A F F I D A V I T

I, Matthew D. Ferrante, being duly sworn, hereby depose and

state as follows:

1. I am a Special Agent ("SA") of the United States

Secret Service (“USSS”), and have been so employed since April

2000.

a. I am currently assigned to the Newark, New Jersey

field office, to the “Operation Firewall” squad. In that

capacity, I am responsible for investigating, among other

things, electronic crimes including computer hacking and

computer fraud.

b. During my career as a Special Agent of the USSS,

I have participated in numerous investigations involving

computer-related offenses, and assisted in the service of

search warrants involving searches and seizures of computers,

computer equipment, software, electronically stored

information, and instrumentalities of fraud.

c. I have also been certified as an “Electronic

Crimes Special Agent,” which I obtained through extensive

training in computer forensics and network analysis.

2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based

primarily on information I have obtained from my work on the

“Operation Firewall” squad. The affidavit is also based on

knowledge obtained from other individuals, including other law

enforcement officers; my review of documents and computer records

have personal knowledge of the events and circumstances described

herein; and information gained through my training and

experience.

3. This affidavit is submitted in support of an

application for a criminal complaint and arrest warrant

charging NICOLAS LEE JACOBSEN, of 1655 East 1st Street,

Apartment 291, Santa Ana, California, with violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030(a)(2)(C) (intentionally accessing a computer without

authorization and thereby obtaining information from a

protected computer).

4. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there

is sufficient probable cause to support a criminal complaint

and arrest warrant and does not purport to set forth all of my

knowledge of, or investigation into, this matter. Unless

specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and

statements described in this affidavit are related in

substance and in part only.

5. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1030(a)(5)(A)

states, in pertinent part:

Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer without

authorization or exceeds authorization access, and

thereby obtain . . . information from any protected

computer if the conduct involved an interstate or

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 foreign communication.

6. This Application is being made to further an

investigation into Shadowcrew, Carderplanet, and Darkprofits

(collectively, the “criminal organizations”), three organized

criminal groups dedicated to promoting malicious computer

hacking; Internet fraud schemes; electronic theft of personal

financial and identifying information; trafficking in and use of

stolen credit card and debit card information (“dumps”), stolen

bank account information, and other stolen individual identifying

information; and the production of, trafficking in, and use of

counterfeit identification documents.

Background

Definition of Relevant Computer and Internet Concepts

7. The Internet is a collection of computers and computer

networks that are connected to one another via high-speed data

links and telephone lines for the purpose of communicating and

sharing data and information. Connections between Internet

computers exist across state and international borders;

therefore, information sent between two computers connected to

the Internet frequently crosses state and international borders

even where the two computers are located in the same state.

8. Internet Service Providers ("ISP’s"): Most individuals

and businesses obtain access to the Internet through ISP’s.

America Online (“AOL”), Microsoft, and Earthlink are examples of

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some of the larger and better-known ISP’s. Other ISP’s include

private entities such as corporations, universities, and

government agencies. Among other services, ISP’s provide their

customers with access to the Internet using telephone, cable,

Digital Subscriber Line, or other types of telecommunications

lines.

9. Internet Protocol Address ("IP address"): An IP

address is a unique numeric address used to identify computers on

the Internet. The standard format for IP addressing consists of

four numbers between 0 and 255 separated by dots (e.g.,

149.101.10.40). Every computer connected to the Internet (or

group of computers using the same account to access the Internet)

must be assigned an IP address so that Internet traffic sent from

and directed to that computer is directed properly from its

source to its destination. ISP’s assign IP addresses to their

customers’ computers. An ISP might assign a different IP address

to a customer each time the customer makes an Internet connection

("dynamic IP addressing"), or it might assign an IP address to a

customer permanently or for a fixed period of time ("static IP

addressing"). Either way, the IP address used by a computer

attached to the Internet must be unique for the duration of a

particular session; that is, from connection to disconnection.

ISP’s typically log their customers’ connections, which means

that the ISP can identify which of its customers was assigned a

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specific IP address during a particular Internet session.

10. Domain Names: Numerical IP addresses generally have

corresponding domain names. For instance, the IP address

“149.101.10.40” resolves to the corresponding domain name

“www.cybercrime.gov”. The Domain Name System (“DNS”) is an

Internet service that associates each domain name with an IP

address. This mapping function is performed by DNS servers

located throughout the Internet. DNS allows a user knowing only

a domain name to reach a computer without having to know its IP

address. In general, a registered domain name should resolve to

a numerical IP address.

