Herder, Folklore, and Modern Humanism
Lael Weissman
University of Pennsylvania
William Wilson's article "Herder, Folklore andRomantic Nationalism"
presents the dominant view in folklore that the roots of our discipline are
tied to nationalistic motives:
[Serious folklore studies] were from the beginning intimately associated with
emergent romantic nationalistic movements in which zealous scholar-patriots
searched the folklore record of the past not just to see how people lived in
by-gone days-the principal interest of the antiquarians-but primarily to
discover "historical" models on which to reshape the present and build the
future. (1973:819)
Certainly it is true that these romantics were trying to effect change in their
political climate by reformulating the past, but ideology governed this
reformulation. Wilson simplifies romantic nationalism as "the wistful dream
of scholars and poets who endeavored through constant education and
propaganda to rekindle the spark of national consciousness in the hearts of
their fellow countrymen" (1973:820).
In Germany, this dream of romantic nationalism was born out of a
new worla conception, a mythology if you will; and, as mythos it was
comprised of both immediate and ultimate concerns. To ignore the
mythological aspect of the origin of our own field is to pretend in effect that
we are myth-free. We must apply to our own history the realizations we
have gleaned from the study of others.
Nationalism was part of a larger movement, loosely called modern
humanism (Schiitze 1920). Modern humanism contains as an essential
characteristic a conflict between the ideal and the actual: romantic
nationalism, as product of these ideas, contains the same tensions. This
movement strove to manifest the ideal nation in the actual world; thus
folklore began as a reformist endeavor. Herder's philosophy was essentially
a critique of his times, and his concept of nationalism emerged out of that
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critique. "Herder's attack on his own century can no longer be of so great
interest as his revolutionary idea of the autonomy of each individual culture.
In the eyes of its author, however, the idea was probably a by-product"
(Clark 1955: 196).
An examination of the historical currents of the eighteenth century
helps to create a contextual backdrop for evaluating Herder's work. German
intellectual life was more advanced than the country's social and political
development. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, a loose
confederation of small states, was still in existence, and aside from one or
two exceptions, Germany had no statesmen who could act to change this
fragmentation. Constant comparison occurred between countries on the
Continent, a situation which may be difficult for Americans to imagine. At
this time cultural relativism was being invented and its implications thought
through. Modern humanistic ideology is largely responsible for our ability
to conceive of different conditions in each country as historical and cultural
rather than as more or less advanced; that is, it may be this line of thought
that moved us beyond notions of evolution.
Germmy had suffered the disruptions of the Reformation, the CounterReformation, and the Thirty Years War all during the seventeenth-century;
it was divided into 1,800 different territories with an equal number of
rulers. Among the elite, foreign influences dominated; in fact, most elites
spoke languages different from those in lower classes, making
communication impossible. Aristocrats imitated the court life at Versailles,
and these French habits were filtering through to the middle classes.
German writers not only used French as their medium of expression but
also adopted French and classical models to shape form and content.
Similarly, the language of the intellectuals was Latin, used exclusively in
the schools: during this period, Kant, in a revolutionary act, lectured in
German for the first time.
Through modern humanism, a shift in understanding had been
accomplished. Until that time, foreign influences were not seen as
demeaning but as uplifting what some saw as a backward culture. Germans
did not consider themselves as an autonomous culture, but instead the upper
and middle classes evaluated themselves in relation to other cultures which
they considered superior. Through modem humanism, Germans began to
conceive of themselves as having an independent and valuable cultural
heritage. Clearly, this shift occurring in the intellectual class was related to
the Enlightenment in France and Britain.
