freedom but in the right to do what the laws

permit. "If a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no
longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would
have the same power." 13 Such liberty is found only in moderate
governments, that is, in governments where the power is restricted,
subject to limitations; and, even in these, only when there is no
consist in unlimited

abuse of power. Since experience teaches that every

with power

is

apt to abuse

corruption. This

is

it,

way must be found

the way: let

man

invested

to prevent this

power be a check

to

power. In-

and concentrated power, there should be a

stead of a single

tain distribution of separate powers, each acting as a

cer-

check and

balance on the other. These separate powers are the legislative, the
executive, the judiciary. In virtue of the

first,

laws are enacted; in

virtue of the second, all legislative enactments are executed

and

enforced; in virtue of the third, crimes are punished and the dis-

putes between individuals judged and settled. "There would be an

end

to everything,

were the same

man

or the same body, whether

of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers."

Having

stated the theory that

classification

first

introduced the

of powers, Montesquieu shows

it

at

14

now common
work

in the

English constitution. In England the government runs well because

V Ibid.,

Ill, 10.

14 Ibid., 6.

Ibid.,

XL

3.

Montesquieu XVIII.
of the interplay of

its

[255

elements

magistrates, the nobility, the king.

all

the people

None

and

their elected

of these organs possesses

the power; each possesses certain definite limited power;

all

are

interrelated and interlocked, mutually checking, mutually balancing and, by the necessary movement of things, forced to avoid

deadlock and to join in a concerted motion.

It is

true that even in

the middle of the eighteenth century the British constitution

was

from working in the manner described and praised by Montesquieu; but he well expressed its spirit. It may be added that Montesquieu's ideal of political liberty, both as to spirit and actual
workings, was later fully realized in the American constitutional
far

system.

THE NOTION OF THE GENERAL SPIRIT

moral element that the laws must
never forget or disregard. This moral element, a product of the
morals, manners, customs, standards of each people, a mixture of
virtues and vices proper to each nation, Montesquieu calls "the
general spirit." So strong is this dominant character or mentality
that in certain domains it is more powerful than law. Therefore,
the legislator must be extremely circumspect lest he attempt,
There

is

in every nation a

through legislation, to change the general

laws

may be

mand, never

spirit of

a country.

New

used to change or reform what previous laws comto

change or reform what custom or immemorial

if deemed necessary, shall be done by
and strengthening of new customs and

usage has sanctioned. This,

the gradual" introduction

standards.

AN APPRAISAL
It is

not easy to understand and appraise Montesquieu's

cal philosophy.

He

covers so

much

avenues and lanes, he probes into so

that those

who

try to follow

him

ground, he walks so

many

politi-

many

ideas and institutions

find themselves, not infrequently,

and bewildered. A man of prodigious intelligence and vast

erudition, Montesquieu often forgets that what he has grasped re-

lost

He once compared himan antique-dealer who left his country, arrived in Egypt,
looked at the pyramids, and rushed back home. Undoubtedly,

quires further explanation for his listeners.

self to

V. Modern Times

256]
even a quick journey could teach

much

to

Montesquieu, but

it is

a pity that in reporting his impressions and findings he moves at

own

his

breathless pace. It

becomes

times fully to un-

difficult at

derstand or to reconcile certain of his points.

spirit and to a
Montesquieu is a realist, free of prejudice and dogma. Experience, and not a prefabricated system, is his guide. He draws freely on examples from history, ancient and modern; he invariably tests his principles against
the facts of the social and political environment. He does not say:

In his theories of the laws and the general

limited extent in the theory of governments,

this is the best law, this is the best

thing relative, contingent

government.

upon general

moral, in this or that particular country.

special attention to

what custom and

Indeed, his principle of legitimacy

is

He makes

every-

conditions, physical

He

and

pays constant and

tradition

have sanctioned.

based on the

test of reality

and the primacy of experience.

Yet history, which he knew so well, does not bridle his excessive optimism. Montesquieu trusts human nature too much, he
has too much confidence in man's reason. Perhaps he was preoccupied with refuting Hobbes' pessimistic belief in man's antisocial and beastly instincts. But Montesquieu goes to the other extreme: he makes natural man entirely too meek, timid, and peace
loving; he blames society for the introduction of inequality and
war. 15 It is true that man is not so bad as Hobbes would have us
believe. It

foolish

is

equally true that his passions strongly incline

him

to

and regrettable deeds.

Montesquieu's faith in human reason led him to imply that

once the people have been given a good constitution and a proper
political organization, everyone and everything in the state will be
all right.

rational system

is

certainly vital, but

it

can work as

it

should only through the good will and cooperation of the individual citizens. This truth Montesquieu either forgets or minimizes.

Age of Enlightenment, he not only exaggerates

human reason but also considers right action the in-

true son of the

the

power

of

variable corollary of right reasoning. Experience points to quite

another conclusion, just as

the people's political

it

shows that too great a reliance on

wisdom may end

Montesquieu also has great

in delusion.

faith in himself. In his realistic

15 Borrowed and emphasized by Rousseau, this idea became one of the

fundamental principles of the latter's social and political philosophy.

Montesquieu XVIII.

[257

mood, he declares that government best which best responds to

the needs and conditions of a particular country. In his optimistic
mood, he believes that he has found the best political system and
he does not hesitate to recommend it as such for all nations and
peoples. But in discussing his theory of political liberty the realistic
Montesquieu goes full circle and becomes dogmatic, intransigent.

He
it

is

so

much

everything
is

in love with his ideal of liberty that

not as a means but as an end in

is

Once

liberty

gained. Nothing else matters, not even

used. In a free nation, he says,

citizens reason rightly or

is

itself.

wrongly;

it

it

is

he regards
is

attained,

how

reason

immaterial whether the

suffices that they reason: this

liberty.

What

political liberty is narrow

Montesquieu mistakes a very important sign and
effect of liberty (the right to do what the laws do not forbid) for
liberty itself. True liberty consists, more essentially, in the right
to make good laws; and good legislation is possible only when the
majority of the citizens know what justice is, and reason well, and
embody their sense of justice and their right reasoning in their
laws. Furthermore, does Montesquieu believe that there are personal, inviolable rights, which even the law must respect? Probably. Unfortunately, he makes no mention of them.

and

is

more, his very concept of

formalistic.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Montesquieu, C.

de.

The

Spirit of the

Laws.

New

York: Hafner,

1959.

Levin, L.

M. The

New

Political Doctrine of

Montesquieu's Esprit des

York: Columbia University Press, 1936.

Morgan, C. The Liberty of Thought and the Separation of Powers.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.
Lois.

chapter xix

Rousseau

LIFE

THE

1
T

very

beginning

of

his

Confessions,

Jean-Jacques

Rousseau described himself as

a heart at once haughty and tender, a character effeminate, yet invincible; which, fluctuating
virtue,

has ever set

me

between weakness and courage, vice and

in contradiction to myself; causing abstinence

and enjoyment, pleasure and prudence, equally

to

shun me. 1

This complex individual, "paranoiac and genius, poet and

madman,"

was born at Geneva on June 28, 1712, into a family

French origins. His mother he never knew for she died in childbirth. His father, an ill-tempered, sentimental, and irresponsible
watchmaker, fled from Geneva when Jean-Jacques was ten years
old, leaving him to his mother's relatives. Rousseau was soon
sent to a private school at Bossey, a nearby village. In 1724 he
left or was expelled from the school and apprenticed to a Genevan
notary. Dismissed almost immediately, in the spring of 1725 he
of

The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,

(New York: Tudor,

2 J. Maritain,
p. 121.

trans,

by W. C. Mallory

1938), p. 15.

Three Reformers

(New York:

Scribner's Sons, 1955),

Rousseau XIX.

[259

went to learn the art of engraving in the workshop of a watchmaker. In 1728, tired he claimed of blows and harsh words
but more probably of discipline and obedience, he ran away and
roamed the countryside until at Annecy, in Savoy, he met the
young and pleasant Madame Louise Eleonore de Warens. 3 She

gave him shelter in her house and a place in her heart. But later,
resenting his violent temper and his fits of jealousy, she managed
to

send him to Turin, the capital of Piedmont, there to study the

Catholic faith.

He

did eventually embrace Catholicism, but with-

out any inner conviction. After his conversion, Rousseau remained

Madame de Vercellis until the famous

(when he cowardly blamed an innocent girl,
a fellow servant, for his theft) cost him his post. Some time afterward, Rousseau was back in Annecy, warmly welcomed by Madame de Warens, who installed him in her house as her lover and
encouraged him to study literature and music. But again there were
frequent and bitter quarrels and more or less prolonged absences.
Finally, in 1741, he left for good and journeyed to Paris, where
he attached himself to a Madame Dupin. Recommended by her,
he was engaged as secretary by the French ambassador to Venice.
Rousseau lasted at this about eighteen months, taking little interest in his work and intensely disliking his employer. In 1745
he returned to Paris, became acquainted with Diderot's literary
group, and took as his mistress Therese Le Vasseur, an illiterate
servant at the inn where he was staying. They had five children,
all sent anonymously to a foundling asylum.
As a means of livelihood Rousseau copied music. He also
wrote an opera, Les Muses galantes, which was privately prein

Turin as footman to a

incident of the ribbon

1749 the Academy of Dijon offered a prize for an essay

on morals. Rousseau won the contest.
His essay, proclaiming the superiority of the savage state, was
published in 1750 and made him famous overnight throughout
France. As a result he was given the post of cashier in the receiver
general's office, but he soon resigned and returned to his old trade
of copying music. In 1752 his operetta Le Devin du village was
presented at Fontainebleau. Its success brought him an invitation
sented. In

on the

effect of civilization

3 Madame de
Warens, a Calvinist converted to Catholicism, was
separated from her husband. In all probability she was a paid secret agent
in the service of the king of Piedmont. See G. Mosca, Storia delle dot-

trine politiche (Bari: Laterza, 1945), pp. 226f.

V.

260]

Modem

Times

he refused to go. That same year he sent a new

on Inequality, 4 to the Academy of Dijon.
In 1754 Rousseau was in Geneva. There he renounced Catholicism and re-accepted Protestantism. Back in Paris, in April 1756,
at the invitation of Madame d'Epinay he went to live in the famous
Hermitage near Montmorency. In its seclusion he wrote La
Nouvelle Heloise and had an affair with Madame d'Houdetot,
Madame d'Epinay's sister-in-law, a married woman who also had
another lover. Having quarreled with Diderot and Madame
d'Epinay, he moved to Mont-Louis in the winter of 1757. There
he wrote Le Contrat social (using the notes prepared while in
Venice) and Smile or De V Education, which were published in
1762. By this time his books had won him immense popularity.
They had also brought the condemnation of the parliament of
Paris. Warned by friends that he was about to be arrested, he fled
first to Switzerland and then to the principality of Neuchatel.
There, his attacks on the archbishop of Paris and the council of
Geneva soon made him unpopular. Feeling hunted, he repaired
to the court but

essay, Discourse

"

Bienne and, shortly after, at the

David Hume, to England. Rousseau arrived in London on January 13, 1766. As restless and insecure as ever, he
tired of the capital and left for Wootton in Derbyshire. The quiet
country should have afforded him peace and comfort; but before
long, true to form, he became suspicious of his English friends and
quarreled even with Hume. In May 1767, he returned to France
and lived here and there, half insane, tormented and tormenting,
never at peace with himself or anyone else. Still, he continued his
writing. He finished his Confessions (a book whose documentary
value is highly questionable) and began Les Reveries du promeneur solitaire. At the beginning of 1778 he established himself
in a cottage at Ermenonville. He died there on July 2, probably
of an apoplectic stroke.
to St. Pierre Island in the lake of

invitation of

For Rousseau the

origin

and foundation of inequality among men

is

introduction of private property robbed man of the happiness and equality he enjoyed in the state of nature. "The first man who,
having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying This is
property.

The

mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder
of

civil society."

This idea was later borrowed and elaborated by Babeuf

and Proudhon and,

in general,

by

all socialist

philosophers.

Rousseau XIX.

[261

POLITICAL WRITINGS
Rousseau's political thought
Inequality, in his essay

on

is

Political

contained in his Discourse on

Economy,

En-

written for the

cyclopedic, and in his Social Contract. There are further references

to politics in the fourth

Letters Written from the

book of Emile; and in the sixth of his

Mountain he summarized the arguments

of the Social Contract.

It
litical

has been customary to attribute to Rousseau two main poideas

thetic. It

and

to find

them

essentially different

has in fact been said that there

is

and even

anti-

a complete contradic-

between the idea of the Discourse on Inequality and the idea

of the Social Contract: the former is the antisocial, individualistic,
liberal idea, based on the "return to nature" and the illegitimacy
tion

of society; the latter, the social,

antiliberal,

bureaucratic idea,

which extols society and political organization while stripping man

of all rights and freedoms. How can pure liberty be reconciled with
pure tyranny? How can a system wherein man exists solely as a
person be logically bridged to a system wherein man exists solely
as a part of a social

In reality there
course,

Rousseau

whole?
no fundamental contradiction. In the Dis-

is

traces the origins of sociaL>jganization a s it-ac-

tually exists to the gradual degeneration of

man

as the result of

and the perverse tiesire of the

rich and powerfuLfew JtQ- Jceep 4he masses-in poverty and subjection.^ This explains Rousseau's emphasis on primitive man's
equality and his romantic declamations in praise of the noble
savage wandering alone, free, uninhibited, content, in his semianimalistic state, with food, an occasional female companion, and
the introduction of private property

sleep. Realizing,

however, that a

possible (and he never

Rousseau
serve the

it

in

literal

good of
Whether

all

may be

as a poetic

whereby the

so purified and re-organized as to

and restore to men

their pristine liberty

his solution of the political

The underlying

is imdream),

"return to nature"

mind except

in the Social Contract presents a system

corrupt, historical state

equality.

had

problem

is

and

the right

idea of the Discourse is that the state, as originally

nothing but an instrument of exploitation, an unjust means
of favoring a minority and keeping the have-nots in chains. The philosophy
of modern collectivism is based on this very principle.
established,

is

V. Modern Times

262]

one or not is highly debatable, to say the least. It might even be

argued, and reasonably, that his treatment of the problem has gaps
and inconsistencies. The fact remains, however, that the two underlying ideas of his entire political thought can be easily reconciled.

may be summarized

His general thesis

return to nature, that

become

is,

to virtuous

in this

and simple

way:

living;

man must
man must

and equal. In existing conditions, this is possible only in a state where the people are sovereign and through
their general will give themselves just laws and closely watch the
government they have chosen limiting, modifying, and taking
over its powers whenever they like.
again

free

THE SOCIAL PACT

In the Note prefixed to
seau states that
basis of

it is

his

Government."

Book

I of the Social

Contract, Rous-

wish "to discover a legitimate and stable

This basis

is

not force, not the natural

authority of the patriarch or of any born leader, not the natural

man. The sole legitimate foundation of the social

is its free, unanimous acceptance by all concerned. Having reached a point in history where the original state of nature 7
sociability of

obligation

The Social Contract, I, Note. Selections from The Social Contract

from the translation by G. Hopkins published by the Oxford University Press (London and New York, 1952).
6

are taken
7

According to Rousseau,

velopment.

Man

man

passed through several stages of de-

in the real state of nature

is

a nonrational animal, living

purely on instinct, incapable of sentiments of admiration and love; but, like

other animals, he has a sense of pity. In reality, as Mercier remarks, this

man

an ante-homo sapiens, an animal still devoid of

Rousseau refers when he says in his discourse On
the Origin of Inequality: "A man who thinks is a depraved animal." The
second stage is the status of rational primitive man: the stage of development of savages discovered by explorers and missionaries, the stage at which
nature intended man to stay. Man in this stage is neither good nor bad, yet
in it he is most happy: "Nothing is so gentle as man in this primitive state,
when placed by nature at equal distances from the stupidity of beasts and
the fatal lights of civic man, limited equally by instinct and reason to
guarantee himself against the evil which threatens him, restrained by natural pity from harming anyone, even after being harmed by another." The
third stage is that of civilized man
a stage that had its beginning in the
introduction of family life, the differentiation of man's work and woman's,
the establishment of community life, ambition, and love (love is an invention of women "to make dominant the sex which should obey"), and
is

"not

reason."

at all, but

It is to

him

that

Rousseau XIX.

[263

men were

could no longer endure,

central direction

how

to pool,

and

A problem ensued:

through some form of association, the whole strength

community

of the

forced to develop some sort of

to learn to act in concert.

each individual

for the protection of the person

member

and property of

and, at the same time, leave to each his

former freedom. The problem was solved by the social contract,

whereby each associated individual completely and unreservedly
surrendered to the community

all his rights.

The pact

for the person of each of the contracting parties a

lective

body composed

assembly has votes.

the community.

None

And

rights

members

of the

any claim against

we

of the social group precisely the

we have surrendered

to him, the pact results in our

to conserve

we

lose, as well as

what we already have."

obedience are assured:

member

retains

member

gaining "the exact equivalent of what

power

col-

as the constituting

through the act of association

yet, since

acquire over every other

same

many members

of as

substitutes

moral and

liberty,

Thus both

an added

liberty

because as a citizen each

is

of the sovereign, a sharer in the sovereign authority,

as such equally participates in the activities of the

obedience, because as a subject

by the sovereign, that

is,

the

body

and

now

and

politic;

he faithfully obeys the laws issued

body

politic of

Rousseau's theory of the social pact

is

which he

is

member.

better understood

when

compared with the contractual theories of Hobbes and Locke. The

three meet on common ground only when they consider the state
a voluntary contrivance, a product of man's free choice exclusively.

Rousseau's surrender

is

Hobbes', while Locke's surrender

as
is

complete and unreserved as

partial

and

limited.

But Rous-

seau differs from Hobbes and agrees with Locke in making the
surrender not to the government but to the community.

THE GENERAL WILL

Once

the pact

is

actualized each

speak, a dual personality.

member

He becomes

of the state has, so to

a constituent associate, a

For a detailed treatment of man's

evolution according to Rousseau, see L. J. A. Mercier, "Rousseau:
Discourse on Political Economy, On the Origin of Inequality" in The Great

particularly in the institution of property.

Books, ed. by H. G. Gardiner

pp. 107-121.
8

The Social Contract,

I, 6.

(New York: Devin- Adair,

1950), Vol.

II,

V. Modern Times

264]
citizen, a part of the sovereign people,

a social being.

He

is

also

a man, an individual being. In the former capacity, he has chiefly

rights; in the latter

he has

only the general interest, the

the
all

making of the general

As a

chiefly duties.

will.

common
This

is

citizen

he wants

good, and contributes to

not necessarily the will of

in a numerical, quantitative sense, but a will of a general inten-

tion, general in

a qualitative sense, a "mythical" will able to grasp

demands and

the true

fulfill

retains his natural instinct;

terests; his individual will

the true needs of

he looks

may be

all.

As

a man, he

after his personal, selfish in-

at variance

with the general

will.

Rousseau does not doubt that the general will is good and
right, for "it is impossible that the body should wish to injure all
9
its members."
The general will must therefore always take precedence and command over the individual will. This is an essential
clause of the social pact. On it all have agreed. Everyone wants
this condition fulfilled and should it happen that a subject refuses
to obey the general will "he must be constrained by the whole
body of his fellow citizens to do so; which is no more than to say
that it may be necessary to compel a man to be free," 10 that is,
it may be necessary to force him, even by coercive action, to do
what he really wanted, what he originally and in perpetuum declared to be his better will
the will of the body as a whole, the
general will free of dependence on particular persons.
So far so good. It may be conceded that "in the silence of his

passions" everyone wishes the general good. Theoretically, there

may be

a general will in Rousseau's sense. There

subconsciously, the earnest desire to find

ways be able

it.

is

in

all,

at least

But will the people aland infallibly carry

to cancel individual selfishness

the idea over into actual legislation? Is the will of the majority the

organ of the general will?

least, for

If not,

where

is

comes blind and dumb and the general

voice of a lone
there, in

one to look,

at times at

another organ? Suppose the majority of the people be-

man

will speaks

through the

or of a small minority: what guarantees are

such cases, that

it

will

win over the

selfish will of the

majority? These and similar questions occurred to Rousseau, and

he tried hard to find the right answers. But

ways satisfactory.
o Ibid., 7.

io Ibid.

his

answers are not

al-

Rousseau XIX.

[265

SOVEREIGNTY
In Rousseau's state the people, expressing through laws the
general

will,

are sovereign. Sovereignty

of the people's will.

As such

it

is,

therefore, the exercise

has four characteristics:

it

is

in-

alienable, indivisible, infallible, absolute.

1

"I maintain that sovereignty can never be alienated

the sovereign,

who

is

and that

a collective being only, can be represented

by no one but himself."

u As

soon as sovereignty is alienated to a

master, the general will is no more. There remains only an individual will bent naturally to privilege and to private interest and
not to equality and general interest. Likewise, just as soon as the

people agree to be represented by deputies, they cease to be sov-

They chain themselves, which is absurd.

"For the same reason that sovereignty is inalienable, so, too,
12
To
it is indivisible. For either the will is general or it is not."
divide sovereignty in its principle is to kill it. But even to divide it

ereign.
2.

only in

object

its

co-equal branches

to divide
is fatal.

it

into separate, independent parts or

The sovereign

authority has different

manifestations but no separable parts. Rousseau admits the delega-

must always
remain subordinate to the sovereign people.
3. "The General Will is always right and tends to the public

tion of executive functions to special agents, but these

advantage."

13

Rousseau has to admit that the people can be de-

ceived and that at times their decisions might not be right; but
in these cases,

he imperturbably adds, what the people will

is

not

"The General Will does not then come into play

This is bound to happen when the people are poorly or

the general will.

at all." 14
ill

informed, or when, instead of each citizen's voting individually,

and factional groups are formed within the body, or

partisan group becomes so large as to overpower the
others. Therefore, if the general infallible will is to be truly expressed, not only must the people be enlightened but "it is essential that there be no subsidiary groups within the State, and
that each citizen voice his own opinion and nothing but his own
intriguing

when one

opinion."

15

11 Ibid., II, 1.
13 Ibid., 3.

w Ibid.

12/6W.,
14 ibid.

2.

V. Modern Times

266]
4.

As

Rousseau discusses it
The two points of
personal individualism and democratic ab-

to the range of sovereign power,

rather confusedly in Chapter

view there expressed

solutism

seem

VI

of

Book

II.

irreconcilable. Anticipating the reader's surprise,

Rousseau brushes away the apparent contradiction by blaming

"the poverty of human language." But at one point he is clear.
After having stated that, as a result of the social compact, what
each man alienates of power, property, and liberty is only as much
as concerns the well-being of the community, he adds significantly:
"It must be admitted that the sovereign alone can determine how
much, precisely, this is." 16 Yes, there are limits to Rousseau's
sovereign power, but only those that the state deems it wise to set.
Such a sovereignty, allowed to fix its own boundaries, is nothing
short of absolute.

THE LAW
According
will. It is

to

made

municable

Rousseau, law

right,

is

the expression of the general

It is

an incom-

a right of which they cannot divest themselves.

A law worthy of the name,

people and

is

only by the whole body of citizens.

then,

is

made by

the whole

body of the

valid for all alike. Therefore, the matter of the law

must be general, that is, concerned with the subjects of a state

taken as a whole and with actions treated purely in the abstract.
"It is not the function of the legislative power to concern itself
with specific actions." 17 Should the law decide, for instance, that
there shall be privileges, "it is not its business to assign those
privileges to actual individual men and women." 18
Rousseau has deep respect for the law. For him it is invariably
right, sacred, and inviolable, like the general will of which it is the
expression. The entire body of the people is incapable of unjust
legislation, for "no man is unjust to himself." Yet, Rousseau repeats, the people do not always know where good lies. "The General Will is always right, but the judgment guiding it is not always
well informed."

19

The people must, therefore, be made to see

must be shown how to attain the good they

things as they are, they

seek, they

must be protected and guided. Suddenly, on the

level

horizon of Rousseau's democracy, a strange figure emerges.

ibid.,
is Ibid.

4.

17 ibid., 6.

19 Ibid.

It

Rousseau XIX.

[267

looms larger and larger until it stands on the platform of history,

a giant dominating the multitudes assembled below. Unexpectedly
for some, inevitably for others, Rousseau has brought forth "the
legislator," the extraordinary figure in the state, the guide of the

people, the wise, inspired individual

what

who

will ensure their happiness. True,

has not the power to

make

he

suggests and proposes

is

not the sovereign and

laws, his proposals

becoming laws only

is that out
the people. But
nowhere a deus ex machina has appeared to tell and lead the
people where they ought to go. At this point the already very short
distance between democracy and totalitarianism shrinks to the

when approved by

the disturbing fact

of

space of a sigh.

THE GOVERNMENT
According to Rousseau the general will is expressed only
an enactment of the entire body on a general matand never through decisions affecting details or concrete ap-

through law
ter

plications of principles.

for the

main

making of

The

laws, for

body politic is alone responsible

the power to legislate is and must re-

entire

exclusively the people's.

ticular acts) to the

On

the other hand, the people en-

power (the power concerned only with par-

trust the executive

government, that

is,

to a definite

group charged

with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty.

Notice the special meaning that the term "government" acquires in

Rousseau. Government for him

what

is

is

solely the legitimate exercise of

usually termed the executive and the judiciary power.

intermediate power,

it

stands

midway between

An

the sovereign peo-

body politic in its active role of citizens) and the state

body politic in its passive role of subjects). The government
receives from the people as sovereign the orders which it passes
on to the people as subject. The sovereign wills, the government
acts. The latter is the practical strength at the service of the will.
The government is also a subordinate power existing, both as
to form 20 and individual incumbents, at the people's discretion.

ple (the
(the

20

For Rousseau's classification of governments (democracy, aristocmonarchy), see ibid., Ill, chaps. 3-7. The classical division is represented but with an essentially different meaning. The machinery of
government may be in the hands of the whole people (a form fit for "a nation of gods" but not suited to "mere men"). Or it may be in the hands

racy,

V. Modern Times

268]
It is

established through a law, not through a contract. There

only one contract in Rousseau's state

is

the primitive contract that

and created the sovereign. "The State exists

government depends for its being on the Sovereign." 21 "Such power as he [the prince, the ruler] has is but the
power of the community concentrated in his person." - 2 There4
fore, "those who hold the executive power in trust are not thepeople's masters but its officers; the people can appoint and remove them at will; for them it is a question not of contract but of
established society
in

and by

itself,

obedience."

23

RELIGION
The Social Contract ends with a revealing chapter on religion.
Rousseau discusses "how religious institutions may fit into the constitution of the State" and distinguishes three forms of religion:
the religion of man as man, the religion of the citizen, the religion
of the priest. The priestly religion, whether that of the lamas, or
the Japanese, or Roman Christianity, is "so obviously bad that to
demonstrate the fact, though it might be amusing, would be merely
a waste of time."

24

The religion of the citizen, the

on the law of exclusion, is

ancient city, founded

rejected, for

it is

altars,

by fanaticism,
man, "without temples,

a national religion, characterized

hatred, intolerance.

without

religion of the

likewise to be

The

without

religion of

man

rites, strictly

as

limited to the inner worship

Supreme God and to the eternal obligations of morality, is

the pure and simple religion of the Gospels." 25 It is theism in its
truest form. Through it, men, as children of the same God, regard
each other as brothers. But even this religion, good in itself, is of
of the

number of magistrates (to be periodically elected, if one wants

form of government among men). Or it may be in the hands of a
single magistrate from whom all other officials derive power (a very vigorous but extremely dangerous form because "only a Hercules can carry the
weight of the world upon his shoulders" and "bad men do mount the
throne, or perhaps it is that the throne makes them bad"). But in each and
every case it is always the people as a whole who retain the legislative
function. Government in any form is always responsible and answerable

of a small
the best

to the people.
21 Ibid., in,
23 ibid., 18.
25 Ibid.

1.

22 ibid.
24 ibid., IV, 8.

Rousseau XIX.
no help

[269

by
weans

to the state. It adds nothing to the force of the laws;

detaching the citizen from

him from the state.
Having thus eliminated

all

purely earthly concerns,

it

Rousseau

these three types of religion,

presents his civil religion, a religion that deepens man's social con-

him to the society issued from the social

which it is impossible to be a good citizen
Let the citizen believe whatever dogma he

sciousness and cements

pact, a religion without

and

faithful subject.

likes; yet, let the

sovereign

fix certain principles for this civil re-

God, the reality of a life to

and the punishment of the evildoers,
the sacredness of the social contract and of the laws. None should
be compelled to believe; but those who fail to do so may be banished from the state "not on ground of impiety, but as lacking in
social sense." Moreover, "any man who, after acknowledging these
articles of faith, proceeds to act as though he did not believe them

ligion, particularly the existence of

come, the reward of the

just

deserving of the death penalty."

is

26

On this shrill note of supreme intolerance, the

No commentary could bring home more

ends.

poignantly the

Rousseau's corporate Leviathan. The chains have not

reality of

become

Social Contract

legitimate.

They have been doubled and redoubled. The

God with a monster, the old dogma

new and terrible one: outside the state there is no salvation.
The new sovereign is more arbitrary, irresponsible, and capricious
great iconoclast has replaced

with a

than the absolute king, for

it is

multiple and anonymous. Truly, in

such conditions of unmitigated slavery,

men

are left

no

alternative

but to accept the advice given by Rousseau on another occasion:

let

them throw themselves

to the

ground and lament the

fact that

they are men.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Rousseau,

W.

J.-J.

The Social Contract. Trans, with an Introduction by

Gateway Books, 1954.

Kendall. Chicago:

Cassirer, E. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Columbia University Press, 1954.

lbid.

New

York:

V. Modern Times

270]

Cobban, A. Rousseau and the Modern State. London: G. Allen and

Unwin, 1934.
Chapman, J. W. Rousseau Totalitarian or Liberal? New York:
Columbia University Press, 1956.
Green, F. C. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Critical Study of His Life
and Writings. Cambridge: The University Press, 1955.

Maritain, J. Three Reformers: Luther

York: Scribner's, 1955.

DescartesRousseau. New

chapter xx

Burke

LIFE

EDMUND BURKE was born in Dublin on January

He and

his brothers

12, 1729,

an attorney, and a Catholic mother.

to a Protestant father,

were brought up in the Protestant religion

while his sister followed her mother's faith.

In 1741 he was sent to school at Ballitore in Kildare County,

and in 1743 entered Trinity College in Dublin. Burke, however,
resented Trinity's rigid methods and discipline and received his
degree in 1748 without any particular academic distinction. In
1750 he went to London and for ten years he lived in obscurity,
consorting with

Bohemian

the debating societies of

ing

on various

a satire

subjects.

(A Vindication

literary groups, practicing oratory in

Covent Garden, trying

Two

his

hand

at writ-

of his books, published in 1756,

one
on

of Natural Society), the other an essay

aesthetic thought (Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of

Our

Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful), attracted some attention

both in England and abroad.

The year 1761 marked Burke's entrance

into public

life.

He

attached himself to Sir William Gerard Hamilton, a rather shallow,

and despicable individual, and followed him to Ireland when

Hamilton was named secretary to the Lord Lieutenant there.
English mismanagement in Ireland disgusted Burke and stirred

vain,

V. Modern Times

272]

him

to a

warm,

lasting interest in the affairs

and defense of the

After two years he returned to

Irish people.

London with

Sir

Hamilton. In 1765 they quarreled and parted company. That same

year the Marquis of Rockingham, leader of the Old Whigs, be-

came George
tary.

the

Ill's

fourth prime minister and took Burke as secre-

In 1766 Burke obtained, through his

House

of

new

patron, a seat in

Commons.

There were

at the time

two burning

issues in English political

the king's attempt to raze the system established

life:

by the

Revolution of 1688 and concentrate national power in his

hands, and the North American

crisis

breaking point. Since his accession to

III

had frequently and

arbitrarily

changed prime ministers, look-

ing not for skilled public servants but for

and answerable

to him, ready

and

own

moving toward the

the throne in 1760, George
rapidly

men

completely bound

willing to carry out his plans to

re-establish direct personal rule. William Pitt

was dismissed

in

1761, the Earl of Bute in 1763, George Grenville in 1765. Gren-

Stamp Act, 1 which

greatly embittered already strained relations between the American colonists and England. Such was the situation when Burke
entered the House of Commons, where he immediately took a
firm stand against both the king's policies and the official handling of the American question.
Under the short-lived Rockingham administration, the Stamp
Act was repealed and the tension somewhat eased. But in 1767
the new government, headed by the Duke of Grafton, imposed
duties through the Townshend Acts on several colonial importations (lead, glass, paint, paper, tea) and rekindled the rebellious
spirit of the colonists. He was dismissed and replaced by Lord
North. The king had finally found his man. He kept him in office
for twelve catastrophic years. Lord North first tried a policy of
appeasement. He repealed the Townshend Acts but his insistence
on parliament's right to tax the colonies met their violent disapproval and was one of the main causes of the Boston "tea party"
(1773), which in turn provoked British retaliatory measures. This
course of events was opposed step by step by Burke. He spoke in
ville,

a Whig,

had been responsible

for the

1 The Stamp Act required

that a stamp be affixed to all legal documents, books, newspapers, college diplomas, bills of lading, and letters of

credit issued in the

American

colonies.

Burke XX.

[273

favor of the colonists, pleading in parliament for a policy of

moderation and conciliation and, when war began, for peace.

Another nation, Ireland, was clamoring for the restoration of

economic and religious rights. The Irish economy had been all but suffocated by the selfish exigencies of the

certain long-denied

British mercantile interests.

Likewise, the vast majority of the

were barred from

deep and far, subjected them to harsh measures and stiff penalties. Burke never
stopped campaigning, in the name of natural law and reason, for
Irish people,

by reason of

their Catholic faith,

political life while iniquitous laws, reaching

legislation capable of bringing Catholic Ireland relief in all spheres.

True to the same liberal principles, Burke sided against

Warren Hastings, governor general of India. Accused of corruption, extortion, brutality, and deception, Hastings was brought
before the court of the House of Lords (1788) and acquitted
(1795), but Burke's thundering philippics, if they did not completely

prove his case,

still

speak eloquently for his exacting

standards of political morality.

When the French Revolution broke out in 1789, many, in

England and abroad, turned their eyes to Burke. The champion of
freedom versus absolutism, the fighter for the rights of the oppressed, the orator indignant against oligarchic interests, would
surely hail the revolutionaries across the Channel. But Burke was
silent. He was watching the French fury, raised against the throne
and the altar, with increasing alarm. Finally, when news reached
him that the royal palace at Versailles had been invaded by the
Parisian mob and the Queen threatened, 2 he became convinced of
the folly of the French reformers. A sort of holy anger seized him
and he lashed out at them in condemnation and warning. In
November 1790, his famous Reflections on the Revolution in
France appeared. Returning to the argument in 1791, he wrote
Thoughts on French Affairs. Shortly before he had released
2

The

Reflections

tragic events of

on

October

6,

1789, are described by Burke in

the Revolution in France.

6th ed. [Boston: Little

{The Works of

Brown and Company,

1880],

Edmund

Volume

III, p.

Burke,
325.)

There he also draws a romantic portrait of Marie Antoinette as seen on a

visit to France some sixteen years before: "I saw her just above the
horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to

move

in

glittering like

joy." (lb id., p. 331.)

the morning-star, full of

life

and splendor and

V. Modern Times

274]

Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, contrasting the spirit
and methods of the revolutions of 1688 and 1789.
His position on the French Revolution was frowned upon by
the men of his party, particularly its leader, Charles James Fox.
They resented Burke's censure of the French happenings and doc-

An

trines,

of

and

May

in

1791, in a highly dramatic episode in the House

Commons, Burke

publicly renounced Fox's friendship.

breach led to Burke's expulsion from the

Whig

This

But with the

Burke's viewpoint was

passing of the years and the turn of events,

party.

vindicated. In February 1793, riding the crest of popular resent-

ment

to

French

policies, Pitt declared

war on France.

summer of 1794, thirty years after he had first entered

the House of Commons, Burke retired from parliament. His financial conditions were difficult, and King George granted him an anIn the

nual pension. His health declined steadily

he died

at his

home

in Beaconsfield.

until,

on July

9,

1797,

According to his wish, he was

buried there in his parish church.

DUAL BASIS OF BURKE'S DOCTRINE

More than

a system of political philosophy, Burke's speeches

and writings are a statesman's manual. He was impatient with

formalism. He saw no little danger in too much reasoning. He disliked definitions. According to him, these are in order in the field
of metaphysics, not in the practical science of politics, whose end
is not speculative knowledge but action. When one deals with
actual conditions and must decide upon a course of action for a
specific situation, dogmatic, universal, and abstract principles have
little to offer. In politics, experience, common sense, and prudence
are the immediate instruments of judgment and decision, and "prudence is cautious how she defines." 3 This is not to say that Burke
was unscrupulous and unprincipled. On the contrary, he had a set
of very definite, fundamental beliefs and adhered tenaciously and
uncompromisingly to them. But his point was that in the practical
application of principles the context of time and place and persons
was paramount. A statesman must meet an infinite variety of circumstances.
ciple
3

its

It is

these that "give in reality to every political prin-

distinguishing color

Appeal from the

New

4 Reflections, p. 240.

and discriminating

to the

Old Whigs

in

effect." 4

Works, IV,

One must

p. 81.

Burke XX.

[275

never forget the principles.

One must

always act in conformity

with them. But political action, invariably a delicate operation,

while informed by them, must be guided by circumstances. While

government and freedom, for example, are in themselves good and

desirable, one cannot praise a certain type of government without
first inquiring into its nature and how it is administered. Or,

may be classed amongst the blessmankind, that I am seriously to felicitate a madman who has
escaped from the protecting restraint and wholesome darkness of his
5
cell on his restoration to the enjoyment of light and liberty?
is it

because liberty in the abstract

ings of

Hence

the dual basis of Burke's political theory and action: a

firm, unshifting respect for sound principles,

tion to varied and varying circumstances.

demned the French Revolution.

On

and a constant attenboth grounds he con-

BURKE AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The Revolution

1789 had been preceded by and achieved

of

with a shouting and parading of principles seldom,

Burke considered

history before or since.

all

of

ever, seen in

if

them wrong, spur-

fallacious. The very opposite principles were the right

The Revolution was for man individual, uprooted man, in
opposition to God and man and mankind. But religion, says

and

ious,

ones.

Burke,
is

the basis of civil society, and the source of

comfort.

Man

is

by

his

all

good, and of

constitution a religious animal;

all
.

our reason, but our instincts. 6

All
persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and
awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust, and that they
are to account for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master,
Author, and Founder of society. 7
The awful Author of our being
is the Author of our place in the order of existence.
We have

atheism

is

against, not only

to

mankind at large.
They arise from the relation of
man, and the relation of man to God, which relations are not

obligations to

man

matters of choice. 8

The Revolution was

tion to collected reason
5 Ibid.,
p.
7 Ibid.,

241.

p. 354.

for abstract, individual reason in opposi-

and sentiment. Burke wanted practical wis*Ibid., pp. 350, 351.

8

Appeal, pp. 165, 166.

V. Modern Times

276]

dom

in place of the Revolution's philosophy of reason divorced

from experience. Naked reason can never be a guide to action.

Man is not a creature of sheer reason but of passion and habits,
a creature capable of veneration, love, and attachment.
too
More, because each individual's private stock of reason is scant,
"individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general
bank and capital of nations and ages." 9
The Revolution was for the "rights of man" in opposition to
man's rights and duties, both viewed and realized within the frame-

work

of historical realities.

The pretended

and
and

rights of these theorists are all extremes;

tion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally

false.

men

The

rights of

men

are in a sort of middle.

in

The

propor-

politically

rights of

government are their advantages; and these are often in

balances between differences of good, in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil. ... By
in

these theorists the right of the people

is

almost always sophistically

confounded with their power

the whole body of them has
but
no right inconsistent with virtue, and the first of all virtues, prudence.
Men have no right to what is not reasonable, and to what is not for
.

their benefit. 10

The Revolution claimed

that the social contract

was

solely re-

sponsible for the establishment of the state in opposition to man's

natural, inescapable inclination to society, including political society.

Burke answered that God

is

the

and Author and Protector of civil society, without which

man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable nor even make a remote and faint
approach to it.
He who gave our nature to be perfected by our
virtue willed also the necessary means of its perfection: He willed,
Institutor

civil society

therefore, the state. 11

The Revolution stood

for individual, solitary, selfish liberty in

opposition to individual and collective freedom based on natural

and directed to the achievement of a stable and

The freedom Burke loved was not an
unconnected liberty whereby every man regulates the whole of his
conduct by his own will.

law and

justice,

well-ordered living together.

9 Reflections, p. 346.
11 Ibid., p. 361.

Ibid.,

p. 313.

Burke XX.
The

liberty I

liberty

in

is

mean

[277
social freedom. It

is

is

that state of things in

secured by the equality of restraint.

which the

which

constitution of things

no one man, and no body of men, and no

means to trespass on the liberty of any

liberty of

number of men, can

find

person, or any description of persons, in the society. This kind of

liberty

is,

ration

is

name

indeed, but another

made between

and

liberty

for justice.

justice, neither

Whenever a
is,

in

my

sepa-

opinion,

safe. 12

The Revolution was

for "Jacobin democracy," the will of the

number, in opposition to the natural aristocracy of the

great landowners and all cultured and right-thinking citizens
formed independently of numerical quantity. How the judgment of
every citizen could be assigned equal weight was beyond Burke's
greatest

comprehension.

who

Believe me, Sir, those

attempt to level never equalize. In

societies consisting of various descriptions of citizens,

some

all

descrip-

must be uppermost. 13
There is no qualification for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or presumptive. 14 I see as little of

tion

policy or utility as there

is

majority of

men

and that

such their will

as

told

of right, in laying

by the head are

is

is

a principle that a

to be law. 15

For Burke, only when the multitude

leadership of the best

down

to be considered as the people,

under the wise

and not "a disbanded race

acts together

there a people

and vagabonds." 16
the French Revolution was for the abrupt, total,
violent destruction of all previous ideas and institutions in opposition to a gradual correction of social ills and a prudent adjusting
to changing conditions, both to be achieved without breaking with
history and tradition. "You began ill because you began by despising everything that belonged to you." 17 A diseased man or
country cannot be cured with undiluted poison; but in Burke's
of deserters

Above

view, the

all,

men

of the Revolution attempted just that.

order "into which

we

The

French Revolution was therefore "a strange chaos of

12

Correspondence of

Rivington, 1844),

III, p.

Appeal,

p.

Edmund Burke (London:

106.

13 Reflections,
p. 295.
15

ancient

are born" they utterly disregarded.

174.

17 Reflections,
p. 278.

" ibid.,

p. 297.
i Ibid., p. 176.

Francis

levity

The
and

and John

V. Modern Times

278]
ferocity,

and of

of follies."

all sorts

of crimes jumbled together with

all sorts

18

For the same reason, Burke criticized the absurdity of thinking a state could be organized by simply formulating a constitution
full of abstractions and generalities. Political science cannot be reduced to brief formulas. Rather than in a written document drawn
up by some individuals at a given time and place, the true constitution of a country is found in the organs of government established
and refined through centuries as well as in the customs, traditions,
and general character of a people. This explains Burke's organic
view of the state and the nation. The state is something that grows
up over a time, "a partnership between those who are living, and
those who are dead, and those who are to be bora." 19 The nation
is "an idea of continuity." It extends in time as well as in number
and space. Therefore, to grant a living generation the right to

make

stroying the

is tantamount to decompact that binds together the dead, the living, and

the unborn.

radical changes in political institutions

small minority (in this case, the living generation)

must be denied so broad and sweeping a power of reform.

Nor is a governmental system to be judged by abstract standards but by practical considerations its way of working, its results
(does it actually achieve order, unity, peace, good will?), the
caliber and character of the men in power. On all three counts
Burke strongly decried the French Revolution. Its leaders were
:

immoderate, turbulent, impractical, presumptuous.

After

had read over the

list

of persons and descriptions elected into

the Tiers tat, nothing which they afterwards did could appear astonishing

... of any practical experience in the state not one man was
The best were only men of theory. 20

to be found.

Its

methods

mob

violence,

impious, brutal, and shameful.

demagoguery,
Its results

arbitrariness

were no

less

were

heinous and

pernicious.

They

[the

men

of the Revolution! have found their punishment in their

Laws overturned; tribunals subverted; industry without vigor;

commerce expiring; the revenue unpaid, yet the people impoverished;

success.

18 ibid., p. 244.
19 Ibid., p. 359.

20 ibid., p. 284.

Burke XX.

[279

a church pillaged, and a state not relieved; civil and military anarchy
the constitution of the kingdom; everything human and divine

made

sacrificed to the idol of public credit,

consequence.

and national bankruptcy the

21

Again, theorizing

is futile

when

there

forms or taking a course of action.

commonwealth, or renovating

it,

question of instituting re-

is

"The

science of constructing a

or reforming

it,

sists

on expediency

as the guiding light

expediency he speaks of
sidered,

is

particular

is

not opportunism but what,

all

con-

best for the community and every member of it at a

moment. The best may consist of a limited solution, a

not be the best in an absolute sense, but hie et nunc

men and human

tion of the ideal

is

may
may be the

settle. It
it

men and politics deals

and human concerns the realizaalways conditioned by inexorable limitations

only sensible thing to do. In dealing with

with

every

22

Burke inand the

the
statesman;
of

compromise, a patient waiting for the dust to

deft

like

is,

other experimental science, not to be taught a priori."

actions

and imperfections. Surtout, pas trop de

zele.

The Procrustean

bed, mass production from a single mold, the conveyor belt, these

have no place

in politics.

tion to circumstances

sense of bounds, the science of adapta-

both

of these were

unknown

to the

French

Revolution.

THE EXAMPLE OF ENGLAND

Against the character and temper of the French Revolution,
Burke upheld the system, opinions, and dispositions prevalent in
England. A famous page embodies Burke's conservative creed:

We

are not the converts of Rousseau;

Voltaire; Helvetius has

made no

we

are not the disciples of

progress amongst us. Atheists are

not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers. We know that we
have made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be
made, in morality; nor many in the great principles of government,
nor in the ideas of liberty. ... In England we have not yet been completely

we

embowelled of our natural

entrails:

we

still

feel within us,

and

cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faith-

ful guardians, the active

all liberal

monitors of our duty, the true supporters of

and manly morals.

21 Ibid., p. 282.

We

have not been drawn and trussed

22 ibid., p. 311.

in

V. Modern Times

280]

we may be

order that

filled, like

stuffed birds in a

museum, with

chaff

paper about the rights of man.

We preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire, unsophisticated by pedantry and infidelity. We have real hearts of flesh
and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; we look up with awe

and

rags,

and

paltry, blurred shreds of

to kings, with affection to Parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with

reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility. 23

BURKE'S CONSERVATISM
Not a few who have
there

is

no inconsistency

studied
in the

Burke have

man who

justly pointed out that

so strongly denounced the

French Revolution but considered himself a child of the Revolution of 1688, defended the American Revolution, and supported
Irish claims for freedom of trade and religion. In all his battles
Burke persistently fought the same foes: arbitrary power and political imbecility. As already remarked, Burke was not averse to
positive and constructive change. He was against the French Revolution because it had no respect for the past, no religious sense, no
sense of history, no vision of reality. He could not justify a revolution that so violently attacked political traditions and institutions,
property, and religion, a revolution that tampered with the very
roots of national life and had for its aim not the reform of a government but the subversion of the order of Europe.
Burke deserves praise for his courageous stand against the
Jacobins' destructiveness, for his grasp of the real and sometimes
shallow meaning of their declarations, for his defense of the traditional principles of liberty, order, and justice, for injecting a note
of humility where others were extolling the superpower of reason.
It should be added, however, that Burke's antagonism to radical

him to another abstraction. He placed too much

emphasis on the consecration of the status quo, on prescription,

innovations led

on vested

He

admired the past and venerated the wisdom

and distrusting new political
ideas and ways. Here, perhaps, in his lack of faith in the future,
rights.

of antiquity to the point of fearing

lies his

inconsistency.

He had

now he minimized man's

credit that

lbid.,

exalted man's past conquests, and

conquer again. It was to Burke's

he saw in history the guiding hand of God's providence,
p. 345.

will to

Burke XX.

[281

but too often he used that hand to forestall events and changes

long overdue.

True, there was no moral justification for the

violence and cruelty of the Revolution of 1789, but neither

was

there any justification for the old, rotten, crumbling fabric based

on a

frivolous

and useless court, a privileged and

selfish nobility, a

corrupt and incompetent judiciary. Burke was touched by the

plight of a king and queen taken prisoners and sent to die, but

he did not notice the sorrow and tears of an oppressed nation.

How

different,

attitude

how much more

on the very

elastic

issues that

and wise was Tocqueville's

rigid and un-

found Burke so

compromising.
at

One could say that Burke's reaction served a healthy purpose

moment for Europe. It acted as a sobering force amid

a crucial

and the reckBut Burke's protest and condemnation should at least have been followed by an effort to understand
the causes that made the French Revolution almost inevitable and
by an attempt to make the best of it once it had occurred. Instead,
Burke merely presented to the French people the example of
England and invited them to follow the British political system.
This was, to say the least, naive and incongruous. It showed a
Burke incapable of understanding the real situation of continental
Europe, a Burke defeating his own doctrine, for the problems and
circumstances to which he wanted the statesman to pay careful
attention differed greatly in the two countries and called for
entirely different approaches and solutions.
the extravagant, inflamed passions of the reformers

lessness of their sympathizers.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
*

Burke, E. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Introduction by

O. Piest. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955.
Burke's Politics: Selected Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke.
Ed. by R. J. S. Hoffman. New York: Knopf, 1949.

Cobban, A. Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth

Century. New York: Macmillan, 1929.
Cone, C. B. Burke and the Nature of Politics. The Age of the
American Revolution. Lexington, Kentucky: University of
Kentucky Press, 1957.

V. Modern Times

282]

Parkin, C. The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought. Cambridge: University Press, 1956.

McGann,

J.

Thought,

Moorhouse,

A. C. "The

Political

Philosophy of

Edmund

Burke,"

(1930), 474-494.

F. X.

M. "Burke and

Liberty," Thought,

XVI

the Moral Basis of Political

(1941), 79-101.

chapter xxi

Bentham
LIFE

son and grandson

THE
London, February
Bentham was born
of

well-to-do

in

the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle terminated the

Succession.

He was

attorneys,

Jeremy

15, 1748, the year

War

of the Austrian

a precocious child, reading Latin at four and

French at six. In June 1760 he entered Queen's College at Oxford

and in 1766, when only eighteen, he obtained his master of arts
degree. But he disliked the school and, although an insatiable
student all his long life, he later labeled formal education a waste
of time.

The

uncertainty of the English legal system and the abuses so

common

in the administration of the English justice of the time

soon turned him from the practice of law as a career. Bentham
devoted himself instead to the study of the theory of law for the

purpose of providing a foundation for

scientific

jurisprudence and

legislation.

In 1776 he anonymously published his first book, Fragment

on Government, in which he strongly attacked the doctrines of a
former teacher, William Blackstone, the famed author of Commentaries on the Laws of England, a four-volume opus that appeared between 1765-1769. Bentham criticized the oracle of
English law for his undiluted eulogy of the British Constitution;

V. Modern Times

284]

endorsement of current ideas on the law of nature,

on sovereignty, on natural rights of the individual; and particularly
for his failure to propose any reform in the national legal system.
The Fragment served also to present the general lines of Bentham's
his uncritical

philosophic and political theory.

From August 1785

to

February 1788, Bentham traveled exand Turkey, and

tensively in Europe, sojourning in France, Italy,

spending about two years in Russia as the guest of his brother

who was then in the employ of Prince Potemkin. There

Samuel,

he wrote the controversial Defence of Usury, published in 1787.

Returning to England, Bentham tried to obtain a seat in parliament. Disappointed, he abandoned the idea of becoming active in
In 1789 he published Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, a lengthy and systematic presentation of
politics.

fundamental doctrines. "Yet the Principles are not a

his

on

treatise

utilitarianism but a separately published introduction to a penal

code; and their main concern

is

again with the science of law, this

time with special reference to punishment."

That same year the French Revolution evoked more than mild
enthusiasm from Bentham and he voiced his approval of the happenings in France in several articles in the Courrier de Provence,
a revolutionary paper founded by Mirabeau. In reality,

Bentham

could not stand the abstract "rights-of-man" theory and he put

little

stock in "equality" and "democracy"; but he praised the

destruction of the corrupt ancien regime and

in dictating the laws of the

National Assembly

new

made him

France.

On

hoped to have a part

August 23, 1792, the

a French citizen (with Priestley,

Paine, Washington, and a few others).

Bentham died

in

London

at the age of eighty-four

1832, the day before the Reform Bill became law.

married.

An

on June

He had

6,

never

indefatigable worker, he left nine large volumes of

published writings and 148 boxes of unpublished manuscripts.

Ten
to

years before death he had founded the Westminster Review,

which both James and John Stuart Mill contributed frequently.
True to the rationalistic mood of the time, Bentham took a

Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government and An Introduction

Morals and Legislation (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1948),
Introduction by W. Harrison, xxxiv. The entire Introduction is worth
1

to the Principles of

reading.

Bentham XXI.

[285

dim view of religion and in some of his books he criticized

severely on several scores. For him religion was an obstacle

it

to

ground" of which he found in

the data of experience and not in dogmatic statements. It was also
his opinion that religion was a divisive factor in the community,
intellectual progress, "the only safe

setting believers against unbelievers

and vice versa, and an

ally of

the "sinister interests of the earth."

man

of varied talent

and exceptional

activity,

Bentham

exerted a pervasive influence in the fields of legal thought and

legislative reform. Directly traceable to

him were such modifica-

tions as the mitigation of penal laws, the abolition of colonial

deportation, the revocation of laws against usury, the removal of

religious disabilities against Catholics,

liamentary representative system.

Of

and the reform of the parother changes, such as the

secret ballot, sanitary regulations, international

peace through the

establishment of an international court, laws for the protection of

he was both prophet and advocate. The

words "codification" and "international law" were coined by
Bentham.
One of Bentham's pet projects, devised in collaboration with
his brother Samuel, who had returned from Russia in 1791, was
the building of the panopticon. This new-type penitentiary was to
have all convicts employed in useful works; they were, moreover,
to be constantly and simultaneously under the panoptic (all-seeing) eye of the guard. The guard was to be seated in the center of
the structure, the inmates were to be in rows of cells radiating
from the center toward the points of the star-shaped edifice. After
children and animals,

almost a quarter of a century of negotiating with the English

government for the adoption of the project, it was rejected in

1811. Thus the panopticon affair ended in bitter disappointment.
Bentham was shocked by the realization that the people in power,
as he said later, "were against reform." He had always thought
"they only wanted to know what was good in order to embrace

The ensuing rancor as well as new influences conspired to

make him (until then a Tory sympathizer and humanitarian re-

it."

former) a radical of a

and were decisive factors in his deJames Mill (1773-1836), a school

called Benthamism. Further developed by John Stuart Mill (18061873), Alexander Bain (1818-1903), Henry Sidgwick (1838sort,

veloping, with the help of

V. Modern Times

286]
"the most potent force in

(1772-1823), the school proved

English reform" 3 for more than half a

1900), and David Ricardo

century.

ETHICAL THEORY
The central principle of Bentham's philosophy is the wellknown formula: "The greatest happiness of the greatest number
the measure of right and wrong." Neither the doctrine nor its
wording was original with Bentham. He admitted having met the
phrase in Priestley's Essay on the First Principles of Government
is

and Beccaria's Dei

delitti

writing, utilitarianism

was

English contemporaries
timistic

e delle pene.*

At

the time

Bentham was

most of his
embodying the empirical, op-

in substance the theory of

a theory

outlook of the English middle classes equally dissatisfied

with the conservatism of Burke and the radicalism of Paine and

Godwin. Yet Bentham, though not the originator of the idea, was
able to bring the abstract principle pointedly to bear on numerous
aspects of practical politics and particularly on the broad field of
law. It was he who found the way to apply the principle to countless issues of immediate interest.
2

David Ricardo, the son of a Dutch Jew who had settled in England,
Economy and Taxation, published
in 1817 at the insistence of his friend James Mill. It is in this book that
Ricardo states his rigid laws of rent, value, and wages, thus outlining, unis

the author of Principles of Political

wittingly perhaps, the case for class warfare.

3

Fragment on Government

Introduction,

xii.

In this book published in 1768, Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), Unitarian minister and scientist, says that "the good and happiness of the

members, that is of the majority of the members, of any state is the great
standard by which everything relating to that state must be finally determined." In the preface of his famous essay, published in 1764, Cesare
Beccaria (1737-1794) speaks of "the greatest happiness shared by the
greatest number." A sociologist and economist, Beccaria is one of the
major exponents of the Italian rationalistic movement. A believer in
Rousseau's contractual theory of the state, he held that the demands of
social justice must be reconciled as far as possible with the respect due
each man's personality. From this, the general principle of his famous
treatise, Beccaria draws an enlightened program of penal methods. Francis
Hutcheson (1694-1746) had already stated the utilitarian principle as
early as 1725 with much the same wording in Enquiry concerning Moral
Good and Evil (III, 8): "That action is best which secures the greatest
happiness of the greatest number."

Bentham XXI.

[287

In what specifically does Bentham's theory consist?

swered

this

He

an-

question in the opening sentences of Introduction to

and

the Principles of Morals

Legislation:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign

masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them to point out what we ought
to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the
standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we say, in
all we think; every effort we make to throw off our subjection, will
The principle of utility
serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.
recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that
system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the
.

hands of reason and of law. 5

Bentham

further explained the principle of utility, or

what hep

later termed the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" prin-l

"which approves or disapproves of every action what/

soever according to the tendency which it appears to have to aug>
ment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is ii
question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote
or to oppose that happiness." 6 Good, then, is that which is usefi

ciple, as that

il

to us; evil, that

which

pleasurable; that

harmful. In turn, that

harmful, which

is

Bentham

it

society,

naturally

is

is

and

first

of

is

inclined to

all

useful

which

;s

painful. In other words, for

man, taken

self-evident that

is

is

either

alone or in

do what brings him

more
him unhappiness,
More important, Bentham went on to make this

happiness, that

is,

pleasure or absence of pain, or, at least,

pleasure than pain; and to avoid whatever causes

that

is,

pain.

and only this principle, man's and society's standard of

and wrong. The revealed word of God or God's law imprinted in man's conscience or even speculative reasoning as means
of providing man with a uniform and universal standard of morality, he summarily dismissed. It was according to his principle that
any given action, whether private or public, was to be evaluated.
This is done through what he calls the calculus of pleasure: a
summing up of the pleasures and pains involved in each instance
and a balancing of the one against the other. If a particular action,
thus hedonistically and mechanically tested, appears likely to cause
principle,

right

A Fragment

on Government

*lbid., p. 126.

p. 125.

V. Modern Times

288]

to be avoided: it is "unjust," "immoral," "wrong,"

on the contrary, it is likely to bring pleasure, it may be
done: it is "just," "moral," "right." It follows that virtue is a good
to be pursued only in view of the pleasures that attend it; vice, an
evil to be avoided because it inflicts pain. Moral good exists only
because of its capacity to give physical pleasure; moral evil bepain,

it

is

"evil." If,

it produces physical pain.

While Bentham seems to refer the term "physical" pleasures
and pains to the delights and sorrows of both the soul and the
senses, he nevertheless maintains that pleasures (or pains) differ

cause

only quantitatively. In reality, there

is

a qualitative difference be-

tween various kinds of pleasures that makes

it

impossible either to

compare them or to evaluate them mathematically. How does one

compare the pleasures of listening to good music and eating a good
dinner, or the pleasures of climbing a mountain and playing a
of chance? Here, as in his entire ethical system, Bentham
shows a marked degree of naivete. His empiricism made him take
a rather superficial view of the moral problem, and led him to
ignore the complex constitution and manifold implications of
man's nature. At times, pleasure is evil, pain is good. What one
feels he ought to do is often painful and contrasts directly with
what he would like to do or what he actually does. Problems are
never solved by denying they exist.
To the principle of utility Bentham adds the principle of
benevolence or good will a natural, universal tendency in men
to seek their own happiness in the happiness of others. While the
first law of nature urges man to pursue his own happiness, prudence and good will advise that self-love and individual happiness
can (and should, as a rule) coincide with communal good, that is,
with the happiness of the greatest number. The reason is that in
most cases individual interests are bound up with general interests,

game

for the latter are but the

sum

of individual interests;

in striving for the greatest happiness of the greatest

7
ficial.

litical,

therefore,

number

the

This individualistic concept of the common good is rather superThe common good, the purpose of every society including the po-

something more than the mere sum of private goods. It is of

it must be carefully noted against most of the collecthe welfare of the whole group must per se result in the good of
is

another order. Yet,

tivists,

the persons within the group.

Bentham XXI.
individual
is

is

working out

[289
his

own. The happiness of the individual

always included in the happiness of the greatest number.

Bentham's enlightened self-interest, dress it as he might,

is

but a rationalized selfishness. He refuses to acknowledge the existence of true disinterestedness or, to say the least, he considerably
lowers

good

its

character. Persons

who

contributed to the

for purposes transcending their

pleasures never

came within

own

communal
and

interests

selfish

his experience or, perhaps, his

un-

derstanding.

POLITICAL THEORY
Bentham's

political

theory

an application of

is

ethical

his

The same

doctrine to social issues and political questions.

utility

becomes the magic touchgovernment; it becomes

and
analyzing
the
nature
of
state
for
stone
action
and obligation, the
the infallible test for judging political
end of law, and political economy.

that solves for

him

the moral problem

THE STATE
For Bentham the state is a group of men, part of
accustomed to pay obedience to other members.

When

number of persons (whom we may

whom

style subjects)

are

are sup-

posed to be in the habit of paying obedience to a person, or an assemblage of persons, of a known and certain description (whom we
call governor or governors) such persons altogether (subjects and governors) are said to be in a state of political society. 8

Natural society, on the contrary,

such habitual obedience

is

a group of

is

men

in

which no

paid other men.

Why did men begin and why do they continue to obey the
government? Bentham rejects the social contract theory both as
an explanation of the origin of the state and as the foundation of
Not because they or their fathers agreed to it
do men obey the laws of the state. Nor are the origin of the state
and the duty of obedience to be referred to some natural law or

political obligation.

Fragment on Government

p. 38.

V. Modern Times

290]

some eternal reason. States were established and state laws are
of
obeyed because of their usefulneslTtoln^^
men to obey. That is why they obey. "The probable mischiefs of

to

obedience are

less

than the probable mischiefs of resistance."

LAWS AND LEGISLATION

What

are laws?

They

form of a

are expressions of a will in the

expressions are only those formulated by one

command. Such

man

or several men. For particular men, not man in general or human

reason or nature, can be said to have a will. Even God is out of
the picture in Bentham's field of legislation. Of course, God's will
would be law if it were clearly expressed in the form of a command; but Bentham feels that there is no way to know (at least,
to know with certainty) the will of God. In political society, then,
law is the command of the sovereign habitually obeyed by the
members. The political superior in a political society actually
functioning, whether one man or a body, possesses unlimited political

power. Legally speaking, the governor or sovereign has

neither limitations nor duties, he has only rights.

the other hand, has

no

The

subject,

on

legal right to disobedience, resistance, or

He has only a legal (or political) duty to obey the supreme

power unconditionally. But the power of the sovereign is limited
on another level. The limitation stems from the necessity of havrevolt.

ing the people actually acquiesce in the legislation

indeed

made

to

be obeyed. There

is

lar dissatisfaction, of general resistance,

The

for laws are

always the possibility of popu-

and of eventual

unchecked, his power

rebellion.

and unhe runs the risk of being unseated should obedience

seem to a sufficient number of subjects less useful or more harmful than disobedience and revolt.
legislator rules

is

indefinite

limited; yet,

To

help subjects to obey: not only to

make laws

that they

must obey out of political duty but to appeal to their good will
so that they may obey freely out of moral duty, realizing that the
rules enforced tend to their greatest happiness

task of the legislator or sovereign body.

direction

Bentham

suggests a

As

this is the difficult

a weighty step in this

form of government

in

which the

interests of the subjects coincide with the interests of the gov-

*Ibid

p. 55.

Bentham XXI.

[291

Then laws will be dictated by a serious concern for what

end of every human action the promotion of the greatest
happiness of the greatest number. The danger of disobedience will
ernors.
is

the

greatly diminish.

In addition, Bentham warmly recommends education for all,

at least to some degree. Useful learning (chrestomatia) helps man
form a right judgment about what is truly conducive to happiness.

Moreover, knowledge enables

out of

man

to get

more,

if

not the most,

life.

Bentham's

interest in

law expressed

itself in

a constant effort

Most of his writings

laws or proposals for new laws. He was

to vitalize his principles in legislative reform.

are a criticism of existing

first

of

all

against the chaotic condition of law in England.

wanted the law

codified, that

is,

clearly expressed in terse

He
and

simple statements, understandable to even the plainest citizens.

He

make the law

and he suggested this be done
through a system of general education and the distribution, posconsidered

known

to all

it

a primary duty of the state to

who were bound

to

it

sibly gratuitous, of copies of the law.

GOVERNMENT
One

notes a close connection between Bentham's theory of

legislation

and

his theory of

philosophers for

seems to have

whom

first

government. Unlike most

the former follows the latter,

political

Bentham

a theory of lawmaking to which he suits his

doctrine of government. "His primary concern

psychology nor ethics, nor was

it

with

was with neither

'political theory,'

but with

by means of a science of law." 10 Because laws are made to be obeyed and, as a rule, they are freely
obeyed when they promote the general utility, the interests of the
governors and of the governed must become identical. Only thus
is the conflict between the good of the sovereign and the good of
the subjects likely to be averted. Bentham shows how the English
form of government (a representative government) should be
made to function properly. Far from satisfied with the "matchless
constitution," so highly praised by so many since Montesquieu's
first panegyric in 1748, he suggested numerous and drastic re-

the reform of existing laws

10 Ibid., Introduction, xviii.

V. Modern Times

292]

forms such as universal manhood suffrage, with ability to read as

the sole requisite; u annual parliaments; vote by ballot; equalization of electoral districts. Dissatisfied with the two-chamber sys-

tem and contemptuous of the House of Lords, he proposed a

single legislative chamber composed exclusively of representatives duly and annually elected by the people. Even the monarchy
fell under his criticism and he spoke feelingly for a republic. For
Bentham these were all logical steps in the right direction: promoting and securing the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
Given a monarchy, he reasoned, and the King's interest alone is supreme; given a limited monarchy, and the interest of a privileged
class, as well as that of the sovereign, comes in; it is only when
democracy rules that the interests of the governors and the governed
become identical, for the greatest happiness of the greatest number
12
is thus the supreme end in view.

POLITICAL ECONOMY
Bentham's

political

economy

main

follows the

lines traced so

Wealth of Nations. 13 On only one

did
the
disciple
dissent
from the master and then merely
occasion
to insist on applying principles from which Smith had momen-

forcefully

by

Adam

Smith in

his

11 As to woman suffrage, for which only an insignificant number

clamored at the time, Bentham, evading the question, said simply that it
would be decided when there was a truly popular demand.
12 W. L. Davidson, Political Thought in England, the Utilitarians
from Bentham to Mill (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 50.
13 The new "science of political economy," originated in France by a
group of thinkers known as Physiocrats (from the word physiocracy, meaning "the rule of nature" and referring to the physical constitution and
pertinent laws given by God to the universe), found its classical expression
in Adam Smith (1723-1790). His most important works are Theory of
Moral Sentiments (1759) and The Wealth of Nations (1776). He believed
that the government which governs least governs best, that economic prosperity is assured if the individual is left alone to pursue his own interest,
for, by seeking it, one promotes the welfare of all. The "invisible hand"
of God's providence will take care of this, for divine providence, which

"has endowed
it

that

no

man

with a desire to better his

conflict arises

Smith therefore

between individual

asserts that every

own

condition," will see to

and social welfare.

man, provided he does not violate the
self-interest

rules of justice, should be left "perfectly free to pursue his

his

own way, and

to bring both his industry

and

own

interest

capital into competition

Bentham XXI.

[293

tarily departed. This was in his Defence of Usury (1787) when

Bentham accused Smith of inconsistency for supporting the laws
against usury. In this booklet Bentham did not defend the usurer
or usury as such. He condemns government legislation against the
lending and borrowing of money at high interest, arguing that
such interference is more detrimental than advantageous to the

common
As

utility.

a rule, then,

Bentham was a vigorous defender

of unrez-

stricted property rights, free trade, the doctrine of non-interfer-

ence on the part of the government with the law of supply and
demand, and, broadly speaking, with the individual in all his dealings with his fellow citizens.

He was

in the

main

for unlimited

freedom of competition as responsible for both the best products

and the lowest prices. The fact that through free competition the
more energetic and talented were able to prevail over others less
gifted and enterprising was also, for Bentham, a reason for adl
vocating it. In this vein he wrote in his Manual of Political Economy (1798): "The request which agriculture, manufacturers and
commerce present to governments, is modest and reasonable as

which Diogenes made to Alexander: Stand out of my sun14

In other passages ("laissez-nous faire," "all government
is in itself one vast evil"), Bentham expresses the same principle.
Yet this "let alone" or "be quiet" doctrine, as well as his repeated
relegation of government to police duty (to preserve order,
guarantee property rights, prevent men from murdering one another), must be taken with a grain of salt. Empirical philosophers
such asTSentham would be surprised and shocked at being taken
that

shine."

with those of any other man, or order of men."

The

historical influence of

Smith has been tremendous. With him, according to Harold Laski, "the

maxims of

practical

Max

business enterprise achieved the status of a theology."

new

and a new
have emphasized the fact
that Smith was essentially for individual economic enterprise and would
have repudiated the "big business" perversion of property as well as any
kind of monopoly. "Perhaps. But this much is true, and tragically so, that
According to

Lerner, "he gave a

dignity to greed

sanctification to the predatory impulses." Others

history

(with infallibly perfect logic, of course)

has used his classical

greed as a sanctimonious camouflage for ghastly
economic oppression and tyranny." (George C. Higgins, "Adam Smith:

rationalization of

human

The Wealth of Nations," The Great Books, Vol. I, pp. 98-103.)

14 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. by Bowring (Edinburgh:
1839),
Vol.

m,

Part IX, p. 35.

V. Modern Times

294]
literally.

The

laissez -faire principle is too closely

not to-be disc ardedshould__the latter

imperative in some particular instanc e.
to-^emerrlbeirtEat the individualism of

bound

to utility

ma ke

government action

It is

therefore important

Bentham and Benthamism

do n ot coincide with an absolute opposition to governmental

in-

terference.

The general tendency was

in that direction; and in purely economical

any exception was admitted to the rule. Men are
the best judges, it was said, of their own interest; and the interference
of rulers in a commercial transaction is the interference of people inferior in knowledge of the facts, and whose interests are "sinister" or

questions, scarcely

inconsistent with those of the persons really concerned. Utility, there-

government: but, as utility is

be cases in which it does
not coincide with the "let alone" principle, we must always admit the
possibility that in special cases government can interfere usefully, and,
in that case, approve the interference. 15
fore, will, as a rule, forbid the action of

always the ultimate principle, and there

may

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bentham,

J.

Fragment on Government and An Introduction to

Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Blackwell,

the Principles of

1948.
*

An
New
.

tion.

Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legisla-

York: Hafner, 1948.

Atkinson, C. M. Jeremy Bentham. London: Methuen, 1905.

Baumgardt, D. Bentham and the Ethics of Today. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1952.

Bedoyere, M. de la. "John Locke and Jeremy Bentham," Thought,

IX (1934), 236-248.
Neill, T. P. Makers of the Modern Mind. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1949.
Keeton, G. W., and G. Schwarzenberger (eds.). Jeremy Bentham
and the Law. London: Stevens, 1948.
Wallas, G. "Jeremy Bentham," Political

XXXVIII

15 Leslie Stephen,

Co., 1900), Vol.

Science

Quarterly,

(1923), 45-56.

I,

The English

p. 310.

Utilitarians

(London: Duckworth and

chapter xxii

Hegel

LIFE

GEORG

WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

was born in
on August 27, 1770, the son of a minor official of
the Duchy of Wiirttemberg. He received his elementary and
secondary schooling in his native town and, at the age of eighteen,
enrolled in the University of Tubingen to study theology. There,
Stuttgart

at the Protestant seminary, he shared a room with Schelling.

Another fellow student was the young poet Holderlin.
After he received his degree in theology in 1793, Hegel became a tutor in a private family first in Bern, and then in Frankfurt where he remained until 1800. All these years he devoted
himself to an intensive study of philosophy, economics, and politics, and wrote several books
among them a rationalistic Life

of Jesus.

Toward
him

to join

the end of 1800, Hegel accepted Schelling's invitation

as a lecturer at the University of Jena, then

portant center of Romantic culture.

The courses he gave

an im-

there to

a handful of students were logic, metaphysics, history of philos-

At Jena, Hegel wrote On the Difference between Fichte and Schelling and collaborated with Schelling
ophy, and pure mathematics.

in the publication of the Critical Journal of Philosophy.

But his
most important work in that period was Phenomenology of Spirit

V. Modern Times

296]
published in 1807.

marks the break with

It

own

and lays the foundation for his

Schelling's philosophy

system.

The Jena sojourn

came to a close with the famous Napoleonic victory there.

In 1807 Hegel went to

Bamberg

Bavaria to edit a daily

in

paper and shortly afterward (1808) he moved to Nuremberg to

head the Aegidien-gymnasium. In 1811 he married Marie von
Tucher, twenty-two years his junior. They had two children. In
Nuremberg he wrote Science of Logic, his central and most sig-

work.

nificant

In 1816 Hegel accepted a professorship at the University of

Heidelberg.
left

Two

years later he

for Berlin to

left

vacant by Fichte. Hegel taught in the

maining thirteen years of

his

German

recognized leader of

He became

life.

occupy the chair

German

capital the re-

a national figure, the

philosophic thought. In 1821 he

published The Philosophy of Right, and in 1830 was appointed

were interrupted by occasional

rector of the University. His courses

to the Baltic States (1822), Austria (1824), and France

trips:

On November

he died of cholera. Hegel was

of his books, Philosophy of
History, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, were published posthumously by his disciples.
(1827).

14, 1831,

Some

buried in Berlin near Fichte.

GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
Hegel's

an

is

center; the idea

it

is

is

the

By

the absolute.

means reason,

Not only is the idea its

For Hegel thought is all;

idealistic philosophy.

sum

of

all reality.

the terms idea, thought, absolute, Hegel

both the essence and the norm of one's

thought (a subjective faculty) and the essence and the law of the
that

is,

evolution of things (an objective reality).

thought and unconscious nature

which things move

Reason

is

is

What

human

directs

reason, and the goal toward

is

also reason, but self-conscious reason.

the sovereign of the world.

Reason ...

is

substance,

power; its own infinite material underlying all the

natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the infinite form
that which sets this material in motion. On the one hand, reason is
as well as infinite

the substance of the universe;

reality
finite

has

its

viz.,

that

by which and

On

the other hand,

being and subsistence.

energy of the universe. ...

their entire essence

and

truth. It

It is

is its

in

which

all

the

in-

it is

the infinite complex of things,

own

material which

it

commits

Hegel XXII.
to

own

its

own

Active Energy to work up.

and absolute

basis of existence,

power

ing

[297
.

realizing this aim; developing

it

While

aim,

final

exclusively

is

it

is

it

not only in the

of the Natural, but also of the Spiritual Universe

its

also the energiz-

phenomena

the History of the

World.*

Thus, in Hegel's philosophy, nature and

same absolute

of the

principle

are determinations

spirit

reason. Likewise, for

him being

and thought are synonymous.

This explains the other important characteristic of Hegel's
philosophy:

dynamism. The idea or reason

its

an

active infinite,

stantly developing.

quest of
that

is,

its

not

is

The

an

static. It is

infinite evolution. It is constantly

moving, con-

various phases of the process of the idea in

perfect realization are not to be considered a result,

a product differing from the source or cause from which

The idea does not remain outside them. It is wholly

They are successive modes of the idea. They are the idea.

they derive.
in them.

In other words, the very process of the idea

ing

itself,

unfolding

itself as it

indifferent source of reality,

is

immanent

actual

is

in

it.

is

the idea determin-

were. Hegel's absolute

is

not an

producing and yet transcending

Hence: "What

is

rational

is

actual

it.

It

and what

is

rational." 2

In Christian philosophy

God

is

the cause of

all

that exists.

He

and everyone as source and preserver. Yet God is

above all, distinct from all, a transcendent being, whom human
reason will never know perfectly. Hegel's god is an absolute, immanent in reality, not at all distinct from it, perfectly knowable.
In this sense, it has been correctly noted, Hegel's philosophy is
most atheistic.
The logical or dialectic development of Hegel's idea, its process
is

in everything

of metaphysical development, has three stages:

itself,

the pure idea perceived through the

thought (that
itself,

in

its

ness (that

is

is

being in

itself);

first,

the idea in-

medium

of absolute

secondly, the idea outside-of-

external realization, the idea passed over into other-

nature); thirdly, the idea

for-itself,

the idea that has

come back to itself, the idea arrived at the consciousness of itself

(that is mind or spirit). Each of these triadic determinations is
1 The Philosophy
of History (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica
Great Books, 1952), Vol. XLVI, p. 157.
2 The Philosophy of Right (Chicago: Encyclopaedia
Britannica Great
Books, 1952), Vol. XLVI, p. 6 (Preface).

V. Modern Times

298]

divided into three secondary determinations; these are subdivided

into three others,

and so on.

The movement

of the idea

spiralwise.

is

The

idea develops

through an endless, dramatic, almost tragic tension. Reason becomes self-cognizant by affirming itself (thesis), negating itself
(antithesis),

and reaffirming

itself

(synthesis).

reconciliation of opposites. Reintegration

Then

integration, life through death.

peated again and again in

new

is

The

full truth is

reached through

the identical process

is

dis-

re-

forms: the contradiction reappears

and is resolved in a new unity or synthesis, only to be confronted

by a new negation and so on, until the absolute is reached. In this
way Hegel repudiates the traditional principle of contradiction and
comes close to the Sophists' manner of reasoning while at the
same time steering clear of their skepticism and despair.
Hegel's philosophy includes three sciences:
science of the idea in
stract

itself,

the science of the pure idea in

science that coincides with metaphysics.

externalized in nature,

chemical process,
is

spirit,

its

ab-

elements, the morphology and physiology of thought, a

nature, the science of the idea out of

form

Logic, the

(1)

the

first

The philosophy of

the science of the idea

in the inorganic world, then in the

finally in the

human

(2)

itself,

organic world whose perfect animal

organism.

(3)

The philosophy

of

mind or

the science of full consciousness and freedom, the science

Here the idea passes through three

mind (the individual), objective mind
mind (mind subject only to mind) expressing

of the idea returned to

distinct forms:

itself.

subjective

(society), absolute

itself in art, religion,

and

science.

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

grasp of Hegel's general philosophy is necessary for an

understanding of his political doctrine. One must grasp too Hegel's
concept of freedom. For him, freedom means ability to overcome
finiteness, to burst the

He

bonds and break out of the limitations of

who rises superior over all irrational

requirements and unjust restrictions without and within. Lest these
impressive words be misleading, it must be added that Hegel's
any

exteriority.

is

free

freedom, as far as the individual

nition

is

concerned, consists in a recog-

and acceptance of the course of

necessity.

One

is

free

when

Hegel XXII.

[299

he grasps the ineluctable and triumphant law of history and

consciously and willingly falls in step with it. One's personality
may be pitilessly crushed in the process; yet he is free for he

knows why and how

Now

this occurs.

Hegel sees history (also

political history)

as a process

toward the attainment of this rational freedom. In the progress

toward final deliverance mankind passes through several phases
(family, tribe, lower forms of political groupings), gradually freeing itself of the many bondages by which it is held in slavery.
These bondages are man's own beliefs at a given epoch, man's

own reason, man's imperfectly dehuman capabilities. The final liberation from bondage
come when man, or rather the divine spirit moving within

temporary embodiments of his

veloped
will

him, reaches the perfection of social existence or, in Hegel's term-

when

inology,

the subjective

mind has given place completely

to

the objective mind.

THE STATE AND

The

EVOLUTION

ITS

highest form of social existence

great respect for the family

manent

and for

institutions. But, while

the state rests,

it is

tion of society

is

it is

is

the state. Hegel has

Both are peron the family that

civil society.

particularly

only with the state that the perfect organiza-

attained.

community concerns

itself

The family

is

an individual; the

civil

with the protection of individual in-

is

the

embodiment of the

lives for the ethical idea,

it is

not interested in individuals as such.

terests;

but the state

Individuals as individuals cease to exist.

ethical idea,

They and

it

their private

interests are expendable.

Evolving through a series of

litical

organization reaches

its

less

adequate forms, the po-

highest development with the na-

a state incorporating a homogeneous people, welded

by a common language, a common religion, a common
history, by customs, traditions, and ideas. Hegel sees this evolution marked by four major phases: the despotic potentate of the
tional state

together

East, the small city-state of the Greeks, the world empire of the

Romans,

the

German

The East knew

world, that some

nation.

only that one

are free; the

is

free; the

Greek and Roman

German world knows

that

all

are free.

V. Modern Times

300]
The

political

first

form therefore which we observe

in History,

is

mon-

despotism, the second democracy and aristocracy, the third

archy. 3

The

phase represents the childhood of history; the second,

first

manhood; the fourth, old age, that is, perand strength of spirit, "in which the Spirit returns to

adolescence; the third,

fect maturity

unity to
the

itself,

German

but in

its fully

developed character as

nations even the conflict between

Spirit." 4

Church and

In

state

has vanished.

The

no longer occupies a position of real inferiority to the

is no longer subordinate to it. The latter asserts no prerogative, and the spiritual is no longer an element foreign to the state.
Freedom has found the means of realizing its ideal its true existstate

church, and

ence. 5

march of God
in the world,"
"the divine idea as it exists on earth," 7 "the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in

Hence Hegel's glowing

definition of the state: "the

an objective form."

THE STATE FIRST AND FOREMOST

It is

evident that in Hegel's system there

is

no place for a con-

tractual, utilitarian, individualistic, liberal theory of the state.

for a Christian concept of politics. His evolutionary view

the state not a conscious creation of

man

Nor

makes

but the result or rather

the last link in a chain of progressive developments. It

is

an organ-

view according to which the state is an organic

whole, a living being, an end in itself, existing for its own sake.
"All worth which the human being possesses, all spiritual reality,
he possesses only through the state." 9 The glorification of the
ismic, totalitarian

becomes the supreme imperative for all, under penalty of

from the source of life. The state is the tree, the
citizens are the branches. Consequently, the state "has supreme
right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a memstate

their being cut off

Philosophy of History,

p. 203.

*Ibid., p. 205.
6

Philosophy of Right,

8 Ibid., p.

174.

5 ibid., p.

p.

141.

206.

Philosophy of History, p. 171.

9 Ibid., p.

171.

Hegel XXII.
ber of the state."

must

10

[301

And

to be a

good

vital

obey the dictates of the

faithfully

member

the individual

state; for the state

and

its

embody universal reason. Obedience to the will of the state

the only way for man to be true to his rational self. Moreover,

laws
is

the citizen must be willing to sacrifice himself for the state: "Sacrifice for

the sake of the individuality of the state

is

the substantive

and is, thus, a universal duty." n

High above individual and family, Hegel's state is also superior
natural law and morality. A moral law, fixed, timeless, univer-

relation of all the citizens,

to

invariably valid, does not exist. The principle that ultimately

man's actions must be guided by his conscience is incompatible
with the principle of progress. It would mean confusion and fossilisal,

would

by anchoring it forever in intermediate harbors. Individual rights and duties are transcended by
social ethics, that is, by a code of morality issuing from the customs, usages, and traditions of the community to which one happens to belong. Moral ideas grow along with the ethical standard
of the social group of which one is a member. At the highest level
of social organization, true morality is expressed in and through
the laws of the state. For Hegel there is nothing higher or holier
than what the state declares moral and right.
One would expect Hegel's constant preoccupation with the
"universal," the "whole," the "totality," the "World Spirit" to
lead him to plead for a world state and for the single state's sub-

zation. It

ordination to

arrest civilization

it.

This

is

not the case. Hegel's World Spirit can

never be embodied in a world

state. For him the national state is

supreme community. One national state against another: this

the
it is

that

makes

universal idea.

possible the ever

world

more

state or

perfect actualization of the

even a world league of

states

would be an absurdity. It would eliminate the dialectics of history.

It would destroy the very medium through which reason unfolds
its

various phases in time.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN STATES

Hegel's assertion that history

is

an incessant struggle between

but a corollary of his general doctrine. "In the history of

the world, the individuals we have to do with are peoples; total-

states is

10

Philosophy of Right,

" Ibid.,

p. 107.

p. 80.

V. Modern Times

302]
12
that are states."

ities

Not

the single individuals but the nations

are the primary instruments and major embodiments of the World

Spirit in its process of auto-revelation. Hegel is fascinated by the

great conquerors and statesmen. Alexander the Great, Caesar,

Charlemagne, Napoleon stand before him in solitary splendor. He

regards

them with awe, reverence, and admiration. He defends

these world figures despite their peculiarities as private persons. 13

even possible that such men may treat other great, even sacred
conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral
reprehension. But so mighty a form must trample down many an
innocent flower, crush to pieces many an object in its path. 14

It is

interests, inconsiderately;

Yet, even the great appear on the stage of history as mere agents
of necessity to

fulfill

their function of leaders of this or that nation

and then disappear the very instant their mission has been accomplished. The states remain the true protagonists of history.
Particularly the victorious, conquering states. Each of them comes
closer to the ideal state than the defeated.

Each

represents at a

given epoch a more perfect incarnation of the universal mind or

reason only to be, in turn, overcome by another

actualization of the

sion

same mind. Each

by the absolute

as

its

Assyrians, the Greeks, the

is

privileged organ

Romans,

state,

still

higher

the one chosen in succesthe Egyptians, the

the French, the Germans.

Through them, the conquerors, civilization constantly forges ahead;

through them God judges the imperfect, one-sided principles embodied in the vanquished. History, the development of the idea of
freedom, with all the changing scenes that its annals present, is
indeed a sacred history, "the true Theodicaea, the justification of

God,"

15

Most

"the world's court of judgment."

16

of the time, then, the Hegelian absolute marches with

the big battalions; and since the victorious army or nation is always and necessarily its most perfect realization at that particular
moment, one would conclude that for Hegel might is right. Hegel
12

Philosophy of History, p. 159.

'No man is a hero to his valet-de-chambre? is a well-known
proverb; I have added and Goethe repeated it ten years later 'but not
because the former is no hero, but because the latter is a valet.'" (Ibid.,
p. 167.) See also pages dedicated to great men in general (ibid., pp. 16613 "

68), and to Alexander the Great in particular (ibid., pp. 281, 282).
14 Ibid., p. 168.
is ibid., p. 369.
!6 Philosophy of Right, p. 110.

Hegel XXII.

[303

would say rather that right is right and might only a medium
through which right affirms and vindicates itself. Be that as it may,
Hegel has no qualms about war. It is necessary for the betterment
of mankind. Perpetual peace is neither possible nor desirable.
Through war "the ethical health of peoples is preserved" 17 and
nations escape corruption "just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea

from the foulness which would be the

prolonged calm."

result of a

18

GOVERNMENT
Hegel

is

for

an authoritarian government.

the democratic belief that government receives

the consent of the governed nor

is

He
its

does not share

just

powers from

he for the division and separa-

powers as advocated by Montesquieu.

According to Hegel, "those who know ought to govern." 19
Competent knowledge, experience, and a morally regulated will
are the only qualities that obtain an individual a share in the government. As to sovereignty, it exists in the person of the ruler.
Governmental power is divided into the legislative, executive, and
monarchic branches. The legislative, "the power to determine and

tion of

establish the universal," 20

composed
consisting

is

to

be divided into an upper house

exclusively of great landowners

of

representatives

and into a lower house

each main branch of society

of

and manufacturers "representatives who are

thoroughly conversant with it and who themselves belong to it." 21
Laws should be few and general in character, for they must state
only universal principles and leave application and details to the
executive. The executive, "the power to subsume single cases and
the spheres of particularity under the universal," 22 is to include
the judiciary. Moreover, the members of the executive, the ministers of state, must be members ex officio of the legislative assembly
with the right to speak and vote. The monarchic organ, "the will
with the power of ultimate decision," 23 is the most important of
such as traders

the three.

It

harmonizes the particular elements contained in the

17 Ibid., p. 107.
19 Philosophy

i* Ibid.

21 Ibid.,
p. 103.
23 Ibid.

M Ibid.,

of History, p. 368.
20 Philosophy
of Right, p. 90.
p. 90.

V. Modern Times

304]

other two organs, presides over their work, and shares in their
functions. It transcends them,
thesis, it

it

reduces them to unity.

gives them the necessary synThe monarch, to be sure, must

be an actual person, one individual. He

basis of the whole," 24 he is the leader:

is

at

once "the apex and

"It is only as a person,

the monarch, that the personality of the state

achieves

true

its

mode

is

actual"

25

and

of existence.

It is true that in his political

system, formulated in the years

between Napoleon's defeat and death, Hegel bowed to public

opinion and did not stress absolute monarchy. In fact, he spoke in
favor of limited or constitutional monarchy. But an attentive reading reveals a

marked sympathy

for absolute

monarchy

if

not for

dictatorship.

PANTHEISM, RATIONALISM, MONISM

A
litical

general criticism of Hegel's philosophy, including his podoctrine, calls for three central remarks.

First of

all,

God

is

no longer

He who

is.

He

is

merely the ex-

The elements to which He gives life are not

from Him. God is not transcendent but immanent.

pression of a totality.
distinguished

He

is

not the Creator.

He

is

one with the

reality

with which

He

is

confused.

Secondly, Hegel extols to absurd heights the power of man's

reason; and logically to follow out his

wrong premise he has

to

deny the existence of everything man's reason is unable fully to

comprehend and explain, the problem of evil, for example. But his
denial or suppression of certain major aspects of life and history
merely emphasizes the insufficiency of reason. The "rational" is
all the "real." The "rational" is not always the norm of reality.
One of Hegel's fundamental errors is simply this: he so confused
human reason with absolute reason (divine reason) that he found

not

it

impossible not only to grasp but even to admit the existence of

anything in reality outside the limited pale of man's

Thirdly, Hegel denies that

man

intellect.

and autonomous. For

him the individual does not enjoy a personal dignity and sufficiency, an independent, concrete, spiritual life of his own. He is not
sui iuris. The only way for him to live a worthy life is to submerge
24 ibid.
25 ibid., p. 93.

is

free

Hegel XXII.

[305

himself into the state and lose himself in

philosophy, the state

is

it.

According to Christian

but an element integrating the person of

man. In Hegel's philosophy, the state is the true inand the sacred prerogatives of man's
personality are transferred to it. More, the state acquires rights
and privileges the human person has never possessed, belonging as
they do exclusively to God. The Hegelian state is the very fountain
of all authority. It claims not only legal but moral sovereignty as
well, that is, the power to declare infallibly what is right and what
individual

dividual, the true person,

wrong. Hegel's concept of the

is

Religion

itself is

state is

approved only when

pure "statolatry."
it

merges completely into

the state. Hence, Hegel's violent opposition to Catholicism for "in

Church ... it is nothing singular for the conscience

be found in opposition to the laws of the state," 26 and his
preference for Protestantism, wherein, he claims, the religious
the Catholic
to

conscience

is

neither separate

from nor antagonistic

to secular law.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hegel, G. W. F. The Philosophy of History and The Philosophy of
Right. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (Great Books,

Vol.

XLVI), 1952.

Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Trans, by J.

by C. J. Friedrich. New York: Dover Pub-

Sibree. Introduction
lications,

1956.
*

Findlay,

J.

N. Hegel:

Re-examination.

New

York: Macmillan,

1958.

Foster, M. B. The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1935.
Marcuse, H. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social
Theory. 2nd ed. New York: Humanities Press, 1954.
26 Philosophy of History, p. 353.

chapter xxiii

Tocqueville

LIFE

CHARLES HENRI MAURICE CLEREL DE TOCQUEVILLE was born in Verneiiil, near Paris, on July 29,

A LEXIS

ii

1805. His father, Count de Tocqueville of an old aristocratic

Norman

was prefect of the departement of Seine-et-Oise.

After completing his studies in law, Alexis became a judge at the
tribunal of Versailles. He was at this post when the Revolution of
1830 broke out, bringing the Bourbon monarchy to an abrupt
end. Expecting little from the new regime of the Orleans and tired
of his career in the French magistracy, he sought an opportunity
to visit the United States. Since 1789 France had known a series
of harrowing experiences and searched in vain for firm ground
whereon to start social and political life anew. In America things
seemed to have proceeded otherwise. There was something worth
seeing and studying and appraising in a country where the democratic revolution had been accomplished in an orderly manner.
At this time France was displaying much interest in the question of prison reform. Tocqueville and a friend, Gustave de
Beaumont, presented a report on the problem to the Ministry of
the Interior and asked to be sent to the United States to study the
American penal system. On May 10, 1831, the young lawyers
landed in New York. Tocqueville remained in America only nine

family,

Tocqueville XXIII.

[307

months, but his exceptional power of observation enabled him to

collect

such a store of facts and ideas that the resulting Democracy

America has been justly considered the best foreign appraisal

of American social and political institutions. The first volume was
written in 1832-1834 and published in January 1835. Tocqueville
then worked for five years on the second volume, which apin

peared in 1840.

