RogelioC.

LascoaJr
WillsandSuccession

June15,2015

2. Borja v. Borja
46 SCRA 577
GR. L-28040
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE
BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco
de Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,
special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco
de Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco,
defendant-appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p

Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja, 1 from the approval of a
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding
No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with
his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate,
which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In
1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de

Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the
sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de
Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955,
she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some
eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa
Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all
these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, 2 by and
between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,
assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise
agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and
as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the various
court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the
administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as
liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any
reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala,
Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866,
Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la
Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con
los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the
total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which
represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs
Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and
complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de
Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco
de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from
and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala,
"Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation
incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes
payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2
of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirschildren of Francisco de Borja.

4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding
receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns,
hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all
manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money,
accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or
now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955,
CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case
No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their
heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or
indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities
of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and
lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her
rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4
hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to
Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the
corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties
mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of
the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the
said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966,
to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement,
but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R.
case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case
No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1)
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de
Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco
de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and
effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to
the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses
that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1,
Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the
dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed
the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will,
the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different
manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.

The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco
shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary share in the estate
of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by
Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or
otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted
or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even
if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated
to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of
the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between
the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 7982) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by
the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious
reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on
the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual
capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to
enter into the same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is
submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings.
Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there
shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period
for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its
effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated
in an agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of
Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the
consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and
which contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property
mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the
herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is
consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the
period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no
further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to
this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it
bears no date, the day being left blank "this day of October 1963"; and while signed by the
parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed
notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A),
provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid

to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde
all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1,
and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja
under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate
unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the
contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal
compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the
Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose
de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco
for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized
by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the
compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal,
for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate
of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could
not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in
favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by
article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir
could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because
it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The
point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex
"A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There
is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status
as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in
L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been
arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated
that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion
above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been
formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that
some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's
approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because
of the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was
not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs.
Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and
widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was
natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new
settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A",
since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the
attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to
Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it
is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964
referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to
reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the
act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the

Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be
ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its
order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished,
the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the
payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to
nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel,
Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon
Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if
there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and
properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is
the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or
whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence
to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the
Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the
accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the
rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was
duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of
Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the
Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the
Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded
to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of
Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less,
assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No.
7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's
first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was
conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the
presumption established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of
the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and
exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff
had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his
Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose
de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in
question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late
Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of
the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the

Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended
Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the
plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted
therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the
"Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more,
Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings
No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an
inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the
Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of
judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor
of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was
not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on
the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August
1951 (Exhibit "F") that
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337
hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had
been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand
from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother
Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's
assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that
the amount would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness
further testified that
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was
still a bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965,
t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the
admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate
courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the
testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original
Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal
partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil
Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de
Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since
both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A
ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does
not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) "
refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there
were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at
P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F")
refer to? In addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is
plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and
"7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted,
they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and

his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the
self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted
but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda
de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages
should be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of
the deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No.
L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed
and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

5. LORENZA QUISON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs. HIGINA SALUD, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-4314 November 21, 1908
Upon the merits of this case the only question is one of fact, namely, is the boundary line between
the land formerly owned by Fidel Salud, the father of the defendant, and land owned by Claro
Quison, father and uncle of the plaintiffs, the estero or River Nagsaulay, or is it, as found by the
court below, a straight line of mango and bamboo trees to the south of the above-mentioned
estero? The land in controversy is situated between this line of trees and the estero.
That Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed, but the defendant claims
that he [Quison] never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of evidence,
principally parol, was introduced upon this question, and after an examination thereof, we are
satisfied that it clearly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below, and that it was
proven at the trial that the land in question belongs to the heirs of Quison.
The defendant relied to a great extent upon the record of an action brought by Claro Quison in
1887 against one Perdeguera. Quison alleged in his complaint in that action that the defendant
therein had in unlawfully possessed himself of a portion of his, the then plaintiff's land. The land
there in question was in the extreme northern part of the land of Quison, and therefore entirely
north of the Estero Nagsaulay. Judgment was rendered in that action in favor of the plaintiff, and
the gobernadorcillo of the two of San Juan de Bocboc was ordered to restore the plaintiff to the
possession of the land detained by Perdeguera. In executing this judgment the officers of the law
apparently gave Quison possession of the land which he had described in his complaint in that
action, which description was as follows: "On the east, the sea; on the south, land of Fidel Salud;
on the west, lands of Juan de Chaves and Camilo Perez; and on the north with the arroyo called
Amoyongan." Fidel Salud was cited to appear, and did appear when possession was given to
Quison. It will be noticed that, while the land of Quison is described as being bounded on the
south by the property of Salud, nothing is said about the Estero Nagsaulay, nor does that
esteroappear upon the plan which accompanied the complaint in that action an which the officers
had before them when possession was restored. The minute of the proceeding concerning the
restitution was signed by Salud.
The importance of these documents for the defendant's case lies in the fact that in them the land
described as being in the barrio of Subuquin. We think the evidence establishes that the land here
in controversy is in the barrio of Bataan, and that the dividing line between the barrios of Bataan
and Subuquin was the River Nagsaulay, Bataan being to the south of the river and Subuquin to
the north, and the argument of the defendant is that, according to these documents, the entire
property owned by Claro Quison was situated in Subuquin, and therefore was north of the Estero
Nagsaulay.
Even giving the document all the weight which the defendant claims it is entitled to, it would then
be merely evidence upon the question of fact as to whether Quison did or did not own lands to the
south of the River Nagsaulay, and as such evidence we think it can not overcome the evidence of
the many witnesses presented by the plaintiffs who swore that as a matter of fact, they had
occupied and cultivated lands belonging to Claro Quison situated to the south of this river. It may
be, perhaps, that, in view of the fact that the land in controversy in that action commenced in
1887 was a small parcel which itself was in the barrio of Subuquin, in describing the land in
question the then plaintiff did not have in mind so much where all of his land lay as where the
particular tract then in controversy lay.