11. Log files are computer-generated files containing

information regarding the activities of computer users, processes

running on a computer, and the usage of computer resources.

12. File Transfer Protocol (“FTP”) is a communication

protocol for transferring files between computers connected to

the Internet.

13. ICQ is an online real-time instant messaging service.

ICQ sessions between individuals can run for hours or days at a

time during which these individuals often will have several

discrete conversations separated by breaks in time when there is

no communication. Each person participating in ICQ chat is

assigned a unique ICQ number eight-digit number that remains

assigned to them until such time as they abandon that number; the

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number may or may thereafter be recycled and assigned out to

another person.

14. Whois search is a search of a public records database

to learn the identity of the ISP with assignment authority over

particular IP addresses. Once the identity of the ISP is

determined, that ISP can be compelled to disclose records related

to the customer or subscriber assigned that IP address on a

specific date and at a specific time.

Background of the Criminal Organizations

15. As noted above, Shadowcrew, Carderplanet, and

Darkprofits are three organized criminal groups dedicated to

promoting malicious computer hacking; Internet fraud schemes;

electronic theft of personal financial and identifying

information; trafficking in and use of stolen credit card and

debit card information (“dumps”), stolen bank account

information, and other stolen individual identifying information;

and the production of, trafficking in, and use of counterfeit

identification documents. These groups operate, respectively,

the Internet web sites www.shadowcrew.com, www.carderplanet.com,

and www.darkprofits.com as the public manifestations of the

criminal organizations. These web sites serve primarily as

communications media to facilitate the commission of the above-

referenced criminal activity. These web sites publicly

disseminate information regarding the perpetration of such

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criminal activity through postings and responses to postings by

members to electronic forums on the sites. They also facilitate

the transmission and receipt of private electronic messages

between members of the respective criminal organizations.

Furthermore, the web sites serve as electronic bulletin boards

for members of the respective criminal organizations to advertise

and promote the sale of credit card and debit card dumps, stolen

bank account information, other stolen individual identifying

information, and counterfeit identification documents to other

members.

16. The criminal organizations operate their associated web

sites and oversee the activities of their members through the

following hierarchical framework:

a. “Administrators”/“Forum Techs” are a small group

of individuals that serve as a governing council of each criminal

organization who, collectively, control the destiny of their

organization. The administrators handle day-to-day management

decisions of the organizations as well as long-term strategic

planning for the organizations’ continued viability. They

determine which individuals are permitted to become and remain

members of criminal organizations; the functions,

responsibilities and levels of access to information for all

members of the organizations; and the rewards accorded members

for their loyalty to the organizations as well as the punishments

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meted out to members evidencing disloyalty to the organizations.

Furthermore, they decide when, how and under what circumstances

to attack and/or to retaliate against members of rival criminal

organizations and their associated Internet web sites. The

administrators are accorded full access to and privileges on the

computer servers hosting the corresponding web sites and, thus,

have ultimate responsibility for the physical administration,

maintenance and security of these computer servers as well as for

the content of the web sites.

b. “Moderators” oversee and administer one or more

subject-matter-specific forums on the web sites that either fall

within an area of their expertise or cover their geographic

location, limiting their activities to editing and deleting posts

by members on these forums. Moderators also frequently serve as

reviewers for particular products or services with which they

have an expertise.

c. “Reviewers” examine and/or test products and

services that members of the criminal organizations desire to

advertise and sell via the corresponding web sites (e.g.,

counterfeit passports, drivers licenses, Social Security cards,

credit cards, birth certificates and other identification

documents; credit card dumps; counterfeit checks; and stolen

credit card pre-authorization (“dump check”) services) and post a

written summary of that examination or testing on the appropriate

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web site. A favorable written review is a prerequisite to

vending on the web sites hosted by the criminal organizations.

While most reviewers primarily serve in the capacity of

administrator or moderator, any qualified individual can be

appointed by an administrator to conduct a review, even a general

member.

d. “Vendors” advertise and sell products and services

to members of the criminal organizations via the associated web

sites after the product or service has received a favorable

written review from a reviewer. Once a reviewer is designated, a

prospective vendor is required to ship multiple samples of the

product or provide access to the service to facilitate completion

of the review. This contact between the prospective vendor and

the reviewer is usually made through a private e-mail message or

through a public post in a forum on the relevant web site.

e. “General members” of the criminal organizations

have no role in the operation of the corresponding web sites.