The work made Tocqueville famous. He was hailed as "anDemocracy was soon translated into many
languages; and in 1838, at the age of thirty-three, he was made a
member of the French Academy. The following year he was elected
to the Chamber of Deputies, where he sided with the constituother Montesquieu"; his

1848 he accepted (not without reservation)

and as a deputy at the Constituent Assembly he voted with the moderate majority. In 1849 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Barrot's government. With
his middle-of-the-road policy Tocqueville stood for French alliance with England against Russia and Austria, and favored, in
the still restive European countries, the liberal and moderate parties. But his policy failed, particularly in regard to the Roman
Question. Disavowed by the president of the ministers, he resigned
October 30, 1849, and retired to Sorrento, in Italy, where he
wrote his Souvenirs, published posthumously (1893). Later he
returned to France and re-entered the political arena. Then, withdrawing definitely from public life, he resumed his studies and
writing. In 1856 Tocqueville published the first part of L'Ancien
regime et la revolution, which views the Revolution not as a
tional opposition. In

the February Revolution,

break with tradition but as the final step in a long process of unification and equalization. He died in Cannes on April 16, 1859.

VIEW OF HISTORY

keen student of social and

political history, Tocqueville

saw

course dominated by three basic drives: man's irresistible tendency to absolute equality of condition, the state's effort to extend

its

sphere of action and to control the entire life of the individual,

man's natural inclination to liberty. Equality of conditions, the

its

and most striking mark of democracy, is here to stay

whether one likes it or not. It may well represent a definite progress over the old class systems. It has its virtues; it is not without

essential

V. Modern Times

308]
its

grave dangers. But total concentration of power in the state,

the complete centralization of government and administration (to

which even democracy may

harmful.
liberty

easily lead) is wholly unhealthy

and

Salvation rests, then, with man's undying passion for

and

dignity. This

it is

the state within bounds. This

that can keep the growing

it is

power of
demo-

that can wisely guide the

and render it profitable.

democracy without succumbing to servitude, how
to have democracy and preserve freedom, is then the main problem of our times. The study of its nature and the search for its
cratic revolution so as to offset its perils

How

to attain

successful solution are the impassioned concerns of Tocqueville's

Democracy

in

America.

DEMOCRACY

IN

AMERICA

America is divided into two parts. The first deals

with the impact of democracy on the political life and institutions
of the American people, the second with its impact on their private
ideas, feelings, and manners. The closing chapters analyze the influence of democratic ideas and feelings on political society in

Democracy

in

general. Tocqueville concludes with a general survey of the subject.

In a masterful Introduction the author

tells

why he

has under-

taken the study of the nature and dynamics of democracy in a

specific

country and makes

against democracy.

He

it

clear that

he

is

neither for nor

does not write to praise or to condemn.

an impartial appraisal of a system bound to be universally

is to search for truth and to serve the
cause of humanity by making democracy safe.

His

is

accepted. His only interest

merely to satisfy a legitimate curiosity that I have examined America; my wish has been to find instruction by which we
may ourselves profit. Whoever should imagine that I have intended to
write a panegyric would be strangely mistaken
nor has it been my
object to advocate any form of government in particular, for I am of
the opinion that absolute excellence is rarely to be found in any
legislation; I have not even affected to discuss whether the social
revolution, which I believe to be irresistible, is advantageous or prejudicial to mankind; I have acknowledged this revolution as a fact
already accomplished or on the eve of its accomplishment; and I have
selected the nation, from among those which have undergone it, in
which its development has been the most peaceful and the most comIt is not, then,

Tocqueville XXIII.
plete, in

order to discern

its

[309

natural consequences, and,

if it

be possi-

means by which it may be rendered profitable.

I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought the
image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its
prejudices, and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or
ble, to distinguish the

to

hope from

progress. 1

its

democracy is equality a general equality

of condition among the people, which only subsequently and consequently brings political and economic equality. In Europe,

The

central fact of

throughout
century,

men have

sought to achieve

of the principle of equality

constantly eludes
all

men

dawn

history but especially since the

its

all

human

contribute to

its

is

it.

of the eleventh

The gradual development

a universal fact, a durable fact: "It

interference,

progress."

and

all

events as well as

The democratic

revolution,

(and Tocqueville regards it with a kind of

"religious dread"), cannot be resisted. The aristocratic society of
yesterday, with its undeniable merits and glaring defects, is dead
and buried. From its ashes has emerged a new society that can
afford mankind a superior happiness provided it is guided, edu-

formidable as

it

is

cated, purified, regulated. Otherwise man's insatiable passion for

equality will generate confusion, corruption, universal despotism,

and

slavery. Fortunately,

it is

within man's power safely and ad-

vantageously to wield this two-edged sword.

DANGERS OF DEMOCRACY
Liberty

is

not equated with democracy. 3

Democracy

in

America, Part

racy in America are taken

by Walker,

New

I,

from the

Nor

is

the one neces-

from DemocHenry Reeve published

Introduction. Selections
translation of

York, 1847.

2 ibid.

men cannot become absolutely equal unless they be enand consequently equality, pushed to its furthest extent, may
be confounded with freedom, yet there is good reason for distinguishing
the one from the other. The taste which men have for liberty, and that
which they feel for equality, are, in fact, two different things; and I am
not afraid to add, that among democratic nations, they are two unequal
things. ... I think that democratic communities have a natural taste for
freedom: left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and view any
privation of it with regret. But for equality their passion is ardent, in3

"Although

tirely free,

satiable,

incessant,

invincible:

they call for equality in freedom;

if

they

V. Modern Times

310]

There is even the danger and this is

that equality and democthe gravest of the dangers of democracy
racy exist without individual and social freedom.
Equality, once become a social condition, must necessarily'
sarily the effect of the other.

make

its

way

into the political world.

political equality is

According to Tocqueville,
two ways: rights are

established in one of

granted either to every citizen or to none.

manly and lawful passion for equality, which

be powerful and honoured. This passion
tends to elevate the humble to the rank of the great; but there exists
also in the human heart a depraved taste for equality, which impels
the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level, and
There

is,

in fact, a

men

excites

reduces

men

to wish all to

to prefer equality in slavery to inequality with freedom. 4

In political terms, the alternative

absolute

is

the sovereignty of

all

or the

power of one. Even the nation fortunate enough

to

escape a single person's despotic rule and, like the Americans, to

choose the other system of government has not entirely averted

the danger of tyranny. For the "sovereignty of the people" in

democratic states

is

often but the tyranny of the majority, the

despotism of the greater number.

To

hold that the people have a right to do everything

To assert, further,
own affairs and that,

solutely absurd.

that a people

in deciding

consequently,

its

be granted the majority, which represents

it

is

is

ab-

always right

full

power may

this is the prattle of

power is in itself a bad

and dangerous thing," 5 whether held by a people or a monarch
or an aristocratic senate. "I can never willingly invest any number

the fool or the talk of the slave. "Unlimited

of

my

fellow-creatures with that unlimited authority which I should

refuse to any one of them."

Above the sovereignty of the people

mankind and, farther above, there is
the sovereignty of God
who, because His wisdom and His
justice always equal His power, is alone omnipotent. "The rights
there

is

the sovereignty of

of every people are consequently confined within the limits of

what

is

just." 7

cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery. They will endure
poverty, servitude, barbarism, but they will not endure aristocracy." Ibid.,
Part II, Book II, chap. 1.
4 Ibid., Part I, chap.
3.
6 Ibid.

5 ibid., chap. 15.

t ibid.

TOCQUEVILLE XXIII.
What

[311

more, majority rule and democracy in general

is

may

exert a sinister influence on private opinion, the national character,

the action of the intellect, the feelings

and manners of the

in-

dividuals.

As

to the majority's influence

so long as the majority

as

soon as

is

observed.

its
.

decision
.

is still

undecided, discussion

carried on; but

is

irrevocably pronounced, a submissive silence

is

The majority

on opinion,

raises very

formidable barriers to the

may write whathe ever step beyond them. Not

that he is exposed to the terrors of an auto-da-fe, but he is tormented
Under the abby the slights and persecutions of daily obloquy.
liberty of opinion:

within these barriers an author

ever he pleases, but he will repent

it if

sway of an individual despot, the body was attacked in order to

subdue the soul; and the soul escaped the blows which were directed
against it, and rose superior to the attempt; but such is not the course
adopted by tyranny in democratic republics; there the body is left
free, and the soul is enslaved. 8
solute

Not

less

degrading

the influence of the omnipotence of the

is

majority on the national character. In democracies, public

life is

mixed with domestic affairs. There, sovereign authority is everywhere and easily accessible. Many speculate on its
weaknesses and passions, currying favors with the multitude, voicconstantly

ing slogans that please rather than principles that are unpopular

but true. The result could be an extensive debasement of character

both in the huge crowd that throngs the roads of power and

the masses

from

whom power

The operations

democracy and its

would seem to lie in the

received.

fact that equality of conditions leads

to consider themselves equal

ate themselves

is

mind may also be adversely affected by

majority rule. At first sight the danger here

of the

from

all

even

intellectually

and hence

men

to alien-

outside sources of intellectual truth and

Old systems and

habits, family maxims,

between generations, the authority of superior men, long established principles, at times even religious
dogmas, are summarily discarded. In the movement that continually agitates a democratic community, one is incessantly thrown
back on his own reason to seek in himself the light of truth and
spiritual enlightenment.

class opinions, the ties

the standard of judgment.

s Ibid.

The

practice of relying solely

on one's

V. Modern Times

312]

own

and testimony, as well as the tendency to reject or

deny whatever one fails to understand with utter clarity, shuts
each man in his own breast, surrenders him to his own guidance,
separates him from his fellow men. "Men are no longer bound
together by ideas, but by interests; and it would seem as if human
opinions were reduced to a sort of intellectual dust, scattered on
effort

every side, unable to collect, unable to cohere."

But

dom

this excessive

of thought,

is

independence of mind,

not without

its limits.

analysis, Tocqueville cites another

of democratic societies

life

that carries with

it

an

this pernicious free-

Relentlessly pursuing his

phenomenon in the intellectual

movement of the spirit

inverse

new and more ominous

implications.

Man

can

never do without some principle of authority. In ages of equality

multitude and

this principle resides in the

expressed through

is

public opinion, which then gains ascendancy as mistress of the

world.

When

the inhabitant of a democratic country compares himself in-

dividually with

all

those about him, he feels with pride that he

equal of any one of them; but

when he comes

is

the

to survey the totality of

and to place himself in contrast to so huge a body, he is

overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance and weak-

his fellows,

instantly
ness.

The public has

which

singular power, of

conceive an idea; for

it

therefore

among

a democratic people a

aristocratic nations could never so

much

does not persuade to certain opinions, but

enforces them, and infuses

them

by a

into the faculties

sort of

as
it

enormFor

all upon the reason of each.

when I feel the hand of power lie heavy on my brow, I care
but little to know who oppresses me; and I am not the more disposed

ous pressure of the minds of

myself,

to pass beneath the

yoke because

it is

held out to

me

by the arms of

a million of men. 10

What about

the influence of democracy

on men's

feelings?

Tocqueville answers this question by comparing conditions in

aristocratic and democratic nations. Under the old structure, men
were aware of a close bond between one generation and another;
families remained for centuries in the same condition and frequently in the same place; each individual was conscious of being

a link in a living chain.

Part II, Book
wibid., chap. 2.

9 Ibid.,

By
I,

the very nature of the aristocratic

chap.

1.

com-

Tocqueville XXIII.

[313

many were attached to something outside their own sphere

which they were ready to forget and sacrifice themselves. In

munity,
for

democratic times instead, the sense of belonging diminishes as

changes in families, in places, in conditions are constant: "the

woof of time

effaced."

is

every instant broken, and the track of generations

People become indifferent and strangers to one an-

other. "Aristocracy

had made a chain of

all

the

members

of the

community, from the peasant to the king: democracy breaks that

chain, and severs every link of it." 12 As individualism creeps into
the new order, it disposes the community member to form a little
circle of his own with his family and friends and leave the rest of
society to
is

none

Social conditions being

itself.

to

whom

anything. It

is

to

owe

more or

anything, none from

less equal, there

whom

to expect

as though he stood alone, as though his

destiny were in his

own

whole

hands.

Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors,
but it hides his descendants, and separates his contemporaries from
him; it throws him back for ever upon himself alone, and threatens
in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own
heart. 13

IF

DEMOCRACY

Tocqueville
glasses.

He

is

IS

TO BE MADE SAFE

not looking at democracy through rose-colored

perceives grave dangers. But his apprehensions do not

preclude hope and he grants that

safe.

How? The

the second

is

first

it is

key to success

possible to
is

make democracy

man's passion for

liberty,

religion.

Although, for a moment, the saddening and chilling sight of

worked by democracy tempts Tocqueville

no means
suggests a return to aristocratic society. The democratic revolution has been willed by God. It marks a progress in man's history

the universal uniformity

to

mourn

the state of society that has ceased to be, he by

and condition.

We may

naturally believe that

it is

sight of the Creator

11 Ibid.,
i 2 Ibid.

Book

II,

not the singular prosperity of the

which is most pleasing in the

and Preserver of men. What appears to me to be

few, but the greater well-being of

all,

chap. 2.
13 ibid.

V. Modern Times

314]

is to His eye advancement; what afflicts me is acceptHim. A state of equality is perhaps less elevated, but it is more
and its justice constitutes its greatness and its beauty. 14

man's decline,
able to
just;

constant sharp eye

is

necessary

if

is

to lead not to servitude but to freedom.

is

to secure

and maintain a

the sovereignty of the people provided

An

task

free government. Tocqueville accepts

thermore, he would moderate

stitutions.

the principle of equality

The most important

it

independent press, local

traditions, the legal profession

not unbounded. Furby a web of free in-

it is

carefully

liberties, free associations,

many

these should act like so

all

concealed breakwaters checking the passions of the multitude,

stemming the

tide of

popular opinion. The Americans "have com-

men

bated by free institutions the tendency of equality to keep

asunder, and they have subdued

on

local liberties.

15

it."

Tocqueville

insists chiefly

For him decentralized administration

is

a very

powerful deterrent to the excesses of democracy and the encroach-

ments of the

state.

He

is

for centralized government, that

is,

for the

concentration in one place or in the same persons of the legislative

power

in matters of national interest

relations;

but he

is

and in the conduct of foreign

against centralized administration, that

against the concentration, likewise in one place or in the

persons, of the direction of local interests.

He

is

is,

same

enthusiastic in his

New

England townships and in his approval of the American system, whereby political life is infused
into each portion of the territory "in order to multiply to an inpraise of the spirit of the

finite

extent opportunities of acting in concert, for

bers of the

community and

mutual dependence."
to individualism:

them

16

local

make them

it

men

makes them

all

the

mem-

constantly feel their

decentralized system

freedom brings

one another;

to help

to

is

a strong barrier

together and forces

realize that they are

parts of a whole.
It is difficult to

draw a man out of

his

own

circle to interest

him

in

the destiny of the state, because he does not clearly understand what
influence the destiny of the state can have

be proposed to

make

glance that there

" Ibid.,
15 ibid.,

ie Ibid.

is

upon

his

own

lot.

But

if it

a road cross the end of his estate, he will see at a

a connection between this small public affair and

Book IV, chap. 8.

Book II, chap. 4.

Tocqueville XXIII.
greatest private affairs;

his

shown

to him, the close tie

Tocqueville did not find

it

[315

and he will discover, without

which unites private to general

its

being

interest. 17

unusual to see Americans make gener-

ous sacrifices for the public good, and he attributes

this selfless-

ness to the free institutions of the townships and to their political

rights.

he

that

These have a thousand ways of reminding every

Second

means

to local liberties as

racy, Tocqueville sees

Among

citizen

fives in society.

its

for the salvation of

free associations, both civil

and

democ-

political.

democratic nations ...

feeble; they

all the citizens are independent and

can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them

can oblige his fellow

men

him

to lend

their assistance.

They

all,

there-

do not learn voluntarily to

democratic countries had no right and

fore, fall into a state of incapacity, if they

help each other. If

men

living in

no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence

would be in great jeopardy; but they might long preserve their wealth
and their cultivation: whereas if they never acquired the habit of
forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered. A people among which individuals should lose the power of
achieving great things single-handed, without acquiring the means of
producing them by united exertions, would soon relapse into barbarism. 18

Hence Tocqueville's emphatic

tries

assertion that in democratic coun-

the science of association

progress everything else

the mother science, to

is

whose

is tied.

Other powerful counterpoises to the democratic element are

and the administration of justice. The mem-

the profession of law

by their training, developed

and order, a taste for formalities, and
reasoning. These characteristics eminently

bers of the legal profession have,

certain habits of regularity

a regard for logical

them to counteract the evils inherent in popular government. Tocqueville saw this sobering force at work in the United
qualify

States.

When

the American people is intoxicated by passion, or carried away

by the impetuosity of its ideas, it is checked and stopped by the almost invisible influence of its legal counsellors, who secretly oppose
their aristocratic propensities to
17 Ibid.

its

democratic

instincts, their super-

18 Ibid., chap. 5.

V. Modern Times

316]
attachment to what

stitious

narrow views
tion to

its

its

love of novelty, their

their habitual procrastina-

exercise their restraining

action in various ways.

its

immense

designs,

ardent impatience. 19

The lawyers
Firstly,

antique to

is

and

to

through the courts.

Empowered

to declare laws

uncon-

American magistrates hold the people to consistleast obliging them to obey their own enactments.

stitutional, the

ency by at

Secondly, through their public

offices.

In the legislative assemblies

as well as in the administrative departments

make

their influence felt in

and agencies, they

both the formulation and the execution

of the law.

In his treatment of the administration of justice, Tocqueville

lauds the institution of the jury, whereby a certain
citizens are selected

The

and temporarily vested with the

number

of

right to judge.

jury

upon the national characcommunicate the spirit of the judges to the minds
of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is
the soundest preparation for free institutions. It imbues all classes
with a respect for the thing judged, and with the notion of right. 20
cannot

ter.

...

fail to
It

exercise a powerful influence

serves to

As bulwarks

against the possible evils of democracy, religion

goes hand in hand with liberty. Tocqueville tersely states that the

two stand or fall together. "I am inclined to think, that if faith be

wanting in man, he must serve; and if he be free, he must believe." 21 He finds this true in every age, under every form of government. He finds it more obviously true in ages and countries
where equality of conditions prevails. Democracy tends to isolate
man, to concentrate his attention on himself, to breed in him an
excessive love for material gratification. Religion inspires other

and desires. It lifts man's soul far above the treasures

and the regions of the senses. It makes man socially
conscious and responsible, thus drawing him away, at times at
least, from the moorings of his solitary and sterile individualism.
Moreover, religion gives man a fixed point amid the constantly
moving pageant of human affairs and the swirling current of huprinciples

of the earth

19 Ibid., Part

I,

chap. 16.

20 ibid.
2i Ibid., Part

H, Book

I,

chap. 5.

Tocqueville XXIII.

man

opinions.

The immutability

ceaseless agitation

[317
of religion compensates for the

and the frequent

order. Again, religion greatly helps

shifts in the political

man

resist the

and

social

tyranny of the

majority: for even to the largest majority no deference

is

to

be paid

whenever conscience or faith rules otherwise.

For Tocqueville, America was eloquent proof of the beneficial
influence of religion on democracy. In the United States he did not
see the unnatural and absurd conflict that certain partisans of
liberty had tried to foster against religion in Europe. He even saw
signs that pointed specifically to the

the

most powerful

ally of liberty

Roman

Catholic religion as

and democracy.

America is the most democratic country in the world, and it is at the

the country in which the Roman Catholic religion makes
same time.
most progress.
The men of our days are naturally little disposed to
believe; but, as soon as they have any religion, they immediately find
in themselves a latent propensity which urges them unconsciously
toward Catholicism. Many of the doctrines and practices of the
Romish Church astonish them; but they feel a secret admiration for its
discipline, and its great unity attracts them. ... I am inclined to
believe that
our posterity will tend more and more to a single
division into two parts
some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and
others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome. 22
.

22 Ibid., chap. 6. This

is one of the numerous "prophetic" passages in

America. It would be interesting to list others and show how
many have been vindicated by events. Among these are: (1) the determination of the factors (particularly America's emergence as a world power)
that were to bring the president of the United States to the exercise of
"almost royal prerogatives"; (2) America's "imperialist" war against
Mexico, and Mexico's status as a small nation for a long time to come;

Democracy

in

(3) the prevalence and characteristics of the two-party system in the

United States; (4) the inevitable growth of the American republic both

and numerically; (5) the reference to the United States and

Russia as the two nations of the world "each marked out by the will of

territorially

Heaven

to

sway the

destinies of half the globe,"

and to the conditions

under which each was to rise to its present-day dominance; (6) the rise of
an aristocracy of manufacturers or "class of masters," the harshest that
ever existed, unless strong measures would be taken (such as a gradual
wage increase) to make the interests of the working class prevail. Of his
predictions that were not realized, two may be cited. ( 1 ) Tocqueville said
that the Indians would never become civilized and that eventually they
would be exterminated by the Whites. There are probably more Indians
in the United States today than in Tocqueville's time, many of them successful and respected. (2) Tocqueville foresaw a war to death between the

V. Modern Times

318]

Tocqueville saw in America the proper climate for the spread

religion in the democratic state. First, religion

and usefulness of

and

exercises self-restraint

and

affairs

its

ministers take

no part

in worldly

political animosities.

is a distinct sphere, in which the priest is soverwhich he takes care never to go. Within its limits he
is the master of the mind; beyond them, he leaves men to themselves,
and surrenders them to the independence and instability, which belong to their nature and their age. 23

In America religion
eign, but out of

Second, religion and

its

uncompromisingly holdembodied
are not too minute, formalistic, and perministers, while

ing and guarding the essentials, that

in the articles of faith,

is,

the eternal truths

emptory about nonessentials. Third, the ministers of

a

warm

interest in their contemporaries,

mary and
struggles

religion take

never allowing the pri-

eternal objects to make them oblivious of the day-to-day

and problems and successes of the common man.

man's freedom and responsibility

In

its

passion for liberty and in

its

religious beliefs, then,

man-

kind has the means for steering clear of the dangers of democracy.

of that

sedulous vigilance

new

being crushed by

main
his

free. //

own

is

the price for the successful building

society wherein everyone will enjoy equality without

it.

If

they will

they will
it

it,

men can

for man's destiny

be equal and yet reis

to a large extent in

hands. Tocqueville rejects as false and cowardly the

theory that

man

is

an animal driven by

necessity, a slave of his

environment, hopelessly bound by inexorable physical forces and

blind historical laws. Nothing could be farther from his philosophy

than the doctrine of his friend, Count de Gobineau,

Essay on the Inequality of the

Human

who

in his

Races (1854) advanced

Negroes and the Whites in the South. The Civil War (1861-1865) came,
but no Negro uprising took place. On the contrary, relations between the
two races have improved and the easing of tensions, though gradual, continues. In reality, Democracy in America is a monumental and timeless
work not so much because of its author's good guesses but because of his
remarkable perception of the permanent and universal principles underlying the ideas and the workings of democracy.
23 Ibid., chap. 5.

Tocqueville XXIII.

[319

an early theory of Nordic racial superiority and advocated a most

radical racial determinism.

America beautifully
and responsibility:

The

closing lines of

Democracy

in

reaffirm Tocqueville's faith in man's freedom

true that around every man a fatal circle is traced, beyond which
he cannot pass; but within the wide verge of that circle he is powerful and free; as it is with man, so with communities. The nations of
It is

our time cannot prevent the conditions of men from becoming equal,
but it depends upon themselves whether the principle of equality is
to lead them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to
prosperity or wretchedness. 24

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tocqueville, A. de. Democracy in America. Trans, by H. Reeve,

revised by F. Bowen, and further corrected by P. Bradley. New
York: Knopf, 1948.
Democracy in America. Ed. by R. D. Heffner. New
York: New American Library, 1956.
Journey to America. Ed. by J. P. Mayer. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1959.
The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Trans, by
S. Gilbert. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955.
.

Gargan, E. T. Alexis de Tocqueville, The

Critical

Years, 1848-

1851. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1955.

Mayer, J. P. Prophet of the Mass Age: A Study of Alexis de Tocqueville. Trans,

Pierson, G.

W.

by Bozman and Hahn. London: Dent, 1939.

Beaumont in America. New York:

Tocqueville and

Oxford University Press, 1938.

Schlaerth, W. J. (ed.). A Symposium on A. de Tocqueville's
"Democracy in America." New York: Fordham University
Press, 1945.

Mary Lawlor, S.N.D. Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber

of Deputies. Washington: Catholic University of America Press,
1959.

Sister

24 ibid.,

Book

IV, chap.

8.

CHAPTER XXIV

Man
LIFE

KARL HEINRICH MARX was born May

5,

1818, in Trier,

an ancient town in the German Rhineland under French

rule during the Napoleonic regime but part of the Prussian kingdom after the Vienna settlement of 1815. Marx's ancestry on both
the paternal and the maternal side included generations of rabbis
and Talmudic scholars. From them Marx inherited a Messianic
spirit,

a tendency to read the future, and a passion for subtle dis-

But he received none of

none of
remained
his secret tragedy. He looked upon it as a personal stigma. In an
effort to explain away the Jewish problem, he once remarked
that the Jews were a purely economic unit reduced to usury and
putation.

their love for Judaism,

their attachment to his people. In fact, his origin ever

other unpleasant professions by the hostility that surrounded them.

The emancipation

of society,

Marx

continued, would emancipate

the Jews and end the Jewish problem. 1 Several times he could not
refrain

toward

from anti-Semitic outbursts and, on the whole, his attitude

his people and their institutions was one of aloofness if

not of aversion.
1 These ideas
were expounded by Marx in an essay on the Jewish
Question written early in 1844 for the Deutsch-franzosische Jahrbiicher, a
periodical published in Paris by Ruge (editor) and Marx (associate editor).

Only two numbers of

this journal

appeared.

Marx XXIV.

[321

When

Karl was six, his father, a lawyer and a disciple of Voland Diderot, had the entire family baptized in the Protestant
church. It was a step dictated more by social expediency than
inner conviction. Some years before he had changed his name
from Herschel Levi to Heinrich Marx.
The young Marx attended the Trier schools until he entered

taire

Bonn

the University of

age of seventeen.

at the

year later

(1836) he transferred to the University of Berlin, where he soon

gave up the study of law for philosophy. Though he completed
all his courses there, he received his doctorate at Jena in 1841.
His thesis on the "Differences between the Natural Philosophy of
Democritus and That of Epicurus" highly praises the latter and
presents Prometheus as humanity's hero for his open defiance of
the gods. Better to be chained to a rock and eaten by vultures
than be a

meek servant of Zeus

The motto affixed

dissertation.

the Aeschylean tragedy: "I hate

from

Marx's

life

and

seems the general idea of the

from Prometheus' words in

it is

all

This hatred of the divinity

sistent point in

this

to

the gods."

the most fundamental and con-

is

theories.

As

far as

can be gathered

were doubts, vacillations,

changes on all other questions. But from beginning to end Marx
was against all religions, against all gods, against God. The significance of this fact must not be underestimated.
While at the university Marx fell under the spell of Hegel's
the

He

philosophy.

In the

ian.

records,

available

fast

became wholly Hegelian, but a

German

Hegelian schools:

there

universities

the

of the

conservative

leftist

Hegel-

time there were two

school,

holding state

and

church in great respect, and the young rebel school, which used
Hegel's principles to fight state absolutism and to advocate freedom

from

religion,

especially

from

Christianity.

Marx, with Bruno

Bauer, Moses Hess, and Arnold Ruge, sided with the radical
school.

Before long, his virulent, antireligious

articles so

angered the

Prussian government that he was barred from an intended teaching career.

came

Marx

turned to journalism. In the

fall

of

1842 he be-

editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, but his atheism led to the

paper's suppression. In

mosphere

November 1843,

finding the Prussian at-

and asphyxiating," Marx emigrated to France with his wife Jenny, whom he had married that
same year. She was the daughter of a good friend of his family,
"really too intolerable

V. Modern Times

322]

and Marx had

Baron Ludwig von Westphalen, a Prussian

official,

loved her since his school days in Trier.

She proved a

wife, remaining constantly

and

faithful

affectionately at his side until her

death in 1881. Together they endured

exile, poverty, persecution.

Together they mourned the premature death of several of their

children. 2

Parisian years (1843-1845) were the most decisive for

The

the development of Marx's thought. It

shedding forever the

method

in Paris that

he be-

Marx met

man who was

idealism while retaining the dialectic

latter's

as the basis for his

Paris too that

the

was

a communist. There he changed his attitude toward Hegel,

came

own

historical materialism. It

for a second time (end of August,

to be his devoted friend

was in
1844)

and genial collaborator

Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), a fellow Rhinelander, the son of

a rich cotton manufacturer in Barmen, Germany, and Manchester,

From the day of their Paris meeting the two were inMarx relied on Engels as his best disciple and interEngels admired Marx and encouraged him in every

England.

separable.
preter.

imaginable

way

ghostwriting for him,

wealth with him, defending him against

sharing his

all

capitalistic

adversaries during his

life and after his death. For Engels, Marx was a prophet,
an inspired leader, the greatest man ever born. For Marx, Engels
was a staunch supporter on whom he could rely in every con-

stormy

tingency, his "chief of staff," capable of perfectly understanding

his

message and of

At

faithfully

implementing his plan of action.

Marx was expelled from Paris. With

and year-old daughter he went to Brussels. In Belgium

the beginning of 1845

his wife

he established contact with the various German Communist

Workers' organizations and with Belgian socialists and radicals,
and engaged in extensive correspondence with members of similar
associations in other countries.

In November 1847, the London center of the Communist

League asked him

to prepare a "confession of faith," a

communist

catechism formulating clearly the principles and aims of what

was then a
2

One

little

known and

small communist association.

Marx

of their children was born dead; three died young in London:

Guido and Franziska

in infancy;

Edgar

at the age of eight;

Jenny Longuet,

the oldest daughter, died suddenly in Paris in 1883 (before Marx's death);

Eleanor Aveling and Laura Laf argue committed suicide in 1898 and 1912
respectively.

Marx XXIV.

[323

undertook the

enthusiastically

He

task.

drafted the

document

collaboration with Engels and, in early 1848, delivered

who had

requested

it.

In February of that year the

Manijesto was published

it

in

to those

Communist

a small pamphlet, bound in green, with

Manifest der Kommunisten.

As soon

as the

book appeared,

the

title

its

author and his family were expelled from Belgian territory.

Marx reached

Paris the day after the outbreak of the February

Revolution. Cutting short their stay, he and Engels returned to

Germany to edit a new daily paper, the Neue rheinische Zeitung.

Its first number was published in Cologne on June 1, 1848; its
last, set up entirely in red type {die rote Nummer), on May 19,
1849.

During those fateful months, when Europe was ablaze and

was the order of the day in most capitals, Marx went
all the way in everywhere supporting the rebels, denouncing the
Prussian government, and demanding immediate war with Russia.
His articles and his collaborators' were consistently violent and
inflammatory. Finally Marx was arrested for incitement to sedition.
Tried before a Cologne jury, he was acquitted but ordered to
leave the Rhineland. Back in Paris, he was immediately asked by
the French government to retire to Brittany or quit France. Marx
thereupon left for London, where he arrived August 24, 1849.
For several long years Marx's life in London was marred by
destitution and obscurity. At times he had to pawn his wife's
family silver and even his own clothes. There were creditors after
him constantly. He moved from one squalid apartment to another.
When one of his daughters died, he had to borrow two pounds
sterling from a fellow refugee for the coffin. Once the situation berevolution

came

so desperate that he,

who had

always refused to become a

bourgeois "money-making machine," applied for a job as booking clerk with a railroad

down because

company. The application was turned

of his illegible handwriting.

Marx

never tired of

turning to Engels for financial help, and Engels tried never to

fail his

unfortunate friend. For about ten years Engels wrote some

of the articles

Marx

contributed to the

New York

Daily Tribune

and for which he received one pound

sterling per article. Finally

Engels sold his part of the family business and made Marx the

beneficiary of a

permanent annuity that made

it

possible for

him

to live his last years in sufficient comfort.

In 1864 the "International Working Men's Association" (the

V. Modern Times

324]
First International)

year-old

Marx

was formed. Upon

joined

its

invitation, the forty-six-

General Council, wrote

its statutes,

com-

posed the inaugural address. Soon, while the International was

growing rapidly, he became its sole leader. But in 1871 his public
stand in favor of the terrorist activities of the Paris

Commune

shocked and alienated many members

bitterly opposed Bakunin, a fellow member, refused to compromise with him, and finally had him expelled. 3 These and other
manifestations of Marx's ruthless and dictatorial leadership led to
the dissolution of the First International. Its last meeting was
of the International. Later

Marx

held in Philadelphia in 1876 but from the practical standpoint

had died much

it

earlier.

Marx continued to study and write inces1852 he published The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Napoleon, in 1859 the Critique of Political Economy, and in 1875
Critique of the Gotha Programme. The first volume of his most
remarkable economic treatise, Das Kapital, was published in 1867
and soon translated into French, English, Russian, and Italian.
Volume II and Volume III (completed by Engels) appeared
posthumously in 1885 and 1894.
In 1881 Marx's wife Jenny died of cancer. Marx himself lived
only another two years. In 1882, at the suggestion of his doctors,
he went to Algiers and then to the French Riviera. He returned
to London still unwell, more restive, irritable, and tired. Death
came to him March 14, 1883, while he was asleep in an armchair
in his study. He was sixty-four years old. At the burial in Highgate
Cemetery only a few relatives and friends were present. Engels
In the meantime,

santly. In

delivered the funeral address.

MATERIALISM
Marxism is, first of all, a materialistic philosophy. Its fundamental idea is the primacy of matter. Ultimately, for Marx, only
matter counts. As God is the center-principle, the supreme reality
in Christian doctrine, so, in Marx's theory, matter is the first and
only real principle. Matter, however,
3

is

not

static.

Fluent and

Appalled by Marx's despotic methods, a disillusioned Bakunin (18141876) cried out on that occasion: "I hate Communism. ... It is the negation of liberty!"

Marx XXIV.
dynamic,

it

[325

moves, evolves, and progresses continuously. Move-

ment, Engels says,

is

matter's

mode

of existence.

Marx

accepts the

Darwinian theory of biological evolution and then applies it to the

history of man and society. The movement of matter takes place
in two ways. There is a gradual and uniform progress, causes and

Or

effects following in regular succession as links in a chain.

is

there

a sudden, cataclysmic break, a sort of jump at the climax of the

which effects not only quantitative but also/

Marx's view of the movement of matter as a/
continuous transformation toward an indefinite betterment differA
entiates his philosophy and the crude materialism of the eighteenth
century. Marx's matter is vitalized by an intrinsic energy that
makes possible the appearance of rationality and the growth of
ideas in man. His materialism, strangely reminiscent of primitive
man's animistic beliefs, is consistent with a belief in the spirit; but
transitional point,

qualitative changes.

that spirit

is

nothing other than a product of matter or, rather, a

higher phase in the evolution and transformation of matter

itself.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
In further explaining the

movement of matter, Marx introduces

new element, a cosmic law. The

into his materialistic philosophy a

essence of matter, and of

Matter has in

itself its

life

own

tout-court ,_is_a_perenn

al

confl ict

contradiction. Matter inevitably pro-

and a struggle of opposites. A.

gresses thrcmghjyDerpetual tension

material state or condition that a preceding conflict has

dominant (thesis)

is

patible material force (antithesis).

The

the destruction of both rival forces

(synthesis),

which

is

made

immediately threatened by another incomclash of the

and the

two

results in

rise of a third force

by its own
and decomposi-

in turn automatically confronted

negation, and so on, in a continuous composition

the inexorable law that governs the

tion of colliding forces. This

is

progress of matter. This

the meaning of "dialectical material-

is

The framework of this aspect of Marx's system is obviously

an adaptation of Hegel's dialectical doctrine. What Hegel says
concerning the manner in which the idea evolves Marx applies to

ism."

Marx admitted the Hegelian foundation of this approach.

In the preface to the second edition of Das Kapital, he describes
matter.

his

view as "Hegel's dialectic turned upside down."

V. Modern Times

326]

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
In applying his dialectical materialism to history,

human

Marx

begins

and natural developments, is governed by obje ctive, inflexible laws. There is nothing
accidental in history. Whatever happ ens hqs_to_happen and could
not happen otherwise. Furthermore, all these laws, although independent of human will, can be gradually discovered. Thus the
study of history becomes an exact science of successive actions and
reactions. Men are able to penetrate the secret reasons of its work-

by

stating that

ing. Eventually,

history, like nature

having mastered the historical necessity, they will

be in a position to foresee the future and achieve perfect freedom. 4

The law s
ditions^pf

of histo ry are based exclusively

on the material con-

)^^^^^~^^ ^^rr^aQ--tQOfi^vmc~i?LCtOT.
:

to Engels, this proposition

According
forms the nucleus of the Manijesto:

mode of economic producand exchange, and the social organization necessarily following
from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone
can be explained the political and intellectual history of that epoch. 5

In every historical epoch, the prevailing

tion

The economic

factor or, rather, the productive forces in themselves'

complex interplay provide the only clue to the means

ing of history, the history of ideas and ideologies included. Marx
does not deny man's ability to think, to calculate, to plan. He even
admits a sort of "spiritual life" in man but he is quick to qualify
it as secondary to and derivative of the material. Man's thoughts
and plans and inventions are but the necessary product of economic development; economic conditions are the causes of all the
ideas and ideal motivations the human mind and conscience have
ever known. Engels again, in his funeral oration on Marx, em-

and

in their

phasized the point:

He
all

[Marx] discovered the single fact

that mankind must first of
and drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue
.

eat
4

For Marx (and for Engels) freedom does not

consist in the

power of

self-determination and voluntary choice in view of this or that motive.

consists

It

a correct understanding of the inexorable social laws, in a

grasping of the true facts of the historical situation, and in a conscious
adaptation of one's life and actions to them. This is a concept of freedom
in

some respects to that of Hegel and that of Spinoza.

The Communist Manifesto, Engels' Preface to the English Edition of

similar in
5

1888

(New York:

Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955),

p.

5.

Marx XXIV.

[327
and that therefore the production
means of subsistence and consequently the

politics, science, religion, art, etc.;

of the immediate material

degree of economic development attained by a given people or during

a given epoch, form the foundation upon which the State institutions,
the legal conceptions, the art and even the religious ideas of the people

concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which these things
must therefore be explained, instead of vice versa. 6

As a further consequence of this view, nothing is immutable.

no stable
There__aj^_j]r^tern^
institutions. As soon as the mode of production changes, principles, ideasJ_and_institutions change. And change they must, conby the all-powerful driving force of history,
formation
of ideas out of material practice." 7
"the
explains
which
ditioned as they are

Hence

by each

the creation,

principles

historical period,

of

its

peculiar

and laws of evaluation.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE

In his application of dialectical materialism to history,
asserts that

Marx

man's social evolution (the passage from one mode of

production to another) dqes_jiQl-always- occur- through, gradual,

almost^ imperceptible progress. There are

changes take place throughcreative revolution.

Then

of rival social forces

the very

medium

in

is

moments

in history

when

sharpJbreak with tradition, through a

the violence that accompanies the clash

so intense as to effect a transformation in

which

it

occurs. Dialectical materialism, defy-

ing the principle of contradiction, considers matter as containing

its

own

flict

negation, as perennially conflicting, as resolving each con-

only to conflict again. Historical-materiali s

struggle at the very heart of the conflict.

The

c lass

m
is

pl a ces-class

for

M arx the

a group

naturafgroup, _and_ by class he means a social fact

of

who find inermelv*-4n-4he-^ame-rrrateTial

conditions and share a com mon e^pjioniic--status-m:-tlrat society.
Each group, "each class, is engaged in a common struggle against
another class. Men7 as individuals, may show or take no interest
in the struggle. Not so the social groups, the classes, who are
individuals in society
\

6 Engels' Funeral Oration, in Karl Marx: Selected Works (London:

Lawrence and Wishart, 1942), Vol. I, p. 16.
7 Marx, The German Ideology, cited in E. Rogers,
A Christian Commentary on Communism (New York: Praeger, 1952), p. 85.


V.

328]

Modem

Times

and death. Their destiny, the very

one another until both perish and
historical development reaches a new, more advanced stage. So
much so that a group of individuals forms a class only when enfaced with the problem of
essence of their being,

gaged in such a

The

is

life

to fight

struggle.

heavy accompaniment of hatreds,

and revolutions, Marx continues, is a natural, inhealthy phenomenon. It is to be welcomed, encouraged,
for the conflict of one class with another is the only way

class struggle, with its

^stabilities,

evitable,

fostered,

At length, the antagonism bewUTtal^aTasrform. When this too will have dis-

to pragressjand final deliverance.

tween classes

appeared, the c onfhc TwilLlilceMs_e.disappear.

from their slavery to one another.

and live happTTy'ever after.

Men

Men will be liberated

will at last taste

freedom

THE FIVE AGES OF HUMAN HISTORY

Marx found

proof in history for the validity of his system. Ac-

cording to him, his theory of materialistic, dialectical, historical

becoming is clearly vindicated by the various phases through

which man has passed since his appearance on earth. These principal phases or ages have all been conditioned by the economic
factor. In each of them, social institutions, moral beliefs, and
ideologies (the superstructures, as he calls them) have been the
product of the mode of production and economic conditions of
that particular age. Each historical phase has been cut from the
preceding by a violent revolution.
(1) The first human age was that of pjirnitiy__communism.
Men, just born of beasts, were preoccupied solely with the problem
of survival. Equality, freedom, collective ownership, and communal work characterized their mode of life.
(2) The second age was that of ancient society, founded on
th e master-sl ayejrelation. With the introduction of agriculture,
cattle breeding, trades, and the division of labor, private property
appeared.

minority, in possession of the means of production

(such as iron axes and plows), was able to control the majority.

The

class

struggle began.

On

one side there were the few

wealthy, free, owners, masters; on the other, the

nothing, subjects, slaves.

possessing

many

(3) The third age was that of feudal society, a result of the

Marx XXIV.

[329

progressive improvement of the

in turn for a certain

incentive of a

minimum

the lord-serf relation.

Still

era

is

The

fourth age

of production that called

of initiative in the laborer

The new

of profit.

mercy of a minority (the

(4)

means

and the
was based on
the majority (the exploited) was at the

amount

society

exploiters).

the present

is

that of capitalism. This

the result of the passage from artisan to mechanized and

replaced by the worker, the

by the capitalist. Again, the few own
the means of production. The many, though no longer bound to a
lord, are still deprived of the means of production and, so as not
to die of hunger, must sell their labor, thus subjecting themselves
industrial production.

The

serf is

proletarian; the feudal lord,

to exploitation.

(5) The fifth age, that of communist society, is the one that
must inevitably come. In fact, men are already witnessing the fateful passage from the capitalist system to the socialist and com-

Marx

has several things to say about

era, in

both the Communist Manifesto

munist structure of society.

this transition

and the new

and Das Kapital.

SURPLUS VALUE
According to Marx, the

two

social groupings

that

conflict

between the two classes (the

embody

the dialectical contradiction

today) stems essentially from an intolerable fault inherent in the

capitalist

system

the cr eation of_surplvjs=yalue. In Marx's theory

th e co mmercial value (the price)

commodity is the average amount of human labor
(preponderantly manual labor) directly or indirectly expended in
its production. Labor becomes the source- and the measure of
value, the pver-alLif-BQ^the-4one fautui in Ihe-^production and
evaluation of wealth. It follows that wealth, produced by labor,
ought to go to thejaborers. But in capitalist-society this_i& not so.
The worker is obliged to sell his capacity for work, his laborpower. For this commodity he receives a subsistence wage, a price,
proportional to the amount of labor, barely sufficient to keep him
alive, healthy, and efficient. At the same time the worker produces

of labor, the sole constituent- o f

of an object or

commodities of a value far in excess of his v/age. This difference,

worker has added to the total wealth

this definite residue that the

of society, this "surplus-value" as

Marx

calls

it, is

pocketed by his

V. Modern Times

330]
employer. This
capitalist

ism

the exploitation, the robbery, to which the

is

system sacrifices the worker. This

intrinsically

wrong, for

very end

its

is

is

what makes

capital-

the production of sur-

plus-value. Surpluszvalue^-whai__prpduces "capital," for productionj3fjmlu^ry.alue4s-4he-absel^

of production.

In mis ronststs^he-^ilrof^he-fH^i^

capitalism.

Capitalist production
is

is

not merely the production of commodities,

essentially the production of surplus-value.

no longer suffices, therefore, that he

produce surplus-value. ... To be a
not a piece of luck, but a misfortune. 8

not for himself, but for capital.

should simply produce.

productive labourer

is

it

The labourer produces,

It

He must

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE BOURGEOIS STATE

Private pro perty and the bourgeois state are the natural allies
and su pporters of the capitalisTsystem. Both make it possible for
the owners of the means of production to steal, to keep the stolen

goods^tp_continue steajin^r^llaTjoYalionwTfrrfhem
sible

nor desirable. Capitalism

will

is

neither pos-

be destroyed only when private

property gives place to collective ownership of the means of

production^ anoTThe~^r5oTrrgeoTs~~state~to arnew" social order. At

length, this

is

what will happen Marx never doubts

on the wall of history.

it;

he already

sees the writing

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION

How will it happen? Through a violent revolution. The dynamics of capitalism are such that it tends of necessity constantly
more and more of it, to concenand fewer hands. This is what Marx calls "the law
of centralization of c apital," a law that inexorably demands "con-

to increase capital, to accumulate

trate

it

in fewer

centration_of_capitals already formed, destruct ion. _of. their in-

d ividual

mdependence^-expropriation

transformation of

more,

this

many

of ca pitalist

by

small into Jew large capitals."

law of -centralization

will

capitalist,
9

Further-

bring unemployment;

unem-

Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of

capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of
8

Marx, Capital (New York: The Modern Library, 1906),

*Ibid., p. 686.

p. 558.

Marx XXIV.

[331

transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation;

but with this too grows the revolt of the working-

a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united,

class,

organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist pro-

duction itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the

method of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with,
and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible

with their capitalist integument. This integument

The

knell of capitalist private property sounds.

is

burst asunder.

The expropriators

are

expropriated. 10

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The

s ocial

revolution

is

ine vitable. It will

come

as the irrever-

consequence of historical laws, which operate independently

of human will. The clock of time cannot be stopped or put back.
sible

It will strike

tion

true

the fatal hour sooner or later. However, the revolu-

may be

by making th e masses consciou s of the

and the ir destiny, by rip pinj[_off^the mask of

accelerated

situation

bourgeois respectability, by organizing and readying the proletarian

forces for the ultimate crisis. This

is

the task assigned the

~

mumstpartyJThe communists
point out and bring to the front the

com-

'

common

interests of the entire

proletariat, independently of all nationality; [and] in the various stages

of development which the struggle of the working class against the

bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the
fore, are

movement

on the one hand,

The Communists, theremost advanced and resolute

as a whole.

practically, the

section of the working-class parties of every country, that section

which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they
have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly
understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate
general results of the proletarian movement. 11

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

Be tween

the overthrow

olJx)ili-ihe- capitalist system and the

bourgejojLSL-Siate-and-^he-rise of the
10 Ibid.,
pp. 836, 837.