There was much intellectual and artistic exchange between these
countries. With the Enlightenment had come another set of abstract ideals
by which knowledge was measured, and what was not rational according to
this measurement was considered irrational and thus false. Herder revolted
HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM
53
against the Enlightenment and its emphasis on reason and argued for the
importance of the emotions, which united feeling with reason. Clark sums
up Herder's aim as being "the destruction of what may be called the caste
system in eighteenth century philosophic anthropology" (1955:249). Great
changes were occurring in the intellectual and the political worlds. The
French and American revolutions helped to characterize the period as a time
of action: the Sturm und Drang movement has been termed by Ergang, "the
German form of the French revolution" (1966: 192).
Many view Herder's work and involvement in intellectual movements
in a cursory way, emphasizing his association with great philosophers and
literary figures of his day, and overlook his profession as a preacher. Born
in East Prussia in 1744 to a poor family, he was able to develop a good
hand for calligraphy and came to work for his teacher, Trecho. Herder
began to satiate his desire for knowledge in Trecho's library. Through
Trecho, he met an officer who offered to support his medical training, but
Herder could not stand the sight of blood and so enrolled as a theology
student; legend has it that he was so poor that he survived on no money and
lived for some time on only bread and water.
Herder worked as preacher but his orthodoxy was often challenged,
despite his strong commitment to leading his congregation to spiritual
regeneration. He felt called to restore harmony between the world and the
will of God; he considered the absence of this harmony to be the origin of
spiritual degeneration of his day (Gillies 1945:58). And though his peasant
congregation did not always understand him and often wanted a more
orthodox approach, Herder delivered brilliant sermons (Gillies 1945:58).
Chronicler Alexander Gillies summarizes their content:
The existence of a divine purpose in the world, which is inscrutable and
cannot be fully revealed until the end; the activity of God throughout all
nature; the demand that life should obey the divine laws of nature, and fulfill
the puwers that have been given to it; the condemnation of sins,
unnaturalness, or a falling-away from God's purpose; a Peagian assumption
of the innate purity in man; the assertion that the one central factor in all
human effort is religion and that religion is founded upon revelation and
faith-all these are themes that Herder is constantly expanding and stressing.
(1945:62)
This message was not exclusively religious for Herder but penetrated each
subject he took up; he read widely and attempted to rebuild various areas
of study by giving them new spiritual and philosophical foundations.
All of Herder's vast work bore the same sub-structure: an examination
of humans as moral and spiritual beings. Herder assumed that people evolve
spiritually; he termed the ultimate end of this evolution Humanitat
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(humanity). "Humanity," he wrote, "is the character of our race . . . we do
not bring it ready-made into the world. But in the world it must be the goal
of our strivings, the sum of our exercises, our guiding value" (Herder
quoted in Wilson 1973:823). With this assumption, he proceeded with his
reinterpretation and formulated a dissertation which consciously included the
idea of humans having both purpose and destiny.
His conception of nature illustrated his assumptions; it was based on the
unification of different forms of knowledge. He saw, for example, no
reason why purely scientific investigation should embarrass religion, which
he considered the palladium of truth (Clark 1955:275). He saw nature as
"a universe filled with the spirit of God, progressively revealing Himself
and completing His work through nature and man" (Herder in Gillies
1945:54). Awareness of matter resulted from the recognition of this
omnipresence of divinity. "Through the similarity of the effects of this
'energy' or 'force' in nature to its effects in us we become aware, according
to Herder's psychology of 1778, of what we call matter" (Clark 1955:223).
God speaks to people through nature by analogy-that is, in understandable
terms. HerJer conceived of nature as an artist and therefore brought the
natural sciences more closely together with aesthetics, bridging the alreadyestablished dichotomy between science and art.
Nature, the greatest artist of all, economically re-uses its protoforms as the
human artist re-uses the fundamental structures of all art, and the over-all
effect is that of an ascending series culminating in man, who is thus akin to
all creation but not derived from it by any process of physical transformation.
(Herder in Clark 1955:306)
Herder conceptualized evolution as symbolic rather than temporal.
Just as in nature, Herder saw artistic genius in poetry, which was to
him the mechanism of the universe.