Instead, they typically use the web sites to gather and provide

information about perpetrating criminal activity through postings

on the various forums and through private e-mail messaging to

other members. They also use the sites to facilitate their

purchases of credit card dumps, false identification documents

and other contraband that then serves as instrumentalities of

their own criminal conduct. A member of any of these criminal

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organizations is known to other members by his/her chosen screen

name or nickname (“nic”). Individuals often are known by and

conduct their criminal business under more than one nic.

17. The continued viability of the criminal organizations

is dependent upon individuals who are skilled hackers. A

computer hacker is an individual who accesses computer systems

without authorization, often for the purpose of stealing

information or causing damage to computer systems. Hackers,

whether actual members of the criminal organizations or not, are

the primary source of credit card dumps and stolen identity

information that are sold on the associated web sites and used to

create false identity documents and counterfeit credit cards.

Like the members of the criminal organizations that they service,

hackers are known by their nic’s and predominantly communicate

with each other and with others in the online criminal underworld

through real-time chat sessions, exchanging information on forums

and other electronic bulletin boards, and private e-mail

messaging.

18. The hackers and members of the criminal organizations

use their own descriptive vernacular when communicating with each

other regarding their criminal activity. Several of the most

frequently used words and phrases include:

a. “Banging out ATM’s” (or “cashing out PIN’s”)

refers to illegally obtaining funds from an automated teller

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machine (“ATM”) through the unauthorized use of bank account

information encoded onto counterfeit plastic cards. These

counterfeit plastic cards are often used in conjunction with

other personal information acquired from potential victims by

various methods, including hacking and phishing scams, to steal

money and to engage in financial fraud.

b. “Carding” refers to the general concept of

purchasing retail items with counterfeit credit cards or stolen

credit card information.

c. “In-store carding” occurs when the carding

committed by an individual requires him/her to be physically

located inside a retail store when making the fraudulent

purchase. In such a scheme, a counterfeit credit card that has

been encoded with the legitimate account information of the

victim is presented to the cashier by the offender. Often,

various false identification documents are used to facilitate

this fraud.

d. “Carding on-line” refers to carding via an online

Internet transaction.

e. “Carding to a drop” refers to the act of carding

goods via online Internet transactions and having the items

purchased shipped to an anonymous mail drop. A variation of this

scheme occurred when the offender causes the fraudulently

obtained merchandise to be shipped to a third party in return for

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a previously agreed upon sum of money, thing of value, or service

or for a specific percentage of the future proceeds from the sale

of the item by the third party.

f. “Change of billing” (or “cob”) occurs when an

individual, after having acquired all the pertinent information

related to victim’s credit card account, accesses the account via

the Internet or via a telephone call and causes the billing

address for the credit card changed, or causes an alternate

shipping address to be added, in order to facilitate credit card

fraud.

g. “Novelty” (or “nov”) refers to a counterfeit

identification document (e.g., drivers licenses, birth

certificates, and passports). The term is often used on the web

sites by vendors of counterfeit identification documents in a

misguided effort to afford them plausible deniability of any

criminal culpability for producing and selling these items by

claiming that they are only for novelty purposes.

h. “Phishing” refers to an Internet fraud scam

involving the sending out of large volumes of unsolicited

commercial e-mail (“spam”) containing a link to a replica of an

Internet web page of a well known commercial or financial company

in an effort to trick the victim into clicking on this link and

entering his/her credit card or personal financial information as

requested by the replica web page, which is then sold by the

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offender or used by the offender to commit fraud or identity

theft.

i. “Printing” is commonly used to refer to the

production of counterfeit plastic credit cards.

19. The members of the criminal organizations have employed

multiple, real-time Internet chat messaging services to

facilitate the commission of criminal conduct. These services

include America On-Line Instant Messenger (“AIM”), ICQ (I seek

you), mIRC (Internet Relay Chat), Yahoo Messenger, and MSN. Many

of these chat messaging services can all be accessed

simultaneously using a software program called Trillian which

offers, for example, encrypted instant messaging capabilities.

These services accommodate discussions among the subjects and aid

them in securing their communications with each other.

Specifically, Trillian offers a secure method by which online

criminals can communicate and facilitates their ability to engage

in criminal activity without being monitored by law enforcement.