11

The Communist Manifesto,

p. 23.

new

society,

Marx

allows for

V. Modern Times

332]

the intprimjujgjrf the proletariat organized into a governing class:

"the dictatorship of the proletariat ." True, the state as an instru-

ment

of exploitation will have ceased as a result of the social

revolution; but then a

new form

functions will have been set up.

contro l, will dictate

its

of state with highly intensified

Through

it

will to the minority,

the

maj ority, then

break forever

all

in

the

sTiperatrnp.tnres prn pp.r to ^thfipast system, empty the heart and

mind of allr-old-attaehments and beliefs, purify the entire world.
The dictato rship of the proletariat is thc-erucible wherein history
and mankind will be renewed.

THE NEW SOCIETY

Finally, this

The
The

state, to

form of

proletarian class will

ness,

and

state too will

have served

its

purpose.

use Engels' significant expression,-^wilLadther_.away."

itself

disappe ar. Together with selfish-

forcejmcTcc^^

lasting^,syj|tTip;k

relations.

The

last

jfae-aew society win p.mp.rgp._in-its indescrib-

No

able bejmtyJ3dtLits_unjma^

longer will legend-

ary angels keep shut the gates of the earthly paradise. In the

new

economy, the principle of distribution will be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." 12 Men will no
longer be governed; things only will be administered. This is the
statelesy classless, communist society "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." 13

MARXISM AND CHRISTIANITY

The mere exposition of Marx's system demonstrates clearly its
incom patibility with Christ ian principles. It is obvious that in
Marx's doctrine of dialectical and historical materialism
no room for the idea of God; there is no difference between
spirit; between soul and body; there is neither survival of
the soul after death nor any hope in a future life.
Communism,
there

is

matter and

moreover,
dignity,

12

strips

man

and removes

of his liberty, robs

all

personality of

all its

the moral restraints that check the eruption

Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Selected Works, Vol.

p. 566.

13

human

The Communist Manifesto,

p. 32.

II,

Marx XXIV.

[333

of blind impulses. There

is

no recognition of any

right of the in-

dividual in his relations to the collectivity; no natural right

to

human

system.

personality,
.

Nor

is

which

is

mere cog-wheel

in the

is

accorded

Communist

the individual granted any property rights over

material goods or the

means of production.

Christian needs no further refutation of MarxHaving grasped its basic tenets, which is to say, its basic
fallacies and weaknesses, only one conclusion is in order: "Communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save
Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking

The well-grounded
ism.

whatsoever."

15

MARXISM AND REASON

Prescinding from
doctrine proves

its

irreconcilability with Christianity,

wrong even when

Marx's

tested against the principles of

sound reasoning. Despite his boasts to the contrary, Marx uses

methods and voices assertions thoroughly unscientific. His view of
history and historical laws is a crude over-simplification of the
complicated framework and interplay of social phenomena. He
patently denies the principle of contradiction, the very foundation

and practical knowledge. He considers one element of history (the economic factor )-4he^ only key to the evaluation and interpretation of all human history, while experience
of true speculative

teaches that

many

ment, and religious

another element (great

me n,

nationalist senti-

example) has at least concurred to

an^equal degree in the shapingjrfni an's p rogress and aviation.
Marx uncomfortably sTSts^round on this very question. Does he
belief, for

believe in the all-embracing, iron law of economics, or does he

and creative determination of

economic factor alone
being merely superstructures; on

believe in the intelligence, free will,

man? On
makes

the one

hand he says

history, all other factors

that the

man has understood the laws of

he is able to dominate and direct the course of history. He
cannot have it both ways. His application of dialectical materialism to history involves a similar incoherence. If the three phases

the other, he states that once

society

14 Pius XI, Encyclical Letter

on Atheistic
D.C.: N.C.W.C., 1937), 9, 10.
15 Ibid., 58.

Communism

(Washington,

V.

334]

if

Times

and synthesis constantly mark the evolution of

of thesis, antithesis,

matter,

Modem

the cosmic law

every synthesis contains

is

a perennial struggle of opposites,

own

its

negation,

how

is

if

possible to

it

reach a stage wherein social conditions will be such as to form a

unique synthesis devoid of its own negation, a synthesis that will
stay static, perfect, changeless, forever?

Even

if

one were to concede

grounds, Marx's final synthesis

one wonders
earthly
society,

how

gullible

the

paradise,

feasibility

its

on philosophical

so childishly Utopian that

still

he believed his followers to be. His

perfectly

involves

necessarily

is

happy,

classless,

and

nature. Against the overwhelming data of experience

chology,

we have

only Marx's

stateless

human

complete revolution in

word

and psy-

that the unattainable will

eventually be attained.

That Marx, a poor reader of past history, equally failed to

is further evidenced by his prediction of the inevitable worsening of workers' conditions under the capitalist

read the future

system.

The

fact

is

that in the highly industrialized countries of

today a marked amelioration of social

ills

has been consistently

if

slowly effected. Capitalism as a tool of oppression and exploita

tion (so justly

condemned by Marx)

has not deteriorated.

extent at least. It

is

It

is

on the wane. Capitalism,

has changed for the better to a notabl

precisely in the industrialized countries tha

the class struggle has practically ceased, while the sporadic soci

revolutions to date, both in the

West and

in the East,

have

arise

out of pre-capitalist systems.

In addition, students of economics deny the validity of the

labor theory of value and surplus-value.

Manual labor

is

not the

predominant factor in modern production. Correctly to explain the

enormous productivity of modern industry and the increase in
capital, one must take into account many other contributing factors
such as personal ability, technical skill and knowledge, as well as
the existence of competition and the relation of supply to demand.
Students of politics also strongly attack Marx's idea of a transitional period

under the dictatorship of the

proletariat.

Marx, they

justly argue, so sensitive to the evils of the concentration of wealth,

is

totally blind to the evils of the concentration of

power. Dictators,

and again, are incapable of voluntary abdication. How, then, will the state wither away?
It may be added, finally, that hatred, which Marx so im-

history has proved again

Marx XXIV.

[335

placably willed and so carefully sowed in the hearts of his follift the world an inch. "Many dark hells have
on hatred, and darker ones may still be built, but para-

lowers, will never

been

built

even earthly, not

dises,

now

or ever."

16

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings.
Eastman. New York: The Modern Library, 1932.
Marx, K. and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (and selections from other writings of Marx). Ed. by S. H. Beer. New
York: Crofts Classics, 1955.

Marx, K.

Capital,

Ed. by

Berlin,

I.

Max

Karl Marx, His Life and Environment.

New

York: Ox-

ford University Press, 1948.

*

Hook,

S.

ton:

The Ambiguous Legacy: Marx and

Van Nostrand Anvil Books, 1955.
.

Towards

the Marxists. Prince-

the Understanding of Karl

Marx. London: V.

Gollancz, 1933.

Hunt, R. N. C. Marxism, Past and

Present.

New

York: Macmillan,

1954.

Schwarzschild, L. The Red Prussian: The Life and Legend of Karl

Marx. London: Hamilton, 1948.
Sheed, F. J. Communism and Man. New York: Sheed and Ward,
1938.

Timasheff, N.

S. "Karl Marx: Communist Manifesto," The Great

Books. Ed. by H. Gardiner. New York: Devin-Adair, 1949.
Vol. I, pp. 104-108.

16

G.

1953), p.

Manacorda, Comunismo
7.

Cattolicesimo

(Milano:

Garzanti,

chapter xxv

The Fabians*

THE FABIAN SOCIETY

THE 1880's, in England, a small group of social reformers

INdubbed
themselves the Fabian Society. The name chosen was
that of the

Roman

The Fabian

who

waited for the

against Hannibal,

though many

general Fabius Cunctator,

moment "when warring

censured his delays; but when
right

the time came, he struck hard."

Society is the oldest socialist society in the world, and

most successful: it has never had a split, and its tenets today
are the same as when it was founded. It was the matrix from
which the British Labor Party was produced, and it still is the
"Brains Trust" of the same Labor Party.
The Fabian Society originated with a small group of persons
who had gathered around a peripatetic Scot, Thomas Davidson
(1840-1900), to study ethics. Born into a peasant family, after a
brilliant career at Aberdeen University, Davidson settled in the
United States, visiting England from time to time. He had been
much influenced by Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797-1855), whose
works he had translated into English, and whose life he had written. Davidson founded an association called the Fellowship of the
New Life, which on November 23, 1883, passed the following
resolution: "The members of the Society assert that the competitive system assures the happiness and comfort of the few at the
* An essay written especially for this work by Anne Fremantle.
the

The Fabians XXV.

expense of the suffering of the
reconstituted in such a

and happiness."
On January

manner

[337

many and

that Society

must be

as to secure the general welfare

1884, a majority of the members of the Fel-

4,

New

and to form a society

above aim: the reconstruction of society. This seceding group of a dozen men, calling
itself the Fabian Society, from the first proposed to devote itself

lowship of the

more

Life decided to secede

practically tailored to achieve the

aim by the study of social questions and by spreadWith this in view, the members of
which numbered only 130 in 1889 at the time of the
the Society
studied, gave lectures and published Tracts,
first Annual Report

to achieving

its

ing information about them.

ten in the

first five

years.

With the publication in 1889 of Fabian Essays, lectures deby the seven then most distinguished and active members
of the Fabian Society, Fabian theory became widely known and
the Fabians became politically as well as ideologically important
in England. The "seven" were:
George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), Irish dramatist and critic.
He was bom in Dublin, of a Protestant family, but migrated to

livered

London
Fabian

at the
tracts,

age of eighteen. In addition to writing

Shaw was

editor of the

many

Fabian Essays

of the

at its first

and again in 1908, 1931 and 1949.

Webb (1859-1947). The first of his many tracts for
the Society was Facts for Socialists. In 1894 he was elected to the
London County Council. That same year he and his wife Beatrice
published their History of Trade Unionism. In 1895 the Webbs
founded the London School of Economics, and in 1913 the New
Statesman. In 1918 Sidney Webb wrote the new constitution for
the Labor Party: Labor and the New Social Order. In 1929 he
was elevated to peerage as Lord Passfield and made Colonial

printing,

Sidney

Secretary.

Graham Wallas (1858-1932), English political scientist. He

was a lecturer at the London School of Economics from 1895 to
1923 and a professor at the University of London from 1914 to

He is the author of Human Nature in Politics (1908).

Sydney Olivier (1859-1943). An English administrator, he
filled with distinction such prominent posts as Governor of
Jamaica and Colonial Secretary. In the 1924 Labor Government
he was made Secretary of State for India.
1923.

V. Modern Times

338]

William Clarke (1852-1901), leader writer for The Spectator,

the oldest English weekly.

Hubert Bland (1856-1914), a journalist.

Annie Besant (1847-1933), nee Wood. She married Reverend Frank Besant in 1867, and accepted theosophism in 1889;
then she went to India and became an ardent Indian nationalist.

FABIAN POLITICAL THEORY

The Fabians had declared themselves

to be socialists as early
were from the outset anti-Marxian. They were

as 1887; they also

the

first critics

tion of history

Marx: they rejected his materialistic interpretaand declared that one could be a socialist even if

of

one had not read a

Marx had been

was

ism, but he

line of Capital: in fact,

Bernard Shaw said

very useful in showing up the wickedness of capitalin

no sense a

socialist.

The Fabians read Marx,

however, and also Owen, 1 Proudhon, 2 and the English economists,

Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Bentham.

Fabianism as a doctrine begins with the conviction of the

human person, and a belief that all men and women
have an equal right to live their lives in a manner that seems to
them morally good. The Fabians agree with Bentham in their
value of the

insistence that the state exists for the individual

1

Robert

Owen

and that the main-

(1771-1858), born of poor parents, at the age of

eleven was already at

work

in a textile factory, early

amassed consider-

able wealth, and in 1799, having bought an impoverished mill village at

New

Lanark

in Scotland, transformed

it

into a

model

socialist

community.

In 1825, he established another such settlement in the United States, in

Indiana, which however soon dispersed. In later years he abandoned further experiments in cooperative societies

and

and

by writing
and the profit

tried to spread,

lecturing, his radical ideas (abolition of private property

system, uniformity in education, absolute equality, replacement of

money

by labor notes, suppression of all exterior cults). The term "socialism" is

found for the first time in a manifesto he issued in 1820.
2 Pierre- Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), French journalist and politician, a militant revolutionary, is regarded by many as the father of
anarchism (his society is without a master but is to be based on "equality,
law, independence, and proportionality"). He rejected the institution of
private property ("property is theft," "property is the suicide of society")
while disagreeing equally with Marxian communism and the Utopian ideas
of St. Simon and Owen. Some of his books are: What Is Property? (1840),
Letter to Blanqui (1841), Philosophy of Misery (1846), Economic Contradictions (1846).

The Fabians XXV.

tenance of his rights

[339

is its first

duty.

These

rights are the conditions

that the individual feels necessary to the fulfillment of his best

and these rights cannot be equal unless the freedom is equal,

and for individuals to have equal freedom their economic opportunity must be equal. And this is where the Fabians broke away
from Bentham, whose chief emphasis was conditioned by his fear
self,

of state interference with individual action.

The Fabians declared

economic equality could only be imposed by collective control. Nor could this collective control be effective without collective ownership of the means of production. Thus, from the outset,

that

recommended

the Fabians

were

and

still

are

nationalization,

called "gas

first

and water

of

utilities:

socialists"

they

then

of

other national assets, such as coal, electricity, railroads, aviation

and transport, cables and communication, medical services, iron

and steel, and banks. Each citizen, the Fabians declared, had an
equal claim in the common good in respect of his equal needs.
Yet the Fabian view of collectivism from the first took great pains
to insist on the absolute value of private property. In Fabian
Essays, discussing the moral basis of socialism, Sydney (Lord)
Olivier emphasized that private property was as essential a factor
of industrial society as it had been of agricultural, since "it was
obviously necessary for the establishment of industrial society that

each

man

should own the product of his labour and the tools neceshim to labour effectually." 3 Although the Industrial Revoluhad entirely changed the conditions under which men produce

sary for
tion

wealth, yet the sanctions of law and morality

still

cling to all that

has been included in the old definition of property. But

if

the idea so constantly appealed to in justification of property law

to be realized;

if

is

the fruits of each man's labour are to be guaranteed

him and he is to own the instruments with which he works; if the

laws of property are not to establish a parasitic class taking tribute
from the labour of others in the forms of Rent and Interest, then we

to

must modify our administration of property. 4

3

Fabian Essays (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 117.

117. Rather surprisingly, Lord Olivier, who never professed
Christianity in any form, took several pages of Fabian Essays to praise the
Church: "The Catholic Church has always insisted on the duty of helping the poor, not on the ground of the social danger of a 'residuum' but
by the nobler appeal to the instinct of human benevolence. The Catholic
Church developed, relatively to the enlightenment of its age, the widest and
4 Ibid.,
p.

V. Modern Times

340]

Even

so, the

amount of

socialization possible

and necessary was

considered by the Fabians to vary not only from time to time but
also to require continual adaptation to differing conditions of
peoples and places. 5

The Fabians rejected revolution and any form of direct action.

They believed, as Sidney Webb put it, in "the inevitability of
gradualness" and Bernard Shaw obstinately maintained that the
"meaning of history is Fabian" that is, that evolution was going

their

way. Sidney

Webb

regarded

reforms as evidences

all social

of the growth of socialism within the capitalist society,

sidered that

and con-

such must be encouraged in every way. Yet the

all

Fabians never became a

political party,

never ran a single candi-

date for Parliament as a Fabian; their speakers never urged any-

one to become a Fabian or to join the Fabian Society not even

in 1892, when 3,400 lectures were given by 113 Fabians in a
twelve-month period. The Fabian Society has never had more than
4,000 members;

at the time of its greatest influence

when

permeating both the Liberal and Conservative parties with

ist

it

had under 1,500. Nor

doctrine; rather

it

is

it

its

was

ideas

the Fabian Society a school of social-

was, and

is,

a group of

men and women who

spread practical views on current needs and immediate social

problems, and indicate the

way

these problems

legislative or administrative reforms.

Over

its

may be met by

seventy-six (1959)

years of existence, the Fabian Society has in fact produced a collective

body of

socialist doctrine tested at

every step by constant

concrete experience.

The Fabians

did for British socialism at the end of the nine-

system of education the world has ever seen before this century.
its revolutionary conception that God was incarnated in Man, exploding the hideous superstition that the imagination
of the thoughts of man's heart was only to do evil continually, and substituting the faith in the perfectibility of each individual soul; by its
brilliant and powerful generalisation that God must be Love, because there
is nothing better, and that man is freed from the law by the inward
guidance of grace, has done more for social morality than any other
freest

Catholic Christianity, by

religion of the world. Protestant Individualism in

Catholic Church; founded the

estates; destroyed the

England shattered the

modern land system upon

its

in religion rehabilitated the devil. . . ."

5 For the Catholic view on socialization, see this volume,

nos. 111-120.

confiscated

medieval machinery of charity and education, and

Appendix,

The Fabians XXV.

[341

teenth century almost exactly what their predecessors, the

utili-

same
century. The philosophic radicals or utilitarians with Jeremy
Bentham and the two Mills James and John Stuart had exercised a permanent and powerful influence on the reform movetarians, did for British liberalism at the beginning of the

ments and

legislation of their period,

and above

all

they were in-

strumental in forging the means of carrying out the reforms they

advocated:
Fabians,

and

many

this

means was the

British Civil Service.

of them, were British Civil servants

and Sydney Olivier were clerks

in the Colonial Office;

Podmore (1856-1910), who gave

the Society

was

in the Post Office;

its

The

Sidney Webb

name

Frank

of Fabian,

and many others were in other branches of

the Civil Service. This gave the Fabians an acquaintance with the
actual functions of

government that was of great practical ad-

vantage to them in keeping their schemes concrete and helping in

their realization: the

machinery of government was familiar to the

own blueprints, or work

was a disadvantage, however, in that it
Fabian minds the state and the govern-

Fabians, and they could execute their

for their execution. This

tended to confound in

keep clear. But, just as Owenon Robert Owen's works was

idyllic, and Marxist socialism was theoretical and revolutionary,
so Fabianism was, and is, "everyday politics for social regeneration." But it is apt to be short on political theory.

ment: a distinction that

ism

the

socialism

it is

vital to

patterned

FABIAN ECONOMICS
Fabian economics are based on Ricardo's theory of rent.
Ricardo had demonstrated that the worth of land arose from the
landlord's manipulation of the soil,

and the difference

in the pro-

ductive value of different pieces of land. This enables the landlord

to

skim

off as rent the difference

between the yield of

his piece of

land and that of the least productive piece in use or cultivation.

Thus the Fabians appeared to many land reformers, such as those

converted by Henry George, 6 to recognize socialism as the logical
outcome of their ideas. And for the Fabians there was no theoretical difference between land and capital: sauce for the goose (land)
was sauce for the gander (capital).
6

Henry George (1839-1897), an American writer, was the inventor

Tax" idea and the author of Progress and Poverty (1879).

of the "Single

V. Modern Times

342]

The

earth

is

the Lord's, but the fullness thereof

is

the land-

'

saw the source and measure

Marx, but in utility, and the Fabians
were fundamentally utilitarians. But whereas Bentham had used
declared the Fabians. Jevons

lord's,

of value not in labor, as did

number to justify his opbad forms of state interference, the Fabians used it
good forms. The Fabians were and are totally

the greatest happiness of the greatest

position to the
to justify the

unconvinced of the relevance of the class theory, or of class

tinctions,

and they have no

dis-

belief in the class struggle as the in-

strument of social change. Nor do they have any mystique about

and the
two leading working-class organizations, and they later rejected H. G. Wells' idea that the only way
to achieve socialism is by making socialists. "The work of the
Fabian Society has been not to make socialists, but to make
socialism" wrote E. R. Pease (1857-1953), the Society's secretary
for twenty-five years, and its only historian. And the Fabian way
to make socialism was, and is, by municipalization and nationalizathe proletariat: the early Fabians ignored the trade unions

co-operatives, at that time the

tion.

"We

take over," Pease has written,

the entrepreneur's enterprise, his gasworks and waterworks, his docks

and trams,

and mines.

his railways

We

secure for the State the profits

management and the future unearned increment, and we compensate him for his capital with interest-bearing securities. We force
him in fact to become the idle recipient of unearned income, and then
we turn round and
tax him heavily precisely because his income
of

is

unearned.

Fabians from the

first felt

that decentralization

was a necessary

condition of the realization of their aim, and they set out to capture

from the first. Before the first Labor government

power (as a minority) in 1922, there were 10,000
Labor representatives in various municipal and other local

local bodies

came

into

elected

bodies

scattered

throughout

England:

Bernard Shaw himself

worked for six years as a vestryman of St. Pancras (a slum parish

in London) and never missed a meeting: in 1900 there were only
62,698 Labor voters in England; by 1922, AV2 million; by 1944
7

opher,

William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), English economist and philosis the author of Theory of Political Economy (1871), The State in

Relation to Labour (1882), Methods of Social Reform.


The Fabians XXV.
there

200

was a

of

solid majority of

whom,

[343

Labor members

in Parliament, over

including the Prime Minister, Clement (later Earl)

were Fabians.
based his socialism on Mill's theory of social reform by
means of the Ricardian law of rent, but took it much further.
Mill had stopped at land reform (though he died a confessed
socialist), but Webb noted that as soon as production was sufficiently advanced to furnish more than the barest necessities, a

Attlee,

Webb

Whatever individuals or

struggle for the surplus began.

were in power used

it

classes

to get hold of that surplus product, leaving

beyond the means of sub-

the rest of society "practically nothing

sistence according to the current local standard."

This surplus produce possessed the character of rent. In relation to

agriculture

it

presence of

was

fertility,

human

mineral contents, position, or even the mere

beings (labour) that combined to

make

the net

advantages of one piece of land very different from that of another.

This differential advantageousness, rising in scale
the

phenomenon of economic

rent.

Under

accounted for

unrestricted private

ownership and free competition, with the motive of pecuniary selfman in possession of any position economically
superior to the very margin of cultivation
was able to retain for
himself the whole differential advantage of that position. This law of
rent held good not of land only.
Alike in all capitalist enterprise

interest in full play, the

manufacture, in transport, in distribution, as well as in agriculture

the factors of production were different from one another in net
advantageousness no less than the land itself. 8

in

But the product, whatever its cost to produce, is worth only

what the market will bear, and the exchange value of the least useful part of the supply fixes the exchange value of all the rest.
Technically this occurs by the "law of indifference" and since the
least useful unit of the supply is generally that which is last produced,
called the final utility of the commodity. The utility of the
or most useful unit is called the total utility. Final utility is sometimes called "marginal utility".
The main point to be grasped is

its utility is

first

however useful any commodity may be, its exchange value can be
run down to nothing by increasing the supply until there is more of it
that

Max

1942), Vol.

Beer, History of British Socialism (London: Allen and

II, p.

282.

Unwin,

V. Modern Times

344]
than

wanted. The excess being useless and valueless, is to be had

nobody will pay anything for a commodity as long

is

for nothing, and

as plenty of

On

it

to be

is

had for nothing. 9

by withholding necessary things,

them can send the price up: thus if gas, elec-

the other hand, of course,

private owners of

water,

tricity,

transportation,

mail

sewers,

delivery,

etc.,

are

privately owned, the owners can make people pay much more for
them than if the state that is, all the people own them and pay

them in proportion to their use of them.

Thus for Webb, the struggle is not between the capitalist class
and the working class, but between the great mass of the people
and the appropriators of differential rent: between the producers

for

those

who

on the

fatten

make

organize industries, design machinery,

or discoveries, or perform bodily labor

tions

results

and

merely because they invest

inven-

those

capital.

who
Since

improvement performed by, or

community ("social labor and general
development") it should belong to, and be utilized by and for,
the good of the whole of society: this is to be done by municipalization, nationalization, and taxation.
The Fabian Society from its beginning opposed all pretensions
to hamper

differential rent is the result of

belonging

to,

the whole

the socialisation of industry with equal wages, equal hours of labour,

official status, or equal authority for everyone. Such conditions
were not only impracticable, but incompatible with equality of sub-

equal

ordination to the

common

was

origin

interests.

They recognised

that wealth

and must be social in its distribution, since

the evolution of industry had made it impossible to distinguish the
particular contribution that each person made to the common product
social in

or to ascertain

its

its

value. 10

Whatever things ... we allow a man

to possess, we must allow

exchange never takes place unless both parties
believe themselves to benefit by it. Further, bequest must be allowed,
since any but a moderate probate duty or personalty would, unless
supported by a strong and searching public opinion, certainly be
evaded. Moreover, if we desire the personal independence of women

him

to exchange, for

George Bernard Shaw, "The Basis of Socialism,"

p. 14.

10

Max

Beer, op.

cit.,

p. 286.

in

Fabian Essays,

The Fabians XXV.

[345

must for a long time to come be

and children, then their property
Voluntary associations of all kinds,
most carefully guarded.
whether joint stock companies, religious corporations or communistic
groups, would, in the eyes of the Social Democratic State, consist
.

simply of so

many

which are allowed

individuals possessing those rights of property

to individuals. 11

FABIAN LANDMARKS
The Fabians had a totally unexpected success with Fabian
Essays which sold 46,000 copies in England alone before World

War

and has never been out of print since its publication.

had held practically uniEnglish
minds, and his suspicion
unmitigated
sway
over
versal and
the
educated among the
of the state was the attitude of most of
highly individualistic English people. But in the seventies T. H.
Green, an Oxford idealist and a Platonist, had begun to teach that
Bentham's opposition between the state and the individual was
artificial, and suggested that the citizen has, and can have, no
meaning apart from the state. Unless the state can guarantee to
each man the powers without which he could not realize himself,
I,

Until 1870 Jeremy Bentham's ideas

then the state

is

void of

all

ethical content, for the state

is

the

instrument in and through which the citizens realize themselves,

and the
ment of

state's

main function

is

to achieve the full

moral develop-

its citizens.

Bentham's mistrust of the state, and his relegation of its funcmerely to those of being the citizens' watchdog, and T. H.

tions

Green's return to a more important governess-type role for the

state,

were the practical

results of historical happenings. Just as

the civil wars of the fifteenth century in

England had ended the

old feudal, hierarchical view of society

by proving it obsolete
and broken down so the seventeenth-century wars disposed of
the Tudor absolutism, and of the idea of the divine right of kings
that had succeeded feudalism. So, too, the Napoleonic wars at the
end of the eighteenth, and early nineteenth century, had freed the
commercial classes from the last vestiges of aristocratic control.
The Reform Bill of 1832 had established a world in which the
rights of the business man and his unlimited economic possi-

11

Fabian Essays,

p. 128.

V. Modern Times

346]
bilities

had been secured by

legislation,

and England became the

leading mercantile and banking power in the world. But the wasteful horrors of unlimited cut-throat free competition, the terrible

deterioration of the condition of the laboring classes as the result

of the Industrial Revolution, together with the ever greater de-

pendence of the employers on a cheap supply of labor, and of the

employed on their capacity to sell their labor their only possesbrought about widespread discontent, leading in many cases
sion
to near revolts. It was in this atmosphere that Fabian Essays first
appeared, during a temporary industrial depression (which caused
Henry Adams to write home to America that England was completely bankrupt), and its practical effects were tremendous. In
1892 Fabians captured the new London County Council, and the
Fabians also succeeded in forcing on the Liberal Party a program
of social reform written by Sidney Webb and known as the Newcastle Program, which was adopted by the National Liberal Federation in 1891. The Liberals got in, but then refused to honor their
election promises. Sidney Webb and Bernard Shaw wrote an article

The Fortnightly Review entitled "To Your Tents, O Israel"

condemning the Liberals and urging the necessity for the creation
of a socialist party. As a result, in February 1900, the Labor
Representation Committee was founded, and took office in 1922
as the Labor Party.
Another Fabian landmark was the Education Act of 1902,
drafted and maneuvered into law by Fabians. And in 1909-1911
the "Minority Report on the Reform of the Poor Law," written by
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, was another vitally important Fabian
and socialist statement. "Hitherto," wrote E. R. Pease,

in

writings on the organisation of society, whether contemporary or Utopian, had visualised a world composed exclusively of
healthy, sane and effective citizens, mostly adults. No Socialist had
stopped to think out how, in a densely populated and highly industrialall socialist

community, we should provide systematically for the

orphans, the sick, the physically or mentally defective and the aged
on the one hand, and for the adults for whom at any time no im-

ised Socialist

mediate employment could be found on the other. The Minority Report, meanwhile, worked out the lines along which the necessary organisation must proceed, even in the fully socialised state. 12
12 E.

R. Pease, History of the Fabian Society (London: George Allen

and Unwin, 1924),

p.

218.

The Fabians XXV.

[347

This Minority Report was shelved by the Liberal government

then in power, in favor of a general insurance scheme produced

by the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George; but twenty years

later Lord Beveridge, a Fabian, brought in all the many of the
reforms suggested by the Minority Report, and in 1947 the third
Labor government (the first with a majority) completed the implementation of the schemes adumbrated in the Minority Report.
At first the Fabians were anxious to stay a small group; later
H. G. Wells made an attempt to persuade them to increase in
numbers, but it was "an expensive failure" and today the Fabians
are only about 4,000 strong. The most serious challenge to their
collectivist doctrine was made by the Guild Socialists, who advocated a modified type of syndicalism. Their opposition to the
collectivist doctrine began in 1907. The Fabians that year had

approved the "treaty" Lloyd George "imposed" on the railroad

industry. A. J. Penty (1875-1937), who had published a book
The Restoration of the Guild System in 1906, together with A. R.
Orage (1873-1934) and S. G. Hobson (1864-1940), both of
whom were journalists writing for The New Age, a Fabianfinanced publication, began to wonder whether strikes would be

permitted in a state-owned industry. In 1915, G. D. H. Cole

(1889-1959), just down from Oxford, was elected to the Fabian

and began a "Reform" movement, hostile to the Labor
Party, from which he proposed to disaffiliate the Fabians. His
resolution, however, was defeated by ninety-two votes to fortyeight. The Guild Socialists believed in producer management of
industry instead of consumer control, and advocated workers
elected in each case. But Cole left the Fabians, and their subseexecutive,

quent history

is

Sir Ernest

The

the history of the British

Barker has

Labor

Party.

summed up Fabian Theory

policy of Fabianism has been

somewhat

as follows:

as follows.

An

intel-

permeate all classes, from the top to the

bottom, with a common opinion in favour of social control of socially
created values. Resolved to permeate all classes, it has not preached
lectual circle has sought to

has worked as much with and through Liberal

and through Labour representatives. Reformist
rather than revolutionary, it has urged the necessity of a gradual
amelioration of social conditions by a gradual assertion of social
control over unearned increment. ... It has preached that the society
which is to exert control must be democratic, if the control is to be,

class-consciousness:

"capitalists" as with

it

V. Modern Times

348]

as it must be, self-control; it has taught that democratic self-control

must primarily be exerted in local self-government; it has emphasised

the need of reconciling democratic control with expert guidance.

It

has adopted the sound position that democracy flourishes in that

form of
ity of

state in

which the people

freely produce, thanks to

an equal-

educational opportunity, and freely choose, thanks to a wide

and active

suffrage, their

own members

for their guidance, and since

they have freely produced and chosen them, give them freely and
fully the

honour of

their trust. 13

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fabian Essays. London: Allen

Beer, M.

& Unwin,

1948.

History of British Socialism. London: Allen

& Unwin,

1942.

Fremantle, A. The Fabians.

Pease, E. R. The History of

New

York: Macmillan, 1960.

London: Allen

the Fabian Society.

&

Unwin, 1924.

Ulam, A.

B. Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism.

bridge:

Harvard University

Cam-

Press, 1951.

13 Sir Ernest Barker, Political Thought in England from Herbert

Spencer to the Present Day (New York: Holt, 1915), pp. 219, 220.

chapter xxvi

Lenin

LIFE

VLADIMIR

ILICH ULYANOV,

foes as Nikolai Lenin, 1

better

was born

known

in Simbirsk,

and
on the Volga

to friends

River, April 22 (Gregorian calendar; April 10, according to the

Julian calendar), 1870.

At

the time, his father, a schoolmaster of

Mongolian ancestry, was provincial inspector of primary schools

in Simbirsk and, as such, belonged to the minor Russian nobility.
His mother, the former Maria Blank, of Volga-German parents,
was a well-educated woman to whom Lenin remained deeply attached

all

his

life.

In June 1887, the young Ulyanov graduated from the Simbirsk

at the head of his class. A year before, at the age of
he had ceased to believe in God. A month before, pre-

gymnasium
sixteen,

cisely in the early

Alexander, by him

morning of

much

May

8,

1887, his older brother

loved and admired, had been hanged for

participation, with other students of St. Petersburg University, in

a plot to assassinate Czar Alexander III. That

had

same year Lenin

lost his father.

1 He chose this name after the Lena, the Siberian

river that flows
through the region where he spent his exile. He first used this name when
he published, in Switzerland, The Aims of Russian Social Democrats.

Others say he chose it in memory of his brother Alexander,

called Lenin (Lion) by his companions.

who was

V. Modern Times

350]
In the

fall

of

1887 he entered Kazan University. Expelled

al-

most immediately for disorderly activities against the school auhe lived for several months under police surveillance on
Denied re-admittance to the University
return to Kazan a year later, he gave himself completely to

thorities,

his mother's country estate.

on

his

the study of social problems. It

was

then, at the age of eighteen,

began to read
Marx. The void left in him by the loss of God and father and
brother seemed to be filled by the presence and the teachings of
the old prophet of communism. And the newly discovered faith
gave his bitterness and hatred a precise goal in which to seek
that in a spare kitchen of his family's apartment he

revenge and satisfaction.

In 1891 Lenin was allowed to go to

St.

Petersburg to study

He

mastered the four-year course in one year and again

finished at the head of his class. Then he plunged feverishly into
law.

the revolutionary activities that were to culminate, twenty-five years

later, in the

establishment of the

first

communist

state

with him-

self as first dictator.

In April 1895, still weak from a severe attack of pneumonia,

he went abroad for medical treatment. In Paris, Geneva, and
Zurich he familiarized himself with the problems of the Western
socialist movements, visited at length with foreign socialists, and
met the founding fathers of Russian Marxism (Plekhanov and
Akselrod). He returned to Russia in September 1895 already, at

the age of twenty-five, a recognized leader of the

was practicing law. In

St.

Petersburg

most of his
time and energies were devoted to inflammatory writing and other
forms of clandestine propaganda. But the Secret Political Police
(the Okrana) had its eyes on him and on December 20, 1895, he
was arrested. Fourteen months later he was released from jail and
banished for three years to the village of Shushenskoe in eastern
Siberia. He arrived there in May 1897. The following May he was
joined by Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, a fellow communist. She became his wife, and their marriage lasted for life.
Lenin's stay in Siberia was no harrowing experience. The food
was simple but wholesome and plentiful. He could always find
diversion in hunting, fishing, swimming, skating, and wrestling. He
would still indulge, even by correspondence, in his favorite pastime, chess playing. Above all, the forced isolation was an invaluable opportunity for study and writing, and particularly for selfMarxists. Ostensibly he

reality

Lenin XXVI.

[351

appraisal. In the Siberian setting Lenin's personality

defined,

his

central

goal

reaffirmed,

the

road to

was
it

clearly

definitely

mapped.
In

March 1900,

his period of

banishment ended, Lenin

left

European Russia. From there he went abroad to become one of the editors of Iskra ("The Spark"), the organ of the
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Its first issue, printed in
small crowded type on thin paper, was published in Munich in
December 1900 and smuggled into Russia for distribution by
secret agents who, in Lenin's plan, were also to link up with the
party network. In April 1902, Iskra was transferred to London
and a year later to Geneva. Lenin followed the paper to both
cities. It was in London that he first met Lev Bronstein (Leon
Trotsky). 2 The two became friends and, at Lenin's insistence,
Trotsky remained abroad to assist in the work of Iskra.
The year 1903 marked a split in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Membership in the party was the precipitating
issue. Lenin, the leader of the radical wing, wanted membership
Siberia for

limited to professional revolutionaries

active conspirators blindly

submissive to party discipline. Julius Martov, speaker for the more

conservative faction, wanted membership for

friends and symHere Lenin lost to

all

pathizers, active or not in revolutionary work.

Martov by a small margin. But on every other important issue the

Second Congress of the Social Democrats (held first in Brussels
and then in London) was carried by Lenin's group, which came to
be known as Bolsheviks (members of the majority), while Martov's
was termed Mensheviks (members of the minority). With the
2 Trotsky or Trotski, born in Russia in 1877 of Jewish parents, became
a revolutionist in his early youth. He was arrested in 1898 and banished

1902 he escaped to England and there he met Lenin. In

was banished again to Siberia. He
escaped, this time to Austria. In 1916 he was expelled from France and
repaired to the United States. On his return to Russia in 1917, after the
March Revolution, he filled important posts in the communist government,
always remaining loyal to Lenin though differing with him at times on
methods and policy. After Lenin's death, Trotsky continued to champion
World Revolution against Stalin (1879-1953), who wanted instead
"Socialism in one country." But Stalin won the party leadership and in
1929 Trotsky was banished from Russia. In 1937 he went to live in
Mexico and there, on August 21, 1940, he was murdered. His most
famous books are: The Defense of Terrorism (1921), My Life (1930),
History of the Russian Revolution (1932).
to Siberia. In

1905, having returned to Russia, he

V. Modern Times

352]
passing years the

rift

between the two factions widened and the

became more acute and

violent. In 1912, at the Bolshevik

Conference in Prague, the division became final. From then on,
the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks led a completely separate existence. But it was not until 1918 that Lenin's faction changed the

struggle

name from

Democrat to Communist.
In the meantime Lenin had to fight and maneuver against the
suspicion and distrust of his comrades. At one time, isolated,
criticized, practically abandoned, he was demoted from the Russian
Central Committee and forbidden to print anything without its
party

consent.

At

Social

another, after the Bolshevik failure in the Revolution

of 1905, 3 he was tempted to yield to despondency and frustration.

But

his fanatical will

made him more adamant

in following his

devious course to party leadership and the revolution that was to

change the history of the world.

The Revolution came in 1917. At
according to the revised calendar),

it

first,

in

was the

February (March

strange, spontaneous

revolt of the Russian people, tired of Czarist absolutism, literally

and blows and

Without leaders, without

common impulse, they ceased to be
interested in and to obey their old government
and abruptly this
and all that it stood for crumbled. The Bolshevik leaders were
taken by surprise: Lenin and Zinoviev in Zurich, Bukharin and
Trotsky in New York, Stalin and Kamenev in Siberia. But they
rushed to Petrograd to take command of the revolution and further agitate the people. Lenin with Krupskaya and several other
sick of slavery

indignities.

programs, following but a

Bolsheviks, as well as a party of

traveled through

Germany

some twenty non-Bolsheviks,

The transpor-

in a sealed railway car.

had been arranged by the General Staff of the German

army, confident that the return of the Russian emigres would

tation

accelerate the
3

disintegration of Russia

and

particularly of the

Three major parties were clamoring for reform

time: the Constitutional Democratic Party

members were

middle-class business

(known

men and

in

Russia at the

as the Cadets),

intellectuals

whose

who wanted a

British-type of government, a constitutional

tionary Party, whose

monarchy; the Social Revoluthe overthrow of the

land to the peasants, and whose left

more moderate wing advocated

and the redistribution of their

wing wanted to organize the farmers into socialized co-operatives; the
Social Democratic Labor Party, which was divided into the Bolshevik and
Menshevik factions.
nobility

Lenin XXVI.

[353

Russian army. Lenin and his immediate party arrived in Petrograd

at the Finland Station the night of April 3 ( 16)

Lenin immediately launched into a series of speeches and

and manifestoes (The April Theses) to hammer home his
ideas. The revolution of February was but a first step just as the
overthrow of Czarism had been but a first phase. What had haparticles

pened was a bourgeois revolution; what had yet to happen was a

proletarian revolution, wherein the supreme power would be seized
by the Soviets. 4 No compromise was to be proposed or accepted,
no aid given the moderate government that replaced the old
regime. Push the revolution, overthrow Kerensky's "bourgeois"

democracy, establish a dictatorship of the proletariat this was

Lenin's immediate program.
At the same time, realizing that the Bolsheviks were a minority, Lenin determined to gain control of the Petrograd Soviet and

He threw his men into army and labor

gave the Soviets an electrifying watchword: "Peace,

the other Soviets in Russia.

politics.

He

Land, and Bread." Lenin soon added another war cry: "All power
to the Soviets!"

On November

7,

1917

(October 25 by the old Russian

calendar) what then seemed impossible, what

still today seems

by a Bolshevik majority, 5 were able to seize the power Lenin dreamed for them. The
Bolshevik troops quietly and simultaneously occupied all strategic
buildings and places in Petrograd. The Winter Palace held out
until late evening. Lenin announced its fall at the opening session
of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets: "Comrades, the
workers' and peasants' revolution has come to pass." The following day the Second Congress set up an executive branch of government, the Council of People's Commissars, as a provisional ad-

incredible, took place: the Soviets, controlled

4 The Soviets were a new kind of representative body, representing the

oppressed classes against the classes that held power; they were therefore
not representative of all the people. As to the Soviet National Body (the
All-Russian Congress of Soviets), it was indirectly elected: its delegates

were appointed by the local Soviets and not by the people.

5 At the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets (June 16, 1917), the
tally of delegates was as follows: Social Revolutionaries 385, Mensheviks
248, Bolsheviks 105. At the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets
(November 7, 1917), the tally was 390 Bolsheviks, 150 Social Revolutionaries, and 80 Mensheviks.

V. Modern Times

354]
ministration.

Lenin was made

its

chairman and proceeded im-

mediately "to construct the socialist order."

What happened

afterward

is

familiar history.

The

elected

Con-

stituent Assembly (the Bolsheviks received only 175 of 707 seats)

met only to be dissolved by force by the Soviets (January 1918).

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which definitely ended the RussianGerman war, was signed March 3, 1918. Then the terror began.
Chaos and uncertainty and fear and brutality engulfed the Russian
land as the Cheka (the Soviet Secret Police organized December
20, 1917) went pitilessly about its grim business of liquidating all
opposition and denying the people the very freedoms for which
the Russian revolutionaries had so long fought. Early in 1918 the
Soviet government was transferred from Petrograd to Moscow and
soon after Lenin took up residence in the Kremlin. August 30,
1918, Fanya Kaplan fired three shots at him from a distance of
only a few

He

feet.

One

bullet pierced his neck, another his collar-

The Cheka

was

and Lenin,
proclaiming that "outside of force and violence, there is no way to
bone.

survived.

terror

intensified

suppress the exploiters of the masses," took

it.

In

March 1919 he founded

to carry out in

all

in

Moscow

full responsibility for

the Third International

countries the revolutionary aims of the

Com-

munist Party and of the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1921, to

save the country from spreading famine and discontent, he in-

New Economic

(NEP), which admitted

and the wage system. It was not
capitalism but merely a strategic retreat on the eco-

troduced the

Policy

private enterprise, private trade,

a return to

nomic

front, a recoiling in order to leap forward.

front, Lenin's dictatorship continued,

Toward
paired.

He

more

the end of 1921, Lenin's health

suffered

On

ruthless

became

the political

and

from insomnia, weariness, headaches,

May

secure.

seriously imspells of

him almost
second followed in December 1922, a third in March
1923. In the middle of May he was taken a last time to his private
home in Gorki. His condition was hopeless. Early on January 21,
1924, he suffered a final stroke. At seven that evening he was dead.
vertigo. In early
totally.

1922, a

first

stroke incapacitated

THEORY AND ACTION

Some have said that Lenin the man of action is greater than
Lenin the theoretician. Some have added that, while unexcelled as

Lenin XXVI.

[355

conspirator, revolutionary leader,

and statesman, he

is

but a small

star in the constellation of political philosophers.

As for the first assertion, Lenin's activities were so related to

and influenced by his ideas and so influenced his and others' ideas,
that one is reluctant to make such a clear-cut distinction between
doctrine and practice. Lenin was himself fond of quoting Goethe:
"Theory is gray: what is green is the eternal tree of life." Thought
divorced from experience was for him nonsense. At the same time,
he was equally firm in stating that there is no revolutionary action
without revolutionary theory. Strategy (the application of theory

broad situation) and tactics (the direct practical application

and strategic principles to everyday affairs) were
for Lenin derivatives of theory by strictly logical deduction. One
rightly points to Lenin's articles, speeches, and books as the docuto a

of theoretical

ments wherein to become acquainted with his theory. But parallel

to his tersest statements one must place his decisions and policies
and methods for a full understanding of his contribution to the
development (or deformation) of political thought.
As for Lenin's place among the major political philosophers,
it can hardly be questioned, for Lenin's posthumous impact on
countless minds has been and still is far greater than the tremendous influence he exerted, while alive, on the history of the world
in general and of Russia in particular. In fact, one of Lenin's
major contributions to politics (one that his adversaries cannot
afford to ignore or minimize) is his insistence, even while he impressed his followers with the necessity of revolutionary practice,

on the immense importance of

theory.

LENINISM
In a series of remarkable lectures delivered in 1924, Stalin
defined Leninism as a development of Marxism: the

Marxism

of

and of the proletarian revolution, or, to

be more precise, "the theory and the tactic of the proletarian
revolution in general and the theory and the tactic of the dictator-

the epoch of imperialism

ship of the proletariat in particular."

and rightly, that Leninism is predicated

on combat and revolution. From the day of his brother's
imprisonment and execution, Lenin knew no peace until the popular fury was unleashed against the czar and the czarist system. Even
Stalin also asserted,

chiefly

V. Modern Times

356]

then Lenin's aggressiveness had been cold and calculated, for

from his brother's failure he drew the lesson that a revolutionary

movement must rely not on

but on an organized and

individual, sporadic acts of terrorism

disciplined

drive

of the

proletarian

masses.

A
him

year later (1888), an attentive reading of

that

Marxism had

to

defended tooth and nail

be restored to
against anyone

its

Marx convinced

pristine purity

who would

and

falsify

or

Lenin saw clearly that, next to the materialistic interpretation of history and the denial of everything
spiritual in man, Marx's central dogma was the necessity of revolution and the violent seizure and holding of all power by the proletariat. Marx and Engels had said that force is the midwife of every
old society pregnant with the new. Lenin too believed that the
obligatory road for changing the world led through much blood
and violence and ruthless extermination. He never tired of repeating that there could be no attempt at a reorganization of society,
no testing of solutions for political and economic problems before
the revolution had occurred
and by "revolution" he meant the
soften

its

original message.

violent destruction of the

monopoly

of force that

is

the capitalistic

and the immediate transfer of that same monopoly of force

to the proletariat. Thus revolution is the fundamental premise for
both Marxism and Leninism. Everything else is but a means.
Lenin fought tirelessly to uphold these principles all his life.
He fought against the "reformists" of Western Europe, who, in
an effort to change the Marxist creed, wanted to expunge its most
dynamic principle, the will violently to overthrow the bourgeoisie
and its bourgeois state. Marx's self-appointed interpreter and defender, he could never tolerate those who wished to replace Marx
the revolutionary with Marx the gentle reformer. Lenin fought
state

against the Populists, who still regarded the peasantry as a homogeneous force and had faith in its revolutionary potential. To him
the Russian peasantry, hopelessly disunited since the Emancipation

Act of 1861, was

together.