[For Herder] Shakespeare was more than divinely inspired; that he was
god-like, a creator in miniature, whose work followed and dustrated the same
process of Creation itself. . . . The poet's function is to make known God's
purpose; to interpret nature or the universe, of which he is a part, by making
it live again, by reconstructing and reproducing its modes of operation, by
re-creating it, as it were, before the eyes and ears of his fellow-men, so that
they may perceive and comprehend its workings. (Gillies 1945:49-50)
Herder similarly considered philosophical systems as poetry (Dichtung)
unless they could be applied (Clark 1955: 178).
He li !tied poetry with revelation in several ways. Herder suggested
that "poetry was originally theology, " but he later inverted this notion when
HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM
55
he conceptualized theology as poetry. "The oldest and most venerable
heathen poets, lawgivers, fathers and educators of mankind, Orpheus and
Epimenodes and all the fabulous names of early time, sang of the gods and
gave rapture to the world" (Gillies 194555). The Old Testament was for
him a kind of poetic folk song. "One can see," he wrote, "that I am not
here using poetry to mean falsehood; for in the realm of understanding the
significance of the poetically composed symbol is truth" (Herder in Clark
1955:297). Neither does he deny the possibility of the role of history in
shaping the quality and content of the poetry. The universe, for him, was
permeated by God: "history and revelation were thus identical" (Gillies
1945:54).
Clearly, there is difficulty in discussing one topic in isolation when
considering Herder's work. He made connections with disparate realms of
thought and aspects of man's nature that had not been central foci of the
Enlightenment. The superiority of reason over sensibility was challenged by
the new unity of being and purpose which Herder proclaimed. Herder's
arguments were persuasively shaped by his revolt against the
Enlightenment, for in a significant way its narrow-mindedness inspired him
to articulate a more comprehensive philosophy.
One of the best examples of his confrontation with a rationalistic
perspective is his criticism of Kant. Kant held that humans were animals
who needed a master; Herder posited, to the contrary, that "man is an
animal as long as he needs a master to rule over him; as soon as he attains
the status of a human being he no longer needs a master in any real sense"
(Herder in Barnard 1969:323). In this juxtaposition one can see Herder's
main counter-argument to Enlightenment thinking. Whereas the
Enlightenment had placed human beings at the peak of history-the dawn
of a new age, Herder reinstated the continuity of human life and joined
together what could not fit under the umbrella of pure reason-sensibility
and will. Thus, he automatically identified not only areas for action-the
arts, for example-but also a directive for the will, and an ultimate goal; he
preached the possibility that these three aspects of human experience could
become unified.
Unification is a central impulse in Herder's work and one of the goals
of modern humanism. Several authors have noted Herder's remarkable
similarity to Faust and suggested that Goethe must have based this character
in part on Herder; Goethe, in fact, did directly quote him. According to
Gillies, "Herder shows at this time more than a little affinity with Faust.
The desire to grasp the whole of the universe and to set forth its meaning
so as 'To help or convert a fellow creature [Faust]' is certain" (1945:61).
"His chief aim," writes historian Robert Ergang, "[is] to understand the
purpose and destiny of man as an inhabitant of this earth" (1966:82). To
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that end, Herder began by looking at mankind, placing him at the center,
in order to come to a new understanding.
In his early work Herder posited a new conception of the difference
between the human and the animal: the two were distinguished by the fact
that humans can speak. Language, for him, was the outward manifestation
of Bessonenheit (reflection), while reason was its internal function.
"Language is the real external, as reason is the real internal character
essential factor to our species" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:528). He did not
consider reason as a distinct faculty of mind, but indicated that reason could
be employed to different degrees: "But does thinking rationally mean the
same as thinking with fully developed reason? Does it mean that an infant
thinks reflectively or uses logic like a sophist at his desk? It is clear that
such an objection does not touch the mental power as such but only
different degrees of use" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:529). Through the
development of reason, people become creators and acquire a kind of
freedom within nature. "By virtue of 'Bessonenheit' every idea ceases to
be an immediate work of nature and becomes man's own work. No longer
an infallible machine of nature, man creates the motives and purposes of his
own constructive efforts" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:529). Again, Herder
extended the Enlightenment tenet of the human being as a perfected machine
of nature to include a will: "Knowledge without will is false and incomplete
knowledge . . . Impulse is the mainspring of being" (Herder in Schiitze
1925:536).