20. To further facilitate their illegal activity, members

of these criminal organizations utilize Digital Currency

Businesses (“DCB’s”) to pay for illegal purchases and launder

money gained from criminal conduct. These DCB’s are based on the

concept of stored value, and do not act in a manner consistent

with traditional banking methods. In other words, the electronic

currency is backed by and translated into an unencumbered

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physical commodity, most often a quantity of gold or another

precious metal. DCB’s are popular within these criminal

organizations because they quickly and easily facilitate the

conversion of national hard currencies when dealing with co-

conspirators in foreign countries. Moreover, because of DCB

internal policies and their location beyond the reach of U.S. law

enforcement authorities, they provide unprecedented levels of

privacy for those engaging in illegal monetary transactions.

21. The members of the criminal organizations use proxies

to surf the Internet and access web sites. A “proxy” is an

intermediate computer that sits between the user’s computer and

the destination computer. It accepts requests from the user’s

computer, transmits those requests on to the destination

computer, and then returns the response from the destination

computer back to the user’s computer via the proxy. These

proxies are used to conceal the identity of the user from law

enforcement by hiding the user’s true originating IP address.

When an individual uses a proxy to access a web site for illegal

activity, the logs from the web site show the IP address of the

proxy, not the IP address of the user’s computer. It is not

uncommon for hackers and other online criminals to conceal their

identities by using more than one proxy when accessing the

Internet for the purpose of engaging in criminal conduct. The

USSS has learned that there are currently over 100,000

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compromised computers being used as proxies in the United States.

These proxies are part of hotel computer networks, university

computer networks, and corporate computer networks, as well as

compromised privately owned computers throughout the country.

22. Members of the criminal organizations often establish,

maintain and make use of proxies augmented by high quality

encryption standards specifically to conceal their true

identities when accessing the Internet (“anonymizers”). A common

example of an anonymizer is a virtual private network (“VPN”). A

VPN affords many computers the ability to simultaneously connect

to it via a single shared IP address, commonly referred to as the

“gateway IP address.” Privacy is achieved by providing each user

a separate encrypted tunnel to secure his/her electronic

communications. The content of the data packets sent from each

individual’s computer to the VPN is then encrypted.

Probable Cause to Believe A Person Using the Nickname “Ethics”

23. On March 15, 2004, a person using the online nickname

“Ethics” posted the following information on a website designated

as www.muzzfuzz.com:

am offering reverse lookup of information for a t-

mobile cell phone, by phone number at the very least,

you get name, ssn, and DOB at the upper end of the

information returned, you get web username/password,

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 voicemail password, secret question/answer, sim#,

IMEI#, and more.

24. I know that www.muzzfuzz.com is an Internet bulletin

board for buying, posting and sharing hacks and credit card

numbers, and for facilitating identity theft and fraud.

25. In my training and experience, I understand this

posting to be an offer to sell information contained on T-

Mobile’s customer database, including “reverse lookup”

information that enables a person to enter a phone number and

obtain personal information regarding the person using that

telephone number.

26. Or or about July 28, 2004, USSS Special Agent Peter

Cavicchia spoke with representatives of T-Mobile, who confirmed

that a hacker had obtained unauthorized access to their customer

database.

27. On July 28, 2004, a confidential informant (“CI”)

working for the USSS was contacted by a person using the online

nickname “Sigep,” who the CI knew to be a member of the

Shadowcrew criminal organization.

a. In that communication, Sigep permitted the CI to

see portions of previous online conversations that Sigep had with

another member of the Shadowcrew criminal organization who used

the online nickname “Myth.”

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 b. The portions of the conversation between Sigep and

Myth contained excerpts of an internal USSS Memorandum Report as

well as part of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty from the Russian

Federation. These documents contained highly sensitive

information pertaining to ongoing USSS criminal cases.

28. The CI is a high ranking member of both the Shadowcrew

and Carderplanet criminal enterprises having served in the

capacity of administrator, moderator and reviewer. The CI has

entered into a cooperating plea agreement with the United States

pursuant to which the CI will receive consideration in return for

his/her assistance. The CI has not yet been formally charged,

but has been informed that he/she will be charged as a result of

his participation in the criminal enterprises. The CI has been

assisting the undercover investigation since in or about August

2003, and has provided extensive information about the activities

of the criminal enterprises, their members, and the manner in

which computer systems are used by these groups and individuals.