He

either unable or unwilling to stand

and

fight

fought the Economists (a group akin to the Trade

Unionists), whose interest was not politics but economics.

They

were unaware of the Marxian emphasis on strong leadership or too

timid to face its responsibilities. Their excessive trust in the working class led them to believe that the proletariat would ultimately
reach socialism by itself. This viewpoint or theory of spontaneity

Lenin XXVI.

[357

(also called "tailism," the ideology of those

of the

who

movement

instead of trying to lead

it,

who

cling to the tail

the ideology of those

await the progress of events and are therefore "opportunists")

Lenin rejected as a most dangerous heresy, a catastrophic delusion.

Left to

itself,

the proletariat

would never reach

socialism.

processes of history would never do automatically what

The

Marx

expected of them. Socialism would come to the masses but only

when brought

to

them from above.

IMPERIALISM AND THE PROLETARIAN

REVOLUTION
Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution

is

found primarily
pamphlet

in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 6 a

written in Zurich in the spring of 1916. In particular, the author

aimed

French and
1914-1918
of July 1920, that the war of
was

to prove, as

German

editions

imperialistic

on both

he

states in the Preface to the

sides:

a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition

... a war
German group of

of colonies, "spheres of influences," finance capital,

for the purpose of deciding whether the British or
financial

marauders [was] to receive the

etc. 7

lion's share. 8

In general his aim was to prove that capitalism had grown into
imperialism, "a world system of colonial oppression and of the

overwhelming majority of the people

by a handful of 'advanced' countries." 9
Imperialism, Lenin insisted, represented capitalism's highest
historical stage of development: a parasitic and decaying stage
financial strangulation of the

of the world

bringing to the forefront a very small

number

of the earth's in-

habitants and a handful of rich and powerful states that plunder

by using their enormous

and power these few privileged states are able to bribe in a
thousand ways the labor leaders and the upper levels of the labor
the entire world; a corrupt stage, for

riches

aristocracy or "bourgeoisified workers." Yet, imperialism has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism. In this sense, then,
6

V.

I.

1942), Vol.

Lenin,

XIX,

7 Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid.

Collected

it

Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart,

pp. 83-196.
8 ibid., p. 87.

V. Modern Times

358]

the transition of the moribund,

constitutes

agonizing capitalist

regime toward a superior economic and social order.

It is

"the

highest stage of capitalism" and "the eve of the proletarian social

revolution." 10

Lenin describes

this special

phase of capitalism:

Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of

the fundamental attributes of capitalism in general. But capitalism

only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of

its

development,

when

certain of

fundamental attributes began to

its

be transformed into their opposites, when the features of a period of

transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system

began to take shape and reveal themselves

main thing

nomically, the

in this process

is

all

along the

line.

Eco-

the substitution of capital-

monopolies for capitalist free competition. Free competition is the

fundamental attribute of capitalism, and of commodity production
ist

generally.

we have

Monopoly

is

exactly the opposite of free competition; but

seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our

very eyes, creating large-scale industry and eliminating small industry,

replacing large-scale industry by

still

larger-scale industry, finally lead-

ing to such a concentration of production and capital that

has been and

monopoly

the result: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and, merging

is

with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks manipulating thousands

At

same time monopoly, which has grown out of free

it and alongside of it, and thereby gives rise to a number of very acute, intense
antagonisms, frictions and conflicts.
Imperialism is capitalism in
that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and
finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has
acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world
among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all
of millions.

the

competition, does not abolish the latter, but exists over

territories of the globe

among

the great capitalist powers has been

completed. 11
is better understood if one bears
Marx, capitalism meant a mode of

Lenin's theory of capitalism

in

mind

that for him, as for

production or economic system, in existence since the advent of

the machine, wherein all means of production are privately owned

by a

privileged

few (who tend to become fewer and fewer); ex-

ploitation of the laboring class or proletariat

ownership of capital
10 Ibid., p. 90.

is

is

of

its

essence;

separated from the application of capital

" Ibid.,

pp. 159,

160.

Lenin XXVI.

[359

and the whole productive process is hampered by

the "distorted" motives of profit. But Marx in his Capital was
concerned with an analysis of industrial capitalism, a capitalism in
which free competition prevailed, whose most characteristic feature
was the export of goods and whose colonial policy consisted
to production;

merely, so to speak, in the "free grabbing" of territories not yet

occupied by a capitalist power. Lenin, on the other hand,

ing with a

new brand

is

deal-

had its day).

monopoly in the

of capitalism (for the old has

It is a capitalism in which monopolies prevail:

form of combines, syndicates, trusts, and cartels, arising out of
the concentration of production; the monopoly of the most important sources of raw materials; the banks' monopoly of finance
capital with its consequent creations of an all-powerful financial
oligarchy. It is a capitalism whose typical feature is the export of
capital and whose colonial policy is marked by a monopolistic

possession of the territories of the world.

This
Firstly,

new

capitalism

is

further characterized

by parasitism.

because

monopoly, this capitalist monopoly inevitably gives rise to a

tendency to stagnation and decay. As monopoly prices become fixed,
even temporarily, so the stimulus to technical and, consequently, to
like all

progress, disappears to a certain extent,

all

economic

the

possibility

arises

of

and

deliberately

to that extent, also,

retarding

technical

progress. 12

Secondly, because
imperialism
countries.

is
.

an immense accumulation of money

Hence the extraordinary growth of a

category of bondholders (rentiers),

coupons,"
is

idleness.

who

The export of

who

live

by "clipping

capital,

one of the most essential economic

more completely isolates the rentiers from

seal of parasitism on the whole country that

still

production and sets the

and

people

few

or rather a

take no part whatever in production, whose profession

bases of imperialism,

lives

i.e.,

capital in a
class,

by the exploitation of the labour of several overseas countries

colonies. 13

Lenin applies

this

theory of imperialism to the theory of the

proletarian revolution, showing the latter's basic principles and

consequently the practical attitude to be taken toward the problem.

12 Ibid., p. 170.

i3 Ibid.

V. Modern Times

360]

fronts.

On

capitalist

or

Lenin sees the forces of revolution gaining on three

the

internal

front

proletarian

(the

front

in

the

"mother" countries), the revolutionary crisis becomes more acute,

the yoke of a financial oligarchy more unbearable. The utter lack
of social consciousness in the privileged few, their parasitism and
corruption, intensify the workers' indignation until these finally

seek liberation in revolution.

On

the external front (the colonial front), the exploitation of

and dependent countries results in the division of nations

two antagonistic camps: a few "advanced" capitalist countries
on one side, the rest of the world on the other. This becomes a
growing reality, until the only hope of deliverance from the imperialistic yoke is its violent overthrow by the oppressed masses.
Finally, on the world front, war and revolution become inevitable: war between the capitalist states that want to hold
securely and exclusively what they have and those that want to
share the colonial spoils or steal their monopolies and markets
outright: the revolution of a united European (proletarian) and

colonies
into

Eastern

(colonial)

front

world-wide front of im-

against the

perialism.

This global stage of capitalism profoundly affects the com-

munist attitude toward the problem of revolution. In the past,

was

right to regard the proletarian revolution in

it

one country as an

internal affair to be solved in view of certain conditions existing in

the country in question (its

velopment,

its

economy,

its

proletarian population).

degree of industrial de-

Now,

instead, individual

national economies are but parts of a world economy, the various

national capitalist fronts have

become

a unified whole

all

over the

world, and the proletarian and colonial masses are banded together in a united front by a

common

antagonism to a universal

system of imperialism. Therefore the approach to the problem of

the revolution

must be more general. The revolution need not

where industrial development is most

necessarily begin in a country

advanced and the proletariat constitutes the majority.

well start in a country where capitalism
It

may,

likely as not,

is

not yet

much

It

may

as

developed.

occur where the chain of imperialism

is

weakest. In any case and in any place two conditions are requisite
if

the proletariat

power:

is

to think of successfully seizing the

monopoly of

Lenin XXVI.
it is

[361

essential, first, that a majority of the

jority

of

the

class-conscious,

thinking,

should fully understand that revolution

sacrifice their lives for

it;

workers (or
politically

is

at least

a ma-

workers)

active

necessary and be ready to

secondly, that the ruling class should be

passing through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most

backward masses into politics (a symptom of every real revolution is a
rapid, tenfold and even hundredfold increase in the number of memhitherto apathetic
who are
bers of the toiling and oppressed masses
capable of waging the political struggle), weakens the government
and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to overthrow it rapidly. 14

Another consequence of the existence of the two antagonistic

is that the victory of the proletariat in one counbecomes in a sense the responsibility of all proletarians in the

world-wide fronts
try

world. Conversely, because the successful revolution in a particular

country

is

but a step toward world revolution, the victorious

country must do

its

utmost to awaken, develop, and support the

revolution in other countries.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

During his sojourn in Finland, in August and September 1917,
Lenin wrote The State and Revolution, using as documentary
sources all that Marx and Engels had written on the state. He himself had diligently copied in a blue notebook all pertinent passages
from their works. The volume was to have had seven chapters but
the last, "The Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and
1917," was never written. Lenin returned to Petrograd to prepare
and lead the November Revolution. "It is more pleasant and usego through the 'experience of the revolution' than to write
15
he remarks in the Postscript to the First Edition.
It is in The State and Revolution that Lenin dwells on the
problem of the state and, particularly, the question of the relation

ful to

about

it,"

He starts by restating
and re-interpreting the basic Marxian ideas on the origin, role,
and meaning of the state. He approvingly quotes Engels to the

of the proletarian revolution to the state.

14

V.

I.

Lenin,

"Left-Wing"

Communism, An

Infantile

Disorder

(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), p. 114.

15 V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International
Publishers,

1932), p. 101.

V. Modern Times

362]

not always exist but was established only

economic development necessarily bound up
with the cleavage of society into classes. Once society was divided
into two irreducible antagonisms, in order that the warring classes
would not by their struggle bring an end to that society, a force
had to be created to contain them within certain limits of order.
effect that the state did

at a certain stage of

This force

The

state

is

is

the state.

the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability

of class antagonisms, the state arises when, where, and to the extent

And, con-

that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled.

versely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are

irreconcilable. 16

In other words, the state

is

but an organ of class rule, the organ of

the rule of a definite class for the oppression of another definite

purpose is to legalize and perpetuate this

Thus the ancient and feudal states were organs for
the exploitation of the slaves and serfs, and today's bourgeois state
is an instrument for the exploitation of wage labor by capital.
The state (the accumulation or, better, the monopoly of power
in the hands of one class) fulfills its purpose of repressing and
exploiting the opposite class through an apparatus or machine consisting essentially of special bodies of armed men (army and
police) and bureaucrats (state officials). Both are "parasites" on
the body of bourgeois society, enjoy privileges and immunities,
and are protected by special laws. Both are the masters of society
rather than its servants: they stand above it and are, therefore,
alienated from it.
class (its antipode); its

oppression.

Lenin

significantly

monarchy or the most

expression,

adds that every

liberal

state,

whether an absolute

democratic republic,

a "special repressive force" holding

pressed class. Although one

cratic republic the best

capitalism (for

it is

is

is,

in Engels'

down

justified in considering

form of

the op-

a demo-

state for the proletariat

under

the "nearest approach" to the dictatorship of

it must never be forgotten that even in the most

democratic of bourgeois republics the iniquitous exploitation of
wage-slavery is the lot of the people. All such states are, in the

the proletariat),

lbid.,

p. 8.

Lenin XXVI.
the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

analysis,

last

[363

would be

It

catastrophic to believe that this type of state could successfully

resolve the class contradiction.

The

class contradiction

of a classless society.

Through a

1.

leader of

How?

can be solved only by the re-creation

Here, in summary, is Lenin's answer.

violent revolution the proletariat

masses and

all toiling

led, in turn,

overthrows and destroys the capitalist

Once

victorious in this

becomes the

tariat

and exercises

its

own

monopoly

dictatorship.

proletarian dictatorship, unrestricted by law, always

The

3.

itself.

phase of revolution, the prole-

first

ruling class, gets exclusive hold of the

of force, organizes

as

state, that is, the centralized

organization of force created by the bourgeoisie for

2.

(acting

by the workers' party)

guided by the vanguard of the proletariat (the workers' party)

and relying directly upon the armed forces of the masses, uses its

machine for the purpose of completely crushing bourgeois

and leads the whole people to a new economic order.

state

resistance

Once the capitalist resistance is completely broken, people

will become accustomed to observe the rules of social intercourse
without compulsion and without the special apparatus for compulsion that is called the state. Then the state will wither away.
4.

There can be nothing save destruction for the capitalist state.

bureaucratic-military state machine has to be
smashed out of existence. Otherwise the new classless society will

The old bourgeois

On

never be.

this point

no compromise

not above classes, the state

and,

if

is

this particular class is to

of force,

its

inevitably
tion (to

possible, for the state

be suppressed, then

organization of violence,

and

is

is

the instrument of the ruling class;

its

state

its

monopoly

apparatus must be

forcibly suppressed. Therefore, the people's revolu-

be successful in the

the capitalist state with

its

first

most

phase) must break and destroy

characteristic institutions

the

bureaucracy and standing army. Many revolutions failed (and

here Lenin quotes Marx) because they perfected the machine of
the bourgeois state instead of smashing it. The first aim of a revolution is " 'to concentrate all its forces of destruction' against the
state

power, and to regard the problem, as one, not of perfecting

the machinery of state, but of breaking up and annihilating

The

it."

17

revolution can be accomplished only by the proletariat.

ibid.,

p. 27.


V. Modern Times

364]
It "is the

only class

thoroughly revolutionary, the only class

that can unite all the toilers

and the exploited

against the bourgeoisie, in completely displacing

in the struggle

it."

18

the particular class, which, by the economic conditions of

is

being prepared for this work and

is

It is

its

existence,

provided both with the oppor-

and the power to perform it. While the capitalist class breaks
up and atomises the peasantry and all the petty-bourgeois strata, it
welds together, unites and organises the town proletariat. Only the
proletariat
by virtue of its economic role in large-scale production
is capable of leading all the toiling and exploited masses, who are exploited, oppressed, crushed by the bourgeoisie not less, and often
more, than the proletariat, but who are incapable of carrying on the
tunity

struggle for their

freedom independently. 19

In their revolution, the proletarians are led by the workers'

party,

which constitutes the vanguard of the proletariat both in its

its direction and organization of the new

bid for power and in

order.

Once

the capitalist state, with

its

standing army, police, and

bureaucratic apparatus, has been destroyed, the proletariat seizes

power, organizes

itself

Thus a new state comes

by Lenin the "proletarian dictatorof the proletariat ... a special form of

as the ruling class.

into existence: a state defined

ship, the political rule

organisation of violence against the capitalist class";

bourgeois but a proletarian

state,

20

not a

a state exclusively at the service

of the exploited and not of the exploiters; "a special repressive

force" not for the exploitation of a majority by a minority but for

the suppression of the bourgeois minority
jority;

a state that

by the proletarian ma-

is

democratic in a new way (for the proletariat and the poor in general)
and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoisie). 21 ... To limit

Marxism
ism

to the teaching of the class struggle

to distort

bourgeoisie.

it,

to reduce

Marxist

is

it

to

means

something which

is

to curtail

Marx-

acceptable to the

one who extends the acceptance of

class

struggle to the acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 22

It is

not enough for the proletariat to seize power. Even after

this step the bourgeoisie

is ibid., p. 22.
2 <> Ibid.,
24.
p.

22 Ibid., p. 30.

remains very strong, possibly stronger

is Ibid., p. 23.
21 ibid., p. 31.

Lenin XXVI.

[365

than the victorious proletariat, and eager to reconquer its lost

Power, once seized, must be held, consolidated, rendered

position.

invincible.

Hence,

the proletariat needs the state.

The

exploited classes need political

rule in order completely to abolish all exploitation,

i.e.,

in the interests

of the vast majority of the people and against the insignificant minority
consisting of the slave-owners of

modern times

the landlords

and the

capitalists. 23

The

proletarian

spans the period of transition from

communism. In

capitalism to

much

state

it

the class struggle continues; so

becomes a period of unusually

violent class struggles in their sharpest possible forms." 24 The rule
so that "this period inevitably

a democracy only for the poor and the

and the bourgeoisie it is a new kind of
Under these conditions there is no real freedom for

of the proletariat, then,

is

dispossessed; for the rich

dictatorship.

the exploiters.

The

dictatorship of the proletariat produces a series of restrictions of

liberty in the case of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists.

must crush them in order to

resistance must be broken by

We

humanity from wage-slavery; their

force; it is clear that where there is suppression, there is also violence, there is no liberty, no democracy. 25
While the state exists there is no freedom. When there will be freedom
there will be no state. 26
free

Other tasks of the proletarian dictatorship are the education of

workers and peasants to

rally them to the support of the revoluand imbue them with the spirit of socialism, and the organization of the whole national economy according to a new system on
all

tion

way

the lines of "the postal system in such a

that the technicians,

managers, bookkeepers as well as all officials, should receive no

higher wages than 'workingmen's wages,' all under the control and

armed proletariat." 27 Finally, the proletariat will

army and keep it in constant readiness for the fight
against the imperialists, the enemy outside.
The dictatorship of the proletariat is but a transitory state. At
the beginning and for a time it will retain some of the marks of

leadership of the

organize

its

the old society. This will constitute the

Ibid.,

p. 22.

25 Ibid., p. 73.

^Ibid., p. 44.

first

phase of communism

24 ibid., p. 31.
26 Hid., p. 79.

V. Modern Times

366]

a phase not yet able to produce absolute justice and equality

much

("every worker, therefore, receives from society as

given
as

it";

2S "differences,

defects

in

and unjust

distribution]

will

as

he has

differences, in wealth [as well

still

exist" 29 ).

The communist

society then
is

forced at

first

to destroy only the "injustice" that consists in the

means of production having been

seized

by private

individuals, [but]

not capable of destroying at once the further injustice consisting in

the distribution of the articles of consumption "according to work
is

performed" (and not according to need). 30

The

perfect development of

communism

will

come with

the

second or higher phase of communist society, when there are no

longer any capitalists, any classes and, consequently, there is no

need to suppress any

being;

it

ceases of

class.

Then

the state loses

its

very reason for

itself.

Only in Communist society, when the resistance of the capitalists has

been completely broken, when the capitalists have disappeared, when
there are no classes (i.e., there is no difference between the members
of society in their relation to the social means of production), only
then "the state ceases to exist," and it "becomes possible to speak of
people will gradually become accustomed to
freedom." Only then
the observance of the elementary rules of social life that have been
known for centuries.
they will become accustomed to observing
;
.

them without

force, without compulsion, without subordination, with-

out the special apparatus for compulsion which

is

called the state.

31

be able to wither away completely when society has

realized the rule: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs," i.e., when people have become accustomed to ob-

The

state will

serve the fundamental rules of social

ductive, that they voluntarily

When this perfect

He confesses

not say.

life,

and

work according

state of

their labour is so pro-

to their ability. 32

communism will dawn, Lenin does

know "how quickly and in

that he does not

what order" the conditions that will usher mankind into the fully
developed communist society will be verified. But he is certain
that sooner or later the classless and stateless society, where all
members will be bound together in a new brotherhood of love,
will open its gates to waiting humanity.
28 ibid., p. 76.

29 ibid., p. 77.

30 Ibid.

zilbid., pp. 73, 74.

& Ibid.,

pp. 79, 80.

Lenin XXVI.
many

Others,

and what

[367

others, are not so certain.

What

has happened

happening in the communist countries seems to

is still

support the conclusion that a

new

class of masters,

a harsher

from the masses, has supplanted

33
the old class divisions that Marx and Lenin sought to abolish.
Indeed, the state seems to have accepted the challenge hurled
at it by Lenin and to have fought back successfully. The very men
who were to bring about its destruction, the very communist excaste, a privileged class alienated

perience, the state used as allies for the intensification of

paratus and the consolidation of

all

The end

police, prisons, bureaucrats.

its

special forces

of the state

is

its

ap-

army,

nowhere

in

sight.

Communism

at

work has even created

its

own brand

of auto-

from the bourgeois masters of

gone happily hunting throughout
the world of free nations in the best colonial style to fill the hunger
of its imperialistic belly; and when whole nations have tried to
overthrow the oppressor's yoke and regain some measure of freedom, communism has restored order in the well-known traditional,
repressive way.
crats not too different in essence

Communism

old.

Unless

in action has

human

nature suddenly changes, unless the lessons

has learned in his millenary history prove

conclude that the means must after

all

wrong, one

is

man

led to

have a certain affinity to

aim that will make angels of
men and a paradise of earth. But in the meantime wherever communist rule has been installed, it has become synonymous with
inhuman means and conditions. It does make sense therefore to
doubt, at the very least, a system whose reality contrasts so sharply
the end.

with

Now

Lenin speaks of a

all

lofty

its ideal.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lenin, V.

I.

Collected Works. London:

Lawrence and Wishart,

1942.

"Left-Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952.
State and Revolution. New York: International Pub.

lishers,

1932.
*

33

Class:

For a recent view on

An

Analysis of the

this

subject, see

Milovan

Djilas,

Communist System (New York:

The

New

Praeger, 1957).

V. Modern Times

368]
Gurian, W. Bolshevism: Theory and

Practice.

New

York: Mac-

millan, 1932.
.

Dame:

The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology,

University of Notre

Dame

Reality.

Notre

Press, 1951.

Schapiro, L. The Origin of the Communist Autocracy. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1955.
Shub, D. Lenin: A Biography. New York: New American Library,

1948 (New York, 1943).

Wilson, E. To the Finland Station. New York: Doubleday Anchor
Books, 1953 (New York, 1940).
Wolfe, B. D. Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History (Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin). Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

chapter xxvii
IN

STRICTLY

Italian Fascism*

SEARCH OF A PHILOSOPHY

Fascism never had a political

philosophy of its own. But Fascism was preceded by speculative movements critical of democracy and the parliamentary system, by the formulation of a syndicalist doctrine, and by a boldly
expressed belief in the supremacy of the nation. These were currents of political sentiment and thought not merely Italian but
European. Indeed, they first appeared outside Italy. Yet they
found in Italy more complete and precise theoretical expression.
Italian Fascism did not even begin as a theoretical movement.
On August 27, 1921, Mussolini (1883-1945), its founder and
leader, wrote to Michele Bianchi, one of his first and closest collaborators: "If Fascism does not wish to die or, worse still, commit suicide, it must provide itself with a doctrine." The quest for
it ended only in 1933.
Italian Fascism was a political movement and, as such, the
speaking,

Italian

result not of ideological preparation but of certain historical conditions. Some of these were: the formation of a class of unemployed veterans, or demi-soldes as they were termed at the time of

Napoleon
*

An

I;

the personal magnetism of Mussolini; the devalu-

essay written especially for this

and translated from the

Italian

work by Giuseppe

by John A. Abbo.

Prezzolini

Modem

V.

370]

Times

World War I and the consequent transhands of a good part of the land in northern Italy;
the sorry decline of the Italian parliamentary system, unable to
provide a stable government (somewhat like conditions that
ation of the lira following

fer into other

French republic) the split in the Socialist

Party following the rise of Russian communism.
This casual combination of social forces did not, however,
crystallize into a theoretical doctrine, nor did it produce a common
theoretical idea. Fascism was born without a doctrine. It went in
brought about the

fifth

search of one once

it

had

seized power,

currents of thought then

classes of

Europe. These

and found

common among

it

in the various

the young, cultivated

sought to amalgamate in a unified

it

system, which was given official expression in an article written by

the philosopher Giovanni Gentile in

1933 and signed by Mussolini

but which never really served as the party norm. Along the road
that

was

was

itself to

to lead to

an ideological

contribute

new

justification of its action,

intellectual

Fascism

approaches and solutions,

particularly in the field of syndicalism or corporativism. But no

one of these became predominant. Obviously the Fascist Party was
but a multitude agitated by momentary passions, a mass wrestling

with practical problems and stirred by personal

bothered about principles, especially

when

rivalries.

the principles

hurriedly pieced together or simply borrowed.

Very few
had been

The impact

of ideas

on the sentiments and interests of political parties is usually slight

and superficial. It was even more so among the Italians, generally
skeptical and ready without conviction to adopt and adjust to the
exterior and theoretical aspects of a party in control of the government and able actually to manipulate the national income.

FASCISTS AND NATIONALISTS

When,

in

1919, the Fascist Party presented candidates for

program was a rather haphazard list of

and promises, most of which were quickly
discarded once Mussolini was called by King Victor Emmanuel
III to head the Italian government (October 31, 1922, following
the Fascist March on Rome of October 27). The Fascist platform had left unresolved the constitutional question of whether to
election in Milan,

its

pointers, resolutions,

choose the monarchic or the republican form of

strong anticlerical flavor (with

its

had a
Church

state. It

proposal to confiscate

all

Italian Fascism XXVII.

property) and an anticapitalist tinge (with

[371
its

proposal to con-

war superprofits). Finally, as to the armed forces, it

proposed "an armed nation" of the Swiss type.
The nucleus of statements that came to constitute the Fascist
doctrine was provided by an articulate group, the Nationalists.

fiscate all

These never gained political leadership of the masses like the

Fascists, but they were men with some basic doctrine of their own
and more culture and refinement. The early Fascists came from
the rural population and from the political movements of the extreme left (socialists, syndicalists, republicans, even anarchists).
The Nationalists were considered conservatives of the extreme
belonged to well-to-do classes and in the years prior to
Fascism supported the interests of the industrial groups (heavy
industry) rather than those of the small rural landowners from
whom were to come the first Fascist volunteers. These differences,
right: they

names

best typified in the

of the Nationalist

De

Frenzi (Luigi

Federzoni, b. 1878) and the Fascist Mussolini, persisted,

if under
two parties merged.
The review Politica was the organ of Nationalist thought. In
the issues published before the advent of Fascism there are many
of the theoretical assertions that became common patrimony after
the Fascist victory, principally the doctrine of the supremacy of
the nation and of the nation's interests over the individual or the
class. At that time (the years prior to Fascism) Mussolini was
preaching the class struggle. When the Nationalist Party was absorbed by the Fascist (and the result was the Fascist National
Party) early in 1923, its members remained an aristocracy, in
principle more attached to the monarchy than the bulk of the
Fascist Party, while some of the more independent Fascist mem-

the surface, even after the

bers, like Italo Balbo, did not always hide their old republican

tendencies.

And

this

divergence was tragically displayed in July

Then De Frenzi helped the king rid

himself of Mussolini and later Mussolini founded the last desperate
Fascism, that of the Republic of Said. It must be noted, however,
1943

at the fall of

that the difference

much

theoretical as

truly intellectual

Fascism.

between Fascists and Nationalists was not so

it was a difference in education and character.
discussion between monarchist and republican

Fascists never took place.

To

this

amalgam

the Fascists brought the contribution of their

syndicalist experience.

All Fascist theory that has reference to

V. Modern Times

372]

the corporative state was, as a rule, not of Nationalist but of

Fascist origin.

But before explaining in detail this and other aspects of the

Fascist doctrine, one must place it in the right perspective
against the background of the period's mentality as expressed

official

by the various currents of ideas that

later

converged in Fascism.

THE ANTILIBERAL ROOT

must first of all be remembered that the antiliberal ideas
that became popular among the Italian Fascists had their deepest
roots in the unfavorable reaction to the French Revolution that
was common in all Europe among both Catholics and socialists.
Fascist political thought rejected liberalism more than communism.
Italian Fascism made its own the criticism of Catholics and socialists of what was then commonly called the "atomism" of the
French Revolution: the breaking of the social bonds that united
the individual to society to make of him but an atom abstracted
and historically separated from his past (Catholics) and from his
labor environment (socialists). This adverse reaction lasted, one
may say, all through the nineteenth century and finally came to a
head in the twentieth century. Essentially, Fascism wanted to
represent the supremacy of society and state against liberal individualism. If, in a sense, Fascism seemed to be born in opposition to communism, more fundamentally it came to oppose and
attack the liberal thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth cenIt

turies in political

economy

as

much

as in practical politics. Basic-

Fascism had several political principles in common

with Russian communism: for instance, the exaltation of the
ally,

Italian

who take over the power of the state, the

concept of a single party (totalitarianism), the belief in the suaction of minorities

premacy of the state over individuals and in the Machiavellian

axiom that the ultimate aim (the seizing of power) justifies all
means employed by a minority that anticipates the times and feels
itself

vested with a mission. This reaction against the so-called

"rights of

man" brought

Marx and

his successor

together

and

men

interpreter,

of opposite camps: Karl

Georges Sorel; Giuseppe

Mazzini, whose favorite book, significantly entitled The Duties of

Man, was intended as an answer to the French Revolution's emphasis on the rights of

man; even a Catholic

like

Giuseppe Toniolo,

Italian Fascism XXVII.

[373

who derived his social consciousness from Saint Thomas Aquinas.

What strange bedfellows one finds when looking for the ideals that
inspired contemporary minds possessed of a vast culture!

MAURRAS, KIPLING, PARETO, MOSCA

But searching deeper into the theoretical confusion of Fascist
motivations and impulses brings other things to light. For one, the
marked influence of Charles Maurras. It was his ideological
construction, positivistic and naturalistic, that the Italian Nationalists wished so passionately to imitate and emulate. The impact of
the theoretician of Action Frangaise was particularly felt by
Francesco Coppola, editor of the review Politica from 1929 to
1943.

On

of the

first

chief

the other hand, a writer like Enrico Corradini, founder

Italian Nationalist review, //

was Giovanni Papini),

Kipling (1865-1936).

What

fell

Regno (whose

under the

the latter

spell

had been

of

editor-in-

Rudyard

for the English,

Corradini sought to be for the Italians (he lacked, however, the

English writer's imagination and never achieved Kipling's popularity),

and he

tried

hard to translate for them the sweeping

motives of imperial consciousness and responsibility.

Corradini's writings one finds

war always

Thus in
and

exalted, aggressive

predatory instincts praised, the conviction, proudly reiterated, that

an influence to exert on the world. Corradini lived long

enough to see the triumph of his ideas. Fascism considered him
one of its "fathers," and he was made a senator; but Corradini
was left out of active political life and, luckily for him, he died
before Fascism crumbled under the weight of a lost war.
Considerable influence was also exercised by Vilfredo Pareto
and Gaetano Mosca. At almost the same time (as the nineteenth
century blended with the twentieth) and for almost the same
reasons, these two Italian philosophers of the "leading classes"
disapproved strongly of parliamentary regimes and democratic
Italy has

practices.

They

further maintained, against a doctrine that dated

back to Aristotle and had been more or less accepted by all

students of politics, that the true political forms of government are
never monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies. In Pareto's and
Mosca's view, these are such only in name: in reality, all social
organizations are led and governed by a "ruling class" (an elite,
or oligarchy) that, possessed of greater social vitality and useful-

V. Modern Times

374]

ness than the other classes, guides and dominates them until it is
in turn overpowered by another elite more vigorous and alert and

capable {circulation des

another and none

is

elites).

No

essentially

regime

different

is,

per

se, better

than

except for the social

composition of the minority, which always governs (for example,

the Junkers in Germany, the bankers in the United States, the
small landowners in France). This interpretation of political his-

which reduces it to a conflict of social groups without ideal

values and in which political doctrines play but a secondary role,
derives in part from the thesis of Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893)
in his Origines de la France contemporaine. In this huge and unfinished work the great French historian sought to show that the
French Revolution was due to a decadence of the aristocracy that
had dominated the nation for centuries and then had been replaced by a new aristocracy, fresher and more aggressive. The
social and political process was thus totally committed to the play
of natural forces whose conflicts were glossed over with a veneer
of intellectual and moral principles. It was a concept of history
similar to that of Marx. But the latter attributed historical changes
and the political predominance of minorities to economic transformations in the means of production; Pareto and Mosca traced
them to moral forces.
These historical and social doctrines, which asserted the mission of conscious, active, dynamic, daring minorities, and their
natural right to seize power in the face of inert and tired masses,
were quite popular in the decades that preceded communism in
Russia, Fascism in Italy, and Nazism in Germany. In Italy, faith
in such an energetic minority representing the nation (the masses
were dull and blind and the wealthy classes idle and fearful) grew
when Italy entered the war in May 1915 despite the open opposition of the parliament and the displeasure of the country's majority. Interestingly, it was during that period (from September
1914 to May 1915), when a political minority imposed Italy's
intervention in the war, that the first Fasci were founded. That
minority, fully aware of being such, was the cradle of Fascism
and gave the movement its name. When Fascism was not yet being
spoken of, it was the same minority that first used against the
parliament the methods of violent pressure that became so
familiar later, in the period between 1919 and 1925. The conviction that the country's destiny was not to be left to votes in
tory,

Italian Fascism XXVII.

[375

parliament and in national elections was further strengthened by

the expedition to Fiume (September 1919) led by the then very

popular poet and soldier Gabriele d'Annunzio to prevent the

surrender of the port to Yugoslavia.

CROCE AND SOREL

Another remarkable

coefficient for

weakening regard for the

parliamentary regime and spreading the belief that history

is

made not

only by legitimate assemblies but often by audacious

minorities

was

all

the early

work

of Benedetto Croce

(1866-

1952), from the publication of his Estetica (in 1902) to at least

1925. Those years Croce (a Croce unknown in America) used
his sarcastic wit, his formidable erudition, his unrelenting logic,

what he termed the masonic

and optimistic principles of the eighteenth century and a fatuous belief in social
remedies that were to end men's conflicts and wars. The dominating figure and the leader of Italian culture during the first twenty
years of the century, Croce helped spread moral contempt for the
democracies. He leaned favorably toward imperial Germany, republished writings of conservatives and even reactionaries (such
as Vittorio Imbriani). But later his bent toward opposition led
him stoutly to resist Fascism.
To Croce chiefly is due the first presentation of a French writer
who was to have more influence and fame in Italy than in his own
country: Georges Sorel. His Reflexions sur la violence (a work
little known in English-speaking countries) went through several
editions in Italy. Italian magazines and daily papers also carried
the unusual articles, strangely conceived and without a precise
logical order, by this somber thinker, conservative and at the same
time revolutionary, one of the more indicative manifestations of
what was soon to be: the world wars and the faith of the new
generations in the power of the subconscious rather than the rational.
Mussolini (and Lenin, it is said) read and admired him. One
cannot study the ideological formation of Fascism without becoming aware of how deeply Sorel inspired and aided it.

his

pointed

anecdotes

to

fight

mentality, or a naive faith in the rationalistic

V. Modern Times

376]

GENTILE
was Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) who formulated
most coherent, valid, and philosophical
way. He too came to Fascism from other currents of thought.
Gentile had been Croce's faithful collaborator during the latter's
antidemocratic period. He had come from a pure Hegelian tradition
in Italy (where Hegel had few but ardent supporters during the
Risorgimento, especially in the South). Like Croce, Gentile had
But

it

Fascist ideology in the

started with

German

idealism, a school of thought for which, to

use the words of Croce himself, the physical facts do not exist.
Gentile was a heroic thinker and his

life

came

to

an end when

he was murdered by unknown

Fascism, Gentile might simply have been called a conservative (on
Burke's type). Although as a philosopher he denied the absolute
communists in 1944. Prior to

value of religion, he recognized the usefulness of teaching

masses and the children. In

fact,

it

to the

almost alone, he had held for

was neutral
and did not permit the teaching of religion in public schools and
recognized only the academic degrees granted by its own lay

years that the Italian state (which before Fascism

should allow the teaching of Catholic doctrine in ele-

schools)

mentary schools. At that time this might have seemed rather

strange, but it was logical, given the idea Gentile (and Croce) had
of the religious problem. When Fascism reached power, Mussolini
called Gentile to direct the Ministry of Public Education. Gentile

had been

member
In that

until then but a university professor,

never a senator or a

of the parliament or even a candidate for political office.

first

period he called himself a liberal (he was editor of a

review entitled L'Educazione liberate).

He

liked the opportunity

Fascism offered him to make a complete reform of the Italian

schools. But save for a small group of teachers personally devoted
to him, none in the country was ready to understand, much less
support him. Gentile's gratitude to Mussolini was such that, "liberal" or "conservative" though

he claimed to be, he accepted

Fascism completely. Gentile tried, however, to inject into Fascism
those modes of thought that his idealistic and Hegelian philosophy
dictated. Needless to add, his language

the majority of the Fascists.

number

What

is

was incomprehensible to
more, Gentile had a large

of enemies within the teaching class. Finally, he

was

re-


Italian Fascism XXVII.

[377

garded with suspicion by the Catholic Church, which had understood that his thought contained the concept that the state was
the inevitable adversary of the Church.

THE FASCIST DOCTRINE

When

the Enciclopedia

was

its

director;

his although

it

Treccani

was about

deavor of Fascism)

(the highest cultural en-

to be published in 1933, Gentile

and the doctrinal part of the

article

Fascismo

is

appeared in the Enciclopedia under Mussolini's

name.

The

text of the article

might

just as well

have been written in

Arabic for the greater number of his followers to whom, in the

last analysis, it made little difference whether the Fascist state
declared

Fascism

itself

spiritualist

or idealist.

What mattered was

satisfied certain sentiments of national pride,

strong, stable government,

and brought employment

that

provided a
this last of

extreme importance in a country of such steady unemployment for

both intellectuals and laborers as Italy. The enthusiasm with which
a great part of the population hailed the Fascist regime

thusiasm that lasted at least until the Spanish Civil

was not

at all

an

en-

War (1938)

due to the ideas expressed in Gentile's

article or in

other publications.

But the article is in itself of much interest. Gentile was a philomind of the first magnitude. Together with Croce he
dominated Italian thought between 1900 and 1940. Then, after
his death, it was his legacy, more than Croce's, that continued to
influence men and ideas. Croce was a much more systematic
thinker, richer in literary gifts, culture, and affability. His system
sophical

is

the better organized and,

it

may even be

said, so perfectly or-

ganized and estheticalry formulated as to leave no possibility for

further development.

But Gentile worked

in depth and,

though

not always clear and at times repetitious, he has a power to

mind and heart

rarely found in Croce.

stir

Croce compiled a vast

encyclopedia of philosophical sciences where one can find an
answer to all the problems of his time and to which nothing need
be added. Gentile on the contrary touched only certain points
(teaching, art, religion) and left everywhere a leaven that is still
brewing. The interesting thing is that Croce himself was led by the
the

V. Modern Times

378]

modify his philosophic positions,

what concerned the structure of his system that

internal criticism of Gentile to

particularly in

seemed

to Gentile to

Now,

have imperiled the unity of the Spirit.

which gave precise form to the ten-

Gentile's article,

dencies and ideas current

among

Fascists,

is

a sort of translation

and perhaps turbid,

boiled in Fascism as in all revolutionary movements. Gentile's
article, first of all, succeeds in giving unity and coherence of form
to tendencies that differed by reason of time, origin, and nature.
It is a document not lacking nobility and, within the idealistic
framework, the principles therein expounded cannot be easily
challenged. The article is written in a compact and sober style. It
is clear, too, once one becomes acquainted with the German
philosophic terminology. The main body of the article comprises
seven pages in large type. The rest is annotation, commentary,
documentation, and history.
Here are some notable passages. "Fascism is action and it is
thought: action in which doctrine is immanent, and doctrine
arising from a given system of historical forces in which it is
inserted, and working on them from within." All this sounds like
abracadabra to the unprepared reader. Yet the meaning is clear:
Fascism is not born of external forces: it is an autonomous force
that moves all that surrounds it materially, men and things; at the
same time it does not come from heaven (as in the case of religious revelations) but is born of mankind's history. It is not the
effect of an environment: it is instead the latter's internal motor.
"It has therefore a form correlated to contingencies of time and
space; but it has also an ideal content which makes it an expresinto Hegelian language of whatever deep,

sion of truth in the higher region of the history of thought."

As

in

Fascism one distinguishes

changeable features and an immutable ideal principle. What about
all

important manifestations of

the latter? First of

all,

it is

life,

in

a spiritual principle. For the philos-

opher schooled in German idealism and for the Anglo-Saxon, this

means two different things. For example, Fascism is the negation
of individualism. Spirit, in fact,
spirit that

universal

is

not that of the single person, the

corresponds only to one's conscience.

spirit,

which,

it is

It is

the

true, realizes itself in a single

human,
person

but makes him conscious of belonging to the past as well as to the

present, of being one with the state, one with humanity, capable of

Italian Fascism XXVII.

suppressing the instinct for

life

order to build up a higher

closed in a brief circle of pleasure, in

founded on duty, a life free from

which the individual, by self-sacrifice,
by death itself, can achieve that purely

life,

and space,

limitations of time

[379

in

the renunciation of self-interest,

spiritual existence in

which

From

paragraphs, one

the very

first

his value as a

morality, a morality that promises

action save that of being, through

it,

man's highest manifestation. But in

The

the contemplative.

"Fascism wants
all his

energies

man
.

is lifted

to a climate of stern

this ideal there is

makes

nothing of

action imperative:

be active and to engage in action with

manfully aware of the

and ready to face them.

consists.

no other reward for moral

immersed and sublimated in

Fascist ideal

to

man

It

conceives of

difficulties besetting

life

him

as a struggle ... as for

the individual, so for the nation, and so for mankind." Fascism,

therefore, lays stress

on

culture, education,

work. Obviously, these

statements by Gentile reaffirm the concept of activism that has

often caused Oriental thinkers to look with disdain

and

their history,

and that manifested

itself in

on the Whites

the great colonial

adventure of the nineteenth century as well as in the aggressive,

Germans and the Ruswas almost a new ideal,

the government or the dominant party was con-

expansionist wars of peoples such as the

sians.

But

in Italy this ideal of activism

at least as far as

cerned.

This activism was, however, no vulgar unleashing of instincts.

was guided by an ethical concept. Gentile says: "Life, as conceived by the Fascist, is serious, austere, religious; all its manifestations are poised in a world sustained by moral forces and
subject to spiritual responsibilities. The Fascist disdains an 'easy'

It

life."

Of

course, the concept of "religion" here referred to

any particular positive

not

is

merely considers
the individual in relation to a superior Will through a bond that
indicative of

makes him

the participant in a "spiritual society." It

that could be accepted

by the Protestant

or perhaps simply by the patriot

At any

religion. It

rate, the

who

is

a concept

as well as the Catholic,

places country before

self.

statement remains an anti-individualistic one.

As

was the outlet for the many currents of reaction hostile to the French Revolution, which was accused of
having split social life into atoms the citizens. And less consciously but not less peremptorily Fascism was against the Anglosaid before, Fascism

Modem

V.

380]

Times

state as "an agency for the welfare of the

one of the tersest and firmest points of Fascist
doctrine. Contrary to Anglo-Saxon thought, Fascism refuses to
admit the existence of a conflict between the state and the individual. For the Fascist, the state must be found in the very soul

Saxon concept of the

individuals." This

is

human individual, must feel

state. To explain this concept so

of the individual, who, to be a true

himself part and parcel of the

would be tempted to refer,

by way of comparison, to the Christian dogma of God's incarnation in Christ. For Gentile, the state is a divinity that realizes itforeign to Anglo-Saxon thought one

self,

incarnates

who

is

truly a

itself as it

man

the dignity of the state.

The

his arbitrary pleasure),

if it is

will.

The

citizen's will

individual

with the

and truth through

is

as the

most

is

a closer analogy between

communism and Fascism than between Fascism and the

idea. To the same concept of "coincidence" the concept of
is subject: the truly free citizen is he who operates in full

The

or spiritual values can

derstood, Fascism

is

As a consequence,

is

exist,

totalitarian,

and a unit inclusive of all values

ates the whole life of a people.

liberal

liberty

agree-

words of Gentile:

for the state. In the

Fascist conception of the State

human

more

antiliberal of doctrines,

than anticommunist. There

ment with and

state's

identifica-

precisely here that Fascism, as already

tion with the state. It

noted, manifests

itself

(not his imagination or

ethical, will coincide

individual acquires worth

antiliberal

An

were, in the individual.

has and feels in himself the laws, the power,

all-embracing; outside of

much

less

and the Fascist

it,

no

have worth. Thus unstate

interprets, develops,

synthesis

and potenti-

and group activity (political parties,

economic unions, social classes) can be
exercised only with the state's consent and within the state. Here
Fascism, which up to this point could otherwise agree with communism, clashes with it. For communism wants the state to represent the interest of one class only
the working class
while
Fascism sees the state as an organism superior to all partial and
temporary formations. Hence the most radical of all Fascist forcultural

individual

associations,

mulas: All within the

state. (It

was

state, all for the state,

nothing outside the

and all-embracing view of the state,

that drew upon Fascism the severe condemna-

this totalitarian

at least in principle,

Italian Fascism XXVII.

tion of the Catholic

Church

[381

in Pius XI's encyclical

Non abbiamo

bisogno of 1931.)

Out

of this totalitarian but spiritual concept of the state

grew

and nation that continued in Italy

Nazi Germany. Fascism is not
satisfied with the concept of nation alone, which it considers a
purely naturalistic criterion like race. Originally Fascism was not
racist. The most at which Gentile hinted was the schiatta (that is,
something combining natural formation, like that of animals, and
historical formation, born of men's inherited experiences). "It is
Rather, it is the State
not the nation which generates the State.
which creates the nation, conferring volition and, therefore, a real
life on a people made aware of their moral unity." Naturally, this
point too is incomprehensible and unacceptable to the AngloSaxon mind for which the state, through the vote of the majority,
is the result of the people's will. For the Fascist, therefore, public
teaching must be in the hands of the state and not of private associations; the press must become the organ of the unifying political
will of the state. In short, Fascism made its own the concept
termed by the German Hegelians "the ethical State." It is not a
the distinction between state

until the time of the alliance with

"men's rights."

state that is neutral, indifferent, respectful of

an active

state,

vidual activity, wants to permeate the will

of the whole

man, sinking deep down

Fascism, in short,

is

his faith.

less

than the

intellect

not only a law-giver and a founder of institutions,

ing not only the forms of

life

... To achieve

uses authority,

no

into his personality.

but an educator and a promoter of spiritual

and

It is

a state that, not satisfied with setting limits to indi-

life. It

this

aims

man,

but their content

at refashion-

his character,

it enforces discipline and

and ruling with undisputed

purpose

entering into the soul

sway.

CORPORATIVISM

chapter of the Fascist program worthy of particular atten-

its origins as well as its consequences is the one that has

been termed corporativism. The Fascists used this word to designate certain associations wherein employers and employed, both
intellectuals and manual laborers, would come together to discuss
their problems in the interest of the country or state common to

tion for

V. Modern Times

382]

was to be Fascism's solution to one of the gravest problems of our times: the problem of labor differences and conflicts.
them.