In his system Herder offered a primary unity of thought, will, and
feeling and so synthesized science and philosophy, two polar modes of
thought-rationalism which understood existence to be governed by nerve
processes, and vitalistic naturalism which defined being as governed by
impulse. He described sensibility, will, and thought as acting reciprocally
and argued that each always be interpreted in relation to the other two.
"Isolation of genetic conditions, of technique, subject matter, inherent
mental, moral, and aesthetic character, is contrary to the unity which
functions integrally throughout the activities of the living individual"
(Herder in Schiitze 1925:541). For Herder, sensibility led to knowledge
rather than threatened it: "We must conclude that the strongest passions and
impulse properly ordered, are merely the sensible outline of strong reason
within them" (Herder in Schiitze 1925:547).
Establishing the primacy of human aspects more directly associated
with feeling, Herder stated that the arts should not be based on clearly
defined models established by the reasoning self; that is, one need not
comply with classical rules. Indeed, he challenged the very heart of
Enlightenment thinking by suggesting that there are other sources of
HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM
57
knowledge beyond that of pure thought, ways of knowing which precede
reason.
This is therefore the principal law according to which nature has regulated
both faculties; namely, that feeling operates where perception cannot yet be;
that it introduces a great deal at once into the soul obscurely, so that this latter
may clarify it to some extent and discover thereby what its own existence can
achieve; that this takes place in the easiest and pleasantest possible way so that
the greatest possible amount may be perceived in the shortest possible time,
and the soul may be gently led forth outside itself in its operations, as if it
were operating in isolation and concerned only with itself. . . . In every
minute part of the infinite prevails the truth, wisdom and goodness of the
whole; in every perception, as in every feeling is reflected the image of God,
there with the rays or the brilliance of white light, here into which the
sunbeam is divided. . . . Honour therefore, the genius of mankind and seek
to serve it as purely as you can. (Herder in Gillies 1945:71)
Similarly, Herder conceived of reason not as distinct from feeling but
"nothing more than something formed by experience, an acquired
knowledge of the propositions and directions of ideas and faculties, to which
man is fashioned by his organization and mode of life" (Herder in Barnard
1969:264). Rather than viewing reason as an a priori faculty, Herder saw
it "as the accumulation or product of the impressions that are received, the
examples that are followed, and the internal power and energy with which
they are assimilated within the individual mind" (Herder in Barnard
1969:264-265).
Herder's philosophy of history was in effect an epistemological
inquiry. His process of reexamination hinges on two central principles: that
a people's knowledge is shaped by the environment, and-more difficult to
identify-that there is a divine will manifested through the process of
Creation, which has its end in Humanity. "Man considered as an animal is
the child of the earth and is attached to it as his habitation; but considered
as a human being, as a creature of Humanitiit, he has the seeds of
immorlality within him and these require planting in other soil" (Herder in
Barnard 1969:280). For Herder, people are at once animalistic and human,
and they strive to emphasize their humanity. Their mission is what Herder
calls "paligenesis [which] means . . . a purification and regeneration of our
whole life in this world as a means of winning a higher than earthly life"
(Herder in Gillies 1945:99).
Understanding the notion of continuity in Herder's work is vital to
comprehending his philosophies of history and nationalism. Edgar Schick
(1971) reads Herder's work as poetry, identifies the primary images of
organicism, and finds a continuity of thought and execution. Herder
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described the nature of thought, feeling, and will as being one and
articulated a system which united these impulses. Schick further illustrates
Herder's consistency of feeling and thought, but more interestingly
demonstrates the relationship between these two and the will. We have seen
how Herder found unity in every subject he approached, recasting each
according to his own longing and faith.