The defendant also claims that Fidel Salud was given judicial possession of the property here in
controversy in 1895. No written documents were presented to prove this possession, but
admitting that proceedings relating to judicial possession were then taken in accordance with the
provisions of title 13 of the Spanish Law of Civil Procedure, such proceedings could in no way
prejudice the plaintiffs according to the express provisions of article 2016. The law did not require
for such proceedings the citation of the adjoining proprietors, nor was there any evidence that
they were in fact cited in this proceeding, and, according to the testimony of Gregorio de Villa, any
possession which Fidel Salud obtained in 1895 was lost in 1901, when Quison again took
possession of the premises and held them until the reconcentration when the defendant, in 1903,
by reason of such reconcentration again possessed herself of the property.
We hold that the finding of the court below in favor of the plaintiffs as to the true boundary line
between the respective properties is sustained by the evidence.
Some questions of procedure remain to be considered.
This action was first brought against Fidel Salud and Gregorio de Villa, the father and husband,
respectively, of the defendant Higina Salud. They answered, alleging that the property in question
had been conveyed to Higina Salud in 1895, and that she was the only owner thereof.
Upon the presentation of this answer, the plaintiffs asked leave to present a supplementary
complaint against Higina Salud. The court, in disposing of that motion, ordered the dismissal of
the action so far as the defendant Fidel Salud and Gregorio de Villa were concerned, with costs
against the plaintiffs, and permitted the plaintiffs to present a complaint against Higina Salud. The
plaintiffs excepted to this order and insisted that the two defendants above-named should be
included in this case, but the court refused to vacate his order of dismissal. The plaintiffs then
presented a complaint against Higina Salud as the only defendant. She made a motion that the
complaint be stricken out, but it does not appear that the court ever made any ruling thereon. She
afterwards answered then complaint and the trial was had upon the pleadings then in the case,
namely, on the complaint against Higina Salud and her answer.
Higina Salud was the only one who appealed from the judgment and she now alleges in her brief
that the court erred in dismissing the case as to the other defendants. This dismissal only
prejudiced the plaintiffs and they have not appealed. The complaint against Higina Salud was
improperly called by the plaintiffs as supplementary complaint. But the name given to it was of no
importance. At the time it was presented she was the only defendant. It perhaps was error to
permit the filing of that new complaint against Higina Salud in this action and perhaps the
complaint should have constituted a new case, but the fact that it was placed among the papers
in this case and that the trial and judgment were had and rendered therein, if it were error, was an
error which in no way prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant Higina Salud upon the
merits, and is therefore no ground for reversal. (Sec. 503, Code of the Civil Procedure.)
Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next of kin
and heirs, but it is said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain this action because
there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the
estate of Claro Quison, and that, without such settlement, the heirs can not maintain this action.
There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Procedure, the title to
property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is,
under the present law, subject to the claims of the administration and the property may be taken
from the claims of the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent the
immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without
some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate
of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.
The court below gave the plaintiffs P900 as damages. While the defendant has assigned this part
of the judgment as error in her brief, it has not been argued therein. While it is true that the
evidence relating to the damages is in some respects vague and uncertain, yet, after an
examination of all of it, we are satisfied that it supports the judgment of the court below, at least
to the extent of P900.
The appellant finally claims that the action can not be
are married women whose husbands did not join with
record shows that at least one of the plaintiffs, Lorenza
husband did not join with her in the action. Section
follows:

maintained, because some of the plaintiffs

them in the action. An examination of the
Quison, was a married woman and that her
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as

Married women as a party. When a married women is a party, her husband must be joined with
her, except:
1. When the action concerns her property, in which her husband can have no interest or
right;lawphil.net