The

It

fact that

it

did not succeed does not

make

the attempt less

worthy of note.
In

its

origin

and in

its

very name,

its

idea derives from a

Catholic scholar, Giuseppe Toniolo (1845-1918).

many

He

was, like

other Catholics of the nineteenth century, a critic of econ-

omic liberalism and the advocate of an economic system not to be

founded on natural forces to the exclusion of human factors and
considerations. Re-presenting and defending, against the liberals,
the economy of the Middle Ages, he praised the medieval corporation: and this name was used again by the Fascists when they
wanted to establish labor associations to replace those of the
socialists and the Catholics.
For a long time, corporativism seemed to constitute Fascism's
principal innovation. In politics, Fascism had, in its opposition to
the liberal system, simply returned to the authoritarian and police
state of the days prior to the French Revolution. But labor problems, non-existent then, took on great importance only at the end
of the nineteenth century. In this field, it may be said, the majority

of those

who took an

some was eventually

interest in the corporative state

(which for

to replace the parliamentary system)

not of Nationalist but of revolutionary and Fascist origins.

this

sector,

then, that the

most

were

It is in

original expressions of Fascist

thought as such are to be sought.

The

Europe had a meaning and an aim rather

from the Anglo-Saxon and, in particular, the American
union. The latter's purpose was to enrich the workers through the
enrichment of their employers. The end of the European syndicates
was the creation of a society controlled by the workers through
their labor associations. To many these syndicates seemed destined
to form the cells of an entirely new world founded on work. It
was, then, a moral ideal, a moral aim that was being advanced.
In this vein spoke Georges Sorel, a prophet of the new world to be
built by the syndicates. While he remained almost unknown in
England and America, he became very popular among French
and Italian socialists and Mussolini was one of them.
It should not seem strange, therefore, if in the Fascist meetings of students of corporativism (which, under Fascism, became a
science and was taught in the universities in much the same way as,
syndicates in

different

Italian Fascism XXVII.

[383

economy) extreme opinions were presented and de(like Ugo Spirito) went so far as to propose a reform of property in a corporative sense. But such exciting novelties did not please the most powerful segment of the Fascist
leaders, who saw in corporativism but a means to control the
forces of labor and prevent strikes. The representatives of the
various syndicates were never elected by the workers through free
balloting. They were in reality hand-picked by the central authorities. They were but government employees. As a consequence,
corporativism, which was supposed to give life to a new social
system, a system neither communist nor liberal, remained only a
bureaucracy. Instead of solving one of the most fundamental internal problems of the modern state
how to deal with labor
associations having a monopoly of power and how to prevent
them from opposing or crippling the action of the state corposay, political

fended.

Some

rativism resolved only the practical personal problems of

Fascists

who found

in

it

positions of

power and

many

influence.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mussolini,

Benito.

Fascism:

Doctrine

and

Institutions.

Rome:

Ardita, 1935.
.

The Corporate

Ashton, E. B. The
Morrow, 1937.

State. Firenze: Vallecchi, 1936.

Fascist:

His State and His Mind.

Borgese, G. A. Goliath: the March of Fascism.

New

New

York:

York: Viking

Press, 1937.

Ebenstein, W. Fascist Italy. New York: American Book, 1939.

Elliott, W. Y. The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1928.

Lederer, E. State of the Masses. New York: Norton, 1940.

Missiroli, M. The Organization of the Arts and Professions in the
Fascist Guild State. Rome: Laboremus, 1938.
Prezzolini, G. Fascism. New York: Dutton, 1927.
Schneider, H. W. Making the Fascist State. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1928.

Sturzo, L. Italy and Fascism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927.

Volpe, G. History of the Fascist Movement. Rome: Poligrafica
Italiana, 1934.

part

six: American Political Thought

chapter xxviii

American

Political

Thought*

THE SOURCES

AMERICAN
L

scholarship

political

like

American statesman-

ship has been primarily problem-conscious rather than meta-

physical and doctrinaire. Scarcely a definitive treatise in political

theory was produced in America until the famous Legal and Political

Hermeneutics of Professor Francis

Lieber,

German

refugee at the University of South Carolina, appeared in 1839.

His Civil Liberty and Self-Government followed in 1853. Ameri-

government has been largely

ca's contribution to the science of

the adaptation of principles

the

common

virtually

all

principles of social adjustment for

good, most of which had been developed through

the

ages

of

mankind

to

expanding geographical
and resultant

frontiers with their necessary scientific inventions

evolutions of social and economic situations. Consequently, political

theories that have been applied in

for in a multiplicity of sources:

political

literature,

discussions,

America are

to

be looked

the Bible, sermons, classics in

platform addresses of publicists, newspaper

pamphlets,

official

pronouncements and directives,

and constitu-

resolutions of colonial assemblies, colonial charters

An

essay written especially for this

work by Milton Conover.

VI. American Political Thought

388]
tions, state constitutions

with their

of rights, the Declaration

bills

of Independence, Articles of Confederation, the United States

Constitution,

state

and federal

municipal ordinances,

statutes,

opinions expressed with reasons in decisions of state and federal

courts, platforms of political parties, debates in legislative sessions,

the mores and customs of various people in various geographical

sections

Of

and

their representative pressure

propaganda.

on Colonial America of

the impacts

earlier political philos-

ophies, there were four of especial significance: (1) Pulpit interpretations of the Bible, especially those of the

(2)

New England pulpit;

Publications circulated in the eighteenth century including

works or derivatives of works by Plato, Aristotle, Livy, Cicero,

Saint Thomas Aquinas, James Harrington, John Milton, Richard
Hooker, Sir John Fortescue, Algernon Sydney; and by writers of
the European continent who had been influenced by classical
Chinese political philosophy, especially that of Mencius and Confucius

(such as

Leibnitz,

Christian

Wolff,

Voltaire,

Francois

Quesnay, and Oliver Goldsmith); (3) Roman law and the English common law since Bracton; (4) Instruments of government,
particularly the English

Magna

Carta, the Petition of Right, the

Habeas Corpus Act.

derived from such sources would

find varying de-

grees of acceptance because of the geographical

and topographi-

Bill of Rights, the

Principles

cal influences

and

social

and

religious cleavages in the various

areas: Puritans in Massachusetts, Independents in

Rhode

Island

and Connecticut, Dutch in New York, Quakers in Pennsylvania

and Southern New Jersey, Catholics in Maryland, Anglo-royalists
in Virginia, and French Huguenots in South Carolina. Frontier
civilizations moving from these Atlantic tidewater topographies
across the continent to California and the Southwest met the long
established Spanish colonial civilization
which likewise had
moved up from Panama and wrought consequent political adjustments upon acceptable theories or principles. Then the closing
of the frontier with the rise of cities brought newer problems of
urban and international import that were unpredictable by either
the Atlantic or the Pacific colonists. But through it all, and until
the establishment in San Francisco of the United Nations in 1945,
those colonial ideas of government persisted however modified in

application

as

circumstances dictated.

have been fashioned

fifty states

From such

which have proved

applications
fifty

modern

American Political Thought XXVIIL

[389

experimental laboratories for the testing of ancient political theories

and for the possible invention of other political institutions.

These fundamental American political principles were established progressively and firmly during three initiatory periods: the
Colonial, the Revolutionary, and the Constitutional. After 1789,
there were periods of development in which emphasis on certain
of these ideas waxed and waned in cycles. For instance, the
original principle that the state and national governments should
be divided into three separate departments, namely the executive,
legislative and judicial, has continued persistently, to warrant a
system of checks and balances for the defense of the individual
citizen against governmental tyranny. Initially, the legislature was
favored for power over the executive branch due to experiences
under colonial executives. Later the courts were sought by the
people to restrain legislative proclivities and spending power.
Afterward, the courts were felt to need a certain balancing by the
executive. But each of the departments has been continually
desired.

THE COLONIAL PERIOD

During the colonial era, political theories were expressed inby leading and learned thinkers and collectively by
assemblies. Together they comprised seminal origins for subsequent commonwealths. Individuals pre-eminent in this regard were
dividually

Thomas Hooker (15867-1647)

of Connecticut; John Wise (16521725) of Massachusetts; Roger Williams (16037-1682) of Rhode

Island; and William Penn (1644-1718) of Pennsylvania.

Thomas Hooker, one of the founders of Connecticut, is not to

be confused with the English Richard Hooker, whose Ecclesiastical Polity allegedly served to

convey some of the political philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas to John Locke and thence to
Thomas Jefferson. But Thomas Hooker of Connecticut, like Saint
Thomas and Richard Hooker and Thomas Jefferson, did maintain
democratic ideals. Some of them were embodied in the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut as adopted in 1639, and served for
Connecticut

Hooker

as

written

In sermons, Thomas
The long-cherished maxim

Constitution.

stressed his political principles.

that the consent of the people

was necessary to righteous governThis connoted popular elections. He sanctioned the right of the people to place limitations upon govern-

ment he held

essential.

VI. American Political Thought

390]

ment, which principle has become of increasing importance for

America with the increasing governmental

individual liberty in

functions and corresponding governmental powers as instanced by

Act of
1948 and its proposed modification according to the Hoover Task
Force Recommendations of 1956.
John Wise of Massachusetts, a Harvard graduate and Congrethe enactment of the Federal Administrative Procedure

gational

clergyman,

American democrat."

acquired

An

classification

as

"the

first

great

ardent proponent of liberty, he led a

noteworthy case of resistance against an attempted tax plan of

Governor Edmund Andros. In his Word of Comfort to a Melancholy Country (1721) he supported paper money, and in his
Vindication of the Government of

New

England Churches (1717)

he considered fundamental notions of local government

subject

Democracy and a later urban age

demanding state autonomy and municipal home rule respectively.
In the accomplishments of Roger Williams, American political philosophy as a derivative of European culture wedded to
the American frontier is well illustrated, if not typified. A graduate of the University of Cambridge, a protege of Sir Edward Coke
anticipatory to Jeflersonian

and a personal friend of John Milton, he founded Providence in

1636 while in his early thirties. His statesmanship as president of
Rhode Island with his authorship including The Bloudy Tenent of
Persecution for Cause of Conscience established four political
principles into the permanent fibre of American civilization:
natural rights, religious freedom, human rights, and popular sovereignty. As a natural right, religious freedom was the right of
Jews, Catholics, and the much persecuted New England Quakers,
as well as of members of other faiths. In this he was a spiritual
predecessor of William Penn in Pennsylvania and of Lord Baltimore in Maryland. So in Providence there was religious liberty
and realistic separation of church and state.
Principles were put into practice. During Williams' presidency,
Rhode Island received its first Jewish immigrants and provided a
haven from persecution for Quakers. Human rights were implemented in Williams' treatment of Indians and in his opposition to
King Philip's War. Popular sovereignty had been Williams' principle when he wrote that "the Soveraigne, originall, and foundation of civill power lies in the people." Neither "Kings or Parliaments, State, and Governours" had any rights to power "then

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[391

what the People give." Consequently, "a People may erect and
what forme of Government seemes to them most meete." x
In actual practice, therefore, the town government of Providence was for a time a primitive democracy wherein "all heads of
families had an equal voice." Like Saint Thomas Aquinas, Roger
Williams regarded as the object of government the advancement
of the common good wherein good will among men would constitute a firm social solidarity. Modern writers have regarded
establish

Williams as a forerunner of

Thomas Paine

in political philosophy,

French romanticists. 2
William Penn, who helped to found Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and Delaware, had been trained at the Huguenot Academy at
Saumur in France, dismissed from the University of Oxford for
non-conformity, further educated in law at Lincoln's Inn, and
profoundly influenced in Ireland by Thomas Loe. He might be
classified more as a humanitarian and tolerationist than as a democrat like John Wise and Thomas Hooker.
Problem-minded, Penn established precedents by applying
as well as of the

With the Indians of Pennsyland asserted that "the Indians and English
must live in Love as long as the Sun gave Light" a policy that
became more general when in 1924 the American Congress permitted the Indians, the original Americans, to attain to American
citizenship. His religious toleration, especially his close friendship
with King James II, caused him to be charged repeatedly with
being a Jesuit in disguise rather than a Quaker. His boundary
problems with Lord Baltimore and Maryland were solved
amicably. His democracy was more of the substance than of form
as seen in his Concessions and Agreements of 1677 for colonists
in New Jersey, and as indicated by his maxim in his Frame of
principles to situations as they arose.

vania he

made a

Government
is

treaty

for Pennsylvania in 1682, to wit:

"Any Government

under it (whatever the Frame) where the

and the People are a Party to those laws."

free to the People

Laws
1

rule,

See Narragansett Club Publications

III,

Providence (1866-1870) 249,

"The Bloudy Tenent" in part is reproduced in J. Mark Jacobson,

The Development of American Political Thought A Documentaiy History
(New York: Century Co., 1932) pp. 71-76.
2 See R. G. Gettell, History
of American Political Thought (New
York: Appleton-Century, 1928) citing J. E. Ernst, "The Political Theory
of Roger Williams"
a doctoral dissertation at the University of Wash250, 355.

ington.

VI. American Political Thought

392]

Perm's governmental interests being humanitarian, they extended to international application. In his Essay Towards the
Present and Future Peace of Europe in 1693, he urged the establishment of a permanent international parliament or congress looking to that objective. Subsequently, in 1697, he presented to the

Board of Trade

in

London a plan whereby

colonies might be united. In his constitutions,

embodied

in

James Harrington's Oceana

all the American

Penn applied ideas

in such a

way

as to

win

approval in Europe including that of Montesquieu and Voltaire.

Experience, however, had taught him some weaknesses in democ-

more and more, as when

he wrote to a pressing Colonial: "For the love of God, me, and
the poor country, be not so governmentish, so noisy, and open, in
your dissatisfactions" a remark that might become the authors of
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1948 or the taxpayers of a welfare state.
racy, especially the insatiable hunger for

Later

Thomas

Jefferson called

world has produced; the

who

first

Penn "the

greatest lawgiver the

in either ancient or

modern times

government in pure and unadulterated

principles of peace, of reason, and of right." It would seem that
Penn's ultimate success was due largely to self-effacement in his
laid the foundations of

practical application of venerated theories including the essence of

the natural law.

John Woolman (1720-1772), a New Jersey farmer with but

few pretensions to formal education, concerned himself locally
with three policies that eventually became realized nationally and
internationally and stamped him as an initial "Apostle of Human
Freedom": the abolition of slavery, the amelioration of the landless and the poor, and
with lesser immediate success the aboli-

tion of militarism. Realist as well as idealist,

Woolman

visited slave

Amboy, New Jersey, and in Newport, Rhode

and labored among his fellow Quakers for the ending of

centers in Perth
Island,

even

Las Casas had struggled

America about
two centuries before. Woolman's Considerations on the Keeping
of Slaves appeared in 1754 and fifteen years later his own New
Jersey imposed an import duty on the slave trade. Two years later,
this unchristian trade

as Father

against Indian slavery in the Spanish colonies of

almost simultaneously with the passing of the Declaration of In-

dependence in Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of

Friends officially acted to disown any members who refused to
free their slaves, thereby exceeding the Declaration in the doctrine

American Political Thought XXVIII.

of equality

and precluding

in principle the

[393

arbitrament of the

sword.

Woolman's social politics extended to others than slaves.

Laboring for the poor and the landless and for those whose lot
forced them to work under conditions that might evoke the commiseration of slaves, his Plea for the Poor appeared in 1763 and
was republished in 1897 as a tract for the Fabian Society in
England. His aversion to war as a political policy was expressed
in his opposition to taxation

military purposes

and the conscription of men for

a policy that in the nuclear age could be con-

sidered as an eventual alternative to nihilism.

principal colonial contribution to the science of government

was the written constitution defining rights of persons and limiting government authority, which conditions established lasting
principles.

Some

anticipatory

prototypes

were:

(1)

charters

granted to mercantile companies operating colonization projects

in

America; and (2) instruments of government formulated by

proprietors of colonies, or their leaders, or by the colonists them-

Charters granted to commercial companies between 1550

and 1700 numbered more than fifty. 3
Of these the English Virginia Company was chartered in 1 609
two years after the settlement of Jamestown. It applied to 715
persons and organizations. They were permitted to form their own
government, to make their own laws, and to repel invasions, i.e.,
to constitute an original American political experiment station. This
selves.

More imEnglishmen who settled in

the colony the rights of free-born Englishmen. This became a
matter for reference by 1776. The rights included immunities,
liberties, and franchises, and they extended to the posterity of the
colonists. Here also was a legal basis for civil rights and local selfgovernment so dear to the Virginian of the later national era. John
Quincy Adams epitomized the political significance of such coloni-

matter,

it

seems, eventually interested Lord Baltimore.

portant, the Charter guaranteed to

zation:

"By bestowing upon

all

the colonies themselves an organiza-

tion perpetually tending to independence,

the minds
3

and measures of men

it

gradually predisposed

to that final separation

R. G. Gettell, History of American Political Thought,

p. 33.

See also

Thought (New York, Century, 1924), pp. 299-301,

theory from ancient origins and from a more nearly

his History of Political

treating of political

from the

world-wide perspective.

VI. American Political Thought

394]
parent stock which

it

was impossible not

lapse of ages, prove unavoidable."

to foresee must, in the

Virginia well illustrated this trend, but not with the same

New

England and Middle Atlantic Colonies. Her

mores of the ruling classes of England was a tempering influence that was not so effective farther north or in the
Carolinas. In Virginia, the Church of England was established;
stimuli as the

relation to the

likewise the Royalist tradition.

The

plantation system with slave

labor was congenial to the feudal residues of England. Sir Walter

Scott's novels of chivalry eventually

found appreciative readers

in

plantation society. Colonial Virginia, like colonial Massachusetts,

democracy of the masses or for the education of the masses. But the spirit of the charter government
flourished in pre- Jefferson days. When the Revolution came, a
Virginia gentleman, George Washington, was nominated by a
Massachusetts statesman, John Adams, to lead the forces for in-

was not too avid

for the

dependence.

The Puritans

of colonial Massachusetts

Old Testament for support of

common

cognizant of the English

dents,

are

and John Calvin's

now

drew heavily from the

their political theories

polity at

archaic matters of history.

Geneva.

Many

Of those

that lived

into twentieth-century observance were:

right

to

local

of their theories

and matured

the contract idea of a

constitutional government, the separation of

and balances, the

although

law, English political prece-

powers for checks

and limited

self-government,

suffrage.

The contract

was utilized for both ecclesiastical and

government the "church covenant" and the "plantation
covenant." They were coordinated. The idea of the latter was
crystallized before the landing at Plymouth Rock.
Governor William Bradford in 1620 recorded the need observed on the Mayflower for a written agreement to abide by
recognized social principles upon which the Colony of Plymouth
should be founded:

political

This day,

before

principle

we came

to

harbour,

observing some not well

and concord, but gave some appearance of faction,

was thought good there should be an association and agreement,

affected to unity
it

4 Collections of Massachusetts Historical Society,

3d
quoted in Gettell, History of American Political Thought,

Series, IX, 202,

p. 33.

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[395

that we should combine together in one body and to submit to such

government and governors as we should by common consent agree to
make and choose, and set our hands to this that follows, word for

word.

5
.

Two months of confinement to the ocean-churned Mayflower

might well have reduced the Puritans temperamentally to a Hobbesian state of nature requiring such a government or Leviathan.
In the Mayflower Compact the sacred nature of the contractual

was primary. Personal submission and obedience were

was
to acquire the advantages of general good. The laws were to be
just and equal. Here were the germinal forces of a polity that
would be thoroughly American for centuries, however limited in
principle

considerations to be rendered by each individual, for which he

content:
In ye

name

of

God Amen. We whose names

are underwriten, the

our dread Soueraigne Lord King James by ye grace

of God, of Great Britaine, Franc, & Ireland king, defender of ye
loyall subjects of

faith, &c.

Haueing undertaken, for ye

glorie of

God, and advancemente of

ye christian faith and honour of our king

plant ye

first

&

countrie, a voyage to

colonie in ye Northern parts of Virginia.

presents solemnly

another, couenant,

& mutually in
& combine our

Doe by

these

ye presence of God, and one of

selues togeather into a Ciuill

body

our better ordering, and preseruation & furtherance of

ye ends aforesaid; and by Vertue hearof to enact, constitute, and
frame such just & equal lawes, ordinances, Acts, constitutions, &
politick; for

offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meete and

conuenient for ye generall good of ye Colonie: unto which we promise
all due submission and obedience. In witness thereof we haue here6
under subscribed our names at Cap Codd ye .11. of Nouember.

The theory

of checks

and balances, to be assured through a

some support in Scripture wherein

separation of powers, found

5 Alexander Young, "Chronicles

of the Pilgrim Fathers," Boston:
1841, 120, reprinted in Albert Bushnell Hart, American History Told by
Contemporaries, Vol. I (New York: Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 344.

William Bradford, History of the Plimoth Plantation (Fac-simile

from the original manuscript, with an Introduction by John A. Doyle

[London and Boston, 1896], 54, reprinted in Hart, op. cit., p. 344. This
compact and other early charters are collected also in B. P. Poore, Constitutions and Charters.

VI. American Political Thought

396]

the Israelites of the Exodus, having suffered under the tyranny of

the Pharaohs, determined against a probable parallel.

They recog-

nized their chief leader, their judges, and eventually their prophets.
Likewise, their congregation lent importance to local authority. 7

Limited suffrage was logical to the Puritan faith in God's

Government should be
The Puritans were not too

administered by the righteous

tolerant with those

elect.

elect.

God's

who might be

considered of the non-elect such as Roger Williams or the Quakers.

The Thomistic concept

of the inherent dignity of the

human

soul

apparently did not appeal to them enough then to insure the belief
that

men

"all

"equality of

all

are created equal," although they might accept

men

Some might even

before God."
perceive biblically that there was "democracy

Redemption" a sort of spiritual

John Cotton, the Puritan leader who led the attack on
the "radicalism" of Roger Williams, wrote in 1636
the year of
the founding of Harvard College
to Lords Say and Seale:

in the Fall, but aristocracy in the

aristocracy.

Democracy, I do not conceyve that ever God did ordeyne as a fitt

government eyther for church or commonwealth. If the people be
governors, who shall be governed? As for monarchy, and aristocracy,
8
they are both of them clearly approved, and directed in scripture.
.

This idea experienced certain elements of recrudescence in

America after World War I was fought "to make the world safe
for Democracy," and after World War II upon the advent of the
scientific age that sent man-made satellites to orbit around the
sun.

The

principles of equality, of isolation,

fundamental

in

Lord Baltimore's

and of pacifism were

1633

Instructions to Colonists in

directing:

bee uery carefull to do justice to euery man w th out

and that they auoid any occasion of difference w th those of
Virginea and to haue as little to do w th them as they cann this first

That in

fine they

partiality,

S. Straus, Origin of the Republican Form of Government

United States of America, 1885.
8 Thomas Hutchinson,
"History of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay"
(London, 1760), I, 496-501, reprinted in J. Mark Jacobson, The Develop-

See Oscar

in the

ment of American

Political

Thought

Documentary History,

p. 33.

American Political Thought XXVIII.

yeare that they conniue and suffer

little

iniuryes

than to engage themselues in a publique quarrell

[397

from them rather

w tb

them.

That the Maryland colonists found that their principles stood

is evident from the subsequent testimony of the
Jesuit, Father Andrew White, who in 1634 narrated of negotiations for land from the Indians with results which seemed to them
the pragmatic test

miraculous:

God, by these miracles, opened a way for his law and for eternal life.
Some emigrate, and others are daily relinquishing to us their houses,
lands and fallow-fields. Truly this is like a miracle, that savage men, a
few days before arrayed in arms against us, so readily trust themselves like lambs to us, and surrender themselves and their property
to us. The finger of God is in this; and some great good God designs
to this people. 10

In 1639, "The Fundamental Orders" of Connecticut were

drawn up

at

Hartford by a popular assembly to constitute the

commonwealth. They provided a framework for

government with a representative assembly that should not adjourn without the consent of the majority and in which there was
to be liberty of speech. 11
A further popular advance was realized two years later in
Rhode Island in the "Newport Declaration":
basic law of the

The Government which

this

Bodie Politick doth attend unto in

Island and Jurisdiction thereof, in favour of our Prince

is

this

Democ-

Government; that is to say it is in the power of the

Freemen orderly assembled or the major part of them, to
or constitute just Lawes, by which they will be regulated, and
to depute from among themselves such ministers as shall see them
faithfully executed between man and man. 12

ratic or Popular

Body
make

tions,
p.

of

"The Calvert Papers" (Maryland Historical Society, Fund-PublicaNo. 28, Baltimore, 1889), 131-140 passim, reprinted in Hart, op. cit.,

252.

10 Rev. Father Andrew White, "A Relation of the Colony of the Lord
Baron of Baltimore in Maryland" (Baltimore, 1847), 18-24 passim, reprinted in Hart op. cit., p. 256. Father White's letter was in Latin, and
translated by N. C. Brooks in 1847.
11 J. Hammond Trumbull, compiler, "The Public Records of the
Colony of Connecticut," 1636-1665 (Hartford, 1850), 20-25, reprinted in

Hart, op.
12

cit.,

Rhode

pp. 415-419.

Island Records, I, p. 112, quoted in Charles E. Merriam,

History of American Political Theories (1928), p. 18n.

VI. American Political Thought

398]
This democracy,
It

it is

noted, did not yet extend to

concerned the "Body of Freemen,"

who

as yet

all male adults.

were to tolerate

Rhode Island a center of the slave trade.

The supremacy of fundamental agreements over subsequent
statutes, at least in matters of religion, was assured by Lord

within

Berkeley and Sir George Carteret in their "Concessions and Agree-

ments of the Proprietors of East Jersey" in 1665:

.

noe person qualified as aforesaid within the said Province

at

any

time shalbe any waies molested punished disquieted or called in ques-

any difference in opinion or practice in matters of Religious

who doe not actually disturbe the civill peace of the
said Province,
any Law Statute or clause conteyned or to be
conteined usuage or custome of this Realme of England to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding. 13
tion for

concernements,

"The Concessions and Agreements" established through

William Penn in 1677 for the government of some 200 colonists at
Burlington,

New

Jersey, provided for popular sovereignty; legis-

lative control of the

jury (which jury,

if

government; the right of petition;

trial

by

concerning Indians, should be composed of

an equal number of Indians and white persons); friendly methods

freedom of conscience; and

freedom of speech in the legislative assembly. Elements of a bill of
rights were thus established. These agreements were to take
precedence over any subsequent enactment of statutes thus inaugurating a principle of constitutional supremacy that was to be
enshrined in the leading Supreme Court case of Marbury v.
Madison by Chief Justice Marshall in 1804. Of Penn's Concessions
and Agreements, Professor Charles M. Andrews, the historian,
wrote that they constituted "the broadest, sanest, and most equitable charter drafted for any body of colonists up to that time." 14
Constitutional developments in the colonies continued to evolve
for the purchase of Indian lands;

as adjustments to evolving social situations.

tions

were much

like statutes.

nition as superior to

lished

by a

mere

At

first

the constitu-

Circumstances wrought their recog-

statutes.

Eventually they were estab-

special convention representing the authority of the

13 "Documents relating to the Colonial History of the State of New

Jersey" (edited by William A. Whitehead, Newark, 1880), I, 28-39 passim,

reprinted in Hart, supra, pp. 563, 564.

14 C.

M. Andrews, Colonial Self-Government (1904),

p.

121.

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[399

which made them a fundamental law. By the end of

1780 precedent was established in Massachusetts for submitting
the constitution to the voters for approval, making it the instrument of popular sovereignty a mark of progress from the Company Charter of 1550 and the Mayflower Compact of 1620. Before the end of the Revolution, each colony except Rhode Island
and Connecticut had adopted a new constitution. These two exceptional colonies carried on with their time-tested instruments.
Between the outbreak of the Revolutionary War and the Civil
War the average adoption of constitutions had been more than one
per annum. During the three decades following 1860, seventy-six
constitutional conventions were held and seventy-two constitutions
drafted. Of these, sixteen were made operative by the conventions.
Others were sent to the voters, who ratified them as the popular
electorate,

sovereigns

In

fact,

create

succeeding

and

to their seventeenth-century inaugurators.

1840 many of these constitutions did more than

after

restrain governing functionaries.

actually legislated via

constitution,

fundamental instrument to the level of a

constitution of

Oklahoma

as

The popular

sovereigns

reducing in a measure the

statute.

The voluminous

adopted in 1907 was utilized subse-

quently at the University of Oxford as a specimen of American

popular

statecraft.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD

tion

Varied causes and political theories of the American Revoluwere epitomized in the Declaration of Independence as penned

principally
ality

by Thomas

in the

ideas

Jefferson.

He

claimed virtually no origin-

expressed therein. His contribution was his

graphic presentation of ideas current in the minds of American

thinkers of his time,
authorities

ancient,

who

in turn

medieval,

had inherited them from multiple

and eighteenth-century, as ob-

served heretofore.

Among the most compelling ideas were the theory of government based on a contract between the government and the governed, natural law and natural rights, and the resultant right of
revolution
rights

were

when

either the

fundamental contract or the natural

violated.

The theory
tary contract

that legitimate government resulted from a volunbetween the governed community and the govern-

VI. American Political Thought

400]

had been axiomatic among some of the political

It had been stressed in
American colonies since the Mayflower Compact of 1620. The
later Massachusetts Bill of Rights had stated that "the body
politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a
social compact by which the whole people covenants with each
citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be
governed by certain laws for the common good."
Such theory of government by the consent of the governed
soon found a reference to matters of taxation upon the enactment
of the English Sugar Act and Stamp Act. In 1765, pamphlets
written almost simultaneously by scholars of eminence were widely
current in attacks on these Acts. Immediately influential was
Stephen Hopkins (1707-1785), whose pamphlet on The Rights
of Colonies Examined appeared in 1764, the same year Brown
University was founded as Rhode Island College. He was its first
chancellor, having previously been Colonial Governor of Rhode
Island and in attendance at the Albany Convention, where he
favored the Plan of Union of Benjamin Franklin, his close friend.
His attacks on the proposed Acts of Taxation were made "on the
ground that direct taxation of an unconsenting people was tyrannous," and he considered "the theory of colonial home rule," which
later was elaborated by John Dickinson. While Hopkins' Rights of
Colonies was being circulated extensively in 1765, another pamphlet appeared presenting Consideration on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the Colonies
by Act of Parliament by Daniel
Dulany (1722-1797). The son of a lawyer, he had been educated in England at Eton College, Cambridge University, and at
the Middle Temple, and admitted to the Bar of Maryland. He held
that "taxation without representation was a violation of the coming authority

philosophers since the thirteenth century.

mon

law of England." His principles were influential in both

England and America. William Pitt drew from them when speaking in Parliament for the repeal of the taxation. Charles Carroll

considered Dulany "indisputably the best lawyer on this continent."

Dulany was not of the

politically

immature or violent

radical groups and, at the outbreak of hostilities, withdrew to

private

Of

life.

like poise

was John Dickinson (1732-1808), the "Penman

Maryland of a Quaker family, who

of the Revolution," a native of

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[401

at the Middle Temple in London nearly four

His pamphlet on The Late Regulations Respecting the
British Colonies expressed his opposition to the Sugar and Stamp
acts. In 1768 his Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the

had studied

also

years.

Inhabitants of the British Colonies were published.

pacific in spirit

and favorable

to conciliation

They were

somewhat

of the

Edmund

Burke. Eventually he voted against the

Declaration of Independence. Yet, save for one other gentleman,
maturity of

he was the only member of the Congress actually to take up arms

in the war when it did break out. How many times in history this

phenomenon has recurred may not be entirely impertinent to

history of American statesmanship. So few who have pressed
war have participated in its battles and vice versa.

the
for

In 1765, while these three pamphlets were being circulated

James Wilson (1742-1798), a youthful native Scotsman

studied at St. Andrews and Edinburgh universities, arrived
in America. After studying law in the office of John Dickinson for
a few years he settled in practice at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. His
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Auinitially,

who had

concluded that such authority

These Considerations likewise were widely read by
thoughtful persons in both England and America. His statement
thority of the British Parliament

was quite

nil.

that "all the different

states,

the

members

of the British

Empire are

distinct

independent of each other, but connected together under

same sovereign"

cast a plan for conciliation

anticipate the ultimate British

Commonwealth

and seemed to

of Nations of the

twentieth century.

Relevant to the contract theory was the natural status of the

parties to the contract as to their natural rights

and

their situation in a state of nature

abrogated.

As

early as 1763,

if

under natural law,

the contract should be

James Otis (1725-1783), Harvard

graduate, Boston lawyer, and correspondent of John Dickinson,

had declared that "Every British Subject in America is, of Common Right, by Acts of Parliament, and by the laws of God and
Nature, entitled to all the essential Privileges of Britons." So there
were God-given rights as well as civil rights. The next year, to
counteract the Sugar and Stamp acts, he illuminated The Rights
of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in what Professor
Charles H. Mcllwain of Harvard 150 years later said was "one of

VI. American Political Thought

402]

the earliest and ablest pamphlets written

point of view."

from the natural law

15

Natural law was acknowledged by William Blackstone, whose

Commentaries on the Common Law also appeared in 1765 and

was read profoundly in America as well as in his own England.
Standard reading in America also was John Locke's Two Treatises
on Civil Government, which considers Richard Hooker, who in
turn considered Saint Thomas Aquinas, whose theory of natural
law was classic although not always understood correctly by
some of his professed followers even in the mid-twentieth century.
But Otis, reflecting on the constitutional ideas of Lord Coke and
Sir Matthew Hale, sharply invoked fundamental law that embodied principles of natural law. Colonial publicists like John
Adams were familiar with at least some attributes of natural law.
From allegiance to the contract theory and the natural law, it
was but a short step to belief in the right of revolution when it
was felt that the contract had been broken. For the government
to enforce a law contrary to the constitution could be regarded as
a violation of the contractual relations. For a royal customs collector to procure from the courts Writs of Assistance to be used
for searches in the enforcement of tax acts was illegal to the legal
mind of James Otis. He argued against them in the Superior
Court in Boston, and according to John Adams, "American Independence was then and there born; the seeds of patriots and
heroes were then sown." 16 John Adams, witnessing the procedure,
noted that Otis had said that

An
is

is void; an act against national equity

an Act of Parliament should be made, in the very words
petition, it would be void. The executive courts must pass such

act against the Constitution

void;

of this

and

if

acts into disuse. 17

How

Thomas Aquinas.
Consciously or otherwise, Otis had taken the same position as

Saint

like the reasoning of Saint

Thomas Aquinas

any law contrary to the

law is that part of divine
law of which man is cognizant. But possibly Otis was thinking of
reason in the common law as being superior to an act of Parlianatural law

is

no law

at

in holding that

all,

15 C. H. Mcllwain, The
16 John Adams, Works,

Ibid.,

p. 522.

since natural

American Revolution (1923),

X, 247.

p. 153.

a*

American Political Thought XXVIII.

-?

[403
i

ment, and in doing so he anticipated the position of Chief-Justice A ^

John Marshall in the Supreme Court case of Marbury v Marshall) j^h

1804 when he held

in

the United States

Thomas

is

that a congressional statute in conflict with

void.

Common

Paine, author of

Sense, also took the posi-

King of England had broken a contract with his subjects. Patrick Henry in the Continental Congress orated: "We are
in a state of nature, Sir. All America is thrown into one mass."
And from this state of nature in a Lockean sense, a new government could be formed, a product of revolution. The idea was
tion that the

crystallized in the Declaration of

Independence:

Whenever any form of government becomes

it

new government,
ing

destructive of these ends,

the right of the people to alter or to abolish

is

its

safety

laying

its

powers in such form, as

and happiness.

Books
session of

in the Library of

Thomas

shall

own

As

and

to institute

seem most

likely to effect their

Congress that once were in the pos-

Jefferson and apparently annotated marginally

by him, bear eloquent testimony

science.

it,

foundations on such principles and organiz-

to his erudite reading in political

to the effect of his reading

political philosophy, there

upon

has been

the formulation of his

much

elucubration. There

are impressive evidences of his response to ideas as found in

works
by Saint Robert Bellarmine and by Saint Thomas Aquinas. How
conscious he was of the original sources of his ideas is another
matter of interest. Judging from his aversion to Plato's writings and
yet the complete

harmony

of

many

of his

own

propositions with

those inferred from a correct interpretation of Plato, one might

opine that Jefferson's erudition might have originated with him as

primely as with his philosophical predecessors.

If so,

we may

ac-

count for principles of Plato's Republic in the Declaration of

Independence despite Jefferson's expressed aversion to Plato's

Republic when he wrote to John Adams that his reading of it
"was the heaviest task-work I ever went through" 18 and that
"Socrates

had reason, indeed,

to

complain of the misrepresenta-

tions of Plato: for in truth, his dialogues are libels

18 See The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia,

No. 6680, "Plato's Republic."
19 Ibid.

ed.

by

J.

on Socrates."

19

P. Foley (1900), p. 697,

\s L
-


VI. American Political Thought

404]

Referring to Plato in a letter to William Short, Jefferson also

wrote that

"No

writer, ancient or

modern, has more bewildered

renowned philosopher

the world with such ignes jatui, than this

in ethics, in politics,

and physics."

20

Yet with modern political hermeneutics, one may perceive

works were proposing precisely what Jefferson
desired: freedom of the individual from dominance of the state.
Plato's Republic may be interpreted, not as a proposed earthy
polity, but rather as a symbol of what the human soul seeks, a
republic within himself somewhat like William Penn's dictum that
"The Kingdom of God is within you." The function of earthly
government is to protect this inherent dignity of the human soul
even as Saint Thomas Aquinas would exhort and as proposed in
readily that Plato's

the Declaration of Independence.

Rooted deep in many sources, the political theories of the

American Revolution in 1776-1783 embraced both legal and
political rights. Legal rights were claimed from the colonial
charters and from the constitution of England, which from the
Whig viewpoint was based on natural law: "We Hope In God."
Political rights included the rights of man, social contract, and the
resultant right of revolution. Beginning with loyalty to the king of

England and with hope for obtaining their just rights from him,
the colonists proceeded to independence and representative government. To attain representative government it was necessary
that constructive principles, rather than revolutionary dogmas, be
implemented after the Revolution. Under the Articles of Confederation in 1783-1789 the political philosophers devoted their
thinking to this end.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD: 1789

AND AFTER
The

Articles

of Confederation in operation in

1783-1789

anticipated the Constitution as adopted in 1789. Experience as a

confederation under the Articles revealed the necessity of a "more

perfect union," especially in that the confederation
as a nation, lacking as
state

it

was so impotent

did the power to tax or to regulate inter-

commerce. While the revolutionaries had sought independ-

20 ibid.

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[405

ence from big government, the importance of some such instrument

was now perceived and statesmen proceeded to fashion it.

now were concerned with creative

government rather than with speculations
upon democracy or even on a bill of rights. These could be deferred. Their immediate concern was for law and order and
property rights. This required stable government. With thirteen
separate discordant states, or quasi-nations, each claiming sovereign power such as had been enjoyed by the king and parliaStatesmen in leadership

ideas for constructive

ment of England, the problem of forming an adequate national

power that would allow separate state autonomy and liberty was
a major one of political philosophy. Upon its solution depended
the form of government and the assurance of human rights.

To
that

secure mutual understanding, a written instrument evolved

came

to

be considered one of America's greatest contribu-

tions to applied political science. In the sweltering heat of the

Philadelphia

summer

of 1787, the

Founding Fathers met

in Inde-

pendence Hall without air-conditioning and fashioned the Constitution of the United States, which can be read within a half
hour but which gave the word "constitution" a significance it
never before had connoted. It is quite different from the Constitution of

Athens accredited to Aristotle and for which he was

indebted to prior political thinkers, including Solon, Herodotus,

Xenophon, Thucydides, and most

particularly Androtion. It

is dis-

tinguished above Justinian's hundreds of novellae constitutiones,

which essayed to codify the laws of Rome. It went beyond the

Constitution of Clarendon of Henry IPs England of a.d. 1164,
which expressed some of the unwritten customs or mores of the
realm. Likewise,
stitution"

of

it is

distinct in nature

from the singular "Conwhich was unwritten

eighteenth-century England,

but which included the physical body or structure of the English

political

system with

its

governmental organs and

its

people in

was an original constitution, which

William E. Gladstone (whose parliamentary career in England
extended through sixty years) said was the greatest political instrument ever struck from the mind of man.
While original, the Constitution contained substantial factors
that were not entirely new. In the Constitutional Convention,
Benjamin Franklin, its eldest statesman at eighty years, noted that

their political relationships. It

VI. American Political Thought

406]

they had sought ideas from

many

sources and, not finding sufficient

guidance for the American environment, he suggested that they

invoke divine aid. As a product of eighteenth-century thought and

American Constituthe essence of cosmopolitan wisdom dis-

the ancient antecedents to that thought, the

some

tion contains
tilled

of

through the ages.

In

it,

many

immigrants from

cultures might identify derivatives

of their native philosophical heritage

ing warmth.

The

and respond to their welcomwas exposed even to

Constitutional Convention

the influence of Confucius' and Mencius' doctrines. These, trans-

by the Jesuits since the late seventeenth century, had peneEurope and from there, through the German Leibnitz and
Wolff and the French Turgot and the Physiocrats, had reached
Jefferson and Franklin. Incidentally, Franklin, the octogenarian

lated

trated

of the Convention, congenial to the

more youthful

delegates in-

cluding Hamilton and receptive to youthful vision, could have

typified

Mencius' idea of a great man: one

who

has not lost the

appeared also in Adam Smith's

Wealth of Nations (1776). Applicable to growing American in-

child's heart. Physiocratic ideas

dividualism was the Physiocratic principle of non-interference with

workmen who

desired to

make

things even

if

they did not belong

monopolies and injustice warranted interference

by the government a principle expressed by the term laissez-

to guilds, unless

faire.

This harmonized with both Jefferson's and

Thomas

Paine's

theory that the less government necessary the better for liberty.

Many

other political principles engaged the attention of the

Constitutional Convention.

Madison, much of

its

Due

to the ingenious diligence of

consideration was recorded and

is

James
avail-

able. 21

The

Constitution as finally

composed and adopted by the Con-

vention in Philadelphia and submitted to the several states for

ratification
litical

was the stimulus

theory. This obtained

Persuasive essays urging

for

much more

rationalization in po-

on both national and

local scales.

were published by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. These were collected in a volume entitled The Federalist. For 170 years, these
21

See

Max

its

ratification

Farrand's edition of The Records of the Federal Conven(1911-1937); and his Framing of the Constitution
(1913), both published in New Haven at Yale University Press.

tion of 1787, 4 vols.

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[407

essays have been accepted as authentic expositions of the purposes

of various principles of the Constitution. John Dickinson wrote as

"Fabius," urging ratification. In the states, the debates comprised

three volumes under the caption "Debates, Resolutions and Other

Proceedings in Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution." They were collected and published in 1827-1830 by an
English immigrant, Jonathan Elliot.

Still

available, they are

popu-

known as "Elliot's Debates."

Of the two major designs of

larly

the Constitution, one was to

from possible emergent tyranny
government a possible Hobbesian Leviathan whether
in
wrought by patricians or plebeians. The other design was to proinsure protection to the individual

vide

economy and

efficiency in the

should be found necessary to the

The

first

objective

harmony

of the state

man

was

to

as

was
where the function

advance the individual's personal

to use

a tool or

as a slave of the state. This

with the ideal of Plato's Republic,

and happiness rather than

end in itself.

To

good.

would feature government

servant of man, rather than

in

governmental agencies that

common

life, liberty,

man's existence for the

protect such happiness of the individual, the

state as

an

American

Constitution provided for short terms for the president

(four

years) and for the representatives in Congress (two years).

Gov-

ernmental power was divided horizontally and

Hori-

vertically.

it was divided into three branches: executive, legislative,

and judicial somewhat after the experience of Hebrew government of the Old Testament, and to a measure after the polity of
England as elaborated by Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws.
Vertically, the sum of the federal governmental power was comprised of that which the component states had granted to the
central or general or national government and of that which was
retained by the states. That granted to the national part of the
federal government was enumerated in the Constitution and came
to be known as enumerated powers. That which remained with
the component states constituted the residuum of power or sovereignty. Since the states maintained this residuum of sovereignty,
they needed no constitution to grant them powers. Each state, however, formulated a constitution constructing a frame of government.
In general they followed the form of the federal government with

zontally,

VI. American Political Thought

408]
the separation of powers.
chusetts,
in the

For

adopted in 1780 and

government of

this

shall never exercise the

instance, the Constitution of

still

Massa-

in force, stipulated that

commonwealth, the

legislative

department

executive and judicial powers or either of

them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legisla-

and executive powers or

tive

either of

them

to the

end that

it

may

be a government of laws and not of men.

Naturally,

men were needed

to administer the laws, but they

The power of the legislawas divided into two houses, and the federal purse strings
were to be held by that house closer to the electorate the House
of Representatives. A federal Supreme Court was created, which
eventually established the supremacy of the Constitution as the
fundamental law even as colonial courts had pronounced the
supremacy of colonial charters; so that legislative acts in conflict
with the fundamental law were null and void just as in Saint
Thomas' view any positive law in conflict with natural law was
no law. Military service was subordinated to the civil authorities,
thereby assuring a bulwark against military dictatorships and
military imperialism. This advanced a principle in Plato's most
mature work, the Laws, wherein he opposes the Spartan type of
military man and the idealization of war. (In his Gorgias, too, he
themselves would be under those laws.
ture

opposes

all

imperialism, the Athenian imperialism of Pericles not

excluded, and maintains that the best protection of the state

is

virtuous citizenship and virtuous leadership.)

The second general objective of the federal government, the

was provided by the independence, within
limits, of the executive, and by the congressional power to create
efficiency of service,

necessary administrative agencies with congressional supervision

over them. Such supervision was spelled out in 1948 in the Administrative Procedure Act, to

mended

in

1956

in the

which modifications were recomHoover Commission Reports.

Many nations have tried to imitate this Constitution. 22 Tributes

have been paid to the breadth and depth of its appeal and warnings
have been sounded as to disasters that might result from a mis22 See Amos J. Peaslee, Constitutions
of Nations,
N.H.: Rumford Press, 1950).

vols.

(Concord,

American Political Thought XXVIII.

understanding of
its

[409

philosophical basis or a misinterpretation of

its

clauses.

For the Constitution was

philosophy

definitely

formulated upon a dualistic

which the essential difference between matter and form was recognized, and the Constitution was designed to
permit changes of form as needed through the years to come without sacrificing its substantial guarantees. But the economic challenge
of today, which in rejecting dualism, either for monism or its counterpart, pluralism, places matter and form on the same level of thought,
completely wipes out fundamental law and all law while substituting
mere regulatory decrees in its place. 23

Scholastic

in

So the basic philosophy of the Constitution

and implementation. Its
natural law is one of these essentials.

is

proper interpretation

essential to its

the

to

relation

THE CONSTITUTION AND NATURAL LAW

While under the Articles of Confederation, the thirteen states
were virtually engaged in cold wars threatening the advent of
interstate anarchy. The need of a law higher than that of any one
state was obvious then
World War II. Parallel

as well as in the
situations in

world situation

European

history

after

had

re-

sulted in the recognition of such a law, denominated natural law,

which according to Saint Thomas Aquinas is that part of divine

law made known to man through the light of reason. Law, as
such, he averred,

is

an ordinance of reason for the

common

good.

American Founding Fathers may not have envisioned natural law in just this sense, many of them did have a
While

all

the

concept approaching

The
been

it.

24

idea of natural law, natural rights, or natural justice had

essential to the colonists

23

M.