SummarizingHerder's understanding of the relationship between mind,
sensibility, and will, Schiitze draws the following conclusions: 1) Mind and
sensibility are one and can only be separated in words; 2) pure reason is a
delusion because it originates and remains in the sensibility and stays there;
3) ridding oneself of the sensibility does not liberate reason; 4) people
cannot demonstrate their own immortality; and 5) absolute being, or
immortality, is an article of faith, but faith generates its own truth from
sensibility rather than reason (1925:550). Faith is not excluded from
Herder's thought: it is instead the goal of human will. Thus, we can
understand the nature of his pedagogy and his concept of Humanitit, which
he claimed as the foundation of his work.
Herder's thoughts on history and nationalism have a tendency to
overshadow their foundation in modem humanism. His main impulse was
to synthesize disparate aspects of human knowledge and redefine knowing
as involvicg various facets of the personality and as being shaped by the
environment and the genetic force of Divine Nature. This process could be
called "crestive analogy," beyond mere analogy because it entails more than
the breaking down of boundaries between preformulated logical systems.
Infusing faith, longing, and will, Herder created a new relationship between
different aspects of thought, between preestablished dualisms. Frederick
Smith in Studies of Religion under German Masters characterizes Herder as
"the great master who led his way back into this ancient time" as captured
in the folk poetry he studied (Smith 1880:131). "Herder penetrated the
recesses of that time when sense and spirit were one, because this was the
secret of his own inward life. . . . All his labours, as philosopher,
theologian, critic, historian, and scientific inquirer, have this as their aim,
to bring man back to the point, whence he started as a child, of harmony
within himself and between himself and the universe around him" (Smith
1880:131-132). But Herder could not be called a primitive thinker, for we
tend to conceive the primitive as not choosing harmony consciously over
other forms of thought.
According to Gillies, Herder's own desire became problematic. The
harmony he consciously sought through his pedagogy did not correspond
with his own environment:
HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM
59
The trouble arose from Herder's strong pedagogic sense, from the desire to
criticize and to improve his own age, and ultimately, therefore, from his own
personal dissatisfaction. This clearly conflicted with his historical outlook, as
it had done before. Herder was always seeking deficiencies and striving to
eliminate them, always seeking and never finding harmony between himself
and the world. . . . Humanitiit was now Herder's consolation in the face of
contemporary shortcomings; he clung to it with great-but not
unshaken-optimism, and into it projected the qualities he missed so much
around him-peace, religion, sympathy, equity, reason, truth. He proclaimed
his doctrine, which rested on personal longing, as if it were the law of nature.
(Gillies 1945:93)
The nature of Herder's pedagogy was two-fold, critiquing the existing
social, political, intellectual, and spiritual situation as well as illustrating the
ideal process with which people need to establish contact. Inseparable from
these two tendencies, Herder suggested how to realize this pedagogy,
nowhere more frequently than in his discussions of the nation.
Herder's conceptions of nationalism and ideal culture were strongly
influenced by his reading of Giambattista Vico's Scienza Nuova. From Vico
he borrowed two significant ideas. He focused on the existence of different
historic ages, which evolve from one another in the continuity of history.
He also embraced the notion that each historical epoch forms an
independent cultural entity whose various parts are integrally related to form
an organic whole. Similarly, Herder borrowed from Montesquieu the idea
that cultural types are primarily determined by the physical environment in
which the nations are located. From these ideas emerged his philosophy of
history which assumes that history is "a stream that flows unceasingly
toward the ocean of humanity" (Herder in Ergang 1966:220). While
Aristotle had placed the city-state at the end of history, and Vico the
idealized civilization, Herder envisioned "Humanity" as the ultimate goal of
the historical process.