In the course of providing assistance, the CI's online activities

and communications have been logged, with his/her consent, by

monitoring software. In addition, the information provided by

the CI has been extensively corroborated through consensual

communications with the subjects of the investigation and

through the results of search warrants and pen register and

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trap and trace orders. The USSS special agents supervising

the CI believe him/her to be truthful and reliable.

29. Later on July 28, 2004, the CI was contacted directly

by Myth, who stated that:

a. Myth had received the compromised USSS documents

from an undisclosed person.

b. Myth knew, based on information from this

undisclosed person, that his (Myth’s) ICQ number was under

surveillance by federal agents.

c. Myth would try to put the CI in contact with the

undisclosed person who had provided the USSS documents and who

had informed Myth of the surveillance.

30. Later that same day, the CI received an email from Myth

that contained prior conversations between Myth and the

undisclosed supplier of the data. The conversations between Myth

and an unknown person contained references to subpoena requests

for information regarding the ICQ numbers pursuant to an ongoing

USSS investigation.

31. On July 29, 2004, the CI was again contacted by Myth,

who stated that the undisclosed person who had supplied the

Secret Service investigation information (as well as the other

information outlined above) wanted to speak to the CI. Myth

instructed the CI to meet this person in an IRC chat room.

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 32. Later that day, the CI met Myth and another person

who was using the online nickname “anyonman” in an IRC chat

room. During that three-way conversation:

a. “Anyonman” stated that he had obtained

information from numerous Secret Service documents.

b. “Anyonman” thereafter showed the CI numerous

USSS documents (through pasting them into the chat).

c. “Anyonman” then told the CI that the computer at

IP address 209.250.116.88 was “interesting,” and identified

that address as belonging to the United State Secret Service

New York field office.

33. After checking online database and Secret Service

records, I know that IP address 209.250.116.88 is registered

to a Secret Service computer in the New York Field Office

Electronics Crimes Task Force. In particular, that IP address

is registered to a computer used by USSS Special Agent Peter

Cavicchia.

34. From speaking with Peter Cavicchia, I know that he

has a T-Mobile account which:

a. He has used to access his work computer at IP

address 209.250.116.88.

b. Automatically received email forwarded from his

personal “mac” account, at pcavvichia@mail.mac.com.

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 35. On August 2, 2004, the CI contacted a person using

the online nickname “Ethics.” Based on the CI’s extensive

involvement with the Shadowcrew criminal organization, the CI

knows that “Ethics” is a “vendor” in the Shadowcrew

organization. During their conversation:

a. The CI asked “Ethics” whether he was the person

using the nickname “anyonman” earlier that day. When the CI

raised that possibility, Ethics proceeded to paste text

conversation intercepted from SA Cavicchia’s T-Mobile e-mail

account, including conversations that explicitly referenced

Cavicchia.

36. A few days later, on August 5, 2004, the CI and

Ethics again spoke, and Ethics asked if the CI had a proxy

server that he/she could use. When the CI asked Ethics why he

needed a proxy, Ethics responded, “[t]o browse and log into a

site with the credentials of a USSS Agent.” Under the direction

of USSS agents the CI was instructed to configure a computer that

was controlled by agents of the Newark Field Office. The CI then

gave Ethics the IP address of the undercover USSS computer and

the appropriate port number which would allow Ethics to access

the computer. Later that day, USSS observed the following:

a. Ethics used the proxy supplied to him by the CI.

b. We observed Ethics use the undercover proxy

computer to log into http://mail.sidekick.dngr.com, which is the

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web server computer used by T-Mobile to store its customers’

information, and attempt to log into the SA Cavicchia’s

compromised personal email account with T-Mobile. It was later

determined that the sensitive USSS information was stored on the

T-Mobile/Danger servers.

c. We also observed Ethics attempt to log into

pcavicchia@mail.mac.com, which is the personal email account of

SA Cavicchia to which Cavicchia’s T-Mobile e-mail account

automatically forwards any T-Mobile email.

37. On or about October 19, 2004, Ethics sent a private

message to the CI which contained a link that provides

unauthorized access to the T-Mobile database. This link allows a

user to input a phone number ultimately allowing access to the

user’s personal information. Ethics also instructed the CI to be

extremely careful with this type of information. Furthermore,

Ethics provided our CI with the direct access to SA Cavicchia’s

T-Mobile account.