T. Rooney,

and to

"The Constitution of the United States"

Official Publication of the Intercollegiate

Vol. 22, No. 3

24 See

(New York,

James

their overseas predecessors,

in

The

Federation of Catholic Alumni,

1939).

Walsh, The Education of the Founding Fathers (New

York, 1935); William F. Obering, Philosophy of Law of James Wilson,
(Washington: Catholic Philosophical Association, 1938); and Clarence
Manion, The Founding Fathers and Natural Law (Pamphlet) (South
Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1948).
J.

VI. American Political Thought

410]

who needed

a higher authority for guidance to their freedom of

conscience and religion. Social rights were indicated in both the

Bible and in Aristotle.

The Bible

said that

it

was not good

for

be alone. Aristotle said that man is a social being. Inferentially, both authorities advised that man achieves his greatest

man

to

community life. Consequently, man should maintain

community in such a way that the individual may, through it,
achieve his best potential and oppose the contrary. Hence, the

potential in

the

natural right of revolution.

By

logical processes, natural

law be-

the foundation of the bills of rights in both the federal and

came

the state constitutions. 25

In their reflections on natural law, the Founding Fathers were

not confined to the simplified alleged line of transmission of natural

law from Saint Thomas Aquinas to Richard Hooker to John Locke

to Thomas Jefferson that some political theorists have been so
fond of narrating.
Students of political theory

may

recall that ideas of natural

works of Aristotle and other ancients, of Saint Thomas

Aquinas and other medievalists had become current in eighteenth-

rights in the

century thinking.

Aristotle's

"Natural justice

law because

right because

is

it is

cryptic
it is

line
right;

in his

Rhetoric,

that

conventional justice

law," was actively pursued. Zeno and

is

some of

and justice emanated from

man's reason rather than from social compacts; and they elaborthe Stoics later perceived that law

ated the doctrine of equality. This was

much

the

same idea ex-

pressed later by John Dickinson. Cicero in his Republic and in

Laws traces the origin of the state to natural law and justice,
which man-made (or positive) laws should not contradict. During the Middle Ages, materials for the study of law included'
treatises of Roman lawyers expounding ideas of natural law, of
natural reason, and of the people as the ultimate source of political authority. There was Saint Augustine's assertion that a law
made by a ruler was not to be obeyed if it was contrary to divine
and natural law. So with Saint Thomas Aquinas. What a suggestion in natural law for revolution or at least passive resistance!
Saint Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, with his com-

his

prehensive original thinking on natural law, accepted some of the

25

For a general, thorough examination of natural law and its relapositive law, see R. F. Begin, Natural Law and Positive Law
(Washington, D. C: Catholic University of America Press, 1957).

tion

to

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[411

propounded by the
John Fortescue of the fifteenth century
essayed a state of nature wherein natural law and perfect justice
dictated by God prevailed. Philip Melancthon in the sixteenth
century treated of human instincts concerning right and wrong as
or as a means of finding it along
a foundation for natural law
with Saint Thomas' reason and revelation. William Penn of the
seventeenth century, writing of The People's Ancient and Just
doctrines of natural law and natural rights as

Roman

lawyers.

Sir

Liberties Asserted (1693), treated of fundamental laws of nature

and impervious to human alteraand the Founding Fathers, right reason was
a directive as were the works of Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, and
Burlamaqui. Blackstone, in his Commentaries (1765), recognized
natural law even if he would not declare that a king's order in
conflict therewith was void
as would indeed Lord Coke, Saint
Thomas, and Saint Augustine.
In colonial New England, James Otis considered that God
made the lav/ of nature and urged that lawyers keep available a
volume on natural law. He held that God Almighty "has given to
all men a right to be free." Samuel Adams proposed that the right
to life, liberty, and property was of the first law of nature, being a
right of self-preservation, and he noted that "The rights of nature
that were eternal, unchangeable,

For the

tion.

colonists

are happily interwoven in the British Constitution. It

is its

glory

copied from Nature." John Adams, his more conserva-

that

it

tive

kinsman, considered that principles of the Revolution stood

is

on sources that included eternal reason and nature. He said that

rights are from "the Great Legislator of the Universe." John Wise,
widely read, referred in 1772 to "the dictates of right reason,"
and "the law and light of nature," to "the moving suggestions of
humanity," and "the just demands of natural liberty, equity,
equality and principles of self-preservation." By now, it seemed
that man could know natural law, or at least some characteristics
of it, through reason, revelation, nature, instinct, and the suggestions of humanity.

Outside of

New

New

England, Alexander Hamilton, educated in

Jersey, while considering the "sacred rights of

mankind,"

"They are written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume

of human nature, by the hand of Divinity itself and can never be
erased or obscured by mortal power." Particularly significant was
said:

his

argument that natural

rights are traceable to

many

sources in-

VI. American Political Thought

412]

common law

That the comHamilton

as a source
mon law of England should be regarded by
twentieth-century
of natural rights was of momentous import, and
scholarship would sustain him. As Dr. M. T. Rooney, dean of
Seton Hall Law School, says: "During the first five hundred years
of the existence of the Common Law as an autonomous legal
system, it was formulated, nurtured, and developed by men who
were not only jurists of eminence but also thinkers trained in

eluding religion and the

Scholastic principles."

the

common

Many

jurists

of England.

during the formative years of

law "brought to their professional duties a belief in

the value of the

mon Law than

human

soul

much more

the adaptation of

Canonical procedures

chief contribution." 26 She adds:

them as their
"The Constitution of the United

States as the fundamental

the land, is the crystallization of

many

usually credited to

Com-

significant for the

Roman and

law of

of the Scholastic principles

whole Common Law system." 27

Likewise, Rev. Robert J. Gannon, S.J., addressed lawyers in
Brooklyn in 1958:
implicit in the

The supremacy of law over

the English
rather than

Common Law

the ruler, was handed down to us through

which derived from custom and tradition

from formal codes.

law that was in

its

It

recognized the existence of a higher

broadest outline knowable through reason, know-

able because it could be deduced from the nature of man.

Our
Founding Fathers not only preserved for us the English Common Law
and the parliamentary tradition but also carried over from the Middle
Ages the Augustinian concept that all men are equal under God as
.

persons; as individuals, that

of

God and

The source
of Pennsylvania

from

is,

of natural law

when he

with spiritual powers; as adopted sons

Kingdom

heirs of the

of Heaven. 28

was sensed

also

by John Dickinson
do not come

recalled that "our liberties

charters; for these are only the declaration of pre-existing

rights.

They do not depend on parchments or seals; but come from

Lord of all the Earth." Likewise, George

the King of Kings and

Mason

in Virginia argued that "the laws of nature are the laws of

God, where authority can be superseded by no power on earth."

So from Massachusetts to Virginia, natural law of a kind was
26 "The Constitution
." p. 8. See also her Lawlessness, Law, and
Sanction (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1937).
27 "The Constitution
." p. 10.
.

2 &The Tablet (Brooklyn,

N. Y.: September

20, 1958), p. 9.

American Political Thought XXVIII.

acknowledged
tion.

in the formative years of the

towering power in the

juristic

[413

American Constitu-

thinking of this period was

James Wilson of Pennsylvania. Proceeding beyond Blackstone's

limited view, in his law lectures in Philadelphia he said that "Parliament may unquestionably be controlled by natural or revealed
law, proceeding from divine authority." For the growing American
nation, with its expanding frontiers in geography, education, and
scientific invention, James Wilson proclaimed a concept of natural
law particularly adaptable in that it was progressively applicable
even as
to evolving higher standards of living and of morality

they portended to global situations.

century

later,

Professor

John W. Burgess of Columbia University in his famous work on

Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (1890) re-

marked

"that the Creator of

man

implanted the substance of the

man"; and President Theodore Roosevelt in

1906 acknowledged James Wilson's political theories as his personal guide to political action. Natural law had been adjusted to

state in the nature of

expanding national

situations.

THE CONTRACT THEORY OF GOVERNMENT

Since the natural law assured

men

of God-given rights,

it

was

quite natural that they should covenant with one another for the

mutual protection of these sacred rights. Collectively they might

create a governing authority and then contract among themselves
and with that governing authority, with considerations of obedience on the part of the governed, and of justice on the part of
the governors.

In

some minds

American colonials had access to such philosophy.

it was thought that in previous ages men had been

in a state of nature or of anarchy, subject only to the

nature in the sense of the law of the jungle

law of
and

the law of claw

was devised an agreement or social compact

through which the weak might be protected from the strong, so
that, metaphorically speaking, little fish would not be consumed

fang. Eventually there

by bigger

Even

fish

and the

lion

might recline with the lamb in safety.

Compact of 1620 evolved from fac-

the exalted Mayflower

among the sea-tossed during the long voyage that

could have pressed them toward reversions to the primordial;
nearly every one of forty previous voyages to New England had

tional situations

ended

in failure.

VI. American Political Thought

414]

Such a compact idea had a kind of antecedent in the Old

Testament account of the covenant between God and His chosen
people, who, after deviation from the obligations of the covenant,
became the object of severe warnings from the prophets. The
compact theory as a source of law was treated by Plato in both
his

Republic and his Protagoras. Likewise by the Epicureans.

theory of a pact between society and kings was expressed by Saint

Augustine. Richard Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity

(c.

1594)

in-

American thought on the formation of government

through mutual consent or through contract to which both the
governor and the governed were subject parties. Pufendorf indicated two separate contracts. The Vindiciae contra tyrannos of
the sixteenth century considered a three-party contract between
God, the king, and the people, the last two parties agreeing to
rule and obey, while both agreed with God to sustain his elect. If

fluenced

the king should violate this agreement he could be resisted. In

modified form, the contract theory was held by John Milton,

Thomas Hobbes, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, which

fact gave

it

dominance in political thought for approximately two centuries.

During the American Revolution in 1780, Jonathan Mason, Jr.,
indicated that America was in the "original state of nature." In the
same year the people of Massachusetts formed their constitution,
which has endured nearly two hundred years and stipulates that
"The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact, by which the whole people
covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people
that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good."
During the following year, Thomas Dawes, Jr., declared that
"the people of Massachusetts have reduced to practice the wonderful theory" of the compact. Its roots had run deep in previous
history and philosophy. From it, the agitators for the Revolution in
1775-1783 could argue justification of the Revolution because the
king had violated his obligations in the contract and they were
being subjected to governmental decrees without their consent.
The theory persisted into the period of the federal Constitution

away from it after the utilitarian denial of it by

(1711-1776). Thereafter, some states in their constitutional bills of rights asserted the compact theory. The Kentucky Constitution of 1890 declared that "All men, when they
form a social compact are equal."
despite the trend

David

Hume

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[415

THE THEORY OF FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY

For the 170 years

since

1789, the nature and location of

federal sovereignty have been of such importance as to engage the

superlative thinking of superlative minds.

Upon

nature and

its

location depended the national government's authority to par-

world affairs, which by 1959 extended to Outer Space.

Upon it also depended the remaining authority for the functions
that might be conducted by the state governments and the manner
ticipate in

in

which they might be conducted

in education, for instance,

with such problems as the desegregation of racial groups in the

some powers residing

government and the remaining powers residing in
the state governments. Together, they comprise the federal powers
emanating from the total federal sovereignty. Those powers
granted to the national government are enumerated with an elastic
clause providing that the national congress may exercise whatever
1950's.

The

federal Constitution recognizes

in the national

may be

other powers

How

"necessary and proper" for carrying out the

and "proper" be defined, inand construed? Does the power to tax for the common
defense and general welfare allow the national government to do
anything that it might consider conducive to the general welfare?
If so, could the national government absorb all the functions of
the state governments in the presumed interest of the general

enumerated.

shall "necessary"

terpreted,

welfare?

And

all

private industry?

What

are the limits,

if

any, to a

Hobbesian Leviathan? Powers not so enumerated for the

national government or prohibited to the states are reserved to
"the states" or to "the people." What people? Those of each state
or those of the United States collectively? Such perennial problems arise from two provisions in the federal Constitution: The
first is Article X, the "Tenth Amendment," which declares that
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

potential

respectively or to the people."

The second

is

Article

I,

Section

8,

which authorizes the Congress "To make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof."

These two pronouncements resulted in two schools of

inter-

VI. American Political Thought

416]

pretation culminating in two political parties that precipitated the

War, which

Civil

in turn did not settle all of the potential con-

troversies resulting

from those pronouncements,

as witness the

civil rights in the 1950's. One school was that of the

"Broad" or loose interpretation and construction of the Constitution, which looked to a powerful "central" or "national" government. The other was that of the "Strict" or narrow interpretation
or construction, which desired a limited participation in affairs on
the part of the central or national government and more conse-

problems of

quent liberty for the states to carry out their affairs as they desired
the states-rights view. Thus were shaped the two national

political parties:

the Federalist Party of broad national power,

and the Anti-Federalist Party of

came

state sovereignty that later be-

the Republican-Democratic Party and finally the Democratic

Party prior to the

"New Deal" Democratic

Party of 1932.

Despite the tragedy of such differences of interpretation, the

generality or vagueness of these constitutional provisions

had some

measure of redeeming value in that they were elastic enough to be

adjusted to problems of the nuclear age, which could not have
been dreamed of when they were written.
The preamble to the federal Constitution makes the parties to
the instrument "We, the People" rather than "We, the States."
Hence, the question of who consented to the agreement: the people
of the states separately or of the United States collectively? And
whose might be the right of revolution in the event of one party's
breach of agreement? Where resided sovereignty? The Constitution did not mention that word. Patrick Henry of Virginia, who
had been such a radical agitator for the Revolution, desired states
rights and was antagonistic to the Constitution. Samuel Adams, of
Massachusetts, the "Father of the Revolution," opposed the Con-

and in 1788 wrote "I meet with a National Government instead of a Federal Union of Sovereign States."
Had the colonies separated from one big government to be
subjected to a newly created Leviathan? Their fears for the freedom of their respective states were somewhat like those held by
some American statesmen for the United States in 1919 with regard to the erstwhile League of Nations and in 1945 to the United
Nations. Would American sovereignty be subordinated to a
stitution at first

superstate?

As

with the nature of natural law and of the social compact,

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[417

history afforded rich resources of tested thought. Aristotle

had

indicated that the whole people or the electorate constituted the

residuum of ultimate power. So had the Roman lawyers Ulpian,

had suggested that the state is best

when some control of it is shared by every citizen. Marsilius of
Padua in his Defensor pads theorized on the sovereignty of the
people and the right to rule by the majority of them. But Saint
Thomas Aquinas previously had warned that the majority could be
wrong. William of Ockham had a clear conception of popular
power. Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) recognized popular sovereignty that might be delegated to a monarch. Juan de Mariana
(1536-1623) and Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) visualized
political authority in popular support. John Milton (1608-1674)
held that political power basically is in the people and that liberty
is for all of the people. James Wilson of Pennsylvania envisioned
Florentinus, and Gaius. Cicero

sovereignty as residing in the people rather than in an assemblage

of

states.

legislators

Accordingly, he favored the popular election of

and of the president

a view

amendment

century later in the seventeenth

Amendment

ported in the proposed Lodge

all

actualized in part
of

1913 and sup-

of the 1950's.

In 1798, the enactment by congress of the Alien and Sedition

Laws

served to activate the theory of state sovereignty. In op-

Kentucky Resolutions were

by Madison and Jefferson respectively in 1798-1799
relative to sovereign powers
each author subsequently becoming
president of the United States. Both resolutions stressed the states
as parties to the Constitution. The Virginia Resolution, drafted by
Madison, who was educated in New Jersey at Princeton, after
referring to the grants enumerated in the federal Constitution
declared that "in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous
exercise of other powers not granted by said compact, the States,
who are parties thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to

position to these acts, the Virginia and

drafted

interpose for arresting the progress of the evil." Just

states

might interpose was

left

to

conjecture.

how

the

The Kentucky

Resolution, referring to the Constitution, declared that "to this

compact each State acceded

its

co-States forming, as to

as a State,

itself,

and

is

an

integral party,

the other party" and that "when-

ever the general government assumes undelegated powers,

mean

nullification.

its

acts

and of no force." Virtually, this would

But who might determine whether or not the

are unauthoritative, void,


VI. American Political Thought

418]

general government assumed undelegated powers?

The Kentucky

Resolution stipulated that

the government created

by

this

compact was not made the exclusive

or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to

itself;

since

would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the
measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among
parties having no common Judge, each party has an equal right to
judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of
that

redress.

The

tariff

(dubbed the "Tariff of Abominations"),

of 1828

offensive to the Southern States, resulted in further vitalization of

John C. Calhoun
"The
South Carolina Exposition" based partly on the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions. In his Disquisition on Government he attacked the idea of a sovereignty divided between the national and
the states sovereignty or states-rights doctrine.

of South Carolina, educated in Connecticut at Yale, wrote

state

government: "Sovereignty

destroy

it.

It is

the supreme

is

an entire thing; to divide it is to

in the state and we might just

power

as well speak of half a square or half a triangle as half a sover-

eignty."

The

was empowered to exercise some

by the sovereign states. Calhoun advanced

national government

powers delegated to

it

wherein he insisted
and void any act contrary to
the Constitution, and he claimed the right of any one single state
to secede from the union by virtue of the separate individual state

his theories to the doctrine of nullification,

that the states might consider null

sovereignty.

This stressed state sovereignty more than did the

which implied interposition, rather than

by "the States" rather than by a single state.
By 1830 a congressional resolution the Foote Resolution
proposing to limit the sale of lands of the public domain in the

Virginia

Resolution,

secession,

western states again dramatized the question of sovereignty

whether

state or divided

in the

famous senatorial debate between

Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and Robert Y. Hayne of South

Carolina.

Hayne

the Constitution

resorted to the Calhoun Exposition, claiming that

was adopted by the people of the separate states

by the people of the nation collectively. Webster, in

argued that the Constitution was a creature of the people of
the United States.
rather than

reply,

The

extension of slavery into the federal territories of the West

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[419

brought Lewis Cass's proposal (1847) that the people residing in

these territories decide whether or not they would have slavery.
This would constitute a sort of local sovereignty on national

soil.

Supported by Stephen A. Douglas, a native of Vermont, this

theory became propagandized as "popular sovereignty" and was

By the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854 each separate area might have decided the local
slavery question for itself, but in 1857 the United States Supreme
Court decided, in the Dred Scott Case, 29 that the federal territhus ending the application of the
tories were open to slavery
doctrine of territorial popular sovereignty. During the following
year, the Lincoln-Douglas debates showed to the Southern States
the importance of secession if they would retain slavery from dederisively called "squatter sovereignty/'

struction through federal power.

native of Kentucky,

now

the

War

On

July 4,

1861, Lincoln, a

President, addressed a message

Congress in which he denned sovereignty as "a political

community without a political superior" and declared that "Tested
by this, no one of our states except Texas ever was a sovereignty.
Originally some dependent colonies made the Union, and in
turn the Union threw off their old dependence for them, and made
them states, such as they are. Not one of them ever had a state
constitution independent of the Union." Here apparently Lincoln
was not alluding to colonial charters like those of Connecticut and
Rhode Island, which were continued in operation as state conto the

stitutions after the Revolution.

While slavery was a challenge to the theories of sovereignty,

had been attacked on other grounds. William Rawle, an associate
of George Washington, argued against it on constitutional principles as John Woolman had opposed it from the viewpoint of

it

General Joseph Bloomfield of

Christianity.

Dissertation
in

1804

on Slavery

as governor

in

1796 proposed

its

New

he signed a gradual emancipation act when

slaves constituted about six per cent of the total

lation.

By

influence

Jersey in his

gradual abolition, and

New

Jersey popu-

1860, there were just eighteen slaves in the

was extensive

in space

and

state.

His

in time, his Dissertation being

reprinted in Philadelphia as late as 1861. In the South also gradual

was taking place as plantation ledgers showed

economic inexpediency after the invention of the cotton
gin and the advent of an industrial age.

emancipation
slavery's

29 19

Howard, 393.

VI. American Political Thought

420]

After the Civil War, the two constitutional provisions quoted

above continued to be storm centers of legal and political theory

on a wide variety of proposed governmental activities. Questions
as to whether certain functions should be performed at all by any
level of government or should be left to private enterprise on the
principles of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations were seemingly
perennial.

Functions that are classified as legitimately govern-

mental in nature stimulate theories as to whether they should be

performed by the national government or by the state governments
or by a coordination of both levels of government into a veritable
federalized effort.

Within the Constitution

itself,

or implied therein, are other

principles of importance similar to the basic theories of natural

law, social contract, and sovereignty, each predicated

upon deep-

rooted historical antecedents. These include such principles as

equality before the law, civil liberty, ownership of property: in
short, the Bill of Rights.

Other implicit theories

tional status such as judicial supremacy, the

the police

power

of states.

relate to institu-

law of nations, and

Throughout American

history, also,

there has been a multiplicity of issues or ideas derived

ations

principles. Others

issue

Some such

needing solution.
stage

e.g.,

it

became

proved to be ephemeral. Others

isolationism,

definitive elaboration of

essay. Suffice

ideas

expansion,

still

from

situ-

established

are in the

imperialism,

etc.

each would be disproportionate to

A
this

to note that pursuant to the brief Constitution of

more than a hundred

heavy tomes of Congressional Acts. Pursuant to thousands of such
Acts, there have been issued many volumes of executive orders
the United States there have been enacted

and many thousands of orders and regulations of

all
expressive of American political
theory or derivative of it. So with the legislatures and administrative functionaries of each of the fifty states and of hundreds of
of the president

administrative

agencies

municipalities throughout those states.

MINOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Many

of the political ideas that became a permanent part of

American political and governmental system were propagandized by minor political parties or by civic associations and,
after winning public support, were adopted by the major political

the

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[421

powers and put into operation. Platforms of all of the American

political parties from 1840 to 1956 inclusive are reprinted in full
in Kirk H. Porter and D. B. Johnson's compilation of National
Party Platforms, 1840-1956. In them may be found virtually all
the major

and minor

during that

An

1 1

issues that

have been before the electorate

6-year period.

early product of this procession

engineer

is

from the pioneer

to the

that of the presidential nominating convention as in-

augurated in 1832 by the Anti-Mason Party, the convention becoming a spectacular American institution in the television age.
Slave emancipation was a dynamic motivation of the Abolition,
the Liberty, and the Free-Soil parties, preliminary to becoming a
dedication of the Republican Party

The

upon

its

formation in 1856.

was a fundamental of the Constitu1860 nearly a century before the nuclear

age. Justice to the American Indian was advocated by the American Party in 1872 a half century before group citizenship was
granted in 1924. Amicable relations with Latin America with
strong naval and coast-defense measures were essentials of the
American Party of 1884 likewise a half century before the
formally established Good Neighbor Policy and Hemispheric
policy of national peace

tional

Union Party

of

Solidarity.

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Federal Trade

Commission Act of 1914 were anticipated by the agitators of the
Anti-Monopoly Party of 1884. Propaganda for an interstate commerce law, for sanitation in factories, and for shorter hours of
labor conducted by the Greenback Party in 1876-1884 moved
toward the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
1887, the Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. The Initiative and Referendum plans for
popular legislation as eventually adopted in eighteen states and
the Direct Primary Nominating System as established in fortyseven states were promoted along with many other policies by the
Populist Party of 1891-1908. Some of the New Deal and Fair Deal
policies of the Democratic Party of 1932-1952 had been advanced
previously by the Socialist Party and variants of it, by the FarmerLabor Party, and by the Progressive Party which in 1924 cooperated with the Socialist Party. Free educational provisions for
30 Published in

fessor Porter's

first

Urbana, 111., by the University of

compilation appeared in 1924.

Illinois Press.

Pro-


VI. American Political Thought

422]

and classes were a cardinal element of the American or

"Know-Nothing" Party a century before President Eisenhower's
proposal in 1959 for Federal Aid for public schools.
Principles of the four amendments to the federal Constitution
all sects

be adopted after the ratification of the fifteenth amendment

namely, those providing for a federal income tax, the direct electo

tion of senators, national prohibition of alcoholic beverages,

for

woman

suffrage

all

were planks

tion Party prior to their acceptance

by any other

Likewise that party, organized in 1869, was the

federal civil

and

in platforms of the Prohibipolitical party.

first

to

service reform, child labor laws, employer's

demand
liability

unemployment insurance and old age pensions, uniform

acts,

marriage and divorce laws, postal savings banks, the Tariff

mission, and international arbitration.

By 1921

it

Com-

had adopted

Women Voters' program.

which it still adhered as late as
1959 but which is not necessarily reduced to a tangible platform
plank nor solidified as an institution, is now probably acceptable
to all other political parties, to all political scientists, and to all
experienced statesmen. That is its pronouncement made with
especial emphasis during the decade 1908-1918, when a majority
of the states had enacted legislation prohibiting the manufacture
for sale of alcoholic liquors for beverage purposes and when the
fourteen principles of the League of

One

of

its

political theories, to

eighteenth

amendment

prohibition

was imminent. This pronouncement

to

the federal Constitution for national

insisted that about

99 per cent of successful governmental objective is achieved by
administration and interpretation and one per cent by legislation. 31
Political objectives are to be attained by first placing in political
power persons loyal to such objectives and then providing them

with the necessary legislation. Prohibition could end in disaster

were entrusted to authorities who personally desired it.

who voted for it to appease their constituents and then
violated it to appease their thirst could not be trusted to provide

unless

it

Legislators

31

Such were the reported contentions of the presidential nominee of

The American Prohibition Year Book, 1916, it
was stated on the flyleaf that "One thing stands out clearly; the burden
of our fight hereafter must not be to obtain first the prohibitory law,
whether by city, county or state, but first of all to elect to power a Prohibithe party in 1912; and in

tion Administration.

Prohibitory Law.

We

Prohibition Government must go

must reverse our former policy."

in

advance of a

American Political Thought XXVIII.

for honest administration of their
litical

theory proved to be a truism

own
is

legislation.

[423

That

their po-

indicated by the fact that the

amendment passed the House of Representatives, whose

members were elected in 1916 by a vote of 282 to 128, or 2 to 1;
passed the Senate by a vote of 65 to 20, or 3 to 1 was ratified by
eighteenth

which the combined vote for ratifithe legislatures

cation of all of the lower houses of the state legislatures was 3775
to 1025, or 3 to 1; the combined vote for ratification of all of the
state senates was 1309 to 240, or 5 to 1. The legislatures of six of
32
Yet within fourthese states voted for ratification unanimously.
teen years the eighteenth amendment was repealed by the conventions in 36 states, largely on the argument that it had failed of
administration. Thus overwhelming legislation, being only one per
cent of the political objective, proved inadequate without the adof 46

states, in

ministrative implementation of that legislation.

Since the Great Depression of 1929,

World War

II,

and the

advent of stratospheric exploration, federal administration has ex-

panded

to

such dimensions that some publicists consider

it

fourth branch of government, equal in rank to the executive de-

partment. Administrative law has become an extensive discipline

due

to congressional legislation's delegating so

many

functions to

them to act within standards

set up by the Congressional Acts, accompanied by administrative
discretion. To maintain protection of individual freedom from posadministrative agencies and directing

sible arbitrary administrative action, there

has developed a wider

significance of the venerated principles of the

and the Separation of Powers

American political theory.

33

Due

Process of Law,

original cardinal principles of

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hart, A. B. National Ideals Historically Traced, 1607-1907. New
York: Harper, 1907.
Jacobson, J. M. Development of American Political Thought: A
Documentary History. New York: Century Co., 1932.
Thorpe, F. N. Federal and State Charters, Constitutions, and Organic
Laws, 1492-1906. Washington, D. C: Government Printing
Office, 1909.
32

D. Leigh Colvin, Prohibition

in the

United States (1926), pp. 448,

449.
33 See

K. C. Davis, Treatise on Administrative Law, 4

vols.

(1958).

VI. American Political Thought

424]

General

Carpenter, W.

S.

The Development of American

Political

Thought.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930.

Gettell, R. G. History of American

Political

New

Thought.

York:

Century Co., 1928.

Grimes, A. P. American Political Thought. New York: Holt, 1955.
Lewis, E. R. A History of American Political Thought from the Civil
War to the World War. New York: Macmillan, 1937.
Merriam, C. E. A History of American Political Theories. New York:
Macmillan, 1903.
.

American

Political Ideas,

1865-1917.

New

York: Mac-

millan, 1920.

Specialized Phases

Adams,

E. D. The

Power of

Ideals in

American History.

New

Haven:

Yale University Press, 1913.

Adams, R. G. Political Ideas of the American Revolution. Durham:
Trinity College Press, 1922. Also, New York: Facsimile Library,
1939.

Inc.,

Ames, H. V. The Proposed Amendments

to the Constitution of the

United States During the First Century of Its History. WashingAmerican Historical Association, Annual Report,
ton, D. C.
:

1897.

Bassett,

J. S.

The Federalist System, 1789-1801.

New

York: Harper,

1906.

Becker, C. L. The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922.
Channing, E. The Jeffersonian System, 1801-1811. New York:
Harper, 1906.

Town and County Government in the English Colonies of

North America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Studies in
Historical and Political Science, 1884.
Dealey, J. Growth of American State Constitutions from 1776-1914.
New York: Ginn & Co., 1914.
Draper, J. W. Thoughts on the Future Civil Policy of America. New
York: Harper, 1871. 4th ed.
Fiske, J. American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of
Universal History. New York: Harper, 1885.
Ford, H. J. Rise and Growth of American Politics. New York: Mac.

millan, 1898.

Gayley, C. M. Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty

New York: Macmillan, 1917.

in

America.

American Political Thought XXVIII.

[425

Haynes, F. E. Third Party Movements Since the Civil War. Iowa City:
The State Historical Society of Iowa, 1916.
Houston, D. F. A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1896.
Mulford, R. J. The Political Theories of Alexander Hamilton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political

Science, 1903.

Porter, K. H.

History of Suffrage

in the

United States. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1918.

Robinson, E. E. The Evolution of American Political Parties. New

York: Harcourt, Brace, 1924.
Snow, A. H. The American Philosophy of Government: Essays. New
York: Putnam's, 1921.
Straus, O. S. Origin of the Republican Form of Government in the
United States of America. New York: Putnam's, 1885.
Taussig, F. W. The Tariff History of the United States. New York:
Putnam's, 1931. 8th ed.

Walsh, C. M.

Political Science of

John Adams.

New

York: Putnam's,

1915.

Willoughby, W. W. The American Constitutional System.

Century Co., 1904.

New

York:

Appendix

CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS

The following

extracts are reprinted

by permission from

Code

of Social Principles, 3rd edition, Oxford: Catholic Social Guild,

1952. Prepared by the International Union of Social Studies or

Mechlin Union, an association of prominent Catholic theologians,
sociologists, political scientists,

and statesmen from more than a

dozen countries, the Code does not necessarily always voice the
official teaching of the Church. Some of the statements are open to
further debate; others, rather than offer a solution, merely indicate
a general trend or direction. But, on the whole, the Code

reflects

mature Catholic thinking and provides, in the form of a simple and

brief outline, a reliable primer on the fundamentals of government
and on the most important social and political questions of the day.

CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF THE STATE

State is made up of three elements: a community, a
and an authority.
52. As a community, the State is differentiated from other
human groupings in the temporal order by its extent, and by its

51.

The

territory,

higher aim.

It

comprises, and, within certain limits,

it

governs

Appendix

428]

and a diversity of institutions arising, for infrom the following of a like calling, from the need for
mutual help, or from the pursuit in common of some science or art.
families, townships,

stance,

53.
it

The

State

is

sovereign within

its

territory, in the sense that

has plenary authority to maintain within

peace, and justice. With other States

frontiers order,

its

has relations of interde-

it

pendence which require regulation by supra-national

juridical

bodies.
54.

The

function of the authority of the State

common good

of the

members which compose

is

to direct the

it.

THE NATURAL FOUNDATION OF AUTHORITY

made man social in his nature. Leo XIII wrote
The Christian Constitution of States: "Man cannot, if living apart from his fellows, provide himself with what is
necessary and useful for life, nor procure the means of developing
his mental and moral faculties." 1 The family in isolation does not
55.

God

has

in his encyclical,

afford surroundings that will assure the full development of our

being, or even our existence. Civil or political society

is

therefore

natural.

But no society can subsist without an authority which, as Leo

XIII says elsewhere, "directs all to strive earnestly for the com-

mon

good." Authority, as well as society, thus proceeds from

nature,

An

and consequently from God Himself.

immediate consequence of this principle

to authority

is

is

resistance to the order established

that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of

that resistance

by God. "He
God." (Rom.

13: 2.)

Another consequence concerns the authority itself: he who

it is appointed by God to serve the people. Public service is
the sole reason for his power, and defines its limits.
56. Though authority comes from God, it does not take the
form of a gift to this individual or to that family. God does not
point out the one who is to hold power. He has only done so exbears

ceptionally, in the history of the Jews,

on account

of the special

calling of that people.

57.

Nor does God determine

!Leo

XIII,

the

title

of the supreme authority,

The Christian Constitution of

States (1885).

[429

Appendix

nor the forms of the constitution. These contingent matters come

from human

activities,

for instance,

as,

a long tradition, or a

written constitution.

Since the legitimacy of power

is

not bound up by Providence

of government, there cannot be a

with any one form

monarchy

of

any more than an aristocracy or a democracy of

divine right,
divine right.

The Catholic Church,

in her official relations with States,

is

unconcerned as to the forms that differentiate them, so that she

may

more

deal

freely with

them

in the religious interests of their

peoples.

Thus she recognizes, equally with any other, the democratic

form of government, that is to say, the greater or less participation
of the people in the government.

As State activity in modern times has widened considerably

and decisively increased its influence, and in view of the sacrifices
which the State of today exacts from its citizens, a democratic
form of government, which allows the citizen to control State administration, seems to many a natural postulate of reason itself.
A healthy democracy should allow the citizen to hold his personal
opinion, to express
the

common

cratic State,

it,

to assert

it

in conformity with the claims of

good. Like any other form of government, the demo-

whether monarchical or republican, must be invested

command with real and effective authority. 2

with the power to

The

citizen has

no

right to live in indifference

and

to neglect to

use the greater or less share in government that has been accorded
to

him

in

many

States.

He

has the duty of exercising conscien-

tiously the political functions assigned to him.

58. In the speculative order, therefore, Catholics, like other

citizens,

have

full liberty to

prefer one form of government to

another, precisely in virtue of the fact that none of these special

forms

is

maxims

in itself contrary to the rule of right reason, or to the

of Christian doctrine.

we have inevitably to deal with

one ought to accept the established government, and to attempt none other than legal means to overturn it, or change its form. To acknowledge that individuals have
the liberty to oppose by violence, either the form of government
But, since in such matters

practical realities, each

2 Cf. Pius XII,

Democracy and Peace (1944).

Appendix

430]

or the persons at its head, would be tantamount to setting up a

permanent condition of disorder and revolt in the body politic.
Only an insupportable tyranny, or flagrant violation of the most
obvious essential rights of citizens, can give, after every other
means of redress has failed, the right to revolt or to passive
resistance.

However, citizens have the right to control and criticize the

powers that be.
To bring pressure to bear on the government and, if needs be,
to replace it, they may use every means which the constitution or
the law allows.
59. State authority is not unlimited. Its limits are determined
by its origin (natural and positive rights) and by its object (the
common good in the temporal order).
Material force is doubtless such an indispensable means to
authority, that, if deprived of it, a government would be incapable
of functioning. But the use of force is subordinate to the end of
society, which is itself derived from reason.
Law is thus an ordinance of reason for the common good,
enacted by him who has legitimate authority. From the point where
it ceases to be an ordinance of reason, it loses its proper nature
and is no longer binding. The presumption is in favor of law
promulgated by lawful authority being in conformity with reason.
Prudence and fear of a greater evil to society may prompt
individuals to obey a law which is not binding in conscience. But
should such a law formally prescribe acts or omissions contrary,
either to the natural law, or to the positive divine law, then each

one ought

to

God

obey

rather than men.

60. State Absolutism, pretending as

is

unlimited and independent of

all

it

does that State authority

higher law,

ruption which, in spite of empty appearances,

any

political

is

a political cor-

may be found

in

body.

Such an absolutist regime strikes at the rights of the human

person and of the family; it shakes the foundations of international
order and, moreover, it weakens the State itself in basing it on a
purely
61.
it

human
The

foundation. 3

State

is

perpetual by

its

nature.

As

a result the treaties

makes, and the financial and other obligations

3

Cf. Pius XII, Darkness

Peace (1944).

Over

the Earth (1939),

it

enters into, in

and Democracy and

Appendix
the

name

[431

of the

community

it

governs, are binding, regardless of

changes which

may be made

in the political

forms that clothe

in the personnel

which embody

it

or

it.

62. The State possesses moral personality. It is indeed composed of substantially distinct individuals, but these form a body
unified by the convergence of their rational activities toward the

end for which they are constituted a body politic.

Hence the State has and can have only human rights and
duties, though on a larger and wider scale. It is therefore subject
to the same moral law and the same rule of justice as individuals.
In the sphere of
States,

its

relations with similar bodies, that

is

with other

cannot escape the obligation to respect that law and that

it

rule.
It is

indispensable for the attainment of the social end that the

State should be legally subject to laws in the

dividuals,

same way

as in-

though in a more extended sphere and with suitable

modifications.

This personality does not derive from positive law, but from
nature

itself.

THE PURPOSE OF AUTHORITY IN THE STATE

common good, must
and guarantee the rights of the individuals
and groups which it embraces. For the violation of these rights
has a profound and evil reaction on the common good of which
the State is guardian, while, on the contrary, respect for the rights
of everyone helps to increase the well-being of all. There must,
therefore, be a power able to prevent abuses, to restrain the unruly and to punish offenders.
63. Authority being the director of the

in the first place protect

64.

The

authority of the State should also set

itself to

encour-

age the growth of material, intellectual and moral good in the

whole body of the members of the community.

65. It does not follow from this that the State ought to make
provision for everything in every branch of human activity. It
has no totalitarian power. It is even more dangerous for the State
to usurp the functions of private persons and private groups than
it is to leave them without any control. It is essential to the wellbeing of the community that an equilibrium should exist between
social forces, so that each element of social life, including the

Appendix

432]

be obliged to allow a reasonable liberty to the others.

reason alone the powers of the State ought to be

State, should

Already for

this

limited.
Firstly,

it is

piness. This

not concerned with leading

the concern of the Church,

is

men

to eternal hap-

which the State can and

should help, without replacing her.

Again, in the temporal order, the State, in

guardian of the
individual

and

common
collective,

and

attaining good, either shared

whole

its

good, encounters private

this

capacity as

initiative,

also has a certain

both

power of

by many, or even common

to the

social body.

When private initiative is effective, the State should do nothing

may embarrass or stifle the spontaneous action of individuals

that

or of groups. But
aid
it.

when

and co-ordinate

it,

it is

and

inadequate, the State should stimulate,

if

necessary, supplement and complete

common good of temporal

an imitation of God's action in the general gov-

This method of providing for the

societies is only

ernment of the world. He enlists every force, including those of

man's free actions, to concur in the designs of His saving will.
In the same manner the State will bring the central power to
co-operate with

whose main

all

national activities, according to a general plan

outlines

as possible to

it

ought to

fix,

and which

it

will leave as far

be carried out by individuals.

THE FREE ACTIVITY OF THE GOVERNED

66.

The human person has

rights antecedent to

and above

all

positive law.

These

whether individual or collective, derive from

is rational and free.
67. The law must protect personal liberty, not only against

human

rights,

nature which

external attack, but also against the misuse of liberty

For every use of

It is

liberty

is

itself.

liable to degenerate into license.

the duty therefore of the law to define the limits

and

to

control the exercise of rights.

68.

Modern

constitutions are particularly inclined to stress

and

proclaim the corollaries both of personal liberty and of equality of

4 Cf. Pius

XT, The Social Order, 78-80.

Appendix

[433

common

nature

men. They have often done so under the

autonomy

to all

influence of philosophical systems which exaggerate the

human

of the

person.

69. In enunciating and regulating by law the corollaries of

personal liberty, the legislator must never lose sight of the fact
that human liberty is liable to go wrong, and that, in consequence,
it is

important not to confuse the use and the abuse of the faculties

which it implies.
For this reason the use of the

right of ownership, of the right

by teaching, of the right

of publishing one's views in the press or

and association with one's

of assembly

fellows,

is,

in principle,

only lawful within the limits of well-being.

the business of authority to define the frontiers

It is

which the use of a supposed

order to avoid a greater
that public

evil, to

may

authority

things contrary to truth

right

becomes

beyond

license. It is only in

obtain or preserve a greater good,

"use tolerance in regard to certain

and

justice." 5

divided on the subject of religious beliefs

In a society which is
and philosophical opinions, the Church,

full

of care for the rights

which cannot
by pressure from outside, proclaims respect for
personal opinions which comply with the needs of the social order,
and claims for herself liberty to devote herself to her divine
of truth, but respectful of the liberty of consciences

be

won

to the faith

mission.

Neutrality of the State

must not be confused with Secularism.

This comes from the denial of God's rights in public

life,

neutrality only implies that the State does not favor

more than another

in

its

whereas

one

belief

administration.

70. In enunciating and legally settling the corollaries of equality in

nature, such as equality before the law, before justice, in

taxation,

and

in public administration, the legislator

must take

into

account, not only equality in nature, but also accidental inequali-

which may make individuals more or

ties,

less fitted to exercise

this or that faculty.

For instance, under pretext of equality, he should not allow

and sundry, learned or ignorant, to practice medicine.
5

Leo

XIII,

Human

Liberty (1888).

all

Appendix

434]

nationalization of industries
By nationalization is meant that an undertaking belongs
Community, represented by public authority. It is limited to
ownership or extended to management and profits.
112. Christian ethics do not condemn, in principle, nationaliza111.

to the

tion or socialization. Indeed, "It

is

rightly

contended that certain

forms of property must be reserved to the State, since they carry

with them a power too great to be

left to

private individuals with-

out injury to the community at large."

therefore be admitted

mon

when

it

Nationalization could

seems really demanded by the com-

good, for example to withdraw from private enterprise un-

dertakings of capital importance for the defense of the country, to

safeguard political

authority

against

financial

forces,

or

when

is clearly beyond doubt the only efficient means

remedying abuses and for ensuring that public interests prevail.

nationalization
for

113.

Where

it is

a question of undertakings already worked by

is subject to a suitable compenwhat the concrete circumstances

private persons, their taking over

sation, calculated according to

suggest as just and fair for

all

concerned.

114. Nationalization, taken in

all

its

widest sense and applied to

or even the majority of industries, ends by force of circum-

stances in Collectivism, condemned by the encyclicals Rerum

Novarum {The Workers' Charter) and Quadragesimo Anno {The

Social Order)

or in State Capitalism.

115. Nationalization,

if

applied generally,

still

runs the risk of

same result, even when limited to mere ownership

or management.
116. Not even a system of more or less self-governing public
undertakings would seem to be acceptable, if it includes the maarriving at the

jority of enterprises.

Private initiative, of individuals or of groups,

limited to the extent that the

common good

may

only be

manifestly requires.

It is

very needful to preserve the two great stimulants to produc-

tion,

which are the prospect of acquiring property and lawful

competition.
Besides, nationalization holds other risks, especially the exag-

6 Pius

XI, The Social Order (1931),

114.

Appendix

[435

gerated extension of economic power in the hands of the public

and the subjection of workers to these authorities.

Nationalized industry is far from resolving the fundamental problem of relations between capital and labor.
117. Considerations of public interest may, in particular cases,
demand or suggest public management, either national, provincial,
or municipal. In that case, the setting up of autonomous bodies,
carrying on industrially under the control of public authorities
and for the benefit of the community, can be recommended in
authorities

preference to wholly

is

official

administration.

understood that the right of supervision by the State

to be exercisable when private organizations are entrusted with
118.

It is

and whenever the public

the maintenance of public services,

terest calls for

in-

it.

119. In undertakings which are subject to concessions placed

with private organizations,

it is

desirable that the agreements shall

contain clauses securing liberty of contract and fair wages.

120. In the case of war, famine, or serious and manifest

up a
monopoly and usurious specula-

abuses, the State has not only the right, but the duty, to set
special organization for checking

tion in necessary articles of consumption.

Such a system should be limited to the minimum compatible

with the end in view, and suppressed as soon as circumstances
permit. If possible,

it

is

better to restrict the control

authority to a few important sectors

and

by public

to leave the rest to the

collaboration of interested organizations, rather than to extend

State interference to every field of the

economic

life.

CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM, AND SOCIALISM

178.

The system

of private capitalism, in which

economic activity, some by

itself condemned.

ute to
in

Right order

is

violated

exploit industry at will

taking into account the

when

and for

human

Cf. ibid., 101.

men

contrib-

by labor,

is

not

capital

employs workers only to

own

exclusive profit, without

its

dignity of the workers or the social

character of economic activity. 7

capital, others

Appendix

436]
179. Capitalism, in our time,

economic

dictatorship. This

is

is

characterized

by an increasing

not so noticeable in the concentra-

tion of wealth as in the accumulation of economic power in the

hands of a small number of men, the trustees and managers of
capital, dispensers of credit, which fulfils, in the economic organism, the function of blood in the human organism. 8
180. This concentration of economic power has been the
natural outcome of an unbridled competition that has brought

about

its

own

ruin.

Economic

dictatorship gives rise in

its

turn to

and international spheres. 9

181. The conditions of economic and social life are at present

ruthless political strife in both national

such that a very large number of

achieving the one

work

men

find the greatest difficulty in

necessary, that of their eternal salvation. 10

The demoralization of those in control

inevitably reached down to the world of
dragged
182.

it

of economic

life

has

the worker and has

to ruin.

To ward

dangers and to remedy the abuses of

off the

some wish

private capitalism,

to install a system of State Capital-

ism, which implies the wholesale nationalization of the

production. This system, giving as

it

means

of

does to the State an exorbit-

ant economic power, keeps workers and citizens alike in a condition of

dependence and economic slavery which

human

with the rights of the

183.

and

Communism,

basing

historical materialism,

itself

wages a

On

account of

and destructive
propaganda.

It

its

irreconcilable

on the

principles of dialectical

relentless class-war to attain its

end: a classless society through the abolition of

erty.

is

person.

Godless principles and

all

private prop-

its

revolutionary

action, the public authority ought to

should above

the masses and prepare the

all

way

check

its

suppress abuses which exasperate

for revolution.

become less extreme

toward class-war and the abolition of private property, and they modify these false principles
184. Certain forms of Socialism have

than

Communism

in their attitude

to a greater or less extent. 11

Still, as far as it remains true to its essential principles, Socialism ignores the true destiny of human society and the human

person, in affirming that

human

society

was

instituted

8 Cf. ibid., 106.

9 Cf. ibid., 108.

io Cf. ibid., 130,

ii Cf. ibid.,

113.

merely for

Appendix

[437

the sake of material well-being alone and in subordinating man's

higher goods, not even excepting liberty, to the exigencies of the

most

efficient production.

These principles are irreconcilable with

genuine Christianity and, hence, no one can be

sincere Catholic

and a true

at the

same time a

Socialist. 12

INTERNATIONAL LIFE
190.