For Herder, history takes place in terms of organic entities of culture:
"Each age, each nation possesses an individuality, with temporal or local
characteristics, never to be repeated; it cannot be other than imperfect. It
cannot be judged by any standards other than its own, since they are equally
imperfect; it carries its own criterion within itself" (Herder in Gillies
1945:65). History is then "an account of ethnic groups or nationalities
considered as historical, genetic, organic entities. In each national group
there is an active power which, influenced by environment and tradition,
effects an orderly development or historical continuity" (Herder in Ergang
1966:220). One is not to study individuals or political events, but "all that
the nationalities did and thought" (Herder in Ergang 1966:220). The study
is to be undertaken by means of sympathy rather than abstract reasoning;
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the subject must be regarded "in the spirit of the age (Zeitgeist)" (Herder
in Ergang 1966:216).
This ideal notion of the nation as an organic unit proved particularly
challenging in the practical world. Other aspects of Herder's conception of
nationalism must be considered in close relation to his period. Again,
Germany had been exposed to many foreign influences. As Gillies states,
"The loss of Charles the Great's folksong collection, the Latin domination
of German culture in the Middle Ages, followed by the Renaissance and
Wars of Religion-had cheated German literature of its due, so weakened
it as to make it subservient to French literature, and made an irreparable
breach between the present and its own national past" (1945:Sl).
Meanwhile, contemporary thinkers considered nationality as an obstruction
to humanity. In all cases, Herder used nation to denote a cultural rather
than political distinction. Thus, the nation becomes the central factor in
human development but still not an end in itself. Opposing the shallow
individualism of his time, Herder clearly articulated how individual needs,
selves, and knowledge related to those of the group (Ergang 1966:248).
"For no one of us is by himself alone. The whole structure of man's
humanity is connected by a spiritual genesis-education-with his parents,
teachers and friends, with all the circumstances of life, and hence with his
countrymen and forefathers. Indeed, in the last analysis, he is connected
with the whole chain of the human species, since some links of this chain
inevitably come into contact with, and thus act upon, the development of
mental powers" (Herder in Barnard 1969:3 12-313).
With Herder's thinking about nationality he began to apply his whole
abstract epistemology to the concrete world: on this subject he united his
most idealistic thoughts and his criticism of contemporary trends. Between
these conflicting projects, he proposed techniques for bridging this gap
between the ideal and the practical. Even within his work he recognized,
and struggled over, the presence of conflicting impulses. In his early travel
journal, he showed himself tom between becoming "a man of action" or
pursuing his intellectual insights (Barnard 1969). Accordingly, he later
voiced concern about the effect and influence of his work-that is, whether
it had a substantial Wirhng-and wrote "complete truth is always and
exclusively action" (Clark 1955:230). Ultimately, both his activism and his
thought concentrated on the nation.
This activism could not have happened apart from his focus on culture;
Ergang outiines three main reasons for a lack of political interest at that
time. Government was monopolized by rulers; absolutism was common.
Conditions were poor, and minds were turned away: "Political resignation
seems to have been widespread." Writings were still censored at this time
(Ergang 1966:240). Intellectually, Herder challenged the Enlightenment
HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM
61
view that negated the cultural lines which he believed nature had drawn;
"the members of nationality and state are joined together by inner spiritual
bonds" (Ergang 1966:101). Herder proclaimed that these differences were
decreed by God and must be emphasized rather than ignored or erased
(Ergang 1966:92). "In contrast to the division of the German people and the
drab political affairs of his time, he [Herder] continually reminded the
German people of their common part and of the heritage which must be
preserved if German culture was to continue to exist" (Ergang 1966:23132). Preaching a doctrine of self-realization (at the level of nation), he
sought to "eliminate the boundaries between classes by stimulating the
national feeling, national consciousness" (Herder in Ergang 196652).