Probable Cause to Believe “Ethics” Is JACOBSEN

38. On July 30, 2004, analysts at Criminal Investigative

Division, USSS Headquarters conducted searches on the Internet to

try to determine the true identity of the person using the Ethics

nickname.

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 a. Analysts identified Ethics by his ICQ number of

23292256, which is the only ICQ number Ethics used when

communicating with the CI.

b. A resume posted on the Internet from 2001 for

Nicolas JACOBSEN, with an address of 120 Winston Section Road,

Winston, Oregon 97496, contained ICQ 23292256 as a contact number

for JACOBSEN. The e-mail address listed on the resume was

“ethics@netzero.net”.

39. On August 8, 2004, USSS agents examined the backdoor

logs into the Shadowcrew web site (the backdoor had been operated

by the USSS as part of the undercover operation) and learned that

Ethics logged into www.shadowcrew.com using the IP address

24.75.10.122 on August 8, 2004 at 17:22:29 EDT.

40. On that same day, USSS agents conducted a Whois search

and a trace route on the IP address of 24.75.10.122 and

determined that this IP address belonged to the Residence Inn

Hotel located near Buffalo, New York. USSS agents searched the

Internet and located the phone number for the Residence Inn

located in Williamsport, New York (just outside of Buffalo.)

Agents telephoned the aforementioned hotel and confirmed that

Nicolas Jacobsen was residing at that hotel at the date and time

at issue.

41. On August 11, 2004, the Residence Inn in Williamsport,

New York provided business records relating to the customer

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assigned the IP address 24.75.10.122 on August 8, 2004 at

17:22:29 EDT. The Residence Inn’s records showed that the IP

address in question was assigned to “Nicolas Jacobson” as a guest

at the hotel.

42. On or about July 28, 2004, a review of public record

databases was conducted for Nicolas JACOBSEN. This review

revealed the address 1655 East 1st Street, Apartment 291, Santa

Ana, CA. It was also learned that JACOBSEN works for Pfastship

Logistics International, 17752 Mitchell Ave., Suite H, Irvine,

CA. USSS agents placed a call to Pfastship Logistics

International and confirmed that Jacobsen is currently employed

by that company.

43. From California Department of Motor Vehicles records, I

know that JACOBSEN has a valid California driver’s license

D6644175, under the name Nicholas Lee Jacobsen, which lists his

date of birth as February 24, 1983; his address as 1655 East 1st

Street, Apt 291, Santa Ana, CA; and his physical description as

5’10"; 210 lbs; brown hair; brown eyes.

44. On or about October 26, 2004, USSS Special Agent

Christopher Henderson conducted physical surveillance on 1655

East 1st Street, Apt 291, Santa Ana, CA. Earlier that morning,

Henderson observed JACOBSEN leaving the residence for the Irvine

location of Pfastship Logistics. Henderson followed JACOBSEN to

that locale and continued surveillance.

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 45. After speaking with Pfastship Logistics International,

I know that JACOBSEN regularly travels on business and was in

Buffalo, New York on business when he accessed the T-Mobile

service on August 8, 2004. I also have reason to believe that

JACOBSEN had continuous access to the T-Mobile database between

March 2004 and October 2004 because the Secret Service documents

he showed the CI bore different dates and because we witnessed

multiple intrusions, as noted above. Because JACOBSEN travels

with the computer he uses to access to the T-Mobile database, and

because JACOBSEN lives and works in Orange County, California,

there is probable cause to believe, in light of his continuous,

unauthorized access, that JACOBSEN has illegally accessed the T-

Mobile database on at least one occasion from his home or work in

the Central District of California.

Sealing Order Requested

46. It is respectfully submitted that this Court issue an

Order sealing, until further order of this Court, all papers

submitted in support of this application, including the

application, the affidavit, the criminal complaint, and the

arrest warrant. Sealing is necessary because the items and

information to be seized are relevant to an ongoing investigation

into the criminal organizations as not all of the targets of this

investigation will be searched at this time. Premature

disclosure of the contents of this affidavit and related

24
documents may have a negative impact on this continuing

investigation and may jeopardize its effectiveness.

Conclusion

46. For the foregoing reasons, I believe that there is

probable cause to believe that NICOLAS LEE JACOBSEN accessed a

protected computer without authorization and obtained

information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).

Matthew D. Ferrante
Special Agent
United States Secret Service

Sworn to before me this

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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