The interdependence

of nations

development of which

facts, the

is

is

shown by

the following

according to nature and whose

number grows increasingly:

The existence of international trade.
The existence of unions for international common good.
The existence of international private companies and industrial
associations.

International legislation in the field of labor and in other

spheres.

International assemblies and congresses.

Above

international treaties

all:

and international organiza-

tion of States.

These

facts reveal the existence of a natural society

among

nations and, consequently, of an international law antecedent to

and higher than

191.

The

all

conventions.

sovereignty of the State,

out restriction,

is

if

understood to exist with-

the very negation of international law.

The sovereignty
regard that nations

of each State

owe

is

modified, not only by the

to the dignity of each other, their inde-

pendence, the possession of national wealth and even more of

national

they are

fife,

but also by the good will and co-operation to which

bound

in regard to one another.

Furthermore, national sovereignty is limited by the obligations
of States toward the international community, in the constitution

and development of which they must not delay.

195. The idea of giving a permanent form to the natural
society of nations is rational and beneficent.
This society of nations meets two needs: the duty of reconstruction which is enjoined upon our age; the duty of transform12 Cf. ibid., 118-120.

Appendix

438]

ing international law and international society from potentiality

into act.
It

operates

on the temporal plane, whereas the Catholic

Church, herself also supra-national, operates on the

spiritual

plane.

The

spiritual

and the temporal, being

indivisibly mingled, every

tions with the Catholic

in the nature of things

comity of nations has necessary rela-

Church.

General Bibliography

Bowe, G. The Origin

of Political Authority:

Philosophy. Dublin: Clonmore

&

An

Essay

in Catholic

Reynolds, 1955.

Bowle, J. Western Political Thought. London: J. Cape, 1948.

Brunello, B. Dottrine politiche. Brescia, Italy: Morcelliana,
1955.

and R. W. A History of Medieval Political Theory

6 vols. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and
Sons, 1903-1936.
Catlin, G. The Story of the Political Philosophers. New York:
Whittlesey House, 1939.
Chevalier, J. Histoire de la pensee, Vol. I: La Pensee antique,
Vol. II: La Pensee chretienne. Paris: Flammarion, 1955,

Carlyle, A.

J.

in the West.

1956.

Chevallier, J.-J. Les Grandes oeuvres politiques. Paris: Librairie

A. Colin, 1949.
Church and State through the Centuries (A collection of historic
documents with commentaries). Trans, and ed. by S. Z.
Ehler and J. B. Morrall. Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1954.
Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy. 5 vols. New rev. ed.
Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1953-1959.
Dunning, W. A. A History of Political Theories, Ancient and
Medieval. New York: Macmillan, 1935.

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440]

History of Political Theories, From Luther to

New York: Macmillan, 1953.

Montesquieu.
.

History of Political Theories,

York: Macmillan, 1936.

Ebenstein, W. Great Political Thinkers, Plato

York: Rinehart & Co., 1951.
*

From Rousseau

to

New

Spencer.

to the Present.

New

Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism,

Englewood

Socialism.

Cliffs,

New

Jersey:

Prentice-Hall,

1958 (New York, 1954).

Ehler, S. Z. Twenty Centuries of Church and State. Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1957.
Elliott, W. Y. and McDonald, N. A. Western Political Heritage.

Furfey,

New
P.

York: Prentice-Hall, 1949.

H.

History of Social Thought.

New

York: Mac-

millan, 1942.

Gettell, R. G. History of

Political

Thought.

New

York: Apple-

ton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

Hallowell,

J. H. Main Currents in Modern Political Thought.

York: Henry Holt, 1950.
* Hughes, P. A Popular History of the Catholic Church. Garden
City, New York: Image Books, 1947.
Kohn, H. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and
Background. New York: Macmillan, 1944.
McIlwain, C. H. The Growth of Political Thought in the West.
New York: Macmillan, 1932.
Parkinson, C. N. The Evolution of Political Thought. New York:

New

Houghton

Lo Grasso,

Mifflin,

1958.

B. Ecclesia et Status:

J.

Rome:

fontes selecti.

Rommen, H. The

De

mutuis

officiis et

iuribus

Universita Gregoriana, 1939.

State in Catholic Thought. St. Louis: B. Herder,

1945.

Sabine, G. H.

Henry
Thonnard,

History of Political Theory. 2nd ed.

New

York:

Holt, 1950.
F.

Maziarz.

J.

New

Short History of Philosophy. Trans. E. A.

York: Desclee, 1955.

Index

Absolutism:

the age of transi149n; in Bodin, 155,

188-189,
190-194;
in
Bossuet,
156-157; in Charles II, 156n; in
Hegel, 217, 300-301, 303-305; in
Hobbes, 155, 196, 199-200; in
the Idealists, 216-217; in James I,
155-156; in Luther and Lutheranism, 151-152; in Machiavelli, 149150, 179, 180-182, 184-185; in the
Middle Ages, 90-91; in Rousseau,
208, 263, 266
Reaction to: in Althusius, 158; in
the Anabaptists, 159-160; in Bellarmine, 160; in Coke, 156n; in
Erasmus and More, 158-159; in
liberalism, 205-208; in Locke, 205,
208, 241, 243-244; in the Monarchomacs, 157-158; in Montesquieu, 208, 254; in Suarez, 167tion,

in

149,

169.

See also Authority, Divine

Monarchy, Sovereignty, Totalitarianism, Tyranny

Academians, 10, 31-32, 72n
right of kings,

Adams, John, 394, 402, 403, 411

Adams, John Quincy, 393-394
Adams, Samuel, 411, 416

Ad

beatissimi (encyclical), 165

Aegidius Romanus, 99-100, 123
Aeterni Patris (encyclical), 113

Alexander the Great, 11, 32, 33, 76,

293
Alexander VI, Pope, 182-183
Althusius, Johannes, 158, 417
Ambrose, St., 67, 72
American Colonial charters and
constitutions, 393-399
American Constitution, 405-420

Amendment, J. C. Murray
165-166
American Revolution, 210, 211, 272273, 399
Anabaptists, 159-160
Anarchism, 224-226
Antisthenes, lln
First

on,

Aquinas, Thomas. See Thomas

Aquinas,

St.

Arcesilaus,

72n

Aristippus, lln

Aristocracy. See Government, forms

of
Aristotle:

life,

31-33; general philos-

ophy, 10, 33-35; political writings,

35-45;

Politics,

chean

Ethics

38-39;

on

35-45;

(Books

Nicoma-

VTIMX),

aristocracy, 41, 42, 44,

10-11, 39, 41,
44-45, 46, 139; on classes, as part
of the state, 45; on constitutions,
87;

on

citizenship,

40-41, 42, 44; on the contract

theory, 36-37; on education, 45;

Index

442]
on the family, 36-37, 38, 39, 47,
48; on the forms of government,
40-41; on God, 34n; on justice,
38, 39; on law, 34, 41, 43; on
polity, 14, 42; on property, 47; on
revolution, 42-44; on slavery, 36n37n, 45, 46; on the state, 34-35,
36-45, 86, 105, 119; on tyranny,
41, 43-44; on women, 47-48, 139;
and Plato, 10, 25, 31, 33, 36, 38,
39, 45-48, 54, 60; and St. Thomas,
54, 59, 86, 92, 113-114; 119, 139,

201, 373, 410

Articles of Confederation, 404
Augustine, St.: life, 70-73; City of
God, 73-80, 177; on authority, 77,
79; on the Church, 74n, 80, 8788; on church and state, 74, 74n,
80; on the forms of government,
77; on justice, 68-69, 75-76; on
peace, 76-77, 78-79, 137; on the
qualities of the ideal ruler, 77; on
slavery, 79; on sovereignty, 76,
79; on the state, 75-79; on the
state as a consequence of sin, 7779;

410,

414

Ausculta fili (bull), 96

Authority: in St. Ambrose, 67; in
the Anabaptists, 159-160; in St.
Augustine, 77, 79; in Bellarmine,
160; in Bodin, 155, 190-191; in
Calvin, 154; in Christian political
thought, 65-66; in Cicero, 53, 55;
in Hegel, 303-304, 305; in St.

John Chrysostom, 67; in Locke,

241-242, 243; in Luther and Lutheranism, 152-153; in Marsilius
of Padua, 100, 138, 139-141, 417;
in the Middle Ages, 89, 91; in
Origen, 66-67; in St. Paul, 66n;
in Roman law, 17; in Suarez, 167169; in Thomas Aquinas, 119,
122. See also Sovereignty

Bakunin, Mikhail, 225, 324, 324n

Baltimore, Lord, 396-397
Barker, Ernest, 347-348
Barres, Maurice, 212
Beccaria, Cesare, 286n
Bellarmine, St. Robert:

and

state,

litical

123,

on church

134;

the contract theory, 215, 289-290;

on democracy, 290-291; on education, 291; on the English constitution, 291-292; on the French
Revolution, 284; on law, 290-

291;

on

284-285;

religion,

on

revolution, 290; on the state, 289290; on the state and economics,

292-294; on utilitarianism, 215,

286-289, 290-291, 293; on woman
suffrage, 292n;
338, 341, 342,

345
Besant, Annie, 338
Blackstone, William,

283-284, 402,

411
Bland, Hubert, 338
Bodin, Jean: life, 187-188; the Republique, 189-194; on absolutism,
155, 188-189, 190-194; on authority, 155, 190-191; on church
and state, 190-191; on citizenship,
190, 190n; on law, 190, 192-193;
on natural law, 193; on monarchy,
190-194; on property, 193; on
sovereignty, 155, 190-194; on the
state, 190-193
Boniface VIII, Pope, 96-97, 127,
132
Borgia, Caesar, 174, 176
Bossuet, Bishop Jacques Benigne,
156-157, 191n
Boucher (Parisian priest), 158
Bracton, Henry de, 156n
Bradford, William, 394-395
Buchanan, George, 158
Burke, Edmund: life, 271-274; his
conservatism, 280-281; his political
principles, 274-275, 278279; on the American Revolution,
211, 272-273; on constitutions,
278; on the contract theory, 276;
on democracy, 277; on the English constitution, 279-280; on the
French Revolution, 211, 273-274,
275-281; on rationalism, 275-276;
on religion, 275, 276; on the state,
278; 376

160-161; on po-

power, 160; 101, 123, 163,

164, 167, 403

XV, Pope: on Dante, 133on liberalism, 165

Bentham, Jeremy: life, 283-286; on
Benedict

Calhoun, John

C, 418

Calvin, John, 153-155, 169

Index

[443

law. See Law

Capitalism. See Capitalist imperialism, Communism, Property, Socialism
Lenin on,
Capitalist imperialism:

Canon

357-361
Carneades of Cyrene, 72n
Caterina de'Medici, 188
Catholic Church: in Hegel, 305; in
Hobbes, 200; in Lord Olivier,
339n-340n; in Tocqueville, 317
Catholic League, 158n, 188n
Catholic principles of politics. See

''Catholic

See Church and state

Worker" movement, 225-

state.

226

54; on sovereignty, 53,

on the state, 53-59, 75, 75n,
and the Stoics, 59-60; 8, 12,
76, 105, 410, 417

slavery,

87;
70,

Circulation des

Charles II, 156n

Chauvin, Jean. See Calvin, John
Christian democracy, 229-233
Christian society. See Church
Christianity and political thought,
63-66
Chrysippus of Soli, 11
Church: in St. Augustine, 74n, 80,
87-88; in John VIII, 88; in Mar141-142;
in
Padua,
of
Suarez, 169; 37n, 64
silius

Church and state: in Aegidius Romanus, 99, 123; in St. Ambrose,

67; in the American Constitution,
165-166; in St. Augustine, 74, 74n,
80; in Bellarmine, 123, 160-161;
in Bodin, 190-191; in Boniface
VIII, 96-97; in Bossuet, 191n; in
Calvin, 153-154; in Connell, 162n;
in Dante, 100-101, 130-131, 131in
Febronius,
19 In;
in
88n,
141;
88,
Gregory VII, 93-94; in Henricus
de Segusia, 99; in Hobbes, 155,
200; in Innocent III, 94-95; in
Innocent IV, 95-96; in James of
Viterbo, 100; in John of Paris,
101-102; in John of Salisbury,
109-110, 123; in Luther, 152-153;
in Marsilius of Padua, 100, 136,
138, 139, 141-142; in Murray,
163-167; in Origen, 66-67; in
Suarez, 169; in Tertullian, 66; in
Thomas Aquinas, 123-124; 64, 65-

133;

58; on justice, 53, 54, 57; on law,

53, 54, 57-59, 60; on natural law,
58-59; on revolution, 55; on the
Roman Principate, 56-57; on
55;

Politics

Catholic

Church-state struggle in the Middle

Ages, 93-97, 98-102
Cicero: life, 50-52; political writings, 52-59; Laws, 52-53, 54; Republic, 52-59; on authority, 53,
55; on constitutions, 59; on the
family, 53; on the forms of government, 55-56; on God, 54, 54n,

in

Gelasius

I,

66, 86, 91n, 162,

233

Church law. See Law

elites,

374

Citizenship: in the Anabaptists, 160;

in Aristotle, 10-11, 39, 41, 44-45,

46, 139; in Bodin,

190, 190n; in
300-301; in Marsilius of
Padua, 139-140; in Rousseau, 263264; in the Stoics, 13; in Thomas
Aquinas, 123-124
City-state, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 21-26, 33,

Hegel,

46, 60

Clarke, William, 338

Class struggle: in Fabianism, 342;

in Lenin, 362-363, 363-364; in
Marx, 327-329, 330-331
Classes: in Aristotle, 45; in John of
Salisbury, 105; in Marx, 327-328;
in the Middle Ages, 93; in Plato,
23, 25, 27. See also Citizenship
Cleanthes of Assos, 11
Clericis laicos (bull), 96
Coke, Sir Edward, 156n, 411

Cole, G. D. H., 347

Common

good, 288n
Pius XI, 227n;
in Lenin, 221-222, 355-367; in
Marx, 221, 326-335; in Plato,
24n, 27
Communist Manifesto,
322-323,
326, 326n, 329, 331, 332
Communist party, function of, 22 In,
331
Communist "state": in Lenin, 365-

Communism: and

366; in Marx, 332

Comte, Auguste, 217-219
Concessions and Agreements of the

Proprietors of East Jersey, 398

Index

444]
Concordia discordantium canonum.
See Gratian
Confessional state. See Church and

205,
399, 403
Decretum Gratiani. See Gratian

De

state

Connell, Francis J., C.SS.R., 162n

Conscience, 159-160, 207n
Constitutions: in Aristotle, 40-41,
42, 44; in Burke, 278; in Cicero,
59; in Colonial America, 393-399;
in Herodotus, 6; in Locke, 208; in
Montesquieu, 208, 250-255; in
Plato, 24n, 26-27, 28; in Polybius,
16-17; in
14; in Roman law,
Suarez, 168. See also American
Constitution, English constitution
Contract theory of government: in
the American Constitution, 413in
414;
Aristotle,
36-37;
in
Bentham, 215, 289-290; in Burke,
276; in Colonial America, 394395, 399-401, 403; in Hobbes, 37,
196, 197, 198-199, 200, 201, 241,
241n, 263; in Locke, 37, 207,
240, 241, 263; in Roman law,
16; in Rousseau, 37, 120n, 241,
24 In, 262-263, 264-268 passim;
in
Suarez,
167-168,
169;
in
Thomas Aquinas, 118-119, 120n;
in Vindiciae contra tyrannos, 157158; 207, 215
Corporativism, 381-383

Corpus
Corpus

Declaration of Independence,

luris Canonici,
luris

Civilis,

92n
16,

16n,

ecclesiastica potestate. See

Aegid-

Romanus

ius

Defensor

Pads.

See

of

Marsilius

Padua

De
De

Frenzi (Luigi Federzoni), 371

apud

Scotos,

of

iusta abdicatione Enrici III,

158

hire

regni

Buchanan, 158

De
De

Maistre, Joseph, 211, 217

Democracy: in Bellarmine, 160; in
Bentham, 290-291, 292; in Burke,
277; and Calvinism, 154-155; in
Colonial America, 396-398; Greek
form of, 3n-4n; in Lenin, 364365; in Montesquieu, 251-252,

253;

in

Pius

XII,

232-233;

in

Socrates, 9; in Tocqueville, 214,

307-319; 6, 9, 14, 22, 26, 40, 41,
42,

55,

See

77.

Democracy;

also

Christian

Government,

forms

of

Democratic socialism, 222, 223-224

De

potestate

regia

et

See

papali.

John of Paris

De
De

rege et regis institutione, 158

regimine christiano. See James

of Viterbo
De regimine principum. See Aegidius Romanus
reipublicae christianae in reges

De
90,

106

158
republica libri sex. See Bodin,

potestate,

De

Corradini, Enrico, 373

Cotton, John, 396

Jean
Despotism.

Croce, Benedetto, 375, 376, 377

Cynics, lln
Cyrenaics, lln

See

Absolutism,

Tyr-

anny
Dialectic:

in

Hegel,

297-298;

in

Marx, 322, 325, 326, 327

Dickinson, John, 400-401, 407, 410,

Dante

Alighieri:

life,

126-128;

Monorchia, 128-133; on church

and state, 100-101, 130-131, 131133; on monarchy, 129-133; on
the national state, 129, 131; on
peace, 129-130, 137; on the state,
131; on the world state, 129, 130,

131-132
Darwin, Charles, 219
Davidson, Thomas, 336-337
Declaration des droits de I'homme
et du citoyen, 209

412
Dictatorship of the proletariat: in
Lenin, 355, 362-363, 364-366; in
Marx, 331-332, 334
Diogenes, lln
Divine positive law. See Law
Divine right of kings, 67, 89, 90,
120, 155-156, 167, 196
(encyclical),
Redemptoris
Divini
227n, 332-333
Donatists, 73n
Dubois, Pierre, 129, 129n, 137

Index

[445
on the national state, 212, 228,
380-381; on race, 381; on the

Dulany, Daniel, 400

Education: in Aristotle, 45; in Bentham, 291; in Plato, 23-25, 27; in
Socrates, 8-9

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 224n

Engels,

Friedrich,

221,

322,

323,

324, 326-327, 332

English constitution: in Bentham,
291-292; in Burke, 279-280; in
Montesquieu, 208, 254-255
English Revolution (1688), 197,
210, 238, 272
English Virginia Company, 393-394,

399
Epictetus, 12n

Epicureans, 11, lln

Equality: in American and French
revolutions,
210; in American
thought, 391, 392-393, 411, 412;
in
the
Anabaptists,
in
160;
Archytas, 7; in St. Augustine, 78;
in Cicero, 54; in Christian democracy, 229, 231; in Christian
thought, 64; in Epictetus, 12n; in
Fabianism, 338, 339, 348; in
Locke, 240, 245; in Montesquieu,
253; in Rousseau, 261; in Tocqueville, 307, 309-313, 314, 318, 319
Equity: in Calvin, 154-155
Erasmus, Desiderius, 158-159
Evolution: in Marx, 325, 327; in
Rousseau, 262n-263n; in Spencer,

219-220
Exequatur, 19 In

Fabian Society: and British Socialism,

340-341; chief members,
337-338; foundation of, 336-337;
impact on English political life,
345-348; on Marx, 223-224, 338;
on nationalization, 339-340, 342;
on Ricardo's theory of rent, 341345; on the state, 338-339; 223-

224
Family: in Aristotle, 36-37, 38, 39,
47, 48; in Cicero, 53; in Plato,
24-25, 27, 47, 48

and Communism, 372,

380; and Gentile, 376-377; and

Fascism:

Pius XT, 227n, 381; as idealist

reaction to liberalism, 372, 376,
378; on corporativism, 381-383;

state, 212, 228, 380-381, 381-383

Febronianism, 19 In
Federalist, 208n, 406-407

Fichte,

Johann Gottlieb, 214, 217

96

Flotte, Pierre,

Fortuna: in Machiavelli, 178, 178n

Franco-Gallia: of Hotman, 157, 189
Franklin, Benjamin, 205, 400, 405-

406
95-96
Burke, 276-277; in
Christian democracy, 230-231; in
Hegel,
298-299,
304-305;
in
Hobbes, 200, 201; in Locke, 240;
in Marx, 326n; in John Stuart
Mill, 215; in Montesquieu, 254,
257; in Rousseau, 264; in Tocqueville, 308, 309n-310n; 165
French Revolution: in Bentham,
284; in Burke, 211, 273-274, 275281; in Tocqueville, 307; 208210, 210-211, 213, 372, 379, 382
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut,

Frederick

II,

Freedom:

in

389, 397

Gallicanism, 19 In, 229

Gelasius I, Pope, 88, 88n, 141
Gentile, Giovanni, 217, 370,

376381
George, Henry, 34 In
Ghibellinism, 126n
Giles of Rome. See Aegidius Ro-

manus
Glossators, 90, 92
Gobineau, Count de, 318-319

God:

in

Aristotle

and Plato, 34n;

in Cicero, 54, 54n; in Hegel, 297,

304;

in

Thomas Aquinas,

116-

117

Godwin, William, 224n

Gorgias the Sophist, lln
Government, forms of: in Aristotle,
40-41, 44; in St. Augustine, 77;
in Bodin, 190, 192; in Cicero, 5556; in Hobbes, 199; in Marsilius

of Padua, 138; in Montesquieu,

250-255; in Plato, 22, 26, 27, 2829; in Polybius, 14; in Rousseau,
267n-268n; in Thomas Aquinas,
119; in Tocqueville, 312-313
Gratian, 92

Index

446]
Greeks, The, 3-4
Green, T. H., 345
Gregory VII, Pope, 93-94
Grotius, Hugo, 124, 170
Guelfism, 126n

Hostiensis. See Henricus de Segusia

Hotman, Francis, 157, 189

Humanism, 148, 149-150, 151
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 213

Hume, David,

206, 214, 260

Hutcheson, Francis, 286n

Hamilton, Alexander, 406, 411-412
Georg: life, 295-296; general philosophy, 296-299; on absolutism, 217, 300-301, 303-305;

Hegel,

on

305; on
on dialectic,
297-298, 322, 325; on freedom,
298-299, 304-305; on God, 297,
304; on history, 299-300, 301303; on idealism, 296-299; on
law, 301, 303; on monarchy, 303304; on the national state, 299300, 301; on natural law, 301,
303-304; on the separation of
powers, 303-304; on sovereignty,
303, 305; on the state, 217, 299304, 304-305; on war, 301-303;
on the world state, 301
authority,

303-304,

citizenship, 300-301;

Helvetius, Claude, 214-215, 279

Hennacy, Amnion, 225-226

Henricus de Segusia, 99

Henry IV, 93-94

Heraclitus, 6-7

Herder, Johann G., 216-217

Herodotus, 6
Hesiod, 5-6
History: in Bodin, 187; in Hegel,
299-300, 301-303; in Herodotus,
326-327, 328-329,
6; in Marx,
333-334; in Tocqueville, 307-308
Hitler, Adolf, 227-229
Hobbes, Thomas: life,
195-197;
Leviathan,
197-202;
on
196,
absolutism, 155, 196, 199-200; on
church and state, 155, 200; on the
contract theory, 196, 197, 198199, 200, 201, 203, 241, 241n,
263; on law, 198, 200; on monarchy, 199-200; on peace, 198199; on revolution, 200, 201; on
sovereignty, 155, 196, 198-200;
on the state, 197-198, 198-200; on
the state of nature, 198; 37, 120n,
256, 414
Homer, 5

Hooker, Thomas, 389-390

Hopkins, Stephen, 400

216-217,

Idealism,

296-299,

376,

378
Immortale Dei (encyclical), 165
Indirect power of the Church. See

Church and

State

Individualism: and Fascism, 378381;

in
Calvin,
154-155;
in
Greece, 3-4; in Plato, 25; in the
Stoics, 12-13, 59-60
Innocent III, Pope, 94-95
Innocent IV, Pope, 95-96
Institutes of the Christian Religion.
See Calvin, John
International, First, 323-324
International, Second, 223

International, Third, 354

International law. See Law
Investiture controversy. See
state struggle in the
I us civile,

lus
Ius
lus
lus
lus
lus

ChurchMiddle Ages

16

gentium, 13, 16, 124, 169, 170

multitudinis,

120n

16
privatum, 16
publicum, 16
naturale,

regaliae,

96

James I, 155-156, 169

James of Viterbo, 100
Jean Quidort. See John of Paris
Jefferson, Thomas: on Plato's Republic,

403-404;

205,

389,

392,

399, 406
St., 67-68
Jevons, William Stanley, 342, 342n
Jews: in Hitler, 228; in Marx, 320;

Jerome,

in

Thomas Aquinas, 124

John VIII, Pope, 88

John XXn, Pope, 97
John Chrysostom, St., 67
John of Paris, 101-102
John of Salisbury: life, 103-104;
Policraticus, 104-110; on church
and state, 109-110, 123; on classes

on law, 105-106;
106, 107-108, 109-

in the state, 105:

on monarchy,

Index

[447

on the qualities of the ideal

107; on the state, 104-105;
on tyrannicide, 108-109; on the
110;

Aquinas,

118,

ruler,

90,

139,

165,

tyrant, 108
Petit.

38, 39; in St.

Augustine, 68-69, 75-76; in Chris-

Justice:

in Aristotle,

tian thought, 64, 68-69; in Cicero,

53, 54, 57; in Heraclitus, 6-7; in

Hesiod, 5-6; in Plato, 21, 22, 22n,

23; in the Pythagoreans, 7; in the
Sophists, 7-8; in Thomas Aquinas,
118; 14, 86, 89-90,
Justinian, 16, 16n, 405

91n

Kautsky, Karl, 223, 223n-224n

Kingship. See Monarchy
Kipling, Rudyard, 373
Koinonia, 39
Kropotkin, Peter, 224n, 225

Labor Party (Great Britain) and

the Fabian Society, 336, 342-343,
346, 347
Lamarck, J. B., 219
:

Languet,
Hubert.
contra tyrannos

Law:

in

See

Vindiciae

192-193; in Calvin, 154; in Chris65; in Cicero, 54,

57-59, 60; in Comte, 218-219;
Germanic concept of, 89-90; in
Hegel, 301, 303; in Hobbes, 198,
200; in John of Salisbury, 105106; in Locke, 240-243; in Luther,
151-152; in Marsilius of Padua,
139, 140; in Montesquieu, 248257; in Plato, 26, 27; in the
Pythagoreans, 7; in Rousseau,
266-267; in Solon, 6; in the
Sophists, 7-8; in the Stoics, 105169-170;
in
Suarez,
in
106;
Thomas Aquinas, 117-118, 122-

tian thought,

123; in

Zeno of Citium,

Canon law,
139

law:
Civil

90,

13

16, 92, 98, 113, 118,

139,

170,

positive

tian

thought,

68;

in

in

Thomas

Aquinas, 118, 119

International law:

170;

in

Thomas

in Grotius,
169-170;
in
Aquinas, 124; in Vitoria,

Suarez,

170; 54, 250

Natural law: in the American

Constitution, 409-413; in Bodin,
193; in Christian thought, 68; in
Cicero, 58-59; in Colonial Amer401-403; in Grotius, 170; in
Hegel, 301, 303-304; in Hobbes,
Locke,
240-243;
in
in
200;
Montesquieu, 249; in Socrates,
8-9;
169-170;
Suarez,
in
in
Thomas Aquinas, 117-118, 402,
409; 77, 78, 87, 89, 105-106, 119,
124, 155, 156n, 169, 193, 200,
214, 249
Roman law, 15-17, 53, 90, 91,
106, 388. See also lus civile, et
ica,

Lenin, Vladimir Ilich: life, 349-354;

on capitalist imperialism, 357361; on the class struggle, 362363, 363-364; on the communist
state,
365-366; on democracy,
364-365; on the dictatorship of the
proletariat, 355, 362-363, 364-366;
on Kautsky, 223, 223n-224n; on
revolution, 355-357, 359-361, 363364; on the state, 361-366; and
Marx, 350, 355-357, 358-359,
364; 221-222, 375
Leo XIII, Pope, 231-232, 233
Lex regia de imperio, 17
Liberalism: and Christianity, 205372-373;
and
Fascism,
208;
continental, 156n, 165-166
Libertas praestantissimum (encyclical), 165
Liberty. See

in Christian thought,

68; in Origen, 66-67; in

87, 89, 106, 117,

5,

seq.

34, 41, 43; in

290-291; in Bodin, 190,

Aristotle,

Bentham,

208n, 250

Common law,
156n, 388,
402-403, 412
Customary law,
169
Divine law,
156n,
193
Divine
law:
Chris93,

See John of Salisbury

Josephinism, 191n-192n
Juan de Mariana, S.J., 158, 417
Junius Brutus. See Vindiciae contra
tyrannos

John

122-123; 16, 89,

206n-207n, 207n-

Thomas

Freedom

Lieber, Francis, 387

Lincoln, Abraham, 419

Index

448]
Livy (Titus Livius), 14-15
Locke, John: life, 237-238; general
philosophy, 238-239; Two Treatises on Government, 239-244; on
absolutism, 243; on authority,
241-242, 243; on constitutions,
208; on the contract theory, 207,
239, 240, 241, 263; on law, 240243; on property, 240, 241, 244-

on

205-206, 239;
242, 243-244; on
the separation of powers, 242; on
sovereignty, 241-242, 243; on the
state, 241-242; on the state and
economics, 244-245; on the state
of nature, 239-241, 242; on tyranny, 243; on war, 240-241; 37,
245;

on

religion,

revolution,

389, 402

XV

Louis
(King of France), 247n
Louis of Bavaria, 97, 135-136
Luther, Martin, 86, 150-153, 155,
169
Machiavelli, Niccolo: life, 172-175;
183-184;
Discourses,
150,
175,
The Prince, 150, 175-183;' appraisal,

185;

L49-15.0,

177-180,

on Fortuna and

Virtu,

184178,

Marx, Karl:

320-324; on the
327-329, 330-331;
on classes, 327-328; on dialectic,
322, 325, 326, 327, 333-334; on
the dictatorship of the proletariat,
331-332, 334; on evolution, 325, 327; on freedom, 326n;
on history, 326-327, 328-329, 333334; on the Jews, 320; on materialism,
324-325; on property,
328, 330, 331; on religion, 321,
332-333; on revolution, 221, 325,
327, 330-331; on the state, 221,
326-327, 328-329, 330; on surplus value, 329-330, 334; and
Engels, 221, 322, 323, 324, 326327; and Hegel, 321, 322, 325;
223-224, 338. See also Lenin
Marxian socialism. See Communism
Materialism: in Marx, 324-325
Maurras, Charles, 211-212, 373
Mayflower Compact, 394-395, 399,
400, 413
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 212n-213n, 372
Mein Kampf. See Hitler, Adolf
Middle Ages, 85-86, 9 In, 147, 148
Mill, John Stuart, 215-216, 341, 343
Mirari vos (encyclical), 165, 229
class

life,

struggle,

178n; his love for Italy, 175-176;

his theory of knowledge, 179-180;
his view of man, 150, 177, 180;
his statecraft, 177, 180-183; on
war, 175, 184-185; 8, 43, 155,
194, 212, 228, 372
Magna Charta, 92-93, 93n

Mit brennender Sorge (encyclical),

226n-227n
Mobocracy, 22
Moderator rei publicae. See Princi-

Manichaeans, 71, 72, 73

Monarchy:

Marbury v. Madison, 398, 403

Marcus Aurelius, 12n
Marie Antoinette (Queen
France), 213n

Roman

in Bodin, 190-194, 199;

Bossuet, 156-157; in Dante,
129-133; in Erasmus,
159; in
Hegel, 303-304; in Hobbes, 199in

of

Maritain, Jacques, 163

Marsilius of Padua: life, 135-136;
Defensor Pads, 135, 136-142; on
origin of authority, 100, 138, 139141, 417; on the Church, 141142; on church and state, 100,
136, 138, 139, 141-142; on citizenship, 139-140; on the forms of
government, 138; on law, 139,
140; on monarchy, 137-138, 140141; on peace, 136-137, 142; on
the state, 137-141; on women,

139

pate,

Monorchia. See Dante Alighieri

Monarchomacs, 157-158, 189, 189n

200;

in

Hotman,

157,

189;

in

John of Salisbury, 106, 107-108,

109-110; in Luther, 152-153; in
the Magna Charta, 93n; in Mar137-138, 140silius of Padua,
141; in Maurras, 212; in the
Middle Ages, 88-89, 90-91; in

Montesquieu, 252-253; in Thomas

Aquinas, 119-120, 122; 4, 5, 6,
14, 26, 40, 41, 44, 55, 77
Montesquieu, Charles de: life, 246248; political writings, 246-247,
248-255; L'Esprit des lois, 248255; Les Lettres persanes, 246-

Index

[449

247; on aristocracy, 252, 253; on

constitutions,
208, 250-255; on
democracy, 251-252, 253; on the
English constitution, 208, 254255; on the forms of government,
250-255; on freedom, 254; on
the general spirit, 255; on law,
248-257; on natural law, 249; on
monarchy, 252-253; on the national state, 248, 250, 255; on the
separation of powers, 208, 254255, 407; on sovereignty, 251253; on the state, 250-255; on
the state of nature, 249, 256; on
tyranny, 253, 254; on war, 250

More, St. Thomas, 159

Mosca, Gaetano, 373-374
Murray, John Courtney, S.J.:
church and state, 163-167
Mussolini,

Benito, 212,
371, 375, 376, 382

369,

on
370,

Nation; Nationalism. See National

state

National Socialism, 227-229

National state: in Aristotle, 44-45;
in Bodin, 190-191; in Burke, 278;
in Dante, 129, 131; in De Maistre, 211; in Fascism, 212, 228,
380-381; in Hegel, 299-300, 301;
Idealists,
216-217;
in
in
the
Machiavelli, 175-176; in Maurras,
212; in Mazzini, 212n-213n; in
Montesquieu, 248, 250, 255; in
National Socialism, 227-229; 226
Nationalization of property. See
Property
Natural law. See Law
Newport Declaration, 397-398
Non abbiamo bisogno (encyclical),
226n, 380-381
Novit llle (decretal), 95n
Objection of conscience. See Conscience

Ochlocracy, 14, 55
Oligarchy. See Government, forms
of
Olivier, Sydney, 337, 339, 339n340n, 341
Origen, 66-67
Origin of the state. See State
Ostracism, 43, 43n

Otis,

James, 401-403, 411

Owen, Robert, 338n, 341

Paine, Thomas, 213, 391, 403, 406
Panaetius of Rhodes, 12, 59

Panopticon, 285
Papacy, investiture struggle. See
Church-state struggle in the Middle Ages
Pareto, Vilfredo, 373-374
Paris, University of,

llln-112n

Paul, St.:

on authority, 66n,

152
Peace: in

St.

67, 88,

Augustine, 76-77, 78-

137; in Dante, 129-130, 137;

in Dubois, 129, 129n, 137; in
Hegel, 217, 303; in Hobbes, 198-

79,

199; in Marsilius of Padua, 136137, 142; 15. See also War

Pease, E. R., 342, 346

Pelagianism, 73n
Penn, William, 391-392,

People, as source
See Sovereignty
Pericles,

of

411

398,

sovereignty.

6n

32
Per venerabilem
97
Philip IV, 96-97
Peripatetics,

(decretal),

95n,

Philosopher-kings: in Plato, 21, 2425, 26, 28-29, 44

Physiocrats, 292n, 406

Pico della Mirandola, 151

Pius XI, Pope: on Communism,
227n; on Fascism, 227n, 381; on
National Socialism, 227n; on the
social order,

232

Pius XII, Pope: on democracy, 232-

233
Plato:

life,

19-21;

general

philos-

ophy, 9-10, 27-28; Laws, 26-27,

408; Politicus, 21, 26; Republic,
21-26, 27, 28n, 403-404, 407,
414; on aristocracy, 28-29, 87; on
the

city-state,

classes

21-26,

as part of the

46;
state,

on
23,

25, 27; on communism, 24n, 27;

on constitutions, 24n, 26-27, 28;

on education

as the purpose
23-25,
on
the state,
27;
family, 24-25, 27, 47, 48; on
forms of government, 22, 26,

of
the
the
27;

Index

450]
on God, 34n; on individualism,
25; on infanticide, 26; on justice,
21, 22, 22n, 23; on law, 26, 27;
on the philosopher-kings, 21, 2425, 26, 28-29, 44; on property,
24-25, 27, 47; on race purity, 25;
on the state, 22-25, 27, 28, 105;
on womenr25, 47-48; 54, 56, 179,
407, 408, 414. See also Aristotle
and Plato
Plotinus,

72n

Plutocracy, 22

Podmore, Frank, 341

See City-state
See Constitutions
Political absolutism. See Absolutism

Polis.

Politeia.

Catholic principles of: on

capitalism,
435-436;
on communism, 436; on the essential elements of the state, 427-428; on
the foundation and purpose of
political authority, 428-432; on
international life,
437-438; on
nationalization, 434; on the rights
of the human person, 432-433; on

Politics,

socialism, 436-437

42

Polity: in Aristotle, 14,

Polybius, 14
Popular sovereignty.
eignty, State

cipate,

Sover-

Roman:

Cicero, 5617
Property: in Aristotle, 47; in Bodin,
193; in Christian democracy, 230,
231; in Christian thought, 69; in
communism, 221: in Fabianism,
339; in Locke, 240, 241, 244-245;
in Marx, 328, 330, 331; in Plato,
24-25, 27, 47; in Rousseau, 260n,
261, 266; in socialism, 220
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 22 In, 338n
Pythagoreans, 7, 21

Quadragesimo

in

15;

anno

(encyclical),

232-233
Qu'est-ce

que

Sieyes, E.

J.

le

316-318

Rerum novarum
232, 233
Revolution:

(encyclical), 231-

Anarchism, 225; in
42-44;
Bentham,
in
290; in Bossuet, 157; in Cicero,
55; in Colonial America, 402,
403; in Declaration of Independence, 205; in Fabianism, 224,
340; in Hobbes, 200, 201; in
Hotman, 189; in James I, 156; in
in
Kautsky,
223n-224n;
223,
Lenin, 355-357, 359-361, 363in

Aristotle,

Marx, 221, 325, 327, 330-331;

in

222; in Tertullian, 66; in

Thomas Aquinas, 120-121; in the
Vindiciae contra tyrannos, 157Sorel,

Roman

57; in Tacitus,

Plato, 25; in Rome, 15

Rationalism: in Burke, 275-276; in
Locke, 238-239
Rebellion. See Revolution
Recursus ab abusu, 19 In
Reginald of Piperno, 112, 115n
Regium placet, 19 In
Religion: in Anarchism, 225; in
Bentham, 284-285; in Burke, 275,
276; in Locke, 205-206, 239; in
Marx, 321, 332-333; in Rousseau,
239n, 268-269; in Tocqueville,

364; in Locke, 242, 243-244; in

See

Populus christianus. See Church

Posidonius of Apamea, 12, 59
Positivism, 207n-208n, 217-220
Priestley, Joseph, 286n
Princeps rei publicae. See PrinPrincipate,

Race: in Fascism, 381; in Gobineau,

318-319; in Hitler, 227-229; in

Tiers

tat?

See

158, 189n. See also American

Revolution, Class struggle, English Revolution, French Revolution, Russian Revolution
Revolution of 1905 (in Russia), 352
Ricardo, David, 286n, 341, 343
Roman law. See Law

Romanticism, 208

Rome,

4, 13, 14-15, 15-17, 50-52,

56-57, 73, 247-248
Rose (Bishop of Senlis), 158
Rousseau, Jean Jacques: life, 258-

260;

political

writings,

261-269;

on absolutism, 208, 263, 266; on

citizenship, 263-264; on the contheory, 120n, 24 1,. 24 In,
262-263, 264-268 passim; on the
forms of government, 267n-268n;
on law, 266-267; on property,
260n, 261, 266; on religion, 239n,
268-269; on the separation of

tract

Index

[451

powers, 265; on sovereignty, 208,

263, 265-266, 267-268; on the
state, 261n, 263, 266-268; on the
state of nature, 256n, 260, 260n,
57n,
262n-263n;
261-262,
37,
256n, 279, 414
Ruler, qualities of the ideal: in St.
Augustine, 77; in John of Salisbury, 107; in Machiavelli, 177,
180-183; in Plato, 24-26, 28-29
Russian Revolution, 352-354

Hobbes,

198-200; in
in Locke,
241-242, 243; in Machiavelli, 179;
251-253;
in
in
Montesquieu,
Roman law, 17; in Rousseau, 208,
263, 265-266, 267-268; in Suarez.
167-168; in Tocqueville, 310, 314;
17, 158. See also Authority, Contract theory of government, State
155,

196,

206n-207n;

liberalism,

Spencer, Herbert, 219-220

Stalin, Joseph,

35 In, 355

Stamp Act, 272, 272n

Bartholomew Massacre, 188n
Saint-Simon, Henri de, 217, 221
Savonarola, Girolamo, 173, 176

St.

Scientific socialism.

Seneca

(Lucius

See

Communism

Annaeus Seneca),

12, 12n, 86-87, 88, 159

Separation of church and state. See

Church and

state

Separation of powers: in the Amer407-409; in

ican Constitution,
Hegel, 303-304; in Locke, 242;
in Montesquieu, 208, 254-255; in
Polybius, 14; in Rousseau, 265
Shaw, George Bernard, 337, 338,
340, 342, 343-344, 346
Sieyes, E.

J.,

208-209

36n-37n, 45,
46; in St. Augustine, 79; in
Cicero, 54; in Roman law, 16n17n; in the United States, 392-

Slavery:

in

Aristotle,

393, 418-419; 10, 46

Smith,

Adam, 292n-293n

Social compact. See Contract theory

of government
Socialism, 220-225. See also Communism, Democratic socialism,

Fabian Society, National Socialism, Syndicalism, Utopian socialism

Sociology: in Comte, 218; in John
Stuart Mill, 215
Socrates, 8-9, 10, 20, 21
Solon, 6
Sophists, 7-8, 298
Sorel,

Georges, 222-223, 372, 375,

382
Sovereignty: in the American Constitution, 415-420; in St. Augustine, 76, 79; in Bellarmine, 160;
in Bodin, 155, 190-194; in Cicero,
53, 55; in Hegel, 303, 305; in

State,

The:

in Aristotle, 34-35,

36-

45, 86, 105, 119; in St. Augustine,

75-79; in Bellarmine,
160; in

Bentham, 289-290;
193;

in Bodin, 190278; in Calvin,

in Cicero, 53-59, 75, 75n,

in

Burke,

154;
87; in Dante, 131; in Fabianism,
338-339; in Fascism, 212, 228,

380-381, 381-383; in Hegel, 217,

299-304, 304-305; in Hitler, 228229; in Hobbes, 197-198, 198200; in John of Salisbury, 104105; in Lenin, 361-366; in Locke,
241-242; in Marsilius of Padua,
137-141; in Marx, 221, 326-327,
328-329, 330; in Montesquieu,
250-255; in Plato, 22-25, 27, 28,
105; in Roman law, 90; in Rousseau,
261n, 263, 266-268; in
Socrates, 8-9; in Suarez, 167-169;
in Thomas Aquinas, 117, 118-119,
121-123. See also Authority, Contract theory of government, Sovereignty, Catholic principles of
politics

and economics: in Bentham,

292-294; in Locke, 244-245; in
Adam Smith, 292n-293n
State of nature: in Hobbes, 198; in
Locke, 239-241, 242; in Montesquieu, 249, 256; in Rousseau,
256n, 260, 260n, 261-262, 262n-

State

263n; 37, 207

See Sovereignty
Stirner, Max, 224-225

States' rights.

Stoics, 11-13, 59-60, 67-68, 87, 105-

106
Sturzo, Luigi, 230

Suarez,
170,

Francisco,

417

S.J.,

124,

167-

Index

452]

Summa

super titulis decretalium.

See Henricus de Segusia
Surplus value: in Marx, 329-330,
334
Syllabus of Pope Pius IX, 165
Syndicalism, 222-223, 382
Tacitus (Cornelius Tacitus), 15
Taine, Hippolyte, 212, 374

in

158;

S.J.,

Thomas Aquinas,

120-121; 89, 91

Tyranny: in Aristotle, 40, 41, 43-44;

55-56; in John of
in Cicero,
Salisbury, 108; in Locke, 243; in
Montesquieu, 253, 254; in Suarez,

168; in Thomas Aquinas, 120121; 3, 9, 14, 19, 22, 26, 89-91.

See also Government, forms of

Tertullian, 66

Thomas Aquinas,

St.: life, 111-112;

general philosophy and theology,
112-118; Summa Theologica, described, 114-116, 117; on authority, 119-122; on church and state,
123-124; on citizenship, 123-124;
on the contract theory, 118-119,
120n; on the forms of govern-

119; jon_iu^tice,_yT^ on
law, 117-118, 122-123; on monarchy, 119-120, 122;^n_natural
law, 117-118, 119, 402, 409; en
revolution, 121; on the state, 117,
118-119, 121-123; on tyranny and
tyrannicide, 120-121; on war, 124;
and Aristotle 38, 113-114; 102,

ment,

109, 201, 389, 391, 396, 402, 403-

404, 409, 410-411, 417

Timocracy, 22

sanctam (bull), 97

Unico. See Stirner,

life,

passages, 317n-318n

225

Toniolo, Giuseppe, 372-373, 382

Totalitarianism, 226-227. See also
Communism, Fascism, National
Socialism
Trotsky, Leon, 351, 351n
Tyrannicide: in Boucher, 158; in

Buchanan, 158;
in Hobbes, 200;
bury, 108-109; in

Erasmus, 159;
John of SalisJuan de Mariana,

in

Max

United States: in Tocqueville, 307319; 387-423

Universal empire. See World state
Utilitarianism,

290-291,

214-216,

286-289,

293

Utopian socialism, 22 In
Utopias, 159n
Vindiciae contra tyrannos, 157-158,
189n, 414
Virtu: in Machiavelli, 178, 178n
Vitoria, Francisco, O.P., 124, 170

Wallas,

War:

Graham, 337

in Hegel,

clitus,

6-7; in

Machiavelli,

306-307;
on aristocracy, 312-313; on the
Catholic Church in the United
States, 317; on democracy, 214,
307-319; on freedom, 308, 309n31 On; on the French Revolution,
281, 307; on religion, 316-318;
on sovereignty, 310, 314; on the
United States, 307-319; prophetic

Tocqueville, Alexis de:

Tolstoi, Leo,

Unam

Montesquieu,
Aquinas, 124

Webb, Sidney,

301-303; in HeraLocke, 240-241; in

175,

250;

184-185;
in

in

Thomas

337, 340, 341, 343,

346
Wells, Herbert George, 342, 347

White, Andrew, S.J., 397

Williams, Roger, 390-391
Wilson, James, 401, 413, 417
Wise, John, 390, 411
Women: in Aristotle, 47-48; in
Bentham, 292n; in Marsilius of
Padua, 139; in Plato, 25, 47-48
Woolman, John, 392-393, 419
World state: in Dante, 129, 130,
131-132; in Hegel, 301; in Zeno,
12-13

Xenophon, 8

in

Zeno of Citium, 11-13

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