A nation's consciousness, thought Herder, should naturally produce its
own expressive forms; so the absence of a unique and explicitly German
literature troubled him. He explained Germany's lack of literature as a lack
of connection to its essential character and happiness:
Thus, from ancient times we have absolutely no living poetic literature upon
which our modern poetry might grow, as a branch upon a national stem;
whereas other nations have progressed with the centuries, and have shaped
themselves upon their soil, from native products, upon the belief and taste of
the people, from the remains of the past. In that way their language and
literature have become national, the voice of the people has been used and
cherished, they have secured more of a public in these matters than we
Germans have. We poor Germans were destined from the start never to
remain ourselves; ever to be the lawgivers and servants of foreign
nationalities, the directors of the fate and their battered, bleeding, exhausted
slaves. (Herder in Gillies 194552)
Ergang points out that Herder was the first to explain to the German people,
"in a way both large and impressive, the idea that literature is the
evolutionary product of national conditions" (Ergang 1966:190). Thus, he
not only identified the causes for the absence of literature but also, and
more importantly, hastened the advent of a cure. Herder states that "there
is no absolute poison in nature which might not on the whole be also a
medicament and a balm" (Ergang 1966: 198). Herder diagnosed the illness
(the lack of literature) as a result of Germany's breaking away from her
own cultural foundation; only a reconnection to this essential identity could
cure the nation.
To connect with this source of culture, people would have to identify
the most recent time in German history when the spiritual connection was
still present: the Middle Ages. Herder thus recreated the idea of the volk;
no longer were they the rabble of the streets, but "the body of the
nationality." This group, which had remained on its national foundations,
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was most in harmony with the national soul (Ergang 1966:195). Folklore
was the instrument of his social program; through this medium, one could
work to change the present situation. According to Ergang, Herder
suggested "that they go back to the sources of their own language and
literature and liberate the former power and noble spirit which,
unrecognized up to now, lie dormant in the documents of the national past"
(Ergang 1966:235). He described the native language as being "filled with
the life and blood of our forefathers" and thought that folklore was a
treasure to be unlocked to release its spirit and heal his nation (Ergang
1966:253).
The persistence of vestigal elements in culture is balanced by eternal rebirth
through 'evolutions' rather than revolutions, through orderly cyclic
progressions rather than through violent upheavals. It is the nature of culture
that institutions, long since outlived, manage to perpetuate themselves long
after loss of their functional value, while from the very embrace of senility
arises the promise of a new day. (Herder quoted in Clark 1955:363)
Here again, Herder observed the real workings of culture and contrasts this
reality with his ideal.
This contrast is even clearer in his thinking about relationships within
and between nations.
It is nature which educates families: the most natural state is therefore, one
nation, an extended family with one national character. . . . Nothing,
therefore, is more manifestly contrary to the purpose of political government
that the unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing of various races and
nationalities under one sceptre. (Herder quoted in Barnard 1965:324)
Although this statement easily could be read as foreshadowing a racist love
of "purity," Herder was in fact referring exclusively to the "unnatural
enlargement of states" taken up by government. His emphasis on the
importance of remaining on one's cultural foundation conflicted with his
goal of not becoming self-contained on the other. "It was not his goal,"
writes Ergang, "to make the German nationality self-contained. . . .
Although he was vehemently opposed to imitation of other nationalities, he
wished his countrymen to learn from the example of others, to emulate their
great achievements" (Ergang 1966:265). The borrowing, then, would
represent an improvement, a deeper understanding: Germans would not just
take on the ways of others but find their roots in humanity.
I walk through strange gardens merely to get flowers for my language, the
betrothed of my mode of thought. I see strange customs so that I may bring
HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM
63
mine, like fruits ripened by a foreign sun, as an offering to the genius of my
fatherland. (Herder in Ergang 1966:160)
Here Herder advocated a method for social action: he did not meditate on
the nature of Germany's penchant for imitation, but instead tried to conquer
it with his strict focus on the commitment to one's nation. Still the
foundation of his nationalism "was human brotherhood. . . he was driven
by the desire of . . . having them fulfill their mission to mankind" (Ergang
1966:263). However, he could only suggest preliminary steps to transform
his ideal into reality.