2. When the action is between herself and her husband;

3. When, for just cause, she is living separate and apart from her husband, or by reason of an
agreement in writing entered into between them.
In either of which cases she may sue or be sued alone.
The action was brought not only to recover the possession of the land and to secure a declaration
that the plaintiffs were the owners thereof, but also to recover the sum of P6,720, damages which
the plaintiff have suffered by the wrongful occupation of the land by the defendant. These
damages consisted of the products of the land which the defendant had received during the time
of such occupation.
Passing the question whether, as to the land itself, it being the separate property of the wife, the
husband of Lorenza Quison could have any interest or right therein, we think that it is very clear
that as to the rents and profits of the land he does necessarily have such an interest or right. The
most that can be said in favor of the plaintiffs is that these lands were bienes parafernales. In
regard to the rents of such lands, articles 1385 and 1401 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
ART. 1385. The fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, and are liable for the payment of the marriage expenses.
The property itself also be liable, in the case of article 1362, provided that of the husband and the
dowry property should be insufficient to cover the liabilities referred to therein.
ART. 1401. To the conjugal partnership belong:
1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the
partnership property, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses
only.
2. That obtained by the industry, salaries or work of the spouses or either of them.
3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage, coming from the
partnership property, or from that which belongs to either one of the spouses.
We hold, therefore, that the husband of Lorenza Quison was a necessary party to this action.
The case was submitted for our decision on the 21st of July, 1908. An examination of the record
having disclosed the facts above stated, the court, on the 22d day of August, made an order
permitting the plaintiffs, on notice to the adverse party, to move the court for permission to
amend the complaint by adding thereto the names of the husbands of those plaintiffs who were
married. In accordance with such order, the plaintiffs made a motion that the complaint be
amended by adding thereto the names of the husbands of Lorenza Quison, Maximina Quison,
Roberta Quison, and Petra Quison, as plaintiffs. This motion was argued on the 5th day of October.
Plaintiffs rely upon section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is in part as follows:
The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a
party to amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of
First Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name or any party, either
plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or
inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the
controversy may speedily be determined, without regards to technicalities, and in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner.
It will be seen that this case falls directly within the terms of this section. The amendment
consisted in adding the names of certain parties as the plaintiffs. That amendment is expressly
allowed by the section. The motion was made in the Supreme Court. That is also expressly allowed
by the section, and if it is ever to be given any effect as applied to the addition of a party to an
action, it must cover this case. The provision, moreover, seems to us a very wise one. If it were
not allowed, the plaintiffs would either fail entirely in the action or, the present suit would to have
be dismissed and they would be compelled to commence another action for the same cause,
joining their husbands as plaintiffs, which second action would be but a repetition of the first and
would involve both parties, plaintiffs and defendants, in much additional expense and would cause
much delay, in that way defeating the purpose of the section, which is expressly stated to be "that
the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined without regard to technicalities
and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner."
For the reasons above stated, the court on the 5th day of October, made an order stating that on
the payment by the plaintiffs of P50 for the benefit of the defendant, the motion would be

granted. These terms were imposed upon the plaintiffs for the reason that the attention of their
counsel was called to the defect several times in the Court of First Instance and in this court also
by the brief of the appellant and that, notwithstanding this fact, he took no steps to correct the
error. The plaintiffs have paid into the clerk's office the P50 mentioned in the resolution of October
5, and it is therefore now ordered that the complaint in the action be amended by adding thereto
as plaintiffs the names of Santiago Sevilla, husband of Lorenza Quison; Simeon Guerra, husband of
Maximina Quison; Dionisio Bravo, husband of Roberta Quison, and Vicente Amador, husband of
Petra Quison.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, without costs to either party in the court. So ordered.
6. ARSENIO DE VERA for himself and as guardian ad litem of the minors ARTURO,
TEOGINISA, DEOGRACIAS, SIMEON, GUILLERMO and VICTORIA surnamed DE VERA,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. CLEOTILDE GALAURAN, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-45170
April 10, 1939
Arsenio de Vera, as surviving spouse of the deceased Isabel Domingo, acting for himself and as
guardian ad litemof six minors heirs, instituted an action against Cleotilde Galauran in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of a deed of sale of a registered parcel of land. It is
alleged in the complaint that Arsenio de Vera and his wife Isabel Domingo, now deceased, have
mortgaged their property to the defendant to secure a loan received from him, but said defendant
illegally made them sign a deed which they then believed to be of mortgage and which turned out
later to be of pacto de retro sale; and that the six minor children named in the complaint are the
legitimate children and legitimate heirs of the deceased Isabel Domingo. A demurrer was
interposed by the defendant alleging that the plaintiffs have no cause of action, for they have not
been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. The demurrer was sustained, and, on failure of
plaintiffs to amend, the action was dismissed. Wherefore, this appeal.
Unless there is pending a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, the legal heirs may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the
ancestor, without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as
such. (Rosa Hernandez vs. Padua, 14 Phil., 194; Mendoza Vda. de Bonnevie vs. Cecilio Vda. de
Pardo, 59 Phil., 486; Government of the Philippine Islands vs.Serafica, 33 Off. Gaz., 334; Uy Coque
vs. Navas L. Sioca, 45 Phil., 430.) If the deceased turns out to have debts, the creditors or the
heirs themselves may initiate a special proceeding. If the heirs are minors, a guardian ad
litemmay be appointed for them. (Secs. 116 and 117, Act No. 190.)
In the complaint it is asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the minor plaintiffs. The
lower court should have granted this petition instead of sustaining the demurrer and dismissing
the action.
The order of dismissal is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, with costs against defendant-appellee.