Schiitze suggests that Herder's basic purpose was to force people to
recognize the centrality of personality, of individuality; this individual is not
the shallow, isolated subject of the Enlightenment, but rather one formed
by cultural diversity and the depth of history. Herder's work strove to bring
this individuality into awareness; he encouraged his contemporaries to offer
up the richness of their culture simply because it belonged to them, and not
because it passed the test of some abstract and celebrated measurement. So,
his work focused on the nation, and he urgently identified ways in which
the individual consciousness could be re-awakened in terms of a cultural
heritage. In addition to the possibility of changing culture, Herder
recognized the importance of the individual.
It was during this period that the individual was first being recognized
as an entity. Psychology was just beginning as a science, and there is
evidence that Herder read widely in this area, expecting great things from
it (Clark 1955:93). So Herder emphasized change at both the national and
individual levels:
It is possible to overcome egolsm, whether this be innate or acquired from
one's environment, to free oneself from the irregularities of too singular a
condition, and, ultimately released from the peculiarities of the national,
temporal, personal taste, to grasp beauty wherever found, in all times and all
kinds of taste. . . He is initiated into the Mysteries of the Muses and of all
times and memories and works. The sphere of taste is unlimited as the history
of mankind. Its periphery lies through all the centuries and their works; its
center is he. (Schiitze 1925:521).
Herder's focus extends beyond culture: "The deepest foundation of our
being both in sensibility and in thought is individual" (Schiitze 192554243). Since the content of his sermons is not available to us, it is difficult to
say to what degree he tried to change individuals. But there is evidence that
he preached on the importance of a well-balanced life as a prerequisite to
work in the arts and sciences, so that a reform of life must precede a
reform of the arts (Gillies 1945:73). "The highest knowledge is undoubtedly
64
Folklore Forum 24:l (1991)
Lael Weissman
the art of living; and how many men have been robbed by their fine arts of
this one thing, this divine art" (Gillies 1945:73). Schutze's brand of modern
humanism involves four necessary components: genetic history, biological
growth, the social character of man, and the unity of these three in the
individual personality (Schiitze 1925549).
Herder came to his conceptualization of humanism by trying to correct
the narrow thinking of the Enlightenment and to effect change in his time.
He conceived of a holistic universe by applying the precepts of Leibniz and
Spinoza, creating a system which releases cultures from domination; thus
he unified these different forms of knowledge. In validating the experiences
of each culture, he also accommodated intuition, sensibility, and
intentionality.
Herder's vast but unifying thought has been taken in bits and pieces;
some have said his greatest contribution was the inspiration he gave to
Goethe, the Grimm brothers, and other contemporaries. Because German
romanticists took Herder's nationalism and adopted it for their own
purposes, our understanding of him is filtered through their perceptions
(Clark 1955:418). As we consider our own history as a discipline, we must
examine the entirety of our roots; we resist the inclination to isolate a single
application of a historical work and examine it out of context. The impulse
which preceded the "wedding with nationalism, " as Wilson calls it, is most
profoundly the pursuit of freedom-not in the American sense of civil
rights, not political per se-but cultural and individual, especially in the
sense of the inner life. For Herder, freedom could always be discovered in
culture, as there is onlyfreedom within law: "The first germ of freedom is
to perceive that one is not free, and to know the bonds by which one is
held" (Schiitze 1925:539).
To find freedom in our culture, we need to re-examine our intellectual
heritage, criticize the ways in which our predecessors applied their insights,
as well as understand the fullness and complexity of their inspiration. To
learn from Herder's difficulties, we must identify and acknowledge the
aspirations which guide our own work today. Three centuries have not
bridged the gap between the ideal and the practical.
References Cited
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HERDER, FOLKLORE, AND MODERN HUMANISM
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